



Stokle, Mark (2020) *The bankers of Brumaire: the financiers behind Napoleon's ascent*. PhD thesis.

<https://theses.gla.ac.uk/81723/>

Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author

A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge

This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission from the author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Enlighten: Theses

<https://theses.gla.ac.uk/>
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk

The Bankers of Brumaire: The Financiers behind Napoleon's Ascent



Mark Stokle

School of Humanities

College of Arts

University of Glasgow

April 2020

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

© Mark Stokle 2020

ABSTRACT

Napoleon Bonaparte's relation with bankers and military contractors is not the first aspect which springs to mind when one reflects on his rise to power. And yet, the support of the influential business lobby and its political allies played a determining role in his toppling of the Directory – the last French revolutionary government – on 18-19 Brumaire (9-10 Nov. 1799). Who then were these financiers who wielded such power? What was their relationship with Bonaparte and the directorial regime? And why did they forsake the Revolution and support the establishment of military dictatorship in France?

By adopting a financial perspective and exploring the opaque networks connecting businessmen, politicians and military leaders during the directorial period, this thesis develops new interpretations of revolutionary events and assesses the influence exerted by leading magnates over the state's political and economic policies.

The thesis begins with Napoleon's initiation in the business world by examining his financial apprenticeship with the *Armée d'Italie*'s civilian commissioners and private financiers during the 1796-1797 Italian Campaign. It then moves on to look at how elite banking circles reacted to moments of political crisis by conducting a detailed evaluation of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*'s activities – the leading Parisian discount bank under the Directory. This analysis draws on a wide range of previously unpublished material from the *Banque de France*'s archives and relies on little known records the Treasury was forced to publish following the outbreak of the notorious *Compagnie Dijon* scandal. A case study of Neuchâtel banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux is provided to illustrate how financiers remained at the heart of power from the Terror to the advent of the Napoleonic regime.

The second part of the thesis presents an extensive review of the military contracting system under the Directory, which is followed by five case studies of army suppliers (the Michel brothers, Michel Simons, Pierre-Louis Hanet-Cléry, Armand Seguin and the *Compagnie Bodin*). These demonstrate how corrupt business practices, exploitation of foreign territories and aggressive speculations on currency and real estate corrupted the Directory from within and left it at the mercy of a looming military takeover.

All these various facets of the activities of financiers converge in a final section which analyses Brumaire from a financial angle and traces the role of bankers in keeping Napoleon's regime afloat with cash advances and establishing the *Banque de France* as their reward. Extensive supporting information is provided in the Biographical Index, the appendices and a set of maps.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	
Table of Contents	
List of Illustrations	
List of Maps	
Acknowledgements	i
Author's Declaration	ii
List of Abbreviations	iii
Note on References & Date Conversions	viii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	
Introduction	3
Historiography & Previous Debates in the Field	6
Methodological Problems	17
Research Objectives & Approach	23
CHAPTER 2: BONAPARTE'S FINANCIAL APPRENTICESHIP IN ITALY	
Introduction	30
The Appointment of Saliceti as Civilian Commissioner	32
The Balbi Network & the Establishment of the Lombard Contribution	39
Bonaparte Decrees the Payment of his Troops in Hard Currency	47
The Conflict with Pinsot over the Lombard Contribution	51
The Conflict with the <i>Compagnie Flachet</i>	55
The Conflict with Garrau	61
The Rise of Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller	67
Conclusion	82
CHAPTER 3: THE CAISSE DES COMPTES COURANTS: HIGH BANKING UNDER THE DIRECTORY	
Introduction: The Projects for a National Bank in 1795-1796	89
The Establishment of the <i>Caisse des Comptes Courants</i>	100
Economic Realignment with Spain: Operating a Return to Hard Currency	110

The <i>Compagnie Dijon</i> Scandal & Coup of 18 Fructidor	113
The Monneron Scandal	125
The Second <i>Caisse des Comptes Courants</i> & the Crisis of Year VII	133
Conclusion	141
CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY OF JEAN-FRÉDÉRIC PERREGAUX	
Introduction	147
The Banker of British Residents and Elegant Ladies under the <i>Ancien Régime</i>	149
The Early Revolution	155
Surviving the Terror	160
Banker of the <i>Comité de Salut Public</i> & Thermidorian Convention	167
Perregaux's Role in Anglo-French Peace Negotiations under the Directory	172
Banker of Talleyrand's Secret Service	176
Relations with British Agents under the Consulate and <i>Premier Empire</i>	182
Conclusion	184
CHAPTER 5: MILITARY CONTRACTORS	
Introduction: The Military Contracting System under the Directory	188
The Michel Brothers	204
Michel Simons	214
Hanet-Cléry & the Invasion of Switzerland	230
The 1799 Schérer Scandal & the Contractor Armand Seguin	235
Brune, Fouché & the <i>Compagnie Bodin</i> in Italy	242
Conclusion	257
CHAPTER 6: BRUMAIRE & THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE <i>BANQUE DE FRANCE</i>	
The Financial Spark of Brumaire: The Forced Loan of Year VII	263
Lindet's Appeal to the Bankers & the Creation of the <i>Syndicat du Commerce</i>	269
The Conflict over Suspending Delegations	272
The Direct Involvement of Financiers in Brumaire	275
<i>Le Couteulx is Offered the Finance Ministry</i>	278

<i>Collot's House at Saint Cloud & Reminiscences on the</i>	
<i>Creation of the Consulate</i>	283
<i>The Dinner with Michel Simons at Meudon on 19 Brumaire</i>	288
<i>Ouvrard's Letter to Admiral Bruix</i>	289
Gaudin's Appointment as Finance Minister & the Forced Loan's Suppression	291
Bonaparte Convenes the Bankers at the Luxembourg (24 November 1799)	295
The <i>Vingt & Dix Négociants Réunis</i> (20 December 1799 & 9 March 1800)	299
Additional Emergency Measures to Raise Funds	302
<i>Negotiations with Foreign Powers</i>	302
<i>Lebrun Convinces Bonaparte to Suspend Delegations</i>	304
The Arrest of Ouvrard	308
The Foundation of the <i>Banque de France</i>	314
<i>The Banque de France is Established with Special Privileges</i>	314
<i>The Banque de France Absorbs the Caisse des Comptes Courants</i>	321
Conclusion	329
CHAPTER 7: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS	337
APPENDICES	
Note on Currency Equivalencies	355
Appendix I: A Note on Sources	356
Appendix II: Extracts from Napoleon's Letters to Joseph in 1795	380
Appendix III: The Finances of Bonaparte's 1796 Italian Campaign	386
Appendix IV: The <i>Caisse des Comptes Courants</i>	389
Appendix V: Inventory after Decease of Madame Perregaux (1794)	398
Appendix VI: Inventory after Decease of Jean-Frédéric Perregaux (1808)	415
Appendix VII: Summary of the Treasury's Operations with Financiers (1796-1797)	423
Appendix VIII: Issue & Sale of Batavian Rescriptions (4 July 1796-1 Feb. 1797)	439
Appendix IX: Diamonds Received & Pawned by the French Treasury (1794-1796)	442
Appendix X: Remittances Negotiated and Assignats Sold for the Treasury by Independent Agents in Foreign Markets (Year IV)	443
Appendix XI: The Schérer Scandal	445

Appendix XII: The <i>Compagnie Bodin</i>	450
Appendix XIII: Two letters denouncing thefts by General Louis Liger-Bélaïr	452
Appendix XIV: Members of the <i>Vingt & Dix Négociants Réunis</i>	455
Appendix XV: Founding Regents of the <i>Banque de France</i>	456
Appendix XVI: The French Treasury's Leading Creditors on 16 August 1801	458
Biographical Index	459
Bibliography	640

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1:1 Bonaparte in the <i>Cinq-Cents</i> at Saint Cloud, 10 November 1799	2
Figure 1:2 Costumes of the Directory's legislative, executive and military officers	6
Figure 1:3 Presumed Portrait of Antoine Barnave	8
Figure 1:4 Reproduction of a Portrait of Antoine Rivarol	8
Figure 1:5 The moneylender from the Palais Royal is beaten with sticks by the mob	14
Figure 2:1 Portrait of Joseph Bonaparte	35
Figure 2:2 Portrait of Lucien Bonaparte	35
Figure 2:3 Portrait of the Abbé Joseph Fesch	36
Figure 2:4 Portrait of Antoine Christophe Saliceti	36
Figure 2:5 The French Army led by Bonaparte crosses the Bridge at Lodi	40
Figure 2:6 The French Army enters Milan	40
Figure 2:7 The Revolt of Pavia	45
Figure 2:8 Portrait of Pierre Ansèleme Garrau	63
Figure 2:9 General Bonaparte as Commander-in-Chief of the <i>Armée d'Italie</i>	63
Figure 2:10 Portrait of Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller	69
Figure 2:11 The French Army led by General Berthier enters Rome	79
Figure 2:12 Proclamation of the Roman Republic	79
Figure 2:13 Portrait of Pope Pius VI (Giovanni Angelo Braschi)	80
Figure 3:1 Portrait of André-Daniel Laffon-Ladébat	96
Figure 3:2 Portrait of Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteux de Canteleu	96
Figure 3:3 The Heirs of the Constitution	99
Figure 3:4 A 100-franc <i>mandat territorial</i> promissory note	99
Figure 3:5 The three elder Monneron brothers	101
Figures 3:6 A 5 <i>sols</i> Monneron coin	101
Figures 3:7 Octagonal silver token of the <i>Caisse des Comptes Courants</i>	102
Figure 3:8 The Coup of 18 Fructidor V	118
Figure 3:9 Allegory of 18 Fructidor	118
Figure 3:10 A 500-franc note issued by the <i>Caisse des Comptes Courants</i>	135
Figure 3:11 A 1,000-franc note issued by the <i>Caisse des Comptes Courants</i>	135
Figure 4:1 Portrait of Jean-Frédéric Perregaux	148
Figure 4:2 Portrait of Adélaïde Praël de Surville, Madame Perregaux	151
Figure 4:3 Portrait of Hortense Perregaux, Duchesse de Raguse	152
Figure 4:4 Presumed Portrait of Alphonse Perregaux	152
Figure 4:5 Some of Perregaux's British Clients	157
Figure 4:6 Some of Perregaux's Female Clients	158
Figure 4:7 Chimney Project for the Banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux	166

Figure 4:8 Portrait of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord	183
Figure 4:9 Portrait of Pierre-Marie Desmarest	183
Figure 5:1 Two 80-franc rescription bonds issued for the 1795 forced loan	193
Figure 5:2 <i>What are you doing there?</i>	193
Figure 5:3 To Each his Turn	202
Figure 5:4 The Speculator's Triumph	202
Figure 5:5 Portrait of Mademoiselle Lange as Danaë	224
Figure 5:6 The Abbaye Saint Michel in Antwerp	227
Figure 5:7 Plan of the Abbaye de Saint Michel in Antwerp	227
Figure 5:8 Portrait of Barthélémy Louis Joseph Schérer	236
Figure 5:9 Portrait of General Guillaume Anne-Marie Brune	249
Figure 5:10 Portrait of Joseph Fouché	249
Figure 6:1 The 18 Brumaire: The Chamber of the <i>Cinq-Cents</i> at Saint Cloud	287
Figure 6:2 Portrait of Martin Michel Charles Gaudin	294
Figure 6:3 The Second Consul Cambacérès and Third Consul Lebrun	307
Figure 6:4 Portrait of Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard	311
Figure 6:5 Portrait of François Nicolas Mollien	319
Figure 6:6 The 100-franc Bonaparte note	333
Figure 6:7 Ah, how relieved I feel. Seven hundred and fifty were crushing me!	335

Cover Illustration: *La séance de Saint Cloud* by Jean-Baptiste Le Sueur, c.1799-1800,
 © Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet/CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain.

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1: The Financial Exploitation of Northern Italy, 1796-1799	73
Map 2: The Financial Exploitation of Southern Italy, 1796-1799	256
Map 3: Financiers of Northern France	772
Map 4: Financiers of the Atlantic Seaboard	773
Map 5: Financiers of the Mediterranean Seaboard	774
Map 6: Financiers of the Lyon Area	775
Map 7: Financiers of the Seine Basin	776
Map 8: Financiers of the Rhineland	777
Map 9: Swiss Financiers	778
Map 10: Belgian Financiers	779
Map 11: Commercial Networks in the Baltic & North Seas	780
Map 12: Financiers of the Ile de France	781
Map 13: Leading European Financiers	782
Map 14: The Political Sections of Paris	783

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institutions.

All translations from original source documents are my own work unless otherwise referenced.

Signature: _____

Printed name: Mark STOKLE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to extend my thanks to my two supervisors – Dr. Michael Rapport and Professor Thomas Munck. This thesis very nearly did not get off the ground, its research proposal having initially been declined by a number of academics. But Dr. Rapport immediately expressed a keen interest in my topic and granted me the opportunity to write the thesis for which I am extremely grateful to him. His enthusiastic feedback and characteristic *bonhomie* were an uplifting source of inspiration throughout my studies. I am also particularly indebted to Professor Munck for his unfaltering commitment to guiding my research and expending so much time in reading through all the chapter drafts and voluminous supplementary material. His diligent instruction and incisive criticism have immeasurably improved the quality of my work and enlivened many productive and stimulating discussions. Likewise, I am beholden to Mr. Graham Parker and the late Mrs. Jennifer Dupras for generously providing me with references to apply for doctoral courses.

During my three years of research, I made extensive use of several libraries and archival repositories in France. My thanks go to all the staff of the *Archives nationales* at the *Centre d'accueil et de recherche des Archives nationales* (CARAN) in Paris and at the site in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, as well as to the kind and attentive staff at the *Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris*. My heartfelt gratitude goes to Mrs. Pradeux at the *Pôle Gestion et archivage des documents* [PGAD] of the *Banque de France's Service du Patrimoine historique et des archives* for orientating and assisting me with numerous documents. To Mr. Jean Bral of *Renault Histoire* – who sent me Jean Mercier's article on Armand Seguin – and Professor Joel Felix for his advice at the outset of my research, I am equally obliged.

My family encouraged me and provided moral support at every step of the way. My sister Wendy was a veritable godsend and helped me digitally format the entire thesis. Many hours were spent in her kitchen and country house working on my laptop. My brother Paul and his partner Sandra helped me move to Phoenix during the last weeks of my degree and endured a typing statue in their living room! David, my other brother, was supportive of my work from the very beginning, as was my nephew Baxter who kindly proofread some of my chapters while completing his own PhD.

Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my parents. My mother, Brigitte, has been gone for many years now. But my father, Dr. Norman Stokle, played a determining role in encouraging me to pursue my interest in history and sadly passed away during my studies. I miss them both dearly and hope this work stands as a fitting tribute to their memories.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AAE* *Archives des Affaires étrangères* (Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
- ABF* *Archives de la Banque de France* (Archives of the French National Bank).
- ADB* Vandal, Albert, *L'Avènement de Bonaparte*, 2 vols., Paris: Librairie Plon, 1902-1907.
- AG* *Archives de la Guerre* (Archives of the French Ministry of Defence).
- AGRB* *Archives générales du Royaume de Belgique* (National Archives of Belgium).
- AN* *Archives nationales* (French National Archives).
- AP* *Archives de la Ville de Paris* (Archives of the City of Paris).
- APE* Révérend, Albert, *Armorial du Premier Empire: Titres, Majorats et Armoiries concédés par Napoléon I^{er}*, 4 vols., Paris: Alphonse Picard & fils, 1894-1897.
- BFC* Payard, Maurice, 'Bonaparte et le fournisseur Collot', *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, janvier-juin 1935: 129-143.
- BL Add. MS* *British Library Additional Manuscript*.
- BN* *Bibliothèque Nationale de France* (French National Library).
- BNMPDE* Bergeron, Louis, *Banquiers, négociants et manufacturiers parisiens du Directoire à l'Empire*, Paris: Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), 1995.
- CIOCN* *Correspondance inédite, officielle et confidentielle de Napoléon Bonaparte. Avec les cours étrangères, les princes, les ministres, et les généraux français et étrangers. En Italie, en Allemagne, et en Égypte*, 7 vols., Paris: C.L.F. Panckoucke, 1819-1820.
- CN* *Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}*, publiée par ordre de l'empereur Napoléon III, 32 vols., Paris: Henri Plon/J. Dumaine, 1858-1870.
- CRDECS* *Comptes rendus au Directoire exécutif par le citoyen Schérer, ex-ministre de la Guerre, pour l'an VI et les cinq premiers mois de l'an VII*, Paris: Chez Dentu, an VII.
- DPF* Robert, Adolphe; Edgar Bourlonton & Gaston Cougny (eds.), *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français. Depuis le 1^{er} mai 1789 jusqu'au 1^{er} mai 1889*, 5 vols., Paris: Bourlonton, 1889-1891.

- FLSP* Waresquiel, Emmanuel de, *Fouché, les silences de la pieuvre*, Paris: Tallandier, 2014.
- FSBDF* Archives de la Banque de France, dossier 1069200901/1, *Founding Statutes of the Banque de France*, 24 & 27 pluviôse VIII/13 & 16 Feb. 1800.
- GPR* Bruguière, Michel, *Gestionnaires et profiteurs de la Révolution : L'administration des finances françaises de Louis XVI à Bonaparte*, Paris: Olivier Orban, 1986.
- Grenville Papers* Grenville, William Wyndham (Lord), *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore*, 10 vols., London: Historical Manuscripts Commission (Series 30), 1892-1927.
- HFF* Marion, Marcel, *Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715*, 6 vols., Paris: A. Rousseau, 1914-1931.
- HPRF* Buchez, Philippe-Joseph-Benjamin & Prosper Charles Roux, *Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française*, 40 vols., Paris: Paulin, 1834-1838.
- HSD* Fabre (de l'Aude), Jean-Claude, *Histoire secrète du Directoire*, Tome III, Paris: Ménard, 1832.
- LBBF* Jacoud, Gilles, *Le billet de banque en France, 1796-1803*, Paris: Éditions de L'Harmattan, 2000.
- LBM* Iung, Théodore (ed.), *Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires, 1775-1840*, 3 vols., Paris: Charpentier, 1882-1883.
- LBPF* Lüthy, Herbert, *La Banque protestante en France : de la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 3 vols., Paris: Les réimpressions des Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), 1998.
- LCAD* Godechot, Jacques, *Les Commissaires aux armées sous le Directoire : contribution à l'étude des rapports entre les pouvoirs civils et militaires*, 2 vols., Paris: Fustier, 1937.
- LCPST* Mathiez, Albert, *La Corruption parlementaire sous la Terreur*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1917.
- LCST* Blanc, Olivier, *La corruption sous la Terreur : 1792-1794*, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1992.
- LDAEPR* Masson, Frédéric, *Le département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787-1804*, Paris: Plon, 1877.

- LDPE* Guyot, Raymond, *Le Directoire et la paix de l'Europe*, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1911.
- LFARR* Stourm, René, *Les finances de l'Ancien Régime et de la Révolution*, 2 vols., Paris: Guillaumin et cie., 1885.
- LERE* Blanc, Olivier, *Les espions de la Révolution et de l'Empire*, Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1995.
- LFC* Stourm, René, *Les finances du Consulat*, Paris: Guillaumin et cie., 1902.
- LFO* Payard, Maurice, *Le financier G.-J. Ouvrard, 1770-1846*, Reims: Académie nationale de Reims, 1958.
- LFSD* Lefebvre, Georges, *La France sous le Directoire : 1795-1799*, Paris: Terrains/Éditions Sociales, 1984.
- LMAP* Bouchary, Jean, *Les Manieurs d'argent à Paris à la fin du XVIIIe siècle*, 3 vols., Paris: Marcel Rivière & Cie., 1939-1943.
- LMFRFSE* Antonetti, Guy (ed.), *Les ministres des Finances de la Révolution française au Second Empire. Tome I : dictionnaire biographique, 1790-1814*, Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France (CHEFF), 2007.
- LMML* Stern, Jean, *Le mari de Mademoiselle Lange, Michel-Jean Simons (1762-1833)*, Paris: Plon, 1933.
- LPG* Branda, Pierre, *Le Prix de la gloire: Napoléon et l'argent*, Paris: Fayard, 2007.
- LRE* Mathiez, Albert, *La Révolution et les étrangers*, Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1918.
- LTLD* Lefebvre, Georges, *Les Thermidoriens/Le Directoire*, Paris: Armand Collin, 2016.
- MC* *Minutier Central des Notaires* (Notarial Archives at the French National Archives).¹
- MJR* Lescure, Mathurin-François Adolphe de (ed.), *Mémoires sur les Journées Révolutionnaires et les Coups d'État*, 2 vols., Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1875.
- MSH* Las Cases, Emmanuel de, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, 2 vols., presented & annotated by Joël Schmidt, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1968.

¹ References for these documents are arranged as follows: MC (Minutier Central) / ET (*étude* – ‘study’) / # of the notarial study in Roman numerals / # of file.

- NBCG-1* Lentz, Thierry (ed.), *Napoléon Bonaparte : Correspondance générale. Tome I : Les apprentissages 1784-1797*, Paris: Fayard/Fondation Napoléon, 2004.
- OMFACD* Archives nationales, C//504, dossier 394/2 – *Observations du ministre des finances sur l'affaire de la Compagnie Dijon*, 29 prairial V/17 June 1797.
- ORCEP* Lebrun, Charles-François, *Opinions, rapports et choix d'écrits politiques*, Paris: Bossange père, 1829.
- PFDR* Lhomer, Jean, *Perrégaux et sa fille la duchesse de Raguse*, Paris: Imprimerie générale Lahure, 1905.
- PPRTSD* Aulard, François-Alphonse, *Paris pendant la réaction Thermidorienne et sous le Directoire, recueil de documents pour l'histoire de l'esprit public à Paris*, 5 vols., Paris: Librairie Léopold Cerf/Librairie Noblet/Maison Quantin Éditeurs, 1898-1902.
- PSC* Aulard, François-Alphonse, *Paris sous le Consulat*, 4 vols., Paris: Librairie Léopold Cerf, 1903-1909.
- PSPE* D'Hauterive, Ernest, *La Police secrète du Premier Empire, 1804-1810*, 5 vols., Paris: Perrin, 1922-1964.
- PVEDAABDF* Archives de la Banque de France, dossier 1069200401/284, pièce 7 – *Procès-verbal et extrait de la deuxième Assemblée des Actionnaires de la Banque de France, tenue à Paris, dans le local de l'Oratoire, 27 pluviôse VIII/16 Feb. 1800*.
- PVRCA-1* Archives de la Banque de France, dossier 1069200402/1 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 1^{ère} société), *Procès-verbal des réunions du conseil d'administration, 14 Vendémiaire an V – 9 Nivôse an VII (5 octobre 1797 – 29 décembre 1798)*.
- PVRCA-2* Archives de la Banque de France, dossier 1069200402/22 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 2^{ème} société), *Procès-verbal des réunions du conseil d'administration, 11 Nivôse an VII – 30 Pluviôse an VIII (31 décembre 1798 – 19 février 1800)*.
- RACSP* Aulard, François-Alphonse, *Recueil des actes du Comité de Salut Public*, 27 vols., Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1899-1933.
- RADE* Debidour, Augustin, *Recueil des Actes du Directoire exécutif (procès-verbaux, arrêtés, instructions, lettres et actes divers)*, 4 vols., Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1910-1917.

- RCACD* Archives nationales, C//504, *Rapport de Camus sur l'affaire de la Compagnie Dijon et pièces y relatives*, 18 germinal V/7 April 1797.
- RCBF* Szramkiewicz, Romuald, *Les Régents et Censeurs de la Banque de France nommés sous le Consulat et l'Empire*, Genève: Librairie Droz, 1974.
- RCLD* Archives de la Banque de France, dossier 1069200402/32 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 1^{ère} société), *Registre de copies de lettres-départs*, 20 frimaire an VII – 29 ventôse an VIII (10 décembre 1798 – 20 mars 1800).
- RDAGA-1* Archives de la Banque de France, dossier 1069200402/1 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 1^{ère} société), *Registre des délibérations de l'Assemblée générale des actionnaires : du 11 messidor an IV au 30 frimaire an VII (29 juin 1796 – 20 décembre 1798)*.
- RDAGA-2* Archives de la Banque de France, dossier 1069200402/23 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 2^{ème} société), *Registre des délibérations de l'Assemblée générale des actionnaires (2ème Société) : du 10 nivôse an VII au 27 pluviôse an VIII (30 décembre 1798 – 16 février 1800)*.
- RDCGRBF-1* Archives de la Banque de France, dossier 1069201116/1, *Registre des délibérations du Conseil General de Régence de la Banque de France. Tome 1 : Du 29 pluviôse an VIII au 1er vendémiaire an XI, 8 ventôse VIII/27 Feb. 1800*.
- SMJHS* Saisie Michel-Jean et Henry Simons (Archives générales du Royaume de Belgique).
- TRPTAF* *Troisième Recueil des papiers trouvés dans l'armoire de fer au Château des Tuileries, pièces imprimées d'après le décret de la Convention nationale du 5 décembre 1792*, 2 vols., Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1^{er} janvier 1793.
- UACAFMJ* Aude, André-Félix, *Un ancien châtelain d'Azay-le-Ferron. Michel jeune, 1771-1852*, Paris: Charles Bosse, 1931.
- USDD* Zylberberg, Michel, *Une si douce domination. Les milieux d'affaires français et l'Espagne vers 1780-1808*, Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France/IGPDE, 1993.

NOTE ON REFERENCES & DATE CONVERSIONS

References to documents in the French National Archives

The French National Archives – the *Archives nationales* – are commonly referred to by the abbreviation ‘AN’. Its records are classified in ‘sub-series’ (*sous-séries*) which are generally organised chronologically, although there are some important exceptions. The AF/II series contains documents from the National Convention, the AF/III series holds files from the Directory, the AF/IV series is devoted to the Consulate, etc. (see Appendix I).

Each record in a sub-series is further sub-divided into dossiers or ‘*plaquettes*’ – booklets. Occasionally, large dossiers are broken down in a set of sequential *plaquettes*.

Finally, each dossier or *plaquette* is comprised of a series of numbered documents – known as ‘*pieces*’. These can be decrees, correspondence, petitions, contracts, payment orders, etc. – often classified according to the state ministries which issued them or to whom they are addressed (interior, finance, justice, war, and so forth). However, sometimes the documents in a dossier or *plaquette* are not numbered and so the only way to identify them is by their title, date or author(s).

For practical purposes, I have translated all document titles from French into English in the text of the thesis. All document titles are listed in the original French in the bibliography.

Since it can rapidly become tedious and wordy to list the entire reference for each document, I have opted for the following abbreviated system:

AN / # of Sub-Series / # of Dossier / # of *Plaquette* : *pièce* # if available / title / date.

Thus, typical examples would include:

AN, AF/III/72, dossier 291, *plaquette* 1, *Clarke to the Directory*, 30 frimaire V/20 Dec. 1796 (no *pièce*/document number).

AN, AF/III/148A, dossier 695:9, *Contractual Agreement between the National Treasury and the Compagnie Flachet, Laporte et Castelin*, 19 messidor V/7 July 1796.

AN, AF/III/345, *plaquette* 1555:49, *Project for a national bank addressed by Jean-Baptiste Paulée to the Directory*, 15 pluviôse IV/4 Feb. 1796.

References to notarial documents in the French National Archives

The French National Archives have a special division exclusively dedicated to notarial archives called the *Minutier Central des Notaires* – abbreviated as ‘MC’. A notarial study – or *étude* – is abbreviated as ‘ET’, and each notarial study is allocated a Roman numeral. Thus, references for notarial documents are arranged as follows:

MC (*Minutier Central*) / ET (*étude* – ‘study’) / # of the notarial study in Roman numerals / # of file / date.

A typical example would be: MC/ET/XLV/661, 5 vendémiaire VI/26 Sep. 1797.

Date Conversions

The French revolutionary calendar devised by Fabre d'Églantine can be extremely confusing for the uninitiated. I have therefore adopted a dual dating system for each document with a revolutionary date, listing both the revolutionary and Gregorian formats. Hopefully, this will help readers avoid having to continuously refer back to a conversion table.

There is also a very handy website which automatically converts revolutionary dates into Gregorian dates or vice versa:

http://www.poissons52.fr/histoire/revolution1789/calendrier_v.php.



CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION





Figure 1:1

General Bonaparte in the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents* at Saint Cloud, 10 November 1799
by François Bouchot, 1838, Château de Versailles

© RMN (Réunion des Musées Nationaux) – Grand Palais

Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org> (uploaded with colour enhancement by 'Rosalinamund')

CC BY-SA 4.0 licence

The 18 Brumaire was the day when the faction of the generals, allied with that of the thieves, toppled the republic. – Louis-Marie de La Révellière-Lépeaux¹

Introduction

The coup of 18-19 Brumaire (9-10 November 1799) marks a decisive turning point in French history. It was the moment when Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Directory and seized power in a military putsch, bringing ten years of revolutionary upheaval in France to a close. All scholars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era are familiar with the political events surrounding this famous episode. But one aspect of the Brumaire plot which has received far less attention is the role played by financiers in its funding and support. A *coup d'état* requires money to reward conspirators, cash to finance logistical operations and bribes to convince those who do not willingly accept the new order. Yet Bonaparte did not dispose of sufficient pecuniary assets to pay for all these costs himself. He was therefore forced to solicit business leaders to help subsidise his operation.²

While evidence implicating capitalist circles in Brumaire remains exceedingly opaque, their involvement is confirmed by the presence of financiers in Napoleon's entourage during the coup, and by the recollections of bonapartist supporters and works of successive generations of historians. "*I did not doubt [Napoleon's] success, for I perceived about him the most powerful of auxiliaries – money,*" recalled Pierre-Louis Roederer, the former advisor of Louis XVI turned Brumarian conspirator.³ Adolphe Thiers, who praised Napoleon as a champion of liberal values, acknowledged that "*the rotten party*" – as pro-business deputies were disparagingly referred to – "*was disposed to serve Bonaparte.*"⁴ Writing a century after the event, Albert Vandal of the *Académie Française* claimed "*shady dealers could smell the enormous bargain.*"⁵ The royalist historian Jacques Bainville concurred, affirming that "*one thing which the plot does not appear to have lacked was money.*"⁶

Most scholars agree that merchant aristocrats supported Brumaire because they wished to enshrine the Revolution's abolition of monarchical privileges and its enormous transfer of landed wealth from the nobility to the bourgeoisie – what Jacques Godechot called the

¹ La Révellière, *Mémoires*, Tome III, Paris: Plon, 1895, p.333.

² Thierry Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, Paris: Jean Picollec, 1997, p.241 – Most of Napoleon's wealth was invested in real estate and thus neither readily accessible nor easily movable.

³ Roederer, *Œuvres*, Tome III, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1854, p.295.

⁴ Thiers, *Histoire de la Révolution française*, Tome X, Paris: Furne & Cie., p.342.

⁵ Vandal, *L'avènement de Bonaparte*, Tome I, Paris: Plon, 1902, p.246 (hereafter 'AdB').

⁶ Bainville, *Le Dix-huit brumaire*, Paris: Bernard Giovanangeli, 1998, p.36.

“irreversible options” of 1789.⁷ Incidentally, British intelligence had reached the same assessment well before the coup took place. In a report dated 13 November 1796 Lord Malmesbury – commenting on his visit to Paris in preparation for the Lille conference – noted “*the formation of a party of nouveaux riches*” whose interests would lead them to seek to establish “*a type of government which shields their persons and their assets from the dangers which have been threatening proprietors for many years.*”⁸

Such observations raise significant questions regarding the impact of business on the late revolutionary era and Napoleon’s rise to power. What was the relationship between Bonaparte and the leading capitalists in France? Who were these financiers? What influence did they exert over the Directory’s political and economic policies? Why did some of them collude in the Revolution’s downfall and the establishment of a military dictatorship? Does this not challenge the traditional perception of liberal elites as a progressive force backing democratic reform? And on a more fundamental level, could adopting an economic perspective to such questions help us elucidate complex revolutionary events which are not easily explained by political or social factors?

These interrogations are all the more enticing when one considers how little research has been undertaken on the links between politicians, military officers and financial magnates during the Directory. We know this was an age of rampant corruption and decadence which witnessed the unbridled privatisation of public markets – when wealthy businessmen once proscribed under the Terror flaunted their wealth in Parisian salons and much of the state’s hard currency supply – along with nearly all military provisions – were outsourced to private enterprise.⁹ A passage from the memoirs of Fabre de l’Aude – a deputy of the *Cinq-Cents* and close advisor to director Paul Barras – illustrates the venality of these times:

...I received superb financial propositions. I was offered to quintuple my fortune if I would only speak to [Bonaparte]. A financier who was more forthright than his colleagues...told me: “In what kind of times do you think we find ourselves? The dyke of honour has been broken and is breaking water from all sides. We are entering positive times...An era in which stoic virtue will be booed, where wise men will never refuse a coin and will sell themselves to the government and its subordinates for a couple of écus. It will be up to those who can inflate their wallets the most. Poor devils who cling to probity will be mocked. The greatest of thieves

⁷ Godechot, ‘Sens et importance de la transformation des institutions révolutionnaires à l’époque napoléonienne’, *Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, Tome XVII, juillet-septembre 1970, p.795.

⁸ Albert Sorel, ‘Les négociations avec l’Angleterre en 1796’, *Journal des savants*, mars 1902, p.130.

⁹ The three ‘muses’ of the Directory, for instance, were all connected to prominent financiers. Juliette Récamier was married to Lyon banker Jacques-Rose Récamier. Joséphine de Beauharnais was close to Rouen banker Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx and to the *Compagnie Bodin*; and Madame Tallien (Thérèse Cabarrus) was the daughter of François Cabarrus, a leading Bayonne merchant who had founded the Spanish National Bank (*Banco de San Carlos*) in 1783.

will become persons of interest, and those who refuse to pillage with the others will be suspect.”¹⁰

Even Joseph Fouché was perfectly forthcoming about his deals with contractors during this period:

My friends pressed me to follow the example of several of my former colleagues who...had obtained interests in military supply contracts through the protection of the directors. A company presented itself, I associated myself with it and obtained – through Barras – a share of its supplies.¹¹

What these testimonies reveal is that the Thermidorian and Directorial periods – far from constituting mere transitional phases – were in fact a crucial economic crossroads of the Revolution; for it was during this short window of time that networks of politico-financial collusion which had covered under Robespierre’s administration re-emerged and big business reasserted its dominance over the economy. Jean-Jacques Régis de Cambacérès, the linchpin of the Convention’s legislative committee, set the tone in a famous speech delivered two weeks after 9 Thermidor declaring the Revolution had not ended but was embarking upon a new liberal phase to enact the freedoms gained in 1789 through a wider devolution of powers. “*The revolutionary government can be considered as the Palladium of the Republic. We should be careful not to impede its rise,*” he proclaimed, before issuing a thinly-veiled warning to those who still believed personal fortunes undermined egalitarian principles: “*Let us attach ourselves to the nation, and not to individuals.*”¹² The deputy Antoine-Clair Thibaudeau observed how rapidly this *laissez-faire* spirit and the complicity of vested interests resurfaced in *bourgeois* circles:

Wealth was no longer a crime, luxury gradually reappeared...It was after 9 Thermidor that I truly made my entrance into what is known in Paris as ‘society’...I was sought out as all members of the Convention who had made a name for themselves. To accept an invitation was to beget ten more...I gave in to these considerations. The ‘golden salons’ – that was how those of the old nobility were called – exercised immense influence. Revolutionaries were not lured there for their personal merit or pleasant company. They were only caressed and fêted to obtain services or corrupt their opinions. They were besieged by all sorts of seductions and mocked behind their backs. That was the order of things. But many could not see it...¹³

¹⁰ *Histoire secrète du Directoire*, Tome III, Paris: Ménard, 1832, p.390-391 (hereafter ‘HSD’).

¹¹ Fouché, *Mémoires*, Paris: Tempus/Perrin, 2015, p.70-71 – see Chapters 2, 3 & 5 for more on Fouché’s links to contractors.

¹² AN, AD/XVIII/13 – *Opinion de Cambacérès sur l’organisation des Comités*, 24 thermidor II (quoted in Pierre Vialles, *L’Archichancelier Cambacérès*, Paris: Perrin, 1908, p.142-143). Cambacérès opposed Cambon’s proposal that individual committees should continue to submit their projects to the Convention’s central committee.

¹³ Thibaudeau, *Mémoires sur la Convention et le Directoire*, Tome I, Paris: Baudouin frères, 1824, p.128-129 & 137-138.



Figure 1:2

Costumes of the Directory's legislative deputies (*Conseil des Cinq-Cents* and *Conseil des Anciens*) and executive directors (top row), and portraits of the generals commanding French republican armies on land and by sea (bottom row) by an unknown artist, directorial period, Musée des Civilisations de l'Europe et de la Méditerranée, Marseille
 © RMN-Grand Palais/MuCEM
 Photo: Jean-Gilles Beruzzi/<https://www.photo.rmn.fr> (authorised for non-commercial use)

Is it really mere coincidence, then, that this juncture marks the precise moment when we lose track of what was happening in financial circles and that serious information gaps in the records of government economic policy and Treasury dealings begin to appear? Let us see how previous historians have approached these issues and traced the encroachment of financial interests in public affairs during the Revolutionary era.

Historiography & Previous Debates in the Field

Debates surrounding the influence of business over French revolutionary events are not new. In fact, several revolutionaries discussed this matter in their writings. Antoine Barnave, the *feuillant* leader who owed much of his early career to the Grenoble banker Claude Périer, remarked in his memoirs that: “*If there is nothing in a state above commerce and wealth, the merchant who no longer has anything to gain from private life*

will consider seizing the common weal, and this is why we have the bourgeois aristocracy!”¹⁴ For Barnave, the idea that capitalism and the entrepreneurial class inherently supported democratic reform was entirely relative. Since the culmination of a merchant’s career was reached upon his ennoblement, what the bourgeoisie really represented was “*an aristocratised version of democracy.*”¹⁵

The royalist auteur Antoine Rivarol shared these sentiments, noting that the preservation of corrupt speculative practices which had inflated France’s national debt had been a prime motivator in the Revolution’s outbreak. Hadn’t one of the National Assembly’s first decrees on 17 June 1789 placed this debt “*under the safeguard of the honour and loyalty of the French nation*”?¹⁶ Rivarol didn’t mince his words when it came to ‘capitalists’:

*...It was vile interest that made Paris rise in revolt...Sixty thousand capitalists and the anthill of speculators determined it by devoting themselves to the National Assembly the day it declared the government’s debts under the safeguard of French honour and loyalty; for it was not a constitution that the capitalists expected from the Estates General, it was a guarantee.*¹⁷

While the importance of these financial interests was recognised by the forefathers of revolutionary history, their analysis was long marginalised by a focus on political and military developments. It wasn’t until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the first biographies of financiers appeared, such as Victor Seilhac’s monograph on the Abbé d’Espagnac;¹⁸ George Lenôtre’s account of the baron de Batz’s conspiracy;¹⁹ and Jean Lhomer’s book on the Neuchâtel banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.²⁰ These works mainly centred on the role of financiers in well-known revolutionary episodes or in shaping public institutions and did not develop much of a cross-disciplinary approach, even though they did reveal important details on mercantile activities.

¹⁴ Barnave, *Œuvres*, Tome II, Paris: Challamel & Cie., 1843, p.141 – Barnave had been a leading voice in the Day of Tiles and at the Estates of the Dauphiné held in Périer’s château of Vizille on 21 July 1788.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Marcel Marion, *Histoire Financière de la France depuis 1715*, Tome II, Paris: Rousseau et Cie., 1919, p.5.

¹⁷ Rivarol, *Mémoires*, Paris: Baudouin frères, 1824, p.234-235 – Rivarol is one of the few revolutionaries who is quite explicit about the roles of financiers in the Revolution’s outbreak: “*The capitalists, through whom the Revolution started, were not so difficult when it came to constitutional matters...They were well aware that, in its present state, France was incapable of paying them – and it is in this sense that they wished it to be free. They also knew that the struggle would be to the death between Paris and the rest of the kingdom; but they decided to take a risk. They therefore helped the people and the National Assembly seize control, on condition that everything be reserved for them.*” (*ibid.*, p.186-187).

¹⁸ Le Comte Victor de Seilhac, *L’abbé Marc-René d’Espagnac*, Tulle: Imprimerie Crauffon, 1881 – See d’Espagnac’s entry in the Biographical Index.

¹⁹ Lenôtre, *Un conspirateur royaliste pendant la Terreur : Le baron de Batz*, Paris: Perrin, 1896 – See Batz’s entry in the Biographical Index.

²⁰ Lhomer, *Perrégaux et sa fille la duchesse de Raguse*. Paris: Imprimerie Lahure, 1905 (hereafter ‘PFDR’).



Figure 1:3
Presumed Portrait of
Antoine-Pierre-Joseph-Marie Barnave
by Joseph Boze, 1791, Musée Carnavalet
© Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain.



Figure 1:4
Reproduction of a Portrait of Antoine Rivarol
by Johan Melchior Wyrsh, 1784
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
(uploaded by 'Julian Felsenburgh')
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain.

Similarly, the earliest economic studies of the Revolution were principally oriented on general policies and trends rather than the composition and wealth of business elites. The first work to really advance a socioeconomic perspective – Jean Jaurès’s *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française* – remains a classic of revolutionary studies which pioneered the approach ‘from below’ by concentrating on how social and economic factors affected peasant farmers and urban labourers; but it did not dissect the financial establishment nor cover the directorial period.²¹ Incidentally, it was in Napoleonic hagiographies that financiers initially featured most prominently. René Stourm, for instance, produced an authoritative review of the financial measures Bonaparte enacted after Brumaire which he claimed had rescued the French economy from the Directory’s calamitous policies;²² while Albert Révérend’s collection of encyclopaedias listing all French peerages awarded from the *Premier Empire* to 1908 traced the genealogy of several financiers and still constitutes a vital record of Napoleon’s ennoblements.²³

Perhaps the most notable of these early works was Albert Vandal’s study of the 18 Brumaire which was the first source to highlight the importance of politico-financial networks in the coup.²⁴ With characteristic republican zeal, Vandal decried “*the military contractors who cleared out millions supplying our soldiers with outdated rifles and expired foodstuffs, the profiteers who made timely gains during speculative crazes, the winners of the battle of the assignats.*”²⁵ He also stressed how the greed and nepotism of these financiers had generated a society of extreme wealth disparity exhibiting a “*scandal of contrasts*”;²⁶ and that they constituted a caste apart:

*The prominent financier has privileged access to the Luxembourg Palace, speaks haughtily in the ministries, dominates the bureaucracy, bribes deputies by giving them a share in his companies...He is endowed with prodigious power because he possesses that rare commodity which has disappeared and is sought after and invoked like an unknown god: money...He snatches this money from taxpayers’ pockets by virtue of delegations awarded by the state. He seizes it at the mint by pretexting outstanding government debts.*²⁷

²¹ Jaurès, *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française*, 4 vols., Paris: Rouff, 1901-1907 – re-edited in 7 vols. by Éditions sociales, 1967-1973.

²² Stourm, *Les finances du Consulat*. Paris: Guillaumin, 1902 (hereafter ‘LFC’).

²³ Révérend, *Armorial du Premier Empire*, 4 vols., Paris: Alphonse Picard & fils, 1894-1897 (hereafter ‘APE’) / *Titres, anoblissements et pairies de la Restauration, 1814-1830*, 6 vols., Paris: Honoré Champion, 1901-1906 / *Titres et confirmations de titres. Monarchie de Juillet à la 3^e République (1830-1908)*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1909.

²⁴ See footnote 5.

²⁵ Vandal, *AdB*, Tome I, p.52.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p.54.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p.53.

But it wasn't until the eve of the First World War that Albert Mathiez took a real interest in the corruption of the Revolution's politico-financial networks. Mathiez observed that economic difficulties had forced the National Assembly to undertake vast projects: the creation of *assignats*, the sale of *biens nationaux* and *biens d'émigrés*, the supplying of armies in goods and equipment, etc. – all of which gave rise to “*an enormous business current and the most brazen speculations.*”²⁸ Combining his flair for detective work with a prosopographical approach to Jacobin deputies, he emphasised how financiers and their political allies had understood real power lay in the National Assembly's commissions and committees; and noted how speculators discreetly acted through intermediaries to avoid publicity. Contrary to Jaurès, Mathiez believed power relations in socioeconomic conflicts should be analysed from above and expounded this view in a series of ground-breaking articles on Danton, describing the bribes he received from the king's civil list as well as his embezzlements during Dumouriez's Belgian campaign.²⁹ At a time when Jacobins leaders were being introduced to every French schoolboy as models of republican virtue, these articles constituted something of a revelation. Information Mathiez uncovered in financial and police records resulted in the publication of a great deal of material including two articles on the banker Perregaux (whom he identified as a sponsor of Brumaire);³⁰ a volume exploring corruption during the Terror;³¹ a study of the 1794 *Compagnie des Indes* scandal;³² and a tome on foreign nationals in the Revolution.³³ These works have influenced numerous scholars, notably Olivier Blanc and his excellent studies on revolutionary corruption and espionage.³⁴

Mathiez had begun writing a history of the Directory when he died suddenly in 1932. Fortunately, his interests were taken up by one of his most gifted pupils – Jacques Godechot. Godechot's thesis on the Directory's civilian commissioners – the successors of the *représentants-en-mission* who oversaw military finances – was a pioneering study which expanded Mathiez's work by examining the Directory's corrupt networks in foreign

²⁸ Mathiez, *Autour de Danton*, Paris: Payot, 1926, p.226.

²⁹ See ‘Danton et la liste civile.’ *Annales Révolutionnaires* (hereafter ‘AR’), 7 (1), janvier-février 1914: 98-111; ‘Danton et l'or anglais’, AR, 8 (2), mars-avril 1916: 167-172; ‘Danton, Talon, Pitt et la mort de Louis XVI,’ AR, 8 (3), mai-juin 1916: 367-376; ‘Danton et Durand’, AR, 11 (2), mars-avril 1919: 141-159; ‘Danton, Delacroix et le pillage de la Belgique’, *Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française* (hereafter ‘AHRF’), 2 (10), juillet-août 1925: 384-390 and ‘Danton : L'Histoire et la légende.’ AHRF, 23, septembre-octobre 1927: 417-461. See also Gabriel Piore, ‘Sur la fortune de Danton (d'après les minutes inédites des notaires parisiens)’, AHRF, 141, 1955: 324-343.

³⁰ ‘Le Banquier Perrégaux.’ AR, 11 (2), mars-avril 1919: 242-252 and ‘Encore le banquier Perrégaux’, AR, 12 (3), mai-juin 1920: 237-243.

³¹ *La corruption parlementaire sous la Terreur*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1917 (hereafter ‘LCPST’).

³² *Un procès de corruption sous La Terreur : L’Affaire de la Compagnie des Indes*. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1920.

³³ *La Révolution et les étrangers*, Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1918 (hereafter ‘LRE’).

³⁴ See Blanc, *La corruption sous la Terreur : 1792-1794*. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1992 (hereafter ‘LCST’) & *Les espions de la Révolution et de l'Empire*. Paris: Perrin, 1995 (hereafter ‘LERE’).

occupied lands.³⁵ Accurately reconstructing the acrimonious conflicts which had pitted army officers and contractors against civilian administrators, Godechot demonstrated how the pillaging of foreign countries had undermined directorial authority – not only abroad but also in France – as revenue generated by military campaigns increasingly entangled foreign policy with legislative and economic agendas. Thus, Mathiez and Godechot were among the first scholars who rejected the mainstream narrative depicting French revolutionaries as benevolent exporters of democracy, pointing out that many were in fact corrupt demagogues.

Godechot was forced to go into hiding during World War II and it fell to Georges Lefebvre – another Mathiez disciple – to produce the first comprehensive studies on the Directory.³⁶ Lefebvre was heavily influenced by Godechot's research and embraced his pan-European analysis of directorial vulnerabilities. He contended the same economic and foreign policy issues which had united bourgeois factions in overthrowing Robespierre had led to sectarian infighting during the directorial era and emphasised it was against this background the rise of financiers should be viewed. Lefebvre was the first to examine the influence of big business in the Directory's economic policies, noting how the abolition of nationalised currency had engendered a deflationary spiral which accentuated the government's dependency on the private sector. As early as 1796, the National Treasury was already asking bankers and speculators to raise money by contracting bills of exchange in foreign markets which were repaid by pawning state assets and outsourcing public markets.³⁷ In Lefebvre's eyes, corruption had set in because the Thermidorians had abolished the controlled economy without making any plans to replace it.³⁸ It was the nature of the system itself, he argued, which fuelled the greed of financiers:

Military contractors were not all dishonest despite popular opinion, but they were businessmen. They took advantage of the situation to exaggerate their profits when they could. And doubtless many were not averse to illicit manoeuvres. While they complained about civil servants, they were the first to corrupt them to ensure their fraudulent deliveries were accepted. They did not hesitate to bribe politicians and win over all those they approached to secure regal markets.³⁹

³⁵ Godechot, *Les commissaires aux armées sous le Directoire*, 2 vols., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1941 (hereafter 'LCAD').

³⁶ Lefebvre, *La France sous le Directoire, 1795-1799*, Paris: Terrain/Éditions Sociales, 1984 (originally published 1942-1943) (hereafter 'LFSD') and *Le Directoire*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1946 – republished with Lefebvre's study on the Thermidorians as *Les Thermidoriens/Le Directoire*, Paris: Armand Colin, 2016 (hereafter 'LTLD').

³⁷ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.117.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.156

³⁹ Lefebvre, *LTLD*, p.250.

As a historian of *structures sociales* Lefebvre was wary of ideology, considering that what people believed had happened (or had not happened) was more important than what had actually occurred.⁴⁰ This explained, for instance, why the fear of a resurgent Jacobin regime had so terrified business in the lead-up to Brumaire. It also accounted for the public's perception of the Directory as a corrupt and degenerate regime – an image carefully cultivated to praise Bonaparte even though he had been unable to resolve these problems.⁴¹ Adhering to Tocqueville's argument that the nobility had started the Revolution in reaction to absolutism, Lefebvre saw the Directory as the period when the foundations of an 'aristocratic republic' had been laid – a compromise solution in which power was shared with the bourgeoisie in exchange for the upholding of property rights.⁴²

The 1930s and 1940s were an exciting time for economic research in the Revolution which produced several notable studies on financiers and private companies. These included André-Félix Aude's biography of the notorious Michel brothers;⁴³ Jean Stern's book on the Belgian contractor Michel-Jean Simons;⁴⁴ and Charles Poisson's volume on the *Directoire des achats* – the agency established on 4 November 1792 which oversaw the National Convention's awarding of military contracts and foreign trade.⁴⁵ In 1931, Marcel Marion completed the first retrospective of the French economy to include a full overview of the directorial period.⁴⁶ Marion presented a scathing indictment of the Directory's budgetary and economic policies supported by meticulously researched descriptions of the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal, the financial background to the 18 Fructidor coup and *biens nationaux* speculations. Unfortunately, he did not delve extensively into price fluctuations, private banking, or the composition and wealth of business elites.

One of the most significant contributions of this period was Jean Bouchary's *Les manieurs d'argent à Paris à la fin du XVIIIe siècle*.⁴⁷ This panoramic and innovative survey which

⁴⁰ Richard C. Cobb, 'Georges Lefebvre', *Past & Present*, 18, November 1960, p.60 – This interpretation was especially important for conspiratorial themes.

⁴¹ Lefebvre, *LTLD*, p.250.

⁴² See Lefebvre, 'La Révolution française et les paysans', *AHRF*, 56, 1933: 97-128.

⁴³ Aude, *Un ancien châtelain d'Azay-le-Ferron, Michel jeune, 1771-1852*, Paris: Charles Bosse, 1931.

⁴⁴ Stern, *Le mari de Mademoiselle Lange, Michel-Jean Simons (1762-1833)*, Paris: Plon, 1933 (hereafter 'LMMML').

⁴⁵ Poisson, *Les Fournisseurs aux armées sous la Révolution française. Le Directoire des achats 1792-1793, J. Bidermann, Cousin, Marx-Berr*. Paris: A. Margraff, 1932 – Poisson used the City of Paris archives as his main source because the papers of the agency's three directors were lost. He highlighted the leading role played by Swiss textile manufacturer Jacques Bidermann in the agency's dealings and noted how Dumouriez had attempted to dissolve it and appoint his henchmen, the Abbé d'Espagnac, to oversee military supplies instead. The agency was dissolved in 1795 prior to the advent of the Directory when military supplies reverted to being outsourced to private contractors.

⁴⁶ Marion, *Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715*, 6 vols., Paris: Rousseau et Cie., 1914-1931 (hereafter 'HFF').

⁴⁷ Bouchary, *Les Manieurs d'argent à Paris à la fin du XVIIIe siècle*, 3 vols., Paris: M. Rivière, 1939-1943 (hereafter 'LMAP').

included many foreign bankers was the first study to view financiers as an entirely separate focus group and attempt to assess their overall impact on revolutionary events. Bouchary's research confirmed speculators had only reluctantly subscribed to the Revolution's new ideas out of a fear of bankruptcy;⁴⁸ and that most promptly disappeared after the monarchy's downfall because:

It was imprudent to admit that one was rich when common people were queuing in front of bakeries and butchers and could voice their anger at the rostrum of the assembly; it was imprudent to admit that one traded with England, Holland or Spain when diplomatic relations were broken and the cannon blazed; it was imprudent to admit that one speculated on exchange rates, on currency and gold, and that one's fortune increased with the depreciation of the assignat and price rises when the guillotine was permanently installed.⁴⁹

Invigorated by these advances, economic historians began to explore the roots of revolutionary commerce. Chief among these was Herbert Lüthy and his magisterial two-volume examination of the 'Huguenot International of Banking' extending from the revocation of the Edict of Nantes to 1794.⁵⁰ Relying heavily on notarial archives and adopting a sociological approach, Lüthy retraced the careers of the great protestant merchants (Samuel Bernard, Isaac Thellusson, Jacques Necker, Isaac Panchaud, etc.). By focusing on the mechanics and networking of financial systems, he demonstrated how bankers became indispensable fundraisers for the French monarchy and benefitted from the privatisation of France's national debt. Lüthy's work heralded a period of renewed interest in revolutionary businessmen which yielded books like Maurice Payard's biography of Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard;⁵¹ Guy Antonetti's volume on *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.*;⁵² and especially Romuald Szramkiewicz's encyclopaedic tome on the Regents and Censors of the *Banque de France* which regrouped a wealth of information and underscored the prominence of the French National Bank's founding Regents in revolutionary economics, politics and intellectual life.⁵³

A major breakthrough was achieved with Louis Bergeron's *Banquiers, négociants et manufacturiers parisiens du Directoire à l'Empire* – the first detailed investigation of

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, Tome I, p.8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.9.

⁵⁰ Lüthy, *La Banque protestante en France : de la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 2 vols, Paris: SEVPEN, 1959-1961 – re-edited in 3 volumes in 1998 (hereafter 'LBPF').

⁵¹ Payard, *Le financier G.-J. Ouvrard, 1770-1846*. Reims: Académie nationale de Reims, 1958 (hereafter 'LFO').

⁵² Antonetti, *Une maison de banque à Paris au XVIII^e siècle, Greffulhe, Montz & Cie : 1789-1793*, Paris: Cujas, 1963.

⁵³ Szramkiewicz, *Les régents et censeurs de la Banque de France nommés sous le Consulat et l'Empire*, Genève: Droz, 1974 (hereafter 'RCBF').

N^o 195.



Le Marchand d'Argent batonné

Le Samedi un des Vendeurs d'Argent du Palais Royal s'étant présenté sur la place fut surpris par le peuple et battu d'importance à coup de Canne et si la Garde ne l'eut tiré des mains de ceux qui lui administraient si galamment les intérêts de l'action indigne comme la veille par un de ses Camarade qui poignarda un jeune homme à la sorti du Palais Royal il eut péri indubitablement mais à une meilleure rencontre

A la Lanterne les Marchands d'Argent à la Lanterne

2885

Figure 1:5
 The moneylender from the Palais Royal is beaten with sticks by the mob
 Engraving by an unknown artist, 1790
 © Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

Parisian speculative and commercial networks from the Directory to the *Premier Empire*.⁵⁴ This study not only reviewed financiers of the Directory but also explored how their business activities were indicative of longer trends – notably the transition from an economy based on land ownership and colonial trade to an industrial model. Disputing the conventional wisdom that the dawn of the industrial era had destabilised economic systems, Bergeron concluded there had been no antagonism between physiocratic interests and emerging capital markets because they had in fact worked hand-in-hand.⁵⁵ To support his line of reasoning, he relied heavily on geographical and spatial themes, emphasising how the Revolution centralised banking and merchant trading in Paris at the expense of regional hubs like Lyon and Orléans.⁵⁶ Bergeron also undertook an examination of private banking under the Directory including the activities of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* – the leading Parisian discount bank – and used his findings to showcase how the Revolution’s concentration of financial capital enabled Paris to fund industrial development.⁵⁷ These factors of concentration also explain why the directorial period constituted the swan song of military contractors and colonial merchants who were replaced as suppliers of public credit by banks and state institutions in the Napoleonic era.

While Bergeron’s work viewed the growth of capitalism and industrial development within a limited timeframe, other scholars like Fernand Braudel adopted a broader perspective and evaluated these trends from their sixteenth century roots.⁵⁸ Braudel drew a distinction between the ordinary market economy affecting the general population and the lucrative activities of business elites which operated above the market and represented the real domain of ‘capitalism’. He believed financiers were organised in “*active social hierarchies*” which “*steered exchanges to their advantage, undermined the established order...created anomalies, ‘turbulences’ and conducted their affairs by extremely particular means. At this higher level, a few great merchants...could shape entire sectors of the European or even global economy. These groups of privileged actors were engaged in networks and calculations which the common man ignored.*”⁵⁹

Many of Braudel’s arguments are relevant to the study of financiers under the Directory. His contention, for instance, that it was in the interest of capitalists to keep their dealings

⁵⁴ Bergeron, *Banquiers, négociants et manufacturiers parisiens du Directoire à l’Empire*, Paris: Mouton, 1978 – re-edited in 1995 by the EHESS (hereafter ‘BNMPDE’).

⁵⁵ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.9.

⁵⁶ For more on the economic centralisation around Paris, see Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, chapters 7-9.

⁵⁷ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.319 – The sale of the Anzin coal mines to the bankers Le Couteulx, Périer and Sabatier in 1795 was a clear precursor of this trend. See chapter 3.

⁵⁸ Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme*, 3 vols., Paris: Armand Colin, 1979.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, Tome I, p.8.

opaque and that their strategies were not based on competition but rather on securing monopolies over entire sectors of the economy – to “gather in a single hand the wealth of all merchandise.”⁶⁰ This certainly applied to financiers of the late Revolution who monopolised the supply of entire armies and the Treasury’s provision of hard currency. Moreover, the companies they directed were “regularly set up with the connivance of the state” because “the quest for an international monopoly was the objective of all great trading nodes.”⁶¹ Governments – or more accurately certain high-ranking officials (including Napoleon) – supported the creation of these monopolies because they benefited from them politically and economically. Braudel also emphasised the most important characteristic of financiers was their flexibility which meant they did not specialise in any single field. Specialisation was a trait of the lower orders while capitalists had to adapt to grasp new profit-making opportunities.⁶² As economic historian Immanuel Wallerstein pointed out, Braudel’s reconceptualisations of capitalism challenged the notion that enlightenment ideas constituted progress.⁶³ Had the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods really marked the break with feudalism and emergence of the bourgeoisie, or had this already occurred centuries before with families like the Medici, the Fuggers, the Welsers, etc.? And by the same token, couldn’t traces of feudalism be detected in industrial practices?

Most research on financiers in the last forty years has sought to balance this long-term outlook with a shorter-term analysis. Michel Bruguière, for instance, published a landmark study focusing on the continuity of *Ancien Régime* financial administrators which highlighted their unaccountability and desperate struggle to preserve their privileges.⁶⁴ Other works have explored the evolution of financial networks in regional contexts;⁶⁵ while Pierre Branda’s recent overview of Napoleon’s relation to money, although principally centred on the consular and imperial periods, contains an excellent chapter on the finances of the Egyptian Campaign.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.368 – Braudel quotes the sixteenth century Augsburg historian Konrad Peutinger (*bona et merces omnes in manum unam deportare*).

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p.370-371.

⁶² *Ibid*, p.335.

⁶³ Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Braudel on Capitalism, or Everything Upside Down’, *Journal of Modern History*, 63 (2), 1991, p.359.

⁶⁴ Bruguière, *Gestionnaires et profiteurs de la Révolution : L’administration des finances françaises de Louis XVI à Bonaparte*. Paris: Olivier Orban, 1986 (hereafter ‘GPR’).

⁶⁵ See Michel Zylberberg, *Une si douce domination. Les milieux d’affaires français et l’Espagne vers 1780-1808*, Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France/IGPDE, 1993 (hereafter ‘USDD’) and Mathieu de Oliveira, *Les routes de l’argent: Réseaux et flux financiers de Paris à Hambourg: 1789-1815*, Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France/IGPDE, 2011.

⁶⁶ Branda, *Le Prix de la gloire: Napoléon et l’argent*, Paris: Fayard, 2007 (hereafter ‘LPG’).

Methodological Problems

One would think that a hundred years of economic research would have produced a reasonably accurate balance sheet recapitulating the finances of the revolutionary period, but sadly this has not been the case. We simply can't put a final tally on how much the depreciation of the *assignat*, the bankruptcy of two-thirds and the liquidation of imperial arrears cost state finances. Nor can we establish how effective the revolutionary taxation system really was, or how much money the exploitation of foreign conquests contributed to French coffers. We don't even precisely know what type of commercial exchanges the Revolutionary government had with foreign countries and intermediaries, nor how important the development of paper money and bills of exchange was in foreign trade. In short, French public finances before and after 1789 are a black hole;⁶⁷ and this makes any attempt to compute the wealth and fortunes of financiers extremely difficult.

Two fundamental reasons account for this knowledge gap – the destruction of state records and the individual prejudices of historians. The financial victors of the Revolution – the *Ancien Régime* officials and *nouveaux riches* speculators who served Bonaparte but rallied to the Bourbon restoration – accumulated vast fortunes through unscrupulous methods. They did not wish to see evidence of their misdemeanours languish in public archives, and thus when Gaston d'Audiffret was appointed *directeur de la comptabilité générale* in 1814, he immediately ordered “*the removal from the Treasury's central bank of all fictive documents ('pièces fictives') which represented promissory notes of payment or compensation,*” conserving only the hard currency in its accounts and real assets in its portfolios.⁶⁸ This liquidation resulted in the incineration of practically all the Revolution's financial archives conserved at the National Treasury including *assignats*, bonds of the national debt (*bonds des deux-tiers*), expired obligations, demonetized coins and mobile assets. A second devastating blow was administered during the uprising of the Commune on 24 May 1871 when several Parisian repositories were destroyed including those of the finance ministry, the *Cour des comptes*, the *Conseil d'État*, the *Palais de Justice* and the *état civil*. These unfortunate incidents have bereaved us of most documentation on the Parisian revolutionary bourgeoisie including many marriage contracts, successions and fiscal information. Moreover, the few surviving economic files in public registers are neither well-known nor have been fully explored.

⁶⁷ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.15-16.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.166-167 & 185 – See Charles-Louis-Gaston d'Audiffret, *Souvenirs de ma famille et de ma carrière dédiés à mes enfants, 1787-1878*, edited by Michel Bruguière & Valérie Goutal-Arnal, Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2002.

This leaves private archives – such as those of banks and companies – but many of these have either failed to preserve their early records or refuse to communicate them to the public. Business groups can be notoriously secretive about their history and often prefer to publish hagiographical versions of their past. Caution often leads them to suspect prying researchers of only being interested in controversy, and they frequently decline requests to open their archives on the justification this would compromise trade secrets – even if they don't have a skeleton in the closet – or invoke various other pretexts.⁶⁹ Thus, any historian delving into revolutionary finance is confronted by a number of seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

The study of revolutionary financiers has also given rise to all sorts of problematic and subjective interpretations which highlight the difficulty of establishing a balanced framework to assess them. Nineteenth century historians who idolised the Revolution as a general uprising against absolutist oppression were loath to recognise that several *girondin* and *montagnard* deputies were in cahoots with speculative interests, received bribes from the monarchy or were even implicated in foreign conspiracies. By the same token, the Napoleonic legend is still alive and well in many establishment circles which prefer to remember l'*Empereur* as the heir of the Revolution and founder of modern France rather than as a ruthless opportunist whose associates included some of the most venal profiteers of his time. Many scholars also fail to emphasise that circumstances changed during the Revolution. While it could legitimately be argued that financiers were protecting themselves from the guillotine by funding various political factions during the Terror, can this explanation really hold sway under the Directory when they dominated the economy and no longer risked their heads? Furthermore, not all financiers were operating on an equal playing field. There was a world of distance separating the select group of magnates who reigned over banking and military contracting – the subject of this thesis – from the mass of common merchants who conducted ordinary business with the state, many of whom actually went bankrupt during the directorial era. Let us therefore keep in mind it really is neither fair nor objective to tar all financiers with the same crooked brush.

In truth, it is difficult to think of entrepreneurs as gravitating in a well-defined 'system' precisely because the Revolution had completely overhauled political, economic and social structures and was in the process of defining new ones. Things were unpredictable and there were no rules – and this was the source of tremendous apprehension on the part of business circles which yearned for stability. Historians of revolutionary finance are

⁶⁹ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.7.

therefore forced to constantly oscillate between micro-economic analysis and the wider theme of questioning how political considerations were fundamentally impacting the French economy. As one historian observed:

*Writing the history of business and of businessmen – at least in [France] and for that time period – pre-supposes a taste for conjecture, recourse to imagination and the accepted risk of extrapolation... In the end, whether it concerns family or business relations, types of activities and operations, costs and profits, strategies and decisions, one is never sure to have seen more than just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to big business.*⁷⁰

Inevitably, the question arises of whether financiers supported Napoleon because they truly believed he would initiate reforms and negotiate peace or simply because he was the man “whom circumstances had rendered necessary and who was needed to win.”⁷¹ Likewise, we may also enquire if Bonaparte really intended to let businessmen orchestrate economic recovery or merely wished to exploit them for his own ends. These issues are difficult to elucidate since not all financiers shared similar objectives. While bankers yearned for a return to peace and market stability, military contractors actively lobbied for an extension of hostilities which would guarantee them new supply contracts. Furthermore, as Gilles Jacoud’s study on the history of bank notes has shown, the demise of the Revolution’s nationalised currencies plunged the banking community in a convulsive struggle pitting the great Parisian bankers against the capital’s middling bourgeoisie for control of paper money.⁷² This conflict revolved around the issue of who had the right to sign bills of exchange presented for discounting operations. Prominent banks like the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* refused to discount bills which were not audited and countersigned by a banker – a requirement denounced by poorer merchants as the ‘tyranny of the third signature’.⁷³ Although discussing these conflicts is not our prerogative, the reader should be aware they had an impact on Brumaire; for Bonaparte undoubtedly played on the fears of the banking elite to gain their support in exchange for certain guarantees, notably the establishment of the *Banque de France*.

We should also be careful not to jump to conclusions and accredit “*the unsubstantiated hypothesis of a capitalist conspiracy associating ‘a wall of money’ with the ‘two hundred [wealthiest] families’*” as one commentator recently observed.⁷⁴ It is no secret Bonaparte was contemptuous of financiers and of contractors in particular – as his imprisonment of

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.7-8.

⁷¹ Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, Tome I, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1891, p.271.

⁷² Jacoud, *Le billet de banque en France: 1796-1803*, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000 (hereafter ‘*LBBF*’).

⁷³ See Chapter 3.

⁷⁴ Arnaud Manas, ‘Le Mythe des Trente Deniers de Brumaire’ in Pierre Branda (ed.), *L’économie selon Napoléon*, Paris: Vendémiaire, 2016, p.80.

Ouvrard after Brumaire proved. Madame Campan even noted he forbade Josephine any relation with contractors, telling her: “*I consent that you should dine with bankers, who are money merchants, but I don’t want you to see contractors, for they are thieves.*”⁷⁵

To compensate the dearth of financial archives, historians have often inclined towards an excessive reliance on statistics because these are erroneously perceived as the only reliable economic indicators still readily available. Yet this is to forget that official government figures are open to manipulation and subjective interpretation like any other measuring device. Moreover, financial data from the Revolution can be particularly deceptive. When one examines the account sheets of ‘contributions’ raised by Bonaparte’s *Armée d’Italie*, for example, these are mostly listed as round sums for individual cities or regions without any further indication concerning the origin of these funds or the method of their collection. Treasury files present similar discrepancies. A researcher might be presented, for instance, with a set amount of Batavian rescriptions issued to financiers for a given year, but with no additional clarification as to how or why they were allocated. Bankruptcy records too must be treated with caution because they frequently mislead observers by tampering with numbers to downplay or dissimulate grievous financial losses. Ironically, the archives of private banks and companies – many of which were managed by *Ancien Régime* experts or foreign specialists (i.e. the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*, *Le Couteulx & Cie.*, etc.) – tend to display far more rigorous bookkeeping. Reviewing the correspondence of bankers and merchants as well as logs of general assemblies of shareholders and administrative board meetings of private firms presents one valuable way of verifying investments and profits; but historians must be careful not to draw generalisations too hastily since each deal or banking operation reflects a unique profile in a specific context.

Lack of sources has also tended to concentrate research on individuals instead of business groups. This is one of the principal reasons why economic historians have often been scorned by mainstream economists who consider that a narrative emphasis does not engage in enough modelling and hypothetical testing.⁷⁶ But genealogical and prosopographical approaches are vital to establish a social dimension to financiers and often provide crucial complementary evidence which is lacking in official records. Tracing relations between individuals and assessing their reach and influence is therefore an essential skill in reconstructing the politico-financial networks of the Directory.

⁷⁵ Campan, *Journal anecdotique*, Bruxelles: P.J. de Math, 1825, p.78 – Fouché (*Mémoires*, p.127) says Bonaparte often referred to the business lobby as “*the rotten party*” because of its affiliation with Barras.

⁷⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘A Theory of Economic History in Place of Economic Theory?’, *Revue Économique*, 42 (2), mars 1991, p.174-175.

Economic historians have drawn on a variety of sources and developed a multitude of techniques to evaluate the fortunes and business dealings of revolutionary financiers. Perhaps the best and most authoritative chronicles available to us are the records of Parisian notarial studies. Being shrewd businessmen, financiers protected their contracts, marriages, partnerships and real estate deals by having them legally registered and witnessed. This confers a certain homogeneity to notarial documents. Unfortunately, they are also among the most difficult sources to exploit due to the dispersal of acts across a wide range of files and time periods. Scholars can spend days skimming through endless logs with references which are often unclear and sometimes purposefully designed to drive the inquisitive mind off the scent! Nevertheless, the wealth of details these archives enclose is unrivalled. Military supply contracts, for example, often list delivery timetables and itemised prices for goods. Marriage contracts divulge dowries and real estate endowments. Inventories after decease contain precise breakdowns of personal fortunes and lists of foreign clients. But the most important documents are probably those in which bankers act as financial guarantors for contractors or speculators because they establish links between long-term financial and short-term speculative interests. Several scholars have also attempted to measure the wealth of financiers by looking at sales of *biens nationaux*, usually through regional surveys.⁷⁷ This has produced some valuable results, notably for the sale of Belgian *biens nationaux* in late 1796 and 1797;⁷⁸ although land acquisitions alone cannot encompass the full range of financiers' activities.

Another crucial source are espionage and police records from the interior ministry which help us identify the associates and intermediaries of financiers – particularly foreign nationals. Where there is money there is information, and where there is information there is power. The large sums businessmen were channelling across Europe through their extensive networks of correspondents made financial circles a natural target for espionage. Financiers were among the best-informed citizens of Europe and had regular access to sensitive state information and government officials since they supplied armies, advanced cash to the Treasury and influenced economic policies. Thus, while being indispensable public auxiliaries, they were also constantly suspected of leaking information to foreign

⁷⁷ See Ivan Lutchysky, *La petite propriété en France avant la Révolution et la vente des biens nationaux*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1897; Marcel Marion, *La vente des biens nationaux*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1908; Hippolyte Monin & Lucien Lazard (eds.), *Sommier des ventes de biens nationaux de la ville de Paris*, 2 vols., Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1920 and Bernard Bodinier & Eric Teyssier, *L'évènement le plus important de la Révolution : la vente des biens nationaux*, Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques (CTHS), 2000.

⁷⁸ For a general summary of these, see Ivan Delatte, 'La vente des biens nationaux en Belgique', *Revue d'histoire moderne*, Tome IX, janvier-mai 1940: 44-51. Romuald Szramkiewicz's study on the Regents of the *Banque de France* also details many important real estate transactions of the early Revolution.

powers or surreptitiously funding royalist plots. Napoleon was especially wary of business and kept it under close surveillance. The police logs of the *Premier Empire* – compiled by Ernest d’Hauterive – are particularly revealing because it was during this period that magnates openly resumed social relations with foreign agents and businessmen, safe in the knowledge their association with the regime shielded them from arrest.⁷⁹ It was also at this time that a number of shady fixers of the early Revolution returned to France and were interrogated by the authorities.⁸⁰ Napoleonic police records are generally far more detailed and meticulous than revolutionary reports – a testament to Fouché’s efficient security reforms. We may also mention the documents discovered in the *armoire de fer* at the Tuileries which provide exceptional insights into the corrupt activities of certain financiers who achieved prominence under the Directory.⁸¹

Last but not least, there is a wide range of primary sources which – if approached objectively and referenced with caution – can provide additional details on politico-financial networks and serve as a cross-referencing tool to check or supplement archival information. Among the most important are the memoirs bequeathed by financiers such as Ouvrard;⁸² Le Couteulx;⁸³ Hanet-Cléry;⁸⁴ and Antoine-Romain Hamelin;⁸⁵ the autobiography of the jurist Pierre-Nicolas Berryer who defended many financiers in litigation cases;⁸⁶ along with the recollections of Napoleonic associates like Bourienne;⁸⁷ Marmont;⁸⁸ Gaudin;⁸⁹ Mollien;⁹⁰ and leading directorial politicians including Barras;⁹¹ La Revellière;⁹² and Thibaudeau.⁹³ These testimonies are often challenging to assess due to lack of corroborating evidence and credibility issues. Many were compiled long after the Revolution and present aseptified versions of the truth which embellish or minimise the

⁷⁹ D’Hauterive, *La Police secrète du Premier Empire, 1804-1810*, 5 vols., Paris: Perrin, 1922-1964 (hereafter ‘PSPE’).

⁸⁰ Especially Antoine Omer Talon who – with his uncle Radix de Sainte-Foix – had managed the monarchy’s covert scheme to bribe revolutionary deputies to prevent Louis XVI’s deposition (see his interrogation file – AN, F/7/6374, dossier 7634).

⁸¹ *Recueil des pièces (3^e à 9^e) trouvées aux Tuileries, imprimées d’après le décret de la Convention nationale du 5 décembre 1792*, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1^{er} janvier 1793.

⁸² *Mémoires de G.-J. Ouvrard*, 3 vols., Paris: Moutardier, 1826-1827.

⁸³ ‘Souvenirs du comte Le Couteulx de Canteleu’ in Mathurin-François Adolphe de Lescure (ed.), *Mémoires sur les Journées Révolutionnaires et les Coups d’État*, Tome II, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1875 (hereafter ‘MJR’).

⁸⁴ *Mémoires de P.L. Hanet*, 2 vols., Paris: Alexis Eymery, 1825.

⁸⁵ ‘Douze ans de ma vie, 1796-1808’, *La Revue de Paris*, Vol. 6, novembre-décembre 1926: 5-24 (part 1), 281-309 (part 2), 544-566 (part 3), 811-839 (part 4).

⁸⁶ *Souvenirs de M. Berryer*, 2 vols., Paris: Dupont, 1839.

⁸⁷ *Mémoires de M. de Bourienne*, 5 vols., Paris: Garnier frères, 1899-1900.

⁸⁸ *Mémoires du maréchal Marmont, duc de Raguse*, 9 vols., Paris: Perrotin, 1856.

⁸⁹ *Mémoires, souvenirs et opinions du duc de Gaète*, 3 vols., Paris: Armand Colin, 1826.

⁹⁰ *Mémoires d’un ministre du Trésor public, 1780-1815*, 3 vols., Paris: Guillaumin et Cie., 1898.

⁹¹ *Mémoires de Barras, membre du Directoire*, 4 vols., Paris: Hachette, 1895-1896.

⁹² *Mémoires de La Revellière-Lépeaux*, 3 vols., Paris: Plon, 1895.

⁹³ *Mémoires sur la Convention et le Directoire*, 2 vols., Paris: Baudouin frères, 1824.

responsibility of their authors in certain events. Naturally, revolutionaries bore sympathies and personal grudges which led them to extoll friends and blacken enemies – and such editorial comments were catchy marketing devices. Thus Talleyrand, for instance, makes no mention in his memoirs of the bribes he received from foreign powers to sign peace treaties; but Barras – who held a grudge against him for his role in Brumaire – produces an exhaustive list of Talleyrand’s ‘*pourboires diplomatiques*’ in his reminiscences!⁹⁴ Bourrienne’s chronicles were so partial that his detractors published two volumes disputing his allegations.⁹⁵ Nonetheless, Napoleonic officials can be quite forthcoming about business tycoons, and some like Gaudin and Mollien even criticise speculators for preying on public funds and obstructing economic reforms – supporting their condemnations with detailed accounts.

Other primary sources of importance include Bonaparte’s personal correspondence – particularly during the Italian Campaign and in the days immediately following Brumaire – which contains several letters on economic matters;⁹⁶ and diplomatic missives, notably from British secret operatives, which occasionally report services rendered by businessmen in delivering payments or extending covert initiatives.⁹⁷ Finally, some public decrees issued by the Directory mention financiers and the business lobby (see the compendiums assembled by Augustin Debidour and François-Alphonse Aulard);⁹⁸ as do a few contemporary press articles.⁹⁹

Research Objectives & Approach

The objectives of this thesis will be threefold. First, to explore Napoleon’s initiation to the business world and trace the influence of capitalists in his apprenticeship of financial management during the 1796-1797 Italian Campaign. Second, to produce original research on leading financiers, business circles and their commercial and political dealings under

⁹⁴ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome IV, p.257-263.

⁹⁵ *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, 2 vols., Paris: Charles Heidelhoff & Urbain Canel, 1830

⁹⁶ *Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}*, 32 vols., Paris: Henri Plon/J. Dumaine, 1858-1870 (hereafter ‘CN’); *Correspondance inédite, officielle et confidentielle du Napoléon Bonaparte*, 7 vols., Paris: C.L.F. Panckoucke, 1819-1820 (hereafter ‘CIOCN’) and Thierry Lentz (ed.), *Napoléon Bonaparte : Correspondance générale. Tome I : Les apprentissages 1784-1797*. Paris: Fayard, 2004.

⁹⁷ These include the Grenville Papers, the Windham Papers and the correspondence of Lord Auckland, William Wickham, William Augustus Miles and James Bland-Burges.

⁹⁸ Debidour, *Recueil des actes du Directoire exécutif*, 4 vols., Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1910-1917 (hereafter ‘RADE’) & Aulard, *Recueil des actes du Comité de Salut Public*, 27 vols., Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1899-1933 (hereafter ‘RACSP’); *Paris pendant la réaction Thermidorienne et sous le Directoire*, 5 vols., Paris: Léopold Cerf/Noblet/Quantin, 1898-1902 (hereafter ‘PPRTSD’) and *Paris sous le Consulat*, 4 vols., Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1903-1909 (hereafter ‘PSC’).

⁹⁹ For a detailed review of all sources referenced by this thesis, see Appendix I and the bibliography.

the Directory and develop new interpretations based on these findings. Finally, to evaluate the degree of support financiers lent to Napoleon's Brumaire coup and determine whether some of them funded or colluded in the putsch in exchange for certain concessions such as the founding of the *Banque de France*.

My preliminary aim in tracing Napoleon's early relations with businessmen during his Italian Campaign has been to establish a precise financial framework for his rise to power. I have approached this task by developing a central theme examining how Bonaparte took advantage of the lack of government oversight in Italy to undermine the Directory's civilian commissioners and arrogate control of military finances and the Lombard Treasury to himself. But I also wanted to evaluate his financial tutelage as an exercise in power – a litmus test or 'rite of passage' – and ascertain if it was possible to extrapolate on its implications for his future career. I was curious to identify what kind of stratagems Napoleon experimented in Italy to consolidate his financial control and observe whether he recycled these tactics in his preparation for Brumaire. Attendant to this question is the role of financiers in his usurpation of authority – were they directly involved or mere auxiliaries? And how did Bonaparte's interactions with them shape his view of the business community and influence his subsequent relations with its leaders? Impartially assessing these issues also entails reflecting upon whether criticisms of corruption during the Italian Campaign are substantiated and pondering how accurately we can measure the sums embezzled by French officials and contractors. Furthermore, I have sought to clarify why people in positions of authority – both in Paris and in Italy – failed to prevent the undermining of civilian government and accepted or even participated in flouting the system. Of course, some officials were enthused by plunder; but others were irresolute or intimidated into corruption by peer pressure.

To perform these inquiries, this study has drawn extensively on records in the French National Archives including the *Armée d'Italie*'s files and dispatches of the Directory's agents in Italy which include important reports such as General Clarke's evaluation of the *Armée d'Italie* and complaints by the commissioner Antoine Amelot de Chaillot regarding Haller's financial embezzlements in the sale of Piedmont's *biens nationaux* to the Cisalpine Republic. Additional evidence was sought from military correspondence conserved at the French Ministry of Defence, diplomatic despatches in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a wide selection of Bonaparte's letters. Personal memoirs were benchmarked to cross-examine information and provide supplemental details which are not disclosed in government records, notably those of the contractor Antoine-Romain Hamelin, Adjutant-general Landrieux, the director Paul Barras and the

jurist Berryer. Several secondary sources have also been referenced like Herbert Lüthy's trilogy which provides detailed information about Haller and Jacques Godechot's study of the Directory's civilian commissioners which has been an invaluable reference guide for my research and makes excellent use of Italian sources. Like Godechot, I believe there is enough evidence to assert the financial trail of Brumaire leads back to Bonaparte's first Italian Campaign.

A substantial portion of this thesis is devoted to presenting and evaluating new research on private banking during the directorial period. Considering it would be impossible to survey all the issues impacting this field, this paper concentrates on the activities of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* as the bank which represented the most visible emanation of the Parisian financial elite at this time. Analysing its foundation and development has proved extremely useful in understanding how private banks re-emerged during the Directory and this has been underlined by clarifying its objectives and marketing techniques. I was especially keen to discover how reliant the *caisse's* business model was on the exploitation of public funds – since this would confirm the private sector was already heavily dependent on state subsidies even before the Napoleonic era – and assessing whether *caisse* shareholders used their political connections to help them attain their goals. Another important theme, given the Directory's economic instability and the breakneck speed at which deals were being concluded, was to establish how well financiers knew the state of their own affairs. Was the *caisse* really a sturdy business? What happened when one of its shareholders went bankrupt? Did the *caisse* receive public funds or even break its own statutory rules if its survival was at stake? And how accountable were leading investors to its assembly of shareholders and administrative board?

Surprisingly, only Louis Bergeron and Gilles Jacoud have previously discussed the *caisse* in any detail, but neither have reproduced its discounting statistics. Thankfully, the archives of the *Banque de France* allow a closer examination of the *caisse's* discounting activities (notably through accounts reproduced in its logs of general assemblies of shareholders and administrative board meetings) and records of correspondence; and this information can sometimes be verified and complemented by notarial files from the City of Paris Archives detailing foundational statutes of companies, litigations, bankruptcies and contractual records linking *caisse* shareholders to various international markets – particularly Spain, Switzerland, the Low Countries and Britain. My objective has been to use this data to determine how the *caisse's* reactions to situations of political crisis revealed the veritable long-term objectives of the banking community while simultaneously addressing some fundamental questions. What effect did the failure to

establish a national bank have upon the French economy and banking interests? How did the *caisse* respond to the 18 Fructidor coup, the economic crisis of Year VII and the permanence of a war economy? Did these events and their economic repercussions make *caisse* shareholders disaffected with government policy and encourage them to support Bonaparte and the military faction? In formulating answers to these interrogations, I have pinpointed several factors explaining why financiers might have been encouraged to back regime change.

This enquiry also explores the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal – the focal point of a bitter financial standoff between royalists and government supporters in the legislative chambers during the lead-up to 18 Fructidor – whose ramifications on directorial politics are widely understated. Probing into this episode affords the opportunity to submit more original material extracted from the records of the public inquiry linked to the scandal – namely the Treasury’s logs detailing its business agreements with bankers and contractors who received commissions to raise cash in France and foreign markets, and its accounts for the issuing of Batavian rescriptions. These files, which the Treasury was forced to declassify against its wishes, are among the only documents which provide us with a detailed breakdown of the Directory’s dealings with private operators. They offer a fascinating glimpse into how financiers took advantage of lax government oversight to appropriate an increasingly large share of public markets and influence the state’s economic and monetary policies. Wherever possible, some indication of the profit generated by these contracts has been given.

To complement the research presented on the *caisse* and provide a specific example illustrating the influence of financiers, a case study of the Neuchâtel magnate Jean-Frédéric Perregaux – a banker with strong political affiliations and international business connections – has been undertaken. This investigation relies on information extracted from the inventories after decease of Perregaux and his wife which both contain previously unpublished lists of business correspondents. It is also supported by directorial decrees and notarial agreements recording transactions Perregaux conducted with foreign businessmen to obtain piasters, sell French merchandise abroad or raise credit in foreign markets – some of which establish his proximity to Napoleon and Talleyrand’s intelligence agency at the foreign ministry. Additionally, several police reports flag Perregaux’s collusion with British agents and diplomatic officials and note his contacts with English business circles and émigrés. Olivier Blanc’s study on revolutionary espionage has advanced some very convincing arguments linking all this evidence together which has been extensively referenced. This case study not only intends to give the reader a better understanding of the

complexity and versatility of someone like Perregaux, but further seeks to identify the factors which motivated him to forge an alliance with Bonaparte and help him establish the *Banque de France*.

The second economic field towards which this thesis directs its attention is contracting – both for military supplies and hard currency advances to the National Treasury.

Contractors are a good choice to represent financiers because their activities extended to all kinds of different areas (lobbying deputies, petitioning the war and finance ministries to secure contracts and reimbursements, dealing with the military hierarchy, etc.). Since very few studies have elaborated how the contracting sector operated, this section is introduced by a detailed review of how the Directory awarded military contracts and paid suppliers (using rescriptions, ‘delegations’, pawned national assets, *biens nationaux*, logging concessions, requisition rights, etc.). A pervading theme of this paper is the degree to which the outsourcing of public markets and military contracts was monopolised by a select group of individuals. This has been showcased in an expanded focus on five contractors (the Michel brothers, Michel-Jean Simons, Pierre-Louis Hanet-Cléry, Armand-François Seguin and the *Compagnie Bodin*) who hogged army supplies in different campaign theatres thanks to their political patrons. In retracing the careers of these men, this enquiry has endeavoured to uncover the reasons behind their financial ascendancy by assessing whether they swept up state procurements due to the necessity of unfavourable economic circumstances or because of their political connections. It has also attempted to demonstrate how their success was dependent upon their fundraising activities for the Treasury in foreign markets and their relations with foreign businessmen and governments. This further links into the sophisticated commercial, political and family networks which speculators established to support their activities. In many instances, it is not just a question of ‘following the money’ but also of ‘tracing the connection’ because financiers frequently moved and placed funds simultaneously through marriages, business partnerships, property sales, etc.

Evidence supporting the research on contractors draws on several dossiers in the French National Archives including diplomatic correspondence recording complaints by civilian commissioners in Italy and letters from municipal authorities in France denouncing embezzlements of military supplies. A wide range of notarial archives recording military supply agreements, marriage contracts, commercial associations, financial guarantees, bankruptcies, etc. has also been solicited. The memoirs of Hanet-Cléry provide unique insights on the French invasion of Switzerland which he claims was motivated by the necessity to fund Bonaparte’s Egyptian expedition. This is a highly valuable source due to

the amount of detailed information it contains. Several company records in the City of Paris Archives have also been consulted, as well as files from the *Saisie Simons* in the Belgian National Archives related to Michel Simons, notably concerning his project to resurrect Antwerp into a major colonial trading port.

The Brumaire coup will be approached from a financial perspective by reviewing evidence directly implicating financiers. As one might expect, there is very little archival documentation attesting to their participation and most witness accounts are found in the memoirs of financiers themselves, Brumarian conspirators and Napoleonic affiliates. This means it is important to observe what happened immediately after the coup and scrutinise the economic measures enacted by the new consular government if we are to understand how Napoleon managed to raise so much money in a failing economic system. Fortunately, Bonaparte's finance minister – Martin Gaudin – discusses these aspects at length in his memoirs, as does Napoleon in his correspondence. Bonaparte hurriedly appealed to the banking community for cash and there are manuscripts and notarial archives which record the creation of business consortiums (the *vingt* and *dix négociants réunis*) specifically established to raise funds for his new government. The thesis will conclude with an overview of the founding of the *Banque de France* and its merger with the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* based on documents in the French National Bank's archives. We will see how the banking sector's assistance in founding the *Banque de France* was a major factor in ensuring the survival of Bonaparte's regime before conducting a final general assessment of the business community's support for Brumaire.



CHAPTER 2 – BONAPARTE’S FINANCIAL APPRENTICESHIP IN ITALY



Introduction

The Italian Campaign of 1796-1797 was not only the first real test of Bonaparte's abilities at the highest military level, but also served as his apprenticeship in the realm of large-scale financial management. Although Napoleon had garnered some previous logistical experience during the Siege of Toulon and in General Carteaux's army, the Italian command would catapult his organisational skills to new heights. He now needed to regularly supply over forty thousand men with food, equipment and pay, which implied establishing a functional relationship with the army's paymaster (who oversaw the disbursement of expenses) and chief ordnance officer (who managed equipment stores and calculated financial needs). More importantly, Bonaparte was going to have to grapple with the Directory's civilian commissioners who – while not endowed with the same powers as their formidable predecessors: the *représentants en mission* – nonetheless held supreme legal authority over military finances and diplomatic negotiations.¹

The *Armée d'Italie* Bonaparte inherited was in an extremely dilapidated condition. Barthélémy Schérer, the outgoing commander, was a rather obscure general nearing sixty who spent most of his time drinking and gambling and had completely failed to exploit the attack on Loano (Nov. 1795).² Of the six civilian commissioners successively attached to the army, all had either been rapidly recalled or proven completely ineffectual.³ Grain and wheat supplies had been contracted to a Genoese firm called the *Compagnie Saint-Esteban* which had furnished practically nothing – resulting in troops being reduced to a quarter of their bread ration.⁴ Despite this, it was owed 1,500,000 *livres* per month plus another four million in arrears.⁵ Fresh meat was scarce and only distributed every four days.⁶ Wine

¹ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.36 – The civilian commissioners were created by the 1795 Constitution and attached to French armies on campaign abroad. They answered directly to the executive directors, unlike the *représentants en mission* who had been accountable to the National Convention. In theory, they had to confer with the military leadership before taking important decisions.

² He had lost 100,000 francs playing *biribi* (AN, AF/III/295, *fiche Schérer*) and sold leaves of absence to soldiers (*Notes de Charles-Alexis Alexandre*, published in *Revue de la Révolution*, 1886, Tome VIII, p.155 – Alexandre had served under Schérer at the *Armée de Sambre et Meuse*). Schérer had previously been Alexandre de Beauharnais's aide-de-camp. La Revellière described him as: “old, worn out, given to the pleasures of the table, apoplectic...” (*Mémoires*, Tome II, p.378).

³ These were André Réal and Ange Marie Chiappe for the *Armée des Alpes*; and Marius-Félix Maïsse, Louis-François Peyre, Louis-Marie Turreau and François-Joseph Ritter for the *Armée d'Italie*. See their respective entries in the Biographical Index. Maïsse and Peyre appear to have indulged in widespread corruption, and Ritter was also considered suspect. By the time Napoleon arrived only Ritter and Turreau were still in post.

⁴ AG, B3/18. *Ritter to Letourneur*, 24 brumaire IV/15 Nov. 1795 – Wheat was sent by sea but often fell prey to the Royal Navy (AG, B3/18. *Ritter to Villars*, 6 frimaire IV/27 Nov. 1795). Grain was also purchased from Greek captains with bills of exchange of tenuous value (AN, AF/III/130 – *Decree of Maïsse*, 26 frimaire IV/17 Dec. 1795).

⁵ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:38 – *Secret conference of Maïsse with the Armée d'Italie's administrative chiefs*, 17 frimaire IV/8 Dec. 1795).

⁶ AG, B3/18. *Ritter to Letourneur*, 7 nivôse IV/28 Dec. 1795.

alone was in abundant supply, and soldiers often took what they wanted from military warehouses without paying.⁷ Artillery horses and mules were furnished by the *Compagnie Lanchère et Cerf Berr* (a joint venture), which also supplied the *Armée du Rhin*. Even though this company claimed it had no forage and hardly provided anything, it was owed 34,000,000 francs in *assignats* and 330,000 francs in hard currency.⁸ During the attack against Loano, it had only delivered 150 horses or mules while ten times as many had been required.⁹ The army's field hospitals also suffered terribly and needed 63,000,000 francs in *assignats* and 23,000 in coin.¹⁰ By December 1795, there was merely 101,000 francs of hard currency in the *Armée d'Italie*'s coffers while it owed 1,280,000 francs in cash and 80,000,000 in *assignats*.¹¹ In short, the army was entirely destitute of funds. There wasn't even enough money to pay spies, several of whom threatened to quit the service.¹²

Acutely aware of this financial predicament, Bonaparte decided to petition Jean Lanchère and the Cerf Berr brothers – the owners of the *Compagnie Lanchère et Cerf Berr* – for a loan.¹³ According to the jurist Berryer who legally represented this firm, their refusal earned them Napoleon's undying enmity and hampered their subsequent careers:

*The general supply of wagons and military transports – formed during the early Italian campaigns – was a source of spicy relations. It revealed to me up to what point Bonaparte's vindictive humour could go. Prior to his departure for his first command at this Armée d'Italie where he acquired such glory and power, Bonaparte approached the Cerf Berr brothers – Jews – to request a considerable personal loan. The brothers – whose religion had probably not accustomed them to lend money on the mere wager of an unsheathed sword – declined the loan. [Bonaparte] never forgave them. Having committed the imprudence of partnering with [Jean] Lanchère for the general supply of wagons and military convoys of his army, the Cerf Berr brothers were struck with arbitrary refusals when they liquidated their firm, which plunged their family in the most profound misery and significantly diminished Lanchère's fortune.*¹⁴

⁷ “The *Armée d'Italie* consumes more wine and eau-de-vie than all the others combined.” (AG, B3/20. Ritter to the Chief Ordnance Officer of the *Armée d'Italie*, 27 ventôse IV/17 March 1796).

⁸ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:38 – *Secret conference of Maise...*, 17 frimaire IV/8 Dec. 1795.

⁹ *Ibid* & AG, B3/18. Ritter to Letourneur, 7 nivôse IV/28 Dec. 1795 – The army had to rely on transports sent by sea, but these were expensive because they were insured by the Genoese who were already owed 11,000,000 francs in *assignats* and 24,000 in hard currency; and they often fell prey to British ships.

¹⁰ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:38 – *Secret conference of Maise...*, 17 frimaire IV/8 Dec. 1795.

¹¹ *Ibid*.

¹² AG, B3/19. Gandolphi to Ritter, 24 nivôse IV/14 Jan. 1796 – To raise money, Ritter had recourse to all kinds of subtleties, selling ships captured in Savona's harbour and enemy merchandise seized in Finale, Noli, Savona and Albissola (AG, B3/18. Ritter to Letourneur, 7 nivôse IV/28 Dec. 1795). The taxes of Oneglia were paid in olives and wood logged from *domaines nationaux* was shipped back to France where contractors attempted to sell it (AN, AF/III/146, dossier 690:172-173 – *Decree of Ritter*, 18 frimaire IV/9 Dec. 1795) & AG, B3/18, Ritter to Letourneur, 7 nivôse IV/28 Dec. 1795).

¹³ See the entries for Lanchère and Cerf Berr in the Biographical Index.

¹⁴ Berryer, *Souvenirs*, Tome II, p.338-339.

While Napoleon's army was afflicted by indigence, the Bonaparte family was not entirely empty-handed and had come a long way since its forced exile from Corsica had left it practically penniless. In 1794, Lucien and Joseph had begun using part of Julie Clary's dowry to speculate on colonial trade and the loss of merchant trading ships (the equivalent of modern-day insurance fraud).¹⁵ Thanks to his position as deputy in the *Cinq-Cents*, Lucien obtained letters of marque to favour ships the family held interests in.¹⁶ The clan's matriarch – Maria Laetizia – earned her share in the business and was said to keep her accounts diligently. These gambling practices infuriated Napoleon who feared they could endanger his military career.¹⁷ His concerns were not unfounded, for in late 1796 a neutral Moroccan ship sailing out of Genoa was captured by a Bonaparte-equipped privateer. The captured vessel's crew were slain and its cargo sold in Ajaccio for 80,000 francs – an act of piracy condemned in the *Cinq-Cents* which jeopardised Lucien's election as a Corsican deputy.¹⁸ Napoleon much preferred the idea of investing the family savings in real estate, and he visited several properties for sale in the spring and summer of 1795 and actively encouraged Joseph to acquire one by spending part of Julie Clary's dowry.¹⁹ The Bonapartes were also related through Maria Laetizia to bankers from Basel – the Fesch – and their maternal uncle, the Abbé Joseph Fesch, often travelled to Italy to keep an eye on his nephews' investments. He had an account in Genoa with the banker Duratti, another one in Livorno and one in Naples – a convenient set-up which soon enabled him to amass a fortune by laundering Italian plunder.²⁰

The Appointment of Saliceti as Civilian Commissioner

Prior even to his elevation as commander-in-chief of the *Armée d'Italie* on 2 March 1796, Bonaparte had already surveyed the situation and drawn his own conclusions. What he needed was a civilian commissioner who was a man of action – someone who could obtain resources quickly, who was sufficiently ruthless and cunning to extort cash from an

¹⁵ Julie Clary (1771-1845), eldest daughter of the Marseille merchant François Clary (1725-1794), married Joseph Bonaparte on 1 Aug. 1794.

¹⁶ This is attested by letters of a business partner of the Bonapartes quoted in Gilbert Martineau, *Lucien Bonaparte, prince de Canino*. Paris: France-Empire, 1989, p.47.

¹⁷ Lentz, *Le 18 brumaire*, p.240.

¹⁸ Théodore Iung (ed.), *Lucien Bonaparte et ses mémoires*, Tome I, Paris: Charpentier, 1882, p.162-163 (hereafter '*LBM*'). Lucien obtained a favourable report exonerating him from Citizen Sapey, the head of Franco-Corsican maritime correspondence. Sapey later served Lucien at the interior ministry and French embassy in Madrid.

¹⁹ See Appendix II – Joseph had married Julie Clary (1771-1845) on 1 Aug. 1794. She was the daughter of François Clary (1725-1794), one of Marseille's wealthiest traders.

²⁰ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.139.

unwilling population and who knew how to efficiently manage large-scale logistical operations. Fortunately, someone in his entourage was perfectly indicated for this role – his 32-year-old Corsican compatriot Antoine-Christophe Saliceti. Saliceti – whom Adjutant-general Landrieux described as “*one of the most astute men Corsica ever produced*” – was already a seasoned politician when he first met Bonaparte in February 1793.²¹ Both men had developed a mutual respect and become political allies under the common patronage of Barras. Having momentarily been forced to go into hiding following the Insurrection of Prairial, Saliceti had been rehabilitated by the amnesty exonerating *montagnards* after the 13 Vendémiaire.²² By early 1796, he was eager to return to politics and had set his sights on the position of civilian commissioner at the *Armée d’Italie*. Thanks to an astute political intrigue, he outmanoeuvred the man touted for the job – Louis-Marie Stanislas Fréron – and was named civilian commissioner on 30 January.²³ General Masséna asserts that Napoleon had a hand in securing his nomination.²⁴ Since both Corsicans were reputed *jacobins*, the Directory delegated Pierre-Ansèlme Garrau – a friend of Carnot – as Saliceti’s colleague to counter any objections.²⁵ But not everyone in Paris was enthralled by these new appointments as the following letter of remonstrance dated 6 March 1796 sent by the *Anciens* deputy Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours to Reubell indicates:

My dear former colleague,

It is said that you are entrusting the Armée d’Italie – our last hope if war continues – to two Corsicans: Bonaparte and Saliceti, of which one at least is the creature and friend of Paoli. I find it difficult to believe that you would commit this mistake. If indeed it is done...[indistinguishable words].

Do you not know what Corsicans are? For two thousand years, no one has ever been able to rely on them. They are mobile by nature. They all have their fortunes to make, and Pitt can give them more guineas than you can supply them with sols.

These people must always be kept in subordinate positions, even when they have merit and appear to be honest.

The best would be to make peace. I will indicate, if you so desire, the safest and most honourable ways of doing so. If it is war that you want, at least don’t make its outcome depend on Corsicans, and on operations in Italy. Are there no more Frenchmen left?

²¹ Jean Landrieux, *Mémoires de l’Adjudant-Général Jean Landrieux*, Tome I, Paris: Albert Savine, 1893, p.37.

²² Antoine-Vincent Arnault, *Mémoires d’un sexagénaire*, Tome II, Paris: Dufrey, 1833, p.228.

²³ AN, AF/III/343, dossier 1542 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome I, p.509 – See Saliceti’s entry in the Biographical Index for more details on his career.

²⁴ Masséna, *Mémoires*, Tome II, Paris: Paulin et Lechevalier, 1848, p.11.

²⁵ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.244.

*I salute and embrace you and pity you.*²⁶

Knowing from experience he would need to borrow money to finance the *Armée d'Italie*'s forthcoming campaign, Saliceti demanded a loan of six million *livres* from Genoese banks.²⁷ When these balked at his request, he did not hesitate to threaten the Ligurian city, insisting Carnot inform its ambassador in Paris – Boccardi – that “*if friendly approaches are neglected, forceful means will be employed.*”²⁸ The French envoy in Genoa – François Cacault – handed the Genoese an ultimatum.²⁹ If they did not acquiesce to French demands within four days, diplomatic relations would be severed and French troops would invest their city.³⁰ The Directory supported Saliceti's belligerent stance and advised Bonaparte that capturing Ceva would “*put us in a situation to impose terms on the Genoese Republic and facilitate...negotiations which could be advantageous to us, and even obtain a loan from Genoese citizens.*”³¹

The Genoese senate, which was hoping for an Austrian intervention, initially voted by 122 votes to 20 against awarding any loan to Cacault and Saliceti.³² But when General Augereau began moving troops towards Genoa and Voltri and Masséna marched his corps of 6,000 men on Savona, it relented and agreed to provide a loan of three million *livres* in 500,000 instalments on condition the agreement remain secret.³³ Bonaparte wanted much more and advised Paris to require an indemnity of 15,000,000 francs as compensation for French frigates and merchant ships the Genoese had allowed the British to capture in their ports.³⁴ However, the loan was ultimately retracted when the Directory temporarily called off operations against Genoa – either because it did not want to rile Austria or more likely due to calculations there was more to be gained by employing the city's financial services

²⁶ Jacques Gaffarel, ‘Documents inédits : Opinion de Dupont (de Nemours) sur Bonaparte en l’an IV’, *La Révolution française*, Tome XXXV, 1898, p.376.

²⁷ Saliceti travelled to Genoa to demand this loan in person, arriving there on 8 March 1796. He soon realised the Genoese had no intention of lending him anything, complaining that they “*would like to amuse us with hopes.*” (AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:54 – *Saliceti to the Directory*, 6 germinal IV/26 March 1796).

²⁸ AG, B3/19. *Saliceti to Carnot*, 18 ventôse IV/8 March 1796.

²⁹ AN, AF/III/65, dossier 267, plaquette 2 – *Faipoult to the Directory*, 19 thermidor IV/6 Aug. 1796 & AG, B3/20. *Cacault to the Directory*, 20 ventôse IV/10 March 1796.

³⁰ AAE, Gênes, 170 & Rome 919. *Saliceti to Cacault*, 20 ventôse IV/10 March 1796.

³¹ CIOCN, Tome I, p.19, *Instructions for the general-in-chief of the Armée d'Italie*, 16 ventôse IV/6 March 1796.

³² Fabry, *Histoire de l'Armée d'Italie*, Tome III, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1900, p.475.

³³ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:54, 6 germinal IV/26 March 1796 – British agents refer to an extorted loan of seven million *livres* (*Drake to Grenville*, PRO, FO 28 Genoa, 29 March 1796 & André Fugier, *Napoléon et l'Italie*, Paris: J.-B. Janin, 1947, p.24). See also Branda, *LPG*, p.135-136. Augereau wrote to Saliceti approving his aggressive tactics: “*The army must strike great blows...We must wage war in Italy as we did in Spain...Patriots in the army look upon you as a saviour. The soldier's morale is generally good. He only needs a bit of energy and everything will go well*” (AG, B3/20 & B3*/198, *Augereau to Saliceti*, 26 ventôse IV/16 March 1796). See also Fabry, *Histoire de l'Armée d'Italie*, Tome III, p.369, *Masséna to Saliceti*, 28 ventôse IV/18 March 1796.

³⁴ CN, Tome I, n°266, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 10 floréal IV/29 April 1796.



Figure 2:1
Portrait of Joseph Bonaparte
by Antoine Maurin
19th century engraving, Musée Carnavalet
© Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



Figure 2:2
Portrait of Lucien Bonaparte
Attributed to Guillaume Guillon, c.1800-1814
Château de Malmaison
© RMN-Grand Palais (Musée des Châteaux de
Malmaison et de Bois-Préau)
Photo: Daniel Arnaudet
Authorised for non-commercial use



Figure 2:3
Portrait of the Abbé Joseph Fesch
(here depicted as a cardinal)
by Charles Meynier, 1806
Château de Versailles
© Château de Versailles/RMN
Photo: Christophe Fouin
Authorised for non-commercial use




Figure 2:4
Portrait of Antoine Christophe Saliceti
By an unknown artist, c.1810
Château de Versailles
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
(uploaded by 'Branor')
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

as an auxiliary launderer of future Italian plunder.³⁵ Nevertheless, some funds must have been secured from the Genoese and we can legitimately enquire as Jacques Godechot does “*whether Bonaparte would have been able to take the offensive upon his arrival in Italy without the active preparations conducted by Saliceti.*”³⁶

Shortly thereafter, the *Armée d’Italie* invaded Piedmontese territory, promising to enforce its official maxim of “*war to castles, peace unto households.*”³⁷ On 28 March, Bonaparte and Saliceti issued their famous proclamation to the army:

*Soldiers, you are naked, ill fed! The Government owes you much; it can give you nothing... Rich provinces, great cities will be in your power. There you will find honour, glory, and riches...*³⁸

While this proclamation underlined how painfully aware Napoleon was of his army’s penury, he also knew many of its contractors like the *Compagnie Flachet, La Porte et Castelin* and the *Compagnie Lanchère et Cerf Berr* had powerful political connections, and that his position as recently-appointed commander meant it would be unwise to openly accuse them of irregularities.

There were also a few suppliers like Jean-Pierre Collot (*Collot, Caillard et Cie.*), a Montpellier trader whom Bonaparte had personally befriended.³⁹ This young contractor – who was then not thirty years of age – had met Bonaparte in 1793 at the *Armée des Alpes* when he was a supplier attached to its *service des vivres*. Their paths had crossed again at the Siege of Toulon in 1793 and at Nice in 1794; and following the insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire they began to frequent each other regularly. One of their mutual friends was a man named Chauvet whom Napoleon appointed chief ordnance officer at the *Armée de l’Intérieur* and later at the *Armée d’Italie*.⁴⁰ Both Bonaparte and Chauvet had lobbied Collot to join them in Italy as *munitionnaire chargé des vivres-viandes*, but he initially hesitated because he was then earning considerable profits negotiating bills of exchange drawn on Amsterdam for the Directory. Collot was a precious recruit for Bonaparte. His

³⁵ See CIOCN, Tome I, *The Directory to Bonaparte*, 27 prairial IV/15 June 1796 – Saliceti was also instructed to spare Genoa (AF/III/367, dossier 1792 – *The Directory to Saliceti*, 18 floréal IV/7 May 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome II, p.325).

³⁶ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.254 – From there to claim like Sorel (*L’Europe et la Révolution française*, Tome V, p.61) that Saliceti pocketed most of the money during the campaign seems a step too far.

³⁷ AAE. Sardaigne, 272. Paris, 20 ventôse IV/10 March 1796.

³⁸ Emmanuel de Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, Tome I, Paris: Seuil, 1968, p.387-388 (hereafter ‘*MSH*’) – This proclamation was actually written by Bonaparte in 1815 on board the *Northumberland*. While the words are not authentic, it does convey the form of the original proclamation (Jean Tulard, *Napoléon*, Paris: Fayard/Pluriel, 2010, p.89-90).

³⁹ See Maurice Payard, ‘Bonaparte et le fournisseur Collot’, *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, janvier-juin 1935: 129-143 (hereafter ‘*BFC*’). Collot founded *Collot, Caillard et Cie.* with Jean-André Caillard.

⁴⁰ CN, Tome I, n°74, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 19 vendémiaire IV/11 Oct. 1795.

brothers headed a trading house in Genoa and he arranged for Chauvet to open an account with their bank which proved all the more useful since the Directory had only deposited 2,000 *louis* in the *Armée d'Italie*'s coffers before the onset of its campaign.⁴¹ Collot even bid for the general contract to supply all French armies with meat in Year IV but was only granted a deal to supply three armies (*Armées d'Italie, des Alpes et du Midi*).⁴²

Thus, Napoleon at first probably judged it prudent not to stir the hornet's nest when it came to contractors which explains why he wrote approvingly of them in early April, noting how:

*The Flachet house, which has the supply of grain, and the Collot house, which has that of meat, are conducting themselves well. They are giving us very good grain, and soldiers are beginning to receive fresh meat.*⁴³

But his tactfulness soon gave way to exasperation once he realised no additional funds were forthcoming from the Treasury. Four days before Montenotte, he complained that:

*The Treasury often sends us bills of exchange which are declined. One for 162,800 livres, drawn on Cadix, has just been refused, which has increased our embarrassment...The Treasury has not kept its word. Instead of 500,000 livres, it has only sent 300,000, and we haven't heard anything about a sum of 600,000 which had been promised us.*⁴⁴

Napoleon's financial difficulties were not assuaged by his victories against Piedmont-Sardinia and remained acute until his occupation of Lombardy. The day after he signed the Armistice of Cherasco, Bonaparte announced to Carnot that:

*I am going to cross the Po and enter Milanese territory. While passing through I intend to ransom the Duke of Parma and make him pay dearly for his stubbornness.*⁴⁵

On 9 May, he concluded an armistice with Parma at Piacenza without consulting the Directory or its commissioners. Its duke promised to pay two million francs and provide 10,000 quintals of wheat, 5,000 quintals of oats, 1,700 horses, 2,000 heads of cattle and 20 paintings.⁴⁶ Napoleon was exuberant and informed Carnot that:

What we have taken from the enemy is incalculable. We have hospital effects for 15,000 patients, several warehouses of wheat, flour, etc. The more men you send me,

⁴¹ Payard, *BFC*, p.129.

⁴² AP, D6U3 11, 18 brumaire IX/9 Nov. 1800.

⁴³ CN, Tome I, n°121, *Napoleon to the Directory*, 17 germinal IV/6 April 1796.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, n°126, *Napoleon to the Directory*, 19 germinal IV/8 April 1796.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, n°267, *Bonaparte to Carnot*, 10 floréal IV/29 April 1796.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, n°368, *Peace terms between the French army and the Duke of Parma*, 20 floréal IV/9 May 1796.

*the more easily I can feed them...I can send a dozen million [francs] to Paris which should come in handy for the Armée du Rhin.*⁴⁷

While Bonaparte rejoiced at these early successes, they also convinced him he could only count on his own initiative if his army were to survive.

The Balbi Network and the Establishment of the Lombard Contribution

Historians are often quick to point out how Napoleon felt he had become a decisive actor on the political scene after the Battle of Lodi.⁴⁸ What is less well reported is how Bonaparte took advantage of his victories to set up a veritable financial network of agents to channel requisitioned goods and contributions levied on the Italian population back to France. In this endeavour, he was assisted by his Corsican commissioner – Saliceti – whose numerous business contacts up and down the peninsula were to prove highly useful.

The first indication of the existence of this network appeared as the *Armée d'Italie* was marching towards the province of Lodi when there were particularly bad episodes of looting at Piacenza and Casalpusterlengo.⁴⁹ In a move which set a precedent for all future conquered towns he passed through, Saliceti confiscated all the objects deposited in Piacenza's *monte-di-pièta* and all the money in the coffers of the city's charitable institutions.⁵⁰ In addition, a forced contribution of 20,000 *livres* was imposed on Piacenza after the triumph at Lodi.⁵¹

But it was the occupation of Milan and the establishment of the Lombard contribution which truly laid the foundations of the network designed to exfiltrate Italian wealth back to France. Bonaparte had already requested Faipoult send him a note on "*the paintings, statues, cabinets and curiosities to be found in Milan, Parma, Piacenza, Modena and Bologna*" two weeks before entering the city.⁵² On 15 May 1796, Saliceti and his wife arrived in the Lombard capital and settled in the luxurious Palazzo Greppi which would

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, n°366, *Bonaparte to Carnot*, 20 floréal IV/9 May 1796.

⁴⁸ Las Cases, *MSH*, Tome I, p.137 – "It was only after Lodi that the idea came to me I could well become, after all, a decisive actor on the political scene. It was then that the sparks of a high ambition were born." See also Frédéric Lullin de Châteauvieux (ed.), *Le Manuscrit venu de Sainte-Hélène*, Paris: Baudouin frères, 1821, p.17 – "I saw myself then – for the first time – not only as a simple general, but as a man called upon to influence the destiny of peoples."

⁴⁹ Carlo Botta, *Histoire d'Italie*, Tome I, Paris: P. Dufart, 1824, p.412 & AG, B3/22. *Augereau to Bonaparte*, 21 floréal IV/10 mai 1796.

⁵⁰ Botta, *Histoire d'Italie*, Tome I, p.412.

⁵¹ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.276.

⁵² CN, Tome I, n°280, *Bonaparte to Faipoult*, 12 floréal IV/1 May 1796.



Figure 2:5 – The French Army led by Bonaparte crosses the Bridge at Lodi
 21 Floréal IV/10 May 1796

Engraving by an unknown artist, 1796

© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)




Figure 2:6 – The French Army Enters Milan, 25 floréal IV/14 May 1796

Engraving by an unknown artist, c.1796-1799

© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

serve as their residence for the next six months.⁵³ The Corsican commissioner immediately began gathering information on the city's financial resources and those of its inhabitants. He asked Nava, a member of the congregation of counts of the chapter of Milan, for information on its central and municipal administrations, and drew up a list of all Milanese public coffers and their paymasters. Then on 19 May, Bonaparte and Saliceti issued their declaration to the Lombard people in which they promised independence for Lombardy but also announced they would levy a contribution of twenty million *livres* on “*veritably wealthy citizens and the ecclesiastical corps.*”⁵⁴

These two seemingly contradictory measures reflected a change in French policy. While Bonaparte and Saliceti had abandoned Piedmontese patriots by signing the Armistice of Cherasco to obtain money and supplies, they now wished to encourage Lombard patriots to undermine Austria while simultaneously extracting as many funds as possible from Lombardy. This inconsistency also transpires in the French government's correspondence. On the one hand, it was denouncing “*horrendous dilapidations*” to Saliceti as early as 14 April;⁵⁵ but on the other it advised him to rapidly levy contributions: “*It is in the first moments of victory that the vanquished pay with the most facility and that the victors are met with the least feelings of hate.*”⁵⁶

Bonaparte was likewise enjoined to “*raise contributions immediately while the initial terror inspired by our approaching troops still reigns.*”⁵⁷ Three days after the proclamation the new municipality of Milan, headed by Duke Gian Galeazzo Serbelloni, was ordered to furnish 3,000 ells of blue cloth for officers and 500 ells for military employees, 12,500 ells of white cloth to make pants and jackets for soldiers, 6,250 ells of scarves, 12,750 ells of

⁵³ Bouvier, ‘L’Italie de 1794 à 1796’, *La Révolution française*, Tome XLV, 1903, p.168 – Every day, the Salicetis would host dinners for 20-30 guests almost entirely at Count Greppi's expense. The count also had to pay for the sustenance of Saliceti's escort of forty dragoons, and the Corsican commissioner was even given the carriage of Duke Serbelloni (Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.288).

⁵⁴ AN, AF/III/183, dossier 841 – *Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief and Executive Commissioner of the Armée d'Italie* – This proclamation was of prime importance, for it set the Directory's policy towards conquered lands – liberty and forced contributions – which ultimately spelt the doom of all French puppet governments in Italy (Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.283-284).

⁵⁵ AN, AF/III/361, dossier 1726 – *The Directory to Saliceti*, 25 germinal IV/14 April 1796) & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome II, p.150.

⁵⁶ AN, AF/III/370, dossier 1814 – *The Directory to Saliceti*, 27 floréal IV/16 May 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome II, p.389 – The Directory rather hypocritically told Saliceti that all effects he confiscated “*must not be requisitioned, but paid for in mandats [territoriaux] at face value... We will spread our currency and fill our warehouses without appearing to be levying new contributions*” (AN, AF/III/371, dossier 1824 – *The Directory to Saliceti*, 29 floréal IV/18 May 1796). Marcel Marion notes (*HFF*, Tome III, p.470) the real value of the *mandat territorial* at this time was only 10% of its face value.

⁵⁷ CIOCN, Tome I, p.153, *The Directory to Bonaparte*, 18 floréal IV/4 May 1796.

canvas for linings, 20,000 pairs of stockings, 2,000 hats, 5,000 pairs of shoes, 2,000 ells of green cloth for guides and dragoons and 500 ells of scarlet cloth.⁵⁸

Saliceti lost no time in confiscating all the money in Milan's various public coffers which turned much of the city's population against the French.⁵⁹ The most important repository was the *monte-di-pièta* which held considerable reserves of cash and valuables.⁶⁰ An inventory of its confiscated objects is still extant in the French National Archives but fails to mention the estimated value of the goods.⁶¹ They were all sealed in boxes and sent to the banker Emmanuel Balbi in Genoa.⁶² It was Bonaparte's uncle – the Abbé Fesch – who oversaw the operation.⁶³ Saliceti justified the choice of Balbi to the Directory in a letter dated 23 May 1796:

*The choice of Mr. Balbi as depository of these objects presents all the guarantees which can be desired. He is the Genoese trader whose fortune and credit are the best established. His probity is generally renowned. He has shown himself to be a friend of France in truly difficult times. None other in the country, through his principles and solvability, appeared to us more worthy of the national trust.*⁶⁴

The Directory approved this choice.⁶⁵ The objects were dispatched from Milan escorted by twenty-five men.⁶⁶ An agent posted in the army's rear-guard was thereafter missioned to continue transferring confiscated goods and works of art to Balbi. Statues, vases and manuscripts from the Ambrosian Library in Milan were sent to Genoa and shipped back to Paris.⁶⁷

⁵⁸ AG, B3/23. *Saliceti to the Directory*, 3 prairial IV/22 May 1796 – Saliceti also authorised the Milanese municipality to raise a new tax on wealthy citizens and advanced it 300,000 *lira* to cover immediate costs (Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.292-293).

⁵⁹ Landrieux (*Mémoires*, Tome I, p.68, footnote 1) records the Bishop of Milan believed the *Armée d'Italie* seized the goods on the Directory's orders, but that this was highly improbable. No letter from the Directory attests this. Godechot (*LCAD*, Tome I, p.293-294) argues Saliceti was attempting to rally the Milanese poor to his side because his edict decreed that “*all objects, excepting those made of gold and silver, of a value less than 200 lira shall be restituted to their owners upon presentation of a certificate of ownership.*”

⁶⁰ Botta, *Histoire d'Italie*, Tome I, p.459 – These items were stored either gratuitously, as simple deposits or as pawned goods yielding interest. Many were intended to serve as dowries.

⁶¹ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:108 – *Inventory of jewels and silverware in Milan's monte-di-pièta*, 1 prairial IV/20 May 1796.

⁶² *Ibid*, dossier 853:81 – *Decree of Bonaparte and Saliceti ordering the Armée d'Italie's chief ordnance officer to dispatch all silverware and jewels in the army's coffers to Balbi at Genoa*, 1 prairial IV/20 May 1796.

⁶³ André Latreille, *Napoléon et le Saint Siège. L'ambassade du Cardinal Fesch à Rome*. Paris: Alcan, 1936, p.69.

⁶⁴ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:79 – *Saliceti to the Directory*, 4 prairial IV/23 May 1796.

⁶⁵ AN, AF/III/380, dossier 1828 – *The Directory to Balbi*, 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796.

⁶⁶ AG, B3/23. *Saliceti to Berthier*, 3 prairial IV/22 May 1796.

⁶⁷ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:87 – *Decree appointing Pierre-Jacques Tinet, member of the Tuscan legation, an agent attached to the Armée d'Italie tasked with collecting paintings, artworks and ancient monuments*, 30 floréal IV/19 May 1796. See also M.L. Blumer, ‘La Commission des sciences et arts en Italie’, *La Révolution française*, Tome LXXXVII, 1934, p.78-79 and Ferdinand Boyer, ‘Les responsabilités de Napoléon dans le transfert à Paris des œuvres d'art de l'étranger’, *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 11(4), octobre-décembre 1964: 241-262.

Manifestly, there was more behind the despoiling of Lombardy and of the Milanese *monte-di-pièta* than a mere act of pillage. Saliceti's correspondence with Paris indicates he had decided to establish a fund overseen by Balbi in Genoa through which all future contributions and requisitioned items would transit. He justified its creation by asserting the army was constantly on the move and that large sums of money could not be dispatched to its headquarters which frequently changed location.⁶⁸ It is unclear when Saliceti first met Balbi, but he obviously placed considerable trust in him, going so far as to reassure the directors that Balbi was "*a very solvable and upright trader whom we have put in charge of this fund under the surveillance of Faipoult.*"⁶⁹ The latter in his capacity as French consul in Genoa was to check all cases upon receipt, dress their inventories and "*fulfil the dispositions entrusted to his zeal.*"⁷⁰ Within a matter of weeks Balbi found himself managing a sizeable flux of monetary displacements, storing millions worth of incoming cash and precious effects in safe boxes and gradually shipping them back to Paris or to French armies on other fronts. He also provided funds to Corsican refugees whom Bonaparte recruited for the upcoming expedition to wrest Corsica back from British control. Citizens Braccini and Paraviccini, for instance, received 15,000 francs to help them purchase a hundred rifles, three hundred pistols, three thousand flints and several thousand pounds of lead and gunpowder.⁷¹

The *Armée d'Italie*'s files at the French National Archives clearly indicate Emmanuel Balbi was at the very heart of the French financial network in Italy.⁷² We find him involved directly or indirectly in nearly all the episodes of looting and profligacy during the early campaign. When the Lombard revolt erupted in late May 1796, for example, the French used the uprising as an excuse to plunder additional funds.⁷³ A passage in General Marmont's memoirs describes what happened when French troops hurriedly invested Pavia on 26 May to relieve its citadel where the garrison was besieged by eight hundred rebels:

The city was delivered over to pillage, and although this was thoroughly done, the soldiers did not indulge – as is often the case in such circumstances – in murder and other atrocities. The house of the tax receiver of the city was threatened, and the poor man believed that by throwing his money into the street he would prevent the

⁶⁸ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:79 – *Saliceti to the Directory*, 4 prairial IV/23 May 1796.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, dossier 853:88 – *Saliceti to the Directory*, 11 prairial IV/30 May 1796.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, dossier 853:81 – *Decree instructing the Armée d'Italie's chief ordnance officer to inventory jewels and silverware in Milan's public depots and send them to Balbi*, 1^{er} prairial IV/20 May 1796.

⁷¹ CN, Tome I, n°475, *Bonaparte to Braccini and Paraviccini*, 2 prairial IV/21 May 1796.

⁷² See Appendix III.

⁷³ On 24 May, Saliceti narrowly escaped being torn to pieces by a crowd at La Gatta as he was traveling to Lodi. Rumours were circulating he had extorted twenty million *livres* from a neighbouring town and that the French had stolen thirty-five million from Lombardy in total. See Eugène Trolard, *De Montenotte au Pont d'Arcole*, Paris: Albert Savine, 1893, p.118 & Francesco Lemmi, *Le origini del Risorgimento italiano*, Milano: Ulrico Hoepli/Libraio della Real Casa, 1906, p.120-122.

*soldiers from entering his home, when in fact his behaviour lured them towards it. General Bonaparte ordered me to the scene and instructed me to take the money away... Later on General Bonaparte reproached me for not keeping the money myself.*⁷⁴

Saliceti claims he did his utmost to restrain pillaging, riding on horseback through the city and threatening all looters he encountered with death.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, Bonaparte awarded his troops twenty-four hours to pillage Pavia. Lucien Bonaparte, freshly arrived from Brussels to visit his brother, recalled that:

*This great city had been given over to pillage that morning. The blood hadn't been washed... The streets and squares had been transformed into open-air stalls where the victors were selling the spoils of the vanquished to hideous speculators.*⁷⁶

According to Count Azara – the Spanish ambassador to the Papal States – the looting was so considerable that spoils taken from the city were sold in the streets of Milan the following day, notably “*chalices and ciboriums filled with wafers.*”⁷⁷ A large convoy of twenty wagons laden with spoils was sent via Voghera to Balbi in Genoa who estimated its total value at 3,465,000 francs of which 1,465,000 francs of jewels.⁷⁸

When the French first entered Papal territory on 18 June, they again resorted to their customary tactic of pillaging to pressure the Papacy into signing an armistice. The target this time was Bologna’s Saint-Dominic *monte-di-pièta*. Items confiscated from the repository’s vaults were examined on 30 August and valued at 3,259,537 French *livres*.⁷⁹ They were placed under seal, packed and sent to Balbi in Genoa. According to Saliceti, the sums seized in the city’s other public coffers amounted to over a million *livres*. In addition, a contribution of four million *livres* was imposed on Bologna – to be paid half in hard currency and half in kind within eight days. The commissioners Garrau and Saliceti

⁷⁴ Marmont, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.180. Cf. CN, Tome I, n°536, 13 prairial IV/1 June 1796.

⁷⁵ Trolard, *De Montenotte au Pont d'Arcole*, p.149.

⁷⁶ Iung (ed.), *LBM*, Tome I, p.140-141 – Napoleon had manoeuvred to appoint Lucien war commissioner at the *Armée du Rhin* after 13 Vendémiaire. But Lucien was posted to the *Armée du Nord*. After one month he grew tired and deserted, seeking his brother’s protection in Italy (*Ibid*, p.137-138 & 143).

⁷⁷ Gregorio Palmieri & Isidoro Carini (eds.), *Spicilegio vaticano*, Roma: E. Loescher & Co., 1890, p.393, *Azara to the Secretary of State*, 31 May 1796.

⁷⁸ Landrieux, *Mémoires*, p.71 – On 12 June, Bonaparte and Saliceti imposed an additional contribution of one million *livres* on Pavia to be levied “*on the wealthy who have the most contributed to the revolt.*” This to be paid within ten days and half distributed to “*the poor of the city, citizens imprisoned by the rebels, peaceful merchants who have lost the most from the rebellion and officers whose luggage has been pillaged by the insurgents*” (Silio Manfredi, *L'insurrezione ed il sacco di Pavia nel maggio 1796*, Pavia: Giuseppe Frattini, 1900, p.174).

⁷⁹ AN, AF/III/410, dossier 2262:48-57 – *Valuation of objects seized in the 112 safes of Bologna's Saint Dominic monte-di-pièta*, 13 thermidor IV/30 Aug. 1796 – Saliceti and Garrau issued their usual demagogical decree stating that gold and silver objects worth less than two hundred *lira* would be returned freely to their owners except for gold and silver plate (AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:112, 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796). The Senate of Bologna – the *senatus bononiae* – hypocritically issued a proclamation “*thanking the civilian commissioners for their actions*” (*Ibid*, dossier 853:113, 24 June 1796).



Figure 2:7
 The Revolt of Pavia, 7 Prairial IV/26 May 1796
 Drawn by Carle Vernet and engraved by Jacques-Joseph Coigny & Jean B. Dambrun, c.1799-1807
 © Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

commented not without irony that all proper formalities hadn't been observed but that French agents would be closely monitored.⁸⁰

One element which suggests Bonaparte was personally profiting from Balbi's network was the fact he had orchestrated the appointment of his brother Joseph – who was then residing at Genoa – as war commissioner to the *Armée d'Italie*. Napoleon instructed Joseph to act as Saliceti's agent in the Ligurian city:

⁸⁰ AG, B3/25. *Saliceti to the Directory*, 2 messidor IV/21 June 1796 – The Bolognese protested against the pillaging of their public coffers and sent a memoir to the Directory arguing the payment of four million in contributions should shield them from such excesses (AN, AF/III/71, dossier 289, plaquette 1 – *Request of the Bolognese deputies to the French government for the restitution of their monte-di-pièta deposits and stolen artworks*, 12 thermidor IV/30 July 1796). But Saliceti retorted that their contribution represented “spoils of war” and was not subject to appeal (AAE, Milan, 55. *Saliceti to the Minister of Foreign Relations*, 9 fructidor IV/26 Aug. 1796). When another 800,000 *lira* of hemp were extorted from the city, the Bolognese addressed another complaint to French foreign minister Delacroix, again to no avail (AAE, Milan, 55. *The deputies of Bologna to Delacroix*, 11 brumaire V/ 1 Nov. 1796).

*Saliceti, who is the government's commissioner with the army, and Chauvet, who is the chief ordnance officer, will employ you in Genoa such that your residence in that expensive city shall not be onerous for your fortune and useless to the country. My intention is that you remain in Genoa unless he employs you in Livorno...The family lacks nothing. I have sent it everything it needs. Fesch is in a good position here.*⁸¹

What Joseph's activities at Genoa exactly consisted in aside from his responsibilities as war commissioner is difficult to ascertain. His correspondence with Napoleon for 1796 is scarce because the brothers frequently met at army headquarters or in Milan to discuss matters directly. Nonetheless, we can reasonably assume Joseph coordinated or at least participated in transfers of plundered wealth to Balbi and likely managed the Bonaparte clan's interests in these shipments with his uncle Fesch. Their organisational set up predated the campaign, having taken shape in the aftermath of 13 Vendémiaire. Eight days after Napoleon was appointed commander of the *Armée de l'Intérieur*, he had already informed Joseph that:

*Fesch, whom I have tasked to correspond with you, will instruct you of everything which can be of interest to you...The family lacks nothing. I have sent it money, assignats, etc. I have only received 400,000 francs for you in the last few days. I gave them to Fesch, who will pass them on to you.*⁸²

Joseph did not linger in Genoa and was soon posted as ambassador in Parma and subsequently Rome (April 1797) – thereby further consolidating the Bonapartes' links with their commercial correspondents in Italy. Balbi's network owed its existence to the Directory's decision to use Genoa as an independent launderer, for any occupation by French troops would have severely impacted the city's economy. Nonetheless, Napoleon still planned to seize the Ligurian capital and was adamant it should pay an indemnity for the five French ships seized in its ports by the British.⁸³ Moreover, the imperial fiefs in Genoese territory (Arquata, Tortona, Massa, Carrara and Lunigiane) administered by Girola – the Austrian ambassador at Genoa – were offering asylum to counter-revolutionaries and isolated Austrian soldiers who formed companies of bandits known as 'Barbets' which made the region unsafe for French troops.⁸⁴ Thus in late June, Napoleon asked Faipoult to conduct an audit of Balbi's coffers with a view to retrieving the funds they contained before marching against the Genoese. Faipoult found 7,000 chests of money – excluding silverware, jewels and diamonds – on which the French government had already drawn 4,000,000 *livres* in bills of exchange. He advised Bonaparte that “*when you*

⁸¹ NBCG-1, n°404, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 19 pluviôse IV/8 Feb. 1796 – Fesch was then Bonaparte's secretary.

⁸² *Ibid*, n°s374 & 377, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 19 & 27 frimaire IV/9 & 18 Dec. 1795 – Bourrienne (*Mémoires*, Tome III, p.36) also claims that Fesch discounted the sequins Bonaparte brought back from Egypt.

⁸³ CN, Tome I, n°727, p.459, 18 messidor IV/6 July 1796.

⁸⁴ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.422-423.

are ready, you can send me a decree...for an imaginary pretext...which will not lead Balbi to conclude to a fall in trust...You can use the excuse of the falling value of diamonds and pearls in Italy.”⁸⁵ Napoleon eventually ordered Faipoult to collect Balbi’s funds and send thirty million francs to Paris.⁸⁶ But the project of invading Genoa had to be delayed until the spring of 1797 after an Austrian army under General Würmser entered Italy.⁸⁷

Bonaparte Decrees the Payment of his Troops in Hard Currency

On 20 May, Bonaparte issued a decree without consulting Saliceti or the Directory which constituted a step of major importance towards laying the foundations of his power. He decided the pay of all troops stationed in Italy would be delivered half in *assignats* or *mandats territoriaux* and half in hard currency. Since the pay of soldiers had been continuously increased to make up for the *assignat*’s depreciation, this measure equated to giving each soldier a considerable sum in coin. It was the first time Bonaparte passed a decree of his own initiative in flagrant violation of French law, and it remains unclear whether Saliceti already knew about the measure and approved it or was ignorant of Bonaparte’s intent.⁸⁸ He certainly appeared somewhat baffled in the report he addressed to the Directory about this, attempting to alleviate charges against Bonaparte and disassociate himself from the general’s actions:

I won’t hide it from you, the army has itself created its own resources through its conquests. It seems just that it should profit by them. Since contributions in conquered lands must provide funds in cash, the payment of half the army’s wages in hard currency – although it may not conform to the law – would constitute a kind of national recognition which its successes have given it the right to aspire to...If the (general) would have talked to me about it beforehand, I would have first observed that paying wages in this manner would consume each month a very considerable sum, that soon the product of all contributions in conquered lands would not suffice to pay it...I would have made him contemplate that since our army is operating in abundant conquered lands...this might create discontent in other armies...Finally, I would have objected that the law and your decrees officially presented contrary dispositions to the chief ordnance officer, and that it would have probably been best to ask and wait for your judgment.

Naturally, now that the army has welcomed “with eagerness” the general’s order, nothing more can be done. Our observations would be useless and even impolitic. I

⁸⁵ CIOCN, Tome I, p.311, *Faipoult to Bonaparte*, 6 messidor IV/24 June 1796.

⁸⁶ CN, Tome I, n°753, 23 messidor IV/11 July 1796.

⁸⁷ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.422-423.

⁸⁸ Bonaparte’s decree of 1 prairial IV contravened the law of 16 germinal IV/5 April 1796 and the Directory’s decree of 23 germinal/12 April.

*must remain quiet and only liaise with you about it, especially since the general assured the chief ordnance officer that he had received special instructions on your behalf authorising him to dispose of the funds levied as contributions in conquered lands as he judged convenient, and I could not expose myself to frustrate orders which you may personally have transmitted him...*⁸⁹

Saliceti added that:

There isn't the slightest disagreement between the general and myself...None other, I say it to you without the slightest hesitation, is more deserving of his country and none better than he can fulfil your hopes for the subsequent conquests to which you destine this army.

But he also warned the Directory a decision must be reached regarding Bonaparte's breach of the law:

*Everywhere, officers – instead of addressing themselves to the chief ordnance officer – are making requisitions themselves...I fear this disorder cannot be stopped and that if you don't purvey to it yourselves through your superior authority, the fate of conquests in Italy will be the same as those in Belgium, and that the resources of Lombardy will be consumed for nothing...*⁹⁰

It is difficult to assess on these words alone whether Saliceti was being genuine, feigning ignorance or even complicit in Bonaparte's actions. In any case, he ended his missive by announcing he would resign if these ills were not promptly resolved.

Bonaparte's decree of 20 May marks a turning-point in his early career, for it transformed the *Armée d'Italie* into a force of mercenaries loyal to him and obliged it to remain in Italy as long as France was unable to pay its wages in hard currency.⁹¹ Its significance did not go unnoticed by Adjutant-general Landrieux who noted that Bonaparte “*was not imposing in the slightest*” prior to its publication; but once in Milan, “*everything changed when he ordered his troops to be paid in silver: something which hadn't been seen in the army in four or five years...*”⁹² Moreover, the publication of this measure represented a clear declaration of Bonaparte's independence *vis-à-vis* the oversight of his commissioners – a move he appears to have carefully prepared, warning the Directory a week beforehand that:

⁸⁹ AG, B3/23. *Saliceti to the Directory*, 4 prairial IV/23 May 1796 – Note that neither Sciout nor Bouvier mention Bonaparte's decree to pay his troops in hard currency.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.297.

⁹² Landrieux, *Mémoires*, BN, ms. fr. 7981, p.841, footnote – Other military memoirs recording the decree include Thiébault, *Mémoires*, Tome II, Paris: Plon, 1894, p.64; François Roguet, *Mémoires militaires du lieutenant-général Roguet*, Tome I, Paris: Dumaine, 1862, p.244 & Pierre de Pelleport, *Souvenirs militaires et intimes de 1793 à 1853*, Tome I, Bordeaux: Didier et Cie., 1857, p.43-44.

*If you impose shackles of all sorts on me, if I must refer all my actions to the government's commissioners, if they are entitled to alter my movements, to remove or send me troops, do not expect anything good.*⁹³

Jacques Godechot draws a direct connection between the decree of 20 May and the Brumaire coup, claiming it was “*one of the first acts which set Bonaparte on the path towards military dictatorship.*”⁹⁴

Yet the Directory took no action against Bonaparte, merely encouraging its commissioner to continue working harmoniously with him.⁹⁵ How could it afford to alienate its victorious generals when it was being submerged by complaints from other fronts (notably Germany)? Ten days later, Paris had forgotten all about Napoleon's misdemeanour and was encouraging Saliceti to continue sending as much cash as possible to Balbi.⁹⁶ To further alleviate the government's scruples, Saliceti dispatched two million *livres* extorted from Milan back to France and sent a million to the *Armée du Rhin*.⁹⁷ Then on 30 May he shipped an extra three and a half million *livres* levied on Modena to Paris. “*You can start drawing bills of exchange on Mr. Balbi,*” Saliceti informed the directors, “*I will only deposit what is necessary in the accounts of the army's paymaster.*”⁹⁸ Bonaparte also cajoled the directors, assuring them they could count on “*six to eight million in gold or silver, ingots or jewels, which are at your disposal in Genoa with a leading banker.*”⁹⁹ Paris replied enthusiastically, authorising finance minister Ramel to draw ten million francs on the Genoese market against the security of Italian contributions and Balbi's funds.¹⁰⁰ Adjutant-general Landrieux astutely noted Bonaparte was sending the Directory “*bulletins doubled in gold*” which were “*making it fall into the general's dependency.*”¹⁰¹ The government's apathy would prove fatal, for several units composing the Parisian garrison on 18 Brumaire were drawn from the *Armée d'Italie*.¹⁰²

Following their victory at Lodi, Bonaparte and Saliceti also seized the opportunity to reorganise the army's supply system, eliminating all contractors whom they deemed

⁹³ CN, Tome I, n°420, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 25 floréal IV/14 May 1796.

⁹⁴ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.298.

⁹⁵ AN, AF/III/374, dossier 1860 – *The Directory to Saliceti*, 12 prairial IV/31 May 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome II, p.514.

⁹⁶ AN, AF/III/377, dossier 1899:42 – *The Directory to Saliceti*, 23 prairial IV/11 June 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome II, p.593.

⁹⁷ CN, Tome I, n°478, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 3 prairial IV/22 May 1796 & n°539, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 13 prairial IV/1 June 1796.

⁹⁸ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:88, *Saliceti to the Directory*, 11 prairial IV/30 May 1796.

⁹⁹ CN, Tome I, n°478, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 3 prairial IV/22 May 1796.

¹⁰⁰ CIOCN, Tome I, p.227, *Carnot to Bonaparte*, 23 prairial IV/11 June 1796.

¹⁰¹ Landrieux, *Mémoires*, BN, ms. fr. 7981, p.841, footnote.

¹⁰² Branda, *LPG*, p.154.

suspect and placing friends and associates in key positions.¹⁰³ Two important directives were issued from Millesimo and Tortona on 5 May. The first restructured the army's *service des vivres* while the second cancelled all supply contracts with private firms except for provisions the army still needed.¹⁰⁴ Clearly, the two Corsicans had decided to take over the army's administration as a letter from the war commissioner Boutier de Catus indicates:

*Bonaparte speaks only of shooting whomever disobeys his commands. He is general, ordnance officer, paymaster, while none of these officers know how to put him back in his place...*¹⁰⁵

On 22 May, Saliceti decreed the creation of new military depots to store 50,000 quintals of wheat, 6,000 quintals of oats and 4,000 heads of cattle. He instructed the chief ordnance officer – Lambert – to award the army's meat supply to Jean-Pierre Collot. This represented Collot's first major deal in Italy and marked the beginning of his ascendancy in Napoleon's entourage which would rise crescendo as the campaign unfolded. General Henri Clarke, who was sent to inspect the Italian front in December 1796, reported that "*it is whispered in the Armée d'Italie that the general has straw men among the military contractors, that Collot – the supplier of meat – is his man.*"¹⁰⁶ Collot was charged with assembling the four thousand cattle into a herd that would follow the army's rear-guard.¹⁰⁷ To establish the warehouses, Saliceti was forced to take money from the coffers of the army's paymaster – Le Gros – without informing him. When Le Gros complained, Bonaparte threatened to have him shot.¹⁰⁸ Napoleon doubled down on these tactics by issuing an order punishing pillaging soldiers with death and forbidding them to collect money without his express consent.¹⁰⁹ He also seized control of Lombardy's wheat supply and sold grain to the Swiss canton of Grisons in exchange for horses.¹¹⁰

¹⁰³ AG, B3/20. *The War Minister to Saliceti*, 12 germinal IV/1 April 1796 – Bonaparte had already alerted Carnot of his intention to "*establish considerable warehouses for wheat, a herd of 600 cattle in the rear-guard*" and "*redress the army*" (CN, Tome I, n°366, *Bonaparte to Carnot*, 20 floréal IV/9 May 1796).

¹⁰⁴ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:71-72 – *Decree appointing Hector Sonolet chief of the Armée d'Italie's supplies*, 16 floréal IV/5 May 1796 & *Decree abolishing supply purchases by entrepreneurs in occupied lands*, same date. See also two letters from Bonaparte requisitioning 100,000 francs from the army's coffers to pay French agents in Italy (AF/III/130:28-29, 15-16 germinal IV/4-5 April, 1796).

¹⁰⁵ Lucien Graux, *Boutier de Catus*, Paris: Ficker, 1930, p.83.

¹⁰⁶ AG, B3/36. *Report of Clarke to the Directory*, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796.

¹⁰⁷ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:73 – *Decree of Bonaparte and Saliceti on supplies*, 19 floréal IV/8 May 1796.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, dossier 853:78 – *Report of Legros to the Treasury commissioners*, 29 floréal IV/18 May 1796.

¹⁰⁹ CN, Tome I, n°615, *Order of the day*, 23 prairial IV/11 June 1796.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, n°614, *Bonaparte to Citizen Comeyras*, 23 prairial IV/11 June 1796 & n°769, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 2 thermidor IV/20 July 1796.

The Conflict with Pinsot over the Lombard Contribution

With the wealth of Lombardy – Italy’s richest province – now under French control, Bonaparte and Saliceti lost no time in decreeing the establishment of the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie* on 19 May 1796.¹¹¹ This new body was to supervise the collection of all tax contributions in Lombardy and was headed by three agents: Albert Maurin, future secret agent of the Directory; Reboul, a former legislator; and Patrault, Bonaparte’s former mathematics instructor at the *École de Brienne*.¹¹² But the agency only lasted three months (22 May–26 August). Its existence was cut short by a bitter feud pitting Bonaparte against the third civilian commissioner of the *Armée d’Italie* – Pinsot – which exposed how jealously Napoleon guarded control over his army’s finances.

Pinsot, about whom almost nothing is known, was appointed commissioner on 24 May.¹¹³ He arrived in Milan with his wife on 7 June and settled in the Palazzo Greppi.¹¹⁴ The following day he met Bonaparte and observed disappointedly that “*the general had been repeatedly warned against me.*”¹¹⁵ Godechot suggests Saliceti had probably been the instigator of these warnings;¹¹⁶ but Saliceti himself claims Bonaparte was angry with Pinsot because the new commissioner had received instructions to liaise directly with the finance minister rather than with the Directory.¹¹⁷

Two days later (10 June), Pinsot suddenly placed the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie* under his control and wrote to all its agents announcing they should henceforth report to him.¹¹⁸ Bonaparte and Saliceti only agreed to this because they expected Pinsot would soon be recalled.¹¹⁹ But instead of returning to Paris, Pinsot began to initiate changes in the agency and its method of partitioning taxes which sparked a major conflict with the Milanese

¹¹¹ This decree suppressed the *Giunta, Magistrato politico camerale* and *Conseil des Décurions* which controlled Lombard tax collection. All documents relating to the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie* are kept in AN, AF/III/183, dossier 841.

¹¹² Bouvier, *Bonaparte en Italie*, p.613 & AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:83 – *Saliceti to the Directory*, 4 prairial IV/23 May 1796 – The agency’s role was to supervise the Lombard Congress of State in Milan (to which it transferred all contribution orders) and determine tax repartition. Collected funds were paid into the agency’s *caisse centrale* controlled by the commissioners (Saliceti, Garrau and later Pinsot). All military agents in Lombardy and even some in Piedmont were under its orders. They reported directly to Bonaparte or Saliceti and filed summaries of their accounts every *décade*. They also oversaw *biens domaniaux* and monitored courts and public opinion. Sciout (*Le Directoire*, Tome I, p.648-649) claims these agents were “*Bonaparte’s pashas*” who committed “*ignoble outrages to Catholicism*” and “*unspeakable profanities*”.

¹¹³ AN, AF/III/373, dossier 1843 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome II, p.455 – See his entry in the Biographical Index.

¹¹⁴ AN, AF/III/410, dossier 2262:47 – *Pinsot’s account of his mission in Italy*, 4 brumaire V/25 Oct. 1796.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid* – Sciout (*Le Directoire*, Tome I, p.679) maintains that “*Bonaparte welcomed Pinsot quite well.*”

¹¹⁶ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.379-380.

¹¹⁷ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:99 – *Saliceti to the Directory*, 23 prairial IV/11 June 1796.

¹¹⁸ AN, AF/III/183, dossier 841:2 – *Agence militaire de Lombardie’s accounts from 3 prairial-9 fructidor IV (Brumaire V)* & AG, B3/25. *Pinsot to the military agents of Lombardy*, 22 prairial IV/10 June 1796.

¹¹⁹ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.381.

municipality. Learning that nothing had yet been organised to collect the Lombard contribution of twenty million *livres*, Pinsot ordered the municipality to confer with the Lombard Congress of State – as other Lombard towns did – instead of negotiating directly with him.¹²⁰ Then on 25 June, he summoned the municipality to the Palazzo Greppi where General Despinoy drew his sabre and threatened the Milanese officials. The Lombard Congress was ordered to elaborate a new plan spreading the contribution more equally among social classes (unlike Saliceti who had imposed the wealthiest citizens the most) – a move which elicited mixed reactions.¹²¹

Pinsot's intervention in the affairs of the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie* turned his colleagues against him. Garrau and Saliceti held an audience with the Milanese municipality in mid-June and devised a plan to concert their efforts with Bonaparte and Laporte (head of the *Compagnie Flachet*) to engineer Pinsot's recall. Saliceti complained to Barras that Pinsot's changes were delaying the collection of Lombard taxes and could jeopardise the army's campaign.¹²² Garrau told his friend Carnot there were too many civilian commissioners attached to the *Armée d'Italie* which resulted in confusion and delays. Moreover, he declared Pinsot had been “*won over by Milanese bankers*” and spread “*indiscretions on the government and each one of us in particular which leave no doubt as to his principles and sentiments.*”¹²³ Laporte confided to his friend Reubell that:

*The arrival of Pinsot and his system...of [tax] repartitions has hindered everything and nothing is coming in. Everything here is military, and everything must be done militarily rather than financially. With four words, the general would accomplish a hundred more things than Pinsot ever could with all his paperwork...*¹²⁴

Finally, Bonaparte administered the *coup de grâce*, informing the Directory that:

As to the administration, it is hardly going well, we are not benefiting from anything. There is neither order, nor work, nor activity... You can appreciate that when each authority, each municipality address themselves indistinctively to one of the three commissioners, and to myself, and that each answers according to his own opinion,

¹²⁰ AN, AF/III/410, dossier 2262:47– *Pinsot's account of his mission in Italy*, 4 brumaire V/25 Oct. 1796.

¹²¹ Giuseppe Greppi observed that “*the views of commissioner Pinsot on the perception of the extraordinary tax will soon revive confidence, credit, and security*” (Greppi, *La rivoluzione francese nel carteggio di un osservatore italiano*, Tome III, Milano: Ulrico Hoepli, 1904, p.28 – *Giuseppe to his father Antonio*, 15 June 1796). By contrast, the Italian economist and philosopher Pietro Verri noted that: “*Pinsot...doesn't appear disposed to make war on aristocrats, but is far busier gathering money to send to the Armée du Rhin...*” (Pietro & Alessandro Vieri, *Lettere e Scritti inediti*, Tome IV, Milano: Giuseppe Galli, 1881, p.218 – *Pietro Verri to his brother Alessandro*, 11 June 1796). Sciout (*Le Directoire*, Tome I, p.679) comes closer to the mark when he states that “[Pinsot's system] *neither satisfied the revolutionaries nor the military contractors.*”

¹²² AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:111 – *Garrau and Saliceti to the Directory*, 2 messidor IV/20 June 1796 & Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.154.

¹²³ AG, B3/25. *Garrau to Carnot*, 2 messidor IV/20 June 1796.

¹²⁴ AF/III/185, dossier 853:110 – *Laporte to Reubell*, 2 messidor IV/20 June 1796.

*it is no longer possible to maintain a single line of thought and to follow the same plan, especially when your agents are multiplied and disagree with one another.*¹²⁵

Napoleon's behaviour during this conflict is revealing. He retained a composed and calculating attitude throughout, carefully avoiding the temperamental outbursts to which he was prone later in his career. He backed Pinsot against the municipality to speed up the collection of the Lombard contribution, enjoining him to distribute funds to the army;¹²⁶ and even had the audacity to tell Pinsot he hadn't written disparagingly about him to the Directory.¹²⁷ In reality, Bonaparte was expecting Pinsot's recall at any moment, and this eventually occurred on 30 June.¹²⁸ It appears the real reason behind his recall was that he didn't favour the Italian *jacobins*.¹²⁹

Pinsot's recall provided Saliceti and Garrau the opportunity to abolish the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie*. On 18 August, they informed Paris the collection of the Lombard contribution was going well but that military personnel were increasingly confusing the treasury receiving Lombard taxes with the *Armée d'Italie*'s coffers. It would be best, they argued, to centralise all contributions in a single repository under their control.¹³⁰ Shortly thereafter, they disbanded the agency with the Directory's approval.¹³¹

To sweeten the pill and alleviate the Directory's concern about this decision, Bonaparte sent the jewels and diamonds stored with Balbi back to Paris before the army's main contractor – the *Compagnie Flachet* – could requisition them (see below). On 13 August, he informed the Directory that:

*The jewels and diamonds, Citizen Directors, which the army had sent to Genoa and which had been redirected to Paris before being brought back to Genoa, must be worth at least two or three million. I think it is in the interest of the Republic these precious objects be transported to Paris. The large number of foreigners in the capital will make the sale of these objects more profitable. Besides, I have learnt the Compagnie Flachet is to acquire them for 400,000 livres, which would be a ruinous affair for the Republic.*¹³²

The Directory responded:

¹²⁵ CN, Tome I, n°664, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, n°592, *Instructions for Citizen Pinsot*, undated (presumed 20 prairial IV/8 June 1796).

¹²⁷ Greppi, *La rivoluzione francese...*, Tome III, p.48 – As a result of their collaboration, four million francs were paid into the army's coffers, a million more was sent to the *Armée du Rhin* via Basel, eight to nine million were dispatched to Genoa to reimburse loans and contractors and five million were sent to Paris (Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.395-396).

¹²⁸ AN, AF/III/383, dossier 1958:86 – *Directory's decree*, 13 messidor IV/1st July 1796.

¹²⁹ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.400-401.

¹³⁰ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:188 – *Saliceti and Garrau to the Directory*, 1st fructidor IV/18 Aug 1796.

¹³¹ AN, AF/III/400, dossier 2150:92, *Letter from the Directory*, 17 fructidor IV/3 Sep. 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome III, p.526.

¹³² CN, Tome I, n°882, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 26 thermidor IV/13 August 1796.

[We] have immediately ordered the finance minister to bring to Paris the jewels valued at 400,000 livres which you estimate at two or three million. The Directory is satisfied by your monitoring on this essential occasion. Every day it feels how urgent it is for all friends of the Republic to denounce the numerous abuses which hamper its financial operations and redouble the inconveniences which an overcomplicated administration can incur in this important field... The assistance which the Armée d'Italie has provided the National Treasury is all the more valuable given the financial crisis... We will continue to recommend that both you and the government's commissioners should place all the sums which aren't indispensable to the various services of the army you command at the disposal of the finance minister...¹³³

Between 18 and 26 August, Saliceti and Garrau held several conferences with Bonaparte, chief ordnance officer Denniée, Laporte (*Compagnie Flachet*) and Lombard Congress members to establish a new administration for the collection of the Lombard contribution. Laporte even wrote to Reubell offering his ideas on the matter.¹³⁴ It was decided the Lombard Congress would collect all taxes and revenues in Lombardy in return for a pledge to provide a million francs to the *Armée d'Italie* every month.¹³⁵ The money – along with all contributions levied – was to be paid into a central repository supervised by a certain Giuseppe Ceriani.¹³⁶ In addition, the Congress promised to furnish 60,000 quintals of wheat to compensate the loss of indirect tax revenues. On 26 August, the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie* was disbanded and these new dispositions took effect.¹³⁷

Jacques Godechot has suggested the agency was dissolved because it did not grant Lombard patriots control over Lombardy's finances.¹³⁸ Others like Joseph Du Teil claim its dissolution signalled Bonaparte's intention of removing himself from Saliceti and Garrau's oversight.¹³⁹ While Napoleon didn't truly begin to act independently until January 1797 after the Battle of Rivoli, there is nonetheless some validity to these arguments. The Corsican general had written to the Directory that "*there must be a unity of military, diplomatic and financial thought.*"¹⁴⁰ But how could it not be in his interest to replace military agents he couldn't entirely control by Italian patriots who felt wholly in his debt and were consequently far better disposed towards him? Just as Bonaparte had transformed

¹³³ AN, AF/III/397, dossier 2121, *The Directory to Bonaparte*, 6 fructidor IV/23 Aug. 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome III, p.436.

¹³⁴ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:200 – *Laporte to Reubell*, 3 fructidor IV/20 Aug. 1796.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, dossier 853:205-206 – *Saliceti and Garrau to the Directory*, 9 fructidor IV/26 Aug. 1796 & *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau*, 7 fructidor IV/24 Aug. 1796.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, dossier 853:190 – *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau*, 2 fructidor IV/19 Aug. 1796.

¹³⁷ Military agents in Lombardy were renamed "*commissioners in charge of the manorial revenues of Lombardy*". Mallet du Pan accused them of grotesque exactions (*Correspondance avec la Cour de Vienne*, Tome II, Paris: Plon, 1884, p.148). His claim may not be entirely unfounded since Bonaparte instituted a commission to investigate them (CN, Tome I, n°937, *Decree*, 13 fructidor IV/30 Aug. 1796).

¹³⁸ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.410-411 – Saliceti was probably supporting the Lombard patriots as well.

¹³⁹ Du Teil, *Rome, Naples et le Directoire*, Paris: Plon, 1902, p.45-46.

¹⁴⁰ CN, Tome I, n° 664, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796.

his soldiers into mercenaries who were personally loyal to him by paying them in hard currency, he was now creating an entire fiscal administration answerable only to his command.

The Conflict with the *Compagnie Flachat*

Although Bonaparte's victories extended his control over the *Armée d'Italie*'s fiscal and military administrations, he soon discovered there were certain contractors whose political relations rendered too powerful even for him to sway. Chief among these was the *Compagnie Flachat, Laporte et Castelin* headed by Victor Flachat and François Laporte (a.k.a 'Delaporte') – a former deputy of the Haut Rhin who was close to the director Reubell and had assisted Fouché during his infamous mission at Lyon.¹⁴¹ The *Compagnie Flachat* had initially been mandated to supply wheat to the army. But on 7 July 1796, it secured a new contract stipulating that all seized merchandise and levied taxes in Italy were to be entrusted to it. In return, it promised to deliver all supplies to the *Armée d'Italie* and make regular payments at Huningue (Alsace), Paris and Hamburg one month after receiving the taxes and confiscated merchandise. Flachat was granted a commission of between 2% and 5% on these payments.¹⁴² Bonaparte and the civilian commissioners were not informed of this agreement, probably because the Directory feared their reaction.¹⁴³

It just so happened that a few days before the *Compagnie Flachat* signed its contract – a French force (the Vaubois division) had illegally marched through Tuscan territory and occupied Livorno on 27 June.¹⁴⁴ Livorno at this time was the most important Italian port in the Mediterranean, having supplanted Genoa and Venice as the principal trading centre for the Levant, and was the city with the greatest amount of hard currency circulation in Italy (approximately forty million *lira* per year).¹⁴⁵ The British maintained trading counters there and the port's capture would not only force them to evacuate Corsica but also represent a considerable commercial prize. The Directory had even drawn up a detailed report on Livorno signalling its most lucrative trading establishments.¹⁴⁶ Saliceti favoured

¹⁴¹ See the decrees they issued together (AN, AF/II/98:21-23, 7 nivôse II/27 Dec. 1793).

¹⁴² AN, AF/III/148A, dossier 695:9 – *Contractual agreement between the National Treasury and the Compagnie Flachat, Laporte et Castelin*, 19 messidor V/7 July 1796.

¹⁴³ Sciout, *Le Directoire*, Tome I, p.679.

¹⁴⁴ According to André-François Miot de Mérito (*Mémoires*, Tome I, Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1858, p.102, footnote 2), the French ambassador to Tuscany, the Republic of Lucca paid 600,000-700,000 francs in gold to the Corsican deputy Barthélémy Aréna, a friend of Saliceti, to avert a French occupation. Saliceti later imposed a 300,000 *lira* contribution on Lucca (30 September 1796) so that “*neither the passage of troops nor requisitions would be made*” on its territory (Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.423).

¹⁴⁵ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.458.

¹⁴⁶ AAE, Toscane, 147. *Note on Livorno*, 3 floréal IV/22 April 1796.

occupying the port and Bonaparte had already been instructed to march against it but had delayed for strategic reasons.¹⁴⁷

After Vaubois's men entered Livorno, the Directory instructed Saliceti and Garrau "*that all effects of enemy powers be sequestrated in compensation for our losses.*"¹⁴⁸ The French consuls in the city – Redon de Belleville and Lachèze – were ordered to dress an inventory of "*warehouses, merchandise and any other property belonging to [France's] enemies.*"¹⁴⁹ Assets of neutral countries were impounded.¹⁵⁰ Under pretext of requisitioning British goods, an embargo was placed on warehouses which completely ruined commerce. Most seized effects were sold on the spot to the highest bidder.¹⁵¹ The port's merchants were forced to advance 1,566,000 *livres* to forgo the verification of their accounts;¹⁵² while Livorno had to pay a million and a half Tuscan *lira* in contributions.¹⁵³ These measures were virulently denounced by Italian observers.¹⁵⁴

It was at this juncture that the *Compagnie Flachat* arrived at Livorno and demanded the confiscated merchandise be handed over in accordance with its contract. To add to the confusion Paris gave no precise directions, telling Saliceti to either sell goods directly or "*treat with those who wish to continue keeping them on their own account.*"¹⁵⁵ The Directory was clearly in an embarrassing position. It wanted to cancel Flachat's contract but dared not do so because of Laporte's friendship with Reubell. Thus, requests for instructions went unanswered and uncertainty prevailed.

¹⁴⁷ AN, AF/III/370, dossier 1810:30 – *The Directory to Saliceti*, 26 floréal IV/15 May 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome II, p.183 – Miot de Mérito recounts that: "*I insisted [with Saliceti] especially for the neutrality of Tuscany to be respected...but I soon realised the Directory's commissioner had very different views...It was the riches of this city which tempted his desires...*" (*Mémoires*, Tome I, p.87-88).

¹⁴⁸ AN, AF/III/386, dossier 1996 – *The Directory to Saliceti and Garrau*, 23 messidor IV/11 July 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome III, p.64.

¹⁴⁹ Godefroy Redon de Belleville, *Correspondance*, Tome I, Paris: Techener, 1882, p.30 & AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:144 – *Garrau to the Directory*, 24 messidor IV/12 July 1796.

¹⁵⁰ AN, AF/III/88, dossier 379:26 – *Belleville to the Directory*, 21 brumaire V/11 Nov. 1796.

¹⁵¹ Redon de Belleville, *Correspondance*, Tome I, p.38 & 96 – Belleville earned 1% commission on these sales (*Ibid*, p.84 – *Decree of Saliceti*, 1 brumaire V/22 Oct. 1796).

¹⁵² *Ibid*, p.275, *Valuation of merchandise seized at Livorno*, 13 messidor IV-7 brumaire V (1 July-28 Oct. 1796) by *Bockti*, 1 ventôse V/19 Feb. 1797.

¹⁵³ AN, AF/III/88, dossier 379:21 – *Belleville to the Directory*, 30 vendémiaire V/21 Oct. 1796.

¹⁵⁴ Count Azara, the Spanish ambassador to the Papacy, reported that "*what the French are doing at Livorno exceeds all tyranny*" (Léon Séché, *Les origines du Concordat*, Paris: Delagrave, 1894, Appendice I, p.188, *Azara to the Pope*, 3 July 1796). Count Fossombroni, the Grand Duke of Tuscany's minister, complained to Saliceti about the requisitions and exactions (Antonio Zobi, *Storia della Toscana*, Tome III, Firenze: Luigi Molini, 1850-1852, p.191 & Appendix, p.41). The Tuscan ambassador in Paris – Néri Corsini – filed several complaints with the Directory to no avail (AAE, Toscane, 148, 28 messidor & 3 thermidor IV/16 & 21 July 1796; AN, AF/III/88, dossier 377:9 – *Protest against French damages at Livorno and Pisa*, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796 & AF/III/185, dossier 853:174 – *Letter from Corsini*, 7 thermidor IV/25 July 1796. The French occupation sparked riots (AN, AF/III/88, dossier 379:6 – *Miot to the Minister of Foreign Relations*, 6 vendémiaire V/27 Sep. 1796).

¹⁵⁵ AN, AF/III/392, dossier 2066 – *The Directory to Saliceti*, 19 thermidor IV/6 Aug. 1796.

Events eventually turned in Flachat's favour. On 20 September, Saliceti and Garrau handed over all silk cloth and padding to the company.¹⁵⁶ Ten days later, it obtained a favourable ruling from the Directory and requisitioned all goods in Livorno's warehouses. The firm even attempted to seize everything in customs, lazarettos and public depots. Belleville was indignant:

Money is disappearing. I am outraged at the theft and brigandage which has been given pride of place by this host of crows which follows armies, by administrations of all sorts which are only composed of émigrés, by enemies of the people, by vendémairists...

He ended his missive by offering his resignation. What could have gone through Reubell's mind when he read this letter, given Laporte was his friend? The Alsatian director wrote the following note in the letter's margins:

*Send a copy of this letter to the finance minister so that he can order a prompt inquiry into the conduct of Laporte and Flachat, who generally stand accused of taking everything and of blatantly misleading the Republic while simultaneously making it appear in an odious light.*¹⁵⁷

Was this a condemnation or merely an expression of doubt regarding Flachat's conduct?

On 21 October, Saliceti allowed Flachat to auction all remaining confiscated merchandise.¹⁵⁸ The sale witnessed considerable levels of corruption. "*The appraisers have been corrupted,*" wrote Belleville, "*with merchandise estimated at the vilest prices but sold for over half and often two-thirds more than its estimated value.*"¹⁵⁹

When Flachat was asked to furnish accounts for the sale, its agents responded with haughty letters. Belleville was powerless and could only deplore his impotence to the foreign minister, describing how Flachat's henchmen:

...take all the hard currency, transport gold ingots and jewels, sell merchandise, furnish the army with bread and forage, pay bills of exchange – they are all businessmen... Those who would like to clarify things would find a great deal of obstacles to overcome.

Concluding his letter, he observed:

I believe it has been less difficult for the general-in-chief to vanquish the enemies of the Republic in Italy than it would be for an administrator to bring order to these

¹⁵⁶ Redon de Belleville, *Correspondance*, Tome I, p.62 – *Saliceti and Garrau to Belleville*, 4^{ème} jour complémentaire IV/20 Sep. 1796 & AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:194 – *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau*, 1 fructidor IV/18 Aug. 1796.

¹⁵⁷ AN, AF/III/88, dossier 379:10 – *Belleville to the Directory*, 9 vendémiaire V/30 Sep. 1796.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, dossier 379:21 – *Belleville to the Directory*, 30 vendémiaire V/21 Oct. 1796.

¹⁵⁹ AAE, Toscane, 148. *Belleville to the Minister of Exterior Relations*, 21 brumaire V/11 Nov. 1796.

*parts and force this multitude of vultures to content themselves with living off the pittance whose scraps they vie over.*¹⁶⁰

One need only look at the numbers to ascertain the raid on Livorno was a classic example of embezzlement on a grand scale during the French Revolutionary wars. The sale of seized British merchandise barely raised 700,000 *livres*.¹⁶¹ The multitude of goods auctioned by the *Compagnie Flachat* returned a meagre 1,300,000 *livres*.¹⁶² The sum total for all operations amounted to 3,556,000 *livres* – a far cry from the original forty million Pinsot had forecast, the ten million Saliceti had predicted, and seven million which Belleville notified Bonaparte on 16 October.¹⁶³ Instead of returning to Paris, most of the money had undoubtedly been pocketed by financiers. Napoleon was incensed, complaining to Paris that “*a swarm of Genoese speculators came to seize all these riches...the sole person [in charge of the sale] was replaced by commissions where everyone steals and accuses his neighbour.*”¹⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the *Compagnie Flachat*'s agents arrived in Lombardy around 28 July. They immediately seized the diamonds, jewels and silverware deposited with the banker Balbi in Genoa.¹⁶⁵ On 18 August, the company commandeered fine cloth, embroidered silks, canvases, etc.;¹⁶⁶ and on 24 August it was put in charge of mints.¹⁶⁷ Flachat even seized the contribution the Pope had paid as part of the armistice concluded at Bologna.¹⁶⁸ These flagrant abuses so infuriated Bonaparte that he resolved to rid himself of the company. On 12 October, in a virulent tirade addressed to Garrau, he meticulously enumerated Flachat's misdemeanours:

The Compagnie Flachat are a heap of scoundrels with no real credit, money or morality...I believed they were active, honest and well-intentioned; but the truth has to be acknowledged.

1) They received 14 million. They only paid out six, and they refuse to pay the bills of exchange issued by the Treasury unless they are given 15% or 20%. These disgraceful negotiations are openly conducted at Genoa. The company claims it has no funds but consents to pay bills when granted this 'honest' commission.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ AN, AF/III/88, dossier 378:98 – *Belleville to the Directory*, 23 fructidor IV/9 Sep. 1796.

¹⁶² Redon de Belleville, *Correspondance*, Tome I, p.100, *Decree of Garrau*, 4 frimaire V/24 Nov. 1796 & *Garrau to Belleville*, 7 frimaire V/27 Nov. 1796.

¹⁶³ AG, B3/26. *Saliceti to the Directory*, 25 messidor IV/13 July 1796 & B3/32. *Belleville to Bonaparte*, 25 vendémiaire V/16 Oct. 1796 – See Appendix III to put these sums in perspective.

¹⁶⁴ CN, Tome I, n°771, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 2 thermidor IV/20 July 1796.

¹⁶⁵ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:191-192 – *Decrees of Saliceti and Garrau awarding the Compagnie Flachat the sums required for the execution of their engagements.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, dossier 853:194 – *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau*, 1st fructidor IV/18 Aug. 1796.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, dossier 853:207 – *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau*, 7 fructidor IV/24 Aug. 1796.

¹⁶⁸ AG, B3/29. *The Compagnie Flachat, Laporte et Castelin to Garrau*, 29 fructidor IV/15 Sep. 1796 & AF/III/404, dossier 2202:28 – *The Directory to Garrau*, 4 vendémiaire V/25 Sep. 1796.

2) *They supply no quality merchandise to the army. Reclamations are coming in from all sides. They are even strongly suspected of having pocketed the equivalent of 80,000 quintals of wheat by issuing fake receipts and corrupting warehouse managers.*

3) *Their contract is onerous for the Republic, since a million weighing ten thousand pounds in hard currency could be transported by five or six coaches or sent by mail for five or six thousand francs, while it costs us 50,000, the Treasury having granted them 5% in their contract. Flachat and Laporte have few funds and no credit. Peragallo and Payan are bankrupt trading houses with no credit.¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, it is to these four people the Republic's interests in Italy have been entrusted. They are not merchants, but speculators – like those of the Palais Royal... Must we suffer that such people who are worse intentioned and more aristocratic than émigrés always accompany the Russian minister in Genoa yet enrich themselves at our expense?...*

You doubtless calculated your administrators would steal but still perform the service and affect modesty. They rob in such a ridiculous and impudent manner that all of them would be shot if I had a month's spare time. I constantly have them arrested and taken before military courts. But judges can be bought. It's a circus here, everything is for sale...

What we need as agents are not fiddling speculators but men endowed with great fortunes and character. I have only spies. There isn't a single agent in the army who doesn't desire our defeat, not one who doesn't correspond with the enemy...¹⁷⁰

Bonaparte further noted that Thévenin, the head of military transports and main representative of the *Compagnie Cerf Berr et Lanchère*, was a thief prone to insulting displays of luxury who should be jailed for his association with émigrés and pay 500,000 francs of war tax.¹⁷¹ Four days later, Napoleon informed Garrau of his intention to imprison Mr. Peragallo, one of Flachat's representatives at Genoa:

I pray you warn this company that if Mr. Peragallo...comes to Lombardy, I will put him in prison. I have strong reasons to believe this man has links to the Russian minister in Genoa. Besides I have been informed I am surrounded by spies. The company's employees in Livorno are mostly émigrés.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Peragallo and Payan were two of the company's associates.

¹⁷⁰ CN, Tome II, n°1088, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 21 vendémiaire V/12 Oct. 1796.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid* – Bonaparte had already complained to war minister Petiet that “*the Cerf Berr Company and those responsible for supplying foodstuffs and hospital provisions to the army are robbing the Republic in the most culpable manner*” (AN, AF/III/183, dossier, 840:19 – *Bonaparte to the War Minister*, 27 prairial IV/15 June 1796). A Lombard patriot named Henri Michel Laurora filed a complaint claiming Thévenin had accumulated ten million in hard currency. Another supply agent – Barey – had sold twenty wagons of wheat and several other objects for five million; while two bureaucrats – an inspector named Sudicelli and an equipment agent called Emont – had diverted several millions. Their wives, “*taken from the Palais Royal*”, had so many “*diamonds, jewels, laces and dresses that no princess could have imitated them*” (AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:214, *Laurora to Carnot*, 18 fructidor IV/4 Sep. 1796).

¹⁷² CN, Tome II, n°1093, *Bonaparte to Garrau*, 25 vendémiaire V/16 Oct. 1796.

On 3 November he insisted Garrau pressure Flachats for money, enjoining him to “*make sure it deposits a million francs with the paymaster...*”¹⁷³

Garrau issued two decrees to compel the company to fulfil its contractual obligations. It was to sell the merchandise put at its disposal to supply the army within twenty-four hours and was given ten days to hand over an account of all the wheat and money it had furnished since the beginning of the campaign.¹⁷⁴ But the Directory hesitated to sanction Laporte and took no decisive action. Bonaparte decided to up the ante and on 20 November instructed Garrau to oblige Flachats to pay all the money it owed from the sale of its merchandise at Livorno within 48 hours.¹⁷⁵ A few days later, the Directory broke Flachats’ contract and instructed Faipoult, French ambassador in Genoa, to audit its accounts – although the company was to continue supplying the army.¹⁷⁶ Naturally, it did no such thing and on 13 December Bonaparte threatened Flachats’ directors with arrest.¹⁷⁷ The following day, he ordered General Baraguey d’Hilliers to have the company’s agent in Milan – Rouillet – imprisoned.¹⁷⁸

But the *Compagnie Flachats* paid no heed to these threats; and even after the recall of the civilian commissioners in December 1796 left Bonaparte in complete control of operations, he was still unable to bring it to heel. In a letter to the Directory dated 6 January 1797, he fumed against the company and demanded its agents be arrested in Paris:

*The Compagnie Flachats [has] perhaps earned three million via false payments. This company owes the army five million in contributions. The army paymaster has drawn 600,000 francs on its trading house in Genoa to pay troops. It had the impudence to decline them...I closed their counters in Livorno and Genoa. I pray you give orders to have the agents of this company arrested in Paris. They are the greatest crooks in all of Europe...I wanted to have Flachats and his brother-in-law (the company’s representative in Milan) arrested...but the scoundrels escaped.*¹⁷⁹

Napoleon also blamed the Treasury for failing to act:

*I have written to the Treasury about its indecent conduct concerning the Compagnie Flachats...Not only does [it] refuse to pay the army’s wages and furnish it needs, it also protects these scoundrels who come to the army to enrich themselves.*¹⁸⁰

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, n°1147, *Bonaparte to Garrau*, 13 brumaire V/3 Nov. 1796.

¹⁷⁴ AG, B3/32. *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau*, 26 vendémiaire V/17 Oct. 1796.

¹⁷⁵ CN, Tome II, n°1204, *Bonaparte to Garrau*, 30 brumaire V/20 Nov. 1796.

¹⁷⁶ AN, AF/III/66, dossier 270, plaquette 1 – *Faipoult to the Directory*, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796 – Flachats’ contract was terminated around 21 November.

¹⁷⁷ CN, Tome II, n°1281, *Bonaparte to Citizens Peragallo, Flachats & Cie.*, 23 frimaire V/13 Dec. 1796.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*, n°1283, *Bonaparte to General Baraguey d’Hilliers*, 24 frimaire V/14 Dec. 1796.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, n°1363, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 17 nivôse V/6 Jan. 1797.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, n°1427, *Bonaparte to Carnot*, 9 pluviôse V/28 Jan. 1797.

General Clarke concurred with Bonaparte's assessment, branding Flachet "a monstrosity."¹⁸¹ When its representatives returned to Paris, they were apprehended on 8 February 1797 but released by Carnot who feared their arrest might alienate businessmen from the Directory. "They are connected to so many accomplices, they are rendered so powerful by the mere act of their rapines," lamented Barras rather ironically.¹⁸² Napoleon later claimed Barras had actually received the company's managers upon their return to Paris and that it was La Revellière who had ordered their arrest.¹⁸³ Refusing to concede, Bonaparte took advantage of the *conseil militaire*'s presence at his headquarters during the negotiations at Leoben to file charges against the company.¹⁸⁴ But on 19 December 1797, it was cleared of all charges by the *conseil de guerre de la justice militaire* and none of its directors were punished.¹⁸⁵

There is no doubt Bonaparte's negative experience with the *Compagnie Flachet* profoundly impacted his appreciation of contractors. Moreover, the fact the army's civilian commissioners failed to reprimand this firm's repeated infractions revealed how weak the Directory's authority was in Italy; and since Napoleon's army suffered from its infringements, he gradually turned against the regime. Yet the *Compagnie Flachet* was but one of many abusive contractors who plagued Italy. As Barras noted: "Soon there were almost as many tax officials and commissioners as there were officers in the army, who appropriated themselves a good portion of contributions..."¹⁸⁶

The Conflict with Garrau

Bonaparte had already manoeuvred to obtain the recall of the *Armée d'Italie*'s third civilian commissioner – Pinsot – in July 1796. But his dislike of Pinsot was nothing compared to his feud with the army's second commissioner: Pierre-Ansèlme Garrau. Relations between the two had rapidly deteriorated due to several diplomatic blunders Garrau committed following his arrival. The first occurred in mid-June during a dinner hosted at the Gnudi Palace for Tuscan officials attending the papal negotiations at Bologna, when Garrau let slip the French would not march on Rome and confirmed Livorno would

¹⁸¹ AG, B3/36. *Report of Clarke to the Directory*, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796.

¹⁸² Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.310-311. See also AF/III/81, dossier 337, plaquette 4 – *Two reports on the civilian commissioners sent to the armies of the Rhine, Helvetia and Italy (messidor VII)*.

¹⁸³ Gaspard Gourgaud, *Journal intégral*, edited by Jacques Macé, Paris: Perrin, 2019, p.317.

¹⁸⁴ CN, Tome II, n°1728, *Bonaparte to Berthier*, 25 germinal V/14 April 1797.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p.50, footnote 1.

¹⁸⁶ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.250.



Figure 2:8
Portrait of Pierre-Ansèlme Garrau
Engraving by an unknown artist, c.1796
© Civica raccolta delle Stampe, Milano
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain.




Figure 2:9
*General Bonaparte as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armée d'Italie*
by Jean-Sébastien Rouillard, 1836
Château de Versailles
© Château de Versailles/RMN
Photo: Christophe Fouin
Authorised for non-commercial use

be occupied, prompting a fierce response from Bonaparte.¹⁸⁷ The Tuscans immediately warned the British and sixty-seven ships of the Royal Navy slipped out of Livorno harbour laden with goods the day before the French arrived.¹⁸⁸

Then on 23 June Bonaparte, Saliceti and Garrau met Count Azara – the Spanish ambassador to the Vatican – whom the Pope had delegated to conduct negotiations on his behalf. Napoleon demanded an indemnity of forty million.¹⁸⁹ In desperation, Azara turned to the commissioners and Garrau rashly admitted the French were incapable of marching on Rome at that moment. Bonaparte was furious and reported in frustration: “*It was then only possible to extort twenty million by conducting a night march on Ravenna.*”¹⁹⁰ He complained about the outcome of negotiations:

*This manner of negotiating with three agents is absolutely prejudicial to the interests of the Republic, because a skilful negotiator can play us against one another and acquire from one what he wasn't able to obtain from the other. This negotiation, in which the Republic lost ten million, has been extremely disagreeable for me in that I have lost, in part, my movement on Bologna...*¹⁹¹

The Bologna conference instilled a profound resentment in Bonaparte against the civilian commissioners and convinced him of their incompetence and unreliability.¹⁹² When the Austrian general Würmser suddenly counter-attacked in northern Italy in late July, Napoleon found himself unexpectedly short of supplies and blamed Garrau. He suspected the second commissioner was surreptitiously limiting his provisions and even warned him that: “*I know you are repeating the word that ‘I will act like Dumouriez’.*”¹⁹³

The contractor Antoine-Romain Hamelin, who was in Bonaparte's entourage at this time, has left us memoirs which constitute an invaluable reference on the Italian Campaign.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁷ CN, Tome I, n°685, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 8 messidor IV/26 June 1796.

¹⁸⁸ AG, B3/25. *Saliceti and Garrau to the Directory*, 12 messidor IV/30 June 1796 – The Tuscan envoys were Prince Tommas Corsini (brother of the Tuscan ambassador in Paris) and Lorenzo Pignotti – former professor of Saliceti and Joseph Bonaparte at the University of Pisa.

¹⁸⁹ In a preliminary meeting with Azara on 20 June Bonaparte had exploded, claiming he had the right to demand as much from the Pope as if he were standing on the Capitoline Hill. He became so angry he allegedly tore a report to pieces with his teeth. The incident was probably staged for effect (Gregorio Palmieri & Isidoro Carini (eds.), *Spicilegio Vaticano*, Roma: E. Loescher & Co., 1890, p.408-409, *Azara to Marquess Gnudi*, 22 June 1796 & Du Teil, *Rome, Naples et le Directoire*, p.148).

¹⁹⁰ CN, Tome I, n°685, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 8 messidor IV/26 June 1796 – The Pope agreed to pay 21 million (of which 15 in hard currency) and give 100 works of art and 500 manuscripts. French troops occupied Ancona's citadel and were granted free access to Papal territory. Papal ports were closed to French enemies (AAE, Rome, supplément 20. *Armistice concluded between Saliceti, Garrau, Bonaparte and the Pope*, 5 messidor IV/23 June 1796). The agreement was broken following Würmser's counter-offensive.

¹⁹¹ CN, Tome I, n°685, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 8 messidor IV/26 June 1796.

¹⁹² Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.434.

¹⁹³ CN, Tome I, n°773, *Bonaparte to Garrau*, 2 thermidor IV/20 July 1796 – The Directory sent Garrau a call to order (AN, AF/III/392, dossier 2057, 14 thermidor IV/1st Aug. 1796 & Debidour, *RADE* Tome III, p.242) and informed Bonaparte it was saddened by their confrontation (*Ibid* & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome III, p.245).

¹⁹⁴ Antoine-Romain Hamelin, ‘Douze ans de ma vie’, *La Revue de Paris*, Vol. 6, novembre-décembre 1926: 5-24 (part 1), 281-309 (part 2), 544-566 (part 3), 811-839 (part 4) – see his entry in the Biographical Index.

He notes there were rumours Saliceti and Garrau had toasted the health of the “*little general on the banks of the Po.*”¹⁹⁵ During one of their meetings, Bonaparte asked them: “*Why haven’t you sent me all I asked for?*” To which they replied: “*General, the difficulties were great, and the time constraints short.*” Bonaparte then threatened them: “*If everything is not delivered to Ferrara within eight days, I will have you put in chains on a cart and led back to Paris.*”¹⁹⁶ Hamelin claims that Monglas – an assistant of the commissioners – believed they were “*the general’s secret enemies whom he only outplayed through his victories.*”¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, the *Armée d’Italie*’s coffers were empty and Bonaparte was forced to advance all his personal funds to cover its immediate costs – 600,000 francs – which he obtained from Collot.¹⁹⁸ On 20 August, Laporte informed Reubell that “*there are a few little conflicts between the civilian and military authorities about which it is wiser to confer with you by speech than in writing.*”¹⁹⁹ These disputes must therefore have been quite serious and indicate Bonaparte was mistrustful of his commissioners’ conduct.

With Saliceti spending most of his time at Livorno preparing the Corsican expedition, Napoleon was left to deal with Garrau in Milan. Their quarrel soon escalated when the chief ordnance officer – Denniée – informed Garrau on 9 September that the army needed a whopping 10,600,000 francs to operate for the month of Vendémiaire Year V alone.²⁰⁰ Garrau was stunned by this request and complained to the Directory: “*...the army has become a terrifying chasm. When chief ordnance officer Lambert was in charge of the service, three million were not even spent per month.*”²⁰¹

Garrau claimed the army’s services were composed of “*inapt men, badly-intentioned scoundrels,*” ominously concluding that: “*The army’s victories shroud the guilty, there is the truth!*”²⁰² His report forced the Directory to take action and an ordnance officer named

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.23.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p.16.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p.20.

¹⁹⁹ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:200 – *Laporte to Reubell*, 3 fructidor IV/20 Aug. 1796.

²⁰⁰ AG, B3/29. *Denniée to Garrau*, 23 fructidor IV/9 Sep. 1796 – The expenses were broken down as follows: soldiers’ pay – 1,500,000; subsistence – 3,470,000; forage – 1,000,000; clothing – 2,000,000; equipment – 1,030,000; various expenses – 1,500,000.

²⁰¹ AG, B3/39. *Saliceti and Garrau to the Directory*, 26 fructidor IV/12 Sep. 1796 – 9 million had been spent in Thermidor and Fructidor, already exceeding predictions by one million. Garrau thought 10.6 million was “*exorbitant for a month.*”

²⁰² AG, B3/30. *Garrau to the Directory*, 1^{er} jour comp. IV/17 Sep. 1796 – Upon receiving this denunciation, the Directory severely admonished Denniée: “*It goes beyond all convenience that you have delayed until now to submit a detailed account of expenses – whose use you monitor – to the commissioners attached to the army. The Directory...is disposed to believe that a profligacy perpetrated by different subordinate agents which has not been repressed as it ought to could have led you into illusion concerning total expenses.*” (AN, AF/III/403, dossier 2191 – *The Directory to Denniée*, 4^e jour comp. IV/20 Sep. 1796).

Leroux was dispatched to investigate Denniée and the military administration in Italy.²⁰³ Bonaparte was instructed to reduce the number of bureaucrats in his army.²⁰⁴ His attempts to save Denniée proved unsuccessful and Jacques-Pierre Orillard de Villemazy was appointed the army's new chief ordnance officer – the third in less than a year.²⁰⁵

We can see from Bonaparte's correspondence that this setback permanently embroiled him against Garrau and forever deterred him from accepting a civilian commissioner at his side again. He began lobbying for a restriction of the commissioners' powers, deviously pointing out that their accounts did not align with those of the *Compagnie Flachet* and requesting the appointment of a special commissioner to oversee army finances:

*I think a commissioner in charge of ordnance, tasked with overseeing contributions and independent of the chief ordnance officer, who would be assisted by a paymaster appointed by the Treasury, could effectively monitor the Compagnie Flachet since he would have the precise accounts of everything he has paid out and of the bills of exchange drawn on his coffers...detailed accounting duties shouldn't be conferred upon men who hold a moral and political responsibility. If your commissioners must only survey as per your instructions, they must never take action, and there is generally an unfavourable impression upon those who handle money...*²⁰⁶

Since Napoleon could not dismiss Garrau, he embarked on a subtle campaign of letter writing to amplify the commissioner's incompetence. Garrau became the cause of all the army's shortages and was blamed for a depreciation of 12% in the value of bills of exchange emitted by the army's paymaster.²⁰⁷ Bonaparte's underlying theme in all his missives to Paris was always the same: "*You should remove from your commissioners the right to dispose of public funds which should only belong to the minister of finance.*"²⁰⁸ When General Clarke later reproached Bonaparte for acting harshly towards the civilian commissioners, Napoleon replied "*that it was impossible for him to honour people who were universally despised and rightly so because of their immorality and incompetence.*"²⁰⁹

²⁰³ AG, B3/36. *The War Minister to Leroux*, 19 vendémiaire V/10 Oct. 1796 – Denniée attempted to justify himself by blaming his predecessors' squandering (AG, B3/30. *Denniée to the Directory*, 9 vendémiaire V/30 Oct. 1796 & B3/31. *Denniée to the government's commissioners*, 5 vendémiaire V/26 Sep. 1796).

²⁰⁴ AN, AF/III/407, dossier 2238 – *The Directory to Bonaparte*, 20 vendémiaire V/11 Oct. 1796.

²⁰⁵ AN, AF/III/418, dossier 2333 – *The Directory to Garrau*, 11 frimaire V/1st Dec. 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome IV, p.392. See Villemazy's entry in the Biographical Index.

²⁰⁶ CN, Tome II, n°1087, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 21 vendémiaire V/12 Oct. 1796.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, n°1249, *Bonaparte to Garrau*, 18 frimaire V/8 Dec. 1796.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*, n°1203, *Bonaparte to the Directory*, 30 brumaire V/20 Nov. 1796.

²⁰⁹ AG, B3/36. *General Clarke's report to the Directory*, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796 – These were entirely baseless accusations. Not a single document indicates the commissioners were universally despised, and the integrity of both Garrau and Saliceti was recognised by all, except Bonaparte of course. As for their incapacity, it was more a result of nearly insurmountable circumstances than of their indecisiveness. But Bonaparte was formulating these accusations by design, knowing they would find their way to the Directory (see Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.552-554).

The opportunity for Bonaparte to rid himself of Garrau arose when the Lombard Congress collected a contribution from the twenty-six wealthiest families of Lombardy. This measure led to countless complaints being addressed to Napoleon and provided him with the perfect excuse to undermine his commissioner's powers.²¹⁰ In an unprecedented act which lay beyond his remit and constituted a further step towards 18 Brumaire, Bonaparte staged a coup in Lombardy by replacing Garrau with General Baraguey d'Hilliers. On 25 October, the new incumbent received his instructions:

*The municipalities, the lenders (that is to say the mayors), enjoy a ridiculous independence – unlike many other services. The government's agents continue to steal, to intercede in police affairs and in everything which doesn't concern them. Remedy all these enormous abuses. As the foremost agent of the Republic in Lombardy, it is up to you to eradicate these abuses and re-establish things as they should be. The Congregation of State is necessarily charged with monitoring lenders and municipalities. It is her responsibility to keep you informed of all the previous disorders in Lombardy.*²¹¹

Bonaparte made no mention of the civilian commissioners in this letter and barely even mentioned them in his address briefing the Lombard Congress about this executive reshuffle.²¹² It was left to Baraguey d'Hilliers to inform the commissioners of their replacement in Lombardy and announce that Bonaparte had transferred their “civilian and administrative authority” to him.²¹³ Confronted by deposition, Garrau kept his composure. On 4 November, he notified Bonaparte that subordinating the Lombard Congress to Baraguey d'Hilliers contravened the Directory's orders and that deputies of the Congress had falsely accused his administration of theft:

*You have been induced into error concerning my agents by men whose interest it is to sow division between yourself and the government's commissioners, and who being unable to attack the irreproachable conduct of these commissioners, have impudently slandered the agents they employ...*²¹⁴

²¹⁰ Greppi, *La rivoluzione francese...*, Tome III, p.106 – Greppi to his father, 11 Oct. 1796.

²¹¹ CN, Tome II, n°1113, *Bonaparte to General Baraguey d'Hilliers*, 4 brumaire V/25 Oct. 1796.

²¹² *Ibid.*, n°1114, *Bonaparte to the Lombard Congress members*, 4 brumaire V/25 Oct. 1796 – “I authorise you to take all measures you may find useful by communicating them to the general in command of Lombardy and by obtaining his approbation...As for the seizure of all silverware in churches, I believe it to be necessary...I have referred the execution of this essential measure to the government's commissioners who will appoint an agent to liaise with you.” Thus, Napoleon was manoeuvring to lay the blame for the requisitioning of silverware on the civilian commissioners.

²¹³ AG, B3/34. *Baraguey d'Hilliers to the government's commissioners in Lombardy*, 5 brumaire V/26 Oct. 1796.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.* *Garrau to Bonaparte*, 14 brumaire V/4 Nov. 1796 – Garrau also asserted the seizure of silverware in Lombard churches would not yield any substantial funds and prove counter-productive.

Nevertheless, Garrau had little choice but to accept his replacement while informing Paris of Bonaparte's actions.²¹⁵ The coup's importance was not lost upon the directors. Barras noted that:

*Bonaparte, to remove himself from the civilian authority we had adjoined him, employed a determined course of action. Under pretext of involving the Italians more in our system by introducing them in the government, he distributed greater powers to the Lombard mission (the Congress of State) by imposing upon it no further control than the approbation of the general-in-chief.*²¹⁶

Yet in the end the Directory took no action against Bonaparte. Why? Because at this moment – November 1796 – it was being submerged by complaints from all its generals in the field (Moreau, Beurnonville and Bonaparte) who were demanding the suppression of civilian commissioners. With French armies defeated in Germany, the Directory dared not risk alienating its commanders for fear of losing support and strengthening its enemies. Thus, Bonaparte's move laid the ground for the creation of an independent Lombard state, eroded the authority of the Directory's representatives and represented a further step towards the 18 Brumaire.²¹⁷ The civilian commissioners were subsequently recalled in December 1796 after General Clarke filed a report advising their replacement and Bonaparte was left in complete control of the army's finances.²¹⁸

The Rise of Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller

Having shaken off the oversight of the Directory's commissioners, Bonaparte now turned to businessmen to manage his army's finances. The *Armée d'Italie*'s coffers would henceforth be administered by agents personally loyal to him instead of civil servants who

²¹⁵ *Ibid.* Garrau to the Directory, 14 brumaire V/4 Nov. 1796.

²¹⁶ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.339.

²¹⁷ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.531-532 – Ironically, Baraguey d'Hilliers and the Lombard Congress proved incapable of raising the remaining sums due on the Lombard contribution. By 30 November, only 16,602,852 *livres* had been collected of the twenty million owed. Garrau had to intervene and appoint new agents to clamp down on municipalities in arrears of payment (AG, B3/36, *Decree of Garrau*, 12 frimaire V/2 Dec. 1796). He issued dubious bills of exchange yielding 6% interest guaranteed on the Lombard contribution (Luigi Veladini, *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi stati pubblicati dopo il cessato governo austriaco*, Tome II, Milano: Presso Luigi Veladini, 1796, p.160, 10 frimaire V/1st Dec. 1796). Merchants who refused them were denounced and arrested. The *Armée d'Italie* 'borrowed' another 1,660,000 *livres* from various chambers of commerce of Lombard cities to meet its expenses (*Ibid.*, Tome II, p.171, 13 frimaire V/3 Dec. 1796). These were also forced to accept Garrau's bills as refunds for their loans (*Ibid.*, Tome II, p.171, 18 frimaire V/8 Dec. 1796).

²¹⁸ AG, B3/36. *General Clarke's report to the Directory*, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796 – On the same day Clarke filed his report – December 7 – the Directory informed Garrau that “*as of 1 nivôse next, the civilian commissioners attached to the armies of the Republic will cease to exercise the functions they fulfil*” (AN, AF/III/419, dossier 2346 – *The Directory to Garrau*, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome IV, p.430).

answered to Paris, and he had already selected the man to take matters in hand: a financier from Berne named Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller.

Often mistakenly presented as a *novus homo* who emerged from the Revolution's financial upheaval, Haller was in fact a veteran of the speculative crazes of the 1770s and 1780s who had earned his spurs working for Jacques Necker.²¹⁹ In 1791, he had relocated from Paris to Marseille where he became a protégé of Augustin Robespierre, Paul Barras and Jean-François Ricord (the deputy of the Var) during the Terror. Thanks to their patronage, he was appointed the *Armée d'Italie's administrateur des finances and munitionnaire général* in February 1794.²²⁰ Although he briefly fled France after 9 Thermidor, he was reinstated as the *Armée d'Italie's administrateur des Finances* and even promoted to *administrateur des Contributions et Finances* in 1796.²²¹ Bonaparte had met Haller during the Siege of Toulon along with a number of other financiers in Augustin Robespierre's entourage like the Genoese banker Aimé Regny (*Regny père et fils*).²²²

Haller's meteoric rise owed much to his connections and ability to position himself in the right place at the right time. His subtle character knew how to cultivate friendships in high places. Instead of clashing with the army's civilian commissioners, he ingratiated himself with them and gradually succeeded in gaining their confidence. This provided Haller with ample opportunities to enrich himself. The jurist Berryer, for instance, recalls how Haller immediately began extorting Milanese authorities following Bonaparte's capture of Lombardy:

*The day after [the Armée d'Italie] entered Milan, Haller had demanded a special contribution from the municipal authorities for the preservation of the Chapel of Saint Charles Borromeo in the crypt of the cathedral. Its walls, two of its confessionals and an oratory were made of massive silver. At the back of the chapel, in a transparent crystal coffin, lay the saint's body...Haller, having been unable to extract a ransom equivalent to the hard currency value of the chapel, suggested that an estimate be made by experts selected by both parties: he made sure to bring home that victory weighed down upon their side of the scale. Two million were paid to buy back the vast reliquary whose weight did not warrant more than 800,000 francs.*²²³

At first, Napoleon mistrusted this Swiss financier whom he described as “*a rascal who has only come to this country to steal and who has propped himself up as a financial intendant*”

²¹⁹ See Haller's entry in the Biographical Index for important details on his early career.

²²⁰ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.135 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.643 – Ricord was the *Armée d'Italie's* principal commissioner at this time.

²²¹ Hamelin, 'Douze ans de ma vie', p.304, footnote 1 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.645 – He undoubtedly owed this return to favour to Barras.

²²² Bruguière, *GPR*, p.140 – *Regny père & fils* stored diamonds at Genoa for the *Compagnie Flachet* (see Appendix VII).

²²³ Berryer, *Souvenirs*, Tome II, p.339-340.



Figure 2:10
Portrait of Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller
by an artist of the French school, c.1790
Musée Carnavalet – © Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain.

of conquered lands.”²²⁴ He had already ascertained Haller was an expert in the “*art of shearing both the vanquished and conquered peoples.*”²²⁵ But when Haller suggested a plan to Bonaparte to dissolve the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie* and centralise its revenues in a specially-created fund under his control, the proposal was accepted and Haller practically became Napoleon’s chief economic advisor overnight, supplanting even Saliceti.²²⁶ It was on Haller’s initiative that the Lombard Congress was entrusted with the government of Lombardy in return for a monthly payment of a million.²²⁷ According to Antoine-Romain Hamelin:

*Haller possessed the talents of the trade he had practised all his life and understood perfectly the handling of money. He proposed a centralising scheme through which all the capital would converge in the general-in-chief’s coffers who could then dispose of it as he wished. The plan was agreed, and Haller soon became controller-general of the army’s finances. The chief ordnance officer and the paymaster-general were nothing more than his premier commis.*²²⁸

Some have suggested that Bonaparte had already noticed Haller’s proximity to Barras as early as 1794. Barras himself relates how he gave Napoleon all his correspondence pertaining to the *Armée d’Italie*, including letters exchanged with Haller “*which contained the most precious information.*”²²⁹ These references supposedly convinced Bonaparte to solicit Haller’s services as soon as he arrived in Italy.

One way or another, an alliance was concluded which marked the first association between Bonaparte and an *Ancien Régime* financier. Haller’s ascendancy was enshrined by his appointment as director of the mint at Milan in a decree signed by Saliceti and Garrau which overrode the Directory’s objections.²³⁰ The commissioners apparently failed to grasp how deeply this opportunist could subvert their authority. When General Clarke arrived to inspect the *Armée d’Italie* in December 1796, he criticised Garrau and Saliceti for employing Haller as their chief financial officer. This “*former banker with daft opinions*” was “*more of a government commissioner than those who are invested with this*

²²⁴ CN, Tome II, n°1201, *Bonaparte to Garrau*, 29 brumaire V/19 Nov. 1796.

²²⁵ Ludovic Sciout, ‘Le Directoire et la République Romaine’, *Revue des questions historiques*, Tome XXXIX, janvier 1886, p.156 & Albert Dufourcq, *Le régime jacobin en Italie*, Paris: Perrin, 1900, p.117.

²²⁶ Hamelin (‘Douze ans de ma vie’, p.306) says Haller became the general’s ‘*right-hand man*’.

²²⁷ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.525-526 – Mallet du Pan, quoting an *Armée d’Italie* war commissioner, reported that: “*The administrations [of Lombardy] have been so badly composed that extortion and rapine have merely changed names [since the military agency’s suppression]*” (*Correspondance avec la Cour de Vienne*, Tome II, p.149).

²²⁸ Hamelin, ‘Douze ans de ma vie’, p.305.

²²⁹ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.75.

²³⁰ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:207 – *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau*, 7 fructidor IV/24 Aug. 1796.

title. *It is said here that he receives bribes for every order he has Garrau sign...*²³¹ In another report, Clarke observed:

*It is certain Haller holds much influence over [Garrau's] mind. I have been assured that this man who has been appointed director of the mint in Milan can do anything he likes, especially since there is no controller to examine his operations.*²³²

Clarke suspected Haller of having embezzled several cases of jewels in Modena following the creation of the Cispadane Republic. During the pro-French coup orchestrated by Saliceti in that city (October 1796), there had apparently been 1.2 million *livres* stored in public coffers; but only 400,000 were transferred to the army's paymaster and Clarke suspected that Garrau, Saliceti and Haller had shared out the remaining 800,000 amongst themselves.²³³ Moreover, the *Armée d'Italie*'s secret bureau had intercepted a letter addressed to Haller in which his nephew had written: "*You are in a position to rebuild your fortune and don't have a moment to lose.*"²³⁴ Bonaparte hesitated to order Haller's arrest but ultimately ruled he was indispensable to the army's finances and let the matter drop.²³⁵

Even if Haller did embezzle funds during Modena's revolution, the French still netted a handsome profit. After Duke Hercules III had fled to Venice, Garrau put all his goods under seal.²³⁶ The money in Modena's public coffers was sent to the central French treasury in Milan as payment for the city's contribution.²³⁷ When Modena was incorporated into the Cispadane Republic, its government was forced to buy back these confiscated assets. It offered the sum of 1,500,000 *lira* in silver or goods to be paid in monthly instalments of 300,000, plus the payment of Modena's military contribution. In

²³¹ Quoted in Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.558.

²³² AN, AF/III/72, dossier 291, plaquette 1 – *Clarke to the Directory*, 30 frimaire V/20 Dec. 1796 – Clarke believed Haller ingratiated himself with Garrau by "[speaking] in favour of Babeuf, and this passes for patriotism with Garrau whose exaltation has not been moderated and who is surrounded by supposed patriots and partisans of anarchy..." (Quoted in Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.558-559).

²³³ See AN, AF/III/72, dossier 291, plaquette 1 – *Garrau to Clarke*, 16 frimaire V/6 Dec. 1796. Clarke was unhappy that several coffers of Modenese contributions had been expedited to Haller's office in Milan without receipts (AN, AF/III/72, dossier 291, plaquette 1 – *Clarke to the Directory*, 30 frimaire V/20 Dec. 1796); but he failed to unearth any concrete evidence against Haller. For Saliceti's role in Modena's revolution, see Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.450-451. After the fall of Milan, Saliceti had already demanded 12 million *lira* from the Duke's younger brother – the Commander of Este – to "*make the [French] army forget the Duke of Modena had found his way into all the European coalitions against us*" (Landrieux, *Mémoires*, p.90, footnote 1). Landrieux claims Saliceti planned to use this money to purchase an estate worth 1.8 million but never received the funds (*Mémoires manuscrits*, BN, ms. fr. 7980, p.844 & footnote 4).

²³⁴ Quoted in Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.558 – Clarke refers to the letter in one of his reports (AN, AF/III/72, dossier 291, plaquette 1 – *Clarke to the Directory*, 30 frimaire V/20 Dec. 1796). Garrau hurriedly sent Clarke evidence there had only been 1,027,932 *livres* in Modena's coffers, and that the money which had not been transferred to the army's paymaster had been employed by Modena for its 'extraordinary expenses' (AN, AF/III/72, dossier 291, plaquette 1 – *Garrau to Clarke*, 16 frimaire V/6 Dec. 1796).

²³⁵ Branda, *LPG*, p.145 & Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.559 – Garrau offered Clarke to demote Haller but Clarke – probably on Bonaparte's request – declined.

²³⁶ AN, AF/III/72, dossier 291, plaquette 1 – *Decree of Garrau*, 16 vendémiaire V/7 Oct. 1796.

²³⁷ *Ibid* – *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau*, 24 vendémiaire V/15 Oct. 1796.

their letter reporting this ‘offer’ to Paris, Saliceti and Garrau wrote: “*we have finally wrested an additional 1,500,000 livres from a country already well-exhausted by a contribution which exceeds its means and for which the Duke contributed a third at most...*”²³⁸

As the campaign progressed, Bonaparte grew increasingly bolder in his treatment of Italian states and routinely employed contractors in his private dealings with them. One of these agents – Antoine-Romain Hamelin – recalled a memorable mission when he was dispatched by Napoleon to ‘recover’ one and a half million francs from the Venetian Republic:

*...since the Venetian lords did not like long speeches, I simply told them that I had orders to leave that very evening, either taking with me the fifteen hundred thousand francs or the refusal to pay them... They retreated again into the neighbouring room, this time for a conference of two hours which felt to me like two centuries. Finally I was recalled, and this time I saw a new character who told me his name was Ferralini, banker of the Most Serene Republic, from which he had just received the order to give me five hundred thousand francs in gold and a million in letters of credit. I went out with him, and after an hour my business was concluded.*²³⁹

Hamelin also describes how Bonaparte and Collot pillaged the silver mines in Istria near Trieste:


*The conquest of Trieste and its surrounding area had brought attention to the value of the mercury mine at Idria in Carniola. Collot, the supplier of meats, who at that time enjoyed the general’s entire confidence in financial matters, was sent there and found four to five million worth of silver ready to be put on the market. It was sold to him in a bogus transaction at a rate of twenty-four sous to the pound, the real market price being three francs. As a result, the army’s coffers received 1,200,000 francs. Collot, who took charge of expenses, received one million. The rest went to Bonaparte (about two million), but he distributed considerable gratifications to his officers. Collot stayed at Idria until all the convoys had arrived at Trieste. He then travelled there and asked me to take charge of the gratifications, handing me a list of recipients. I can’t recall all of them, but there were: 100,000 francs for Berthier; 50,000 francs for Bernadotte; the same for Murat and Friant; 12,000 francs for each of the general-in-chief’s aides-de-camp; 100,000 francs for the chief ordnance officer Villemanzy. The latter’s complacency had been necessary for this illegal transaction, and he entrusted the operation to a war commissioner who was so stupid that he was never even aware of the crime and received nothing.*²⁴⁰

²³⁸ AG, B3/32. *Saliceti and Garrau to the Directory*, 26 vendémiaire V/17 Oct. 1796 – France kept all the Duke’s properties and goods and inherited his rents. See also AG, B3/32. *Modena’s proposals to the Directory’s commissioners*, 23 vendémiaire V/14 Oct. 1796 & *Decree of Saliceti and Garrau ‘accepting’ these conditions*, 24 vendémiaire V/15 Oct. 1796. Haller was invited to reside at several of Count Greppi’s residences in Modenese territory (AAE, Milan, 55. *Decree of Garrau*, 7 brumaire V/28 Oct. 1796).

²³⁹ Hamelin, ‘Douze ans de ma vie’, p.285-287 – Hamelin conducted this negotiation instead of Mr. Lallement – the French *chargé d’affaires* in Venice since 1794 – who was judged too old and respectful of conventions to accomplish the mission!

²⁴⁰ Hamelin, ‘Douze ans de ma vie’, p.298.

Map I – The Exploitation of Northern Italy, 1796-1799



This map is based on a template used with permission under free license from [www.d-maps.com](https://d-maps.com) (https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=5890&lang=en).
 Battle, Silver Ingot, Statue & Treaty icons download and used with permission under free license from www.icons8.com.
 All other modifications created by the author.

There is no direct evidence proving the looted Istrian silver was sent to Balbi or Haller. But nothing discounts the possibility they assisted high-ranking officers in repatriating their kickbacks, especially since Hamelin's testimony clearly establishes that other key military administrators like Villemanzy were complicit in this spoliation. What is more, this account demonstrates how Napoleon used these types of operations to constitute his own clientele of officers and civil servants through an opaque system of generous personal payments.²⁴¹ His aversion to the Directory's bureaucrats led him to set up an unofficial bureau for confiscated funds and property overseen by Haller, Collot and other selected officials like the paymasters Martin-Roch-Xavier Estève and François Rouillet de la Bouillerie (both future Treasurers of the Imperial Crown).²⁴² This parallel agency prefigured the birth of the *Domaine Extraordinaire* – a much larger financial system mixing public funds and Bonaparte's personal fortune which took shape during his 1805 Campaign.²⁴³ These elements therefore suggest the financial trail of Brumaire leads back to the *Armée d'Italie*'s pillaging of Italy.

Following the civilian commissioners' recall in December 1796, Haller reigned virtually supreme over Italian finances. Bonaparte appointed him *administrateur général des finances et contributions d'Italie* – effectively making him his right-hand man.²⁴⁴ Perhaps, as Pierre Branda suggests, Napoleon felt it best to “hire a thief to keep an eye on other thieves.”²⁴⁵ What is certain is that from this point on, we find Haller involved in all kinds of dubious operations. He oversaw the collection of all “unnecessary church silverware” which Napoleon decreed be sent to Milan;²⁴⁶ and worked closely with General Baraguey d'Hilliers to collect contributions in Lombardy.²⁴⁷ Haller was also charged with comparing army headquarter accounts with those of individual divisions to uncover thefts.²⁴⁸ When Barras's secretary – Bottot – was dispatched by the Directory to attend the negotiations at Leoben, he brought 600,000 francs with him in bills of exchange issued on the credit of Querini, the Venetian ambassador in Paris. These bills had been paid as a bribe to Barras via one of the Serenissima's Parisian agents – a Dalmatian or Polish diplomatic fixer

²⁴¹ Branda, *LPG*, p.147 & 153.

²⁴² Bruguière, *GPR*, p.142 – See the entries for Estève and Bouillerie in the Biographical Index.

²⁴³ See Henri de Grimotard, ‘Les origines du Domaine Extraordinaire’, *Revue des questions historiques*, Tome XXXIX, 1908: 160-192; Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.350-356 and Branda, *LPG*, p.322-329 & 386-392.

²⁴⁴ Hamelin, ‘Douze ans de ma vie’, p.303.

²⁴⁵ Branda, *LPG*, p.146.

²⁴⁶ CN, Tome III, n°1781, *Order of the Day*, 19 floréal V/8 May 1797 – Napoleon later reproached Haller for the corruption of his agents, notably in Venetian territory where Verona and Belluno accused them of stealing silverware without compensation (*Ibid*, n° 1935, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 28 prairial V/16 June 1797).

²⁴⁷ CN, Tome II, n°1288, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 26 frimaire V/16 Dec. 1796.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*, n°1360, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 15 nivôse IV/4 Jan. 1797.

named Count Antoine Viscovitch – and Bottot attempted to discount them with Haller.²⁴⁹ When Bonaparte learnt this, he immediately suspected the Venetians were attempting to scuttle the Preliminaries of Leoben by bribing the Directory to conclude a separate agreement with Austria.²⁵⁰

Napoleon's increasing reliance on Haller is attested by numerous letters addressed to him in his correspondence. The Swiss financier was involved in practically every aspect of the Italian Campaign: raising funds, issuing payments, collecting contributions, overseeing army pay, expediting shipments of grain, wine and *eau-de-vie*, managing forestry rights and logging concessions, selling monasteries, etc. The following glimpse of his operations in 1797 demonstrates the range and industriousness of his activities. In February, he was ordered to assemble large stores of wheat, wine, salt and wood at Mantua (which had just surrendered) in preparation for Bonaparte's push towards Carinthia.²⁵¹ He also managed the financial arrangements for this attack, delivering 500,000 francs in hard currency plus a bill of exchange for 150,000 francs to Villemanzuy at Castelfranco, and sending another obligation of 80,000 francs to the paymaster at Mantua.²⁵² After General Baraguey d'Hilliers' troops occupied Venice in May, Haller's agents were instructed to impound all British, Russian and Portuguese assets in the Treviso district.²⁵³ Haller himself was specifically tasked with collecting contributions from Venice and seizing any funds the British crown had deposited in its banks.²⁵⁴ Bonaparte also instructed him to pay a million francs to Dominique André, a contractor based in Genoa, for supplies furnished over the preceding year.²⁵⁵ The following month, Haller expedited two million francs in coin to Paris drawn from the contributions of Venice and Verona;²⁵⁶ confiscated silverware from Venetian churches;²⁵⁷ transferred 1,500,000 *livres* to the army's paymaster at Treviso to cover two months arrears in soldiers' wages;²⁵⁸ and oversaw the sale of merchandise from Trieste's contribution.²⁵⁹ In August, he raised 600,000 francs to pay the wages of Admiral

²⁴⁹ See Viscovitch's entry in the Biographical Index.

²⁵⁰ Landrieux, *Mémoires*, p.278 & La Revellière, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.238-249. Thibaudeau (*Mémoires*, Tome II, p.305) claims Augereau's aide-de-camp, Deverine, travelled from Paris to give Haller the bills. Cf. Raymond Guyot, *Le Directoire et la paix de l'Europe*, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1911, p.529 (hereafter 'LDPE').

²⁵¹ CN, Tome II, n°1491, *Order of the Day*, 25 pluviôse V/13 Feb. 1797.

²⁵² *Ibid*, n°1547, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 16 ventôse V/6 March 1797.

²⁵³ CIOCN, Tome II, p.233, *Baraguey d'Hilliers to Bonaparte*, 27 Floréal V/16 May 1797.

²⁵⁴ CN, Tome III, n°1815, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 1 prairial V/20 May 1797 & n°1833, *Bonaparte to Baraguey d'Hilliers*, 7 prairial V/26 May 1797.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid*, n°1817, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 2 prairial V/21 May 1797 – See André's entry in the Biographical Index.

²⁵⁶ See the secret articles of Napoleon's treaty with Venice (*Ibid*, n°1804, 27 floréal V/16 May 1796) & *Ibid*, n°1877, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 18 prairial V/6 June 1797.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid*, n°1906, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 24 prairial V/12 June 1797

²⁵⁸ *Ibid*, n°1907, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 24 prairial V/12 June 1797.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*, n°1917, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 25 prairial V/13 June 1797.

Brueys' squadron;²⁶⁰ and in September he furnished three million francs of naval supplies to Brueys;²⁶¹ plus another 40,000 francs to help him convey Venetian ships in Corfu back to France.²⁶² He then travelled to Genoa to negotiate a loan with the Ligurian Republic on which the army could draw bills of exchange;²⁶³ and sought a similar arrangement from the Duke of Parma.²⁶⁴ Bonaparte was unquestionably appreciative of Haller's talents, acknowledging them in flattering terms from Mombello: "*You fulfil your important functions with too much zeal and intelligence for anyone to have the intention of harming you.*"²⁶⁵

But Napoleon's benevolence was motivated by more than mere gratitude, for Haller combined the enviable qualities of procuring money at short notice while not asking compromising questions. Witness the following exchange which implies Haller was shipping funds back to Paris while simultaneously setting hard currency aside for Bonaparte's personal use:

*I have written to your agent in Milan that he could print the million destined for Paris, taking care not to touch the gold ingots until he had received new instructions from you. You can always send 500,000 livres in gold to Paris, as I told you in my last letter.*²⁶⁶

When it appeared Austria was about to break off peace negotiations in October 1797, Bonaparte sent Haller an urgent missive for more funds:

*You can feel how necessary it is for soldiers and officers to be paid before going on campaign, and that I have 400,000-500,000 francs in gold at my disposal, and the chief ordnance officer the same. – PS: money, money, money!*²⁶⁷

After the Treaty of Campo Formio was concluded, half the *Armée d'Italie* was ordered back to France to form the backbone of Napoleon's new *Armée d'Angleterre*. The general took his financial dispositions without evening referring to Paris, instructing Haller to pay the troops a total of 3,200,000 *livres* as they passed through Milan.²⁶⁸ Once again, the

²⁶⁰ *Ibid*, n°2073, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 17 thermidor IV/4 Aug. 1797.

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, n°2156, *Bonaparte to Berthier*, 21 fructidor V/7 Sep. 1797.

²⁶² *Ibid*, n°2240, *Bonaparte to Brueys*, 1 vendémiaire VI/22 Sep. 1797.

²⁶³ *Ibid*, n°2268, *Bonaparte to the Ligurian Republic*, 9 vendémiaire VI/30 Sep. 1797.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, n°2275, *Bonaparte to the Duke of Parma*, 10 vendémiaire VI/1 Oct. 1797.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, n°1934, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 28 prairial V/16 June 1797.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid*, n°2286, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 15 vendémiaire VI/6 Oct. 1797.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid*, n°2337, *Bonaparte to Haller*, 19 brumaire VI/9 Nov. 1796 – Bonaparte directed Haller to exact as much as possible from the outstanding contributions owed by the Cisalpine Republic, Brescia, Rome and Genoa. Meanwhile, he would personally pressure Tuscany to lend two extra million and squeeze another two million from Venice, Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Modena, Mantua and Ferrara.

speculator from Berne was playing a central role in securing the army's fealty to Bonaparte.

Upon Napoleon's return from Italy, Haller ambitiously attempted to engineer his appointment as French finance minister. The Prussian consul in Paris, Sandoz-Rollin, reported that:

*Haller is here vying for the position of finance minister with much skill, affecting to tell everyone the resources of the Republic are immense, but that the independence which his own fortune affords him keeps from him any thought of ambition. His fortune is believed to amount to fifteen million francs, the fruit of his vexations as commissioner to the Armée d'Italie. General Bonaparte said of him that he could think of no mind more fertile in resources, nor of any soul more immoral...*²⁶⁹

Haller's efforts failed and he was appointed finance minister of the Cisalpine Republic instead.²⁷⁰

As long as Bonaparte remained in Italy his soldiers were paid quite regularly. But after his departure, Haller increasingly began to prioritise his own financial interests above those of the military which provoked great displeasure.²⁷¹ Army revolts over pay broke out across Italy in January 1798 just as General Berthier – Bonaparte's successor in Italy – was instructed to march on Rome following the murder of General Duphot. Haller accompanied Berthier as his commissioner with orders to notify Pope Pius VI of the Directory's intentions to create a Roman Republic.²⁷²

On 9 February the French arrived before Rome without even having fired a shot, with the financiers Haller, Perillier and Duveyrier “trundling along in their carriages ahead of the columns” as they prepared to appropriate the riches of the Eternal City.²⁷³ Haller had already displayed his hostility to the Papacy the preceding year when he refused to accept the appraisal conducted in Rome by Caucault and the commissioners Berthollet and Monge of five million *livres* of diamonds which the Pope had paid as part of his indemnity for the Treaty of Tolentino.²⁷⁴ Caucault had complained to Bonaparte that “*Haller's conduct is not*

²⁶⁹ Paul Bailleu, *Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807: Diplomatische Correspondenzen*. Vol.1, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1880, p.257.

²⁷⁰ *Moniteur*, XXIX, p.85, 8 frimaire VI.

²⁷¹ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.250.

²⁷² The Directory appointed a civilian commission to administer Rome comprised of Daunou, Florent, Monge and Saint-Martin as their secretary (AF/III/498, dossier 3135 – *Directorial decree*, 12 pluviôse VI/31 Jan. 1798) and gave it official instructions (AF/III/498, dossier 3135, 12 pluviôse VI/31 Jan. 1798). Berthier was ordered to dissolve the Papal government (AF/III/498, dossier 3135, 12 pluviôse VI/31 Jan. 1798). Monge soon left to join Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition and was replaced by Faipoult.

²⁷³ Sciout, ‘Le Directoire et la République Romaine’, p.156-157 & Guyot, *LDPE*, p.621. See also Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome II, p.22.

²⁷⁴ AF/III/77, dossier 320, plaquette 2 – *Dispatch of Caucault*, 10 floréal V/29 April 1797.

worthy of the Republic.”²⁷⁵ Haller alleged that Napoleon had ordered a new appraisal to be made in Milan, that the estimates were not satisfactory and that he believed the Pope owed another nine or ten million francs.²⁷⁶ He justified this bellicosity to Cacault by explaining that:

*You must not lose sight of the fact...that the army's immense and constantly renascent needs oblige us to act a bit like corsairs, and that we cannot give ourselves over too much to discussion because the result would find us at fault and we must try not to be so.*²⁷⁷

Now Haller's agents, the day after their arrival and under pretext of punishing those implicated in Duphot's murder, impounded the Holy See's treasures before the Pope had even left his residence. The Vatican and Monte Cavallo Palaces were sealed and ransacked as well as the Vatican Bank and Rome's *monte-di-pièta*.²⁷⁸ The Pope's belongings such as his personal library and wardrobe were seized.²⁷⁹ The confiscation of all 'superfluous' silverware from Roman sanctuaries aroused such indignation that French officers protested the looting of Imperial and Spanish churches.²⁸⁰ When Pius VI declared he would not leave Rome since he wished to die there, Haller forcibly abducted him saying: “*one can die anywhere!*”²⁸¹

On 28 March, Haller signed a secret convention containing twenty-two articles with the Vatican's interior minister – Camillo Corona. The Papacy promised to pay France three million piasters (equivalent to 15,337,500 francs) in hard currency or paper money, plus 600,000 piasters worth of clothing and equipment and a million piasters of apostolic goods. A particularly vindictive article (number 9) forced the Pope to surrender all his personal estates along with those of his family and of several cardinals, worth an estimated sixteen and a half million francs. The Papacy also agreed to pay the expenses of the French occupation army, excepting its pay. In total, Haller extorted the enormous sum of thirty-five million francs, which must be added to the thirty-six million the Pope had already

²⁷⁵ CICON, Tome II, p.248-249, *Cacault to Bonaparte*, 6 prairial V/25 May 1797.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.277, *Cacault to Bonaparte*, 15 prairial V/3 June 1797.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p.274.

²⁷⁸ AN, AF/III/508, plaquette 3220 – *Daumou to La Revellière*, 10 ventôse VI/28 Feb. 1798. See also Honoré Duveyrier, *Anecdotes Historiques*, Paris: Alphonse Picard & fils, 1907, p.256-257 and Thiébaud, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.167-168.

²⁷⁹ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.149.

²⁸⁰ France was at peace with Austria and Spain. See the ‘*protestation des officiers*’ in Laurent Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, *Mémoires*, Tome I, Paris: Anselin, 1831, p.281-283 and Dufourcq, *Le régime jacobin en Italie*, p.139-143.

²⁸¹ Hamelin, ‘*Douze ans de ma vie*’, p.304, footnote 1 – Berthier had been ordered to arrest the Pope and expel him from Roman territory (AF/III/503, dossier 3176 – *Directorial decree*, 1st ventôse VI/19 Feb. 1796). Haller acted on his instructions.



Figure 2:11 – The French Army led by General Berthier enters Rome
27 pluviôse VI/15 February 1798

by Hippolyte Lecomte & Jean Alaux, c.1835, Château de Versailles

© RMN-GP (Château de Versailles)/Photo: Gérard Blot (authorised for non-commercial use)



Figure 2:12 – Proclamation of the Roman Republic, 27 pluviôse VI/15 February 1798
Drawn by Carle Vernet and engraved by Jean Duplessis-Bertaux & Robert de Launay
c.1799-1807

© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)



Figure 2:13 – Portrait of Pope Pius VI (Giovanni Angelo Braschi)
by Pompeo Batoni, 1775
© National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
(uploaded with colour and resolution enhancement by ‘Luciano Coda’)
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain.

disbursed following the armistice of Bologna and the Treaty of Tolentino.²⁸² The Roman legislature – the Tribune and Senate – were not informed of this arrangement. Considerable funds were sent back to France to finance Bonaparte’s Egyptian expedition;²⁸³ and Haller offered the Corsican general the Vatican’s most beautiful cameo which soon found its way to Josephine.²⁸⁴ Prior to leaving his ambassadorial post in Rome, Joseph Bonaparte chartered a Genoese ship to sail to Civita Vecchia where it was loaded with several chests of spoils before departing for Ajaccio. Its capture by a barbary corsair off the Corsican coast infuriated Lucien Bonaparte who complained to the Minister of Exterior Relations – to no avail.²⁸⁵

With his reputation in tatters after the looting of Rome, Haller was appointed as the Helvetic representative to the Cisalpine Republic (13 July 1798). He purchased a sumptuous manor near Como where he hosted a lavish reception to meet elite diplomatic officials on 1 August. A few days later on 13 August, Haller signed a secret convention with the Cisalpine Republic which formed the prelude to an elaborate Ponzi scheme. The King of Piedmont-Sardinia had been forced to auction off lands belonging to several religious communities to pay state debts but was disinclined to sell them to France. The French Directory – sensing an opportunity to make money – suggested the Cisalpine government purchase these lands from Turin. Milan could then sell them back to France and liquidate its debts with Paris. The plan was for the Cisalpine Republic to sell the Piedmontese lands to Haller for 5,750,000 francs, and in return the Milanese would receive *biens nationaux* which Haller had seized in Rome; but the French paid nothing. Instead, Haller withheld 2,666,666 francs of this amount as repayment on Milanese debts and promised to subsequently deduct 300,000 *livres* from Milan’s monthly payments to Paris to make up for the rest of the payment. Then on 7 October, the Cisalpine Republic ceded eight million *livres* worth of *domains nationaux* in contributions to the French commissioner Amelot, following which the French refused to repay Tuscan creditors who

²⁸² The agreement is detailed in Sciout, *Le Directoire*, Tome III, p.306-311, who bases himself on AN, AF/III/77, dossier 321, plaquette 1 – *Secret Convention determining the contributions to be paid by the Roman Republic to France* (8 germinal VI/26 March 1798). See also Dufourcq, *Le régime jacobin en Italie*, p.175 & Guyot, *LDPE*, p.807.

²⁸³ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.150, footnote 149.

²⁸⁴ Georges Lefebvre, Raymond Guyot & Philippe Sagnac (eds.), *La Révolution française*, Paris: Alcan, 1930, p.420.

²⁸⁵ Jung (ed.), *LBM*, Tome I, p.162-163.

had advanced Milan two million to fund the deal. In total they extorted a profit of 3,540,000 francs on the entire transaction.²⁸⁶

Soon after it was discovered Haller had business interests with the firm of a Venetian merchant named Joseph Ferratini – *Ferratini et Cie.* – through which he was linked to André-Louis-Elisabeth Briche, a former deputy of the Bas-Rhin to the Legislative Assembly. Haller was a partner in *Ferratini et Cie.*'s contracts to supply clothing to French troops in Italy and used its services to issue payment orders. The company was also in charge of collecting Verona's contribution and responsible for managing the sale of effects seized in Venice's arsenal to another firm named *Geribaldie et Cie.*²⁸⁷

These revelations caused the Directory to destitute Haller from his diplomatic brief for “*infinitely grave political reasons*” and forbid him access to Italy.²⁸⁸ The renewal of hostilities in early 1799 forced him to seek refuge in Switzerland where he acquired the estate of Villamont near Lausanne known as ‘*Beau Séjour*’. It was here that Bonaparte stayed with him for five days (12-17 May 1800) before crossing the Great Saint Bernard Pass *en route* to Marengo. Unfortunately for Haller, one of his servants spilt coffee over the First Consul, and this incident fatally lost him Bonaparte's favour.²⁸⁹ After Brumaire, Haller returned to Paris where he hopelessly attempted to revive his political fortunes. He died in 1833 aged eighty-six while trying to recover debts at San Benedetto near Mantua, having lost most of his fortune. Antoine-Romain Hamelin records that:

*Mr. Haller no doubt rendered a great service to the army by getting rid of waste, but he stole considerably for his own account. Bonaparte noticed this too late, but did not forget it, and having become First Consul forced him to return eleven hundred thousand francs employing arguments which were then in his possession: pay or go to prison. Haller hoped to recoup his losses by delving into speculation, but he found a rascal who outfoxed him – Mr. Comaille – who ruined him entirely to the point that he died in distress.*²⁹⁰

²⁸⁶ Full details in Sciout, *Le Directoire*, Tome IV, p.95-98, who bases himself on AF/III/71, dossier 290, plaquette 5 – *Denunciations of false French agents in Italy (with a letter from Amelot to the King of Sardinia on the assistance he must furnish to the Armée d'Italie, November 1798.*

²⁸⁷ AN, AF/III/81, dossier 337, plaquette 4 – *Two reports on the conduct of civilian commissioners sent to the armées du Rhin, d'Helvétie and d'Italie (messidor an VII) & Bouchary, LMAP, Tome III, p.151* – Briche used the alias ‘Gockel’ in his dealings with the firm.

²⁸⁸ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.646.

²⁸⁹ Hamelin, ‘Douze ans de ma vie’, p.304, footnote 1 & Branda, *LPG*, p.515, footnote 38 – In February 1803, Fouché – who had been French ambassador in Milan – placed Haller on the list of émigrés and seized his property in France (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.646). Haller sought refuge in Lausanne and was only allowed to return to France in 1813.

²⁹⁰ Hamelin, ‘Douze ans de ma vie’, p.309 – Haller filed for bankruptcy in 1816 (Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.154).

Conclusion

Historians have offered widely diverging estimates concerning how much money Bonaparte's conquest of Italy raised, with Italian scholars advancing the highest figures. Patrice Gueniffey claims Bonaparte sent back around 50 million francs in 1796;²⁹¹ while Thierry Lentz asserts 200 million were levied between 1796 and 1799 with only half being returned to Paris and the other half used to pay troops.²⁹² Astonishingly, the only official records we have are those for 1796 since the Directory recalled its civilian commissioners in December that year and thereafter left Napoleon in full control. Garrau's final report dated December 20 quotes the sum of 45,959,345 *livres*.²⁹³ How much of this was sent back to the Directory is difficult to assess. Garrau's calculation that about ten million reached Paris may be roughly accurate, for when Barbé-Marbois evaluated the total amount of money raised by the *Armée d'Italie* in 1796 at 51,240,145 *livres*, he was probably including both what had been transferred to Paris and what had been spent on the ground in Italy.²⁹⁴ Finance minister Ramel's accounts for Year IV indicate that twelve million *livres* were received, equivalent to 2.6% of the Directory's 457 million *livres* budget.²⁹⁵ The take for the following years decreased considerably.²⁹⁶ Thus, the money extracted from Italy could not possibly have compensated for the government's abysmal debt (estimated at 240 million *livres*); and Godechot's claim that the commissioners in Italy played a vital part in ensuring the Directory's survival is altogether contestable.²⁹⁷

In the *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, Bonaparte alludes only once to the financial aspect of his Italian Campaign:

*I returned from the Italian Campaign without even having three hundred thousand francs to my name. I could easily have brought back ten or twelve million – they would deservedly have been mine. I never had to account for my actions: nothing was ever reproached me.*²⁹⁸

But this assertion only engages those willing to believe it. The reality is that Napoleon did accumulate considerable sums for the Directory and his personal benefit in Italy. In fact, this was one of the principal objectives of the campaign. As Pierre Branda notes, the

²⁹¹ Gueniffey, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.69.

²⁹² Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.239.

²⁹³ See Appendix III.

²⁹⁴ Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.509.

²⁹⁵ Branda, *LPG*, p.154 – By comparison, Batavian rescriptions for Year IV amounted to 104 million *livres*.

²⁹⁶ In 1797, only Venice and Rome had to pay war contributions, while Lombardy's monthly payment was raised to 1.5 million francs after the foundation of the Cisalpine Republic (Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.568).

²⁹⁷ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.568.

²⁹⁸ Las Cases, *MSH*, Tome I, p.144-145.

conquest of Italy was undertaken “*for money, without any precise diplomatic or even military objective*” and “*the invasion of Switzerland in 1798 would proceed along the same lines.*”²⁹⁹ Bonaparte, however, was no ordinary plunderer. Contrary to most generals in the field, he decided to employ contributions levied on occupied lands as a lever for his own ambitions, appropriating them to win the loyalty of his soldiers and install his own personal administrative system in the lands he conquered.

I have endeavoured to show in this chapter that Napoleon learned a great deal about financial management during his Italian campaign. At first, inexperience led him to seek the guidance of his more seasoned compatriot, Saliceti, who was the real inspiration behind the establishment of the Balbi network designed to exfiltrate Italian wealth back to Paris. Assuredly, Bonaparte could not have set this network up himself; for we have seen it was Saliceti who had connections in Genoese finance and who lobbied the Directory for Balbi’s appointment, even vouching for his solvability. The importance of Balbi’s network must not be underestimated. Practically all the money shipped back from Italy to Paris between May and August 1796 – and possibly a great deal more afterwards – was channelled through Balbi and the Genoese market. This included contributions and fines levied on Italian states, requisitioned goods, items confiscated from *monti-di-pietà*, indemnities drawn from diplomatic negotiations, etc. Moreover, since the repatriation of Italian funds was centralised via this single network – and private individuals also employed Balbi’s services to ship their money back – it is almost impossible to operate a distinction between what constituted personal wealth and government assets. It was therefore easy for embezzlers – and even for Napoleon himself – to disguise personal gains as public funds and launder pillaged assets.

Given these circumstances, it seems incredible – even irresponsible – that the Directory simply accepted Saliceti’s nomination of Balbi without even dispatching an agent to check his references. Perhaps the most logical explanation is that Paris anticipated Balbi would only serve temporarily for want of a better alternative, but that he ended up becoming a permanent intermediary following Bonaparte’s victories. Nonetheless, this lack of oversight obviously played in the general’s favour. We have seen how the civilian commissioners were too busy or too intimidated by Napoleon’s reproaches to conduct proper verifications on the cash and jewels dispatched to Genoa; and it is more than likely that some of the funds used to finance the Brumaire coup passed through Balbi’s hands.

²⁹⁹ Branda, *LPG*, p.146.

Another field in which Bonaparte benefited from Saliceti's mentoring was in the administration of provincial and municipal finances. The most obvious example of this was in Milan, where Saliceti's resolve and determination imposed the Lombard contribution. Jacques Godechot points out that it was Saliceti who convinced Napoleon to march on Milan after Lodi to secure the riches of Lombardy rather than press ahead to Mantua.³⁰⁰ The Corsican commissioner's ruthless efficiency in requisitioning goods and imposing extortionate contributions – which harkened back to feudal structures of vassalage and enfeoffment – influenced Napoleon's policy towards occupied territories.³⁰¹ It also emboldened him to take the crucial step of decreeing the payment of his troops in hard currency. This was the first time the *Armée d'Italie* superseded its civilian overlords – the first indication that Napoleon was prepared to challenge the Directory's financial jurisdiction head-on.³⁰² Although Saliceti's role remains obscure in this decision, his influence is clearly discernible in the general's attempts to emancipate himself from governmental control. In this respect, Saliceti – like Balbi – can be counted among the financial harbingers of Brumaire.

Surveying the campaign as a whole reveals a clear progression in Napoleon's attitude towards the civil servants who accompanied him. Once he felt confident enough to direct economic policy, he began to view his commissioners as rivals for control of the army's finances and grew increasingly intolerant of their authority. We have seen how Bonaparte collaborated with other officials to undermine the commissioner Pinsot when changes were made to the Lombard contribution. As his ambitions grew, Napoleon progressively discarded formalities until eventually he replaced his second commissioner – Garrau – by a military officer in flagrant breach of French law, thereby demonstrating he placed more faith in his own judgment than in that of the government.

Bonaparte also developed a strong dislike and contempt for private contractors who disregarded his orders and eluded his influence like the *Compagnie Flachet*. His frustration with this company implanted a permanent distrust of military entrepreneurs in his mind, and this undoubtedly affected his subsequent relations with them – in particular with Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard whom he later imprisoned. Ouvrard himself attributed Napoleon's intransigence with contractors to the privations his army had suffered in Italy:

³⁰⁰ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.281 – This decision was heavily criticised by several observers, notably Landrieux: “That rogue Saliceti lured Bonaparte to Milan to get écus just as Mantua was receiving reinforcements and preparing its defences” (*Mémoires*, Tome I, p.116).

³⁰¹ Branda, *LPG*, p.162.

³⁰² *Ibid*, p.151.

*During the revolutionary effervescence, [Napoleon] had witnessed...base intrigues, ignoble speculations, criminal enterprises. In a word, he had observed humanity in an unfavourable light and these memories frequently made him suspicious. When he was commander-in-chief of the Armée d'Italie and already putting into practice his grand maxim that war must beget war, the depredations wrought by this system often forced him to be rigorous. He could recall the punishments he had been forced to inflict...He had conserved from this period of his life...a habit of defiance which often exposed anyone presenting a project or entrusted with a service to the following injurious remark: 'How much will he steal from this operation?'...He always believed he had the right to behave in this oriental manner and impose a humiliating tariff on contractors and those who claimed refunds from his government!*³⁰³

Few suppliers escaped the general's wrath, with a notable exception being Jean-Pierre Collot who would figure prominently in the Brumaire coup.

Barras notes that after the commissioners were recalled from Italy, the power of the generals increased: "*Since that time, a regrettable discord has introduced itself in the army, the generals have enriched themselves without any sense of modesty or moderation...*"³⁰⁴ This heralded the final act in Bonaparte's financial apprenticeship, when he imposed his independence by placing private businessmen and handpicked officials at the head of the military's fiscal administration who were personally loyal to him. The most emblematic of these was Haller, who succeeded Balbi as the campaign's launderer and dominated the finances of Italy until early 1799. Thanks to his position as head of the mint in Milan and chief intendant of the army's finances, Haller was able to centralise all Italian revenues in a single fund directly controlled by Bonaparte. From this point onwards it is difficult to compute with any accuracy the precise amount of money that passed through the *Armée d'Italie's* coffers. All I have been able to find is a summary account of contributions levied in the first five months of 1797 drawn up by Haller in Napoleon's correspondence.³⁰⁵ Thus, although it is possible to identify the individual components of Bonaparte's financial network in Italy (Haller, Collot, Villemanzu, Estève, etc.), it is far more difficult to demonstrate how they interacted together. I have not, for example, been able to uncover any direct communication between Collot and Haller. This tends to show that Napoleon's parallel financial system was still relatively decentralised at this point. Each of its actors appears to have enjoyed a certain amount of leeway, and several may even have concealed their thefts by committing them in Bonaparte's name who – while

³⁰³ Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.153.

³⁰⁴ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.239 & Tome III, p.250 – Bonaparte's conflicts with the commissioners heralded those between Masséna and Rapinat in Switzerland, Brune and the Roman commission, and Championnet and Faipoult in Naples (See AN, AF/III/78 for further details).

³⁰⁵ See Appendix III.

undoubtedly aware of this – probably turned a blind eye provided he received the funds he needed.

Considering the prolific amount of funds Haller extorted from various sources we may safely include him as one of the bankers who financed Brumaire. Since he was able to coerce the Papacy into handing over thirty-five million francs in a single agreement, we can legitimately assume there were other unrecorded instances in which he pilfered additional sums. Moreover, Haller – like Saliceti – disappears from Bonaparte’s entourage following his return to Paris, which could indicate they were both inconvenient witnesses who knew too much about the general’s financial past. Whatever the case, these two men unquestionably played a decisive part in setting Napoleon on the road to Brumaire.



CHAPTER 3 – THE CAISSE DES COMPTES COURANTS: HIGH BANKING UNDER THE DIRECTORY



“No study has yet been undertaken on the role of bankers during the Revolution. However if one considers that the crisis was first and foremost of a financial nature, if one reflects that the sale of ecclesiastical and émigré assets, the supply of armies, the construction of military hardware, the laws on taxation, the fluctuations in the value of the assignat, etc. gave rise to an enormous and intense current of business activity and brazen speculation, one cannot doubt that capitalists played an obscure but considerable role in these events.” – Albert Mathiez.¹

“Credit is the true modern discovery which links governments with peoples.”
– Madame de Staël.²

Introduction: The Projects for a National Bank in 1795-1796

During the spring of 1795, the urgent need to remedy France’s economic crisis triggered by the *assignat*’s disastrous inflationary spiral led a growing number of economists and financial specialists to advocate for the creation of a national bank to remove the *assignat* from circulation and replace it with another currency. Pierre-Joseph Cambon, the Jacobin deputy who had dominated the National Convention’s *comité des finances* during the Terror, adamantly refused to contemplate the *assignat*’s liquidation. He knew many citizens perceived it as a symbol of revolutionary success and feared its disappearance might prove fatal to the Revolution. But on 16 germinal III/4 April 1795, Cambon was abruptly denounced and replaced as head of the *comité des finances* by his deputy Jean-Joseph Johannot, a Swiss textile manufacturer far more amenable to monetary reform.³

Johannot, now effectively finance minister, immediately began drafting a new set of proposals calling for the radical liberalisation of the economy and removal of the *assignat*. In a report presented to the Thermidorian Convention on 25 germinal III/14 April 1795, he suggested the government should no longer accept *assignat* at their face value when receiving them in payment for *biens nationaux*, but only at their *real* value set by the market rate of exchange. According to his calculations, the value of all remaining *biens nationaux* in the state’s possession amounted to 17 billion *livres*, while a total of about ten billion *assignats* had been printed (of which seven billion were in circulation). Assuming

¹ Mathiez, ‘Le Banquier Perregaux’, p.242.

² Staël, *Considérations sur les principaux évènements de la Révolution française* in Laurent Theis (ed.), *Madame de Staël : La passion de la liberté*, Paris: Robert Laffont, 2017, p.330.

³ See his entry in the Biographical Index.

ten billion worth of *biens nationaux* were set aside to guarantee the value of all *assignats*, this left a reserve of 7 billion of *biens nationaux* available to sell.⁴

Johannot proposed this reserve be used to create a *caisse hypothécaire* – a mortgage bank – which could serve as both a currency-emitting institution and a lending facility for the government and private citizens. This *caisse hypothécaire* would print mortgaged shares (*cédules hypothécaires*) which would constitute promissory notes of payment guaranteed by the value of one or several *biens nationaux*. Members of the public could then exchange their *assignats* for *cédules hypothécaires* at the bank. To encourage people to hand in their *assignats*, the bank would initially accept to exchange them at a rate of $\frac{3}{4}$ of their real value and $\frac{1}{4}$ of their face value until 1 vendémiaire IV/22 Sep. 1795. Thereafter, the exchange rate would fully revert to the *assignat*'s real value. For all intents and purposes, Johannot's project harkened back to the *assignat*'s original 1790 conception as a bond asset based on mortgaged property rather than a form of paper currency.⁵

Over the next month, from 25 germinal to 24 floréal (14 April-3 May), the Thermidorian Convention spent several sessions discussing Johannot's plan. Two prevailing schools of economic thought emerged, each of which backed conflicting solutions to resolve the financial emergency. The first, led by Robert Lindet, was that of the Jacobin deputies who believed it was their patriotic duty to salvage the nationalised economy by artificially raising the value of the *assignat*. The second, led by deputies like Johannot and Jean-Joseph-Victor Genissieux, was that of the bankers and deputies of the mainstream Thermidorian majority who wanted to liberalise the economy and get rid of the *assignat*. Their deliberations resulted in another financial report being presented to the legislature by Théodore Vernier on 23 floréal/12 May which recommended several additional measures including the demonetisation of *assignats* printed under Louis XVI (*assignats royaux*). Unfortunately, these financial debates were cut short by the Insurrection of 1 Prairial III/20 May 1795. Too preoccupied in dealing with this sudden political upheaval and the subsequent drafting of the 1795 constitution, the Thermidorians discarded the financial dossier, abandoning its resolution to the incoming directorial government.⁶

However in early October 1795, a protégé of Carnot named Guillaume-Charles Faipoult who had been appointed *chef principal aux bureaux du Comité de Salut public* published a

⁴ Guy Antonetti (ed.), *Les ministres des Finances de la Révolution française au Second Empire. Tome I : dictionnaire biographique, 1790-1814*. Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France (CHEEF), 2007, p.173 (hereafter 'LMFRFSE').

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.174-175.

new plan for a national bank in a pamphlet entitled *Essai sur les finances*.⁷ Largely inspired by Johannot's original proposal, Faipoult also recommended the creation of a mortgage bank emitting *cédules hypothécaires* staked on *biens nationaux*. But he advised a different operating system whereby batches of *cédules hypothécaires* would be put in circulation via two newly created institutions. A public bank called the *Caisse de garantie* would enable citizens to exchange their *assignats* at a rate of 50% above their market value for *cédules* and make payments for *biens nationaux* in *assignats*. All *assignats* received would be destroyed by incineration. A second bank – the *Caisse de réserve* – would act as a reserve fund and issue loans to the government to help pay contractors, conduct foreign trade and cover Treasury expenses.

This *caisse de réserve* would be a privately owned joint-stock company (*société par actions*) to promote public trust in the bank and prevent any civil servants from interfering with its duties. It would be comprised of 100,000 shares yielding 4% interest – 75,000 shares of 4,000 *livres* to be purchased in cash and 25,000 shares of 20,000 *livres* to be purchased with *cédules hypothécaires* – thereby forming a starting capital amounting to 300 million *livres* in hard currency and 500 million in *cédules hypothécaires*.⁸ Faipoult modelled the *caisse de réserve* on the defunct *Caisse d'Escompte* and envisaged its activities would encompass four main fields: deposits, transfers, bill discounting and paper currency emission. It could discount bills of exchange for traders and industrial investors, provide credit to landowners in return for tax payments and advance up to 400 million *livres* to the government. Overall, he estimated the *caisse de réserve* could put 560 million *livres* in public coffers.⁹ Shortly after the Thermidorian Convention re-established state ministries on 10 vendémiaire IV/2 Oct. 1795, Faipoult was appointed as the new finance minister on 18 brumaire/9 Nov., largely on the strength of his pamphlet and through Carnot's influence. But his plan for a national bank still had to be approved.

By the time the Directory took office on 4 brumaire IV/26 October 1795, France's economy – teetering on the brink of insolvency – was facing an acute existential crisis. In the provinces, the depreciated *assignat* was so reviled that only hard currency was accepted in commercial transactions. Large cities like Marseille went pitch black at night because their inhabitants couldn't afford candles. Civil servants who could no longer live off their salaries were turning to corruption. The cost of operating the fiscal administration had

⁷ Faipoult, *Essai sur les finances*, Paris: Chez Pougin, 24 vendémiaire IV/16 Oct. 1795.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.20-25 – An investor who purchased a 20,000-*livres* share could expect an annual return of 1¼%.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.30 – 60 million in land registry and customs dues, 100 million in commercial and property taxes and 400 million in *cédules hypothécaires* notes.

become so inflated it nearly surpassed the tax intake.¹⁰ The new finance minister Faipoult estimated the Treasury was in arrears of 700 million *livres* for debts in Paris alone.¹¹ In short, economic reality had finally caught up with the Revolution's deputies and formulating a new monetary policy was absolutely imperative if the nation were to survive. The advent of the Directory therefore constituted a decisive financial moment in the French Revolution, and it was the reforms of the early directorial period – rather than those of 1789 – which would truly determine the Revolution's financial legacy.

Those who supported abandoning the *assignat* – sensing their moment was at hand – struck first. On 1 November 1795, the *Cinq-Cents* appointed a special commission to elaborate a remedial financial plan.¹² Twelve days later, it submitted a report by the deputy Joseph Eschassériaux l'*ainé* which advocated radical structural changes and was essentially a revamped version of Faipoult's scheme. To remove the *assignat* from circulation, Eschassériaux suggested all its notes be collected from the public and reimbursed by the government at their current market rate (and not at face value) by exchanging them for mortgaged shares (*cédules hypothécaires*) yielding 3% interest which could be used to purchase *biens nationaux*. A national bank would be established to supervise this process and endowed with 1,200,000,000 *livres* of *biens nationaux* provided by the finance minister. The *assignat*'s engraving plates were to be destroyed by 5 January 1796 at the latest, while state rents and pensions – as well as all future taxes – should preferably be paid in coin as a prelude to reorienting the economy on hard currency.¹³ Furthermore, Eschassériaux advised the decree of 15 April 1794 banning all private commercial enterprises should be suppressed to favour the creation of private banks, redress public credit and extend commerce and foreign trade.¹⁴ His suggestions were immediately denounced by the jacobins' financial specialist, Robert Lindet, who claimed they would hold the entire population ransom to “*a few thousand wealthy citizens, brigands and profligates.*”¹⁵

The deputies of the business lobby, by contrast, were expected to receive these recommendations rapturously. Yet to the incredulity of many onlookers, nearly all their leaders spoke against Eschassériaux's plan. Charles François Lebrun – the leading financial expert in the *Anciens* — was unconvinced by the floated ‘mortgaged shares’

¹⁰ Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.389 & 402.

¹¹ AN, AF/III/114, dossier 532:1 – *Faipoult to the Directory*, 11 brumaire IV/11 Nov. 1795.

¹² Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.400 — Its members were Defermon, Dauchy, Eschassériaux, Giraud and Rouzet.

¹³ The *assignat*'s engraving plates were ceremoniously destroyed in the Place Vendôme on 19 Feb. 1796.

¹⁴ Full details in Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.400-405.

¹⁵ *L'Amis des lois*, 18 frimaire IV.

because they would not replace the *assignat* as effective currency in the marketplace. The Treasury's meagre cash reserves, he argued, rendered these proposals unrealistic – and besides, how could people pay their taxes in hard currency when there wasn't enough in circulation?¹⁶ Other deputies like the Bordeaux *armateur* André-Daniel Laffon-Ladébat and the Rouen banker Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx also contested the plan which was rejected by the *Anciens* on 5 December 1795. However, Eschassériaux's suggestion to rehabilitate private enterprise was retained and passed on 21 November.

This unexpected opposition to Eschassériaux's plan within the ranks of the directorial majority was the first indication of a major rift between two factions which portended their impending confrontation on 18 Fructidor. On the one hand were those conservative-minded deputies of the *plaine* who wanted to liberalise the economy through progressive reforms but still believed the state should exercise oversight over economic affairs. Facing them were the constitutional monarchists – many of whom were former *notables* of the *Ancien Régime* – who wished to revive the deregulated and outsourced monarchical system and deliver the economy wholesale into private hands – unburdened by any accountability. The parliamentary deadlock resulting from their disputes prevented the government from enacting salutary legislation and reluctantly compelled it to vote the creation of a forced loan of 600 million *livres* on 10 December to replace the unpopular war tax and assuage the Treasury's liquidity problems.¹⁷

There was, however, a more fundamental reason underlying the rejection of Eschassériaux's proposals by business deputies – they had a far more ambitious project of their own. A select group of representatives led by Laffon had devised a plan to create a national bank which would emit a new paper currency that would replace the *assignat* and be guaranteed by the investments of financiers in private banks. Since they knew their project would be virulently denounced by the Jacobins, they initially operated with caution and concealed their veritable intentions. Thus, they supported Eschassériaux's proposal to revive private enterprise while opposing his overall recommendations. Their efforts were assisted by the deputy Jacques Defermon who proposed on 27 November to cede all *biens nationaux* and logging concessions to private banks in return for cash advances they would make to the government.¹⁸

¹⁶ Lebrun, *Opinions, rapports et choix d'écrits politiques*, Paris: Bossange père, 1829, p.69 (hereafter 'ORCEP').

¹⁷ For a detailed examination of the forced loan of 1795 see Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.413-433.

¹⁸ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.120.

Then on 3 December – two days before Eschassériaux’s report was rejected – Laffon publicly submitted his plan for a national bank, suggesting the Directory recycle Eschassériaux’s blueprint and award it 1,200,000,000 *livres* worth of *biens nationaux*. Half this sum (600 million) would be used to reimburse *assignats* which would be exchanged for notes of a new paper currency emitted by the bank. The remaining 600 million of *biens nationaux* would also be delivered to the bank, and in return it would provide the government with a corresponding amount in notes of the new currency – paid out in regular monthly instalments of 25 million. Thus, all notes in circulation at any given time would be guaranteed by real estate assets worth at least twice their value.¹⁹ However, this bank would not be owned by the state and would remain a private institution.

For all intents and purposes, Laffon’s project was nothing more than a revival of Turgot’s *caisse d’escompte*. In return for placing large amounts of public funds at the disposal of private bankers, it offered a simple guarantee of deferred repayments and a tenuous promise of stimulating investment. The bank wouldn’t pay anything for the privilege of minting the national currency, all government oversight would be removed and none of its investors held accountable. This was not the same model as national banks in other countries like Britain, Holland or Sweden which Laffon had extolled to persuade legislators. Tellingly, most supporters of his project were former *Ancien Régime* financiers who had benefited from the reforms of Turgot and Calonne. They included bankers like Jean-Frédéric Perregaux, Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron, Jean-Joseph Johannot, Augustin Monneron and especially Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx whose trading house (*Le Couteulx & Cie.* – the oldest surviving French bank) had monopolised the import of Spanish piasters in France during the pre-revolutionary era.²⁰ Now that the Directory was embarking on a program to liberalise the economy, these men sensed the opportunity was finally at hand for them to reclaim the leading financial positions they had once enjoyed. Le Couteulx had already made a start on 10 July 1795 by jointly purchasing – in collaboration with the bankers Claude Périer and Guillaume Sabatier – roughly half the shares of the *Compagnie des Mines d’Anzin*, the largest coal mining company in France which Cambacérès had convinced the Directory to sell as *biens d’émigrés*.²¹

Nevertheless, with the country afflicted by a dire economic crisis, Laffon’s proposal appeared to offer a viable solution and was therefore supported by the government. On 24 December, the *Cinq-Cents* issued a public announcement stipulating that “*the Directory*

¹⁹ *Ibid* & Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.443-444 – The bank hoped to set up its headquarters at the *Maison de la Mairie* in the Rue Neuve des Capucins, occupied by the general staff of the *Armée de l’Intérieur*.

²⁰ See their respective entries in the Biographical Index.

²¹ See Claude Perier’s entry in the Biographical Index for details of this sale.

will invite and receive offers of commercial partnerships and associations."²² Six days later, Le Couteulx held a preliminary meeting with potential subscribers to Laffon's bank to discuss its future statutes and organisation.²³ Events moved rapidly in early 1796 as the *assignat*'s demise appeared imminent.²⁴ During two important meetings held on 6 & 8 February, Laffon presented his project before an assembly of leading investors and statutes were laid down appointing him as the national bank's director-general. Eleven administrators were designated: Laffon, Le Couteulx, Perregaux, Monneron, Fulchiron, Perier, Marignier *père*, Foacier, Maciet, Parat de Chalandray and Johannot.²⁵ The Directory and its finance minister Faipoult voiced their approval and confirmed their intention of entrusting the bank with 883 million francs of *biens nationaux* whose sale – initially intended as fundraisers for the forced loan – had been authorised by two laws of 23-24 December 1795.²⁶ These assets included forests of less than 300 acres (*arpents*), logging rights in four great national forests for a period of thirty years (including those of Fontainebleau and Compiègne) and the sale at auction of the royal châteaux of Saint-Cloud, Meudon, Marly, Vincennes, Rambouillet, Choisy, Saint-Germain, Chambord and the Château-Trompette in Bordeaux.²⁷ Expectations were running high and the bank even began issuing shares, with Laffon announcing that:

*...the public purse must be placed under the guard of particular interests led by experience, probity and love of country. The scarcity of hard currency which hampers circulation and raises the price of goods beyond their natural proportions must be addressed and made up for...Banking associations are the only means which – following the convulsions of many years – can return to commerce, industry and the arts the activity so necessary to public fortune and the happiness of all citizens.*²⁸

But this successful lobbying by the banking sector had also whet the financial appetites of the Revolution's *nouveaux riches*. On 4 February, a contractor from Douai named Jean-Baptiste Paulée submitted his own proposal for a national bank, offering to advance the Directory fifty million francs a month – twenty million in hard currency, ten million in bills of exchange to cover existing government obligations, another ten million in new bills of exchange, and ten million in bank notes of a new currency printed by his

²² *Moniteur*, 8 nivôse IV/29 Dec. 1795.

²³ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.103, footnote 38.

²⁴ The *assignat*'s engraving plates were ceremoniously destroyed in the Place Vendôme on Feb. 19, 1796.

²⁵ Parat de Chalandray was a former *receveur général des finances* and ex-administrator of the *Caisse d'Escompte*. Marignier was an administrator at the *Caisse d'Escompte*. Maciet was a former exchange agent and Foacier was a relative of Pierre Louis de Betteville Foacier – one of the *receveurs généraux* guillotined in 1794. See Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.50-51 and Antonetti (ed.), *LMFRFSE*, p.195.

²⁶ Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.419 – On 14 February 1796, Faipoult was replaced as finance minister by Ramel who continued to back the project.

²⁷ *Ibid* & Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.120.

²⁸ Quoted in Marion, *HFF*, Tome II, p.443.



Figure 3:1
Portrait of André-Daniel Laffon-Ladébat
by Suzanne Caron, 1763
© Musée d'Aquitaine, Bordeaux
Photo: <http://collections-musees.bordeaux.fr>
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



Figure 3:2
Portrait of Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu
Attributed to Jean-Baptiste Greuze, c.1770s-1780s
Private Collection
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
(uploaded by 'Branor')
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

establishment.²⁹ In return, Paulée demanded the government cede a vast array of state assets to his bank including national forests and logging concessions exceeding 300 acres (*arpents*), all available *biens nationaux* and funds held in the *administration des domaines* (including in Belgium), all ‘national houses’ (*maisons nationales*) and confiscated property plus all the *mobilier national* and confiscated diamonds in public repositories. In addition, he wanted the Directory to hand over the *maison des capucines* (in the Rue Neuve des Capucines) – where *assignats* were printed – to serve as the mint for his new paper currency and requested an immediate advance of two billion *assignats* in notes and rescriptions! Paulée appeared recklessly overconfident in his justification for such excessive demands, dismissing any fears out of hand:

This manner of procuring funds is very advantageous because it gives the faculty of immediately disposing of the sum which circumstances require without needing to have funds in coffers...the bank itself would be tasked with making the funds and providing them at specific dates. The government will therefore have neither grief nor worry. The paper money printed by the company whose solvability is renowned will be highly sought after and will re-establish almost as if by magic the national credit...The government must have neither concern nor hesitation in placing these assets with the bank and deploying the greatest resources. For the Republic must only consider these means as accessories, given it still disposes of its ordinary revenues which will be immense once they have been paid, and will have the proceeds of the forced loan [of Year IV]...Citizen Paulée can guarantee that the trading houses to whom he has communicated this project – notably that of the former Caisse d’Escompte – are very well-disposed to second this establishment.³⁰

Moreover, Paulée was not afraid to use veiled threats to back his proposal:

If bills in circulation are not repaid, not only are the most sacred engagements broken, but national credit is inevitably lost: the government will be sued in the courts and condemned for failure to abide by its engagements...all operations of finance will become impossible. This is what the English, the Austrians and our other enemies are waiting for.³¹

The Directory expressed interest in Paulée’s scheme but was non-committal in its response, no doubt because it preferred Laffon’s plan which was backed by the tenors of Parisian banking.

Although rarely referenced by historians, these initial projects to establish a national carrier were of prime importance – for they formulated the trademark demand which all future proposals for national banks would reproduce and that Napoleon would ultimately concede: the transfer of public funds to private enterprise to stimulate investment and

²⁹ AN, AF/III/345, plaquette 1555:49 – *Project for a national bank addressed by Jean-Baptiste Paulée to the Directory*, 15 pluviôse IV/4 Feb. 1796.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

growth. Financiers desperately wanted to discount their own money and bills of exchange using state funds; and since they would be the ones who founded any such bank, it would only discount their assets! As we shall see, the *Banque de France* was nothing more than this privatised ‘national bank’ which offered privileged discounting services to its own members, and we find the same bankers behind it as those who backed Laffon’s proposal (Le Couteulx, Perregaux, Récamier and several others).³²

Nevertheless, the bankers’ plan on this occasion had to be abandoned in the face of determined opposition from Jacobin deputies and their allies in the press during the lead up to the final confirmatory vote. The *Journal des hommes libres* denounced a plot, arguing:

*Who are those who persisted for so long in discrediting the assignat? The bankers. Who are those who build their fortunes by ruining the people? The bankers. The bankers have joined forces to make the assignat fall in order to substitute their own paper currency to ours. Their conspiracy has worked perfectly.*³³

Monmayou, a deputy of the *Lot*, swayed many undecided parliamentarians when he protested:

*What are the objects of these specific demands for hard currency – of this project for a [national] bank?...It is to annihilate the assignat, substitute it with another form of paper currency and place the Republic under the tutelage of a bank.*³⁴

While the *Cinq-Cents* initially approved Laffon’s bank on 23 February, a sudden realisation among deputies that such an institution could dominate the economy – perhaps even overpower the 1795 Constitution – resulted in the vote being abruptly overturned four days later. Having only narrowly averted a royalist takeover on 13 Vendémiaire, the Directory was not yet prepared to alienate the Jacobin faction. Faipoult, who had already resigned as finance minister on 13 February to take up the post of French consul at Genoa, was replaced by Dominique-Vincent Ramel the following day.

After nearly four years of stunted activity, the disappointment among financiers was palpable. Laffon accused the government of deliberately scuttling his bank to perpetuate the scandalously corrupt supply markets which had proved so lucrative for unscrupulous deputies.³⁵ Le Couteulx, sensing the project was on the skids, turned his attentions to setting up another bank in Rouen without awaiting the final vote’s outcome.³⁶ The

³² Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.122.

³³ *Journal des hommes libres*, 9 ventôse IV/28 Feb. 1796.

³⁴ Quoted in Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.446 – Other detractors included the Jacobins Robert Lindet and Pierre-Jean Audouin and moderates Baudin des Ardennes and Pierre-Louis Bentabole (Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.17).

³⁵ Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.447.

³⁶ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.103.



Figure 3:3 – The Heirs of the Constitution
 ‘France’s misfortunes were their work. Rage, terror and cupidity engendered these monsters...’
 Engraving by an unknown artist, 1792

© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

This early revolutionary engraving denounces links between constitutional royalist deputies and financial circles. Le Cousteulx stands third from left wearing a black hat. The Duke of Orléans is about to stab France (depicted as a woman) while Jacques Necker steals her money bag (far right).



Figure 3:4 – A 100-franc *mandat territorial* promissory note
 National Museum of American History, Washington D.C.
 © National Numismatic Collection at the Smithsonian Institution
 Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org> (uploaded by ‘Godot13’)
 CC BY-SA 4.0 International Licence

inevitable result was an extension of the economy's reliance on paper money which led directly to the creation of the *mandat territorial* (18 March 1796).³⁷ Even more importantly, this failure convinced many of the country's leading businessmen they could not rely on the Directory to improve their affairs.

The Establishment of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*

Since the government refused to create a national bank, the business lobby resolved to set up its own establishment. On 29 June 1796 Augustin Monneron – one of the financiers involved in Laffon's project – founded the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* in partnership with a Lorient trader named Jean Godard. Monneron was the driving force behind this new bank which was headquartered at the *hôtel Massiac* in the Place des Victoires.³⁸ The Monneron family, cousins of the Duplex, owned extensive sugar cane plantations in Mauritius and operated trading counters in Pondichery, the Antilles and Senegal. As former associates of the *Compagnie des Indes*, they were at the centre of colonial transactions and specialists in the movement of paper money and precious metals.³⁹ Three of Augustin's elder brothers had been deputies of the National Assembly, while Augustin himself had served in the Legislative Assembly and participated in many of the Revolution's financial operations, notably serving on the Convention's *Agence du commerce extérieur* and on the *Agence de négociations de la Trésorerie nationale*.⁴⁰

The *caisse*'s foundational statutes stipulate it was established for a period of nine years lasting from 29 June 1796 to 30 June 1805 with a starting capital of five million francs divided into 1,000 shares of 5,000 francs. Ownership of five shares conferred the right of eligibility to its board of administrators and the right to one vote in that body's

³⁷ Le Couteulx spoke in favour of the *mandat* on 4 April 1796 after Laffon's project failed (Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.465). According to Lebrun (*ORCEP*, p.69-70): "A project for a national bank had been formed...Its report caused a sensation with the public, but it died in the Cinq-Cents where no one seized upon it...The assignat was in its death throes, and the government dared not operate a return to hard currency. It was suggested the assignat should be replaced by mandats which were equally worthless. A resolution of the Cinq-Cents was passed on to the Anciens. Convinced this new measure was doomed to failure, I refused to be the financial commission's tool; another deputy [Le Couteulx] dared to propose the adoption of the mandat. It passed, and soon the mandat perished like the assignat."

³⁸ Archives de la Banque de France (hereafter 'ABF'), dossier 1069200402/1 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 1^{ère} société), *Procès-verbal des réunions du conseil d'administration, 14 Vendémiaire an V – 9 Nivôse an VII (5 octobre 1797 – 29 décembre 1798)*, 12 thermidor V/30 July 1797, p.66-69 (hereafter 'PVRCA-1'). The *hôtel Massiac*, owned by Jean Godard, was originally rented to the *caisse* but later purchased in the name of its shareholder Nicolas Claude François Villeminez on 30 July 1797. The total price with legal fees and land registry dues was 365,517 *livres*, with a down payment of 200,000 *livres*. For the notarial bill of sale dated 5 thermidor V see *Ibid*, p.70-75.

³⁹ See Monneron's entry in the Bibliographical Index for further details.

⁴⁰ For the *Agence de négociations de la Trésorerie nationale*, see Chapter 5.



Figure 3:5
 The three elder Monneron brothers.
 From left to right: Pierre Antoine,
 Charles Claude Ange and Jean Louis
 Engraving by Pierre-Guillaume-
 Alexandre Beljambe, 1789
 Musée Carnavalet
 © Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet
 CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public
 Domain



Figure 3:6
 A 5 sols Monneron coin commemorating the *fête de la fédération* held on 14 July 1790 when soldiers of the National Guard took a collective oath of loyalty to the French nation and 1789 Constitution
 The caption around the head side reads '*Vivre libre ou mourir*' (Live free or die)
 Minted in 1792 by Auguste Dupré
 Musée Carnavalet – © Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet
 CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



Figure 3:7

Octagonal silver token of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* commemorating its foundation. On the head side, two female figures representing Wisdom and Fortune with the inscription “*la sagesse fixe la fortune*” (wisdom begets fortune) above them.

Minted by Rambert Duarest on 11 messidor IV/29 June 1796

Musée Carnavalet – © Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet

CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

deliberations. The board was composed of eleven administrators elected by the general assembly of shareholders who took it in turns to preside the bank's administration each month.⁴¹ These administrators were renewed by a fifth every year in Vendémiaire through the drawing of lots. Overall direction of the bank's affairs was entrusted to a director-general whom the administrators selected from among their ranks.⁴²

Article 19 of the *caisse*'s statutes lists its commercial objectives as follows:

- 1) *Discounting letters of credit or commercial bills of exchange bearing three solid and reputable signatures and whose date of validity will not exceed 90 days.*
- 2) *To manage current accounts, to receive in its coffers for the accounts of individuals, the sums they will deposit or receive, and to pay for them – on the amounts of these aforementioned sums – the drafts they will draw or the letters of credit they have accepted, payable at its headquarters.*
- 3) *To emit notes payable on sight when the administration, numbering at least eight members, will judge them useful to commerce.*⁴³

These aims highlight several contentious issues affecting bill discounting operations in the world of private banking at this time. When traders received a bill of exchange in payment of merchandise, they were rarely paid immediately; and since they often needed money at short notice they would 'discount' the bill by obtaining advance payment on its value from a bank which – for a small commission – issued the trader with bank notes for a corresponding amount. The trader could then use these notes to acquit his expenses (enabling the bank to circulate its currency) and reimburse the bank once the client who had given him the bill paid for it.

But who had the authority to sign and endorse bills of exchange presented for discounting operations? Most traders maintained that only the buyer and seller who had contracted the bill should sign it. But the *caisse* argued that in order to avoid the possibility of two merchants establishing debts towards one another without any real movement of assets taking place, the debtor's accounts should be audited by a 'solid and reputable' financial authority – i.e. a banker – to accredit his solvability, and that discounted bills should therefore be signed by three parties – the debtor, creditor and financial auditor.

⁴¹ See Appendix IV.

⁴² For the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*'s foundational statutes see ABF, dossier 1069200402/1 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 1^{ère} société), *Registre des délibérations de l'Assemblée générale des actionnaires : du 11 Messidor an IV au 30 Frimaire an VII (29 juin 1796 – 20 décembre 1798)*, 11 messidor IV/29 June 1796, p.1-4 (hereafter 'RDAGA-1').

⁴³ *Ibid*, p.4 – The paper to print the *caisse*'s 500-franc notes was made at Mr. Morel's manufacture at Glaigne near Crépy-en-Valois (Oise). The printer Firmin-Didot was asked to create an engraving plate for these notes (*Ibid*, 11 Thermidor IV/29 July 1796, p.11-12). Three printers – Deperey, Groizier & Retz – printed the notes and were awarded an annual salary of 3,000 francs each (*Ibid*, 26 ventôse V/16 March 1797, p.33).

This rule of three signatures conferred full control of the discounting process to the *caisse*'s administrators, since they could deliberately exclude modest merchants from discounting their bills if they were deemed insolvable or could not afford to pay for audits. These unfortunate traders – who were then often forced to seek loans elsewhere at exorbitant rates – grew even more resentful upon learning that *caisse* administrators enjoyed the privilege of discounting their own bills without having them verified and frequently waived auditing requirements to accommodate their shareholders.⁴⁴ Thus, the 'tyranny of the third signature' – imposed from above at the *caisse*'s inception to favour the creation of an exclusive clientele – created a commercial vacuum which led middling tradesmen to establish the *Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce* on 24 February 1797.⁴⁵ Eventually, alternative banking models appeared like that of the *Banque Territoriale* – founded by Laffon and Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours in 1799 – which issued bank notes guaranteed by mortgaged real estate.⁴⁶

Records indicate there was prolonged discussion concerning the length of validity of bills of exchange which the *caisse* was prepared to accept for discounting. Article 19 of its foundational statutes mentions a 90-day limit, but the minutes of the first meeting of its administrative board state that "*promissory notes which exceed thirty days will not be admitted for bill discounting.*"⁴⁷ The administrators exercised caution because they knew it could be dangerous – in a market plagued by lack of liquidity – for the *caisse* to refund too many of its own bank notes in return for bills or letters of credit taking up to three months to recoup. To maintain adequate hard currency reserves, it was in the *caisse*'s interest to only accept promissory notes with reduced repayment periods. For this reason, the *caisse* did not immediately start to print bank notes but instead began by accepting deposits in hard currency on which it paid interest at 0.5%.⁴⁸ Moreover, it delivered all its payment orders in precious metals (gold or silver coin) to entice additional customers.⁴⁹

Rather than immediately sell its shares to the public, the *caisse* initially decided to invite respected businessmen to acquire them to strengthen its financial appeal and credibility.

⁴⁴ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.59-60.

⁴⁵ For the *Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce* see Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.101-108; Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.57-67; ABF, 1069199708/2 & 1069200401/305 and Archives de la Ville de Paris (hereafter 'AP'), D31U3 1, dossier 79, 6 Thermidor VIII/25 July 1800 (act of renewal). For its opposition to the 'tyranny of the third signature' see AN, AF/IV/1070:32 – *Observations des actionnaires de la Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce*.

⁴⁶ For the *Banque Territoriale* see Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.112-113; Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.72-92; AP, D31U3 1, dossiers 17 & 33; MC/ET/IX/856 quater, 6 germinal VIII/27 March 1800 and AN, AF/IV/1070:39 – *Observation de Laffon-Ladébat sur le crédit territorial*.

⁴⁷ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 14 vendémiaire V/5 Oct. 1796, p.1.

⁴⁸ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.23 – Nevertheless, the *caisse* charged a commission for storing diamonds (1/12th of their value) and gold (1/16th of its value) – ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 12 frimaire V/2 Dec. 1796, p.12.

⁴⁹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 14 vendémiaire V/5 Oct. 1796, p.1.

Monneron and Godard acquired eight and forty shares respectively, while eleven other selected investors purchased eight shares each. These were:

- Jean Devaines, a former *premier commis des finances* of Louis XVI and Treasury commissioner under the Legislative Assembly;
- Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx, who briefly served as an administrator of the *caisse* but soon left for Rouen to set up another discount bank;⁵⁰
- Jacques-Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron, who had been involved in Laffon's national bank project;
- Charles-Martin Doyen, formerly the *caissier du Trésor royal à Paris* prior to the Revolution who had been appointed *caissier de la caisse générale de la Trésorerie nationale* by Louis XVI in 1791 and served in that post throughout the Terror;
- Jacques-Rose Récamier, a Lyon banker and leading actor in the Spanish piaster trade with strong connections to British and Genevan financial circles;
- Pierre-Joseph Fleury Jubié, a former inspector of manufactures from Isère who had been elected a deputy of the *Cinq-Cents* and embarked on a very successful banking career;
- Pierre-Laurent Hainguerlot, a major real-estate speculator – particularly in Belgian *biens nationaux*;
- Nicolas Louis Marie Magon, marquis de La Gervaisais – one of the last surviving members of the influential Magon family, powerful *armateurs* from Saint Malo;
- Charles Augustin Foloppe (de Caudebec), a financier who had previously done business with the Convention's *commission des subsistances* and sat with Monneron on the *Agence de négociations de la Trésorerie nationale*;
- Étienne Godard, brother of Jean;
- Louis Rosset, an obscure financier about whom very little is known.⁵¹

On 23 August 1796 – after a month's organisational delay – the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* established three committees for discounting, accounting and verification of assets in its safe.⁵² Eight days later it published a prospectus advertising its services to the public which contained a barely concealed critique of the Directory's economic policies:

Wherever [public banks] have been founded, commerce has risen to the highest degree of prosperity, and they have exerted such a marked influence on the fortune of states that they have sustained credit despite the convergence of several events which should have destroyed it.

⁵⁰ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.103-106.

⁵¹ Bruguère, *GPR*, p.120 – See their respective entries in the Biographical Index for more details.

⁵² ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 6 fructidor IV/23 Aug. 1796, p.18.

These results are due to several causes; but the most effective and striking is to be found in the movement which a bank instils in the flow of money. It is common knowledge that the mass of money increases in proportion to the rapidity of its circulation...If, in a regular order of things, such an establishment produces such happy effects, it becomes all the more necessary and precious when – through a chain of circumstances – a portion of the hard currency within a country is removed from it, another portion remains unused, and the remaining portion proves so inadequate in meeting the needs of commerce that it is impossible to borrow even a mediocre sum on a large down payment. This is an evident sign of scarcity and one of the greatest obstacles facing the efforts of industry.

There can be no doubt that this is the moment when it is important to give the remaining money in the economy such an activity that it is possible to accomplish much with very little, so that the scarcity of hard currency may not prevent commerce from enjoying abundance.

It is to attain this objective that the Caisse des Comptes Courants has been established...

The prospectus dismissed certain reservations about the banking trade as common misconceptions:

It would not be superfluous to respond to some objections which are constantly repeated...Banking and speculation have often been confused, when they are in fact not only absolutely separate, but also directly opposed in nature. Indeed, the latter strives for exorbitant gains while the former can only aspire to modest dividends. The one indulges in hazardous speculations while the other only permits itself safe transactions...There will never be any speculation when an institution publicly displays its writings, opens all its books and distributes dividends in the presence of a large number of witnesses...It has also been maintained that a few administrators...could compromise the bank's funds. But this fails to consider that none of them can act alone nor decide anything without the indispensable votes of their colleagues.⁵³

Fortunately, several auspicious indicators – confirmed by police reports – hinted the public would welcome the *caisse's* arrival on the market. One report dated 16 July 1796 noted that:

...all individuals yearn for the moment when there will no longer be a paper currency, or when there will only be one invariable paper standard, as it used to be with [the notes] of the Caisse d'Escompte. For people are convinced that major commercial ventures cannot be performed without paper notes, given the lack of hard currency, even in times of abundance.⁵⁴

Another report of 21 August recorded how the public yearned for:

...banking notes resembling those of our neighbours, and they desire the establishment of a particular bank that would be independent from the government

⁵³ *Ibid*, 6 & 14 fructidor IV/23 & 31 Aug. 1796, p.19-23.

⁵⁴ Aulard, *PPRTSD*, Tome III, p.320.

*and which, modelled on the Caisse d'Escompte, would cash in notes in offices open to the public.*⁵⁵

As anticipated, the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* effected a resounding entrance in business circles, promptly shaking the Parisian banking scene out of its torpor. Its simple and effective business model of providing immediate cash advances on deposited bills of exchange – in return for a moderate commission – guaranteed it instant success in a languid market still hopelessly incapacitated by chronic liquidity problems. Not since the last days of the *Ancien Régime* had there been a bank offering such liberal terms and facilities of payment to its investors. By 30 September, the volume of funds in its accounts already exceeded 20 million *livres*.⁵⁶ On 21 November, the acting administrative president Jubié reported that discounting had passed the threshold of 600,000 francs per *décade* and that cash reserves amounted to 4,262,920 *livres*.⁵⁷ The following day, the authorised limit for discounting was raised from $\frac{1}{5}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ of all sums in current accounts.⁵⁸

These early successes explain why finance minister Ramel's renewed attempts to create a national bank were turned down when he convened the leading businessmen in the country for discussions in the fall of 1796.⁵⁹ An article in the *Décade philosophique* summarised the bankers' position:

[The representatives of commerce] *do not believe that a national bank can be established at this moment in France because investor confidence – the most necessary element for its existence – is lacking. Public trust has experienced far too violent and precipitated a series of shocks triggered by the downfalls of the Caisse d'Escompte, the Compagnie des Indes, insurance firms, the assignats, rescriptions and the mandats [territoriaux] to commit itself anew to a large financial establishment under government influence. The Caisse des Comptes Courants, of which we have already spoken, is of a different nature. The activity of this bank and the circulation of its notes does not extend beyond the circle of those who are acquainted with its administrators and shareholders. Its credit merely reflects that of the signatories to its notes, and it therefore constitutes more of a private association than a public bank.*⁶⁰

The message couldn't have been clearer – the *caisse's* administrators had chosen to go their separate way – and their bank's rapid growth soon convinced them to start printing

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p.403.

⁵⁶ ABF, 1069200402/1, RDAGA-1, 9 vendémiaire V/30 Sep. 1796, p.30.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 1 frimaire V/21 Nov. 1796, p.38.

⁵⁸ ABF, 1069200402/1, PVRCA-1, 2 frimaire V/22 Nov.1796, p.14-16.

⁵⁹ Their deliberations were recorded in the *Journal d'économie publique, de morale et de politique*, n°11, 20 frimaire V/10 Dec. 1796, p.95. The same journal published a follow-up article in a later issue (n°35, 20 thermidor V/7 Aug. 1797, p.356-378) entitled “*Mémoire présenté par les envoyés extraordinaires du commerce au ministre des Finances, concernant les monnoies*” and dated 5 ventôse V/24 Feb. 1797.

⁶⁰ *La Décade philosophique*, Tome 12, 10 pluviôse V/29 Jan. 1797, p.253-254.

bank notes on 7 November.⁶¹ The *caisse* now became an emitting bank issuing paper currency in proportion to the volume of funds it discounted. Its statutes stated that “*bank notes will be printed according to the deliberations of the administrators who shall determine their form, value, series and numbers, while a further deliberation will set the date of their emission.*”⁶² A registry was established to record and trace each printed note, along with the date of its release into circulation and the moment when its bearer presented himself at the bank’s counters to obtain a refund.⁶³ On 22 December, the board fixed the value of its first notes at 500 francs.⁶⁴ The bank approved the printing of two million francs and on 1 January 1797 put a first batch of 500,000 francs of notes in circulation.⁶⁵ They were immediately popular with the public which encouraged the *caisse* to rapidly begin printing more.⁶⁶ The principal advantage of these notes was that they were not affected by inflation or depreciation. Note bearers could cash them in for precious metals at any time; and since notes were far easier to carry than metal, they began to be favoured as a means of payment. Once interest on customer deposits began to be paid in bank notes, the number of deposits skyrocketed, making credit available which could be re-directed into investment.

The introduction of notes had an immediate and palpable effect which rose crescendo right through to 18 Fructidor. On 21 January 1797, the authorised discounting limit was raised from $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{3}{8}$ of all sums in current accounts and to $\frac{3}{8}$ of all notes in circulation.⁶⁷ In Germinal Year V – less than a month after the *caisse*’s first notes hit the market – the volume of discounted bills doubled.⁶⁸ Current accounts at the *caisse* rose from 150 in Frimaire Year V to 270 in Germinal. Davillier, administrative president for that month, proudly congratulated his shareholders:

*It is certain that your intention has been to raise commerce out of the depression in which it found itself, to procure it great resources and to oppose the scarcity of hard currency with means born from a rapid circulation – rather than to ensure prompt and abundant profits.*⁶⁹

⁶¹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 17 brumaire V/7 Nov.1796, p.8.

⁶² *Ibid*, 26 ventôse VI/16 March 1798, p.119-120 – Each series of notes was numbered alphabetically and consisted in a thousand notes signed by two administrators. All cancelled notes were burnt. The first *caisse*’s final statutes were long debated and not approved until Ventôse VI, well over a year after the bank’s foundation.

⁶³ *Ibid*, p.120.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 2 nivôse V/22 Dec. 1796, p.15 – As a means of comparison, the price of a hectoliter of wheat in 1797 was less than 20 francs (Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.20, footnote 19).

⁶⁵ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 12 nivôse V/1 Jan. 1797, p.17.

⁶⁶ 4,000 notes of 500 francs (two million francs) on 6 March 1797; 12,000 more (six million francs) on 21 April; another 4,000 (two million francs) on 4 June (*Ibid*, 16 ventôse, 2 floréal & 16 messidor V, p.30, 41 & 61).

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 2 pluviôse V/21 Jan. 1797, p.22.

⁶⁸ See Appendix IV.

⁶⁹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 18 germinal V/7 April 1797, p.44.

On 24 April, the *caisse*'s commissioners (led by Médard Desprez) told their shareholders: "...if you calculate the obstacles that have attempted to hamper its progress, you will like us be struck by how useful the extent of operations has been for commerce..."⁷⁰ By 15 May, the sums invested in the *caisse*'s share portfolio reached 2,500,000 francs.⁷¹ Ten days later the bank's hard currency reserves topped two million francs.⁷² In Floréal, the discounting limit was raised even further from $\frac{3}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ of all sums in current accounts and from $\frac{3}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ of all notes in circulation;⁷³ and the following month (Prairial Year V), this limit climbed from $\frac{1}{2}$ to an unprecedented $\frac{9}{16}$ of all sums in current accounts. Such was the volume of discounts that the *caisse*'s discounting committee was increased from three to four members.⁷⁴ Prairial witnessed several other milestones with the bank discounting an impressive five million francs per *décade*. On 5 June, for the first time in the *caisse*'s existence, over two million francs were discounted in a single day.⁷⁵ Half of all existing shares had been purchased by this time and shareholders were encouraged to acquire the remaining half to double their portfolios.⁷⁶

This dazzling ascension transformed the *caisse* into the establishment of the Parisian banking aristocracy *par excellence* with most of the future founding and early Regents of the *Banque de France* numbering among its shareholders. But the *caisse* also catered to financiers from a wide variety of different backgrounds. There were former *premier commis* of Louis XVI like Jean Devaines; a host of military contractors and real estate speculators including Charles Bodin (*Compagnie Bodin frères*), Antoine Bayard (*Bayard & Cie.*), Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy (*Compagnie Rochefort*), Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel *jeune* and Pierre-François Tiberghien; naval armateurs based in strategic ports such as Jean-Jacques Bérard (Lorient), Magon Gervaisais (Saint Malo), François Devinck (Dunkerque) and Louis Charles Lemercier (Saint Malo); and several leading textile manufacturers with international connections like Jacques Bidermann (Wintherthur), Gabriel Filliettaz (Geneva), Henri Grandin and the Delon brothers, and the Ternaux brothers from Sedan.⁷⁷

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 5 floréal V/24 April 1797, p.52-53.

⁷¹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-1*, 26 floréal V/15 May 1797, p.49.

⁷² *Ibid*, 6 prairial an V, p.50 – A few months prior on 23 October 1796 the hard currency reserves had amounted to 364,000 (*Ibid*, 2 brumaire V/23 Oct. 1796, p.4).

⁷³ *Ibid*, 12 floréal V/1 May 1797, p.44-45.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 12 & 26 prairial V/31 May & 14 June 1797, p.53 & 56.

⁷⁵ See Appendix IV, 17 prairial V/5 June 1797.

⁷⁶ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-1*, 18 prairial V/6 June 1797, p.54.

⁷⁷ See Appendix IV for a list of *caisse* shareholders and the Biographical Index for further details.

Economic Realignment with Spain: Operating a Return to Hard Currency

One of the most momentous economic events of the early directorial period was the signing of the Second Treaty of San Ildefonso with Spain on 19 August 1796. The conclusion of this treaty ended a longstanding debate concerning which of three main international commercial strategies France should adopt. The first, which had helped defeat Britain during the American Revolutionary War, relied on France's traditional allies (Spain, the Low Countries and the Scandinavian states) to gain access to American and Baltic markets and Dutch banking. The second excluded Spain in favour of peace with Britain – thereby enabling imported American precious metals to be exempted from tariffs and re-exported to Asia in exchange for spices and textiles. The third, developed by Colbert, aimed to encourage domestic commerce and industry through the establishment of manufactures and forges but appeared increasingly outdated due to the nascent Industrial Revolution in Britain and rapid internationalisation of global trade.⁷⁸

The effects of the San Ildefonso agreement proved immensely beneficial to French business. It brought the Spanish colonial trade back into the sphere of France's commercial networks. Access to the all-important Mexican piaster market was restored and the revolutionary government could now import large quantities of precious metals to engineer a return to hard currency and restore confidence in the French economy.⁷⁹ Furthermore, the treaty bolstered the *caisse*'s expansion. Many of its shareholders and associates were leading investors in Spanish and Mediterranean markets. Le Couteulx was a major hard currency importer, as was Récamier who transferred Italian contributions back to Paris through his contacts with the *Banque Saint-Georges* and Aimé Régné in Genoa and purchased Spanish piasters for the Treasury via the French consulate in Cadix.⁸⁰ Likewise, traders and manufacturers such as the Sévène brothers, Henri Grandin and Guillaume-Louis Ternaux were heavily involved in the Spanish wool trade and guaranteed by bankers connected to the *caisse* (Barrillon, Récamier, Fulchiron, *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.*, etc.).

Thus, the size and interdependence of these financial interests suggest the San Ildefonso accord was not merely a serendipitous occurrence. When France subsequently failed to conclude peace with Britain in October 1796, the victory of this 'Hispanic-Metallist' lobby over its Anglophile rivals was complete. The presence of financiers like Pierre Lenormand at the finance ministry's general secretariat and Le Couteulx in the *Anciens* heralded the

⁷⁸ For more on these global economic perspectives see Bruguère, *GPR*, p.75-76

⁷⁹ In December 1795, the Thermidorian Convention's *comité des finances* – then headed by Johannot – evaluated the remaining stock of hard currency in public coffers at 300 million (Bruguère, *GPR*, p.118-119).

⁸⁰ Bruguère, *GPR*, p.120.

return to power of trading houses which had dominated the piaster trade since the mid-eighteenth century.⁸¹

The implications of this economic realignment with Spain which portended an ineluctable return to hard currency were not lost upon Bonaparte who – even before his departure for Italy – had already anticipated the conclusion of such an agreement.⁸² At a dinner hosted by Barras in January 1796, ‘*général vendémiaire*’ as Napoleon was then known approached Le Couteulx and eagerly sought his advice concerning the remedial measures required to improve the dismal French economy. Their prophetic conversation merits closer examination:

Bonaparte – *You were particularly occupied with finances at the National Assembly, and you have already presented several reports to the Conseil des Anciens in which I have noted your earnest efforts to create or furnish resources to the new regime. But you still believe you can make something out of the assignat. Think again, Mr. Le Couteulx! We must return to hard currency.*

[Le Couteulx says he was “*astonished at the audacity of this assertion,*” given the repression exercised against those who spoke ill of the *assignat*.]

Le Couteulx – *It appears very dangerous to me, nearly impossible to wipe out in one fell swoop the only monetary currency circulating in France which – although excessively depreciated – is nonetheless the only tradeable value to which all the savings of the French people are reduced; the only value with which one can still purvey to life’s daily needs.*

Bonaparte – *Believe me, it is not the assignat which puts on our tables in Paris all the good things which are served today with a newfound luxury. It is not the assignat which will pay for the excellent wine we have just been given. It is not with these rags that the grocers of the Halles pay for the goods they take in provincial départements and sell in Paris...All these transactions are concluded in hard currency with daily exchange rates that warn you their value fluctuates and can fall to zero.*

You fear that once the assignat has disappeared the people will no longer have the means to purvey their needs. The people have assignats – it is true – but they have them for what they are worth and always receive the value they need to feed and maintain their family in exchange for their work. Break the assignat’s engraving plates. Break those sterile plates! We will survive their destruction. People will always cultivate wheat, flax and raise cattle. The resources of the earth and of industry, cultivation and work will soon make hard currency reappear when there will no longer be paper money. Ensure the Republic only receives taxes in hard

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p.116 – See Lenormand’s entry in the Biographical Index.

⁸² In July 1795, he had written enthusiastically to Joseph: “*The news of our victory at Quiberon and of peace with Spain instantly changes the nature of our affairs*” (NBCG-1, n°317, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 12 thermidor III/30 July 1795).

currency, or at the assignat's equivalent rate of exchange. Authorise landowners to receive their rents at the same rate or in the same manner.

Le Couteulx – *Do you believe the authority of this new government is sufficiently well-established to risk this transition from paper money to hard currency without causing civil disturbances? Every day, at every moment, means must be found to combat anarchy.*

Bonaparte – *Money, cannons and barrels of flour – there is all this in France. That is what is needed against anarchy. But the government today will have neither money, nor flour, nor cannons with assignats, with paper money.*⁸³

Le Couteulx concludes this anecdote by conceding that Bonaparte's prediction of a return to hard currency came true; but "*it would be ill-founded to suggest that there would not have been much agitation and disorder if the assignat had been reduced to nothing as brazenly as General Bonaparte wanted.*"⁸⁴

What can we infer from such a prescient and intriguing discussion, and how accurate is Le Couteulx's account of this exchange considering it was published many years after the event? It would be difficult to cross-reference his version since neither Barras nor Bonaparte mention this conversation in their memoirs. But if we accept Le Couteulx's description is broadly accurate, then it seems obvious Bonaparte had already been confidentially briefed by the Directory on the financial objectives attached to his Italian command and their potential impact on the French economy. When asserting to Le Couteulx that the *assignat* would soon be replaced by "*the resources of the earth and of industry*", was he not intimating these riches would be seized in Italy – especially since Le Couteulx already knew the general was about to leave on campaign? Moreover, Bonaparte's decision to engage Le Couteulx on economic policy was certainly no coincidence – given the Norman financier had long been the undisputed leader in importing hard currency into France. Thus, if Napoleon was testing the waters, it was presumably to determine how Le Couteulx would react to a sudden change in monetary policy. Why else would Bonaparte have so openly insisted on the necessity of the *assignat*'s destruction if he had not been assured of the government's complicity?

What is more, Napoleon's predictions soon proved correct as the resumption of trade with Spain accentuated the importance of contributions levied by his *Armée d'Italie*. As we noted in Chapter 2, these were integrated via Emmanuel Balbi and Haller in a complex triangular trading system in which confiscated diamonds, Belgian *biens nationaux*,

⁸³ 'Souvenirs du comte Le Couteulx de Canteleu' in Lescure (ed.), *MJR*, Tome II, p.205-208.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, p.208.

Batavian rescriptions and Italian contributions were shipped to France and used to purchase Spanish piasters, tobacco and sugar from America, and wood and iron ore from the Baltic.

However, the perspective of salvaging the economy by relying on precious metals meant there could be no place for a nationalised currency like the *mandat territorial* since its value was pegged to the toxic *assignat*.⁸⁵ Depreciated currency would have to be purged from circulation if monetary stability were to be restored (Gresham's Law – 'good money chases out the bad'). It was this necessity which induced the Directory to operate a dramatic *volte-face* in its economic policy and deliberately run its own currency into the ground by farming out the withdrawal of *mandat* notes to a private financial company.⁸⁶ The result was a major public embarrassment known as the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal which constituted a second decisive turning point in favour of the *caisse*.

The Compagnie Dijon Scandal & Coup of 18 Fructidor

The *Compagnie Dijon* was formed by three Parisian financiers named Gaccon, Muguet de Saint Didier (a former exchange agent and business partner in the Comte de Seneffe's speculations) and Pierre-Laurent Hainguerlot (an early administrator of the *caisse*) – along with their financial guarantor Jean-Baptiste Dijon (a military contractor).⁸⁷ Hainguerlot was the son of a *receveur de l'Enregistrement* of the Calvados. He was one of the biggest speculators of *biens nationaux* under the Directory with a fortune estimated at 50 million francs on which he paid 500,000 francs in annual tax contributions. He and his associate, the Montpellier banker and future *Banque de France* Regent Louis-Barthélémy Bastide, were the real muscle behind the *Compagnie Dijon*.⁸⁸ Their company was initially awarded a contract on 11 December 1796 in which it agreed to lend the Treasury 2,500,000 francs in exchange for 100 million in *mandats territoriaux* notes.⁸⁹ Following a period of forty

⁸⁵ The Directory had set an exchange rate of one *mandat* for 30 *assignats* (Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.462).

⁸⁶ Moreover, with Spain now joining France in its war against Britain, naval expenditures became a priority – but neither the French nor Spanish governments could bear such a cost. Both were forced to turn to the private sector for assistance, with Ouvrard already waiting in the wings as a candidate for the general contract to supply the French navy (Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.155-158).

⁸⁷ Reports on the *Compagnie Dijon* are stored in various files of the French National Archives (AN, C//410, C//419, C//503 and especially C//504). Good summaries of the scandal can be found in Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.516-526; Bruguière, *GPR*, p.121-126 & Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.164.

⁸⁸ See the entries for Bastide and Hainguerlot in the Biographical Index. Bergeron has established that Dijon and Hainguerlot were connected to Bastide who was himself in business with Vanlerberghe and Ouvrard.

⁸⁹ The contract dated 18 frimaire V/8 Dec.1796 (approved and apostilled by the Treasury on 24 frimaire/14 Dec.) can be found in AN, C//504, *Rapport de Camus sur l'affaire de la Compagnie Dijon et pièces y relatives*, 18 germinal V/7 April 1797, p.21-22 (hereafter 'RCACD'). In reality, the company paid 2,695,000

days, the company would return the *mandats* to the Treasury and be repaid in bills of exchange drawn on tax *receveurs* of six *départements*.⁹⁰ According to the deputy Armand-Gaston Camus who led the subsequent inquiry into the scandal:

*The company desired a large amount of mandats to short-sell them...In reality, it wasn't deemed harmful for public finances to allow the mandat to lose value, since it was the only way to get rid of it. As for the profits the company would earn, they would principally be made at the expense of other speculating companies, all of which were indifferent in the eyes of the government.*⁹¹

But when the *Compagnie Dijon* complained its competitors were deliberately inflating the *mandat*'s value to prevent it from fulfilling its contract, the deal was quietly amended by Ramel on 25 December to allow the company to collect “*all the mandats in public coffers or which have been received as payment for biens nationaux and placed under seal*” in forty additional *départements* for a period of forty days!⁹² Neither the Directory nor the Treasury's surveillance committee were informed of this change. Conveniently, Ramel had just ordered – on 21 December – that all public coffers be placed under seal and audited because the *Compagnie Dijon*'s agents had reported that tax *receveurs* in various *départements* were not recording all *mandats* paid to them and were illegally exchanging some for hard currency at depreciated rates.⁹³

Thus, during the month of January 1797, while the tax *receveurs*, paymasters (*caissiers*) and *domaines* administrators of *départements* were busy having their accounts audited by local magistrates and elected officials, the agents of the *Compagnie Dijon* – duly authorized by a governmental power of writ – withdrew all the *mandats* they could find in public coffers, including those used for purchases of *biens nationaux*. They removed 281 million from the administration of *domaines* and 381 million from tax *receveurs* and *caissiers* for a grand total in excess of 660 million in *mandats* notes – roughly a third of all *mandats territoriaux* ever printed!⁹⁴ The Treasury's surveillance committee only became aware of the mass of funds withdrawn in mid-January when a flood of complaints warned

francs in hard currency and received 130 million in *mandats* instead of the 100 million initially agreed (Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.517).

⁹⁰ The six *départements* were those of the Rhône-et-Loire, Calvados, Manche, Seine Inférieure, Seine and Seine Maritime (AN, C//504, *RCACD*, 18 germinal V/7 April 1797, p.22).

⁹¹ AN, C//504, dossier 394/1, *RCACD*, p.2-3 – It was in the company's interest to see the *mandat*'s value go down since it would repay less than it had borrowed.

⁹² *Ibid*, p.6-7 – Note that the company's creation was only recorded by notarial act after the terms of its contract were changed (*Ibid*, pièce justificative X, p.29-33). See also AN, C//504, dossier 394/2 – *Observations du ministre des finances sur l'affaire de la Compagnie Dijon*, 29 prairial V/17 June 1797, p.4 (hereafter '*OMFACD*').

⁹³ AN, C//504, dossier 394/1, *RCACD*, p.6 & AN, C//504, dossier 394/2 – *OMFACD*, p.3.

⁹⁴ AN, C//504, dossier 394/2, *OMFACD*, p.8 & dossier 394/1, *RCACD*, pièces justificatives XVIII & XIX, p.42-53.

it that regional tax depots had been raided and their *mandats* “*delivered over to speculators who sold them on the market at 2 livres 10 sous and more.*”⁹⁵ Ramel claimed the fact that the company had found so many *mandats* proved provincial administrations had deviously underreported their tax intakes. Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain – based on the evidence linked to the scandal – whether he really had been misled, was trying to deflect blame or was possibly even in cahoots with the company.

The *Compagnie Dijon* had agreed to reimburse the initial 100 million *mandats* it borrowed at 2 *livres 10 sous per mandat*.⁹⁶ But on 26 January 1797, it obtained yet another contract from the Treasury stipulating that any additional *mandats* it withdrew beyond this threshold would only be refunded at 20 *sous per mandat*.⁹⁷ Considering one *livre* was worth 20 *sous*, the firm stood to make gargantuan profits. Camus estimated it netted a minimum of 2,700,000 francs in four months simply by repaying its borrowed *mandats* at a cheaper rate.⁹⁸ But the company multiplied these earnings exponentially by using proceeds from *mandats* sales to buy *biens nationaux* at depreciated prices and promptly re-selling them for profit. It also purchased short-term bonds whose value depreciated less than that of the *mandat*, thereby benefiting from conversion rates when these bonds were cashed in to reimburse the Treasury.

With the company’s objectives fulfilled, a decree of 4 February 1797 completed the *mandat*’s liquidation by deliberately “pegging” its value to one percent of its market price in hard currency. On the surface, the entire operation represented a political and technical triumph for Ramel. The cumbersome and worthless *mandat* could now make way for a return to hard currency. And since this deceptive *tour de force* had been administered solely at the expense of the public purse, it only really affected government creditors. Private investors on the market escaped relatively unscathed. Moreover, while the scandal was unfolding in France, Bonaparte’s success at Rivoli – followed by the Preliminaries of Leoben – were bringing the war against Austria to a close. The perspectives seemed promising for business.

But the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal was going to have political ramifications which directly threatened the interests of the financial aristocracy. Government creditors and ordinary speculators were infuriated at being despoiled by the *mandat*’s extinction, and this lit the fuse of a bitter struggle that served as the prelude to the 18 Fructidor coup. For the royalist

⁹⁵ AN, C//504, dossier 394/1, *RCACD*, p.8.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p.22 & 38. See also Appendix VII.

⁹⁷ AN, C//504, dossier 394/1, *RCACD*, p.38 & AN, C//504, dossier 394/2, *OMFACD*, p.5 – Ramel claimed rather unconvincingly he hadn’t been aware of this new contract until long after it was signed.

⁹⁸ AN, C//504, dossier 394/1, *RCACD*, p.13.

party which obtained a majority in the *Cinq-Cents* following the elections of March-April 1797, the general effervescence created by the *mandat*'s suppression offered an ideal angle of attack against the Directory.⁹⁹ No sooner had sessions of the renewed *Cinq-Cents* resumed than the leading royalist financial expert – Jean-Louis Gibert-Desmolières – orchestrated the charge against the government.¹⁰⁰ He advanced on a simple premise: the chronic shortage of money and hard currency could only be attributable to the “*detestable operations of the administration.*”¹⁰¹ Denouncing what he affected to be the government's holding of the country to economic ransom, Desmolières proclaimed the royalists would never cave in to such blackmail:

*The Directory will obtain from us neither a revolutionary loan nor an increase in direct contributions; in vain will it dispense alarming messages, in vain will it convene secret committees on the same day – in both councils – to spread alarm and obtain something from the panic.*¹⁰²

The Directory's financial ineptitude was further exposed on 31 May when naval minister Laurent Truguet, who for months had complained of a lack of funds and supplies, revealed he had signed a supply contract with the *Compagnie Gaillard* of his own initiative.¹⁰³ It was not long before deputies discovered the *Compagnie Gaillard* was in reality a cover for Hainguerlot and his *Compagnie Dijon*! Hainguerlot promised to deliver 60,000 quintals of wheat to Truguet at a price of 21 *livres* per quintal. But an annex to their contract stipulated the *Compagnie Gaillard* would only have to deliver 40,000 quintals, and since the government had already paid the full price for 60,000 quintals, the company would simply advance Truguet the discounted cash equivalent for the remaining 20,000 quintals. Thanks to this subterfuge, Truguet received about 450,000 francs in hard currency which he used to pay his naval officers and sailors. The *Cinq-Cents*'s financial commission voiced its outrage that a government minister should raise cash in such a manner, pointing out that all purchases in hard currency had to be made by the Treasury. Desmolières lambasted the deal, remarking that the price of a bag of flour at Poissy was 10.5 francs, and that even if transport costs were factored in, the total price did not exceed 15 francs per quintal.¹⁰⁴ This blantly corrupt deal sank the Directory's credibility and earned the naval minister the humiliating nickname of ‘*Truguet-farine*’.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.125.

¹⁰⁰ See his entry in the Biographical Index.

¹⁰¹ AN, F/7/4724.

¹⁰² Quoted in Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.39.

¹⁰³ AN/III/203/A, dossier 929:1-4 – *Truguet to the Directory*, 12 prairial V/31 May 1797.

¹⁰⁴ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.153-155.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.310.

A critical point was reached on 18 June when the *Cinq-Cents* passed a resolution to remove the finance ministry's right to award 'emergency visas' (*visas d'urgence*) to selected contractors – meaning the barons of finance would no longer have first priority in obtaining refunds from the Treasury and regional tax offices. The following day – in one of the *Cinq-Cents*'s most tumultuous sessions – the royalists attempted to pass a law placing the entire administration of state finances under the Treasury's remit. Such a measure would have rendered the finance ministry completely powerless and seriously jeopardised the networks of influence patiently built-up by leading businessmen in its services. Fortunately for the financiers, the Directory had a bicameral legislature, and their supporters in the *Anciens* – led by Dupont de Nemours – defeated the proposed law on 27 June.¹⁰⁶ But this victory only brought a temporary respite. Far from being discouraged, Desmolières renewed his attacks, condemning speculations surrounding Belgian *biens nationaux*. Then on 13 August, representatives of the *Cinq-Cents* called for legal proceedings to be brought against the *Compagnie Dijon* and Ramel. Hoping to definitively bring the Treasury under their control, the royalists succeeded in forcing the resignation of its commissioners.¹⁰⁷

The conflict was only resolved by the 18 Fructidor coup (4 September 1797) when the three 'republican' directors – Barras, Reubell and La Réveillère-Lépaux – in conjunction with Bonaparte who dispatched General Augereau to Paris, removed all the royalist denunciators from their seats and deported a large number of them to French Guyana.¹⁰⁸ Three weeks later, the government moved to defraud its creditors by voting a law on 30 September stipulating that two-thirds of the national debt would be repaid in severely depreciated government bonds while the remaining third would be 'consolidated' and continue to yield interest paid in hard currency.¹⁰⁹ This was nothing less than disguised state bankruptcy. Michel Bruguière asserts that "*one need look no further to find the cause of the ultimate failure of Ramel and the Directory.*"¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.39-42.

¹⁰⁷ Four of the Treasury's five commissioners were forced to resign: Savalette de Langes, Desrez, Gombault and Lemonnier. The latter published a statement in which he appeared to break ranks with his colleagues (AN, C/504 (394/2) – *Lemonnier à un citoyen représentant non-identifié*, 13 fructidor V/30 Aug. 1797). Lemonnier survived the scandal and was maintained at the Treasury, probably because he had records of all the Republic's foreign purchases since Year II. The fifth commissioner, Claude-Jean Declerck, had left his post in May and not yet been replaced. Savalette de Langes died shortly after resigning.

¹⁰⁸ The other two directors – Carnot and Barthélémy – were royalist sympathisers. Carnot fled to Germany while Barthélémy was deported to Sinnamary. Both returned to France after 18 Brumaire. Note that Laffon was also deported.

¹⁰⁹ See Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.55-71.

¹¹⁰ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.130.




Figure 3:8 – The Coup of 18 Fructidor V: “No...! We Shall Not Leave Here.”
 Troops led by General Jean Antoine Verdier (Augereau’s aide-de-camp) arrest pro-monarchist deputies
 Engraving by an unknown artist, 1797
 © Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)



Figure 3:9
 Allegory of 18 Fructidor
 The Republic wards off two figures representing religion and monarchy
 Engraving by Auguste Dupré, 1797
 Musée Carnavalet
 © Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet
 CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

While the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal and the Fructidor putsch focused all attentions, certain actors behind the scenes were jostling to benefit from the crisis. Shortly after the coup, a certain Pierre Antoine Marie d'Hautmesnil wrote to the Directory soliciting his appointment as *caissier général* of the future national lottery whose creation was under discussion in the legislative councils. In the margins of his letter were a few lines written by his political protector, Joseph Fouché, who explained that d'Hautmesnil – “*having learnt the Directory needed funds to annihilate the royalist conspiracy*” – had forwarded him “*150,000 livres in gold and three million in three-day obligations*” to help Barras and Ramel.¹¹¹ Fouché was manoeuvring his way back to power.¹¹² D'Hautmesnil was awarded a number of lucrative contracts by the finance ministry in 1798 for the upkeep of French prisoners in Britain and for the collection of outstanding payments on *biens nationaux*.¹¹³ He later resurfaced as Élisabeth Bonaparte's budget minister for the principalities of Lucca and Piombino.

It was through d'Hautmesnil that Fouché was linked to Hainguerlot. In 1798, Hainguerlot was a financial guarantor of *d'Hautmesnil & Cie.* for 250,000 francs.¹¹⁴ He was also in business with William Herries (brother of the Scottish magnate Sir Robert Herries) and with the banker and representative Pierre Joseph Fleury Jubié (who was close to Fouché and had met Barras in February 1798).¹¹⁵ Barras dwells at some length on these links and their role in the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal:

[Fouché] *entered into contact with all businessmen who appeared outwardly dextrous. None were endowed with this quality in a superior degree than H...[Hainguerlot] l'aîné. It is from Fouché himself...that I hold this information....[Hainguerlot] was the type of businessman who, having nothing to lose by the Revolution, had measured with a skilful glance all the advantages such a social commotion presented to audacious speculations. He was among the first to have swooped on the assignats and state and military supplies in the political tumult which followed 9 Thermidor...The decadence of the assignat and its conversion into mandats gave birth to an incredible scheme. It not only consisted in ascertaining the government's thinking on the mandat, but also inspired the policy which destroyed this currency – through a subterfuge whose authors became the masters of the state. Having succeeded in presenting and ratifying a contract based on dupery,*

¹¹¹ AN, 187 AP 1, Papiers Fouché – *Lettre du citoyen d'Hautmesnil au Directoire*, 14 vendémiaire VI/5 Oct. 1797.

¹¹² Several agitators who had incited the *faubourgs* to march on the legislative councils in support of Augereau's troops during Fructidor were Fouché's old friends from the revolutionary committees of 1793 (Pierre-Mathieu Parein du Mesnil, Jean Antoine Rossignol, Claude Fournier 'l'Américain', etc.). See Victor Barrucand, *La vie véritable du citoyen Jean Rossignol*, Paris: Plon, 1896.

¹¹³ See AN, AF/III/565 & 566, 7 & 9 nivôse VII/27 & 29 Dec. 1798.

¹¹⁴ MC/ET/XVIII/1033, 19 March 1808 – One of *d'Hautmesnil & Cie.*'s managers was Hainguerlot's brother, François Jacques Haninguerlot. See also Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.163-164.

¹¹⁵ For Hainguerlot's links with Herries, see AN, T//1710/1 and Blanc, *LERE*, p.349, footnote 17. For his links to Jubié, see Emmanuel de Waresquiel, *Fouché, les silences de la pieuvre*, Paris: Tallandier, 2014, p.259 (hereafter '*FLSP*').

[Hainguerlot] – *under the guise of the Compagnie Dijon – made an enormous fortune.*¹¹⁶

Despite his connections, Hainguerlot was still prosecuted for his role in the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal. Thankfully for him, his trial was held in civilian jurisdictions, notably at Melun where the court president Maurice Gaillard was a close friend of Fouché. According to Barras, Hainguerlot paid Fouché a bribe of 100,000 *écus* to secure his acquittal.¹¹⁷

Records show the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* was significantly affected by the 18 Fructidor. The elimination of royalist deputies was accompanied by rumours of the bank's dissolution, prompting a horde of anxious note bearers to flood its headquarters. The *caisse* was awarded military protection and had to ensure the repayment of five million francs worth of notes within a few days. The first warning signs came on 13 August – the day the *Cinq-Cents* forced the Treasury commissioners to resign – when the discounting limit was lowered from 9/16 to ½ of all sums in current accounts.¹¹⁸ The *caisse* discounted 1,172,203 francs in its last session before the coup on 3 September, but this amount fell to 547,185 francs in its following session on 10 September – a drop of over 50%.¹¹⁹ On 8 September, the discounting limit was set at only 600,000 francs, although it was raised back to half of all sums in current accounts on 12 September.¹²⁰ Putting on a brave face before the *caisse*'s shareholders, acting president Récamier announced on 9 October that discounting had risen to 13 million francs in Messidor Year V generating a profit of 50,000 *livres*, but conceded the level of discounted funds had dropped sharply in Fructidor:

*In circumstances which were not of a nature to alarm note bearers, they nonetheless presented themselves in great numbers at the caisse to obtain refunds...Instead of operating a single refund counter, three of them were opened and five million écus were refunded in three days...Having recovered from the terror of unfounded panic, witnessed the protection which the government afforded the caisse by placing it under an imposing guard and shielding it from any attack, and having especially restored confidence through the exactitude and celerity of its reimbursements, the public returned to deposit the money anew in exchange for notes and this great ordeal has demonstrated the solidity of your establishment and the confidence which it enjoys.*¹²¹

In fact, the *caisse*'s administrators felt the overall consequences of Fructidor were beneficial to their bank. With the *mandat*'s demise they were now in a privileged position

¹¹⁶ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.75-76.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.78.

¹¹⁸ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 26 thermidor V/13 Aug. 1797, p.68.

¹¹⁹ See Appendix IV.

¹²⁰ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 22 & 26 fructidor V/8 & 12 Sep. 1797, p.78-80.

¹²¹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 18 vendémiaire VI/9 Oct. 1797, p.58-59 – Récamier noted funds were continually discounted throughout the crisis except for one day when precautions ruled this out (*Ibid.*, p.60).

to increase the circulation of *caisse* notes and Récamier was confident healthy dividends could be expected in ensuing months. Other investors like Perregaux – then serving as one of the *caisse*'s commissioners – were convinced the time had come to forge a privileged partnership with the state. He put this argument to shareholders on 19 October:

*The advantages resulting from the prosperity of [the caisse] which accrue to the state will undoubtedly impress upon the government that it deserves protection. It might be useful to attempt to persuade [the government] of this without waiting any longer and fix its opinion in order to shield [the caisse] from calumny.*¹²²

Less than two months later, Napoleon returned to France from Italy. One of the first things he did was meet with Augustin Monneron, the *caisse*'s director-general. On 21 December 1797, the *La clef du cabinet* newspaper reported Bonaparte had dined with Monneron on the evening of 18 December.¹²³ The subject of their conversation remains a mystery; but they surely must have discussed the ramifications of 18 Fructidor which had taken place a few weeks earlier and the urgent necessity of restoring stability and confidence to the French economy. The *caisse*'s primary purpose was to discount its shareholders' funds, and most of them were unhappy about the losses they had suffered during Fructidor. It is therefore entirely plausible that Monneron floated the idea of establishing a national bank to Bonaparte during their meeting and even suggested using the *caisse* as its incubator. Gilles Jacoud has noted the merger of both banks could have been planned well before Brumaire.¹²⁴ Moreover, Augustin's brother – Louis Monneron – was subsequently appointed as the Directory's agent in the Mascareignes Islands where he was tasked with secretly contacting Tipu Sultan and supporting Bonaparte's communications in Egypt.¹²⁵ However, Louis's mission was abruptly cancelled after his brother Augustin's flight from Paris (see below).

There certainly was a project circulating in government and financial circles to transform the *caisse* into a state-sponsored bank with a monopoly on paper currency emission. Hainguerlot, Jubié and Basterrèche – who coveted the place left vacant by Jean-Joseph de Laborde and François Cabarrús in the piaster and precious metals trade – had long desired to see such an institution emerge. On 28 February their friend Fouché wrote to Barras expressing surprise as to why the director had not been informed by Ramel about such plans:

¹²² *Ibid*, 28 vendémiaire VI/17 Oct. 1797, p.66-67 – It is worth noting Perregaux had failed to be elected an administrator ten days earlier (*Ibid*, p.62).

¹²³ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.231.

¹²⁴ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.54 – See Chapter 6.

¹²⁵ AN, AF/III/551, plaquette 3792:1-2 & 8-9, 5 brumaire VII/26 Oct. 1798 and Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.228-229 – See Louis Monneron's entry in the Biographical Index for further details.

*I tell you again, my friend, this is the most beautiful deal, the greatest that has been devised. In less than two months, we shall create a bank which will surpass that of England and have the immeasurable advantage of almost immediately repairing the disasters of our finances.*¹²⁶

Unfortunately for them, the project did not materialise. But when Jubié and Basterrèche partnered to form *Jubié Basterrèche & Cie.* in May 1798, an associate of Fouché and Barras was appointed as its head secretary.¹²⁷ *Jubié Basterrèche & Cie.* did business with the *Régie nationale des Hôpitaux Militaires*. It also purchased nearly 400,000 francs of *biens nationaux* in the *départements* of the Nord, Seine-et-Marne and in Belgium (Jemmapes) from the *Compagnie Bodin frères* – a company close to Josephine and Fouché.¹²⁸ Incidentally, it was precisely in these *départements* that Fouché made his first large-scale real estate purchases. In February 1798, he bought the farm of the Château de Lessart at Marchémoret (Seine-et-Marne), the former property of the princes of Conti; and in November he acquired a farm in the parc de Pontcarré (near Roissy-en-Brie) for the grossly undervalued sum of 38,000 francs paid in cash.¹²⁹ This property was located near the Château de Ferrières which Fouché also purchased and embellished a few years later.¹³⁰

Several steps were taken after Fructidor which quickly set the *caisse* on the road to recovery. Due to the discovery of a fake remittance for 40,000 *livres* paid during the crisis, refunds were henceforth only granted to clients who produced the receipt slips corresponding to their notes and deposits.¹³¹ To stem counterfeiting, a new 1,000-franc note designed by Firmin Didot was created.¹³² Six thousand of these were printed on 4 February 1798 and another six thousand on 11 April.¹³³ They became so popular they were mentioned by *La Décade philosophique*.¹³⁴ Germinal Year VI was an encouraging month with over four million francs discounted per *décade*.¹³⁵ The *caisse*'s commissioners began to advise taking more risks, suggesting that bills with a greater validity than 30 days be

¹²⁶ BN, Manuscrits, fichier Charavay – *Fouché to Barras*, 10 ventôse VI/28 Feb. 1798.

¹²⁷ Waresquiel, *FLSP*, p.260.

¹²⁸ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.165 – see Appendix XII.

¹²⁹ MC/ET/LX/591, 23 & 24 mars 1813 – *Inventaire après-décès de Mme. La duchesse d'Otrante*. 3^e prise du 1^{er} avril : Contrat du 17 novembre 1798 passé avec Charles Gabriel Montbrayen.

¹³⁰ See AN, T//484, Papiers Pontcarré, Ferrières – On 16 March 1799, Fouché also purchased 55 acres of adjacent woods at Longniolle for 23,000 francs (MC/ET/LX/591, 26 ventôse VII).

¹³¹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 18 vendémiaire VI/9 Oct. 1797, p.58 – This confirmed the *caisse* had been targeted by opportunists during Fructidor. The new rule imposing receipts for bill refunds was recorded in the *caisse*'s definitive statutes (ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCRA-I*, 26 ventôse VI/16 March 1798, p.118).

¹³² Delisle's paper manufactory at Buges (near Montargis) supplied the paper for the 1,000-franc notes (ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCRA-I*, 6 prairial V/25 May 1797, p.51). A new 500-franc note design was approved on 20 June 1798 (*Ibid*, 2 messidor VI, p.135-136). Old notes were progressively taken out of circulation.

¹³³ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCRA-I*, 16 pluviôse & 22 germinal VI/4 Feb. & 11 April 1798, p.103 & 124-125.

¹³⁴ *La Décade philosophique*, Tome 12, 20 nivôse V/9 Jan. 1797, p.127.

¹³⁵ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 18 germinal VI/7 April 1798, p.69.

accepted for discounting to lower interest rates on borrowing money.¹³⁶ To boost customer confidence, the bank also decided that 39/40 of discounted funds would be paid in silver and 1/40 in coin while notes would be entirely refunded in silver.¹³⁷

Another factor which benefited the *caisse* was the government's farming out of public markets to private interests – particularly military supply contracts. Years V and VI witnessed a massive surge in the number of private bankers acting as financial guarantors in these types of agreements – a trend already in full swing prior to Fructidor. In late March 1797 for instance, we find Charles Martin Doyen's company – *Doyen, Durieux & Cie.* – backing the Brussels firm *Frédéric Romberg et fils* for up to 1,500,000 francs on a supply contract for the *Armées du Nord et de Sambre-et-Meuse*.¹³⁸ On 1 June, Jean-Auguste Sévène guaranteed the *Compagnie Mannier* in a major deal for the general supply of French military hospitals.¹³⁹ A large-scale speculation took place in the Spanish wool trade during the winter of 1796-1797 when Henri Grandin and his associate Antoine Delon purchased 35,426 *arrobes* of Estremadura wool (1,348 bales) worth 666,072 *livres* through the Sevilla trading house *Lanux père, Dubernard et Cie.* and shipped them back to France via Bayonne, selling the wool to manufactures in Sedan and traders in Rouen and Orléans.¹⁴⁰ This venture proved so profitable that Grandin later partnered in 1801 with Barrillon, Récamier, *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* and José Martínez de Hervás (the Spanish *chargé d'affaires* in Paris) to manage the *Compagnie des Laines* which dominated the Spanish wool trade until 1805.¹⁴¹

After the Fructidor coup had dispelled the royalist threat, privatisation of military supplies became the norm and the number of contracts proliferated. Let us note, for example, *Bayard & Cie.*'s deal of 21 November “to supply stageposts and military convoys throughout the whole extent of French territory and the *départements réunis*.”¹⁴² On 26 June 1798, the *Compagnie Bodin* signed a contract with war minister Schérer for the general supply of troops in Italy.¹⁴³ Four days later, Ouvrard secured what was probably the biggest supply contract of the Directory for the Atlantic fleet at Brest through his

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.74.

¹³⁷ Recorded in a notarial document dated 29 prairial VI/17 June 1798 (ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVCRA-I*, 2 messidor VI/20 June 1798, p.136).

¹³⁸ MCN/ET/XLV/660, 8 floréal V/27 April 1797.

¹³⁹ MCN/ET/XLV/660, 13 prairial V/1 June 1797 (Sévène's guarantee) & AF/III/183, dossier 839:24 – *Contract of the Compagnie Mannier*, 9 prairial V/ 28 May 1797.

¹⁴⁰ AP, 6U3 11, 4 fructidor VIII/22 Aug. 1800.

¹⁴¹ See Grandin's entry in the Biographical Index.

¹⁴² MC/ET/XLV/661, 1 frimaire VI/21 Nov. 1797 & *Comptes rendus au Directoire exécutif par le citoyen Schérer, ex-ministre de la Guerre, pour l'an VI et les cinq premiers mois de l'an VII*, Paris: Chez Dentu, an VII, p.36-37 – see Bayard's entry in the Biographical Index for details of this contract.

¹⁴³ AN, AF/III/184, dossier 848:165-166, 28 pluviôse V/16 Feb. 1797 – For more on the *Compagnie Bodin* see Chapter 5 & Appendix XII.

connections with Barras and Admiral Bruix (who had been appointed naval minister two months prior).¹⁴⁴ Ouvrard also presented “*plans of finance and credit*” to the Directory which called for the establishment of an independent *Caisse d’Amortissement* to manage the national debt.¹⁴⁵ Such ventures were an unmistakable sign the liberalisation of the economy was enhancing the political reach of financiers. As Michel Bruguière notes:

*In this diversified environment, whose left wing was represented by Perregaux and Laffitte, and whose right by [Louis] Greffulhe (who was still an émigré in London but in regular contact with Paris), a doctrine of finance began to take shape which only required a political opportunity to materialise.*¹⁴⁶

Lax government oversight also tempted ambitious investors into using high-risk assets as guarantees. One *caisse* shareholder – Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy – advanced 300,000 francs of mortgaged buildings in the Belgian *département* of the Éscout which he had purchased with entirely borrowed funds as security for a contract with the *Armée du Rhin*.¹⁴⁷ Some bankers were even delegated regal state privileges, such as Henry-Liévain Carié who won the tender to farm overdue taxes for 1797.¹⁴⁸

Overall, the corrective measures applied by the *caisse* and the forays into public markets by its shareholders successfully restored the bank’s reputation. Bonds used for its internal payments were even traded as currency by the public.¹⁴⁹ A high point was reached in late Thermidor and Fructidor Year VI when the *caisse* discounted over nine million francs per *décade*.¹⁵⁰ To celebrate this success, it ordered the motto “*la confiance relève le commerce*” to be engraved on its medals.¹⁵¹ On 9 October 1798, president Davillier assured his shareholders the *caisse* had “*a service resting in all parts on such regularity that there is never any error to fear nor risk to be run.*”¹⁵² Two weeks later, a dividend of

¹⁴⁴ The agreement, signed in the name of Claude Blanchard l’ainé of Bordeaux (Ouvrard’s brother-in-law), is reproduced in Payard, *LFO*, p.6-10. See also AN, AF/III/203/A, dossier 930:81 – *The Navy’s Chief Ordnance Officer to the President of the Naval Commission*, 16 thermidor VII/3 Aug. 1799. Ouvrard (*Mémoires*, Tome I, p.39-41) claims the contract was for 63,973,494 *livres*. He succeeded in having a commission called to examine the adjudication process of the naval ministry’s supply contracts and convinced the panel that farming these out to contractors would be more efficient than maintaining an administration for the *vivres de la Marine*. On 24 May 1798, the Directory abolished this administration. The contract was immediately denounced as corrupt. It was widely rumoured that Admiral Bruix owed his appointment as naval minister to the influence of Madame Tallien, Ouvrard’s mistress (AN, AF/III/63, dossier 256, plaquette 1 – *Summary of a conversation in Paris between Cabarrus and a Spaniard*). See also Payard, *LFO*, p.16-17.

¹⁴⁵ Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.60.

¹⁴⁶ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.133-134.

¹⁴⁷ MCN/ET/XLV/662, 14 nivôse VI/3 Jan. 1798 & 663, 18 floréal VI/7 May 1798 – See Lonnoy’s entry in the Biographical Index.

¹⁴⁸ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.131.

¹⁴⁹ This is mentioned in a letter dated 10 July 1798 sent by the *directeur de l’Enregistrement*, Gentil, to the *caisse*’s administrators (ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVCRA-I*, 2 thermidor VI/20 July 1798, p.141-142).

¹⁵⁰ See Appendix IV, 21 Thermidor – 1 Fructidor VI.

¹⁵¹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVCRA-I*, 2^{ème} jour complémentaire VII/18 Sep. 1799, p.150.

¹⁵² ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 18 vendémiaire VII/9 Oct. 1798, p.78.

175 francs per share (168,331 francs for 860 total shares) was distributed to shareholders.¹⁵³ But this optimism was soon rattled by an unforeseen calamity.

The Monneron Scandal

On 17 November 1798, the *caisse*'s director-general – Augustin Monneron – fled Paris with 2,500,000 francs punctured from its cash reserves. According to the deliberations of the bank's administrative board:

*Today, 27 brumaire Year VII, several administrators of the Caisse des Comptes Courants, having been informed that the Director-General, Augustin Monneron, had not come in to work and had left no further information, alerted the other administrators.*¹⁵⁴

The board immediately formed a special committee to audit all the *caisse*'s accounts and investment portfolios. Monneron left no explanation for his flight except a note acknowledging his debt to the bank. Measures were immediately taken to limit the damage. A general assembly of shareholders was convened for the following day, and four of the bank's administrators were sent to the interior ministry to discuss the matter. It was decided that “*the public will be informed by placarded notices that the caisse would limit its reimbursements to 300 thousand écus in the morning.*” In addition, “*a request would be made to the Ministry of Police for an armed force to guard both the interior [of the bank] and surrounding premises.*”¹⁵⁵

The motivations underlying Monneron's sudden disappearance remain unclear. Three weeks before his flight (9 October), he had been removed as an administrator through an unfortunate drawing of lots but was re-elected to the same office on 24 October by shareholders who even awarded him a medal for his services.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, the *caisse*'s commissioners had applauded their choice:

*If the reputation of your director-general was not above all praise, we would talk to you enthusiastically about the surveillance he conducts, in the smallest details, over all departments of the service, without ever hampering it, nor losing from his sight that ease and facility which a great establishment requires...*¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 3 brumaire VII/24 Oct. 1798, p.84-85.

¹⁵⁴ ABF, dossier 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, p.155.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.157.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 12 Vendémiaire VII/3 Oct. 1798, p.152.

¹⁵⁷ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 3 brumaire VII/24 Oct. 1798, p.82-83.

Obviously, the commissioners had not been conducting proper verifications. They were taken aback when finance minister Ramel informed them a businessman named Isaac Le Maître admitted owing Monneron 500,000 francs;¹⁵⁸ and their incompetence was further exposed when it was discovered the manager for bank notes – Robineau – had also fled and 166,000 francs of notes were missing. Their feeble response was a plea of ignorance:

*How could we guess that when Augustin Monneron advanced funds to someone, he disguised it [in the account books] as a bond with a six or seven-day validity date? We have nonetheless found several of these bonds, some of which were backed by nothing and others which were guaranteed by sums that had already been discounted...*¹⁵⁹

The *caisse* tasked its leading commissioner – Perregaux – with investigating Robineau and taking the necessary legal steps to compel Le Maître to repay his debts.¹⁶⁰

Audits of the *caisse*'s accounts were hurriedly performed and published to reassure the public. On 18 November, its cash reserves amounted to 22,145,487 francs of active funds and 19,736,492 francs of passive funds.¹⁶¹ Two days later, shareholders were informed the bank held an overall positive balance of 4,054,575 francs.¹⁶² A new position of controller-general – awarded to Devaines *fils* – was created to verify all payments.¹⁶³ But since Monneron had removed practically all the *caisse*'s cash reserves, it no longer had enough liquidity to guarantee repayment of all its notes. Authoritarian and arbitrary limitations were therefore imposed on reimbursements to ensure the *caisse*'s survival. The number of 500-franc notes accepted for refunds was restricted to one per person and all customers seeking to cash in their notes were issued with tickets to prevent fraud and discourage speculators:

Devaines fils has informed the [bank's] administration, along with police officers, that he has allocated ticket numbers to note bearers seeking refunds; and that police

¹⁵⁸ ABF, dossier 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 1 frimaire VII/21 Nov. 1798, p.161-163 & *RDAGA-I*, 30 frimaire VII/20 Dec. 1798, p.96-97.

¹⁵⁹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 30 frimaire VII/20 Dec. 1798, p.97-99 – One of the bank's *caissiers*, Meysonnier, was fired for failing to spot Robineau's theft (ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 24 frimaire VII/14 Dec. 1798, p.205-207).

¹⁶⁰ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 12 frimaire VII/2 Dec. 1798, p.179-182 & 13 frimaire VII/3 Dec. 1798, p.182-184 – Le Maître refused to reimburse anyone except Monneron himself. The *caisse* eventually accepted his offer to only pay 35% of his debts – see ABF, dossier 1069200402-22, (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 2^{ème} société), *Procès-verbal des réunions du conseil d'administration, 11 Nivôse an VII- 30 Pluviôse an VIII (31 décembre 1798 – 19 février 1800)*, 22 Pluviôse VII/10 Feb. 1799 (hereafter '*PVRCA-2*').

¹⁶¹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 28 brumaire VII/18 Nov. 1798, p.91. These figures were published in the *Moniteur* of 1 frimaire VII/21 November 1798.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 30 brumaire VII/20 Nov. 1798, p.99.

¹⁶³ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 2 frimaire VII/22 Nov. 1798, p.165.

*officers should refuse these tickets to persons who have made a full-time job of coming each day to the bank to ask for refunds.*¹⁶⁴

The *caisse* received help from several quarters during the Monneron crisis. On 21 November, its shareholders were informed that:

*The Minister of Finance has announced that the Spanish ambassador [José Martínez de Hervás] has written to him asserting his full confidence in the Caisse des Comptes Courants, and that he has forbidden his treasury to seek refunds on any of the notes in his possession amounting to a total of one and a half million francs.*¹⁶⁵

The following day, the bank's main rival – the *Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce* – announced it would accept payments in *Caisse des Comptes Courants* notes, and the manufacture of Angers forwarded a deposit of 50,000 francs.¹⁶⁶ On 4 December, the Treasury exchanged 550,000 francs of *caisse* notes for new bonds instead of seeking refunds on them.¹⁶⁷ Two days later, Ramel declared that investors who bought *biens nationaux* could purchase them with *caisse* notes.¹⁶⁸ Finally, the *caisse*'s administrators committed themselves to refunding all the bank's notes in circulation. This was announced in the *Décade philosophique*, which reported that the measure “immediately alleviated concerns” and that “the [caisse] notes immediately recovered their credit and were traded and exchanged with full confidence in all banks.”¹⁶⁹

To increase its cash reserves and procure hard currency for refunds, the *caisse* effected several emergency purchases. For practical purposes, Perregaux was designated as the bank's sole intermediary for piaster acquisitions.¹⁷⁰ His help was urgently required given the *caisse*'s controller-general indicated he was only able to obtain 60,000-80,000 piasters every three days.¹⁷¹ On Récamier's recommendation, a Bordeaux trading house named ‘*Les fils de Rodrigue*’ was mandated to buy piasters for the *caisse* at rates of 5 francs 6 *sols* or 5 francs 7 *sols*, remit them into francs and expedite them to Paris via stagecoach. In exchange, this trading house was paid in bills of exchange drawn on Récamier and

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 6 frimaire VII/26 Nov. 1798, p.171-172 – By the end of Frimaire, 5,354,500 francs of notes had been refunded. Speculators tried to conduct a bear operation on the *caisse*'s notes which caused note bearers to swamp its counters for refunds. Some speculators also attempted to convince note bearers to sell them their notes at reduced prices (ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 30 frimaire VII/20 Dec. 1798, p.101).

¹⁶⁵ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 1 frimaire VII/21 Nov. 1798, p.161-163 – Jubié and Barrillon were sent to thank the Spanish ambassador. The *caisse* also wrote to finance minister Ramel praising Hervás. See ABF, dossier 1069200402/32 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 1^{ère} société), *Registre de copies de lettres-départs*, 20 frimaire an VII – 29 ventôse an VIII (10 décembre 1798 – 20 mars 1800), 20 frimaire VII/10 Dec. 1798, p.3-4 (hereafter ‘*RCLD*’).

¹⁶⁶ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 2 frimaire VII/22 Nov. 1798, p.164-165.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 14 frimaire VII/4 Dec. 1798, p.185-186.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 16 frimaire VII/6 Dec. 1798, p.188-189.

¹⁶⁹ *La Décade philosophique*, Tome 19, 10 frimaire VII/30 Nov. 1798, p.446.

¹⁷⁰ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 6 frimaire VII/26 Nov. 1798, p.171-172.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, 9 frimaire VII/29 Nov. 1798, p.177.

received an additional commission of ¼%.¹⁷² The *caisse* also sent *Les fils de Rodrigue* two bonds for 250,000 francs each which could be cashed in with Servoisier, the *payeur général* of the Garonne at Toulouse – the first on 16 December in exchange for the equivalent in piasters minus commission,¹⁷³ and the second on 2 January 1799 in return for drafts on *Bethmann frères* of Bordeaux (a correspondent of Perregaux).¹⁷⁴

Several other commercial establishments were solicited in a similar manner. On 28 December, *Clément Grandcœur* of Bourges was sent a letter of credit for 270,000 francs guaranteed by Récamier and drawn on the Treasury which could be cashed in with Dufour, the *receveur général* of the Cher at Bourges. In exchange, *Grandcœur* was asked to send cash via stagecoach to Paris. Dufour was granted a commission of ½-1% for his services in disbursing cash instead of government obligations.¹⁷⁵ That same day, *Dolier & Cie.* of Marseille was sent a letter of credit for 320,000 francs also drawn on the Treasury and guaranteed by Récamier which could be cashed in with Gravier, the *receveur général* of the Bouches-du-Rhône at Aix. The *caisse* asked for piasters in return. Gravier was also awarded a commission of ½-1% for his help in disbursing cash.¹⁷⁶ The following day, another letter of credit for 250,000 francs was addressed to *Courtois & Cie.* of Toulouse, also guaranteed by Perregaux and admissible with Servoisier.¹⁷⁷ Additional transactions for lesser sums were conducted with *Ladame* of Amiens, *Mainville & fils* of Orléans, *Delange* of Cambrai, *Quesnel frères* of Rouen, *Veuve Latouche & fils* of Nogent le Rotrou and *Odier & Herries* of Geneva.

One of the *caisse*'s more arresting decisions during the crisis was its awarding of extraordinary discounts to certain trading houses to help them avoid bankruptcy. The nature of these operations is not precisely known; but they related to bills which failed to meet the strict requirements of the *caisse*'s statutes, notably the 'three signatures'. To discount them, the *caisse* charged a rate exceeding the market norm of 0.5%, thereby generating a solid profit.¹⁷⁸ Among the beneficiaries of these extraordinary discounts we find:

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 19 frimaire VII/9 Dec. 1798, p.195-196.

¹⁷³ ABF, 1069200402/32, *RCLD*, 26 frimaire VII/16 Dec. 1798, p.6.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799, p.13.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 8 nivôse VII/28 Dec. 1798, p.10-11.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 8 & 9 nivôse VII/28 & 29 Dec. 1798, p.11-13 – 220,000 francs were still owed on *Dolier & Co.*'s second letter of credit on 17 September 1799. The *caisse* demanded it renegotiate the bill to speed up payment – even at a loss of 10-12% – such was the scarcity of hard currency at the end of Year VII (*Ibid*, 1^{er} jour complémentaire VII/17 Sep. 1799, p.121).

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 9 nivôse VII/29 Dec. 1798, p.12.

¹⁷⁸ The loan documents which have survived do not indicate a precise figure for the increased discount rate.

- The banker Beer Léon Fould who was granted an advance (*secours*) of 100,000 francs to repay a debt of 137,000 francs;
- Antoine Louis Girardot who received 100,000 francs to alleviate a debt of 220,833 francs;¹⁷⁹
- The contractor *Michel frères jeune* who obtained 200,000 francs to reimburse debts of 312,000 francs;¹⁸⁰
- Extraordinary discounts for unspecified sums to *Martin Puech & Cie.* and *Michel frères jeune*;¹⁸¹
- An advance of 300,000 francs awarded to *Cinot & Charlemagne* against mortgaged assets worth 450,000 francs;¹⁸²
- An extraordinary discount of 130,000 francs for *Salon & Salon fils ainé*.¹⁸³

Even more striking were the large cash advances totalling 320,000 francs which the *caisse* granted Antoine Louis Girardot between 15 & 22 December 1798 in an attempt to avert his bankruptcy.¹⁸⁴ Girardot was the nephew of Jean-Baptiste Girardot de Marigny – Haller’s former partner in *Haller, Girardot & Cie.* He was an associate in the *Limoge & Mazères* bank which served as the financial guarantor of the *Compagnie Noé* – one of the principal suppliers of Bonaparte’s *Armée d’Angleterre* (see below). A notarial procuration established in 1800 reveals that Girardot had backed the *Compagnie Noé* for 400,000 francs and that the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* – in which Girardot held a 100,000 franc investment – attempted to save him with a loan of 940,000 francs guaranteed by a mortgage on all its real estate holdings, including 38 Parisian houses.¹⁸⁵

In reality, this loan for Girardot seems to have been made by Ouvrard; for Girardot invested heavily in naval supplies and was one of Ouvrard’s main business partners for the supply of the French Navy. This would explain why we find two exceptional deals agreed with Ouvrard in the *caisse*’s administrative log. The first dated 7 December 1798 stipulated that:

1. *The caisse will accept an offer by Ouvrard to deliver bills of exchange on the contributions of Years V and VI in various départements for up to a million francs. Ouvrard will give a payment guarantee for this sum;*

¹⁷⁹ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 1 frimaire VII/21 Nov. 1798, p.161-163.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 3 frimaire VII/23 Nov. 1798, p.166-167

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, 9 frimaire VII/29 Nov. 1798, p.177.

¹⁸² *Ibid*, 13 frimaire VII/3 Dec. 1798, p.182-184.

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, 2 nivôse VII/22 Dec. 1798, p.215.

¹⁸⁴ 40,000 francs on December 15, 140,000 francs on December 18 and another 140,000 on December 22 (*Ibid*, 25 & 28 frimaire and 2 nivôse VII, p.208-215).

¹⁸⁵ MCN, MC/ET/XLVIII/453, 26 vendémiaire IX/18 Oct. 1800 – *Procuration pour Antoine Louis Girardot.*

2. *A subscription for Parisian merchants (on Girardot) will be opened for up to a million francs payable in six months;*
3. *Sums paid on Ouvrard's bills of exchange will be deposited at the caisse. Ouvrard will cover all the costs of obtaining repayment on these bills, and after these bills come due Ouvrard will be paid the remainder of any of his bills which have yet to be recovered;*
4. *The caisse will advance sums to Girardot & Cie. to cover its costs.*¹⁸⁶

The second agreement dated 23 December reads as follows:

1. *Ouvrard will give the caisse 600,000 francs in bills of exchange drawn on départements to assist in the liquidation of Girardot & Cie.;*
2. *Ouvrard will give the caisse 100,000 francs in bills of exchange for the sum he subscribed to in favour of Girardot & Cie.;*
3. *Ouvrard will give the caisse 190,000 francs for sums he owes Girardot & Cie. A receipt will be given to Ouvrard for all these amounts. The recovery of the 600,000 francs mentioned in the first article and of the 100,000 francs referenced in the second article will be done by the caisse at Ouvrard's expense;*
4. *In return, the caisse agrees to pay Ouvrard within six months whatever sums have been recovered from the 600,000 francs and 100,000 francs, and to return him the bills of exchange which have not been paid. Moreover, it will only be able to spend as much of the 100,000 francs in article 2 as have not been expended by Ouvrard for his engagements to Girardot & Cie.*¹⁸⁷

But while the *caisse* scrambled to avert bankruptcy and assist its clients, some of its leading investors were surreptitiously manoeuvring to reap the benefits of its misfortune. Two of the principal culprits were Girardot and Perregaux. Their suspicious behaviour was reported to the police minister who issued the following 'Note for Inspectors' on 25 November 1798:

*Place under surveillance the trading houses of Perregaux and Girardot. These individuals have been brought to the attention of the Minister as seeking to damage the Caisse des Comptes Courants by spreading false rumours.*¹⁸⁸

Girardot's financial difficulties probably explain his slandering of the *caisse*, assuming its bankruptcy would have enabled him to avoid paying back his debts. But the implication of Perregaux is far more surprising considering his pivotal role in the *caisse*'s administration and financial dealings. Moreover, the shareholders had elected him as one of the commissioners entrusted with verifying the bank's accounts when the scandal broke. Albert Mathiez notes that although Perregaux certified the audit, "*his signature is absent from the binding engagement [to repay all caisse notes] which all the principal*

¹⁸⁶ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-I*, 17 frimaire VII/7 Dec. 1798, p.190-191.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 3 nivôse VII/23 Nov. 1798, p.216-217 – The recovery of Ouvrard's 600,000 francs in bills of exchange was entrusted to *Dolier & Cie.* and *Clément Grandcourt* (*Ibid*, 4 nivôse VII/24 Dec. 1798, p.218-219).

¹⁸⁸ AN, F/7/6140, plaquette 1, dossier 29, 5 frimaire VII/25 Nov. 1798.

shareholders of the caisse had signed.”¹⁸⁹ What is more, a note bearer who presented himself at the *caisse*’s refund counter was recognized as one of Perregaux’s employees. The Swiss banker was forced to conduct an embarrassing retreat and hastily take measures to ensure none of his workers repeated such a *faux pas*.¹⁹⁰

Unbeknownst to the *caisse*, the whole affair had started in early Brumaire Year VII when the police’s attention was drawn to a certain Jean Ruegger of Frankfurt who claimed to know of a foreign conspiracy to harm the French economy by printing large quantities of counterfeit notes of the *caisse*. Ruegger explained rather unconvincingly that Monneron had acted as an auxiliary to the plot. He had advanced 200,000 francs to *Isaac Lemaître et Cie.* in exchange for bills of exchange with a one-month validity; and when that firm had been unable to reimburse the sum, Monneron advanced it a further 500,000 *livres* for fear its bankruptcy might affect the *caisse*. He also loaned money and opened several accounts with *Delaage, Chaumont et Cie.* (managed by three associates – Philippe Delaage, Antoine-Pierre Chaumont and Frédéric-Guillaume Colladon), a trading house with many insolvent clients which proved incapable of reimbursing these debts.¹⁹¹ To mask his losses, Monneron printed *caisse* notes which he left unsigned and claimed he had given three million in notes to Robineau, the bank’s *caissier*, although Robineau declared he only received two million.¹⁹² What is more, Chaumont had been the royal intendant of Alsace during the early Revolution and was the son of Chaumont de La Galaisière, a former intendant of Lorraine; while Delaage, Colladon and Lemaître were all Genevan financiers. Thus, they were all suspected of participating in a foreign conspiracy to ruin the French economy; and Jean Ruegger was accused of being their agent tasked with discrediting the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* by spreading false rumours of counterfeiting.

Perregaux’s behaviour during this whole episode was all the more dubious since he received Ruegger at his Parisian residence. When Ruegger was arrested, Perregaux wrote to the police minister on 10 May 1799 to demand his release, claiming there was no justification for Ruegger’s detention and demanding he be sent abroad! Perregaux’s request was bizarre to say the least, although it can be argued he was acting in the interests

¹⁸⁹ Mathiez, ‘Encore le banquier Perregaux’, p.241.

¹⁹⁰ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.42 – Interestingly, a similar incident occurred on 27 Sep. 1805 when two of Perregaux’s cashiers attempted to cash in 1,000-franc notes at the *Banque de France* during the *Négociants réunis* bankruptcy crisis. See AN, F/7/3834 – *Rapport de la Préfecture de Police*, 5 vendémiaire XIV/27 Sep. 1805.

¹⁹¹ Delaage, Chaumont and Colladon each opened unofficial accounts with the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* which they dissimulated within their firm. The *caisse* also had an official account with *Delaage, Chaumont et Cie.* with a credit of 1,294,580 *livres* and debts of 952,108 *livres* (Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.242). Colladon had participated in the foundation of the *Caisse Patriotique de Paris* (see Bouchary, *Les Compagnies Financières à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle*, Tome II, p.53).

¹⁹² Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.243.

of the *caisse* to minimise harmful repercussions on the bank's reputation. Ruegger was eventually freed on 18 May.¹⁹³

Whatever the underlying causes of the Monneron scandal might have been, they had profound ramifications on the French economy. On 20 December 1798, the *Décade philosophique* reported that “*the setback experienced by the Caisse des Comptes Courants has been cruelly felt in banking and commerce. There have been several bankruptcies among the strongest houses.*”¹⁹⁴

Gilles Jacoud claims the Monneron scandal demonstrated how poor an overall view the *caisse*'s administrators had of their bank. Only Monneron himself seems to have known the true state of its affairs. The other administrators were left scrambling to pick up the pieces. This is confirmed by the sequence of events. It was only on 29 December 1798 – a month and a half after the scandal broke – that the *caisse*'s administration published a complete report on the bank's finances. One could almost assert that if Monneron had not fled with two and a half million francs, the other directors would long have remained ignorant of his embezzlement and the dire state of their bank's finances. Their attitude towards Monneron was also quite revealing. At first, they refused to press charges against him – even after he acknowledged his embezzlement – on the grounds an indictment would curtail any possibility of recovering the money he had stolen.¹⁹⁵ It wasn't until 13 December that the *caisse*'s administration decreed it would press charges against “*the criminal Augustin Monneron.*”¹⁹⁶ Once the initial shock of the scandal had abated, the administrators meekly attempted to justify themselves before their shareholders:

[The crisis] *has been attributed to the negligence of the administrators and the unlimited confidence they placed in the director. It is impossible to dissimulate that these reproaches are founded. But it would be unfair to discount numerous mitigating circumstances.*

Could we deny that the director was the founder of the caisse; that he had essentially contributed to its success; that it was still – less than three months ago – in the most flourishing state; that no one appeared to be more entirely probe than Augustin Monneron; that neither faults, nor dissimulations nor hazardous speculations were known to him; that you yourselves had unanimously re-elected him an administrator;

¹⁹³ For the Ruegger affair, see Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.231-247.

¹⁹⁴ *La Décade philosophique*, Tome 19, 30 frimaire VII/20 Dec. 1798, p.576.

¹⁹⁵ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-1*, 5 frimaire VII/25 Nov. 1798, p.170 – Monneron fled to Guadeloupe. He maintained a correspondence with the *caisse*'s administrative board attempting to justify himself. His brother Louis offered to repay his debts over five years once peace with Britain was concluded (he needed to sail to Mauritius to collect money from the family's sugar plantation – ABF, 1069200402/22, *PVRCA-2*, 6 germinal VII/26 March 1799). Augustin returned to France in 1802 where he was arrested and eventually freed before settling permanently in the United States.

¹⁹⁶ ABF, 1069200402/1, *PVRCA-1*, 23 frimaire VII/13 Dec. 1798, p.204.

*that his nomination had been met with applause and that you awarded him a gold medal as a reward for his cares...?*¹⁹⁷

The Second Caisse des Comptes Courants & the Crisis of Year VII

The Monneron scandal led to the dissolution of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* on 30 December 1798. This did not spell the end for the bank. In fact, it constituted a new beginning. The *caisse* was re-founded by a notarial act on the same day outlining a new set of statutes which addressed all the weaknesses exposed by the scandal.¹⁹⁸ To limit the powers of the new director-general Martin Garat – elected on 9 January 1799 – the revived *caisse* was registered as a joint-stock company managed by three silent partners who were all strawmen: Gaspard Louis Caze-Labove, J.F. Ricqbourg and J.J. Lefreté.¹⁹⁹ The new company was established for 27 years with a starting capital of 8 million francs (as compared to 5 million for its first version), and the old *caisse*'s 5,000 franc shares were re-valued into 8,000 franc shares.²⁰⁰ Each shareholder of the old bank became a shareholder of the new entity by exchanging his old shares for new revalued ones which now paid interest in twelve monthly installments.²⁰¹ The director-general was to be seconded by a controller-general elected by the shareholders while two new committees monitored the bank's investment portfolios and customer accounts. Moreover, a special auditing panel (*comité de vérification*) with the power to call a general assembly at any moment would be elected every six months to independently “*verify the books, portfolios and accounts*” of the bank.²⁰²

One particularly telling aspect regarding the first *caisse*'s liquidation was the manner in which its administrators deliberately eschewed taking any responsibility for its demise. Minutes of the second *caisse*'s board meetings reveal they were displeased with certain comments made by auditors overseeing the liquidation (*commissaires liquidateurs*) in reports concerning the discounting committee and rules and regulations of the first *caisse*. Auditors were reminded “*not to immisce themselves in any administrative matters*” while

¹⁹⁷ ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 30 frimaire VII/20 Dec. 1798, p.106.

¹⁹⁸ MC/ET/LVIII/ ? , 10 nivôse VII/30 Dec. 1798 – see also ABF, 1069200402/32, *Règlement général de la nouvelle société de comptes courants (1798)* for the 2nd *caisse*'s new statutes.

¹⁹⁹ They were awarded 5 shares each and granted a maximum dividend of 2,500 francs per year (ABF, 1069200402/1, *RDAGA-I*, 10 nivôse VII/30 Dec. 1798). Articles 6 & 7 of the new statutes removed all power from these silent partners to make binding decisions against the will of administrators or shareholders and to dispose of the company's signature (*Ibid*).

²⁰⁰ ABF, 1069200402/32, *Règlement général de la nouvelle société de comptes courants (1798)*, p.1-2.

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, p.3.

²⁰² *Ibid*, p.8-9 – However, these auditors could only convene a general assembly of shareholders if they were able to secure a 2/3 majority vote from administrators.

they conducted their verifications!²⁰³ Moreover, the auditors had to submit a monthly report to the director-general who communicated it to the board. In theory, these documents formed the basis on which administrators advised their shareholders of the liquidation's progress; but in reality, all compromising information was carefully filtered out and no prejudicial reports were recorded in the *caisse*'s archives. Thus, none of the administrators were prosecuted for their negligence and Augustin Monneron remained the sole official perpetrator of the first *caisse*'s downfall.

Nonetheless, the revitalised *caisse* made an encouraging start on the market. On the day of its re-foundation, it was announced 22,572,208 francs of assets had been salvaged from the first *caisse*; and the administrative board immediately decided to emit twelve million francs of a newly-approved 500-franc note design.²⁰⁴ Replacing old notes signed by Monneron was an absolute necessity if the bank were to maintain customer confidence, and it therefore issued new paper currency at regular intervals: 500,000 francs in 500-franc notes on 4 February 1799; another million francs on 10 February and four million more francs on 20 February.²⁰⁵ A new 1,000-franc note was also announced at the second *caisse*'s first board meeting (31 December 1798) and ten million of these were issued on 2 March 1799 plus another ten million on 5 April.²⁰⁶ These new notes represented the first form of stable paper currency in France.²⁰⁷ By 9 April – three months after its overhaul – there were 21,400,000 francs of notes in circulation of which only 4,400,000 were older issues signed by Monneron.²⁰⁸

These notes continued to be tied to bill discounting with rates “*set for shareholders at ½% for bills whose validity extends to 30 days, and at ¾% for bills whose validity ranges from 31 to 45 days.*”²⁰⁹ The discount rate for non-shareholders was ¾% for bills with validities between 10 and 45 days.²¹⁰ Eventually, shareholders lost their preferential discounting rate when the *caisse* announced on 20 February that “*the rate of bill discounting is set at ½%*

²⁰³ ABF, 1069200402/22, *PVRCA-2*, 22 pluviôse VII/10 Feb. 1799.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 11 nivôse VII/31 Dec. 1798 – The breakdown of assets was as follows: cash reserves – 11,103,260 francs (5,339,500 francs in notes & 5,763,760 francs in hard currency); Portfolio of discounted funds – 9,104,137 francs; *Effets en comptant* – 782,976 francs; *bons de la monnaie* for piasters – 918,336 francs; bills of exchange drawn on *départements* – 663,497 francs.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 16 & 22 Pluviôse & 2 ventôse VII/4, 10 & 20 Feb. 1799.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 12 ventôse & 16 germinal VII/2 March & 5 April 1799.

²⁰⁷ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.31.

²⁰⁸ ABF, dossier 1069200402/23 (Caisse des Comptes Courants, 2^{ème} société), *délibérations de l'Assemblée générale des actionnaires (2ème Société) : du 10 Nivôse an VII au 27 Pluviôse an VIII (30 décembre 1798 – 16 février 1800)*, 25 germinal VII/14 April 1799 (hereafter ‘*RDAGA-2*’).

²⁰⁹ ABF, 1069200402/22, *PVRCA-2*, 12 Pluviôse VII/31 Jan. 1799.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*.




Figure 3:10 – A 500-franc note issued by the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* on 11 nivôse VII/31 December 1798 (later stamped by the *Banque de France*)

© <http://www.numismondo.net>

Photo released under CC0 1.0 Universal/Public Domain Licence




Figure 3:11 – A 1,000-franc note issued by the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* on 12 ventôse VII/2 March 1799 (later stamped by the *Banque de France*)

© <http://www.numismondo.net>

Photo released under CC0 1.0 Universal/Public Domain Licence

each month for everyone,” although half of all discounted funds continued to be reserved for them.²¹¹

On 25 January 1799, the *caisse*'s cash reserves were judged sufficient to resume unlimited note refunds at its counters, but this was decided without issuing any public announcement.²¹² The procurement of hard currency continued to be a priority. Obligations drawn on Ostend traders and guaranteed by Perregaux were sent to *Biné Overmann & Cie.* of Ostend to be exchanged for hard currency.²¹³ On 6 February, the Dunkerque trader and *caisse* shareholder François Devinck sent the bank eight bills of exchange totalling 95,000 francs to purchase ten notes.²¹⁴ On 3 March, Perregaux forwarded four bills of exchange amounting to 26,000 francs drawn on *Strobert & Martini* of Bordeaux who were awarded a commission of ½% to convert the bills into hard currency.²¹⁵ By 4 April, the *caisse*'s hard currency reserves had risen to 15,500,000 francs.²¹⁶

As of March 1799, the strain on government finances resulting from the renewal of hostilities against the Second Coalition forced the Directory to petition the *caisse* for help and we begin to see the bank conduct an increasing amount of state business. The first signs of this appeared on 3 March when the *caisse*'s director-general Garat agreed to advance sums on delegations and bills presented by the administrators of the *Compagnies de la Guerre Réunis*.²¹⁷ Nine days later, a special office at the *caisse* was set up for this consortium's deposits and financial operations.²¹⁸ One of its main intermediaries was future *Banque de France* Regent Jean-Auguste Sévène (*Sévène frères*).²¹⁹ Gold and foreign currency advanced by the *receveur général* of the Aveyron (Reynier) as payment for the *Compagnies de la Guerre Réunis*'s services was deposited with the *caisse* and held at *Sévène frères*'s disposal.²²⁰

On 6 March, a special account was created at the *caisse* by director-general Garat to deposit 17,500,000 francs in *écus* and *monnaie de billon* which had been levied for the tax

²¹¹ *Ibid*, 2 ventôse VII/20 Feb. 1799 – Bills with 45 day validities could only account for ⅓ of all discounted assets.

²¹² *Ibid*, 6 Pluviôse VII/25 Jan. 1799.

²¹³ ABF, 1069200402/32, *RCLD*, 6 pluviôse VII/25 Jan. 1799, p.31 – These bills were paid on 9 ventôse/27 Feb. (*Ibid*, p.44).

²¹⁴ *Ibid*, 18 pluviôse VII/6 Feb. 1799, p.37.

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, 13 ventôse VII/3 March 1799, p.46-47 – The *caisse* also granted Perregaux a commission for guaranteeing these bills. He was himself backed by *Bethmann & Félix & Cie.* of Bordeaux for this transaction (ABF, 1069200402/22, *PVRCA*-2, 6 ventôse VII/24 Feb. 1799).

²¹⁶ ABF, 1069200402/23, *RDAGA*-2, 15 germinal VII/4 April 1799.

²¹⁷ ABF, 1069200402/32, *RCLD*, 13 ventôse VII/3 March 1799, p.47.

²¹⁸ *Ibid*, 22 ventôse VII/12 March 1799, p.50.

²¹⁹ See Sévène's entry in the Biographical Index.

²²⁰ ABF, 1069200402/32, *RCLD*, 13 ventôse & 5 floréal VII/3 March & 24 April 1799, p.47 & 67-68.

on doors and windows.²²¹ Another account was opened on 24 March for deposits and payments of delegations presented by licensed subcontractors of the naval ministry (*délégués des entrepreneurs du service de la Marine*). Among these was Antoine Roy, a close collaborator of Ouvrard and future finance minister under the Restoration, and the *caisse*'s administrator Dejoly. Each delegation had to contain at least three signatures and be approved by Dailly, the *caissier de la Marine*.²²²

A third special account was created on 25 May to deposit payments made by *receveurs généraux* to the *administrateurs généraux des subsistances, étapes et convois militaires*.²²³ Their *caissier*, Delcro, was authorised to deposit and withdraw funds. Two days later, the *caisse* asked the *receveur général de la Haute Marne* at Chaumont (Harlé) to pay a delegation on *coupes de bois* worth 203,000 francs. The money was to be collected by Charles Bodin of the *Compagnie Bodin*. The delegation was guaranteed by *Jubié, Basterrèche & Cie.* who were awarded a commission of 1/6%.²²⁴ This was the first time the *caisse* resorted to cashing in government delegations to raise cash.

Concurrent to these operations, the Directory's chronic lack of money was accentuating its dependency on the *caisse*'s shareholders to guarantee funds for military purchases and tax returns. Among many notable examples in Year VII, we find *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* – a commission house specialised in the Spanish wool trade – backing the contractor Jean-Louis Joseph Rousseau in a deal to supply the *Armée du Rhin* with forage.²²⁵ Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron – one of the *caisse*'s main bankers – vouched for Jean Gosuin, director of the arms manufactures of Charleville and Liège, in a contract signed with the war ministry to supply 150,000 weapons.²²⁶ Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy partnered with the *Compagnie Musset* to furnish military clothing and equipment;²²⁷ and also joined Jean-Baptiste Ouin (*Compagnie Ouin*), Nicolas Haussmann of Colmar and Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe of Douai in Jacques Antoine Rochefort's *Compagnie Rochefort* for the supply of troops on campaign, stageposts and military convoys.²²⁸ This company was also awarded the supply

²²¹ *Ibid*, 16 ventôse VII/6 March 1799, p.48 & 61 – *monnaie de billon* were silver coins whose value had been depreciated, usually by the addition of 50% copper alloy.

²²² *Ibid*, 4 germinal VII/24 March 1799, p.53.

²²³ *Ibid*, 6 prairial VII/25 May 1799, p.78-79

²²⁴ *Ibid*, 8, 13 & 17 prairial VII/27 May, 1 & 5 June 1799, p.80-81, 85 & 87. *Jubié, Basterrèche & Cie.* promised to repay this delegation on 27 prairial/15 June (ABF, 1069200402/22, PVRCA-2, 6 prairial VII/25 May 1799).

²²⁵ MC/ET/XLV/665, 7 vendémiaire VII/28 Sep. 1798.

²²⁶ *Ibid*, 4 frimaire VII/24 Nov. 1798 & *Comptes rendus au Directoire exécutif par le citoyen Schérer...*, p.115.

²²⁷ MC/ET/XLV/665, 9 frimaire VII/29 Nov. 1798 – The company had a financial guarantee of 2,358,556 francs.

²²⁸ MCN/ET/XLV/668, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799 – See Lonnoy's entry in the Biographical Index. On 5 floréal VII/24 April 1799, war minister Milet-Mureau wrote to ordnance officers and regional

of the French Danubian and Swiss armies.²²⁹ In March 1799, Récamier, Fulchiron and Roëttier de Montaleau (ex-director of the *Monnaie de Paris*) guaranteed the *Compagnie Laurenson et Nobelly* for 2,936,000 francs in its agreement to operate the *ferme générale des droits de passe aux barrières de Paris* for three years.²³⁰

That same month we also see Alexandre Barrillon, future *Banque de France* Regent, team up with the *Compagnie Limoge & Mazères* via his nephew Jean-Joseph Paul Itier who became a partner in the firm. *Limoge & Mazères* supplied the navy with wine and meat in various ports (Brest, Lorient, Nantes, Rochefort); and on 9 January 1800 – shortly after Brumaire – it formed a special partnership with Antoine Louis Girardot and the *Compagnie Noë* (headed by Pierre Noë) to administer a large contract to supply the *Armée d'Angleterre*'s 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 17th, 20th and 22nd divisions with forage.²³¹

But these opportunistic ventures could not prevent the economic downturn of Year VII from impacting the *caisse*. Although the month of May 1799 produced good results for its volume of discounted funds, an audit effected on 11 May indicated overall investments in the *caisse*'s accounts and share portfolio had dropped to 10,902,961 francs.²³² On 4 June, the bank was forced to cede its ownership of the forges of Vierzon to *Michel frères jeune* in a deal where it swapped 104,122 francs in bills of exchange drawn on *Roger, frères et Cie.* for 99,017 francs in bills of exchange drawn on *Perret, Cadet et Cie.* of Lyon which it hoped to cash in.²³³ The *caisse* undoubtedly felt pressured into selling off certain assets to raise the necessary cash to retain clients and pay off debts. On 22 June, for instance, it announced a dividend of 1,000 francs per share would be distributed to shareholders of the liquidated first *caisse*.²³⁴ Moreover, the bank's situation was further complicated by the fact the economic depression and lack of liquidity had created a buyers' market and it knew many of its customers were abusing their privileges by making deposits whose proportions exceeded a quarter in *monnaie de billon* when the bank's statutes stipulated they could not surpass 1/20.²³⁵

administrations demanding to know how the *Compagnie Rochefort* intended to fulfil this contract (AN, AF/III/156, dossier 736:18-19).

²²⁹ AN, AF/III/150B, dossier 706:63, 9 floréal VII/28 April 1799.

²³⁰ MC/ET/XLV/669, 9 germinal VII/29 March 1799 – They also advanced the firm 675,000 francs to cover its first quarter.

²³¹ MC/ET/LXXXVI/921, 19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800 & AP, D31U3 1, dossier 8, 19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800 – The contract was witnessed by General Berthier. See Barrillon's entry in the Biographical Index for further details on all these deals.

²³² ABF, 1069200402/22, *PVRCA*-2, 22 floréal VII/11 May 1799.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 16 prairial VII/4 June 1799 – The forges of Vierzon were mortgaged as security for *Roger, frères et Cie.*'s bills while *Michel frères jeunes* guaranteed *Perret, Cadet et Cie.*'s obligations which were due on 27 thermidor/14 Aug.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 26 prairial VII/14 June 1799.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

By late June, the *caisse* was regularly confronted by demands for extraordinary discounts, cash advances and moratoriums on payments from its clients. On 24 June, for example, it advanced 200,000 francs to *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* against bills of exchange drawn on Ouvrard which were part of his deal guaranteeing Girardot.²³⁶ But the most substantial advances were granted to *Amelin Van Robais & Cie.*, which between 26 June and 14 October was awarded extraordinary discounts totalling 2,597,140 francs (this included renewals of discounts on certain debts to prevent the firm going bankrupt).²³⁷ In exchange, *Amelin Van Robais & Cie.* deposited one million francs in Batavian rescriptions and 162,000 francs worth of mortgaged shares (*cédules hypothécaires*) with the *caisse* on 29 June as guarantees. These assets depreciated rapidly to the point that they were insufficient to repay Van Robais's debt. The *caisse* was unable to cash in the *cédules* and was forced to sell off various assets to raise 3,499,938 francs to cover Van Robais's overdraft of 1,109,750 francs. The one million francs in Batavian rescriptions were exchanged for 500,000 in tax delegations.²³⁸ Justifying these high-risk operations to their shareholders, the *caisse*'s administrators claimed they had been necessary because:

...the interest of the marketplace to whose fate is essentially linked that of the *caisse* required that the *Amelin Van Robais & Cie.* house be helped in a moment where its suspension could have effected that of many other [houses], and where the nature of its embarrassments appeared only to need momentary assistance to cease.²³⁹

The *caisse*'s situation grew so precarious at the close of Year VII that it even solicited foreign correspondents to obtain cash. On 2 September, it sent *Hogguer & Cie.* of Amsterdam 100 coupons worth 200 banco marks to exchange them for French notes. Unfortunately, the Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland (Helder expedition) delayed this operation and caused exchange rates to fall. On 9 October, Garat asked *Hogguer & Cie.* to cancel the transaction and return the banco coupons due to unforeseen complications. Eight

²³⁶ ABF, 1069200402/22, *PVRCA-2*, 6 messidor VII/24 June 1799 – The *caisse* probably felt compelled to grant this advance since on 20 June *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* had deposited 90,350 francs in payment of Girardot's subscriptions (ABF, 1069200402/32, *RCLD*, 2 messidor VII/20 June 1799, p.91). Ouvrard paid *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* 200,000 francs on 9 July (*Ibid*, 21 messidor VII/9 July 1799, p.99) and paid the *caisse* another 365,819 francs for Girardot's subscriptions on 31 August. *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* received 250,000 francs of this amount and Girardot 100,000 francs (*Ibid*, 14 fructidor VII/31 Aug. 1799, p.115).

²³⁷ The breakdown for these extraordinary discounts was as follows: 26 June 1799 – (unspecified amount); 29 June – 477,000 francs; 30 June – 50,636 francs; 2 July – 329,999 francs; 23 August – 330,000 francs; 29 August – 520,000 francs; 4 September – 50,000 francs; 14 October – 513,580 francs and 17 November – 325,925 francs (ABF, 1069200402/22, *PVRCA-2* – 8, 11 & 12 messidor VII/26, 29 & 30 June 1799; 2, 6 & 12 fructidor VII/19, 23 & 29 Aug. 1799; 2 & 22 vendémiaire and 26 brumaire VIII/24 Sep., 14 Oct. & 17 Nov. 1799). *Amelin Van Robais & Cie.* went into administration on 6 frimaire VIII/27 Nov. 1799 following which the *caisse* began marketing obligations on its debts (*Ibid*, 2 nivôse VIII/23 Dec. 1799). Note that the company had been awarded the general contract for military clothing (*habillement*) on 2 Nov. 1796 – an agreement renewed in Year VI. See *Comptes rendus au Directoire exécutif par le citoyen Schérer...*, p.51-52.

²³⁸ ABF, 1069200402/23, *RDAGA-2*, 15 vendémiaire VIII/7 Oct. 1799.

²³⁹ *Ibid*.

days later he instructed *Hogguer & Cie.* to give the coupons to Desforgues, the French extraordinary envoy at The Hague, or to his assistant M. Miot.²⁴⁰

In a landmark general assembly of shareholders held on 7 October 1799, the acting administrative president Jubié lamented the detrimental effects of the economic crisis plaguing Year VII:

*If, by an event which the present statutes of the company would prevent from happening again, the confidence in this establishment appeared for a moment to lapse, its prompt and legitimate return made us hope our situation would continue to improve. This hope, which was met at the start of this semester, was deceived in the last few days. It is pointless to indicate the causes which are generally well-known for these reductions. We must nevertheless point out that the same circumstances which lowered the amounts deposited in current accounts forced us to proportionally restrict the sums allotted to discounting and the number of notes in circulation. To act otherwise would have been to sacrifice the existence of this establishment to an ephemeral prosperity. It would have increased the dividends of current shareholders but would have jeopardised their capital. It would have given more considerable succour to commerce but would have simultaneously removed our capacity to continue aiding it at a moment when it could not possibly be deprived of help. By listing these incontestable truths, we are doubtless expressing the thoughts of each one of you – and certainly all of you up to now have viewed your establishment more as a bedrock for commerce than as a source of particular advantage...*²⁴¹

Jubié announced that a modest dividend of 100 francs per share could be distributed but that a prolonged crisis would lead to:

*...the impossibility to increase the amount devoted to discounting and consequently the dividends they produce...You will notice that hard currency [in the caisse's cash reserves] is in a more than satisfying proportion to the amount of notes in circulation. It will not escape your attention that it is only through a prudent distribution of funds allotted to discounting that these advantages – to which the caisse owes its existence – hold, since nearly all the means of procuring hard currency are currently paralysed.*²⁴²

In addition, Jubié reported the *caisse* had sold several assets to reduce *Girardot & Cie.*'s debt from 802,623 francs to 277,622 francs, and that 324 *caisse* shares had been subscribed of which 301 were fully paid.²⁴³

These economic hardships of Year VII led to a resurgence in petitions for the establishment of a national bank. Everyone could see circumstances had significantly changed since 1796. The era of nationalised paper currency was manifestly over and there were no longer

²⁴⁰ ABF, 1069200402/32, *RCLD*, 13 fructidor VII/30 Aug. 1799, p.116 and 16 & 25 vendémiaire VIII/8 & 17 Oct. 1799, p.127 & 130-131.

²⁴¹ ABF, 1069200402-23, *RDAGA*-2, 15 vendémiaire VIII/7 Oct. 1799.

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

any viable political reasons justifying opposition to a national carrier.²⁴⁴ Politicians who had previously defended the *assignat* like Jacques-Charles Bailleul now argued such a bank “*could produce happy results and change our truly deplorable situation.*”²⁴⁵ Le Couteulx, who had preserved the blueprints of Laffon’s 1796 project, suggested the creation of a discount bank that would be granted a fifteen-year interest-free loan of ten million francs in hard currency by the Treasury. In return, the bank’s associates would furnish an equivalent sum.²⁴⁶ So many proposals for a national bank were submitted to the Directory that the *Cinq-Cents* appointed a commission headed by Michel-Mathieu Lecointe-Puyraveau – the representative of the Deux-Sèvres – to examine them. But when he presented his conclusions on 1 April 1799, his report merely concluded in favour of promoting private banks without returning any decisive verdict on the establishment of a national carrier.²⁴⁷

After examining Lecointe-Puyraveau’s conclusions, the *Cinq-Cents* called upon the Directory to use:

*...all the means in its power to ensure and favour the establishment and independence of private banks, which are tasked with spreading monetary currencies in all areas, in order to help the Republic avoid the costs of transporting money and furnishing commerce and agriculture with the means of exchange they require to do business.*²⁴⁸

It was a *fin de non recevoir* which soon cost the government dear.

Conclusion

Founded in June 1796 as a direct result of the Directory’s inability to establish a national bank, the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* relied on a simple but effective and well-organised business model to attract the cream of Parisian finance. Taking advantage of favourable market conditions, it grew within the space of a few months from a small-scale venture into the uncontested leader of discount banking in Paris, with networks of correspondents stretching across France and in several European countries. The impressive list of the

²⁴⁴ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.33-34.

²⁴⁵ Bailleul, *Corps législatif – Conseil des Cinq-Cents. Motion d’ordre pour la proposition d’une banque, par Jacques-Charles Bailleul*, 29 pluviôse VII/17 Feb. 1799, p.3 – In February 1796, Bailleul had written an article defending the *assignat* (*Moniteur*, n°159, 9 ventôse IV/28 Feb. 1796, p.547).

²⁴⁶ Gabriel Ramon, *Histoire de la Banque de France*, Paris: Grasset, 1929, p.15 (hereafter ‘*HBF*’) & Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.51.

²⁴⁷ The report is conserved in AN, AD/XI/58, *rapport du 12 germinal an VII*. Other national bank projects from 1799 can be found in AN, F/12/971.

²⁴⁸ Ramon, *HBF*, p.50.

caisse's shareholders, which included most future founding Regents of the French National Bank, explains why many economic historians have described it as the 'precursor of the *Banque de France*'.²⁴⁹ But the *caisse* also regrouped military contractors, textile manufacturers, colonial traders and naval *armateurs*; and thus not only represented banking interests but also constituted a lobbying group for high finance which weighed heavily upon economic decisions in revolutionary politics. It is from this standpoint the *caisse* must be interpreted if one is to assess the importance of its role in Napoleon's ascent.

One of the *caisse*'s most striking characteristics is how closely it was aligned to the 'Hispano-Metallist' group of financiers who traded with Spain, the Spanish New World and the Mediterranean. Bankers such as Le Couteulx and Récamier enjoyed privileged access to the Mexican piaster market – vital for French supplies of hard currency – which placed them in a pivotal commercial position. It is no exaggeration to assert that the signing of the Second Treaty of San Ildefonso with Spain in August 1796 owed much to the influence of these men. We have also seen how Bonaparte was eager to ally himself with this faction and had already understood prior even to leaving for Italy that his political importance would soar if he could successfully integrate its economic system. His proximity to Le Couteulx, who joined him at Saint Cloud on the second day of the Brumaire coup, attests to the importance of the Spanish lobby among Bonapartist supporters.

Viewed from a more general perspective, the conclusion of peace with Spain initiated a return to hard currency and inaugurated a ten-year cycle in which the French economy developed strong links with Hispanic trade – a phase which only ended with the *Banque de France*'s crisis of 1805-1806. Historians like Bergeron have highlighted how these connections formed the financial backbone of Bonaparte's consular regime.²⁵⁰ Moreover, Napoleon later displayed a particular attachment to the development of textile manufactures linked to the Spanish wool trade and operated by former *caisse* shareholders, paying several visits to those of the Sévène brothers and Guillaume-Louis Ternaux.

While the analysis of statistics and trading networks is important to understand the functioning of the Revolution's financial elite, real insight into its ultimate objectives can only be gained when observing moments of political and economic upheaval when

²⁴⁹ Mathiez ('Encore le Banquier Perregaux', p.243) says the *Banque de France* was "the new name of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*."

²⁵⁰ Notably the importing of piasters, wool and the selling of *Banco de San Carlos* shares (see Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, chapter 7 & p.289).

different interest groups were compelled to act and openly voice their concerns – thereby leaving evidence which can be traced in various records. The first in a series of such incidents occurred during the politico-financial crisis of 1797 which culminated in the 18 Fructidor coup. *Caisse* shareholders had profited considerably from the progressive return to hard currency – as the bank's discounting figures for the first half of 1797 indicate; and finance minister Ramel's sudden decision to orchestrate the demise of the *mandat territorial* meant the emission of paper currency – and therefore the provision of credit – now became the exclusive remit of private banks. It was this cynical move to intentionally defraud government creditors which decisively turned public opinion against the Directory and stamped financiers with an enduring reputation for greed and corruption. What is more, when unscrupulous speculators like Hainguerlot and his *Compagnie Dijon* openly profited from public losses incurred by the depreciation of nationalised currency, it displayed a blatant disregard for revolutionary solidarity and a readiness to compromise business circles at a time when unity among financiers was of the political essence.

The clumsy manner in which the government managed the 1797 crisis provided an opportunity for the royalists to take power that was only averted through military force. All the good work effected by the *caisse* since its inception was severely jeopardised and nearly swept away at a stroke. If anything, this episode only served to confirm the Directory's flagrant inability to safeguard the welfare of business. But one actor who rendered financiers a great service in this affair was Napoleon. Although reputedly close to Jacobin circles, the young general never lost sight of financial interests during the crisis, and it was his deputy Augereau who oversaw the purge of royalists in the legislative councils. Fructidor therefore constituted something of an act of allegiance by Bonaparte to Parisian finance; and it was doubtless no coincidence that one of his first meetings after returning from Italy was with Augustin Monneron, the *caisse*'s director-general. The subject of their conference remains a mystery, but it must have touched on the necessity of establishing a national bank to shield the economy from subsequent perils. In addition, it was during this phase of his career that Napoleon was introduced to several leading politicians, financiers and civil servants who formed the mainstay of his future administrations.

Another disturbance experienced by the *caisse* which revealed much about its inner workings and connections was the Monneron scandal. The precipitous flight of Augustin Monneron caught the bank entirely by surprise and demonstrated that corrupt practices were still rife in the highest circles of finance. It is particularly interesting to note that some of the *caisse*'s shareholders, notably Perregaux and Girardot, attempted to undermine it

during this ordeal even though the bank did everything in its power to assist its beleaguered investors. Although it claimed to be a private establishment, the *caisse* did not hesitate to rely on state funds and public administrations to ensure its survival. In Frimaire and Nivôse of Year VII, millions of francs in letters of credit drawn on the Treasury were sent to firms like *Les fils de Rodrigue* in Bordeaux, *Courtois & Cie.* in Toulouse and *Clément Grandcoeur* in Bourges to obtain piasters and hard currency. These were cashed in with provincial *receveurs* or *payeurs généraux* and guaranteed by some of the *caisse*'s largest shareholders like Perregaux and Récamier. Once again, the bank relied heavily on its 'Hispano-Metallist' connections with Martin Garat – a leading trader of Bayonne closely linked to the Basterrèche family – appointed as its new director-general. We should also note that the bank's administrators were never properly held to account for the Monneron scandal. When the *caisse* was refounded, all its auditors were elected from among its leading shareholders – which effectively meant that bankers were being overseen by other bankers. In this regard, the scandal was already foreshadowing the bankruptcy of the *Banque de France* in 1805-1806. The remedial measures enacted by the *caisse* saved it from collapse, but it was never able thereafter to discount bills in the same proportions as during its heyday in Year VI.

While the *caisse* enjoyed periods of record prosperity towards the end of Year VI, the economic crisis triggered by the renewal of hostilities in Year VII dragged it back into a period of stagnation and uncertainty. The bank increasingly fell victim to the government's financial woes as it gradually took on the role of a fiscal and military administration at the Directory's behest. Bankers were now not only backing contractors, but also guaranteeing tax revenues and advancing funds for military purchases. Certain financiers profited considerably from such ventures – notably Barrillon, Fulchiron, Récamier and Sévène – with naval supplies proving a particularly lucrative market. But individual earnings could not outweigh the hefty advances made by the *caisse* to help its shareholders avert bankruptcy (especially *Amelin Van Robais & Cie.* and *Girardot & Cie.*). The speech delivered by Jubié at the *caisse*'s general assembly of shareholders a month before Brumaire presented a telling indictment of the economy after ten years of revolutionary struggle.

All these problems raised a certain number of fundamental questions. If private enterprise could substitute itself to the state in matters of military contracting and public markets, why couldn't it also take over the government's duties in food supply and the administration of the Treasury? Wouldn't the fortunes of the Revolution's *nouveaux riches* best serve the state within the framework of a national bank? And since the government

could not extract sufficient revenues from taxpayers, why shouldn't it delegate responsibilities to financiers and military contractors who at least held an interest in getting paid?²⁵¹ These were the considerations which ultimately convinced many financiers to support or at least acquiesce in Napoleon's seizure of power.

²⁵¹ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.121-122.



CHAPTER 4 – CASE STUDY OF JEAN-FRÉDÉRIC PERREGAUX



“Of all the bankers of this era, Perregaux was perhaps the only one who conserved regular business relations with Europe during the Revolution; the only one whose trading house could deliver letters of credit accepted in London, Amsterdam and Hamburg; the only one whose signature inspired confidence. This security might at first have appeared strange, and it was especially disconcerting to witness the most ardent revolutionaries, such as Robespierre and Fouquier-Tinville, address him the greatest of compliments. And yet the reason for this was simple: our banker was a force to be reckoned with and the members of the Committee of Public Safety had understood the services which his financial intelligence and credit could render them.” – Jean Lhomer.¹

Introduction

Among the handful of financiers who left an indelible mark on the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, the Neuchâtel banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux must rank among the most pre-eminent. Such was his influence and ascendancy over the French economy that his name appears at every turn and in each successive phase of these two defining periods. The only contemporary business figure of any comparable stature in France was Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard – the greatest financier of the age. Yet these two barons of finance contrasted one another in almost every way. Unlike Ouvrard, Perregaux was not a *nouveau riche* of the Revolution – he had not risen suddenly from complete anonymity to vast wealth in the space of a few fortuitous years. On the contrary, Perregaux came from a class of merchant aristocrats who could remember the last fastidious days of the *Ancien Régime*. He had begun his career when colonial trading voyages still dominated international commerce and speculative bond markets were a recent innovation, and he was perfectly acquainted with all the sophisticated customs and social etiquette of Enlightenment nobility which so fascinated Napoleon. While Ouvrard’s lack of political experience and visionary enthusiasm frequently led him into troubled waters and imperilled his affairs, Perregaux’s inherent survival instincts, exceptional political flair and elegant affability ensured he always drew advantage of any situation.

Experience taught Perregaux to be on his guard, and he was far too cautious to bequeath any incriminating records to posterity. He burned all his personal papers prior to his death; and while this was undoubtedly motivated by a care to protect his family and friends, it has unfortunately deprived us of documentation which would have proved invaluable in

¹ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.21.




Figure 4:1
Portrait of Jean-Frédéric Perregaux
by an artist of François Gérard's school, c.1805
© Osenat Auction House
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org> (uploaded by 'Branor')
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

unravelling the elusive financial mysteries that continue to linger over his era. This opacity – coupled with the time and difficulty involved in shifting through voluminous archival material – explains why there has only been one monography dedicated to Perregaux’s career (authored by Jean Lhomer) written over a century ago. An updated assessment is therefore urgently required for the purpose of this thesis – not only for the part Perregaux played in Revolutionary finance but also because his subsequent position as President of the *Banque de France*’s Regency Council singles him out as the financier who more than any other “acted as the liaison between the trading and banking communities and Bonaparte.”² We have already seen Perregaux’s dealings with the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* in the previous chapter. The present section will review his career up to the eve of Brumaire, while his role in the establishment of the *Banque de France* will be examined in Chapter 6.

The Banker of British Residents and Elegant Ladies under the *Ancien Régime*

Jean-Frédéric Perregaux was born in Neuchâtel on 4 September 1744. The Perregaux had been one of the foremost families of Neuchâtel since the fifteenth century. His father, François-Frédéric (born 1716), served as an officer in the French army until 1740 and was lieutenant-colonel of the Val-de-Ruz in the Canton of Neuchâtel. Jean-Frédéric was the eldest of seven children and had two brothers and four sisters. As a young man, he was sent to Mulhouse to learn German and spent several years studying business and banking in Holland and England. Accounts conflict as to when Perregaux first settled in Paris, but most authors place his arrival in 1765, aged 21.³ Having founded his own banking house in partnership with his brother – François-Louis – in 1778, Perregaux began his career acting as a commercial representative for the influential Anglo-Swiss magnate Isaac Panchaud during his business trips away from Paris.⁴ This introduced the fledgling banker to many leading financial institutions and foreign residents: the *Compagnie des Indes*, the *Caisse d’Escompte*, the British ambassador John Sackville (3rd Duke of Dorset) and Jacques Necker – his Swiss compatriot – whose patronage benefited the young man’s first steps.⁵

² Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.47.

³ Lhomer (*PFDR*, p.4-5), Lüthy (*LBPF*, Tome II, p.329) and Szramkiewicz (*Les Régents et Censeurs de la Banque de France*, p.314) claim Perregaux settled in Paris in 1765 while Bouchary (*LMAP*, Tome III, p.11) places his arrival in 1780.

⁴ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.426, 429 & 459, footnote 59; Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.315 – Perregaux served as Panchaud’s factotum for several ventures concerning his relatives and clients, including Jean-François Panchaud of Berne, William Burke and Robert-Ralph Foley (both of London).

⁵ Perregaux helped John Sackville 3rd Duke of Dorset to rent a house at Fontainebleau during his residency as British ambassador at the court in Paris (1784-1789). See MC/ET/L/703, 20 Sep. 1785.

Perregaux probably participated in the speculations of Necker and *Girardot, Haller et Cie.* during the American Revolutionary War.⁶ His bank first appeared in the Royal Almanach of 1781 as a trading house specialising in drafts and remittances (*banque pour les traites et remises de place en place*) headquartered in the Rue Saint-Sauveur – the same street as Isaac Panchaud’s establishment.⁷

Unfortunately we know almost nothing of Perregaux’s activities between his arrival in Paris and 1781, except that on 4 December 1778 he made a very advantageous marriage with a young lady named Adélaïde Harenc de Presle de Surville.⁸ They had one daughter – Anne-Marie Hortense (born 18 October 1779) – who married General Marmont in 1798.⁹ Hortense’s godfather was Nicolas Beaujon, court banker of Louis XV and protégé of Madame du Barry, who bequeathed 60,000 *livres* for her marriage in his will.¹⁰ Such generosity suggests Hortense’s mother – Adélaïde – was either Beaujon’s natural daughter or one of his mistresses. Jean-Frédéric and his wife also had a son, Alphonse-Claude-Charles-Bernardin (born 29 March 1785), who married Adèle-Élisabeth MacDonald (daughter of Marshal MacDonald) in 1813.¹¹

In 1782, Perregaux moved his bank from the Rue Saint-Sauveur to the Rue du Sentier.¹² Three years later we find him indirectly implicated in the Affair of the Necklace.¹³ His trading house already enjoyed an excellent reputation both in France and abroad and was

⁶ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.622, footnote 50.

⁷ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.11; Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.426; Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.315.

⁸ MC/ET/LIII/543, 4 Dec. 1778 – *Marriage contract between Jean-Frédéric Perregaux and Adélaïde Harenc de Presle de Surville*. Born in Paris in 1757, Adélaïde was the daughter of Bernardin, *comte de Praël, chevalier de Saint Louis* and *capitaine attaché au service de l’infanterie*, and of his wife Louise Dallie Geffriée (a.k.a. Dalis Geffriée). Bernardin de Praël was descended from the *comtes de Surville*, a Norman family ennobled in 1432. Adélaïde brought a dowry of 20,000 *livres*. She had the legal status of a ‘*mineure émancipée*’ residing with her legal guardian Jean Hilbert Quentin at his château of Villiers-sur-Orge. Quentin controlled all Adélaïde’s wealth (mainly real estate shares). Her parents are not mentioned in the contract.

⁹ MC/ET/X/829, 22 germinal VI/11 April 1798 – *Marriage contract between Auguste Frédéric Louis de Viesse de Marmont and Anne-Marie-Hortense Perregaux*.

¹⁰ AP, C6 263, dossier 191 – Beaujon’s will dates from 1786.

¹¹ MC/ET/CXVI/663, 14 April 1813, *Marriage contract between Alphonse-Claude-Charles Perregaux and Adèle-Élisabeth MacDonald* – In 1814, five years after Perregaux’s death, his son the *comte* Alphonse Perregaux, his son-in-law Marmont and his associate Jacques Laffitte held a mysterious meeting with Talleyrand at which the capitulation of Paris and defection of Marmont’s army to the Sixth Coalition were decided (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.311).

¹² Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.11. Lhomer (*PFDR*, p.11-12) places this move in 1783.

¹³ See Frantz Funck-Brentano, *L’Affaire du Collier*. Paris: Hachette, 1903, p.183-184 – The London jewellers Robert and William Gray of New Bond Street, and Nathaniel Jeffreys of Piccadilly, had purchased 240,000 pounds worth of diamonds from Marie-Antoinette’s necklace from the Count of La Motte who had come to London to sell them. They paid the diamonds partly in hard currency and partly via a bill of exchange drawn on Perregaux’s banking house.



Figure 4:2
Portrait of Adélaïde Harenc de Praël de Surville, Madame Perregaux
by Élisabeth-Louis Vigée Le Brun, 1789
© The Wallace Collection, London
Photo: <https://wallacelive.wallacecollection.org>
CC-BY-NC-ND (Non-Commercial/No Derivatives) 4.0 Licence



Figure 4:3
Portrait of Hortense Perregaux, Duchesse de Raguse
by Jean-Baptiste Isabey, 1818
© Cleveland Museum of Art
Photo: <https://www.clevelandart.org>
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



Figure 4:4
Presumed Portrait of Alphonse Perregaux
by Jean Urbain Guérain, early 1800s
Louvre Museum, Paris
© Musée du Louvre/RNM-GP
Photo: Martine Beck-Coppola/
<https://www.photo.rmn.fr>
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

known for its proximity to British commercial interests. It was probably through his wife's connection to Nicolas Beaujon that Perregaux acquired many of his British clients, for her inventory after decease established in 1794 reveals a glittering clientele of Anglo-Irish peers, MPs, diplomats, artists and intellectuals. These included Lords Gower, Elgin, Cholmondeley and Stormont, the Earl FitzWilliam, the Duchess of Devonshire, Lady Spencer, Lady Anne Culling Smith (Wellington's sister), Dr. Joseph Priestly and many others. Moreover, Perregaux was not only linked to the British ruling class. He also maintained access to its imperial networks of global trade via superb connections with premier London firms (*Coutts & Cie., Ransom, Morland & Hammersley, Hoare & Co.*), East India Company administrators and soldiers (George Colebrooke, William Devaynes, John Purling, Hector Munro), British Army and Royal Navy officers (William Bellingham, John Lindsay, Banastre Tarleton) and prominent entrepreneurs (Josiah Wedgwood II, Francis Egerton, Thomas Walker, John Wilkinson). Add to this his extensive contacts with leading nobles and merchants across the continent and it is clear we are looking at one of the foremost businessmen in Europe prior to the Revolution.¹⁴

Perregaux's propinquity to the British merchant aristocracy is confirmed by a letter dated 7 May 1786 in which General Hew Whiteford Dalrymple introduces him to his friend, the Scottish banker Sir Robert Herries:¹⁵

Monsieur,

I take advantage of the fact that my friend, Sir Robert Herries, is traveling to Paris to enquire of your latest dealings which – I hope – are better than the last time I had the honour of receiving them. The compatriot I take the liberty of presenting you is a great banker in this city and rightly considered one of the most respectable of our English merchants.

Sir Robert possesses a great and useful knowledge of the commercial arrangements which have been proposed and like you he is an enthusiastic supporter of any measure judged sufficient to end these petty commercial disputes which have long dishonoured both our countries.

Since I last had the honour of corresponding with you (approximately six weeks ago), we have not received any new publication on commerce. When something on this subject shall appear, I will send it to you without fail. I hope the treaty is shaping up well. I believe you have already seen Mr. Eden whom you desired to consult regarding the negotiations.

¹⁴ See Appendix V.

¹⁵ Lhomer (*PFDR*, p.10-11) names this officer as 'General Sir Henry Dalrymple' but I think he is confusing with General Sir Hew Whiteford Dalrymple because I could not find any "General Sir Henry Dalrymple" in the British Army at this time. For Robert Herries, see the Biographical Index.

If my services can be of use for any matter here, I pray you make it known to me.

Please address my respectful salutations to La Fayette as well as to Mr. Jefferson, whose book excited the interest of some of my friends when I showed it to them. I soon hope to see your own edition of it.

Adieu, Monsieur, and trust that I am respectfully your most obedient and humble servant.

*Henry Dalrymple.*¹⁶

This letter is of double interest for it proves Perregaux played a part in negotiating the 1786 Anglo-French Commercial Treaty (the Eden Agreement) and was linked to La Fayette and Americans like Thomas Jefferson.

1786 was an auspicious year for Perregaux. He purchased the *Hôtel Guimard* – nicknamed the ‘Temple of Terpsichore’ – from the Comtesse Dulau who had just won it in a fundraising lottery organised by its original owner, the ballerina Marie-Madeleine Guimard.¹⁷ It was here that the enthusiastic socialite Perregaux – “*the banker of all the elegant ladies in Paris*”¹⁸ – hosted splendid receptions and balls for his circle of friends.¹⁹ Among these were many of the foremost Parisian artists of the age including ballet masters (Noverre, Vestris, Dauberval); acclaimed ballerinas (Marie-Madeleine Guimard, Rosalie Duthé, Madame Dugazon);²⁰ and celebrated actresses (Carline and Sarah Lescot of the *Comédie Italienne*, Louise Contat, Mesdemoiselles Montansier, Raucourt and Clairon, etc.).²¹ As the Goncourt brothers rightly observed, Perregaux could have guided us through all the inner recesses of Parisian high society.²² It was also at the *Hôtel Guimard* that

¹⁶ Quoted in Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.12 & Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.10-11.

¹⁷ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.12-14 – Located in the Rue de la Chaussée d’Antin, the *hôtel de Guimard* was built by architect Claude Nicolas Le Doux and decorated by the Boulle workshop and Jean-Honoré Fragonard. The building later served as the headquarters of the Laffitte bank and was destroyed under Louis-Philippe. Radix de Sainte-Foix, Perregaux’s friend and Talleyrand’s financial *éminence grise*, had acquired an *hôtel particulier* nearby in the Rue Basse in 1775.

¹⁸ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.324, footnote 14.

¹⁹ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.13 – Perhaps it was these parties that Perregaux’s associate Jacques Laffitte referred to when he noted that Perregaux had “*conserved the tastes of his youth*” and adopted a libertinism and cynicism which left a “*disagreeable impression*” and made him “*blush with embarrassment*” (Laffitte, *Mémoires*, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1932, p.18).

²⁰ Rosalie Duthé, in letter dated 23 October 1796 calls Perregaux “her dear tutor” (Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.42). Raymond Guyot (*LDPE*, p.272, footnote 2) notes that “*during the entire Revolution, [Perregaux] served as an intermediary for relations of all sorts. It was thus that he ensured for ‘La Duthé’ – the former mistress of the Comte d’Artois who had emigrated in 1789... – the payment of all her revenues.*” Perregaux reputedly died contemplating Mlle Duthé’s portrait by Henri-Pierre Danloux (Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.6-9).

²¹ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.12-13 & 15; Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.9 – Of all Perregaux’s correspondants, the most assiduous was Louise Contat who benefited greatly from his business contacts (Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.43). We may also note that Perregaux managed Mlle. Clairon’s pension from the Vicomte de Pieverscourt and lent Mademoiselle Raucourt 200,000 francs to purchase a farm at Compiègne in Year IV (*Ibid*, p.42).

²² Edmond & Jules Goncourt, *Histoire de la société française pendant le Directoire*, Paris: Gallimard, 1992, p.330-331.

Perregaux first received Jacques Laffitte who came to apply for a clerking position at his bank.²³

On 30 December 1786, Perregaux established a new banking company with Jean-Albert Gumpelzhaimer “to make common profits or losses through banking and in all affairs of a similar nature which relate to it, and to continue the business which has been carried out until now by the aforementioned trading house of Mr. Perregaux.”²⁴ This partnership was contracted for three years, beginning on 1 January 1787 and ending on 1 December 1789, under the name ‘*Perregaux et Cie.*’ with a starting capital of 400,000 *livres* (Perregaux for 300,000, Gumpelzhaimer for 100,000).²⁵ Gumpelzhaimer was born in Ratisbonne in 1742 and had served as the Parisian correspondent for the imperial Bethmann bank of Frankfurt and its affiliate, the Bethmann trading house in Bordeaux, since 1774.²⁶ According to Laffitte, he was a bookworm devoid of any sense of humour whose only pleasure was to continuously audit his account books:

*He was a German, cold, glacial. When he wasn't sleeping he was always numb, a kind of machine who spent his time scratching his eyebrows or sharpening his quills. When it looked like he was thinking, he was not thinking. When you talked to him, he did not answer. His work consisted solely in signing letters without reading them.*²⁷

Hortense Perregaux nicknamed him ‘*le compère*’.²⁸ *Perregaux et Cie.*’s principal activity was to advance credit to wealthy British residents in Paris who reimbursed the bank with bills of exchange drawn on London trading houses. Perregaux would send these bills to London and obtain payment in paper notes which he then discounted at the *Caisse d'Escompte* – where he conveniently served as an administrator from 1789 to 1793.²⁹

The Early Revolution

Perregaux was not particularly troubled by the outbreak of the Revolution. He registered as a citizen in the Saint-Magloire district of Paris and served as a captain in the 9th battalion of its 4th division before transferring to that section’s 1st Grenadiers and becoming a battalion

²³ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.14-15 – Legend has it that Perregaux initially refused Laffitte’s request, but as Laffitte was leaving the building he noticed a needle lying on the floor and picked it up. Observing this, Perregaux realised that Laffitte paid great attention to detail and offered him a position in his establishment.

²⁴ MC/ET/X/764, 30 Dec. 1786.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.720, footnote 34 – He was in charge of signing contracts for India and China.

²⁷ Laffitte, *Mémoires*, p.20.

²⁸ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.73, footnote.

²⁹ Bouchary (*LMAP*, Tome III, p.14) names Perregaux as an administrator from 1789-1791 while Lüthy (*LBPF*, Tome III, p.700, footnote 12) gives the dates 1790-1793.

commander on 1 April 1791.³⁰ He frequented the Duke of Orléans's *Club de Valois* where he mingled with other conspicuous financiers such as Walter Boyd and John William Ker (*Boyd, Ker et Cie.*), Jean Cottin, Le Coulteux, the Mallet brothers (Guillaume and Jean-Jacques), Louis Greffulhe and Jacques-Marc Montz (*Greffulhe, Montz et Cie.*), Jean-Marie Boscary, Jean Girardot de Marigny, Étienne Delessert and Jean-Théodore Jauge.³¹ It was also at the *Club de Valois* that Perregaux made the acquaintance of Nathaniel Parker-Forth (Pitt's leading agent in Paris) and of several *Orléanistes* who later played prominent roles in the Revolution such as Charles-Pierre-Maximilien Radix de Sainte-Foix (Talleyrand's financial agent), the Belgian financier Berthold Proly and especially Bertrand Barère de Vieuzac.³²

Following the creation of the *assignat*, Perregaux was tasked by the revolutionary government in his capacity as administrator of the *Caisse d'Escompte* with hunting down counterfeiters of paper notes until a special bureau was created at the Treasury for this purpose.³³ One of his colleagues was Stanislas Maillard who operated a mint of fake *assignats* at Suresnes!³⁴

On 1 November 1791, Perregaux moved the headquarters of his bank again, from the Rue du Sentier to the Rue Mirabeau (formerly Rue de la Chaussée d'Antin).³⁵ Among his notable clients during the early Revolution was Anne-Josèphe Théroigne de Méricourt – 'la belle Liégeoise' – who entrusted him with the management of part of her fortune.³⁶ Perregaux made several cash advances to help Théroigne and her family and may have assisted in securing her release from the Tyrolian castle of Kufstein after the Austrians kidnapped her at Liège during the night of 15-16 February 1791.³⁷

³⁰ AN, F/7/4774/68, dossier Perregaux, *Procès-verbal du comité révolutionnaire de la section du Mont-Blanc, 7 septembre 1793* – He kept this post until 1 January 1792 when he moved to live in the *section des Piques*.

³¹ Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.14 – See their respective entries in the Biographical Index.

³² AN, F/7/4774/68, dossier Perregaux – see Radix and Proly's entries in the Biographical Index.

³³ *Ibid* – *Procès-verbal du comité révolutionnaire de la section du Mont-Blanc*, 7 Sep. 1793. In 1791, Perregaux paid various sums to different agents tracking counterfeiters, notably 5394 *livres* to a police inspector named Bossenet who had been sent to England, and 2500 *livres* to a Mr. Courouble who had negotiated for the purchase of hard currency with the British government (see AN, F/4/1013 & 1937).

³⁴ Blanc, *LERE*, p.299, footnote 24 – Stanislas Maillard was the agent whom foreign minister Lebrun attached to the *Commune de Paris* to keep him informed of all the decisions taken by the mayor of Paris, Pache, and his entourage. Prior to the fall of the monarchy, Maillard had participated in counter-revolutionary meetings organised by the Comte de Kérautry at Suresnes.

³⁵ Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.13.

³⁶ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.19-20 – See Perregaux's entry in the Biographical Index for details on their relations.

³⁷ Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.16 & Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.20-21 – Théroigne's brother appealed to Perregaux to help obtain her release.

Figure 4:5 – Some of Perregaux’s British Clients




William Pulteney 5th Baronet
Portrait by Thomas Gainsborough, 1772
© Yale Center for British Art/Google Art Project
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



George Granville Leveson-Gower 1st Duke of Sutherland
British ambassador in Paris from 1790 to 1792
Portrait by Thomas Phillips, 1805
© National Portrait Gallery, London
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence



George James Cholmondeley
1st Marquess of Cholmondeley
Portrait by Pompeo Batoni, 1772,
Houghton Hall, Norfolk
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



William Eden 1st Baron Auckland
Portrait by Henry Edridge, 1809
© National Portrait Gallery, London
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence

Figure 4:6 – Some of Perregaux’s Female Clients



Georgiana Cavendish, Duchess of Devonshire
Portrait by Thomas Gainsborough, c.1785-1787
© Chatsworth House, Derbyshire
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
(uploaded & enhanced by 'Hohum')
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



Théroigne de Méricourt
Engraving by an unknown artist, 1789
© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France
(authorised for non-commercial use)



Mademoiselle Rosalie Duthé
Perregaux reputedly died while
contemplating this painting
Portrait by Henri-Pierre Danloux, 1792
© Staatliche Kunsthalle, Karlsruhe
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
(uploaded by 'Shakko')
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

Another prestigious client was Beaumarchais. The playwright had opened negotiations on 3 April 1792 with war minister Joseph Servan, the deputy Charles-François Lebrun and General Dumouriez to sell 52,435 muskets to the government which were stored at Tervere in Zeeland. Perregaux served as an intermediary in this transaction, receiving 800,000 *livres* in Dutch silver florins from the naval ministry to purchase bills of exchange on the London market (despite the fact France and England were at war) which were to be transferred to Beaumarchais in payment of the muskets. A last-minute denunciation by the deputy Lecointre in May 1793 made the deal collapse and Beaumarchais sold his muskets to a British merchant despite the French government's objections.³⁸

Seeking political protection, Perregaux gravitated towards the entourage of Danton, Dumouriez and Brissot, forming links with several of their dubious foreign collaborators in 1792 and 1793. Around this time, we begin to see Perregaux use his bank as a cover through which British and émigré agents could send or receive correspondence from abroad.³⁹ He lent money to these operatives and assisted them in collecting and cashing in foreign bills of exchange. *Perregaux et Cie.* was an important associate of Turnbull & Forbes, the London firm which had secured a contract to supply wheat to the city of Paris in September 1789 – but that also served as paymaster to British double-agents employed by Brissot in France such as John Hurford Stone, Richard Ferris, Gilbert Imlay and Thomas Christie.⁴⁰ Another acquaintance was General Francisco Miranda – a protégé of Brissot and Pétion de Villeneuve and an agent of Pitt – who arrived in Paris in May 1792 and dispatched his London correspondence through Turnbull & Forbes and Perregaux.⁴¹ Other British agents or suspected agents with whom Perregaux was in contact included Walter Boyd and John William Ker, the Scottish banker Robert Herries and William Augustus Miles.⁴²

Perregaux also developed ties with the *enragés* faction which dominated the Paris Commune and sought the protection of Cambon. He served as one of war minister Bouchotte's agents in Switzerland where he was charged with purchasing weapons (notably importing muskets from Liège via Switzerland) in conjunction with two other

³⁸ AF/II/219, dossiers 1890:7, 1891:1-5, 7-9 & 11-36 & 1892: *Mémoire justificatif de Caron-Beaumarchais*.

³⁹ Banks and trading houses were ideal intermediaries in helping spies elude surveillance. A classic technique involved agents forwarding their correspondence to a firm's address in a city where they had no intention of going, but where an accomplice could reception the mail and redirect it to the agent. Such schemes were difficult to notice because traders received considerable amounts of correspondence.

⁴⁰ Blanc, *LERE*, p.36 & 300-301, footnote 43 & *LCST*, Chapters 5 & 6 – Thomas Christie was Turnbull & Forbes's Parisian agent.

⁴¹ Blanc, *LCST*, p.86-90 – see Miranda's entry in the Biographical Index.

⁴² See their respective entries in the Biographical Index.

representatives named Béfot and François Desfieux (a wine merchant from Bordeaux and close friend of Berthold Proly and Collot d'Herbois). He procured a bill of exchange of 100,000 *livres* to Bouchotte on 16 May 1793 to help finance Béfot and Desfieux's activities and put Béfot in relation with several Swiss merchants to purchase metal and sabres for the French government. To facilitate these transactions, he furnished another 600,000 *livres* to Bouchotte in down payments while also advancing extra funds to Swiss merchants.⁴³

Surviving the Terror

Perregaux began to encounter difficulties after the decree of 1 August 1793 ordered the arrest of enemy subjects in France.⁴⁴ On 8 August, the *Comité de Sûreté générale* received the following letter from the vicar of Chalautre-la-Petite (Seine-et-Marne), a member of the *société populaire* of Provins:

I hasten to warn you that we are informed the citizen Perregaux et Cie., residing in the Rue de Mirabeau, is exfiltrating money out of the country to émigrés. I think it would be well-advised to take all necessary precautions against this citizen. You will find in the registrar of the municipality of Provins all the suitable information concerning the denunciation I address you...⁴⁵

The official who received this letter added the following note:

Check if Perregaux, who is already under arrest, has not previously been investigated for banking operations, brokerage and speculation, or commerce and transportation of hard currency.

It was probably following this denunciation that the *Comité de Sûreté générale* instructed the representative Julien de Toulouse to search Perregaux's residence and seize any suspicious papers.⁴⁶ But Julien de Toulouse – an intimate friend of the Abbé d'Espagnac – was one of those deputies whose influence was for sale and nothing resulted from this first denunciation.⁴⁷

⁴³ AN, F/7/4774/68, dossier Perregaux – *Procès-verbal du comité révolutionnaire de la section du Mont-Blanc*, 7 Sep. 1793.

⁴⁴ Perregaux was Swiss and therefore not an enemy citizen. But citizens of neutral countries were considered almost as suspect as those of enemy powers (Mathiez, 'Le Banquier Perregaux', p.242).

⁴⁵ AN, F/7/4774/68, dossier Perregaux.

⁴⁶ AN, AF/II/*/286 – *Registre portant sur le plat : "N° 2. Registre des arrestations et arrêtés généraux du Comité de Sûreté Générale. Du 8 août 1793 au 7 germinal an II"*.

⁴⁷ For Julien de Toulouse, see Mathiez, *LCPST*, p.185-248 & Blanc, *LCST*, p.132-139.

On 7 September 1793, commissioners from the *section des Piques* delegated by the *Comité de Sûreté générale* searched Perregaux's house at 5, Rue du Mont-Blanc (formerly Rue Mirabeau) following another denunciation filed against him for “*intelligence and money furnished to a Citoyenne Pitt, presumed to be the wife of the British minister Pitt, who can never be anything other than an object of horror in the eyes of all good Frenchmen.*”⁴⁸ The following day (8 September), all foreign banks in Paris were closed and their effects placed under seal. The *comité révolutionnaire* of the *section des Piques* again presented itself at Perregaux's residence and examined his accounts, paying special attention to bills of exchange drawn by foreign traders on his bank. Its commissioners confiscated 121,481 *livres* in bills and placed them in a sealed box.⁴⁹ But nothing was found except “*the most irrefutable evidence of [Perregaux's] civic duty throughout the course of the Revolution and of the generous sacrifices he made to ensure the liberty of his adopted homeland.*”⁵⁰ That same day, Perregaux submitted a lengthy memoir entitled ‘*Observations*’ refuting all the allegations against him.⁵¹ On 12 September, the seals on his residence were lifted and he was cleared of all charges. In fact, this baseless accusation was the result of a farcical confusion in which one of Perregaux's clients had been mistaken for the non-existent wife of the British Prime Minister!⁵² Nonetheless, Perregaux judged it prudent to give additional guarantees of his patriotism after this episode and sent 4,000 *livres* to the *Section des Piques* on 22 October to help pay for the section's volunteers who were leaving to fight in the Vendée.⁵³ He had already sent the same section 1,200 *livres* for its Vendée volunteers on 10 May. Perregaux wisely asked the section for receipts – a shrewd insurance policy given the volatile mood prevailing at this time.

⁴⁸ AN, F/7/4774/68, dossier Perregaux – *Procès-verbal du comité révolutionnaire de la section du Mont-Blanc*, 7 Sep. 1793.

⁴⁹ *Ibid* – *Letter of Perregaux to the Comité de Sûreté générale*, 30 pluviôse III/18 Feb. 1795. This sum was eventually returned to Lançon, Perregaux's representative, on 9 March 1795.

⁵⁰ *Ibid* – *Procès-verbal du comité révolutionnaire de la section du Mont-Blanc*, 7 Sep. 1793.

⁵¹ This memoir can be found in AN, F/7/4774/68, dossier Perregaux – *Procès-verbal du comité révolutionnaire de la section du Mont-Blanc*, 7 Sep. 1793. As proof of his patriotism, Perregaux enumerated all his previous activities hunting *assignat* counterfeiters and advancing funds to purchase weapons abroad.

⁵² Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.19-20; Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.23-25; Mathiez, ‘Le Banquier Perregaux’, p.243-246 – Perregaux had been contracted by an Englishman named Barry Smith on 26 April 1786 to pay an annual annuity of 500 *livres* to a courtesan of Louis XVI's court named ‘Madame de Soinville’ (real name Marie-Madeleine Villetard) who was born at Peronne and resided at Marolles near Boissy-Saint-Léger. After meeting Smith-Barry, she had moved to England and changed her name to ‘Mrs. Pitt’ at his insistence. Although she had returned to France in 1784, she kept the name of ‘Pitt’ to distance herself from her previous life as ‘Madame de Joinville’. When her house in Marolles was searched, some of Perregaux's letters were found. This explains why an anonymous note was sent to the *Comité de Salut public* denouncing Perregaux as “*an agent of Pitt and the English court*”. Perregaux pointed out that Pitt the Younger was not married and that consequently he could not be the banker of the British Prime Minister!

⁵³ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.23; Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.25 and Mathiez, ‘Le Banquier Perregaux’, p.247.

Meanwhile on 10 October 1793, a new decree had ordered the confiscation of all goods belonging to British and Hanoverian subjects. Any citizen holding such merchandise was required to declare it to the authorities and on 12 October Perregaux promptly filed a declaration with the *section des Piques* containing various lists detailing all relevant assets managed by his firm (real estate, pensions, annuities, goods, etc.).⁵⁴ The audit of Perregaux's accounts revealed he owed 44,121 *livres* to nationals of foreign countries at war with France (651,100 *livres* in expenses vs. 695,221 *livres* in deposits) which were confiscated and placed in a sealed box. He had 1,071 bonds of Calonne's second national loan issued in December 1784, plus a further 245 bonds of the same loan deposited at the *Caisse d'Escompte*.⁵⁵ He also owned 57 shares of the *Compagnie des Indes*, shares of the *Caisse d'Escompte*, title deeds and bonds of the royal loan of November 1785;⁵⁶ along with life annuities worth 418,773 *livres* and 21,703 *livres* of pensions in perpetuity.⁵⁷

In November 1793, Perregaux and his associate Gumpelzhaimer were arrested once again by the *Comité de Sûreté générale* because of their suspected links to the Duc de Châtelet who had been imprisoned for attempting to emigrate.⁵⁸ According to the charges, the duke had tried to corrupt his jailors by offering them a bill of exchange for 100,000 *livres* drawn on *Perregaux et Cie.*, claiming most of his four million *livres* fortune was deposited with Perregaux, including two million in gold. Three commissioners of the Mont Blanc section – Maréchal, Pernet and Lainé – were delegated by the *Comité de Salut public* to search Perregaux's bank on 14 December 1793;⁵⁹ but Perregaux had gone to Switzerland at the invitation of the Swiss Federal government to be briefed about representing its citizens and merchants in France and to sign contracts for the French government. The commissioners only found his associate Gumpelzhaimer whom they incarcerated in the La Force prison.⁶⁰

On 16 December, the *Comité de Sûreté générale* issued another warrant to search the papers and accounts of Perregaux's bank.⁶¹ Jean-Frédéric immediately returned from

⁵⁴ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.21-22 & Mathiez, 'Le Banquier Perregaux', p.247 and 'Encore le banquier Perregaux', p.241.

⁵⁵ For Calonne's second loan of 125 million *livres* see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.80-83.

⁵⁶ See Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.83-85 – This royal loan of 80 million *livres* was officially requested by Louis XVI from the *Parlement* in December 1785. Etienne Clavière purchased a large amount of its bonds which he then resold on the market for a considerable profit.

⁵⁷ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.21-22 & Mathiez, 'Le Banquier Perregaux', p.247.

⁵⁸ Louis-Marie Florent, Duc de Châtelet-Lomont, was a royal officer and deputy of the nobility to the 1789 Estates General. He gave 800,000 *livres* to Louis XVI to bribe deputies in a vain attempt to prevent the voting of the decree deposing the monarchy (AN, O//3, dossier 2620). The duke was arrested in Picardy, tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal and executed on 13 December 1793.

⁵⁹ AN, AF/II/*/289, dossier 113, *Arrest warrant for Jean-Frédéric Perregaux*, 24 frimaire II/14 Dec. 1793.

⁶⁰ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.27, footnote 1 – Gumpelzhaimer was imprisoned on 25 frimaire II/15 December 1793.

⁶¹ AN, AF/II/*/289, dossier 116 – *Arrest warrant for Jean-Frédéric Perregaux and Jean-Albert Gumpelzhaimer*, 26 frimaire II/16 Dec. 1793.

Switzerland and informed the *Comité de Salut public* he had only paid out 10,890 *livres* for the duke in 1790 and 1791, and that the jailed aristocrat bore him a grudge because he had refused to discount 6,000 pounds sterling for him.⁶² Moreover, Perregaux probably intimated his arrest would negatively impact the commercial operations he was conducting on behalf of the French government, for on 20 December Gumpelzhaimer was released from prison and placed with Perregaux under house arrest. Two days later, the deputies Cambon of the *Comité de Salut public* and Moïse Bayle of the *Comité de Sûreté générale* ordered the Mont-Blanc commissioners to cease their investigations and return all confiscated items.⁶³ On 23 December, Cambon delivered a full report exonerating Perregaux and Gumpelzhaimer before the National Convention which voted to release them without even debating their case.⁶⁴ Their innocence had been established in a matter of ten days. Assuredly, things would not have been resolved so expeditiously had they not benefited from powerful complicities in government.⁶⁵ Perregaux seriously considered taking refuge in Switzerland after this arrest and made preparations to leave Laffitte and another clerk named Leuba behind in Paris but ultimately decided against it, probably because he was given assurances by members of the *Comité de Salut public*.⁶⁶

Nonetheless, there were surreptitious reasons underlying Perregaux's trepidations. The following letter discovered in Danton's papers reveals the Neuchâtel magnate was helping the British Foreign Office to bribe French revolutionaries as part of a deliberate strategy to radicalise the Revolution and turn public opinion against it:

Whitehall, Friday 13

⁶² *Moniteur*, Tome XIX, p.34 - *Report of Cambon*, 3 nivôse II/23 Dec. 1793.

⁶³ Jacques Laffitte (*Mémoires*, p.37-41) claims he was able to remove all the incriminating evidence against Perregaux contained in Cambon's files *in extremis*, including a receipt for 500,000 *livres* which Count Fersen had deposited with *Perregaux et Cie.* prior to Louis XVI's flight to Varennes.

⁶⁴ *Moniteur*, Tome XIX, p.34 & AF/II*/289, dossier 128, *Order from the Comité de Sûreté générale to the commissioners of the Mont-Blanc section to lift the seals on the papers of Perregaux et Cie. and release its directors*, 3 nivôse II/23 Dec. 1793 – Cambon supported all Perregaux's assertions, claiming he and his colleagues from the financial commission (Moïse Bayle and Johannot) had audited all of Perregaux's accounts since 1789 and that they had never held as much as four million *livres*. The 10,890 *livres* mentioned by Perregaux were accurately verified and his sincerity was therefore established. Perregaux and Gumpelzhaimer were released by the *Comité de Sûreté générale* on 24 Dec. 1793 (AN, F/7/4774/68, dossier Perregaux – *Release order for Mssrs. Perregaux et Gumpelzhaimer*, 4 nivôse II/24 Dec. 1793).

⁶⁵ Perregaux's new role as representative for Swiss citizens and merchants in France probably came into play. The French ambassador at Basel, François Barthélémy, had written to the French foreign minister Deforgues on 4 Jan. 1794 approving the choice of Perregaux for this position: "...*It seems we can only favour the execution of such a project. It would be useful in the achievement of its principal objective and can only lead to other advantageous measures...*" (Jean Kaulek (ed.), *Papiers de Barthélémy*, Tome III, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1888, p.312 & 322). Deforgues responded that he also approved of Perregaux (*Ibid*, Tome III, p.342 & 346.). Thus, "*it would not be stretching too far to suppose that this consideration played a part in hastening the examination of Perregaux's denunciation*" (Mathiez, 'Le Banquier Perregaux', p.250).

⁶⁶ Laffitte, *Mémoires*, p.28.

The information which you have lately sent us has been very satisfactory, and gives heartfelt satisfaction to 12. We desire you to continue your exertions and to advance 3,000 livres to Mr. C.D., 12,000 to W.T. and 1,000 to De M for the essential services they have rendered us en soufflant le feu and carrying the Jac... to a paroxysm of fury. We hope that by their endeavours and those of others whom we shall soon send over, the old 7 will be again re-established, or at least the present 0 prolonged for several years. Staley brought your last. We are determined to grant C.D.'s request. You'll be pleased to advance him the 18,000 livres, and be kind enough to assist him in discovering the channels in which the money may be most successfully distributed. We have a great deal of business to transact today in the office, which circumstance obliges me to subscribe myself pro S....e

*Your most obedient and humble servant.*⁶⁷

What was this compromising evidence doing in Danton's papers? J.G. Alger suggests that after Perregaux's arrest, his English correspondence was handed over to Danton for translation (Danton spoke fluent English). Reviewing the letter in 1916, Albert Mathiez agrees with Alger that the letter dates from Friday 13 September 1793 – indicating it was written the day after the seals were removed from Perregaux's house in the bogus affair of Pitt's wife!⁶⁸ However, Mathiez points out that Danton was then no longer a member of the *Comité de Salut public* and that it was Cambon who led the investigation into Perregaux. He therefore concludes the Swiss financier must have given Danton the letter prior to his arrest to dissimulate his links with the Duc de Châtelet.⁶⁹ Bouchary argues that Perregaux gave Danton the letter because it revealed Danton's own links with Pitt's government.⁷⁰

Whatever the explanation may be, we can clearly deduce from this document that Perregaux paid British agents in Paris in 1793 to lobby for ultra-revolutionary measures in the hope this would trigger a period of anarchy culminating in the restoration of the monarchy.⁷¹ Fortunately for Perregaux, he was in Switzerland when the letter was

⁶⁷ AN, AF/II/49, dossier 380:6 – *Letter from an informer in London to Perregaux* – This letter was first published by British historian J.G. Alger who uncovered it while researching correspondence between Thomas Paine and Georges Danton (J.G. Alger, 'Paine and Danton', *The Athenæum*, n°3701, July-December 1898, p.455-456). Alger suggests that "12" = Grenville or Pitt, "7" = the French monarchy, "0" = anarchy and "Jac..." = *Jacobins*. He further speculates "C.D." could be the Duc de Châtelet who attempted to bribe his jailors with a cheque of 100,000 *livres* drawn on Perregaux, or more unlikely Camilles Desmoulins or "Citoyen Danton". "De M" could be Georges Nicolas Mergez – Danton's nephew – who lived in London and married Sophia, daughter of the dramatist Thomas Holcroft, in 1805. Holcroft numbered among Perregaux's clients (see Appendix VI). The letter is reproduced in full and discussed in Mathiez, 'Danton et l'or anglais', *AR*, 8(2), mars-avril 1916: 167-172.

⁶⁸ Alger, 'Paine and Danton', p.455 & Mathiez, 'Danton et l'or anglais', p.171.

⁶⁹ Mathiez, 'Danton et l'or anglais', p.169-170.

⁷⁰ Bouchary (*LMAP*, Tome III, p.38) discounts Alger's suggestion the Duc de Châtelet was a British agent since Cambon's report on Perregaux indicated the duke had never deposited any money with *Perregaux et Cie*. Moreover, since the duke never appeared at the *club des jacobins*, why would Britain pay him to lobby them? Mathiez suggests that "C.D." could be Danton, but Bouchary rejects this idea because the 18,000 *livres* sent to "C.D." were distributed to other sources and this letter was not mentioned at Danton's trial.

⁷¹ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.38-39.

uncovered. The *Comité de Salut public* did not produce it as evidence at Danton's trial, probably because it did not wish to expose Perregaux who was presiding its Committee of Bankers and Exchange Agents (see below) and because Switzerland had entrusted him with representing the interests of its merchants and citizens in France.

Another element which appears to confirm this striking piece of evidence is that one of Perregaux's correspondents in 1793 was the speculator Claude-Odile-Joseph Baroud. Baroud was at the heart of a covert operation financing both federalist rebels and Jacobin inquisitors during the 1793 revolt of Lyon, notably through his links to Pierre Duplain (a Jacobin printer who had incited the September Massacres) and was – along with his nephew Joseph-Benoît Duplain de Sainte-Albine – an active British agent.⁷²

Perregaux was denounced a final time on 8 January 1794 when two masons he had employed – Jean-Médard Stouff and his brother-in-law Marin Petitbled – filed a charge against him at the *section du Muséum*. They asserted that Perregaux had hired them to build secret cabinets in his office at his bank, notably when Louis XVI had fled to Malmédy in June 1791 and in July 1793. On the latter occasion, Perregaux had told them: “*This isn't for me. I am not afraid for my fortune, but I have funds belonging to different clients, and I fear being robbed.*”⁷³ Once again, the *section du Mont-Blanc* sent its commissioners to search *Perregaux et Cie.*, but apart from two secret closets containing chimney decorations and blankets they found nothing and the case was closed.⁷⁴ After this, Perregaux was no longer disturbed by the authorities. His relations with the *Comité de Salut public* and his credit in foreign markets protected him.⁷⁵ Shortly afterwards, his wife died (22 January 1794) and he left for Switzerland to spend several months in mourning

⁷² Blanc, *LERE*, p.92 – Baroud, one of the most successful speculators of the 1780s, had been a business partner of the Comte de Seneffe and Abbé d'Espagnac. His sister, the Comtesse de Genetines, was the mistress of Nathaniel Parker-Forth, Pitt's leading agent in Paris, with whom she had a son. See Baroud's entry in the Biographical Index for more details. For the Duplains, see AN, F/7/4694 & AF/II/22, dossier 270:15 & 17 – *Arrest warrants against Pierre Duplain*, 29 July 1793. Duplain testified in favour of General Miranda at his trial. His nephew, Duplain de Sainte-Albine, was arrested in frimaire II and guillotined in messidor that year, possibly to prevent him revealing compromising information.

⁷³ AN, F/7/4774/68, dossier Perregaux – According to Stouff: “...one day, Perregaux was in the former *salle du Manège* at the National Convention and summoned him to discuss the project of placing a safe in a corner near his cabinet; but given this required formal approval from the government, Perregaux had asked if the work could not be done by a person of confidence and whether he [Stouff] himself could not place the safe, to which Stouff responded affirmatively.”

⁷⁴ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.26-27 & Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.33-35.

⁷⁵ Sandoz de Travers, head of the *commission secrète* of Neuchâtel's government, wrote to the French ambassador in Switzerland – Barthélémy – recommending Perregaux (AAE, Suisse, Correspondance diplomatique, 442, dossier 169 & 175). Barthélémy then wrote to Paris and foreign minister Desforgues to exonerate Perregaux (Kaulek (ed.), *Papiers de Barthélémy*, Tome III, p.407 & 412).




Figure 4:7 – Chimney Project for the Banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux
(Projet de Cheminée pour le banquier Jean-Frédéric Perregaux)
 Drawn by François-Joseph Bélanger, undated
 © Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

with his family. Gumpelzhaimer, Laffitte and a clerk named Lançon looked after affairs in Paris.⁷⁶

The list of Perregaux’s clients as detailed in the 1794 inventory after decease of his wife is an extremely important document because it confirms his clientele included a host of British and émigré agents during the Revolution.⁷⁷ Among these were Quentin Craufurd and his Italian mistress Eleanore Sullivan née Franchi (both of whom played leading roles in the flight to Varennes); James Craufurd (Quentin’s nephew and British representative and master spy in Copenhagen and then Hamburg from 1798 to 1803); Sir Ralph Woodford (William Windham’s assistant at the War Office); and Samuel Baldwyn and his friend George Stratton.⁷⁸ Perregaux was also close to Augustus Rose – the English bailiff

⁷⁶ Gumpelzhaimer also looked after Perregaux’s daughter, Hortense, who was attending Madame Campan’s boarding school in Saint Germain. Hortense’s classmates included Églé Auguier (Mme. Campan’s niece who later married Marshal Ney) and Hortense de Beauharnais (Lhommer, *PFDR*, p.51).

⁷⁷ See Appendix V.

⁷⁸ See their respective entries in the Biographical Index & Blanc, *LCST*, Chapter 6.

of the National Convention – and even signed a notarial procuration bequeathing Rose a rifle so he could perform the mandatory guard service for his Parisian section.⁷⁹

Banker of the Comité de Salut Public and Thermidorian Convention

One of the principal reasons Perregaux successfully eluded the clutches of revolutionary justice was his position as ‘banker of the *Comité de Salut public*’ – or more accurately President of the National Convention’s Committee of Bankers and Exchange Agents (*Comité des banquiers et agents de change*). This body traced its origins to the *Comité des subsistances* which had been created on 22 October 1793 to manage all purchases of goods and supplies made by France in foreign markets (particularly wheat from America and Italy, and livestock from Switzerland and Denmark).⁸⁰ Unfortunately, most reserves of French cash abroad were held in enemy countries, such as Spain and Britain, and had been frozen or seized. On 26 December 1793 – three days after Perregaux was cleared by the National Convention – the *Comité de Salut public* issued a decree to review all state funds abroad which could still be mobilised and requisition all sums which French bankers could draw on foreign markets.

On 29 December, the National Convention’s *Comité des finances*, the *Comité de Salut public* and the *Comité de Sûreté générale* held a joint meeting with the *Comité des subsistances* to deliberate on the best means to secure these funds. Five commissioners were appointed – Cambon, Dupuis, Robert Lindet, Moïse Bayle and Dubarran – to oversee the operation. Their job was to demand that every banker or private citizen holding assets abroad (cash, annuities, shares, merchandise, etc.) submit a mandatory declaration within four days. These five commissioners would be assisted by another commission comprised of five bankers and five exchange agents who would oversee the auditing process and transfer funds to the Treasury. The bankers selected were Perregaux, Pache, Fulchiron, Bagnault and Enfantin, while the exchange agents were Roques, Hupaix, Page, Coulombier and Pillot. All bankers, capitalists and exchange agents were ordered not to draw bills on foreign markets without first receiving approval from the *Comité de l’emploi des fonds*. On 31 December, the decision was taken to establish a list of all bankers with funds abroad.⁸¹ Shortly afterwards on 17 January 1794, the *Comité de Sûreté générale*

⁷⁹ MC/ET/X/832, 16 vendémiaire VII/7 Oct. 1798.

⁸⁰ Five commissioners were assigned to oversee the *Comité des Subsistances*’s operations: Cambon, Charles-François Dupuis, Robert Lindet, Moïse Bayle and Joseph-Nicolas Barbeau Dubarran.

⁸¹ See Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.28-31 & Mathiez, ‘Encore le Banquier Perregaux’, p.238-239.

decided to interrogate all imprisoned bankers and capitalists to make them reveal whether they had assets abroad.⁸² Perregaux was one of those assigned to conduct the interrogations, notably those of bankers Guillaume Sabatier and Médard Desprez at the Pension Belhomme, Jean-Joseph de Laborde in the Malsé prison and Joseph Duruey.⁸³ Perregaux proved to be “*the soul of the commission*” of bankers and exchange agents.⁸⁴ In his capacity as president he designated the bankers to be investigated on its list and recommended the measures it should take. Most of his proposals were voted into law without any significant alteration. On 6 February 1794, the *Comité des subsistances* accepted an offer put forward by a group of bankers assembled by Perregaux to raise 50 million *livres* in bills drawn on foreign markets. Ten days later, Perregaux submitted the list of forty-two ‘subscribers’ – which he had drawn up himself – who were to advance these fifty million *livres* to the state.⁸⁵ He took care to attach a condition that none of the bankers participating in this operation could be arrested or have their papers seized without the consent of the *Comité de Sûreté générale*. This ensured they would not be pestered by the surveillance of the *comités révolutionnaires* of the Parisian sections. Perregaux even obtained a decree from the *Comité de Sûreté générale* stipulating that bills of exchange delivered by the bankers to the Treasury would be reimbursed in *assignats* as soon as their foreign guarantors paid them.⁸⁶ Those bankers who invested their personal funds in commerce, manufacturing or exports were granted preferential status.

To facilitate the negotiation of bills of exchange and the export of merchandise to pay them, certain bankers were sent on missions abroad. It was Perregaux who drew up the list of these agents which was approved on 16 February and signed by Collot d’Herbois, Jeanbon Saint-André, Robert Lindet, Carnot and Billaud-Varenne.⁸⁷ Perregaux argued that “*since Switzerland is the central point of this correspondence, it will require two subaltern*

⁸² AN, AF/II*/294, dossier 48, *Decree ordering commissioners Servoisier, Duranville, Perregaux and Hupais to interrogate prisoners about bills of exchange they hold in foreign markets*, 28 nivôse II/17 Jan. 1794.

⁸³ AN, AF/II*/294, dossier 59, *Decree of the Comité de Sûreté générale to escort the bankers Sabatier, Desprez, Lambert and Laborde to their homes to obtain records of their assets abroad*, 4 pluviôse II/23 Jan. 1794 and AF/II*/290, dossier 95, *Decree of the Comité de Sûreté générale to escort the banker Joseph Duruey to his home to obtain records of his assets abroad* – For more on Jean-Joseph de Laborde and his son François-Louis-Jean-Joseph de Laborde-Méreville (who fled to England and was denounced as an émigré in April 1793), see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.139-145.

⁸⁴ Mathiez, ‘Encore le Banquier Perregaux’, p.239.

⁸⁵ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.32 & Mathiez, ‘Encore le Banquier Perregaux’, p.239.

⁸⁶ AN, AF/II/75, plaquette 554:83, *Decree regarding drafts and remittances on foreign markets*, 30 pluviôse II/18 Feb. 1794 & Aulard, *ACSP*, Tome XI, p.246-248.

⁸⁷ These agents were: Busoni and Page for Genoa, Grivel for Italy, Poehls (a Bordeaux trader) and Barthélémy (a Nantes trader) for Holland, Perregaux and Amet (a trader from Le Havre) for Switzerland. This list is conserved in AN, F/12/798B.

agents and one or two couriers.” This explains why he reserved the mission in Switzerland for himself.⁸⁸ And since he would be absent from Paris for extended periods, his associate Gumpelzhaimer was appointed to the Committee of Bankers and Exchange Agents on 22 February to fill in for him.⁸⁹ Thus, “*Perregaux was the kingpin of the financial system through which the Comité de Salut public hoped to settle the immense purchases of food and raw materials which it had made abroad.*”⁹⁰ Perregaux’s mission to Switzerland lasted several months. On 7 March 1794, Barthélémy noted that Perregaux had just arrived in Basel, and he was still in the country on 5 July.⁹¹ Three weeks later, the 9 Thermidor ensured business magnates were finally able to breathe more easily.

Meanwhile the bankers and exchange agents had been unable to raise the 50 million they had promised in foreign markets.⁹² In eight months of activity, they had only collected 613,045 *livres*.⁹³ Acknowledging its failure, the *Comité des subsistances* dissolved its Commission of Bankers and Exchange Agents and on 19 December 1794 decided to offer wine, *eaux-de-vie* and luxury products to Perregaux, suggesting he sell them abroad (notably in Copenhagen) to reimburse state debts.⁹⁴

Perregaux continued to play a leading economic role under the Thermidorian Convention. On 5 October 1794, he was appointed one of ten commissioners to a newly-created council attached to the *Commission du Commerce* to develop national industry, increase domestic and foreign trade, oversee imports and exports and manage the development of manufactories.⁹⁵ The council was disbanded by a decree of the *Comité de Salut public*

⁸⁸ While in Switzerland, Perregaux was to liaise with the French ambassador Barthélémy in Basel. A report of the *Comité de Subsistances* indicated the Swiss suspected Perregaux of spying for France: “*The commission understands that the Swiss government is concerned about Perregaux’s stay in Switzerland – a Frenchman whose association is useful to the Republic – and that it may be disposed to arrest this agent.*” (AAE, Suisse. Correspondance diplomatique, 447, dossiers 20 & 26).

⁸⁹ Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.35.

⁹⁰ Mathiez, ‘Encore le banquier Perregaux’, p.240. See also Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.33-34.

⁹¹ Kaulek (ed.), *Papiers de Barthélémy*, Tome III, p.473 & 487 and Tome IV, p.15 & 179. See also Mathiez, ‘Le Banquier Perregaux’, p.252.

⁹² AN, AF/II/75, plaquette 555:62 – *Decree concerning the export of excess goods*, 23 ventôse II/13 March 1794 & Aulard, *ACSP*, Tome XI, p.670-672 – The Subsistence Committee spent 175 million *livres* on purchases abroad, including 126 million on wheat. The bankers’s offer to furnish 50 million was therefore insufficient, but the committee hoped to export another 50 million worth of luxury products. When this still proved inadequate, the merchant communities of Bordeaux, Marseille, Nantes, Sète and Montpellier were all required to contribute funds to the committee and colonial merchandise in the ports of La Rochelle, Saint Malo, Le Havre and Dunkerque was requisitioned for sale.

⁹³ Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.37.

⁹⁴ AN, F/12/798B & AF/II/77, dossier 566:49 – *Decree cancelling that of 22 ventôse regarding drafts on foreign markets for wine, eaux-de-vie, sugar, coffee and luxury products*, 23 nivôse III/12 Jan. 1795.

⁹⁵ AN, AF/II/24, dossier 194:3 – *Decree requiring several citizens to form an advisory council attached to the Commission du Commerce*, 14 vendémiaire III/5 Oct. 1794 & Aulard, *ACSP*, Tome XVII, p.230-231. Perregaux secured a decree exempting the *commission des approvisionnements* from requesting visas to export goods worth less than 3,000 *livres* (AF/II/77, dossier 567:30, 10 pluviôse III/29 Jan. 1795).

dated 22 February 1795 and replaced by a *bureau de commerce* comprising fifteen members.⁹⁶ A few months later on 2 July, the *Comité de Salut public* appointed Perregaux, Louis Monneron and the war commissioner Mabilite to oversee contracts signed since 28 April by the *Comité des subsistances* for grain, flour, rice and dry vegetables.⁹⁷

Following Robespierre's downfall, Perregaux returned to Paris and resumed his active social life. He was still in contact with all the leading dancers and actresses of the Parisian scene and also corresponded with literary authorities such as the Abbé Morellet, François Andrieux, Jean-François Collin d'Harleville, Louis-Benoît Picard, Jean-François Ducis, Gabriel-Marie Legouvé, the comte de Saint-Simon (Claude-Henri de Rouvray), Hugues-Bernard Maret (future Duc de Bassano) and Beaumarchais – who owed Perregaux his removal from the list of émigrés.⁹⁸ Another close relation was Jean-Joseph Mounier, the former monarchist deputy of the National Assembly who had established a school in Weimar where Perregaux sent his son Alphonse to receive an education and learn German.⁹⁹

Naturally, Perregaux's influence and connections led people to seek his help. On 7 January 1795 General Henri Clarke, an old friend from the Orléans circle who had been suspended from the army due to his suspected royalist sympathies, wrote to Perregaux asking for a position in his bank. Luckily for him, Clarke was soon reinstated thanks to Carnot's intercession.¹⁰⁰ On 14 June of that year, Perregaux dined with Josephine de Beauharnais and the Talliens.¹⁰¹ Regular guests at his dining table during the Directorial period included Talleyrand, Fréron, Radix de Sainte-Foix and Rœderer. An English traveller named Henry Swinburne who visited Paris during the winter of 1796-1797 was invited to dine at Perregaux's and noted in his diary for 27 January 1797:

Have met for dinner at Perregaux's the former bishop of Autun, Talleyrand, recently returned from America. We reacquainted ourselves with each other. Despite being a lame devil, he is an agreeable man. He moves heaven and earth to secure

⁹⁶ See Aulard, *ACSP*, Tome XXV, p.67 – The space to name the members of the *bureau* on the decree was left blank but there is little doubt Perregaux was among its members (Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.40).

⁹⁷ AN, AF/II/24, dossier 195:40 – *Decree ordering citizens Perregaux, Monneron and Mabilite to investigate the purchases of the Agence de subsistances générales*, 14 messidor III/2 July 1795.

⁹⁸ Lhomer, *PRDR*, p.44-45 – Beaumarchais's wife had written to Perregaux asking him to intercede with Cambacérès to obtain the right for her husband to return to France: “*We must unite all our efforts to achieve this rehabilitation. The longer it is delayed, the more his affairs will become a shambles and – after all – this is such a just request that I do not know what could hold back our legislators any longer. And our poor old friend would finish by dying of grief or despair.*” (*Ibid*, p.47, footnote)

⁹⁹ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.108-109 – Mounier had founded his school at the behest of Charles-Auguste, Duke of Saxe-Weimar. Thanks to Perregaux's influence, he was removed from the list of émigrés on 17 July 1801.

¹⁰⁰ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.37-38.

¹⁰¹ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.41-42.

employment with the Directory. Also present was my old friend Saint-Foix, now the friend and companion of Talleyrand, and Simon Dumesny, grandson of Helvétius.

A few days later on 19 February, Swinburne dined again at Perregaux's in just as illustrious company: "Dined at Perregaux's with Saint-Foix, Talleyrand, Røederer and Beaumarchais. The latter is quite deaf, but nonetheless spirited and gay."¹⁰²

Such distinguished relations also meant that Perregaux was one of the best-informed men in Paris. On 13 June, for instance, he received advance warning of an imminent royalist landing in western France from Beaumarchais who had witnessed French émigré troops in London preparing to embark for Jersey and Guernsey:

*Friend Perregaux, hasten to inform the Comité de Salut public of the following note. Nothing is more certain than the news I receive at this moment from London – London, 2 June 1795. The corps of French émigrés in the pay of England have been ordered to prepare to embark for Jersey and Guernsey, which leads those from whom I receive this news to believe that a descent will very soon take place in which the [British] government has interior complicities. All are generally packing their effects in great haste. Whatever the object of this embarkation may be, it will take place very shortly. I embrace you.*¹⁰³

A few days later the royalists landed at Quiberon. Incidentally, Perregaux held a financial interest in a contract signed in August 1795 for the sale of rifles to the French government by *Winter & Cie.*, the firm of Dutch businessman Jean-Jacques de Beaune which supplied republican armies in western France.¹⁰⁴ The venture proved disastrous for the French Republic and *Winter & Cie.* was later discovered to have been diverting large quantities of supplies to royalist rebels in the Vendée.¹⁰⁵ Perregaux may also have been implicated in corrupt payments made to Barras on goods transiting through Holland, for the memoirs of this director contain the following obscure note dated 31 July 1810 from the police commissioner of Marseille to police minister Rovigo:

The Lady Guidal [wife of the general implicated in the Malet conspiracy of 1812] told me that Mr. Barras received a million from the Dutch through the intermediary of Mr. Perregaux, a banker residing in the Rue du Mont-Blanc in Paris, to conduct

¹⁰² Quoted in Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.46-47.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p.38.

¹⁰⁴ MC/ET/X/818, 22 thermidor III/9 Aug. 1795. Shares from the so-called 'loan of the three sons of the King of England' were used as security for the contract. This loan had been a capital-raising venture suggested by Nathaniel Parker-Forth to the Duke of Orléans on behalf of the Prince of Wales. Forth proposed Orléans should pay an obligation of 300,000 pounds (7,200,000 French *livres*) for which the Prince of Wales and his brothers Clarence and York would issue shares that would begin paying an annual 5.5% interest drawn from the revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall as soon as their father King George III died. See Blanc, *LCST*, p.62.

¹⁰⁵ See AN, W//20; Albert Goodwin, 'War transport and counter-revolution in France in 1793: the case of the Winter company and the financier Jean-Jacques de Beaune' in Michael Richard Daniell Foot (ed.), *War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J.R. Western*, London: Paul Elek, 1973: 212-224 & Arnaud de Lestapis, 'Les Gentilshommes charretiers', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 Sep. 1953.

*some unspecified business without being troubled, and that she received 200,000 francs for her part in this affair.*¹⁰⁶

Perregaux's Role in Anglo-French Peace Negotiations under the Directory

Perregaux resumed regular communication with his British contacts following the advent of the Directory. He was one of the intermediaries employed by the British government to advance vague proposals of peace at the end of Year IV.¹⁰⁷ Perregaux's main contact was William Eden (Lord Auckland) – a longstanding business partner and friend since his residency as British commercial envoy in Paris from 1785 to 1788. When hostilities with England broke out in February 1793, Perregaux began sending Auckland news dispatches and copies of the *Moniteur* every week through the intermediary of his clerk, Majeur, and a Mr. Sartori (nephew of Louis Greffulhe), addressing this correspondence to 'Lord Courtown' to avoid suspicion.¹⁰⁸ More sensitive letters transited through their mutual friend Barthélémy Huber – a Lyon banker residing in London with excellent connections in British financial circles – and a Mr. Nettement.¹⁰⁹ In one of his letters dated 16 July 1796, Perregaux clearly expresses the will to conclude a peace settlement:

My Lord – when I had the pleasure to write you on June 28 last, I did not enter into any details on your observations about peace, the campaign in Germany being then amongst the chapter of events; but now that the successes of it render peace with the Emperor almost certain, is it possible that your country alone would stand its ground? I foresee what your Lordship would say in favour of the affirmative; but, decided as both parties seem to be to fight it out, what misery and mischief will not be the consequence of it to individuals, besides a reciprocal destruction! For the sake of humanity, for that of tranquillity, which is so much wanted after a struggle of so many years, would it not be in the interest of all parties to give way, to come to a solid arrangement, and put an end to the infallible disasters of a continuation of war?

You seem to think that the successes of this side may make them unreasonable; I firmly believe the contrary: all they wished was to be on a level with you to treat, so as not to receive the law.

In general, the nations at war with this country have a wrong idea of it. Seven years' revolution has not exhausted its resources; the soil never was so well cultivated as it is now, the peasantry so rich; money circulates fast since the reduction of paper, and

¹⁰⁶ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome IV, p.196.

¹⁰⁷ Debidour, *RADE*, Tome III, p.722, footnote 4. For these negotiations see Guyot, *LDPE*, p.145-157 & 261-289.

¹⁰⁸ *The Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord Auckland*, Tome III, London: Richard Bentley, 1862, Perregaux to 'Lord Courtown', 28 June 1796, p.350; Guyot, *LDPE*, p.272-273; Blanc, *LERE*, p.146; Mathiez, 'Encore le Banquier Perregaux', p.240-241.

¹⁰⁹ Blanc, *LERE*, p.327, footnote 7. See Barthélémy Huber's entry in the Biographical Index for more details.

the energy of the people increases with their success. The efforts of all classes to enforce the constitution improve the steadiness of the government.

*If your cabinet is earnestly intentioned for peace, and will go frankly about it, I am sure they would be met on this side – as much, I believe, has already been intimated to them; but no time should be lost; for once the peace concluded with the Emperor, the task would be very difficult.*¹¹⁰

Lord Auckland wrote to Pitt informing him of Perregaux's overtures:

[Perregaux's letter of 16 July] may merit a moment's very serious reflection. My private opinion has ever been, that it is right in war to treat at all times...At present I am strongly of that persuasion. I conceive that every extremity ought to be suffered rather than submit to a bad and dishonourable peace...Yet it may happen that the governing party in France may have an interest in making peace on terms far better for us than our present prospects lead people to expect.

*For these reasons I would ask M. Perregaux and others what it is that they mean. Sainte-Foy is a notorious stockjobber, but he contributed materially to the last peace [in 1783]. I do not know that Perregaux is a stockjobber, though he may be an instrument in the hands of others. I know, however, that he is fairly and solidly interested to see peace restored, and he certainly is connected with many of the leading people.*¹¹¹

When Lord Malmesbury was dispatched to Paris in late October 1796 to undertake peace negotiations, upon arriving at Saint Denis he found a note from Perregaux inviting him to dine at the banker's Parisian residence that evening.¹¹² Perregaux was one of the first people Malmesbury met in the French capital and he remained in the British envoy's entourage throughout the duration of his stay (until December 1796). When talks appeared to break down, Perregaux suggested Malmesbury turn to Guillaume Bonnacarrère – Dumouriez's former secretary turned rogue secret agent – as an intermediary.¹¹³ Malmesbury even notes in his diary for 1 December that Perregaux informed him Paris consumed 22,000 sacks of flour daily – a revelation which could have cost the banker his head.¹¹⁴ Records further show that Perregaux was in contact at this time with French foreign minister Charles Delacroix and advanced one hundred *louis* to a secret agent named Durand for which he was reimbursed by the secret funds of the foreign ministry.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ *The Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord Auckland*, Tome III, p.350-351, Perregaux to 'Lord Courtown', 16 July 1796.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.352-353, Lord Auckland to Pitt, 30 July 1796.

¹¹² *The Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, Lord Malmesbury*, Vol. 3, London: Richard Bentley, 1844, p.269, 22 October 1796.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, Vol. 3, p.307.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, Vol. 3, p.336.

¹¹⁵ AN, AF/III/458, plaquette 2739:14 – *Refund of 100 louis to Jean-Frédéric Perregaux for an advance made to the agent Durand*, date uncertain (frimaire IV or 16 nivôse IV/6 Jan. 1796).

Albert Mathiez therefore does not exaggerate when he argues Perregaux headed a group of anglophile financiers “*always intriguing between London and Paris.*”¹¹⁶ A police report of the *Bureau central* dated 9 March 1797 marked Perregaux as a dangerous banker and enemy of the government.¹¹⁷ Another undated police note, probably from September or October 1797, reads as follows:

The minister is invited to place under surveillance at this critical moment the citizen Perregaux, banker, residing at 6 Rue Mirabeau. Perregaux is Swiss. His brother was a captain in a Swiss regiment.

*Perregaux was an aide-de-camp to Lafayette and one of his right-hand men.*¹¹⁸

Perregaux was the banker of Lord Malmesbury. In 1790, he was the intimate friend and banker of Milord Fitzgerald, British ambassador in France, and currently British ambassador to Switzerland. He was the banker and friend of Wickham and of Crauford who resided in the Rue de Clichy and is presently in Switzerland.

Perregaux is the friend of Major Gall [Call], a British spy residing in Paris in the Boulevard des Bonnes Nouvelles. He is the henchmen of all the English.

In 1792, he was channelling enormous sums to Switzerland. Since that time he is an associate in finances and has done and continues to do multiple voyages to Switzerland and Geneva. He is intimately linked to Necker and all his family. His associate is a man named Gumpelzhaimer, a native of Frankfurt who was formerly the clerk of Bethmann, imperial banker at Frankfurt and a shameless royalist.

*Moreover, Perregaux is the intimate friend of the two Barthélémy.*¹¹⁹ *It is probable that he is at this moment transferring funds to Switzerland or withdrawing money to place it elsewhere.*

Should war or a strong deterioration in relations occur with the Swiss, the minister must place under surveillance all the Swiss and Genevan trading houses in France.

*It is the trading houses of these two nations which fuelled the revolts in Lyon, Marseille and other places. The truth of this matter is so obvious that the government cannot ignore it and would greatly serve its interests by seizing all the threads of these conspiracies of which the traders form the rings of an immense chain stretching all across France.*¹²⁰

As the above report suggests, Perregaux was probably helping to channel émigré funds out of France – both to Britain and to Hamburg and Altona via Switzerland. His name appears

¹¹⁶ Mathiez, ‘Encore le Banquier Perregaux’, p.241.

¹¹⁷ AN, BB/3/85 – *Police report on Jean-Frédéric Perregaux from the central bureau of the canton de Paris, 19 ventôse V/9 March 1797.*

¹¹⁸ There is no proof indicating Perregaux was ever La Fayette’s henchman.

¹¹⁹ The diplomat François Barthélémy and his great-uncle, the *académicien* Jean-Jacques Barthélémy.

¹²⁰ AN, F/7/6140, plaquette 1, dossier n°31 – *Undated police report (presumed Sep./Oct. 1797) inviting the police minister to put Perregaux under surveillance.*

at the top of a four-page list in another police dossier identifying citizens “*deserving of a special surveillance*” with the following annotation: “*Banker of Swiss origin, believed to be in English and German service.*”¹²¹

In addition, we find Perregaux involved in the Anglo-French diplomatic negotiations at Lille in 1797. His name appears in a report delivered to foreign minister Delacroix on the eve of these talks identifying several British agents operating in France including Nathaniel Parker-Forth (first name on the list), Henry O’Shee (Henri Shée de Lignières) and his nephew General Henri Clarke, Walter Boyd, the Dutch merchant Jean-Jacques de Beaune and several others.¹²²

All these elements suggest there is “*a conspiratorial side to Perregaux which is more sensed than established by irrefutable documentary evidence.*”¹²³ According to historian Olivier Blanc:

*We can consider that up to 18 Brumaire, Perregaux – protected by Barère and Cambon during the Terror – was one of the principal intelligence officers of the British government. Under the Directory he tried to play the role of mediator and declared himself in favour of peace – as Auckland and Malmesbury encouraged him to – including if the articles of this peace were disadvantageous to France.*¹²⁴

Blanc further suggests that Perregaux may have been complicit in helping Britain scuttle French efforts to support Irish rebels and effect a landing in Ireland:

*The incapacity of the government to efficiently support the Irish rebels while the Cabinet of Saint James never failed to exploit its success in the Vendée therefore finds its origins in the policy of ‘moderation’ towards Great Britain put in place by Lebrun and Brissot and pursued, not in speeches but in facts, by several political officials – former orléanistes and ‘friends of England’ – all close to anglophile bankers such as Savalette [de Lange] or Perregaux, Récamier, Delessert, etc. It was without doubt thanks to them that all the energetic measures taken against Britain were unsuccessful.*¹²⁵

According to La Revellière, Hoche’s 1796 Irish expedition: “*...had been very well-planned, and had intrigue and storms not impeded it, would have met with full success had we but even disembarked a single division on the island.*”¹²⁶ The Treasury, he claims, was dominated by the Clichy faction and deliberately prevented funds from reaching Hoche:

¹²¹ AN, F/7/3339 – Undated 4-page list of people “*deserving of special surveillance*”.

¹²² AN, AF/IV/1671:84 – Report of secret agent Moyon on Britain pursuant to the arrival of Lord Malmesbury at Paris, undated (1796).

¹²³ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.47.

¹²⁴ Blanc, *LERE*, p.146-147.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, p.36-37.

¹²⁶ La Revellière, *Mémoires*, Tome II p.29.

*The commissioners of the National Treasury had given us their word of honour they would transfer these funds to the general at Brest on an appointed day. They did nothing of the sort, despite our pressing solicitations, and perfidiously allowed time to pass. The British government was informed of our intentions and had the time to send forces against us which blocked our way. The members of the Treasury, belonging to the Clichy faction, did not wish to see an expedition attempted against England...*¹²⁷

Banker of Talleyrand's Secret Service

It is unclear when Perregaux first met Bonaparte. Most historians do not mention their first interview, but they were probably introduced shortly after the Corsican general's return from Italy (December 1797), presumably at Talleyrand's residence in the Rue Taitbout. They may have met even earlier than this, perhaps following the royalist insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire. What is certain is that Perregaux decided to forge an alliance with Bonaparte once the ambitious officer had emerged as a major political figure after a year's campaigning in Italy. When Napoleon dispatched General Marmont to Paris to present the government with twenty-two enemy standards captured in Italy, Perregaux hosted one of the Directory's most celebrated receptions on 1 October 1796 in the young *aide-de-camp's* honour with three hundred distinguished ladies in attendance.¹²⁸ It was at this *soirée* that Hortense Perregaux fell in love with Marmont, and they were eventually married on 12 April 1798.¹²⁹

A decisive turning point occurred in Perregaux's career in July 1797 when his friend Talleyrand was appointed foreign minister. Perregaux had lobbied relentlessly in partnership with Radix de Sainte-Foix to secure the former bishop of Autun's promotion, and he now became the banker of Talleyrand's secret service, advancing money to obtain information or exercise influence abroad. Following instructions set out by Talleyrand's

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, p.185.

¹²⁸ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.42 & Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.52-54 – Marmont entered Paris in war minister Pétiet's carriage escorted by twenty-two officers of the capital's garrison each carrying a standard. He delivered a speech before the directors enumerating the *Armée d'Italie's* achievements, and the Directory's acting president – La Revellière – accepted the trophies and responded with his own congratulatory oration. He gave Marmont a pair of pistols as a gift.

¹²⁹ See footnote 9 for their marriage contract. Bonaparte had offered Marmont the hand of his sister Pauline – then only sixteen – but Marmont refused. After returning from the Italian Campaign he met Hortense again. She was by then one of the most distinguished ladies in Parisian society and had been presented to the Ottoman ambassador. Perregaux looked upon Hortense's affections for Marmont as a passing craze and did not favour the match. But after she reproached him for his insensitivity and Gumpelzhaimer pleaded in Marmont's favour, he relented (*Ibid*, p.55-59). Bonaparte gifted his *aide-de-camp* 500,000 francs to serve as his dowry, while Hortense brought a dowry of a million francs (Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.64-67). The marriage was an unhappy one.

deputies Mareuil and d'Hauterive, he handed over bills of exchange to designated secret agents undertaking missions abroad who would then endorse them with *Perregaux et Cie.*'s foreign correspondents such as *Minet & Fector* in London, *Couderc Bryants et Changuyon* in Amsterdam and *Schramm et Kersten* in Hamburg.¹³⁰ *Minet & Fector*'s agency in Dover was especially popular with British agents and émigrés exfiltrating wealth out of France, while Jean-Godefroy Schramm and his associate Kersten were the bankers of Madame de Bonneuil (Michelle Sentuary) – former muse of Nicolas Beaujon, royalist secret agent and client of Perregaux – during her secret missions to Hamburg.¹³¹ All these financial dispositions were overseen by Antoine de Laforêt, head of the foreign ministry's *Division des fonds et de la comptabilité* which paid secret operatives, and his successor Jean-Baptiste Bresson. Laforêt and Bresson were in constant liaison with Perregaux.¹³² We may also note in passing that Perregaux's bank managed the distribution of payments sent to British prisoners in France by their families, and payments sent to French prisoners in Britain by their kin.¹³³ On 24 May 1800, the naval ministry reimbursed 360,000 francs to Perregaux for advances made to the French commissioner in London to cover costs relating to French prisoners held in Britain.¹³⁴

Talleyrand frequently made use of advance information and state secrets relayed by his surveillance networks to indulge in opportune speculative ventures for his personal gain. Of course, Perregaux was often associated with these schemes. Shortly after he took office in August 1797, for instance, Talleyrand instructed his mistress (and future wife) – Madame Catherine Grand – to operate a bull speculation on shares of the London stock exchange via Perregaux – knowing that the recently opened Anglo-French talks at Lille would send encouraging political signs and drive the market upwards. Once he knew the negotiations were doomed to failure in late September, Talleyrand reversed the operation, directing Madame Grand to effect a bear speculation on the London market!¹³⁵ The links

¹³⁰ Blanc, *LERE*, p.147 & 327, footnote 9 – See d'Hauterive and Mareuil's entries in the Biographical Index. *Minet & Fector* was headed by John Minet Fector (died 1821) who married his son to Anne Wortley Montagu Laurie, daughter of Sir Robert Laurie (5th Baronet). The firm was sold to the National Provincial Bank in 1842 which itself became part of NatWest in 1970. Couderc was the banker of Madame Talon in Holland (see AN, MC/ET/XVIII/967, 4 pluviôse VII/23 Jan. 1799), where her husband (Omer Talon) negotiated the cession of Suriname to the British after 18 Brumaire. For relations between Jean-Godefroy Schramm and Perregaux, see AN, MC/ET/X/825, 29 floréal V/18 May 1797. Bonaparte later solicited Schramm to publish pro-French articles in the Hamburg press (Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.179).

¹³¹ Her daughter, Éléonore-Françoise-Augustine Guesnon de Bonneuil (1776-1857) – known as Laure de Bonneuil – married Regnaud de Saint-Jean-d'Angély in 1795.

¹³² Blanc, *LERE*, p.145-146 – See Laforêt and Bresson's entries in the Biographical Index.

¹³³ See Appendix VI and AN, AF/IV/1498 – *Request by Perregaux & Cie. to continue administering payments for British prisoners in France and French prisoners in Britain*, Dec. 1806.

¹³⁴ AN, AF/IV/13, plaquette 67.

¹³⁵ Michel Poniatowski, *Talleyrand et le Directoire, 1796-1800*, Paris: Perrin, 1982, p.235 & 332 – In financial jargon, a 'bull' is a trader who buys shares in the expectation they will rise quickly so that he can

between Perregaux and Madame Grand also appear in her 1802 marriage contract with Talleyrand which shows she owned 300,000 francs of jewels and silverware, 140,000 francs of shares (*créances*) managed by various Hamburg banks and *Perregaux et Cie.*, another 140,000 francs worth of state annuities and 75,000 francs in cash.¹³⁶ We note, however, that Talleyrand strangely does not appear as a client in either the inventory after decease of Madame Perregaux nor in that of Perregaux himself.¹³⁷

Another trading house doing regular business with Perregaux under the Directory was the London firm *Thornton & Power*, founded by the bankers Henry Thornton and John Power. Perregaux discreetly channelled funds through its Hamburg agency to pay British or émigré agents.¹³⁸ When French troops occupied Hamburg in 1804 and seized the papers of the British ambassador George Rumbold, these revealed that *Thornton & Power* served as the paymaster for many British spy networks operating along the Channel coasts of France and the Low Countries, at Hamburg and in the courts of northern German states. The firm worked in collaboration with a committee of British agents operating out of Schwerin in Mecklenburg managed by the Baron Ompteda, the Count of Kielmanseg (former minister of the King of England at Hanover) and M. d'Arnswaldt. A fourth agent, Mr. Flebe, served as the British king's paymaster at Schwerin. In 1801, *Thornton & Power* had received over a million francs to pay these spies.¹³⁹

Georges Rumbold's papers further indicated that Madame Grand had undertaken several mysterious trips to Hamburg in 1799 and 1800 where she was received by the British *chargé d'affaires* James Craufurd.¹⁴⁰ The purpose of these visits remains unclear. However, they were probably linked to the sale of information or influence – for Madame

resell them for profit. By contrast, a 'bear' trader speculates on decreasing stock values – effectively short selling them.

¹³⁶ MC/ET/XI/817, 22 fructidor X/9 Sep. 1802, *Marriage contract between Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord and Catherine Noël Worlée, divorced wife of Georges François Grand* – Madame Grand also owned the château de Pont-de-Sains and a thousand acres of forest, both in bare ownership (*nue-propriété*), in the *département du Nord*, along with two houses in the Rue d'Anjou.

¹³⁷ See Appendices IV & V. I could not identify Talleyrand's name in either of these documents, although he could well have used a strawman as an intermediary or employed a fake identity.

¹³⁸ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.49 – For more on *Thornton & Power* see AN, F/7/6374 (n°7634), F/7/6423 (n°8521), F/7/6451, F/7/6479 (n°406) & F/7/6503 (n°835).

¹³⁹ Hauterive, *PSPE*, Tome I, n°618, p.194-195 – According to another police report, *Thornton & Power* received funds from London, notably from the British court banker Thomas Hammersley, to pay Georges Cadoudal and Pichegru. Cadoudal had received 170,000 *livres* in bills of exchange drawn on *Thornton & Power*, which had not entirely been cashed in when the French police questioned John Power (who applied to become a French citizen in July 1805). Mr. Power promised to inform the police as soon as the remaining bills were presented, but naturally did nothing of the sort (*Ibid*, Tome I, n°1507, p.484-485 & Blanc, *LERE*, p.167-168).

¹⁴⁰ AN, F/7/6453 – James Craufurd received Madame Grand four times, on 1 & 8 August 1799 and on 6 & 13 August 1800.

Grand was later disgraced under the *Premier Empire* for similar motives. As one anonymous contemporary recalled:

*This lady had formed a very close liaison with Radix de Sainte-Foy and other agents of corruption, and having received large sums of money to influence the opinion of the cabinet on the affairs of Genoa and other Italian states, was disgraced by Napoleon and no longer received at court. She made vain solicitations to be permitted to attend the festivities during the marriage celebrations of the Archduchess Marie Louise.*¹⁴¹

To counter British economic ascendancy in northern Germany, Talleyrand asked Perregaux to petition the trading houses of *Schröder et Cie.* and *Schramm, Kersten et Cie.* to serve as French intermediaries, but this met with very limited success.¹⁴²

When necessary, Talleyrand solicited Perregaux's services for particularly delicate diplomatic or espionage missions. In July 1800, for instance, Madame de Bonneuil left Hamburg for St. Petersburg where she received secret instructions (possibly from Madame Grand) to recruit an agent at the Russian court to counteract the influence of the British lobby led by Nikita Panin, the Tsar's foreign minister. Acting through her friend Fyodor Rostopchin, she attempted to influence the Tsar towards supporting France and appears to have been on the point of succeeding when Paul I was murdered.¹⁴³ Madame de Bonneuil's correspondence with the French government was sent via *Perregaux et Cie.*¹⁴⁴ The Neuchâtel magnate also helped plan the mission of Galon-Boyer, a secret agent formerly recruited by Lebrun who was dispatched to Vienna to spy on Louis XVIII.¹⁴⁵ Prior to his departure, Galon-Boyer signed a notarial procuration act with Perregaux.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, a dossier in the French National Archives detailing expenses for the missions of Talleyrand's foreign ministry during the Consulate (those for which it was safe to disclose information) shows that Perregaux was awarded money "*for refunds concerning correspondence*

¹⁴¹ *Documens particuliers en forme de lettres sur Napoléon Bonaparte*, Paris: Chez Plancher, 1819, p.21-22. When Napoleon decided to organize a small court for Josephine at the Tuileries following his ratification as Consul for life, he deliberately avoided inviting Catherine Grand. Bonaparte recalled: "*I forbade her my Court because I discovered that Genoese merchants had paid her 400,000 francs to obtain commercial advantages from her husband.*" (Emmanuel de Waresquiel, *Talleyrand, Dernières nouvelles du Diable*, Paris: CNRS, 2011, p.53-54).

¹⁴² Blanc, *LERE*, p.169 – Talleyrand also asked two Swiss bankers established in Hamburg – Pierre Bellamy and Jacques de Chapeaurouge – for help. See their respective entries in the Biographical Index.

¹⁴³ See James J. Kenney Jr. 'Lord Whitworth and the conspiracy against Tsar Paul I: The new evidence of the Kent Archive', *Slavic Review*, 36 (2), 1977: 205-219. This important article uncovered new documents in the Kent archive suggesting that Lord Whitworth, British ambassador in St. Petersburg, was the instigator of the plot to murder Tsar Paul I. This evidence revealed that important sums were paid to the conspirators by Whitworth who was on the point of being expelled from Russia.

¹⁴⁴ Blanc, *LERE*, p.179-186.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.190.

¹⁴⁶ MC/ET/X/850, 17 frimaire XI/8 Dec. 1802.

costs.”¹⁴⁷ The Swiss financier even advanced funds to the Bonaparte family. On 14 May 1805, Jérôme Bonaparte withdrew the sum of 2,400 francs on an account opened with *Perregaux et Cie*. Perregaux petitioned Joseph Bonaparte on 9 August that year demanding reimbursement, and Joseph instructed Nicolas Clary, the Bonaparte family banker, to refund him.¹⁴⁸

The 600,000 francs Perregaux paid for the 1795 forced loan, along with his position as shareholder and administrator of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*, already marked him out as one of the premier Parisian banking magnates at the outset of the Directory.¹⁴⁹ His experience as president of the Commission of Bankers and Exchange Agents and his new role as the foreign ministry’s banker now allowed him to expand his activities even further – delving into public markets, military supplies and speculation on precious metals and colonial goods. In Thermidor Year V, the government reimbursed considerable advances made by Perregaux to the French navy in the Levant.¹⁵⁰ In Year VI, he joined the financiers Dallarde and Henry Meyssonier (a Swiss trader based in Baltimore but residing in Paris) in a venture to purchase bills of exchange drawn on the French Treasury by Letombe, the French Consul in Philadelphia. Perregaux held 451,723 *livres* worth of these bills, while Dallarde had 495,963 *livres* and Meyssonier 826,446 *livres*. The French Treasury negotiated a treaty with them to reimburse one-sixth of the value of these bills each month in Batavian rescriptions starting on 21 December 1798. The agreement was approved by the Directory on 31 July 1798.¹⁵¹

Perregaux was also associated with Bonaparte’s Egyptian Campaign. In Vendémiaire Year VII, he offered to help finance the French administration in the recently conquered island of Malta by serving as a financial intermediary between the Treasury and two Algerian traders named Jacob-Cohen Bacri and Simon Abucaya. These merchants had been contracted on 10 October 1798 to deliver 40,000 piasters to Malta and 60,000 piasters to Tunis at their own risk for an agreed price. The Treasury advanced 300,000 francs in bills of exchange drawn on *receveurs de départements* to Perregaux as a down payment to

¹⁴⁷ AN, AF/IV/1706/F:37-43 – *Report of the minister on the expenses of his department, Years V-XII/1796-1804 & Blanc, LERE*, p.147 – The largest sums were attributed to Joseph Bonaparte (302,500 francs), Lucien Bonaparte (700,830 francs) and General Bessières (228,000 francs). Certain diplomatic representatives or citizens abroad were paid for special services, such as ‘Citizen Bacher’ in Basel who played an instrumental role in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Basel in 1795. Funds were also expended to present gifts to foreign sovereigns, especially in Spain where the queen was offered dresses designed by the *couturière* Mlle Minette. Most agents employed by Talleyrand under the Directory remain unknown.

¹⁴⁸ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.48.

¹⁴⁹ MC/ET/X/882, 25 Feb. 1808 – *Inventory after decease of Jean-Frédéric Perregaux*.

¹⁵⁰ AN, AF/III/460, plaquette 2762:26.

¹⁵¹ AN, AF/III/535, plaquette 3533:72.

secure the deal.¹⁵² The transaction ultimately fell through when relations between France and Algiers deteriorated a few months later.¹⁵³ At Bonaparte's request, Perregaux paid salaries to several scholars who joined the Egyptian expedition in a private capacity.¹⁵⁴ In Germinal Year VII, Perregaux was appointed an elector of the *assemblée primaire* by the *division Caumartin*,¹⁵⁵ and in fructidor that year, he received the congratulations of the *administration de la Seine* for paying his share of Jourdan's forced loan voted on 6 August 1799.¹⁵⁶ A few days before the Brumaire coup, Perregaux acquired the château of Viry-Châtillon (Seine-et-Oise) for 220,000 francs which became his main residence.¹⁵⁷

Certain police records bring to light Perregaux's conspiratorial side. A report dated 27 November 1800 states that he took part in a meeting with Talleyrand, Barbé-Marbois, Rœderer, Choiseul-Praslin and others to discuss how to counter the ambitions of republicans during the First Consul's absences from France.¹⁵⁸ Another report dated 17 June 1802 indicates that Talleyrand, Perregaux and Rœderer were piloting a constitutional project that would restore hereditary monarchy to France by making Bonaparte king with his brother Joseph as successor.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, Perregaux's complicity with the British did not escape notice, as this 'Note for general inspectors' dated 22 July 1799 demonstrates:

*The minister is informed that citizen Perregaux, a banker living in the Chaussée d'Antin, regularly corresponds with England and serves as an intermediary for persons wishing to transfer money there....The general inspectors will mission an intelligent agent to verify these facts. They will also account for the conduct and liaisons of the aforementioned Perregaux.*¹⁶⁰

But Perregaux had secured alliances with the police hierarchy shielding him from investigation. One of his nieces from Neuchâtel – Mlle Lhardy – had married Pierre Marie

¹⁵² AF/III/548, plaquette 3671:37 – *Contract between the Treasury and Perregaux to purchase piasters from the Algerian traders Jacob-Cohen Bacri and Simon Abucaya*, 19 vendémiaire VII/10 Oct. 1799. Doyen, Durieux & Cie. was Perregaux's partner in this venture (AF/III/582, plaquette 398:38-40 – *Transfer to the Treasury of the funds deposited with Perregaux and Doyen & Durieux for the drafts with Abucaya and Bacri for the supply of Malta*, 13 ventôse VII/3 March 1799).

¹⁵³ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.44-45.

¹⁵⁴ AF/III/578, plaquette 3948:77-79, *Report of the war minister proposing to reimburse Perregaux & Cie.*, 22 pluviôse VII/10 Feb. 1799 – Among these were Louis Bodard (an engineer of the *Ponts et Chaussées*), Nicolas-Jacques Conté (director of the *école des aérostiers* and member of the *Conservatoire des arts et métiers*), the geographer Pierre Jacotin, the architects Charles Norry and Jean-Constantin Protain, the painter Jacques-Gérard Milbert and the botanist Hippolyte Nectoux.

¹⁵⁵ *Le Publiciste*, 6 germinal VII/26 March 1799.

¹⁵⁶ *Moniteur*, 12 fructidor VII/29 Aug. 1799.

¹⁵⁷ The château was purchased at auction on 31 Oct. 1799 at the *Tribunal de la Seine* under the name of Perregaux's nephew, Charles-Frédéric de Meuron (then still a minor), son of Charles de Meuron, a bourgeois from Neuchâtel who had married Perregaux's sister, Suzanne. It had formerly belonged to the Bérard family and Monsieur de Sartines (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.317 & Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.111).

¹⁵⁸ AN, F/7/3829, *Report of the préfecture de police*, 6 frimaire IX/27 Nov. 1800.

¹⁵⁹ AN, F/7/3830, *Report of the préfecture de police*, 28 prairial VIII/17 June 1800.

¹⁶⁰ AN, F/7/6214, plaquette 4:663.

Desmarest, Fouché's right-hand man who headed the 5th division at the *Préfecture de Police de Paris* in charge of the secret police (the *Sûreté*).¹⁶¹

Relations with British Agents under the Consulate and Premier Empire

With Talleyrand installed at the foreign ministry, Perregaux resumed his social escapades with suspected foreign and émigré agents in relative impunity, maintaining continuous contact with several of them throughout the Directorial, Consular and Imperial periods up to the moment of his own death in 1808. On 24 November 1801, for example, he dined with the British ambassador, Lord Cornwallis, at his Parisian residence.¹⁶² Another regular guest was James Maitland, 8th Earl of Lauderdale.¹⁶³ On 5 July 1803 Georgiana Cavendish, the Duchess of Devonshire, wrote to Perregaux telling him of her wish for an end to hostilities between England and France.¹⁶⁴ Others among his circle of friends and correspondents during the Consulate and *Premier Empire* were Lieutenant-General Kenneth Francis Mackenzie, Francis North 4th Earl of Guildford (son of Lord North), Lord Yarmouth (Francis Charles Seymour-Conway, 3rd Marquess of Hertford), scientists such as Pierre-Simon Laplace, the Italian antiquary Bernardino Drovetti, generals like Gouvion Saint-Cyr, the painters François Gérard and Jean-Baptiste Isabey, politicians like Fouché, Jean-Baptiste de Nompère de Champagny, François Barbé-Marbois, Hugues-Bernard Maret and the senators Charles Lambrechts and François de Neufchâteau.¹⁶⁵

Inevitably, such associations implicated Perregaux in dubious affairs. A few months after Brumaire in Floréal Year VIII, the Austrian general Mack who was being held prisoner in Paris escaped; but he left his servant a note instructing him to ask Perregaux if he needed money!¹⁶⁶ In Vendémiaire Year IX, the police arrested a man named Melville claiming to be an Anglo-American who had concluded a deal to speculate on 100,000 units of Isigny butter with Perregaux and Louis Homberg's trading house in Le Havre (*Homberg frère & Cie.*). Curiously, an arrest warrant had already been issued against this Melville in Fructidor Year V, but he had escaped to Holland.¹⁶⁷ Talleyrand interceded on Perregaux's

¹⁶¹ Blanc, *LERE*, p.211 & 337-338, footnote 16 – See Desmarest's entry in the Biographical Index.

¹⁶² AN, F/7/3830 - *Report of the préfecture de police*, 3 frimaire X/24 Nov. 1801.

¹⁶³ Hauterive, *PSPE*, Tome II, n°1433, p.459.

¹⁶⁴ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.107.

¹⁶⁵ See Appendix VI & Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.109.

¹⁶⁶ AN, F/7/3701, *Tableau de la situation de Paris*, 3 floréal VIII/23 April 1800.

¹⁶⁷ AN, F/7/6140, plaque 5.



Figure 4:8
Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord
Perregaux was his personal banker
Portrait by François Gérard, 1808
© The Metropolitan Museum, New York
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



Figure 4:9
Pierre-Marie Desmarest
'The Emperor's Policeman'
(*le policier de l'Empereur*)
married one of Perregaux's nieces
Portrait by Édouard Cibot, early 19th century
Collection privée Desmarest-Cibot-Lamorlette
Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org>
(uploaded by Arnauld and Jordan Lamorlette)
CC BY-SA 4.0 Licence

behalf claiming Melville had been sent to help negotiate peace with the British envoy Lord Malmesbury who was then in Paris.¹⁶⁸

Another shady case involved two British spies named Dubuc and Rossolin who were arrested in Paris on 13 May 1805. The documents found at their residences clearly established their mission was to:

*...give information on our forces and our projects; to procure complicities in the army's offices at Boulogne, ascertain which friends have remained faithful to the Bourbons, lobby generals and officers and submit proposals to them.*¹⁶⁹

It was Xavier Debret, Baron d'Imbert – commander of the fleet at Toulon and British agent to boot – who had sent these men on their mission. Dubuc was in possession of a monthly annuity of 100 *livres* and Rossolin had one for fifty *livres*, both contracted with *Perregaux et Cie*. Their correspondence transited via *Thornton & Power's* agency at Hamburg. Perregaux declared that Dubuc owed his trading house 5,000 francs.¹⁷⁰ A few days later on 25 May, a letter from d'Imbert to Dubuc revealed it was Perregaux who was relaying all Dubuc's funds for his mission in Paris.¹⁷¹

Conclusion

The vicissitudes of Perregaux's extraordinary life reflect one of the most remarkable careers experienced by any financier during the turbulent period of the French Revolution. He was an exceptional merchant banker operating on a global scale whose enigmatic and resolutely elusive figure remained at the forefront of economic affairs for over twenty years. Even more significantly, Perregaux presents the classic study of a *notable* of the *Ancien Régime* who survived the Revolution by feigning acquiescence and indulging in passive collaboration – ultimately turning the tide of events to his own advantage by joining Napoleon and metamorphosing into one of the foremost financial dignitaries of the *Premier Empire*.

An examination of the available historical record reveals Perregaux's complex and versatile character. His status as a foreigner made him vulnerable and he therefore followed a policy of serving all revolutionary regimes while in reality supporting none of them. Above all he understood the value of patience in moments of peril and uncertainty.

¹⁶⁸ AN, AF/III/461, plaquette 2781:100-101, *Statement by Talleyrand on Melville*, fructidor V.

¹⁶⁹ Hauterive, *PSPE*, Tome I, n°1282, p.407-408.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, n°1290, p.410-411.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, n°1390, p.443-444.

Rather than flee abroad to join the émigrés or reside in a neutral country – and thereby designate himself as a target – he kept his composure and resolved to place his services and talents at the disposal of men like Danton, Barère and Cambon who could protect him. Perregaux foresaw perhaps before anyone else that the revolutionaries would eventually be forced to rely on experienced men of finance whose credit would be essential to raise capital in domestic and foreign markets. When accused of complicity with royalists or enemy powers, he stood firm in the face of adversity and defended himself unwaveringly. He knew time was on his side and that increasingly dire economic conditions would inevitably turn the population against radical revolutionary policies.

It seems fairly certain that Perregaux always was a constitutional monarchist at heart – viewing the English system as the model that held the key to ending the Revolution’s political turmoil. And here we must be specific regarding what Perregaux understood to be the ‘English model’ of government – namely one in which the king governed in name but where the merchant aristocracy ruled – just like in his native Neuchâtel where the King of Prussia had been invited to become the nominal sovereign but power was effectively wielded by a council of two hundred elite bourgeois families. Perregaux did not love the king unreservedly – if that had been the case he would have left after the Storming of the Tuileries or the execution of Louis XVI. Instead he chose to stay. Why? One conceivable explanation is that he wanted to help the British undermine the Revolution from within as the letter found in Danton’s papers suggests. A second is that he spotted an opportunity to make rapid lucrative profits in the troubled waters of 1793-1794 by manoeuvring to secure his appointment as President of the Committee of Bankers and Exchange Agents, thereby enabling him to travel frequently abroad and conclude business deals of which we have practically no extant records. Perregaux manifestly afforded great value to his financial dealings with the government, or he would not have hurried back from Switzerland and fought so determinedly against the accusation implicating him with the duc de Châtelet. Moreover, he was confident his political patrons – Cambon and Barère – would protect him. Nonetheless, the fact that he faced another tenuous denunciation filed by two masons almost immediately after he was cleared in the Châtelet case proves that Perregaux had powerful enemies.

We do not know when Perregaux first met Bonaparte, nor what his veritable opinion was of the young Corsican general. In all the written correspondence exchanged between them (mostly weekly reports on the state of the *Banque de France*’s accounts dating from the Consular period), Perregaux maintains a respectful formality and carefully measured

distance. Perhaps he truly hoped – at least for a time – that the Bonaparte of 1796-1799 intended to steer France towards a constitutional monarchy. But he was too cunning and experienced to rush into openly declaring his support for the Bonapartist cause, preferring instead to lurk as an observer in the background while events unfolded. Even though we know the Brumaire conspirators received funds, nothing links this money directly to Perregaux. He destroyed all his personal papers prior to his death, and so the clues pointing to his complicity in Napoleon's rise must be sought elsewhere.


Perregaux's participation in the Brumaire plot is strongly implied by three specific factors. First, his close proximity to Talleyrand and that minister's opaque web of financial networks. One of the driving forces behind Bonaparte's coup was his alliance with the former bishop of Autun's faction. Having been evicted from the foreign ministry in the aftermath of the Coup of 30 Prairial, Talleyrand was desperately seeking a return to office – and so by extension was the Swiss banker who financed his secret agents. Second, Perregaux never ceased to correspond with his British contacts and appears to have genuinely favoured a peace settlement with England. It is therefore entirely plausible that he supported Bonaparte's seizure of power in the expectation this would lead to the signing of a treaty between France and England which would benefit business interests. Finally – and most tellingly – Perregaux's involvement in a sequence of crucial events which followed the Brumaire coup: his attendance at the meeting of Parisian bankers held in Bonaparte's office at the Luxembourg on 24 November 1799 which had been convened to raise emergency funds for the new Consular regime;¹⁷² his nomination to the *sénat conservateur* the following day (25 December);¹⁷³ his decisive role in helping the newly-created *Banque de France* absorb the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* in January and February 1800 and his subsequent duties as President of its *Conseil de Régence*.¹⁷⁴

Taken together, these elements clearly establish a strong case for Perregaux's implication in Brumaire and suggest we should pay closer attention to his actions during the foundation of the *Banque de France*. We will turn to this aspect of his career in a later chapter.

¹⁷² See Chapter 6.

¹⁷³ AN, AF/IV/13, plaquette 67.

¹⁷⁴ Perregaux appears at the top of the list of the *Banque de France*'s newly appointed Regents (ABF, 1069200901/1 [Législation de la Banque de France] and *Statuts primitifs de la Banque de France*, 24 & 27 pluviôse VIII/13 & 16 Feb. 1800).



CHAPTER 5 – MILITARY CONTRACTORS



“The contractors and agents were the class which, above all, excited the uneasiness of the new Supreme Magistrate who called them the scourge and plague of the nation. The Emperor observed that all France would not have satisfied the ambition of those of Paris alone; that when he came to the head of affairs, they constituted an absolute power; and that they were most dangerous to the state, whose springs were obstructed by their intrigues, joined to those of their numerous dependants. – In truth, said he, they could never be regarded as anything but Jews and usurers. They had disgraced the Directory, and they wished in like manner to control the Consulate. It may be said that at that period they enjoyed the highest rank and influence in society.” – Emmanuel de Las Cases, after-dinner conversation with Napoleon at Saint Helena, 29 February 1816.¹

Introduction: The Military Contracting System under the Directory

One of the most common features associated with the directorial period is the corruption of military contractors. Their ascension owed much to the Thermidorians’ determination to engineer a return to free-market economics and abandon the economic *dirigisme* of Year II. Even before Robespierre’s downfall, contractors had already been awarded what was known as the ‘privilege of Pluviôse’ through the decree of 26 pluviôse II/14 Feb. 1794 which exonerated employees, suppliers and subcontractors of any company furnishing equipment to the state from legal pursuits if that company went bankrupt or fell in arrears of payment.² In late 1795, the revolutionary government began to seriously tackle the job of privatising military supplies. On 1 September, it dissolved the *commission des approvisionnements* and devolved its responsibilities to the *commission du mouvement des armées* and the *commission de la Marine*. These bodies now had to obtain supplies by either purchasing them directly on the market through state-managed agencies (*régies*) or by tendering contracts to private contractors.³

In an undated report probably written in late 1795 or early 1796, war minister Jean-Baptiste Annibal Aubert-Dubayet explained that following the Directory’s decision to overturn the ban on financial companies (law of 26 germinal II/15 April 1794), he had signed several contracts with private firms and only a few services remained in state hands.⁴ On 22 February 1796, the Directory abolished all the Convention’s agencies and executive commissions which had been created in germinal Year II to coordinate supply purchases for the army and government. Only the supply of meat, hospitals and military clothing was left in public hands. Finally on 23 December 1796, the Directory abolished

¹ Las Cases, *MSH*, Tome I, p.428.

² AN, AF/II/78, dossier 573:9 – the decree came into force on 16 prairial II/4 June 1794.

³ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.145.

⁴ AN, AF/III/146, dossier 689:18-20.

the state agency for military supplies (*directoire des achats*) and decided to tender contracts to a select group of private investors.⁵

When awarding military supply contracts, the Directory did not issue tenders outlining contractual regulations and inviting bids from suppliers with supporting documentation. Nor was there a period of adjudication during which bids were reviewed to select the most cost-effective proposal. Instead, practically every contract was signed directly by the war minister with the approval of the executive board of directors. Such a system exposed the Directory to accusations of corruption, since the failure to issue public announcements for tenders implied any company or individual could be unfairly preselected and awarded a contract. Contractors often farmed out their deals to third parties which increased prices, and some agreements were illegally rescinded for more advantageous ones assorted with bribes. Moreover, the government often fell victim to swindlers who asked for cash advances and simply pocketed the money without providing anything. Nevertheless, it was accepted commercial practice to advance contractors a certain sum to set things in motion during the initial contractual period.⁶

Aside from contracts signed by the war minister, there were many other agreements related to armies in foreign occupied territories or areas affected by civil war inside France. The Directory's civilian commissioners, for instance, regularly signed contracts;⁷ and the chief ordnance officer of any army on campaign could negotiate agreements with his general-in-chief's approval. This provision allowed generals to reward contractors who were part of their personal retinue as we saw in Chapter 2 with Bonaparte in Italy. The government in Paris had very little information about these dealings, and since one contract was often rapidly substituted for another it soon became impossible for accounting departments to differentiate between various expenses and conduct effective audits. The avidity of contractors also rapidly emptied occupied lands of their wealth and led them to lobby with the generals for new conquests, directing the government's attention to Rome, Naples and Switzerland.⁸

⁵ Lefebvre, *LTLD*, p.248.

⁶ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.146-148 & 508-509.

⁷ See AN, AF/III/407, dossier 2230 – This dossier contains several letters from the Directory to Charles-Alexis Alexandre, the *Armée de Sambre-et-Meuse*'s civilian commissioner, about various contracts he concluded with firms like the Alcan and Van Vertenghem companies. They were made public during the Directory's executive session of 7 October 1796.

⁸ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.618 – The directors La Revellière and Reubell, both anti-Catholics, were not averse to attacking the Papal States, and Reubell – an Alsatian – was all in favour of intervening in Switzerland. Barras was also in contact with the Italian Jacobins who wished to unite the Italian peninsula in a new republic.

Since it was cash-deprived and plagued by terrible credit ratings resulting from the *assignat*'s depreciation, the Directory employed various ingenious methods to pay contractors. It often had recourse to what was known as 'the effect of complacency' (*l'effet de complaisance*). A contractor would obtain funds on government credit from a 'complacent' banker or merchant trader who would pretend he had received merchandise from the contractor and issue him with a 'fictitious' bill of exchange. The contractor could then discount this bill to obtain cash and the Treasury would repay it once its term of validity expired. Thus, these 'effects of complacency' were disguised forced loans that harmed the government's credit because the Treasury had to repay their costs. But they enabled the state to gain precious time.⁹

Bankers and merchants were also solicited to borrow money on behalf of the Treasury from foreign businessmen who would advance bills of exchange or 'remittances' which could then be discounted with other bankers – either in France or abroad – to obtain cash to pay contractors. Again, the Treasury promised to repay these effects when their terms of validity expired. On 5 December 1795, for instance, the Ghent textile manufacturer François Liéven-Bauwens and his associate the *Compagnie Beths* signed an agreement to furnish the Treasury with bills of exchange in return for silverware confiscated from churches during the Terror.¹⁰ On 3 August 1795, a trader named Daniel Itzig was appointed the Treasury's agent for all banking transactions in Berlin.¹¹ There were also bankers like Jean-Auguste Sévène and his three brothers (*Sévène frères*), who in 1790 had purchased the Saint-Sever manufacture at Rouen established by the Jacobite exile John Holker, that specialised in selling *assignats* and *mandats territoriaux* in foreign markets.¹²

One of the best examples of a financier employed as a fundraiser abroad is that of Jean-Baptiste Paulée, a contractor from Douai who secured an agreement from the *Comité de Salut public* on 12 August 1795 to supply 4,500,000 quintals of rye and wheat exclusively from foreign markets for the staggering sum of 157,440,000 *livres* (4,723,000,000 in *assignats*!).¹³ As part of this contract, Paulée was authorised to negotiate loans (remittances) for the Treasury in several European markets with repayments guaranteed by

⁹ Lefebvre, *LFS*, p.150.

¹⁰ AN, AF/III/331, dossier 1442, *Proposal by Citizens Bauwens, Betts et Cie. to exchange silverware from church spoils against hard currency and paper money drawn on foreign markets*, 14 frimaire IV/5 Dec. 1795 – See Appendix VII for the details of this deal.

¹¹ AF/II/77, dossier 570:15 & 22, *Decree appointing Itzig the Directory's commercial agent in Berlin & his safe conduct for border customs*, 16 & 19 thermidor III/3 & 6 Aug. 1795.

¹² See Appendix X & Sévène's entry in the Biographical Index.

¹³ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 2 – *Contract for a supply of 100,000 lasts or 4,500,000 quintals of grain and Report to the Comité de Salut public by the section des approvisionnements*, 25 thermidor III/12 Aug. 1795 – Paulée benefitted from highly advantageous terms due to the scarcity of grain at this time. See his entry in the Biographical Index for more details.

the reputation of his trading house to make them more appealing to lenders. A decree of the *Comité de Salut public* dated 10 October 1795 allowed the Treasury to accept up to 20 million francs in remittances with three month validities drawn on *Paulée & Cie.* or on the markets of Hamburg, Amsterdam, Basel and Italy.¹⁴ In a memoir of 1797 addressed to his political protector – Merlin de Douai – Paulée detailed how this operation worked:

I was authorised to send the National Treasury remittances drawn on my house or other bills of exchange in foreign monies for up to 20 million in hard currency with three months validity payable on the markets of Hamburg, Amsterdam, Basel and Italy; and to employ them – depending on the circumstances – either to pay contractors or sell them on the market...The Treasury...promised to furnish the necessary funds to cover my remittances in assignat or foreign paper currency...I was awarded 2% commission on the sums of the remittances I sent to the National Treasury...Fifteen days before the signature of the contract, I had already forwarded 15 million in remittances...As soon as this operation got underway, I established five banking houses at Hamburg [J.M. Langerin & Cie.], Amsterdam [Moigny & Cie.], Basel [Paulée & Cie.], Genoa [Henri Mertin & Cie.] and Paris [Auguste Le Roy & Cie.]¹⁵ ...all these remittances were accepted as payment by military suppliers or discounted at 5% or 6%...When the Directory took the reins of government... the agreement was renewed for a further six million...and I sent the Treasury for another two or three million...¹⁶

Paulée used the money raised to purchase grain and sent the remittances back to the Treasury to obtain refunds. What makes his deal even more interesting is that he claims the government's veritable intention in promulgating a decree to favour his speculations was to avert the collapse of the *assignat*:

The government needed 20 million in écus or foreign paper currency which could only be obtained with nearly two billion assignats and since there was a scarcity of assignat in the public Treasury, a new emission – whose cost would have been excessive – would have depreciated its value even further...such a massive emission in these circumstances would have accelerated the final downfall of paper money...The government instead procured these 20 million in paper currency abroad and used them to pay contractors without incurring any losses, or it traded these foreign notes for assignats which were then converted into hard currency. Thus, for instance, a bill of exchange of 100 marks of Hamburg yielded 180 francs in hard currency (argent de France), or 1500 francs assignats yielded 168 francs in hard currency thereby reducing losses to 1/15, the exchange rate being 1500 francs assignats for 180 francs in hard currency [excluding commission]. I would add that the influx of foreign paper currency reduced its price while raising that of the

¹⁴ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 3:7, *Joint decree of the Comités de Salut public et des finances and National Convention*, 18 vendémiaire IV/10 Oct. 1795.

¹⁵ Paulée notified the Interior Ministry that “foreigners are informed that these trading houses are dependent on my firm and they demand indirect effects (valeurs indirectes) for our grain operations” (*Ibid*, dossier 3:6, *Paulée to the Interior Minister*, 26 brumaire IV/17 Nov. 1795).

¹⁶ AN, AF/III/21/A, dossier 70(i), *Memoir of Paulée on bids to purchase biens nationaux in Belgium (25 frimaire V/15 Dec. 1796) addressed to Merlin de Douai*, 15 vendémiaire VI/6 Oct. 1797.

*assignat, thus preventing its further depreciation. This was the object of the decree of 18 vendémiaire IV.*¹⁷

When the Directory was unable to repay these remittances, it resorted to pawning national assets such as requisitioned jewels.¹⁸ In January 1796, for example, it authorised Olry Hayem Worms, a Jewish banker from Lorraine, to purchase a portion of the pearls deposited at the *Monnaie de Paris*.¹⁹ On 19 February 1796, the Bordeaux *armateur* Laffon was given over a million francs of confiscated diamonds as partial reimbursement for 20 million in bills of exchange drawn on Spain he had forwarded the Treasury on behalf of *Magon, Labalue & Cie.* and its partners in Cadix.²⁰ Genoese merchants received gems as well;²¹ while the most famous diamond of the French crown – the *régent* – was delivered to François Barthélémy at Basel to be pawned as security on payments owed to Sigismund Otto Treskow, a Prussian merchant who furnished horses to the French army.²²

Another very common means of payment for contractors were ‘rescriptions’ which the Directory voted into existence on 19 December 1795. These were notes worth between 50 and 1,000 *livres* originally issued by the Treasury to taxpayers who paid the 1795 forced loan and were valid for a period of one, two or three months. About 90 million *livres* of them were printed and they were accepted in payment of taxes or *biens nationaux*. But since the state required them in depreciated *assignats*, their value immediately began to plummet and had dropped 75% by early April 1796.²³ Rescriptions were then issued in *mandats territoriaux* but these also became worthless following the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal.²⁴ Thereafter, the Directory relied extensively on ‘Batavian rescriptions’ drawn from an indemnity of 100 million florins the Dutch had granted France as part of the 1795 Treaty of The Hague. The government used these widely in Years VI and VII to finance the war effort and pay contractors and foreign bankers (e.g. in Genoa) for hard currency advances or supplies;²⁵ and contractors in turn frequently used Batavian rescriptions as

¹⁷ AN, AF/III/21/A, dossier 70(i), *Memoir of Paulée to Merlin de Douai*, 15 vendémiaire VI/6 Oct. 1797. See Paulée’s entry in the Biographical Index for more details.

¹⁸ See Appendix IX.

¹⁹ AN, AF/III/114, dossier 532:108-109 – *Lettre du ministre des Finances au Directoire sur l’achat par Worms d’une partie des perles déposées à la Monnaie de Paris*, 4 pluviôse IV/24 Jan. 1796.

²⁰ AN, AF/III/349, dossier 1594, *Decree of 29 pluviôse IV/18 Feb. 1796*. See also Magon’s entry in the Biographical Index.

²¹ AN, AF/II/77, dossier 566:82 – *Plan to transport diamonds to Genoa*, 28 nivôse III/17 Jan. 1795.

²² AN, AF/III/361, dossier 1725, *Decree of 24 germinal IV/13 April 1796*.

²³ Lefebvre, *LFS*, p.125 – Thus, rescriptions represented a fiscal expedient at the taxpayer’s expense. Mollien (*Mémoires*, Tome I, p.288-289) says the Treasury was unable to sell rescriptions even at a 60% loss.

²⁴ Ramel, *Des finances de la république française en l’an IX*, Paris: M. Agasse, 1801, p.25 – Nonetheless, they continued to be issued. A law of 3 fructidor V/20 August 1797 authorised the creation of 25 million francs of rescriptions drawn on direct taxes still outstanding for Year V (Payard, *LFO*, p.38).

²⁵ See Appendix VIII.



Figure 5:1

Two 80-franc rescription bonds of the 1795 forced loan, payable on tax returns of Year VI
National Museum of American History, Washington D.C.

© National Numismatic Collection at the Smithsonian Institution

Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org> (uploaded by 'Godot13') / CC BY-SA 4.0 Licence



Figure 5:2

“What are you doing there? I am guarding this large coin no one wants.
Hey! Why don't you melt it...you would gain something from it.”

Engraving by an unknown artist, c.1792, Musée Carnavalet

© Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet / CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

security for loans, military supply contracts or purchases of *biens nationaux* – seeking out bankers in Holland who accepted to exchange them for cash.²⁶

Logging concessions (*coupes de bois*) were often given to contractors in foreign occupied territories – such as on the left bank of the Rhine or in Holland – although some were awarded in France, especially around Paris or Orléans. On 9 July 1796, the Rousseau Company – which was owed six million francs in hard currency for the supply of the *Armées du Rhin et Moselle* – received logging concessions in the Palatinate and the area around Treves.²⁷ The government also granted contractors ‘adjudications of logging rights’ for certain *départements* – in other words, instead of giving them the right to cut wood directly, they were offered the obligations of those who had purchased this right at auction.

One particularly dangerous mode of repayment for public finances was the right to seize state property in government warehouses. This gave rise to the Schérer scandal which plagued the political scene for most of Year VII (see below). All kinds of goods in government stores were ceded to contractors: diamonds, furniture, foodstuffs, etc., A case in point was the *Compagnie Gobert* which supplied meat to the *Armée de Rhin-et-Moselle* and was owed several million francs. On 23 November 1796, it was authorised to take all the iron, salt, mercury and coal it wanted in the warehouses of the Palatinate.²⁸

These schemes for procuring hard currency and paying contractors proved so farcically inadequate that neither the finance minister – Ramel – nor the Treasury were prepared to assume responsibility for them. With the government’s credit rating at an all-time low, its only recourse to attract investors and procure funds was to forego due diligence on state contracts and hand over their management to private businessmen. Therefore on 21 June 1796, a special negotiating agency for the Treasury – the *Agence de négociations de la Trésorerie nationale* – was set up with four presiding members: Augustin Monneron, Jean-August Sévène, Barthélémy Caillat (a banker from Lyon) and an obscure financier named Charles-Augustin Foloppe (de Caudebec).²⁹ According to official records, this new agency concluded state purchases amounting to 780 million in *mandats territoriaux* and 55 billion

²⁶ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.131-132 & 507 – A convention signed on 3 May 1796 confirmed Holland had already paid 40 million florins to France. Paris agreed to forgo a further 10 million plus 3 million which the US had borrowed from Holland and France had vouched for. That left 47 million florins, of which Holland agreed to pay 8 million per year to France issued in rescriptions.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p.151 – Interestingly, the Directory never awarded logging rights in the western, central or southern areas of France.

²⁸ AN, AF/III/416, dossier 2320, *Decree of 3 frimaire V/23 Nov. 1796*.

²⁹ AN, C//503, dossier 393/3, *Extrait du registre des délibérations du Comité de Trésorerie*, 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796 – Two days later, Monneron announced he was resigning to set up the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*. The Treasury attached as its ‘particular representative’ with the agency Jean-Baptiste-Théodore Declerck (whose father Claude-Jean was a Treasury commissioner).

in *assignats* while only delivering 47 million in hard currency and gold ingots.³⁰ The following sample of its transactions in 1796 discloses the extent of the private sector's dominance over its negotiations:

- 24 June – As part of a secret treaty concluded between France and Hamburg, the trader Georg Heinrich Sieveking (*Voght & Sieveking*) advances the Treasury 10 million francs in hard currency, bills of exchange and obligations on contractors or state creditors in return for 5 million florins in Batavian rescriptions (10,600,000 francs);³¹
- 7 July – The *Compagnie Flachat, Laporte et Castelin* obtains a contract to farm most of Italy's contributions in return for shipments of *écus* to Huningue (Alsace) and gold ingots to Paris;³²
- 3 August – The Bey of Algiers lends France 200,000 piasters to be repaid in Batavian rescriptions;³³
- 10 August – *Gildemester, Folloppe, Vasse & Cie.* advances 450,000 francs in cash to finance Hoche's Irish expedition in exchange for the right to take 764,000 francs of taxes from Brittany's public coffers;³⁴
- 4 September – *Collot, Caillard & Cie.* (Jean-Pierre Collot's company) is awarded an extraordinary logging concession of 5 million francs in foreign occupied lands. A similar concession is given to Mr. Van Recum, a forage supplier to the *Armée de Rhin-et-Moselle*;³⁵
- 5 September – The *Compagnie Beths* is awarded a contract to collect sums owed on Belgian *biens nationaux* in return for a month's supply of bills worth 10 million francs;³⁶
- 10 September – The Hamburg trader Marc Leavenworth furnishes the Treasury with 2,396,000 francs in bills of exchange drawn on Hamburg and Cadix (most of which

³⁰ Summaries of these reports can be found in several files of the AN, notably C//503, dossier 393/3.

³¹ *Treaty signed in Paris on 6 messidor IV/24 June 1796 with the city of Hamburg to restore commercial relations* (see Alexandre Jehan Henry de Clercq, *Recueil des traités de la France*, Paris: A. Pedone, 1864, Tome I, p.277-279) – Article 5 of the Treaty stipulated that: “Hamburg will receive rescriptions furnished by Holland...amounting to five million florins.” Article 6 reads: “In return for the above-mentioned rescriptions there shall be furnished: 1.) Within a month's delay, two million livres in bills of exchange whose validities shall not exceed three months; 2.) Obligations [quittances] on military contractors and creditors of the Republic...amounting to eight million livres and payable within three months, to be taken in Baltic marketplaces – principally Hamburg.” Sieveking, a leading hanseatic merchant, was the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce's representative in Paris from April 1795 to July 1796. His business partner was Caspar Voght.

³² See Chapter 2.

³³ AN, AF/III/392, dossier 2063, *Decree of 16 thermidor IV/3 Aug. 1796* – France had asked to borrow a million piasters.

³⁴ Charles-Augustin Folloppe's (a.k.a. 'Folloppe') company also shipped wine to Le Havre (AN, AF/II/78, dossier 575:25, 16 nivôse III/5 Jan. 1795) and exported large quantities of cotton, sugar and indigo (AN, AF/III/337, dossier 1465, *Decree of 2 nivôse IV/23 Dec. 1795*).

³⁵ AN, AF/III/400, dossier 2155, *Decree of 19 fructidor IV/5 Sep. 1796*.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

were not paid) in return for 1,409,869 francs of state annuities, 89 million francs of *bons du Trésor* valid for the purchase of *biens nationaux* and 8 million francs in *assignats*;

- 7 October – The *J. Warnet, Matthieu Klein & Ambroise Perrotin et Cie.* trading house supplies the Treasury with 600,000 francs in hard currency and three million francs in foreign bills of exchange against the government's promise to refund it at a specific date – one-fifth in hard currency and bills of exchange – and the remaining four-fifths in logging concessions in Ile-de-France and the Orléanais. In exchange, *Warnet, Klein, Perrottin et Cie.* obtains the privilege of adjudicating logging rights in concessions it has been granted for Year V and is paid a commission of 3%;³⁷
- 24 November – The Rouen trader Marc-François Séguy furnishes equipment, supplies and ammunition to the *Armée d'Italie* in exchange for a guaranteed pension from Naples;³⁸
- 1 December – *Gobert, Lanoue, Barraillon et Cie.* receive logging concessions in 12 *départements*;³⁹
- 1 December – *Wouters, Delannoy & Cie.*, suppliers to the *Armées du Nord et de Sambre-et-Meuse*, obtain an advance of five million in Batavian rescriptions;⁴⁰
- 3 December – The *Compagnie Ragueneau* advances the Treasury 3,600,000 francs (of which 600,000 in hard currency) at 3% commission in exchange for logging concessions in seventeen *départements* (Normandy, Champagne, Lorraine, Burgundy, etc.). It is also awarded 2% commission on all military supplies;⁴¹
- 7 December – Jacques-Rose Récamier agrees to pay bills of exchange in arrears contracted by the Treasury to cover the wages of Admiral Richery's fleet anchored at Cadix. To help him raise loans for payments, he receives silverware, Batavian rescriptions and diamonds as security. In return, he is granted a commission of 2% on all cash advances;

³⁷ AF/III/407, dossier 2230 – *Contractual agreement between the National Treasury and Warnet, Klein, Perrottin et Cie.*, 16 vendémiaire V/7 Oct. 1796. The forests and parks which *Warnet, Klein & Perrottin* selected as concessions for their repayment were those of Villiers-Cotterêts, Compiègne, Laigle, Alatte, Fontainebleau, Rambouillet, Saint-Germain, Paris (including Sénart, Bondy, the parks of Raincy, Plessis-Belleville, Petit-Bourg, Beaubourg, Croissy, Meudon, etc.), Montargis and Fère-en-Tardenois.

³⁸ AN, AF/III/417, dossier 2323, *Decree of 4 frimaire V/24 Nov. 1796.*

³⁹ AN, AF/III/418, dossier 2333, *Decree of 11 frimaire V/1 Dec. 1796* – Gobert & Lanoue supplied the *Armée de l'Intérieur* (AF/III/184, dossier 848:163) and the *Armées d'Italie et de Rhin-et-Moselle* (see below).

⁴⁰ AN, AF/III/418, dossier 2333, *Decree of 13 frimaire V/3 Dec. 1796.*

⁴¹ AN, AF/III/419, dossier 2339, *Decree of 13 frimaire V/3 Dec. 1796* – This deal probably represented compensation for a previous contract with the naval and war ministries which the company claimed had not been paid.

- The bankers Jacques de Chapeaurouge of Hamburg and Emmanuel Balbi of Genoa advance funds in exchange for *mandats territoriaux* and guarantees on future Italian tax levies;⁴²

In late 1796, dire economic circumstances forced the Directory to reorganise its payment methods by tapping into previously unexploited resources. On 4 September, Belgian *biens nationaux* were put up for sale even though Belgium's public debt had not yet been paid. On 14 October, the government instituted an order of precedence in its payments (*ordres de paiement*). There were current expenses (*service courant*) – which imperatively had to be paid – along with expenses paid in instalments (*acomptes*) and backlog expenses (*arriéré*). Government ministers determined in which category an order of payment fell, thereby exposing the Directory to accusations of corruption since civil servants could prioritise payments to contractors or bankers. Then on 6 November (16 brumaire V), a fateful law was voted to resume the sale of 500 million francs of *biens nationaux* in France which had been interrupted in late 1795 – with the provision they could now be purchased using hard currency.⁴³

Thereafter, the government began accepting payment orders (*ordonnances*) issued by state ministers for the purchase of *biens nationaux*; and contractors were enticed to accept them. Paulée, for instance, who hadn't even supplied 10% of the grain stipulated in his contract when it expired on 24 April 1796, was nonetheless rewarded via the controversial decree of 28 November 1796 with exclusive bidding rights for 16 million francs worth of Belgian *biens nationaux*.⁴⁴ In association with another contractor named Victor Bodin (*Bodin frères* – see below), he bought about a quarter of all lands for sale in the *département* of Jemappes (around 2,000 acres);⁴⁵ while in the neighbouring *département* of Namur he

⁴² Most of these deals are recorded in AN, C//503, dossier 393/3 (evidence pertaining to the Treasury's role in the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal) and reproduced in Appendices VII-IX. The Hamburg traders Sieveking, Chapeaurouge and Leavenworth were guaranteed reimbursements on ransoms paid by the British government for neutral ships captured by French privateers. Chapeaurouge was already a major client of the Treasury, having received 300,000 banco marks on 17 December 1793 (AN, AF/II/75, plaquette 554:25) and 1,500,000 francs in hard currency and bills of exchange on 7 January 1795 (AF/II/77, dossier 566:40).

⁴³ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.137-138.

⁴⁴ In Pluviôse Year IV, the government calculated it had already paid Paulée 8,590,570 florins plus an advance of 2,810,000 francs in *assignats* (including 700,000 francs from the city of Lille) when he should only have received 1,456,132 florins (AN, F/11/1229, dossier 1, *Report presented to the Interior Minister*, 9 pluviôse IV/29 Jan. 1796 & *Account of the advances made by order and for Jean Baptiste Paulée & Cie.*, 14 pluviôse IV/3 Feb. 1796). Overall, Paulée only delivered 264,994 quintals (*Ibid*, *Report presented to the Interior Minister*, floréal IV). He claimed to have supplied 369,900 quintals (*Ibid*, undated document). The decree of 8 frimaire V/28 Nov. 1796 (AN, AF/III/418, dossier 2331: 24) awarding Paulée exclusive bidding rights on Belgian *biens nationaux* was not printed. Paulée asserts he was not exonerated from notarial and land registry fees and only accepted the decree due to the “horror of his position” (AF/III/21/A, dossier 70(i), *Memoir of Paulée to Merlin de Douai*).

⁴⁵ See Ivan Delatte, *La vente de biens nationaux dans le département de Jemmapes*, Bruxelles: Académie Royale de Belgique, 1938.

acquired 364,000 of the 936,000 *livres* worth of auctioned properties, with other significant plots being purchased by Le Couteulx, the industrialist Liéven-Bauwens and the *Compagnie Pommier* – whose partners included Hainguerlot and Bastide, the men behind the *Compagnie Dijon*.⁴⁶ Instead of paying in cash, Paulée used state ‘obligations’ which had depreciated by 50% of their value, thereby disbursing far less than what his lands were really worth.⁴⁷ Ivan Delatte notes that financiers were the only buyers who did not negotiate the purchase of ecclesiastical *biens nationaux* with religious authorities because they enjoyed favoured status with government administrations.⁴⁸

Finally on 23 December, the government altered its system of awarding contracts (decree of 3 nivôse V) and decided that henceforth it would accept bids for ‘general markets’ (*marchés généraux*) whereby certain contractors would receive general contracts to supply specific goods to all armies (e.g. wheat or naval supplies). This structural change aimed to put the accounting and auditing of military purchases back in order on the understanding that companies endowed with such agreements would be too large to collapse.

Furthermore, there would no longer be competition between rival firms for the same contract which often ironically led to price hikes.⁴⁹ On 24 May 1798, a general supply for the Navy with no apparent benefit to the state was specifically created for Ouvrard who signed the contract on 30 June.⁵⁰ This drive towards bulk deals indicated the Directory was continuing its policy of gradually farming out military supplies to the private sector. But since there weren’t enough businessmen with sufficient capital to furnish all the Republic’s forces, the government was compelled to divide general army supplies into two or three separate ‘groups’. Thus, individual contracts for specific needs endured.⁵¹

In January 1797, the Directory decided to institute ‘delegations’ (*délégations spéciales*) levied on the tax intake. These were issued by state ministers and granted contractors the authority to levy the sums owed them as priority payments directly from the coffers of

⁴⁶ Ivan Delatte, ‘La vente de biens nationaux dans l’arrondissement de Namur’, *Annales de la Société Archéologique de Namur*, Tome XL (deuxième livraison), 1932-1933: 189-339 – produces detailed canton-by-canton lists of these sales (p.243-317). See also AN, C//505; Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.161-162 and Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.512-514.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p.217 – Less than ¼ of all payments for *biens nationaux* in the *département* of Namur were made in hard currency (*Ibid*, p.239). Paulée mortgaged 2,380,000 francs of his *biens nationaux* as security for a new military supply company – the *Compagnie Saint Victor* – which he founded on 14 September 1797 (MC/ET/XLV/660, 28 fructidor V/14 Sep. 1797).

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.217-218 – Religious orders were issued with government bonds as compensation for their confiscated lands, and many of them sold these bonds and negotiated the sale of their estates to obtain funds.

⁴⁹ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.146-147.

⁵⁰ See Chapter 3, footnote 144.

⁵¹ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.147 – The *service des étapes*, for example, had its own administration which regrouped approximately 1,500 entrepreneurs who furnished meals and lodgings to troops in transit at given locations.

receveurs or tax offices in specific *départements*. Ramel later described this system in a report addressed to the *Conseil d'État's Conseil des finances*:

*A fund having been placed at a minister's disposal, he will deliver letters of credit to contractors which can be exchanged at the Treasury for payment orders [lettres d'avis] addressed to receveurs – to whom will be directly sent the delegation or letter of credit he must pay.*⁵²

Previously, Treasury remittances (*ordonnances*) drawn on *receveurs* were exclusively based on audits of *already* existing sums in public coffers. But two new laws of 3 May and 10 July 1798 (14 floréal & 22 messidor VI) authorised delegations to be drawn on the Treasury's future estimated revenues. They therefore constituted more promises of remuneration than real payments. To ensure there was enough liquidity to pay them, the Treasury not only tapped into direct taxes but also logging concessions, the 1795 forced loan, the tax on doors and windows, custom dues and sale revenues from *domaines nationaux*. Additional delegations were given on logging concessions or state obligations which purchasers of *biens nationaux* had acquired at auction.⁵³ There were also 'mixed delegations' in which contractors were partly paid in logging concessions and partly in logging obligations, or partly in taxes and partly in delegations, etc.⁵⁴ Occasionally, contractors were even granted the right to farm taxes in foreign occupied lands. As René Stourm observes:

*The raison d'être of delegations – as well as the abuses they engendered – are easy to comprehend. The Directory had reached the point where it was unable to find any contractors – such was the number of times it had broken its word. To regain their confidence – for [contractors] were indispensable – Ramel authorised them to pay themselves by placing public coffers at their disposal.*⁵⁵

Foreseeing delegations would generate abuses, ministers pre-emptively attached commissioners to contractors to verify the amount and quality of goods they furnished. Unfortunately, since commissioners paid contractors with payment orders drawn on *receveurs*, these rapidly began to be traded on the market and merely became another form

⁵² AN, AF/IV/248, *Report of the finance minister to the Conseil des Finances*, 15 thermidor VIII/3 Aug. 1800.

⁵³ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.138-139 – The cherry on the cake was that paper currency subsisted because on 18 September 1796 the Directory decided government creditors should receive a quarter of their repayments in hard currency. The national debt was thus divided into four quarters. For the first quarter, creditors received 'bonds of a quarter' (*bonds du quart*) yielding interest in hard currency, while the remaining three quarters were paid in 'bonds of three quarters' (*bons des trois quarts*) which could be used to purchase *biens nationaux*. Ironically, *bons des trois quarts* became more highly sought after by speculators because they could be used to purchase real estate, while it was doubtful whether the government would entirely reimburse *bonds du quart*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.151.

⁵⁵ Stourm, *LFC*, p.126.

of paper currency subject to speculation.⁵⁶ Yet even after leaving office Ramel remained unapologetic over delegations, arguing their creation had been necessitated by economic circumstances:

*Contractors were told: deliver now, you will be paid subsequently on the intake of tax contributions which shall be delegated to you. It would undoubtedly have been preferable to obtain these supplies against the simple promise of paying them as they gradually came in. Could this really be hoped for? ...If one refers back to the situation at that time, it would be obvious this measure was indispensable. The circumstances in which one or another measure has been employed are too easily forgotten when they are judged after the storm has passed.*⁵⁷

Nonetheless, the delegation system proved catastrophic for state finances. The fiscal administration was suddenly besieged by innumerable contractors vying with each other for priority access to public funds. Several of them, armed with ministerial writs of power, placed agents in tax bureaus to monitor accountants so that no tax intakes would escape their notice – and to levy through collusion the funds they considered were rightly theirs.⁵⁸

If contractors were so persistent, it was because the crisis afflicting government finances exposed them to the risk of not being repaid. The chronic lack of hard currency meant the Directory was prone to late payments which lingered on endlessly. Suppliers therefore tended to raise the price of their goods to compensate for potential losses. The government did institute a ‘decadary repartition’ (*répartition décadaire*), in which ministers drew up tables of payments based on estimated amounts of available cash in public coffers for ensuing *décades*, but state creditors were listed in arbitrary order and contractors who were not well-viewed or whose services were considered expendable found themselves at the bottom of the list.⁵⁹ The *Anciens* deputy Lebrun justified this rigmarole, noting that: “*In times of distress when everything cannot be paid, reimbursements must be made selectively, with choice determined by urgency.*”⁶⁰

When contractors were repaid in rescriptions, they would generally have to find a provincial *receveur* whose coffers contained enough money for them to be reimbursed. Parisian tax offices were unwilling to repay suppliers and rarely contained large amounts of cash. Furthermore, the state’s financial accounts were not organised to keep track of

⁵⁶ AN, AF/IV/248, *Report of the finance minister to the Conseil des Finances*, 15 thermidor VIII/3 Aug. 1800.

⁵⁷ Ramel, *Des finances de la République française en l’an IX*, Paris: M. Agasse, 1801, p.209.

⁵⁸ Stourm, *LFC*, p.127.

⁵⁹ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.148-149.

⁶⁰ Quoted in Stourm, *Les finances de l’Ancien Régime et de la Révolution*, Tome II, Paris: Guillaumin et cie., 1885, p.346 (hereafter ‘*LFARR*’).

how much money entered its coffers daily, and the slowness of communications along dilapidated road networks caused considerable delays.

To avoid irregular repayments in depreciated currency, contractors regularly resorted to bribing the civil servants with whom they did business. Managers of state warehouses (*gardes-magasins*) frequently demanded bribes when contractors delivered merchandise and threatened not to produce receipts or argued about the quality of goods if they were not offered money. They also took bribes to produce fake receipts, reducing soldiers' rations by a quarter or even a third to dissimulate these forgeries in accounts. War commissioners could demand anywhere from 20% to 40% of the value of a consignment to sign receipts and were notorious for recording non-existent ration deliveries and sharing bribes with warehouse managers. Army intendants indulged in similar fraudulent acts and registered soldiers who did not exist. In short, the war and finance ministries were the most corrupt of all government administrations. A letter from one contractor published in *L'Ami des lois* on 11 April 1796 reflected the extent of the problem:

*"I am obliged to defraud the Republic to obtain the money I am owed. When I present an account to a war commissioner, he only signs it after having received a commission. If the order of goods is to be confirmed, the intendant demands his share. Finally, the paymaster-general retains a third of its value and keeps the certification for all the goods. He assures me that these are the orders from above and that it is done to provide for the expenses of the military officers."*⁶¹

War minister Petiet noted in a report dated 8 May 1796 that the army's official consumption of goods exceeded by a quarter or even a half the real amount consumed. He quotes 1,400,000 rations of meat, while there were only 500,000 or 600,000 soldiers. The government was therefore paying more than double what it needed.⁶²

Should contractors be unable to obtain payment from *receveurs*, they had no choice but to rely on their connections at the finance ministry to help them pinpoint a tax office with funds. And when it came to networks of influence, the barons of contracting were always a step ahead. Securing payment was a ruthless no-holds-barred process in which intimidation and dupery were the norm. Employing a technique perfected by Fouquet who had built his fortune under Mazarin, the most prominent contractors did not hesitate to target middling suppliers whose rescriptions were drawn on tax offices they knew lacked cash. They would convince their exasperated victims to sell them their rescriptions at much lower prices, and

⁶¹ *L'Ami des lois*, 22 germinal IV/11 April 1796.

⁶² AN, AF/III/153:8 – Petiet had previously noted in a report of 13 April 1796 on the *Armée d'Italie* (AF/III/185, dossier 853:59) that a contractor had been paid for 50,000 quintals of wheat when he had only delivered 10,000; and that a mule supplier had been paid for 54 mules having only delivered 13.



Figure 5:3 – To Each his Turn

“I hope, Citizen, to redeem myself through speculation. To you, milord, the triflings. The money is ours.”

Engraving by an unknown artist, 1797, Musée Carnavalet

© Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet / CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain



Figure 5:4 – The Speculator’s Triumph, engraving by an unknown artist, 1796

© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

then immediately cash them in for their full amount at tax bureaus they knew disposed of sufficient funds – a clever trick which bankrupted numerous suppliers under the Directory.⁶³ One truly extraordinary government practice which appeared with increasing frequency in Years VI and VII was to offer contractors unable to secure repayments the option – for an additional fee – of reassigning their rescriptions to another provincial tax office where they might have a better chance of reimbursement. This practice – also employed by Bonaparte during his reign – demonstrated the Directory was not as weak as is often stated when dealing with businessmen.⁶⁴

There is no doubt, however, that certain contractors were guilty of flagrant embezzlement. Jean Lanchère, a leading horse artillery supplier, was repeatedly denounced by the *Cinq-Cents* for all manners of irregularities.⁶⁵ He drew up fake death certificates for horses and bribed warehouse employees to obtain forged receipts which he used to extract payments. A letter to war minister Petiet dated 27 October 1796 claimed that:

*“It is an established fact that the use of funds which this entrepreneur has justified up to the present moment do not relate in any proportion whatsoever to the enormous advances which have been made to him. It is also certain...that the investigations which have been conducted into his accounts have never frightened him because he calculated that they would have no repercussions and was convinced of the silence of those who might demand him to justify them.”*⁶⁶

Such larceny exasperated legislators who still valued republican ideals. In a speech of 4 November 1797 Jean-Antoine Marbot, the *Anciens* deputy of the Corrèze, squarely rebuked his colleagues for their indolence:

*Why are we turning a blind eye to public opinion which screams from all corners that corruption is at our doors, dictates all the markets, besieges all the ministers’ antechambers, even glides into our deliberations and poisons all the channels of public administrations?*⁶⁷

A meek attempt was made to curb the excesses of contractors through the establishment by the *Cinq-Cents* of a *commission des dilapidations* on 2 July 1799, but the financial interests linking leading politicians to army suppliers rendered this body powerless.⁶⁸ Practically all the most successful contractors repaid the government in depreciated state bonds whose real value was 40-50% less than the advances they received. The *Compagnie Rochefort*, for instance, was awarded a contract in Year VII to supply the *Armée du*

⁶³ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.164.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.507.

⁶⁵ See Lanchère’s entry in the Biographical Index.

⁶⁶ See AN, AF/III/114, dossier 533:8-13 & 17-18.

⁶⁷ Quoted in Stourm, *LFARR*, Tome II, p.350-351.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.351.

Danube over 21 months for which it was advanced the sum of 32 million francs in delegations that it never repaid.⁶⁹

Had the Directory sought to conclude peace in Europe and prioritised domestic economic recovery, it might have succeeded in ridding itself of such an abusive system. But its decision to resume hostilities against the Second Coalition in Year VII permanently entrenched its dependency on a select cadre of contractors whose influence became paramount. They performed extraordinary services for the government, enjoyed preferential status and received lucrative contracts in exchange for cash advances.

Examining all the military suppliers who did business with Bonaparte's armies in the space of a single chapter would be a futile endeavour. This section will therefore focus on five different contractors: the Michel brothers, Michel Simons, Pierre Louis Hanet-Cléry, Armand Seguin and the *Compagnie Bodin*. Some of these like Michel *jeune* and Armand Seguin became members of Bonaparte's *Vingt* and *Dix Négociants Réunis*; while others like Michel Simons saw their projects ruined by Napoleon's prerogatives or faded into obscurity like Hanet-Cléry. But all of them left their mark on the directorial period.

The Michel Brothers

Pierre Narcisse Dorothée Michel (known as '*Michel l'ainé*') and his better-known younger brother Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel (known as '*Michel jeune*') were two of the Revolution's most prosperous and enigmatic financiers. Both were self-made men with no prior family history in high finance or commerce – classic examples of speculators turned *nouveaux riches* during the revolutionary turmoil. Little is known concerning their backgrounds and business activities, and only one very cursory study has attempted to trace their careers.⁷⁰ The most detailed sources on the Michels are complaints filed against them by their former employees, notably one Denis Michel Boissière – their former *caissier* – who in 1813 published a memoir denouncing them for filing a bogus embezzlement charge leading to his arrest.⁷¹

The Michel brothers were natives of La Bastide de Sérrou (Ariège) in the *Pays de Foix* where Michel *jeune* was born on 12 May 1771.⁷² According to Boissière, the family was

⁶⁹ AN, AF/III/150B, dossier 706:63-64.

⁷⁰ André-Félix Aude, *Un ancien châtelain d'Azay-le-Ferron. Michel jeune, 1771-1852*. Paris: Charles Bosse, 1931 (hereafter '*UACAFMJ*').

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.21.

⁷² *Ibid*, p.167.

poor and neither brother received any education. However, Michel *jeune* claims he came from “one of the most recommendable families of the county of Foix in the département of Ariège” and that his father was a trader.⁷³ His older brother Pierre worked in a linen shop in Toulouse where he joined him aged 15 and was initially apprenticed to the *Prévot* trading house – who were family relations – before working for *Lanneluc et Cie*. In 1790 Michel *jeune*, aged 18, settled in Bordeaux and spent a few months working for *Cluzet frères* before founding his own trading house.⁷⁴ He describes his first business ventures as speculations on colonial goods from America:

*The variations affecting the respective prices of goods in France and America, the political circumstances and the creation of paper money favoured this commercial exchange. In less than five years, my capital had reached 1,800,000 francs. My trading house enjoyed excellent credit both in Bordeaux and abroad, supported by the loyalty I displayed in the execution of my engagements.*⁷⁵

In 1793, Michel l'*ainé* was requisitioned for the *levée en masse* and Michel *jeune* went into business with a commissioner of the National Convention posted at Bordeaux named Mr. Merzeau. Thanks to Merzeau's connections, he secured a contract to supply the *Armée des Pyrénées* with bed linen.⁷⁶

By 1795, Michel *jeune*'s affairs were flourishing. Having purchased the lease to exploit the forges at Écot-la-Combe (Haute-Marne), he was awarded a contract in April to supply military hardware.⁷⁷ When the *Comité de Salut public* requisitioned 1500 pieces of linen in his warehouse at Cabrespine (Ariège), Michel *jeune* promptly travelled to Paris in June accompanied by Boissière's father (whom he had met in Bordeaux) and not only convinced the government to release his merchandise but negotiated a new agreement to supply the *Armée des Pyrénées Orientales et Occidentales*.⁷⁸ He even landed a second major contract to import large quantities of rice into France – a deal which Boissière claims constituted a veritable “Peru”.⁷⁹

It was at this juncture that the brothers came to be associated with a particularly heinous crime which indelibly tarnished their reputation and cast a sinister shadow over their subsequent careers. This affair concerned François-Gaspard Petit du Petitval (1747-1796), a former *receveur général des fermes* of La Rochelle and one of the wealthiest men in

⁷³ *Ibid*, p.50.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.50-51.

⁷⁵ Quoted in *Ibid*, p.51.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.22-23.

⁷⁷ AN, AF/II/286B:31 – Decree authorising a contract with Michel frères, owners of the forges à l'Est, 6 floréal III/25 April 1795

⁷⁸ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.52-53.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p.25 & 28-29.

Paris. Petitval had purchased the Château of Vitry-sur-Seine for 900,000 *livres* from the Marquis de Vouigny and had been residing there with his family in quiet seclusion since the Terror.⁸⁰ On the night of 20-21 April 1796 Petitval, his mother, mother-in-law (the Dame Donat de Saint-Cout), the two sisters of his mother-in-law and two female servants were all brutally murdered by unknown assassins. Their bodies were discovered strewn beneath the trees lining an alleyway of the château's park. Petitval's son, aged ten, was found unharmed lying near his grandmother's body. The assassins had entered the property undetected and the victims, surprised in their sleep, had been led into the park where some had their throats slit. Mr. Petitval had attempted to flee with his personal papers but was clubbed to death. Nothing was stolen from the château except a few documents. These gruesome murders shocked the public and the Duchesse d'Abrantès relates they were much discussed in the capital's *salons*.⁸¹

Suspicion was cast on a group of soldiers from the barracks of Choisy-sur-Seine who had spent the night at Vitry because a button engraved with the caption '*Légion de Police*' was discovered near Petitval's corpse. Others believed gangs of 'chauffeurs' or Chouans had perpetrated the crime. But a few weeks later, Petitval's secretary – Courtois – was assassinated in the Rue de la Victoire in Paris. The murderers were not apprehended. Rumours began circulating that two bankers of ill repute living in the Rue d'Antine – the Michel brothers – had ordered these crimes. Indeed, Petitval had lent them over a million *livres* and received death threats shortly before his murder. It was claimed the bankers had preferred to eliminate him rather than repay their debt; and although the Michel brothers were investigated and cleared of all charges they became associated with the crime in the public mind, with Michel *jeune* earning the sobriquet "*Michel l'assassin*" while his brother Michel *l'ainé* was nicknamed "*Michel le voleur*".⁸²

Shortly after Napoleon's rise to power, Josephine asked him to receive a relative of Petitval named Cadoret de Beaupréau who presented a memoir detailing the case which confirmed Michel *jeune*'s guilt. Bonaparte turned down Beaupréau's request to arrest Michel *jeune* and advised him to file charges in court. This was probably because the

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.2.

⁸¹ D'Abrantès, *Mémoires*, Tome III, Paris: L. Mame, 1831, p.22-33 – See also Bernard Quilliet, *L'affaire Du Petit-Val : un crime mystérieux sous le Directoire*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1989.

⁸² Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.68-78 – In June 1804, Michel *jeune* was considered to become one of the four treasurers who would replace the *receveurs généraux*. His candidacy was declined due to his implication in the Petitval case. He petitioned Louis Nicolas Dubois, the *préfet de police de Paris* who then owned the château of Vitry, to conduct a new investigation and identify the murderers. Dubois ruled that Michel's fears were unfounded given he had already been cleared of all charges. Michel *jeune* accused the *Légion de Police* of Choisy of having committed the crime. He left 40,000 francs in his will to help the poor of Vitry and donated another 40,000 to that city's church (*Ibid*, p.147).

financier was protected by Cambacérès who dined practically every week with the Michel brothers.⁸³ According to the Duchesse d'Abrantès:

*Madame Bonaparte told us the First Consul's opinion had long been settled on this horrible matter, and that this opinion was that shared by all of Paris. Murders committed by the 'chauffeurs' were then very frequent, but the circumstances of this case were truly remarkable.*⁸⁴

The truth will probably never be uncovered, especially since all the evidence mysteriously disappeared from the archives of the district court of Villejuif in 1816.⁸⁵

This sordid affair did not curtail the brothers' rapid ascension. They founded a new company called '*Michel frères jeune*' endowed with over a million francs, the provenance of which remains unclear.⁸⁶ Initially, the company consisted in two separate firms – one in Bordeaux overseen by Michel l'*ainé* (founded 19 January 1796 with a capital of 1,800,000 francs in hard currency) and the other managed by Michel *jeune* in Paris (founded 20 January 1796).⁸⁷ In its first year of activity, *Michel frères* returned considerable profits and Michel *jeune* decided to liquidate the firm in Bordeaux and base all his activities in Paris:

*We resolved to specifically devote ourselves to the fields of banking, finances and public markets. We sent all the merchandise we had left in stock to the Beaucaire fair and exchanged it for eaux-de-vie which was then very cheap and after a few months this operation yielded a profit of one hundred percent, thereby doubling the value of our merchandise.*⁸⁸

Michel frères was also very active in negotiating hard currency loans for the Treasury in foreign markets. Archival records indicate it had raised over two million *livres* in ingots by June 1796.⁸⁹ Moreover, the firm was advanced three million francs in letters of credit by the Treasury on 27 October 1796 which confirms it had become an indispensable financial intermediary for government transactions.⁹⁰ Thanks to these successes, Michel *jeune* was able to purchase an *hôtel particulier* at 14, Place Vendôme.⁹¹ He even acquired the stables of the Château of Montmorency and petitioned the government to modify some of its buildings.⁹²

⁸³ *Ibid*, p.77-78.

⁸⁴ D'Abrantès, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.33.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.27.

⁸⁶ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.24-25.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p.53.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.54-55.

⁸⁹ See Appendix X.

⁹⁰ See Appendix VII.

⁹¹ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.32 – This is currently the Parisian headquarters of the Morgan & Stanley bank.

⁹² AN, AF/III/127, dossier 583: 70-71, *Petition of Marc-Antoine Michel to the legislature regarding the stables of Montmorency*, Prairial V.

Thus by early 1797, the Michel brothers were well-established as Parisian bankers and brokers. Yet controversy continued to dog their business dealings. A former corsair named Rivière whom they had employed as a clerk filed charges against them in June 1798, claiming they had promised to help him purchase and equip a ship for privateering. He accused them of fourteen different counts of misdemeanour (theft, pillage, embezzlement, etc.) and claimed they regularly falsified their accounts with the complicity of high-ranking officials to extort public funds. The number “10” would be corrupted into “19” or “40”, while “12” would become “42” and “30” would change into “36”! These forgeries allegedly enabled the brothers to pocket an extra 1,543,834 francs on their contract with the *Armée des Pyrénées* for Year IV.⁹³ The reason they were not prosecuted was undoubtedly because they were protected by Cambacérès.⁹⁴ On 29 June – a few days after filing these charges – Rivière was assaulted in the Rue Verdelet in Paris by a grenadier of the guard of the *Corps législatif* named Flocard. The assailant knifed Rivière, but he survived and accused the Michel brothers who were arrested. After a month’s detention, they were released thanks to an obscure procuration order and settled the matter out of court for 120,000 francs.⁹⁵

Another episode tending to confirm Michel *jeune*’s reputation for double-dealing involves his relations with the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* – of which he was a shareholder. On 14 August 1797 – during the run-up to 18 Fructidor – he was accused by the bank of an elaborate scam. *Michel frères* had negotiated a bill of exchange with the *caisse* for 9,000 francs which was guaranteed by another Parisian firm named *Gournon & Guitard*. Michel *jeune* claimed the bill’s due date fell on 12 August and attempted to collect payment from the *caisse* on that day. However, the bill’s deposit slip issued by the *caisse* clearly specified it came due on 11 September. Suspecting the bill was fraudulent, *Gournon & Guitard* suspended its payments on 28 August and the *caisse* immediately demanded a refund from *Michel frères*. Michel *jeune* refused, claiming the bill’s validity had expired, and the case was only resolved when submitted to arbitration by referees.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, *Michel frères* remained one of the *caisse*’s principal intermediaries for the import of

⁹³ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.50 – Aude (*UACAFMJ*, p.83-84) says they gained 2,300,643 francs instead of 459,809 francs.

⁹⁴ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.84.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.27-28 – Michel *jeune* claims that Rivière, who had only worked for him for six months, stole a million francs in *assignats* and silverware from his company’s offices and staged his own assault (*Ibid*, p.60-65).

⁹⁶ ABF, 1069200402-1, *PVRCA-1*, 27 thermidor V/14 Aug. 1797, p.77-78.

Spanish piasters which it purchased and transported via its partners in Bayonne (*Daudinot & Moracin, Dufourcq & Cie., Patto frères*) and Toulouse (*Courtois & Cie.*).⁹⁷

It remains unclear when the Michel brothers first met Bonaparte. Perhaps their initial encounter occurred during the preparations for the Egyptian expedition in Year VI, when the brothers lent three million francs without interest to help equip Admiral Brueys's fleet at Brest and loaned an additional 300,000 francs in cash to pay for his fleet's stopover in Malta. They also provided the French Navy with twelve million francs of hemp and supplies from the Baltic.⁹⁸ Michel *jeune* himself claims he advanced money to the conspirators on 18 Brumaire and provided the Treasury with several million francs in the weeks following the coup.⁹⁹

There is no doubt the Michel brothers were among the most enthusiastic supporters of Bonaparte's consular government. In late January 1800, for example, the new administration attempted to raise six million francs against a down payment of three million florins in Batavian rescriptions. Twenty different bankers successively declined their help until, on 24 January, the Michel brothers advanced Gaudin 400,000 francs (of which 240,000 in gold). Shortly afterwards, Bonaparte petitioned them to supply another two million francs to the *Armée du Rhin* which they promptly did. The First Consul granted them a personal audience to express his gratitude for their services.¹⁰⁰

The brothers rapidly became one of the Consulate's most important creditors. In Year VIII alone, they conducted more than 70 million francs of business with the Treasury;¹⁰¹ and the following year they topped the Treasury's list of biggest investors with over seven million francs.¹⁰² When the contract regulating *Michel frères* expired and the firm was dissolved in February 1802, its accounts showed the firm's capital assets had skyrocketed from 1,800,000 francs in 1796 to over seventeen million in the space of a mere six years!¹⁰³

Unfortunately, we do not possess the requisite sources to corroborate whether the brothers accumulated this vast fortune as a direct result of Napoleon's patronage or that of his

⁹⁷ Zylberberg, *USDD*, p.507-508.

⁹⁸ Several notarial documents of Year VI attest to Michel *jeune*'s business activities in naval supplies (see MC/ET/VII/541, 542, 543 & 545). His partners were an investor named Lacaze and the *Compagnie Desnoyers*. Aude (*UACAFMJ*, p.56-57) places these transactions in 1800, which seems impossible since Admiral Brueys was killed at the Battle of the Nile in 1798.

⁹⁹ See Chapter 6.

¹⁰⁰ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.57-58.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p.58.

¹⁰² See Appendix XVI.

¹⁰³ MC/ET/VII/558, 29 pluviôse X/18 Feb. 1802.

faction. We can only turn to notarial records which overwhelmingly confirm the prominence they achieved during the consular and imperial periods. In Year IX, for instance, they became leading associates in Ouvrard's naval supplying networks when Michel l'*ainé* served as the financial guarantor for 500,000 francs of *Solier & Delarue* in its contract to furnish naval supplies.¹⁰⁴ *Solier & Delarue* – headed by Louis Solier and Louis Delarue – was one of Ouvrard's principal subcontractors, and we find numerous procurations in its favour signed by Michel l'*ainé* in 1802 and 1803.¹⁰⁵ But the most compelling evidence linking the brothers with Ouvrard involves several large-scale real estate deals made during the later consular period. On 22 January 1803, for example, Ouvrard sold four Parisian houses in the Rues du Mont Blanc et de Provence to Michel *jeune* for 640,000 francs.¹⁰⁶ In another colossal sale concluded on 23 March 1803, Ouvrard ceded him the following properties:

- The 100-acre farm of Châteaneuf at Quend (Somme) for 100,000 francs;¹⁰⁷
- The estates of Savonnières (Indre) and Villandry (with its famous château in the Indre-et-Loire) for 250,000 francs;¹⁰⁸
- The estates of Preuilley (Preuilley-sur-Claise in Indre-et-Loire) and Azay-le-Ferron (Indre-et-Loire) for 800,000 francs.¹⁰⁹ Ouvrard had acquired these on 13 September 1798 for 866,000 francs;¹¹⁰ and had founded a company with Jean-Marie Faure to exploit their forges and forestry resources for the navy.¹¹¹

Less than two months later, Ouvrard registered a notarial procuration for 300,000 francs in Michel *jeune*'s favour.¹¹² It was also during this period that Michel *jeune* achieved what he probably considered one of his greatest accomplishments. On 31 May 1803, he married Marie Élisabeth Antoinette Bernard de Civrieux – the daughter of Bernard de Civrieux – a trader from Lyon.¹¹³ This union connected him to Juliette Récamier (née Bernard) – a cousin of Marie Élisabeth – and established a financial alliance with her husband Jacques-

¹⁰⁴ MC/ET/VII/563, 27 floréal & 6 prairial XI/17 & 26 May 1803 and AN, 61 AQ 283. See also Berryer, *Souvenirs*, Tome II, p.337-338.

¹⁰⁵ For example, MC/ET/VII/558, 17 ventôse X/8 March 1802; MC/ET/VII/562, 18 & 23 nivôse XI/8 & 13 Jan. 1803; 5, 16 & 23 pluviôse XI/25 Jan., 5 & 12 Feb. 1803 ; 3, 12, 23 & 28 ventôse XI/22 Feb., 3, 14 & 19 March 1803 and MC/ET/VII/563, 27 floréal & 6 prairial XI/17 & 26 May 1803.

¹⁰⁶ MC/ET/VII/562, 2 pluviôse XI/22 Jan. 1803.

¹⁰⁷ MC/ET/VII/563, 2 germinal XI/23 March 1803.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ MC/ET/XCIX/761, 27 fructidor VI/13 Sep.1798.

¹¹¹ MC/ET/XCIII/227, 15 vendémiaire VIII/7 Oct. 1799.

¹¹² MC/ET/VII/563, 11 prairial XI/31 May 1803.

¹¹³ MC/ET/VII/563, 28 floréal XI/18 May 1803.

Rose Récamier and the banking community of Lyon which included the Bernard clan.¹¹⁴ For a revolutionary upstart like Michel *jeune* with no prior aristocratic or bourgeois pedigree, this represented a step up in society. The social importance he attached to his wife probably explains why Michel *jeune* began using her name in several business ventures, such as when he purchased the estates of Mézières-en-Brenne (Indre), Notz-Marafin (Indre) and Cigogné (Indre-et-Loire) on 5 February 1805.¹¹⁵ Moreover, she had many useful acquaintances including her friend Élie Louis Decazes, Fouché's close collaborator and Louis XVIII's future police minister.¹¹⁶

Thanks to these connections, Michel *jeune* became involved with Ouvrard, Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe (Paulée's associate) and the Spanish finance minister Espinosa in speculations on Mexican piasters,¹¹⁷ while Michel l'*ainé* joined the *Compagnie des Négociants Réunis* and participated in Médard Desprez's speculations on Spanish debt obligations (shares of the *Banco de San Carlos*).¹¹⁸ The legitimacy conferred on the brothers by their status as official state-suppliers did not rid them of their dubious reputation; but their proximity to Cambacérès shielded them from accountability. In a letter to his brother Joseph dated 23 December 1805, Napoleon denounced their fraudulent accounts for military supplies but concluded by advising: "*Don't say anything about any of this to Cambacérès because the Michel brothers are involved and I don't know to what extent his interests are affected.*"¹¹⁹

The brothers were heavily implicated in the *Banque de France*'s disastrous bankruptcy of 1805-1806. Notarial records reveal the *Compagnie Vanlerberghe et Ouvrard*, which had speculated on Spanish debt obligations marketed by the *Banco de San Carlos*, owed Michel *jeune* 2,846,552 francs in cash advances for bill discounts.¹²⁰ As the following imperial decree of 6 February 1806 shows, Napoleon was furious with the Michels and numbered them among those responsible for the crisis:

Mssrs. Ouvrard, Vanlerberghe, Michel ainé, entrepreneurs in the service of the Public Treasury for year XIV, and Desprez, negotiating agent, are declared to have retained the sums they were awarded for the service, amounting to 87,000,000 francs since 1st fructidor last, which they have embezzled for their own particular

¹¹⁴ For the links between Michel *jeune*, the Civrieux and the Récamiers, see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.328-329. The purchase of a house in the Rue de Richelieu by *Banque de France* Regent Jean-Michel Soehnée in Year VIII reveals Madame Michel held investments in the *Compagnie des vivres de Flandre et d'Allemagne* (MC/ET/XCVII/990, 8 fructidor VIII/26 Aug. 1800). She died in 1834 and named Juliette Récamier as her sole heir (see AP, DQ8 474, dossier 166 & DQ7 3444).

¹¹⁵ MC/ET/VII/572, 16 pluviôse XIII/5 Feb. 1805.

¹¹⁶ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.111.

¹¹⁷ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.50.

¹¹⁸ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.96 & 329.

¹¹⁹ CN, Tome XI, n°9604, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 2 nivôse XIV/23 December 1805.

¹²⁰ MC/ET/CIX/913, 26 Oct. 1808.

*speculations and their personal operations in Spain...Should the prescribed reimbursements not be made, Mssrs. Ouvrard, Vanlerberghe, Michel ainé and Desprez will be arrested. Their assets shall be seized, along with any goods they have sold since 1st Vendémiaire Year XII...*¹²¹

Another decree dated 18 February 1806 stipulated that:

*Given our decree of February 6 of this month which determines the sums that must be restituted to our Public Treasury by Mssrs. Ouvrard, Vanlerberghe, Michel ainé and Desprez, for the reimbursement of 87 million which they owe for obligations awarded them for the service of the Public Treasury, and which they diverted for their personal affairs...Considering the damages sustained by the Public Treasury inflicted by Mssrs. Ouvrard, Vanlerberghe and Michel ainé, who disposed – for their profit – of a large part of the obligations drawn on Mr. Espinosa by depositing them with their particular agents...Those bills of exchange amounting to 62,418,873 réals, deposited with Mssrs. Seguin and Michel jeune, will be retrieved from them within twenty-four hours.*¹²²

Although exposed in the imperial line of fire, the Michel brothers escaped prosecution thanks once again to their relations with Cambacérès. In fact, they almost immediately resumed their Spanish speculations. The *Compagnie Vanlerberghe et Ouvrard* had acknowledged it owed the Spanish government and its *Real Caja de Consolidation de Vales (caisse royale de consolidation d'Espagne)* 12 million francs – and Madrid wanted to recover the money.¹²³ On 14 March 1806, the Spanish foreign minister, Eugenio Izquierdo, signed a secret agreement with Michel jeune by which Spain agreed to pay him 411 bills of exchange amounting to 45,704,410 réals. These 411 bills had initially been paid to Ouvrard for grain purchases made on behalf of the *Caja de Consolidation* – and Ouvrard had cashed them in with Michel jeune in exchange for *rentes* yielding 5% interest, obligations on *receveurs généraux* and shares of the *Banque de France*.¹²⁴ The deal's conditions were “*absolutely extraordinary and followed by other mysterious clauses which made it very obscure and extremely complicated.*”¹²⁵

In July 1806, Michel jeune travelled to Madrid with a letter of recommendation from Murat – recently appointed commander-in-chief of the *Armée d'Espagne* – where he met Manuel Sixto Espinosa, director of the *Caja de Consolidation*, who agreed to honour the

¹²¹ CN, Tome XII, n°9764, *Decree of 6 February 1806*. See also Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.142.

¹²² Quoted in Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.148-149 – For the contractor Armand Seguin, see below.

¹²³ Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid), Estado 2881, *Eugenio Izquierdo to Godoy (?)*, undated (probably June 1806) – quoted in Zylberberg, *USDD*, p.538.

¹²⁴ Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid), Estado 5309, *Memorial por Dⁿ Michel menor*, Madrid, 1839 (quoted in Zylberberg, *USDD*, p.538).

¹²⁵ AN, AF/IV/1608, plaquette 2/IV – *Translation of a report by Juan Antonio de Uriarte, general bookkeeper of the Caja de Consolidation*, July 1808.

agreement signed with Izquierdo.¹²⁶ Michel *jeune* was declared the legitimate owner of the 411 bills of exchange and awarded 1% monthly interest for a year as compensation for delay of payment on the understanding that Spain would begin repaying the bills on 1 January 1807. Furthermore, Michel *jeune* was instructed by Espinosa to recover from the *Compagnie Vanlerberghe et Ouvrard* any sums pertaining to these bills – thereby allowing the *Caja de Consolidation* to recoup some of Ouvrard’s debts. Finally, in acknowledgement of his services, Michel *jeune* was appointed director of the *Caja de Consolidation*’s Parisian office in September 1806 on Espinosa’s recommendation. In fact, he advanced the bank forty million *réals* (equivalent to about 10 million francs) and regularly corresponded with Godoy.¹²⁷ When revolt appeared imminent in Spain, Michel *jeune* asked Murat to ensure the recovery of his advances to the Spanish Treasury.¹²⁸ We should also note that in October 1809, he furnished a loan of three million francs in hard currency to the new King of Spain, Joseph Bonaparte.¹²⁹

By 1810, Michel *jeune* was lending the state financial advances totalling over 15 million francs.¹³⁰ An appraisal of his estate conducted in June that year valued his company at 29.5 million francs – excluding the buildings he owned which were worth several millions more.¹³¹ The same document indicates he retired from business, aged thirty-seven, and entrusted the management of his affairs to a financial administrator – Antoine Grouët – who collected 10% commission on all revenues. In 1812, Michel *jeune* sold his *hôtel* in the Place Vendôme for 320,000 francs and retired to his château at Azay-le-Ferron where he was elected mayor on 3 August.¹³² By this time, his fortune may have been the largest of any military contractor in the Napoleonic realm excepting that of Ouvrard.

A final element suggesting Michel *jeune*’s Bonapartist sympathies relates to his attitude during the *Premier Empire*’s downfall. In May 1815, he housed forty officers and non-commissioned officers as well as four soldiers and sixty horses of the sixth imperial lancers at his Azay estate, all free of charge. After Waterloo, he was suspected of harbouring a high-ranking Napoleonic officer, possibly General Lefebvre Desnouettes or even Marshal Ney – whose corps he had supplied during the German and Russian campaigns. Twenty gendarmes searched the Château of Azay and Michel *jeune* was apprehended and

¹²⁶ Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid), Estado 2881, *Eugenio Izquierdo to Godoy*, 22 July 1806 – Murat wrote he had “*nothing to refuse*” to Madame Michel *jeune*.

¹²⁷ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.59.

¹²⁸ AN, 31AP/26, dossiers 554 & 555.

¹²⁹ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.59.

¹³⁰ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.50.

¹³¹ MC/ET/XCIII/330, 9 April 1812.

¹³² Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.59 & 101 – He held the office of mayor until 1816.

interrogated at Loches where he declared his guest was a former *lieutenant aux vivres* of the imperial army named Bagard who had not been proscribed. He was released after verifications confirmed his statement.¹³³ Nevertheless, when he requested a passport to travel on business to Prussia, he was placed under surveillance by the duc de Richelieu.¹³⁴

Unfortunately, the scarcity of detailed sources on the brothers means this cursory exposé broadly summarises the extent of our knowledge about their early activities. There is no doubt they were indispensable lenders to the Napoleonic regime and played an important role in financing and equipping its armies and navies. We may also safely assert that their connections at the highest levels allowed them to embezzle vast amounts of wealth with relative impunity. Both were reclusive characters who steered well clear from the limelight. Michel l'*ainé* lived to witness the advent of the July Monarchy and died on 21 March 1838; while Michel *jeune* survived to see Napoleon III take power and died aged 81 on 16 January 1852 in his *hôtel* located at 32 Rue de Clichy. He was buried in the Montmartre cemetery.

Michel-Jean Simons (1762–1833)

Michel was the eldest of seven children. His father, Jean Simons, was a wealthy carriage-maker and blacksmith from Brussels who was also a '*doyen*' of the '*nation de Saint-Jean*' – the guild of blacksmiths, locksmiths, tanners and clock-makers which traced its ancestry back to the foundation of that city's bourgeois guilds in 1421.¹³⁵ Jean made frequent business trips throughout Europe and even received a commission for a sumptuous carriage from Empress Maria Theresa in 1772. Michel's mother, Anna Pauwels, was the daughter of a Brussels merchant.¹³⁶

Michel had no interest in succeeding his father at the head of the family firm. Upon turning 18 in 1780, he established his own trading house in Dunkerque under the name '*Michel Simons, Catrice et Cie.*' His business developed so rapidly that he soon convinced his younger brother, Henry, to become his partner.¹³⁷ On 10 April 1787, Michel married

¹³³ *Ibid*, p.105-109.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, p.113.

¹³⁵ Jean Simons owned a large house with several dependencies located at the corner of the Rue du Marais and the Rue de la Blanchisserie which he had purchased on 22 October 1768. It was here that his carriage-making workshop was based under the legal name '*Jean Simons le jeune*'. In 1790, a German traveller named George Forster described it as employing 100-125 people with an estimated value of 80,000 florins. On the eve of Waterloo, the Duke of Richmond hosted a ball there (Stern, *LMML*, p.4-5).

¹³⁶ Stern, *LMML*, p.1-3.

¹³⁷ *Ibid*, p.6.

Sophie-Catherine Thiery, the 18-year-old daughter of one of Dunkerque's wealthiest and most influential families. Her father, Adrien Thiery, was an 'entrepreneur of the king's works' and a former alderman (*échevin*).¹³⁸ The following year, their first child – a daughter named Sophie – was born. Writing in 1805, Simons recalled his situation in 1789 immediately prior to the Revolution's outbreak:

*...I was the director of one of the premier commercial houses of Dunkerque, the owner and naval contractor of several vessels involved in the colonial trade for my benefit, doing the business of collecting commissions and providing banking services. I was the owner of three sugar plantations in the West Indies, where I had done important business and completed a trip for my trading house.*¹³⁹

Unfortunately for Simons, his trading house was hit hard by the slave revolts in Saint Domingue. Determined to recoup his losses, Michel left his brother Henry in charge of the Dunkerque firm and moved to Paris in November 1791 where he invested 200,000 *livres* in the *Greffulhe & Montz* bank of which 100,000 were advanced by his father.¹⁴⁰ This large investment granted Simons the status of a partner with the bank and entitled him to one fortieth of its profits and a twelfth of its interests. Fortune smiled upon him when the *Girondins* overthrew the *Feuillant* government in March 1792. General Dumouriez was appointed foreign minister, the invasion of Belgium was approved, and Dumouriez missioned one of his followers – a shady and experienced diplomatic fixer named Barthélémy Tort de la Sonde who had been involved in setting up the third *Compagnie des Indes* in the 1780s and whom Simons had previously met in Belgium – to organise the *Armée du Nord*'s supply.¹⁴¹

On 28 March 1792, Dumouriez instructed Tort to start negotiating contracts:

It is necessary, my dear La Sonde, that you immediately tend to the matter of having your friends assemble a great quantity of supplies of all sorts, so that the army will be sufficiently provided for when it enters [Belgium] and that a lack of means should not lead to pillaging. I conceive of the difficulty your friends will have to overcome to fulfil this object, without informing the Austrian government of their views, but I also know the extent of your relations in the country. Consequently, choose prudent intermediaries. Instruct them to come to Paris without losing any time, so that we can concert all the operations which need to be done...I ardently desire that you

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, p.7-8 – Jean Simons gave his son Michel the sum of 50,000 *livres* as a wedding present, while Sophie-Catherine brought an equivalent amount in her dowry.

¹³⁹ Archives générales du Royaume de Belgique (hereafter 'AGRB'), Saisie Michel Jean & Henry Simons (hereafter 'SMJHS'), Carton XIII-2 – *Simons to the president of the Cour d'Appel de Paris*, 1 thermidor XIII/20 July 1805.

¹⁴⁰ Stern, *LMML*, p.8-9.

¹⁴¹ See Tort's entry in the Biographical Index.

*should find, through the interest which you have in the enterprise entrusted to you, the reward of the services that you have long since rendered.*¹⁴²

Tort approached Michel Simons who eagerly agreed to participate in the venture. Michel submitted a plan to act as the banker of the entire operation, while his brother Henry would handle the signing and implementation of the supply contracts. When Tort reported these proposals to Dumouriez, the general initially hesitated:

*...As to the Simons brothers, I find them to be too interested to hope to conclude a deal with them, unless they consent to diminishing by nearly half the price which they offer for the delivery of most of the supplies we are asking from you, principally grain, weapons and forage.*¹⁴³

But as Dumouriez was about to enter Brussels on 21 October, he urged Tort from his headquarters at Sainte-Menehould to hasten preparations:

*Make sure before leaving Paris of your dispositions with the Simons and all others whom you judge worthy of your association. And if you are content with them, instruct them to come and meet you at Cambrai, where you will immediately go to wait upon me. Do not forget to submit your managers and associates to a contract which gives you the right to clearly verify all their accounts, since you shall be the one I shall blame if the accounting goes awry...*¹⁴⁴

On 4 November, the Simons brothers joined Dumouriez and Tort at the army's headquarters in Cambrai where they submitted a contract proposal which was agreed on the following terms:

*The signatories are agreed that all transactions carried out by Mr. Henry Simons of Dunkerque for the service of French armies for the duration of the present war will be supervised by him and their profits divided into halves and shared with Citizen [Tort de] La Sonde. Consequently, the latter will receive all communications relating to markets, bills and other supporting documents, as well as accounting, which are addressed to the social committee. Down payments shall be deposited with Mr. Michel Simons, banker in Paris, under his guarantee vis-à-vis the government.*¹⁴⁵

This deal established a company headed by Tort and Henry Simons. Michel did not sign the document since he was not a partner in the firm, but merely its banker in Paris. Financial responsibility fell upon his brother Henry who supervised the company's transactions. Tort incurred no risks whatsoever and on 8 November – two days after the Battle of Jemappes – he ceded his interest in the venture to Dumouriez's mistress, Madame de Beauvert (Rivarol's sister), at the *Armée du Nord's* new headquarters in Mont-Saint-

¹⁴² AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton XIV.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* Quoted in Stern, *LMML*, p.16.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Quoted in Stern, *LMML*, p.17.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid* – *Observations générales pour Henry Simons contre Tort de la Sonde.* Quoted in Stern, *LMML*, p.18.

Martin.¹⁴⁶ That same day Dumouriez ordered the army's *commissaire-ordonnateur*, Malus, to conclude two agreements with Henry Simons at Mons – one for 60,000 quintals of oats, 120,000 quintals of hay and 40,000 quintals of straw representing a month's worth of supplies; and the second for 25,000 sacks of flour. Henry, who had already loaned Dumouriez 400,000 *livres* in late October, also agreed to provide 10,000 blankets and 200 flasks of *eau-de-vie* from Barcelona.¹⁴⁷ All these orders entailed growing liquidity needs for Henry who decided on 19 November to entrust a third of his company interest to Michel.¹⁴⁸ The brothers reaped considerable profits during Dumouriez's Belgian Campaign which enabled Michel to purchase the *domaine de la Chauvennerie* (Ozoir-la-Ferrière, Seine-et-Marne) on 23 July 1793 for 400,000 *livres* from a Citizen Legendre.¹⁴⁹

But the Simons' contract with Dumouriez was soon threatened by the new war minister, Jean-Nicolas Pache, who had created the *Directoire des subsistances générales* (a.k.a. the *Directoire des achats*) on 4 November 1792 to centralise all military purchases. Pache and Cambon denounced Dumouriez's dealings with contractors like the Abbé d'Espagnac and convinced the National Convention to appoint a commission of four members (Camus, Gossuin, Delacroix and Danton) on 30 November to investigate his contracts. Simon Pick, the *Directoire des achats*'s new agent for Belgium, reported that: "*From morning until evening, all the generals are at [Henry Simons's] house which resembles more a court than the workshop of a master saddle-maker.*"¹⁵⁰ Dumouriez retorted that "*the market with Henry Simons is the only one on which we are actually subsisting, and without which we could not survive.*"¹⁵¹ Jean-Baptiste Payen, a chemist and friend of Jean-Antoine Chaptal sent to inspect military warehouses, confirmed that: "*The armies up until now have only been furnished by the flour of the Simons.*"¹⁵² On 12 December, Armand-Gaston Camus delivered a report to the National Convention stressing the *Armée du Nord*'s pressing supply needs and Dumouriez was finally granted authorisation to negotiate agreements.

Michel Simons made many friends across the political divide to consolidate his position. He attached himself to Girondins like Dumouriez and Barbaroux, but also gravitated towards Jacobins such as Chabot, Desmoulins and Fabre d'Églantine. He also frequented the American representative Gouverneur Morris and the English bailiff of the National Convention – Augustus Rose – one of Pitt's agents in France. More importantly, he

¹⁴⁶ Stern, *LMML*, p.18-19.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.21.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.29.

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in Poisson, *Les fournisseurs aux armées sous la Révolution française*, p.208-209.

¹⁵¹ Letter of Dumouriez to Pache dated 12 November 1792 quoted in Stern, *LMML*, p.26.

¹⁵² AN, F/7/4598, *mémoire du 20 décembre 1792*.

maintained close links with influential financiers including the Baron Louis, Berthold Proly, François Desfieux and especially Charles-Pierre Maximilien Radix de Sainte-Foix.¹⁵³

In 1790 Radix – who became Talleyrand’s financial *éminence grise* under the Directory – and his nephew Antoine Omer Talon, a former *lieutenant civil* at the Châtelet courts, had been recruited by foreign minister Montmorin on Mirabeau’s recommendation to serve as intermediaries in the royalist faction’s secret operation to corrupt the Revolution from within. Talon had been appointed director of the king’s ‘civil list’ – a register of royal servants remunerated by the state (based on the British model) voted into existence by the National Assembly on 9 June 1790. He and his uncle Radix spent millions of *livres* in bribes to purchase the votes of complacent legislative deputies in a desperate attempt to avert the monarchy’s prosecution and deposition.¹⁵⁴ Following the Storming of the Tuileries, commissioners of the Paris Commune discovered confidential papers detailing their furtive manoeuvres in a sealed safe hidden in a wall of the Tuileries Palace. One particularly incriminating letter from Radix to Louis XVI dated May 1792 confirmed Dumouriez had rallied the king’s cause:

*Those persons whose intentions are suitable for service would be Clavière for finance, Kersaint for the Navy, Leflos for one of the departments of the Interior, Dietrich for another, and Dumouriez for Foreign Affairs. The latter holds a truly magical influence over them. He has intellect and a sufficient dose of knowledge. Besides which he is far less exaggerated than is believed – we are certain of this since we ourselves convinced him of the usefulness of our views.*¹⁵⁵

It remains unclear whether Simons played any role in this large-scale corruption. What is certain is that Radix was apprehended as he was about to flee to Brussels with the Simons brothers and Tort and only escaped the guillotine thanks to the intervention of Bertrand Barère.¹⁵⁶ Talon was more fortunate and secured a passport signed by Danton, Clavière and Lebrun which enabled him to flee to London.¹⁵⁷ Michel Simons also appears to have escaped this episode relatively unscathed.

¹⁵³ Stern, *LMML*, p.29-30.

¹⁵⁴ Olivier Blanc (*LCST*, p.12 & 18) suggests Radix and Talon were taking advantage of the king’s extremely vulnerable position to line their own pockets with funds diverted from royal coffers and various ministries.

¹⁵⁵ *Troisième recueil des papiers trouvés dans l’armoire de fer au Château des Tuileries* (hereafter ‘TRPTAF’), Tome I, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1793, n°X, p.25.

¹⁵⁶ Blanc, *LCST*, p.40 – Both Radix and Barère had been members of the Duke of Orléans circle. Blanc suggests Radix was saved because he held compromising information on Barère.

¹⁵⁷ AN, W//77, plaquette 3:166 – Talon only returned to France under the Consulate when he was arrested and questioned by police. The minutes of his interrogation (AN, F/7/6374, dossier 7634) – in which he is quite forthcoming about his links with Mirabeau, Montmorin, Danton and others – constitute invaluable evidence detailing the networks of parliamentary corruption during the early Revolution. Another significant

However, Dumouriez's treason in April 1793 cast a new veil of suspicion over Michel Simons's activities. Unfortunately, the few surviving archival records render it impossible to determine whether he supported Dumouriez's attempted coup. We can only confidently state that he was one of Dumouriez's principal financial collaborators. In September, Tort was imprisoned in the citadel of Antwerp and Michel was arrested while returning to Paris from his house at Prunay (near Louveciennes) and incarcerated at the La Force prison, but released within twenty-four hours after Chabot intervened.¹⁵⁸ The Simons petitioned the Revolutionary government for a refund of 1,700,000 *livres* they claimed was owed them in arrears, enrolling the deputies Chabot and Julien de Toulouse to plead their cause; but this was rejected by the Convention in mid-October. Then on 30 October, the banker Jacques-Marc Montz was arrested and the *Greffulhe & Montz* bank was shut down and searched. Michel still had an office there despite having already paid the 200,000 *livres* he owed the bank as a guarantee.¹⁵⁹

Finally on 15 November, a former servant of the Simons brothers named Coindet – whom they had dismissed for impropriety – denounced them to the Guillaume Tell section in Paris, accusing them of having stolen gold and silver from Belgium in connivance with Dumouriez and his associates. Michel's house at Prunay was searched and on 17 November the *Comité de Salut public* ordered the arrest of the Simons brothers.¹⁶⁰ But Michel had already left Paris for Dunkerque where he obtained a passport after offering to supply the town on 14 December. He set sail for Altona – a centre of émigré activity in the vicinity of Hamburg – on 11 February 1794.¹⁶¹ Meanwhile, Coindet had registered another accusation on 20 January and the *Comité de Sûreté générale* had issued a second arrest warrant on 6 February against the Simons, their relatives, servants, mistresses and other relations.¹⁶² Two days later, Michel's wife and brother Henry were apprehended and his house in the Faubourg Poissonnière was searched. However, Henry was soon released and on 7 June, after Madame Simons had paid 40,000 *livres* to reimburse sums her husband owed the government, the *Comité de Salut public* deemed Michel Simons was useful to the

dossier regarding occult finance under the first two revolutionary legislatures is that regrouping the private papers of Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély (AN, F/7/6683 – *papiers privés de Regnaud saisis en 1815*).

¹⁵⁸ Stern, *LMML*, p.30-31 – Tort had been dispatched to Brussels in June 1791 to meet Metternich and attempt a *rapprochement* between Paris and Vienna. When Tort subsequently sought refuge in Brussels, Metternich had him arrested on 29 July 1793 because he was an embarrassing witness to their previous negotiations (*Ibid*, p.12-14)!

¹⁵⁹ AN, F/7/4774, dossier 51 (Jacques-Marc Montz) & AF/II/*/290, dossier de Jacques-Marc Montz.

¹⁶⁰ AN, W//76.

¹⁶¹ Stern, *LMML*, p.33.

¹⁶² AN, AF/II/*/292/f°12.

Republic “*through his knowledge of maritime commerce*” and ordered his house be returned. Madame Simons was eventually released on 15 August.¹⁶³

The Dumouriez affair continued to plague the Simons brothers for many years. In February 1799, Tort reappeared in Paris and demanded 2,535,000 *livres* from Henry Simons which he claimed were owed him on the Dumouriez contract. The following month, a court order instructed the Simons brothers to advance a down payment of 100,000 francs and submit their accounts to a full audit. Their appeal against this decision marked the start of a long legal battle which took forty-five verdicts to resolve. In January 1803, Madame de Beauvert unsuccessfully attempted a mediation between her two former associates;¹⁶⁴ and Michel was only cleared of all charges by the *Tribunal de la Seine* on 9 October 1804. The less fortunate Henry was condemned to pay Tort 616,271 francs on 16 April 1806.¹⁶⁵

During the later revolutionary period, Michel Simons effected a remarkable business comeback which propelled him to new heights. His recovery began after the Walckiers Company – having signed a contract to supply French armies in Belgium via the intermediary of Tort in December 1794– sent an agent named Schwartz to offer the Simons brothers a participation in the venture in June 1795. The brothers declined the offer, stating their presence in Hamburg was necessary to continue supplying Dunkerque and that the French government still owed them 1,700,000 *livres*. Nonetheless, they offered to supply French troops with 100,000 quintals of wheat to be delivered in Baltic ports.¹⁶⁶ The Thermidorian Convention declined their offer and signed a contract with Édouard Walckiers instead – who promptly subcontracted the supply of the 100,000 quintals to the Simons! Thus, the brothers benefited from the situation and moreover succeeded in increasing the price of the wheat they delivered in Amsterdam from 34 to 36 *livres* per quintal, claiming that:

*...the British buy at all prices, and it would be a glorious blow to deprive them of four to five thousand lasts of wheat, which approximates to nearly everything that is still allowed to be exported from the Baltic.*¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ AN, F/7/4775, dossier 19.

¹⁶⁴ AN, F/7/3703. Ministry of Justice, Report of 14 nivôse XI/4 Jan. 1803.

¹⁶⁵ Michel successfully argued the company he founded with his brother and Tort to supply Dumouriez’s army on 4 November 1792 was independent from the second company he founded with Henry on 19 November 1792. Supporting documents relating to this case can be found in AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton XIV.

¹⁶⁶ AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton XIV.

¹⁶⁷ *Defence speech for Barthélémy Tort de la Sonde by Pierre-François Réal before the Tribunal criminel du département de la Dyle at Brussels*, hearings of 14 & 15 thermidor IV/1 & 2 Aug. 1796, p.65 (quoted in Stern, *LMML*, p.38-39) – Walckiers simply passed on the extra costs to the French.

The contract expired in October 1795 and netted the Simons a profit of 1,587,132 francs.¹⁶⁸ In May 1796, they signed a new deal to supply grain to France with Michel departing for Amsterdam on 11 May to confer with Walckiers.¹⁶⁹

This period also marked a new chapter in Michel Simons's personal life. In March 1796, he began a longstanding relationship with Mademoiselle Lange (Anne-Françoise-Élisabeth Lange), a young actress born in Genoa of French parents who had been Talma's disciple at the *Comédie Française*. Her sensational performance in François de Neufchâteau's *Paméla ou la vertu récompensée* in August 1793 had brought her instant fame and turned women's hats into the latest Parisian fashion. But the National Convention had condemned the play for royalist sympathies and Collot d'Herbois – a former actor himself – had ordered Mademoiselle Lange imprisoned pending execution.¹⁷⁰ Fortunately, she had wealthy admirers – such as the banker Jacques-Marc Montz – who paid handsomely to ensure her nine months of incarceration were spent in mild conditions.¹⁷¹ Having escaped the guillotine, she was released on 25 May 1794 and soon became the queen of the *Théâtre Feydeau*, earning the delightful nickname 'la merveille des merveilles'.¹⁷² Michel was so captivated by Mademoiselle Lange's charms that he divorced his wife on 6 May 1796 and the following month (15 June) acquired as a present for his new sweetheart the estate of Montalais near Meudon – endowed with a stunning façade overlooking the Seine – hiring the architect François-Joseph Bélanger to refurbish it.¹⁷³

Michel Simons was resolved to take full advantage of the economic transition from the *assignat* to the *mandat territorial* in early 1796. He conceived a project to purchase British guineas from the Bank of England and import them into France where they would be

¹⁶⁸ AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton XIV – *Letter of Michel Simons to Walckiers*, 23 Sep. 1796 (Account summary for the shipping of 4,000 lasts of wheat).

¹⁶⁹ Stern, *LMML*, p.78.

¹⁷⁰ The play contained the verses: "Ah! Les persécuteurs sont les seuls condamnables. Et les plus tolérants sont les plus raisonnables."

¹⁷¹ Initially imprisoned at Sainte-Pélagie, she was transferred on 24 September 1793 to the Pension Belhomme in the Rue de Charonne. Conditions there were so lax that she kept a maid and even signed a notarial document in her room to purchase an *hôtel* in the Rue Saint-Georges for 60,000 *livres* on 24 January 1794! The authorities eventually clamped down on the pension and Lange was sent back to Sainte-Pélagie on 3 February. See Frédéric Lenormand, *La Pension Belhomme : Une prison de luxe sous la Terreur*, Paris: Fayard, 2002, p.87-92 & Stern, *LMML*, p.57 & 61-62.

¹⁷² See Stern, *LMML*, p.63-64 & Lenormand, *La Pension Belhomme*, p.91 – A fellow actor employed at the *bureau des pièces accusatives* named Labussière helped her avoid the guillotine. Her release order is conserved at the *Archives de la Préfecture de Police de Paris* (Série AA, carton 21, folio 468). It is often said Barras was her lover and freed her, but nothing corroborates this. Nonetheless, Mademoiselle Lange had a sulphurous reputation. Before meeting Michel, she already had a daughter with a Hamburg banker named Hoppé and had conducted an affair with an adventurer named Leuthraud – a former wig-maker's apprentice turned military contractor who hosted her in the *hôtel de Salm* (Stern, *LMML*, p.70-71). Leuthraud styled himself 'Le comte de Beauregard' and owned the Château de Bagatelle and an interest in the cannon foundry of Moulins. On 26 June 1798, he was arrested for royalist sympathies and condemned to four years in prison.

¹⁷³ Stern, *LMML*, p.101-102 – The property originally had only two acres of land but was progressively enlarged to 8 acres through various purchases of adjacent property by Simons between 1800 and 1803.

melted and reminted into French hard currency. Simons hoped the Directory would advance him four million francs for this venture, arguing the purchase of large quantities of guineas would depreciate British currency and facilitate the circulation of French coins. When the government failed to respond, he proceeded regardless and founded a new company on 22 November 1796 with a banker from Antwerp named Jean Werbrouck “*to convert foreign currencies and other monies of gold and silver into French currency in the mints of Lille and Bordeaux.*” This company was established for a year’s duration and headquartered in Paris, with 70% of profits going to Michel Simons and the remaining 30% to Werbrouck. Simons was responsible for conducting negotiations with the mint in Bordeaux while Werbrouck served as the liaison with the mint in Lille.¹⁷⁴

A few weeks later, Simons opened new negotiations with the Directory. This time, he made sure to enlist the support of Talleyrand’s henchman – Radix – and through Talleyrand the project was communicated to Barras. Talleyrand was careful not to compromise himself with Simons and delegated the responsibility of carrying on negotiations and corresponding with Werbrouck to Radix.¹⁷⁵ An agreement was concluded on 14 January 1797 between the Directory and the Simons-Werbrouck Company on the following terms:

- Finance minister Ramel would advance the company four million francs in hard currency for the extraction of guineas from Britain and the purchase of gold in Portugal. This advance was to be reimbursed within six months to the French Treasury in monies of gold and silver;
- The Simons-Werbrouck Company agreed to extract 15,000-20,000 guineas per month from Britain enabling it to print – at its own expense – six million francs in the mints of Lille and Bordeaux;
- In return, the Directory would award the company a commission of 2.5% on all hard currency in gold produced by these mints.¹⁷⁶

Furthermore, a complementary note from Ramel dated 21 January 1797 awarded the Simons-Werbrouck Company the right to gratuitously export a certain number of goods (wheat, rye, barley, etc.) from the nine Belgian *départements réunis*:

...in order to introduce in France a quantity of guineas proportional to the value of these goods...These operations must be combined to fulfil all the [French] government’s views, whose double object is to harm England through the extraction

¹⁷⁴ AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton V.

¹⁷⁵ AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton V contains a letter from Radix to Werbrouck detailing the intentions of ‘Ram...’ (Ramel), who wanted to centralise the operation in Paris.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

*of its hard currency and to encourage agriculture in the [Belgian] départements réunis by procuring their rural inhabitants a limited outlet for the surplus of their harvests.*¹⁷⁷

Thanks to these operations, Simons rapidly expanded his fortune and began conducting large amounts of business in Belgium. On 6 April 1797, he took advantage of the sale of confiscated Belgian ecclesiastical goods to purchase the *Abbaye de la Cambre* in Brussels for 428,350 *livres* at an auction held in the offices of the administration of the *département* of the Dyle. The sale was recorded in the name of his henchman Raphaël de Coster – a former cleric.¹⁷⁸ Simons also became an associate in Ouvrard's extensive naval supplying networks, concluding various contracts with the naval ministry to supply wood in the fourth Belgian *arrondissement* and construct shipyards and hydraulic works at Antwerp. These agreements were signed using various names to accommodate Ouvrard.¹⁷⁹ On 24 December 1797, Michel capped off a productive year by marrying Mademoiselle Lange at the *mairie* of Paris's second *arrondissement* with François de Neufchâteau and Talleyrand standing witnesses.

With his affairs back in full swing, Simons steadily reinforced his links with Radix and Talleyrand. To better dissimulate their dealings, he became the financial guarantor of a gambling house located at 58, Rue Honoré near the Place Vendôme. This establishment, which welcomed influential deputies and doubled as a luxury brothel, was managed by a matron named Raynal and reportedly protected by François de Neufchâteau's police. Naturally, the gambling was merely a cover for the contracts and attendant government decrees which Simons, Radix and Talleyrand discussed and agreed on the building's second floor.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, Talleyrand's networks at the foreign ministry regularly provided Simons with lucrative schemes. According to Barras, when the Treaty of Lunéville was signed on 9 February 1801, Talleyrand insisted that payments owed by the Austrian emperor relating to Belgium – amounting to 33 million florins – should be paid in their entirety. Simons suggested that Talleyrand withdraw them in Belgium where their face value was 33%. They retrieved 18 million florins worth of payments and sold these on the market at 66% of their face value, netting Talleyrand a profit of three million florins and Michel Simons 1,600,000.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ For more on this deal, see Stern, *LMML*, p.102-106.

¹⁷⁸ The purchase was recorded by notarial act on 14 thermidor V/1 Aug. 1797 – Étude de M^e François Dufour, notaire à Bruxelles. Simons planned to transform the abbey's palace into a country retreat by clearing several dependencies and planting gardens, but this project was never executed. The sale of confiscated ecclesiastical goods in the Belgian *départements réunis* had been decreed on 1 Sep. 1796.

¹⁷⁹ Stern, *LMML*, p.142-143.

¹⁸⁰ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.295 – Rapport politique du 24 nivôse VII/13 Jan. 1799.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*, Tome IV, p.262.



Figure 5:5
Portrait of Mademoiselle Lange as Danaë
by Anne-Louis Girodet de Roussy-Trioson, 1799
Minneapolis Institute of Arts/Public Domain (CC-PDM)

Simons is one of the rare financiers who appears in the events of Brumaire and his proximity to Talleyrand's faction could indicate he had prior knowledge of the conspiracy.¹⁸² He certainly considered the change of regime yielded new opportunities. On 29 November 1799 – just a few days after the coup – he petitioned the new naval minister Forfait for the general supply of the navy in the Belgian *départements réunis*.¹⁸³ Ouvrard and his associates – the Michel brothers and *Sollier, fils & Delarue* – were aware of Simons's application, for the following day they signed an agreement with him to submit a joint project soliciting the entire supply of the navy for Year VIII. Ouvrard, the Michel brothers and Louis Delarue were to negotiate the general contract while Simons would keep all his subsidiary agreements with the navy which included:

- The supply of wood in the fourth Belgian *département*;
- The construction of frigates, shipyards and hydraulic works at Antwerp;
- The exclusive rights to purchase hemp in the fourth Belgian *département* and its adjacent regions extending to the right bank of the Seine;
- The right to receive a commission of at least 2% when selling these supplies.¹⁸⁴

Simons was paid in bills of exchange drawn on a Parisian banking house with a sixty-day validity payable with the Michel brothers, Jacques-Rose Récamier or Charles Martin Doyen. In exchange, he agreed to abide by the terms and conditions of Ouvrard's general contract for the supply of the navy and to grant a 10% discount on all payments made to him for wood supplies by the Michel brothers, Ouvrard or Delarue.¹⁸⁵ While these financiers had shared interests, their solidarity was by no means absolute. When Bonaparte ordered Ouvrard arrested on 27 January 1800 Simons seized the opportunity to promote his own affairs, successfully expanding his wood supply contract to include the *départements* of the Nord, Pas-de-Calais and Jemappes and prolonging it for six years beginning on 22 March 1801.¹⁸⁶

But all these agreements merely laid the groundwork for a far more ambitious undertaking of pharaonic proportions – the refurbishment of Antwerp's port and its resurgence as the leading colonial trading centre it had been during the sixteenth century.¹⁸⁷ Simons

¹⁸² See Chapter 6.

¹⁸³ AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton V.

¹⁸⁴ For these contracts see AGRB, *SMJHS*, n^{os}269-286, 698-776, 802-808 and Stern, *LMML*, p.156-157 & 162.

¹⁸⁵ AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton V.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid* – *Proposal of Michel-Jean Simons to supply wood for naval construction*, 19 prairial IX/8 June 1801. For Ouvrard's arrest see Chapter 6.

¹⁸⁷ Most of what follows is based on François Antoine, 'La tentative de relance du commerce international à partir d'Anvers autour des années 1800-1803' in Anne de Mathan; Pierrick Pourchasse & Philippe Jarnoux

envisaged this enterprise as the crowning achievement of his career, writing to the naval ministry that his speculations were based “*on the probabilities that Antwerp will once again become a considerable place of commerce.*”¹⁸⁸ The project’s cornerstone was the acquisition of the *Abbaye de Saint-Michel* which Simons purchased in partnership with Jean Johannot on 27 August 1800 for 322,000 francs from the contractor Jean-Baptiste Paulée.¹⁸⁹ Simons planned to convert the building into the port’s central warehouse for colonial goods and naval supplies due to its ideal location adjoining the citadel (which afforded it protection) and running along the Scheldt’s estuary. Moreover, Simons’s old business associate – Jean Werbrouck – had become mayor of Antwerp and conveniently agreed to position a new *place du commerce* adjacent to the abbey.¹⁹⁰ The Simons brothers founded a new company named *Simon frères* with a starting capital of one million francs in February 1802 for a duration of six years for the “*purchases and sales of merchandise, public funds, banking and commercial effects, consignments, maritime expeditions and all other commercial operations which the city of Antwerp is likely to undertake.*”¹⁹¹ One of their main investors was José Martínez de Hervás, the Spanish ambassador in Paris and a major player in the Spanish wool trade, who advanced 300,000 francs to Michel Simons, 200,000 to his brother Henry and 100,000 to Jean Johannot.¹⁹² Michel himself was appointed deputy for the commerce of Antwerp on 15 January 1803.¹⁹³

Michel had conducted a large amount of preliminary market research and established that Belgium’s forests held large timber reserves ideal for naval construction. He even acquired broad tracts of the forest of Avesnes which had formerly belonged to the House of Orléans.¹⁹⁴ But transporting this wood overland to naval bases in northern France like Le Havre or Dunkerque via the dilapidated road networks of the Oise presented significant logistical problems.¹⁹⁵ Simons therefore submitted a project to Bonaparte to open a water

(eds), *La mer, la guerre et les affaires : Enjeux et réalités maritimes de la Révolution française*, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2017: 227-237.

¹⁸⁸ AGRB, *SMJHS*, n°1732 – *The proprietors of the Abbaye de Saint-Michel to the Naval Minister*, undated.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, n°s 1586, 1597, 1598, 1636, 1643 & 1655. See also in the *SMJHS*, Acte du 21 fructidor VIII/8 Sep. 1800 – Étude de M^e Wauters, notaire du département des Deux-Nèthes & Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.82. The Abbaye de Saint Michel had been bought by Paulée as a *bien national* on 18 April 1797.

¹⁹⁰ AGRB, *SMJHS*, n°s 1667 & 1669.

¹⁹¹ Zylberberg, *USSD*, p.463-464. Stern (*LMML*, p.168) quotes a notarial document I could not find: *Acte du 5 fructidor X/23 Aug. 1802 enregistré à Paris le 29 pluviôse XIII/18 Feb. 1805 – Étude de M^e Lezain*.

¹⁹² AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton 5 – In 1806, Hervás still had 313,387 francs invested in *Simon frères* (see MC/ET/CVII/686, 26 Sep. 1806, *État des crédits dont le marquis d’Almenara autorise Eugenio Izquierdo à suivre le recouvrement*).

¹⁹³ Extract from the deliberation of the Conseil du commerce of Antwerp, 25 nivôse XI/15 Jan. 1803 (quoted in Stern, *LMML*, p.172 & *Moniteur*, 1 fructidor XI/19 Aug. 1803).

¹⁹⁴ MC/ET/XI/807, 4 germinal IX/25 March 1801; MC/ET/XI/810, 23 vendémiaire IX/15 Oct. 1801 and MC/ET/XI/811, 19 frimaire X/10 Dec. 1801.

¹⁹⁵ Simons presented a report underscoring how the decrepit road network of the Oise was hindering the transport of timber from Avesnes to naval bases (AGRB, *SMJHS*, n°783).



Figure 5:6 – The Abbaye Saint Michel in Antwerp
 Engraving by Hendrik Causé after Peter Paul Rubens, c.1699, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam
 Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org> (uploaded by ‘Andreas Philopater’)
 CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain




Figure 5:7 – Plan of the Abbaye Saint Michel in Antwerp belong to Mssrs. M.-J. Simons and J. Johannot
 by an unknown artist, undated
 © Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

route linking Paris, Brussels, Antwerp and the left bank of the Rhine via the Scheldt and Sambre Rivers under the management of a company named '*Entreprise de navigation de Paris à Charleroi*'. This would enable large quantities of timber to be shipped to Antwerp which Napoleon planned to transform into a major naval base in preparation for his invasion of Britain. The project's cost was estimated at six million francs with construction work expected to take three years.¹⁹⁶ Bonaparte approved the project, but its execution was repeatedly delayed and ultimately shelved in 1809 because the planned canal between Pontoise and Paris was never built.¹⁹⁷

Unfortunately for Simons, Bonaparte's militarisation of Antwerp dashed his dreams of re-establishing the city as a colonial port. On 21 July 1803, the First Consul issued a directive for the construction of a naval arsenal on the site of the *Abbaye de Saint-Michel*;¹⁹⁸ and Simons and Johannot were forced to sell the building to the French government for 600,000 francs.¹⁹⁹ By the end of 1803, three of the arsenal's twelve new docks were already in service.²⁰⁰ Thanks to help from the Third Consul Lebrun, Simons was able to turn some profit from his operations.²⁰¹ But Antwerp's Chamber of Commerce echoed the feelings of many when it wrote to Napoleon complaining that his fateful decision had sacrificed their city's commercial prosperity to military prerogatives.²⁰²

The misappropriation of Antwerp was not the first instance of Napoleon thwarting Simons's aspirations. On 1 September 1800, Simons had purchased Mademoiselle Dervieux's former *hôtel* in the rue de la Victoire – a palatial residence constructed by Brongniart in 1777 and elaborately expanded and decorated by Bélanger ten years later. Madame Simons's bed alone cost 25,000 francs.²⁰³ But the Simons did not long enjoy their new acquisition. One morning, the First Consul paid them a visit and requested they sell the *hôtel* to his stepdaughter – Hortense de Beauharnais – who was enraptured by it. Michel consulted Talleyrand about the possibility of keeping the property but was advised to let it go and sold it on 27 July 1802 for 200,000 *livres*.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁶ AGRB, *SMJHS*, n^{os}638-688 – *Project presented by Citizen Simons for the opening of a navigable waterway between Paris, Brussels, Antwerp and the départements of the Rhine's left bank.*

¹⁹⁷ Stern, *LMML*, p.163-164.

¹⁹⁸ AGRB, *SMJHS*, n^o1599.

¹⁹⁹ MC/ET/VII/565, 10 vendémiaire XII/3 Oct. 1803 – Naval Minister Decrès was authorised to make this purchase by two consular decrees dated 2 thermidor XI/21 July 1803 and 8 vendémiaire XII/1 Oct. 1803.

²⁰⁰ See Jan Parmentier, 'L'arsenal maritime d'Anvers (1797-1814)' in Carl Depauw (ed), *Bonaparte et l'Escaut : le spectaculaire développement d'Anvers à l'époque française*, Anvers: BAI, 2013, p.102.

²⁰¹ AGRB, *SMJHS*, n^o1734 – *Jean Johannot to Michel Simons*, 28 thermidor XI/16 Aug. 1803.

²⁰² *Ibid*, n^o313 – *The members of Antwerp's Chambre de commerce to Napoléon*, 4 fructidor XII/22 Aug. 1804.

²⁰³ Remacle, Louis (Comte de), *Relations secrètes des agents de Louis XVIII à Paris sous le Consulat (1802-1803)*, Paris: Plon, 1899, p.83, Letter of 28 July 1802.

²⁰⁴ MC/ET/LXVIII/700, 8 thermidor X/27 July 1802.

Although Simons had entertained high hopes for his association with the Bonapartist regime, Napoleon's inherent distrust and contempt for military contractors disbarred him from securing permanent government patronage. Michel continued his close involvement with Ouvrard's naval affairs and piaster speculations, notably conducting unsuccessful negotiations with *Hope & Co.* and *Raymond & Théodore de Smeth* in Amsterdam in May 1806 on behalf of the Spanish foreign minister – Izquierdo – to raise a loan of 30 million florins for the Spanish court payable over fifteen years on the Dutch market.²⁰⁵ Concurrent accusations of embezzlement related to the Dumouriez contract continued to bedevil the Simons brothers, and Napoleon eventually ordered the *Conseil de Liquidation* to perform a full review of their accounts on 23 July 1806. Jacques Defermon, Director of Public Debt, presented Napoleon with the council's report and on 21 September 1808 the Emperor issued the following decree:

*Mssrs. Henry and Michel-Jean Simons are authorised to transfer to the Public Treasury before 1 January 1809 the sum of one million francs in consolidated bonds of 5%, following which they will be cleared of all the charges detailed against them in our decree of 23 July 1806 and exonerated from any reprisals that could be exercised against them.*²⁰⁶

By 1810, Michel Simons's financial situation had become desperate. He pleaded with the French naval minister to repay arrears of supplies owed him but this was refused, prompting Mollien to elicit a rare criticism of his imperial master:

*I cannot sufficiently insist on the gravity of the fault Napoleon committed at this time when, in order to exact revenge for a few supplies that were poorly made and to punish a few prevaricating subordinates, he refused to recognise and repay the remaining incontestable debts, under pretext that they exceeded the credits which the ministers had at their disposal.*²⁰⁷

In December that year, Henry Simons filed for bankruptcy.²⁰⁸ Soon after, Michel was forced to sell his remaining assets to pay off outstanding debts to *Raymond & Théodore de Smeth* of Amsterdam.²⁰⁹ On 14 August 1817, Madame Simons used the remainder of her fortune to purchase the estate of Bossey in the Swiss *Pays de Vaud* for 185,000 francs from Mr. Jacques Aversenc.²¹⁰ She died on a trip to Florence in December 1825. After a long

²⁰⁵ See AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton XV, *Protocole de mes conférences à Amsterdam* – The details of these complex negotiations are summarised in Zylberberg, *USDD*, p.539.

²⁰⁶ AN, AF/IV/332, plaquette 2417:13 – *Imperial decree of 21 Sep. 1808*.

²⁰⁷ Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.425.

²⁰⁸ See his letter to Michel dated 2 Dec. 1810 in AGRB, *SMJHS*, carton IV.

²⁰⁹ The De Smeths went bankrupt shortly afterwards. Simons was their principal debtor (Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.606, footnote).

²¹⁰ Stern, *LMML*, p.209 – Aversenc had purchased the estate from Madame de Staël.

legal battle with his daughter, Palmyre, Michel Simons was expelled from Bossey in May 1827. He died at Evian on 30 January 1833 having lost his fortune and abandoned by all.

Pierre Louis Hanet-Cléry (1760–1834) & The Invasion of Switzerland

Although often overlooked in Napoleon's early career, the French invasion of Switzerland was one of the Directory's military campaigns for which he bore direct responsibility. On 8 December 1797 – three days after his return from Rastatt – Bonaparte discussed the operation during a secret dinner at the Luxembourg with the director Jean-François Reubell and his friend Pierre Ochs (leader of the 'Patriot' party in Berne).²¹¹ Plans were agreed in the ensuing days to use Bernese patriots as a Trojan horse and on 28 December France announced it was conferring its official protection upon the *Pays de Vaux*. Less than a month later (24 January 1798), the region seceded from Switzerland and declared its independence as the 'Lemanic Republic' (*République lémanique*), equipped with a new constitution written by Reubell and Ochs. Revolutionary movements simultaneously erupted in Lausanne, Berne, Lucerne and Solothurn. French troops commanded by Generals Brune and Schauenbourg intervened and occupied the canton of Berne to protect the patriotic movement there, while the cantons of Mulhouse and Geneva were forcibly annexed by France (28 January and 15 April 1798).²¹²

The Swiss Campaign was mainly driven by economic interests. France sought control of the forges and textile manufactories of Mulhouse along with the trade node of Geneva; while Bonaparte drew the Directory's attention to the '*trésor de Berne*' – accumulated over a 200-year period – as a prime target to fund his upcoming Egyptian expedition.²¹³ Jean-Jacques Rapinat, Reubell's brother-in-law, was the civilian commissioner attached to Schauenbourg's *Armée de l'Égypte*. He records how the Directory's agent tasked with establishing the Helvetic Republic – Marie Jean-François Lecarlier – seized funds from municipal Swiss coffers to pay the expenses of French armies:

Citizen Lecarlier, who was appointed civilian commissioner in Switzerland...believed it was necessary to immediately place under seal the funds in the public coffers of Berne, Obwalden, Zürich, Lucerne, Solothurn and Fribourg which had already been seized...he notably sent three million [francs] to the Armée d'Angleterre, nearly 1,500,000 francs to pay the Armée d'Italie's wage arrears, 800,000 francs for the secret expenses of the generals-in-chief and 200,000 francs for the Directory of the Helvetic Republic. This last sum was drawn from the coffers of Zürich. Immediately afterwards, Citizen Lecarlier issued his decree of 19

²¹¹ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.624 – Several of Bonaparte's lieutenants, including Berthier, were also present.

²¹² Geneva was forced to ratify its annexation by France on 26 April 1798 (Staël, *Considérations*, p.565).

²¹³ Staël, *Considérations*, p.561.

germinal [Year VI] by which he imposed a contribution of sixteen million francs on the governing families of the five great cantons of Berne, Zürich, Fribourg, Lucerne and Solothurn.²¹⁴

Fabre de l'Aude, one of Barras's political supporters, recalled that:

“[Switzerland] was delivered over to the rapacity of contractors, generals and agents of the French government. It literally became a cash cow from which everything that could possibly be taken was extracted.”²¹⁵

Pierre Louis Hanet-Cléry, one of the military contractors who supplied Schauenbourg's army, has bequeathed us fascinating memoirs retracing the vicissitudes of his career during the Revolution.²¹⁶ He was the younger brother of Louis XVI's *valet-de-chambre*, Jean-Baptiste Cléry (a.k.a. *le fidèle Cléry*), whose memoirs are far better known.²¹⁷ During the *Ancien Régime*, Hanet-Cléry managed a company operating eight windmills which employed hundreds of workers at Vaucresson (near Saint-Cloud). He also served as Madame Royale's valet. But he was forced to flee to Valenciennes following the monarchy's overthrow while his elder brother joined Louis XVI at the *Temple*. Thanks to a fortuitous encounter with an old acquaintance from Versailles, he was introduced to Lebel and Galand – two contractors supplying the *Armée du Nord* – who obtained from war minister Beurnonville his appointment as *inspecteur des achats* in the *Midi*. Eventually, Hanet-Cléry was promoted to *inspecteur-général des vivres* at the *Armée du Rhin* in September 1793.²¹⁸ He was sent to Strasbourg where – after escaping the clutches of Saint-Just and Lebas – he met General Pichegru (through his *aide-de-camp* Badonville) who recommended him to war minister Aubert-Dubayet.²¹⁹ Hanet-Cléry was then attached to General Moreau's *Armée de Rhin-et-Moselle* for its 1796 Campaign in Germany during which he befriended Charles-Louis Laquante, one of the Treasury's commissioners.²²⁰ On 5 January 1798, he signed a contract with the *Compagnie Petit* – general suppliers of the

²¹⁴ Jean-Jacques Rapinat, *Précis des opérations de Rapinat en Helvétie*, Paris: Imprimerie de Cellot, 1799, p.4-5.

²¹⁵ Fabre de l'Aude, *HSD*, Tome III, p.379.

²¹⁶ Pierre Louis Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires de P.L. Hanet Cléry*, 2 vols., Paris: Alexis Eymery, 1825. See also Jacques Godechot, 'Les aventures d'un fournisseur aux armées : Hanet-Cléry', *AHRF*, 73, janvier-février 1936: 30-41.

²¹⁷ *Journal de Cléry de ce qui s'est passé à la tour du Temple pendant la captivité de Louis XVI*, Londres: Imprimerie de Baylis, 1798.

²¹⁸ Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.235.

²¹⁹ *Ibid*, Tome I, p.290-295. Badonville had founded a secret society in Strasbourg called *Les Vrais amis de la monarchie* (Godechot, 'Les aventures d'un fournisseur aux armées...', p.34).

²²⁰ *Ibid*, Tome I, p.303 – Laquante had been the Treasury's commissioner for war expenses since 1792 (Brugière, *GPR*, p.151).

Armée du Rhin – to supply *vivres-viandes* to its 5th and 6th military divisions; but unfortunately this was cancelled a few days later.²²¹

By way of compensation, war minister Schérer awarded Hanet-Cléry a contract in Ventôse Year VI for the supply of General Schauenbourg's *Armée d'Ergüel* which was on the point of invading Switzerland. Hanet-Cléry notes that commander-in-chief Brune only arrived "when the *Trésor de Berne* was on the point of being taken," and that "gossipers were saying that both generals and their chief ordnance officers had seized Berne's treasury à la Brune."²²² In a surprisingly forthcoming account, Hanet-Cléry confirms funds were dispatched to Bonaparte and describes how Rapinat appealed for his help to convert medieval silver pieces from Berne's treasury into modern currency at advantageous rates:

Bonaparte was at Toulon making great preparations for his Egyptian expedition; but since he needed funds to embark, they were purveyed at the expense of Switzerland. The first financial operation conducted in the country was the extraction of 75,000 silver marks from Berne's treasury which were sent to him (all of these were ancient monies which no longer had legal tender). The war commissioner, Vidal, was tasked with escorting this convoy out of Berne...Informed that these ancient silver coins had been sold at a price of forty francs per mark, [Rapinat] hoped he could obtain a similar price for other old currencies remaining in Berne's treasury and summoned the principal Swiss bankers to whom he offered to sell them; but they refused to treat with a man they considered as a vile plunderer and declined to make any offer...[Rapinat] called me to a grand council which he presided and began the meeting thus...:

Rapinat – *I am told you are a wealthy and honest man.*

Hanet-Cléry – *I enjoy some affluence, Citizen Commissioner; but my credit is my principal resource. I make it my duty to be an honest man.*

(Rapinat then drew my attention to all manner of different coins strewn across the table.)

Rapinat – *I need 600,000 francs to pay troops. You must exchange for me 15,000 silver marks of this money at a rate of forty francs per mark – the same rate General Bonaparte sold these prior to his departure for Egypt.*

Hanet-Cléry – *Citizen Commissioner, I am a military supplier and I don't perform this type of transaction. Besides, I have no market knowledge for jewels or precious metals of gold and silver. However, if you are so confident as to entrust me with this operation, I will conduct it on your behalf at either Basel or Strasbourg, on condition that we reciprocally compensate one another according to gains or losses. I require no commission, but merely travelling costs, and since you need funds to pay the army*

²²¹ Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.13.

²²² *Ibid*, Tome II, p.22 – Brune was admonished by the Directory for his ambiguous behaviour in Switzerland (AN, AF/III/508, plaquette 3212, *The Directory to General Brune*, 17 ventôse VI/7 March 1798).

I will furnish you with an advance of 50,000 écus in bills of exchange which you can discount immediately.

Rapinat – *That is good, Citizen Hanet, but I want to sell at forty francs per mark with neither guarantee nor right of recourse.*

Hanet-Cléry – *And I, Citizen Commissioner, can only negotiate on the conditions I have stipulated. If they suit you, I will always be ready to fulfil them.*

I took my leave, greatly surprised at having been offered such a transaction. Two hours later, Commissioner Rapinat presented himself at my residence and told me: “I will come to fetch you for dinner. Tomorrow morning I will charge you with the negotiation we discussed. I need money, and the bankers have promised to accept your bills at par value.” We concluded our arrangements on 13 April 1798 and I departed for Basel... The Mérian brothers, bankers from Basel who had refused to treat with Rapinat, made no difficulty in negotiating with me. I had the bills of sale drawn up by the French authorities and they exceeded by 90,000 francs the prescribed sum. Having fulfilled this objective, I returned to Berne.²²³

Hanet-Cléry asserts it was Schauenbourg and his chief ordnance officer Rouilhère who convinced Rapinat to approach him for this transaction. When Rapinat informed them that Hanet-Cléry had obtained a rate of 46 francs per silver mark, they calculated the agents Bonaparte had used to sell his 75,000 silver marks (at 40 francs per mark) had netted a profit of 450,000 francs at his expense.²²⁴

To reward his services, Schauenbourg and Rapinat convinced the Directory to grant Hanet-Cléry the general contract to supply the *Armée d’Helvétie* with clothing and equipment (worth 1,103,490 francs) on 25 April 1798. This was later expanded to include all the army’s supplies and forage on 18 August.²²⁵ Unfortunately for Hanet-Cléry, the *Armée d’Helvétie*’s high command was entirely reorganised in early 1799. Masséna replaced Schauenbourg, Féreau succeeded Rouilhère, while Rapinat lost all influence after being denounced several times for corruption and embezzlement.²²⁶ When Hanet-Cléry was presented to Masséna, he was greeted with the following words: “*Do you know, Citizen, that I have the right to execute by firing squad any contractor who causes my soldiers to lack supplies?*”²²⁷ Masséna was clearly applying Bonaparte’s method he had learnt in

²²³ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.29-35 – See also AN, AF/III/82, dossier 337, plaquette 1, *Justification of Jean-Jacques Rapinat on the use of sums found at Berne following the French occupation*, 14 prairial VI/2 June 1798.

²²⁴ Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.37.

²²⁵ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.38 & 65.

²²⁶ See AN, AF/III/82, dossier 337, plaquette 4, *Two reports on the conduct of civilian commissioners dispatched to the Armées du Rhin, d’Helvétie and d’Italie*, messidor VII – A popular rhyme circulating in Switzerland at the time was: “*Ce brave Suisse qu’on ruine, Voudrait bien qu’on décidât, Si Rapinat vient de rapine, Ou rapine de Rapinat*” (Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.28).

²²⁷ Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.83 – To which Hanet responded: “*Before having me executed, general, will you do me the pleasure of receiving me for dinner?*” and sat down next to Masséna and Schauenbourg (who laughed heartily).

Italy.²²⁸ Moreover, the Swiss adventure did not yield the expected financial results. Commissioner Lecarlier only raised ten of the thirty million *livres* anticipated from the forced contribution imposed on the notables and clergy of Swiss cantons, and Masséna was obliged to levy additional contributions on the Swiss population to supply his army.²²⁹

With no payments forthcoming from the Directory and Swiss coffers empty, Hanet-Cléry was forced to advance over a million francs to keep the *Armée d'Helvétie* supplied. His debts were such that he travelled to Paris to demand refunds under armed escort to prevent his creditors from apprehending him.²³⁰ Shortly after Brumaire, the Swiss cantons dispatched a delegation headed by Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller to discuss their affairs with Bonaparte. Hanet-Cléry lobbied Haller to intercede on his behalf; but barely five minutes after entering the First Consul's antechamber, he heard Bonaparte rebuke Haller with the words: "Do not talk to me of these contractors, they are all thieves."²³¹ Hanet-Cléry's prospects were momentarily lifted when war minister Berthier helped him become the *Compagnie Noé*'s agent at Nantes; and he was even awarded a participation in the supply of the *Armée de l'Intérieur* (29 April 1800) which Bonaparte was assembling at Dijon.²³² But his hopes were dashed upon learning that Napoleon had refused to honour Berthier's contract with the *Compagnie Noé* and had awarded it to Jean-Pierre Collot instead.²³³ Hanet-Cléry vainly attempted to track down Collot to sign a subcontracting agreement with him, and shortly after the *Compagnie Noé* went bankrupt.

This was only the beginning of Hanet-Cléry's erratic and colourful career. In 1802, he sailed to Saint Domingue intending to supply General Leclerc's expedition and miraculously survived yellow fever. Returning to France, he furnished several Napoleonic armies with varying success before rallying Louis XVIII and serving the Restoration as inspector of forests in Corsica. Throughout all his tribulations, Hanet-Cléry remained a middling contractor who was never able to develop the networks nor attain the heights reached by leading suppliers like Ouvrard, Paulée or Michel *jeune*. Having become incapacitated after falling from his horse in 1817, he lived off the financial generosity of the Duchesse d'Angoulême for the remainder of his life.

²²⁸ Godechot, 'Les aventures d'un fournisseur aux armées...', p.37.

²²⁹ Denis Woronoff, *La République bourgeoise, de Thermidor à Brumaire 1794-1799*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972, p.182.

²³⁰ Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.84-85 – Rapinat established the government owed Hanet 1,600,000 francs in an undated report probably written in Prairial Year VII (AG, B2/74 – *Report of the government's civilian commissioner attached to the Armée d'Helvétie*).

²³¹ Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.89.

²³² *Ibid*, Tome II, p.91 & 98-99.

²³³ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.101.

The Schérer Scandal of 1799 & the Contractor Armand Seguin (1767–1835)

One of the main scandals which afflicted the Directory in its last year of existence concerned accusations of corruption and embezzlement levelled against its war minister, Barthélémy Schérer. This *Ancien Régime* officer who had served in various European armies prior to the Revolution had first come to attention as General Deprez-Crassier's subaltern at Valmy. After serving as Alexandre de Beauharnais's *aide-de-camp* at the *Armée de Sambre-et-Meuse* in 1794, he was promoted to command the *Armée d'Italie* the following year. But Schérer's indecisiveness and inability to capitalise on the capture of Loano (November 1795) earned him a reputation for corruption and ineptitude. He was suspected of illegally confiscating equipment from military warehouses and misappropriating supplies to sell them for personal gain with the acquiescence of army contractors – notably the *Compagnie Lanchère et Cerf Berr* which supplied horse artillery and mules.²³⁴ These shortcomings served as a pretext for Bonaparte to replace Schérer in February 1796.

But Schérer's career was unexpectedly revived by the tense political stand-off between the Directory and its pro-monarchist deputies in the lead-up to 18 Fructidor. When General Hoche resigned from the war ministry in July 1797, the triumvirate of republican directors – Barras, Reubell and La Revellière – were keen to ensure the war ministry did not slip from their control and fall into the hands of a monarchist or any other commander or politician who might hold their supremacy in check. The senescent Schérer fit the bill perfectly and inherited the war portfolio shortly before the putsch (23 July 1797).

Schérer's one-and-a-half-year tenure witnessed chronic incidents of unwarranted confiscations and shortages of military supplies which occurred in far larger proportions than ever previously recorded during the Revolution. Evidence of this corruption was not immediately manifest but gradually developed into a torrent of complaints emanating from various garrison cities across France which peaked in the middle of Year VII after Schérer left his ministry to replace Joubert at the *Armée d'Italie* (his second time in the job).²³⁵ Reading through the litany of accusations addressed to the *Cinq-Cents*, one is struck by the scale and regularity of the pilfering involved. These thefts caused such outrage that Schérer was forced to publish a memoir defending his ministry's administration in Year VI.²³⁶ He

²³⁴ See Chapter 2 and 'Notes de Charles-Alexis Alexandre' in *Revue de la Révolution*, Tome VIII, 1886, p.155.

²³⁵ All these complaints are kept in a special dossier at the French National Archives (AN, AF/III/158). Schérer replaced Joubert as commander of the *Armée d'Italie* on 22 January 1799.

²³⁶ See Appendix XI for a selection of these denunciations and Schérer's justifications.




Figure 5:8
Portrait of Barthélémy Louis Joseph Schérer
Engraving by François Bonneville, 1790
© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

was completely impervious to criticism, even claiming that: “*Without denying false supplies were for a time the mainstay of the cupidity of contractors, I believe I can assert that Year VI has seen them completely disappear.*”²³⁷

According to Barras, Schérer was “*the scapegoat against whom all denunciations are directed today. But in reality, it was the Directory that was being targeted through [him].*”²³⁸ He claims the director Merlin de Douai was upset with Schérer who refused to grant Madame Villars – Merlin’s mistress – a supply contract for her protégés.²³⁹ But Barras’s memoirs are notoriously biased and tend to focus blame on his enemies which explains why they argue (rather unconvincingly) that Schérer was manipulated by others like Fouché:

*The minister Schérer, who was kept on after 18 Fructidor despite the public outcry, was seeking to defend himself and could not think of anything better than to throw a few cakes at the jaws of Cerberus. Fouché and company, who presented themselves as agile intermediaries, had already taken the lead...they went to find Schérer and asked him – in the name of French patriots under my protection – for the contract to supply the Armée d’Angleterre. Schérer gave it to them to acquire the popularity they promised in exchange for his largess.*²⁴⁰

Georges Lefebvre appears closer to the mark when he asserts Schérer was surrounded by thieves at the war ministry and may even have been one himself.²⁴¹ This assessment is shared by Fabre de l’Aude:

*“Schérer lacks all the qualities of a skilful captain and his blind confidence – while impeding his independence of action – delivers him over to scoundrels who enrich themselves in his name and dishonour him.”*²⁴²

Among Schérer’s main collaborators were two controllers who were agents of a contractor named Armand Jean-François Seguin – one of them being Seguin’s uncle. The career of this eclectic contractor who became Schérer’s officious associate is worthy of a detailed study. Born in Paris around March 1767, Seguin emerged as a leading chemist and assistant to Antoine Lavoisier, publishing several scholarly articles in various academic journals and presenting 49 memoirs to the *Académie des sciences* of which he was a member (in the mathematical sciences and physics section).²⁴³ On 11 June 1794, Seguin

²³⁷ *Comptes rendus au Directoire exécutif par le citoyen Schérer, ex-ministre de la Guerre, pour l’an VI et les cinq premiers mois de l’an VII*, Paris: Chez Dentu, an VII (hereafter ‘CRDECS’), p.34.

²³⁸ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.347.

²³⁹ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.315-316 & Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.509.

²⁴⁰ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.74-75.

²⁴¹ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.509-510.

²⁴² Fabre de l’Aude, *HSD*, Tome IV, p.89.

²⁴³ Pierre Mercier, ‘Armand-Jean-François Seguin (1767-1835), chimiste, tanneur et financier’, *Bulletin de la section d’histoire des Usines Renault*, juin 1976, p.218-219 – Seguin was an editor of the *Annales de chimie*

was tasked by the *Comité de Salut public* to develop a procedure to drastically reduce the time required to tan leather goods – particularly shoes for the military – and was granted the use of two greenhouses in the Parc Monceau to conduct his experiments.²⁴⁴ He also researched how to extract tanbark from trees to lower production costs.²⁴⁵

The success of these initial experiments convinced Prieur de la Marne to grant Seguin a contract to supply ropes made of beef intestines to the Navy.²⁴⁶ Then on 8 October 1794, Seguin submitted a proposal to the *Comité de Salut public* to establish a tannery in the Ile de Sèvres (the modern Ile Seguin) that would produce 30,000 tanned beef hides per year. His project was approved and on 22 October he was offered a fifteen-year contract for regular supplies of leather hides with an advance of 50,000 francs plus a 300,000 franc loan at 3% interest.²⁴⁷ Seguin perfected a technique of filtering water through a succession of barrels filled with tanbark powder, employing the resulting concentrated water extract to tan hides that were stretched and artificially bloated with sulphuric acid. His procedure reduced the tanning period from eighteen months to twenty days.²⁴⁸ Satisfied, the French government issued two decrees on 30 October 1794 stipulating that:

1. Seguin would immediately begin setting up a tannery on the Ile de Sèvres at the government's expense to tan 40,000-50,000 beef hides a year;²⁴⁹
2. The tannery was rented to Seguin for fifteen years and would process the hides of all Parisian slaughterhouses which would be delivered to it daily. If Paris lacked supplies, the army would furnish Seguin with 50,000 hides at government expense.²⁵⁰

On 3 January 1795, Antoine-François Fourcroy (another former disciple of Lavoisier) presented a report to the National Convention extolling Seguin's new tanning procedure.²⁵¹ Seguin became the government's fully-fledged business partner and was allowed to purchase the Ile de Sèvres as *biens d'émigrés* for 187,000 francs, the *Maison Brancas* (former residence of the Comte de Brancas and the modern city hall of Sèvres) for 294,745 francs and the estate of Ravannes (near Nemours) where tree bark used by the tannery was

and also published findings in the *Annales de chimie et de physique*, the *journal de chimie* and the *journal de l'École polytechnique*.

²⁴⁴ See AP, DQ10 644, dossier 3231 – *Report of Lakanal on degradations in the Parc Monceau*, Year II.

²⁴⁵ AN, F/12/2285.

²⁴⁶ AN, F/12/1465, *Tanneries, Decrees of 3^{ème} jour comp. II & 5 vendémiaire III/19 & 26 Sep. 1794*.

²⁴⁷ Mercier, 'Armand-Jean-François Seguin...', p.220.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.220-221.

²⁴⁹ The cost to construct the tannery was estimated at 1,800,000 francs (AN, F/14/188, *Windmills and factories along the Seine*, 1788-Year IV).

²⁵⁰ Mercier, 'Armand-Jean-François Seguin...', p.221 – The existence of these decrees is only attested by draft copies conserved at the French National Archives.

²⁵¹ AN, AD/XI/66, *Report on the arts employed in the defence of the Republic & on the new tanning procedure discovered by Citizen Armand Seguin*, 14 nivôse III/3 Jan. 1795. See also *Moniteur*, 9 Jan. 1795 (p.153-155) & 10 Jan. 1795 (p.162-165).

grinded into powder for 1,580,133 francs.²⁵² Two additional decrees of 12 January 1795 awarded Seguin a 750,000 franc loan over twelve years at 4% interest with 36,000 *livres* up front to help purchase equipment and supplies.²⁵³ Vast quantities of salt, sulphur, saltpetre, tallow and lead were delivered to the tannery by the state.²⁵⁴ The installation covered nearly 9 hectares and employed up to 400 workers.²⁵⁵ On 8 April, Seguin was awarded another 120,000 *livres*.²⁵⁶ His preferential status and state subsidies angered other Parisian tanners who had to purchase hides for over 5 francs on the market while the government was supplying Seguin with 60,000 hides at 18 *sols* per hide (and covering his shipment costs).²⁵⁷ But interior minister Bénézech concluded that: “*Citizen Seguin has fulfilled the engagements he contracted with the Republic.*”²⁵⁸

This privileged position encouraged Seguin to set aside his scientific vocation in favour of business opportunities provided by military contracting. One of his most important deals was signed on 9 November 1797 for the exclusive supply of leather goods to the *Armée d’Italie*.²⁵⁹ It was also at this time that he forged his unofficial partnership with Schérer at the war ministry. One of the principal cases in which they were implicated emerged in a report dated Year XI concerning the *Compagnie Heegmann* whose director was a straw man of Seguin. The company had signed an agreement with Schérer to supply all French armies with canvasses (*toiles*) – either in uncut cloth or already confectioned for use. In return, it was not only given payment orders but also the right to requisition – in all military warehouses – materials and objects deemed unfit for the war effort. The contract specified the war minister would set the price for all requisitioned items without any expertise being conducted! Evidently, this stipulation indicated fraudulent intentions. The raft of complaints by war commissioners and warehouse employees reproduced in Appendix XI confirm that many of these requisitioned items were in fact useful to the war effort, such as uniforms, bed linen, muskets, cannons, etc.; and that the company sold them

²⁵² AP, DQ10 449, dossier 6859. Seguin paid these sums on 13 Dec. 1795. The Ile de Sèvres had been acquired by Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver – Madame du Barry’s Dutch banker – on 3 Oct. 1793 (see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.170-171). His widow contested the sale of the island to Seguin in Thermidor Year III, while the comte de Brancas’s widow contested the sale of the *Maison Brancas*. But a Napoleonic decree of 29 July 1805 awarded Seguin definitive ownership of both.

²⁵³ AN, AF/II/32, dossier 264:9-10, *Decree granting Armand Séguin an advance of 36.000 livres on the 750.000 livres owed him*, 25 pluviôse III/13 Feb. 1795 and F/4/2161, *Accounts, Armand Seguin (leather tanning discovery)*, Year III – On 24 June 1795, Seguin claimed he had only received 185,000 francs of this loan.

²⁵⁴ AN, F/4/2161, *Accounts, Armand Seguin (leather tanning discovery)*, Year III.

²⁵⁵ Mercier, ‘Armand-Jean-François Seguin...’, p.225.

²⁵⁶ AN, AF/II/32, dossier 265:32, *Money order for 120.000 livres for Armand Seguin*, 19 germinal III/8 April 1795.

²⁵⁷ Mercier, ‘Armand-Jean-François Seguin...’, p.225 – There were 20 *sous* (sols) in a franc.

²⁵⁸ AN, F/12/2285, *Preparation of leather hides (in particular at the Seguin manufacture)*, Year VII-1826.

²⁵⁹ MC/ET/XLV/661, 19 brumaire VI/9 Nov. 1797.

at reduced prices or even back to the state! The report of Year XI concludes the *Compagnie Heegmann* received nearly 6 million francs in goods and owed the government about 2 million.²⁶⁰

These types of unscrupulous affairs enabled Seguin to become one of the most successful contractors of the late Directory and Consulate. He specialised in advancing cash to military suppliers and became one of Ouvrard's main creditors, investing 1,250,000 francs in his naval supplying networks.²⁶¹ In 1803, he advanced Ouvrard another 1,400,000 francs in a secret agreement and granted him a 5,400,000 franc loan the following year against assets deposited as security.²⁶² He also forwarded important sums to Christophe Flachet of the *Compagnie Flachet, La Porte et Castelin*.²⁶³

Seguin was renowned for his outrageously eccentric character. Every Tuesday, he held receptions where his wife hosted the leading ladies of Parisian financial aristocracy such as Fortunée Hamelin, Madame Malet, Madame de Rougemont and the 'queen' of his *salon* – Madame Hainguerlot.²⁶⁴ The Duchesse d'Abrantès draws the following portrait of him:

[Seguin was] *neither well born nor well educated...He had two passions which he satisfied in completely opposing ways: hunting and dancing...He hunted even when it made no sense, and never danced...One can imagine the surprise [of his guests]...after walking through rooms of precious objects and beautiful paintings, when they found a master of the house dressed in a frock coat and slippers...It was all perfectly normal to him...By receiving people in this way, he thought he was putting them at ease...His mania for dancing balls was so compulsive that he had all the dances at his balls performed expressly by Julien...He also composed quadrilles – for the poor man played violin – but we could never dance to them...*²⁶⁵

Seguin loved to organise bizarre hunting sprees, bringing rabbits, foxes and hounds from his château of Jouy (Jouy-en-Josas) to his Parisian residence where he would turn them loose in his yard and chase after them through the halls of his mansion while blowing his hunting horn and singing songs at his heart's content. He was also frequently seen driving his cabriolet through the Bois de Boulogne dressed in his nightgown with his three-year-old daughter at his side.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁰ Lefebvre, *LFS*, p.509-510.

²⁶¹ AN, BB/16/762, dossier 1092, *Question from the director-general of the Caisse d'amortissement concerning a decision to refuse a consignment of 1.250.000 livres from Ouvrard and Vanderberghe pursuant to a false account of the conditions of its deposit*, March 1808 & Zylberberg, *USDD*, p.525, footnote 51.

²⁶² MC/ET/XLVI/641, 10 fructidor XI/28 Aug. 1803 & MC/ET/XLVI/652, 14 messidor XII/3 July 1804.

²⁶³ MC/ET/XLVI/642, 3 & 8 vendémiaire XII/26 Sep. & 1 Oct. 1803.

²⁶⁴ D'Abrantès, *Histoire des salons de Paris*, Tome III, Paris: Ladvocat, 1838, p.358-359.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.356-358.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.364, 367 & 371.

These peculiarities do not seem to have hindered Seguin's sharp business acumen. He was undoubtedly a supporter of Bonaparte's new consular regime – having been a supplier of the *Armée d'Italie* – and became a member of both the *vingt* and *dix négociants réunis*.²⁶⁷ Moreover, he was on familiar terms with many Bonapartist supporters who frequented his wife's *salon*. Nonetheless, Seguin lived in constant apprehension, fearing he might one day be held accountable for his corrupt practices. He was notorious for not paying his creditors and placed a chain across the entrance of his *hôtel* in the Rue d'Anjou to intimidate tax officials and bailiffs.²⁶⁸ A police report dated 10 January 1802 mentions that several leading politicians including Bailleul, Saint-Aubin, Chénier, Benjamin Constant, Daunou and Chazal met in the Rue Grande Batelière where Seguin gave them funds to oppose his prosecution for financial abuses.²⁶⁹ He was also someone who took considerable financial risks. On 24 August 1803, for example, Seguin reportedly purchased more than 700,000 francs of *rentes* in partnership with Michel *jeune*;²⁷⁰ but by December, he was in serious debt and selling as many of these as possible.²⁷¹

Eventually, Seguin's dubious methods caught up with him. He was heavily involved in the *Banque de France*'s bankruptcy of 1805-1806, having speculated with Vanlerberghe on debt obligations of the *Banco de San Carlos*. A notarial act registered by the creditors of the *Compagnie Vanlerberghe et Ouvrard* reveals this company owed Seguin 5,030,250 francs in cash advances for bill discounts.²⁷² Napoleon intimated his displeasure in a letter dated 24 July 1805 to Treasury minister Barbé-Marbois: “*Seguin has been condemned to pay 1,800,000 francs. I don't want to hear about any kind of compensation. I want a full refund.*”²⁷³ The repercussions of this affair dragged on for years and continually hampered Seguin's finances as he attempted to unload the blame on others. The case was still ongoing in December 1824 when Seguin had Ouvrard imprisoned at the Sainte-Pélagie jail after obtaining a legal document establishing he was owed 15 million francs.²⁷⁴ To curry favour with Napoleon, Seguin sold him the *Maison Brancas* in 1809 which was incorporated in the imperial estate of Saint Cloud.²⁷⁵ The fall of Napoleon's empire did not improve Seguin's affairs, and although he salvaged most of his fortune he never recovered the preeminent business position he formerly enjoyed under the Directory and Consulate.

²⁶⁷ See Appendix XIV.

²⁶⁸ Mercier, ‘Armand-Jean-François Seguin...’, p.233.

²⁶⁹ Aulard, *PSC*, Tome II, p.696-697.

²⁷⁰ AN, F/7/3704, *police report of 6 fructidor XI/24 Aug. 1803* & Aulard, *PSC*, Tome IV, p.330.

²⁷¹ AN, F/7/3832, *police report of 14 frimaire XII/6 Dec. 1803* & Aulard, *PSC*, Tome IV, p.555.

²⁷² MC/ET/CIX/913, 26 Oct. 1808.

²⁷³ CN, Tome XI, n°9008, *Napoleon to Barbé-Marbois, 5 thermidor XIII/24 July 1805*.

²⁷⁴ Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.66-68, 93-94 & 101.

²⁷⁵ Archives des Yvelines, IV Q 62 (bill of sale).

By 1817, the tannery on the Ile de Sèvres – the symbol of his success – had been replaced by a stud farm.²⁷⁶

Brune, Fouché & the *Compagnie Bodin* in Italy

The *Compagnie Bodin frères* was founded by the Bodin brothers – sons of a trader from Romans-sur-Isère. In Year VII Charles, the eldest brother, is recorded as a shareholder of the second *Caisse des Comptes Courants*, overseeing the family firm's banking and commission-based operations in Paris.²⁷⁷ His younger siblings – Victor and Louis – were merchant tradesmen who managed its commercial operations in Lyon and acted as Charles's financial guarantors.²⁷⁸ The brothers had probably met Fouché at Lyon during his mission there in 1793.²⁷⁹ Louis appears to have been particularly close to Fouché and Josephine de Beauharnais.²⁸⁰ He was a partner in the *ferme de l'Octroi de Lyon* with Georges-François Ricard, a son of future *Banque de France* Regent Georges-Antoine Ricard who became Marshal Suchet's *aide-de-camp* in Year IX.²⁸¹ The Bodins were also connected to Barras.²⁸²

On 16 February 1797, *Bodin frères* signed a contract with war minister Schérer to replace the *Compagnie Flachet, La Porte & Castelin* for the general supply of troops in Italy.²⁸³ According to Antoine-Romain Hamelin, it was Josephine's lover – Hippolyte Charles – who helped *Bodin frères* obtain the contract.²⁸⁴ In return, they paid him half their total profits, amounting to approximately two million francs. The Bodins lost no time in exercising their contractual rights. French troops under General Berthier had occupied Rome on 10 February 1798 and the Directory had appointed a civilian commission on foreign minister Talleyrand's recommendation to administer the Eternal City and set up a

²⁷⁶ Mercier, 'Armand-Jean-François Seguin...', p.225.

²⁷⁷ Charles was the financial guarantor of Jean-Ulrich Schlumberger – a partner in the textile manufacture of Jean-Jacques Dollfus and Mathias Mieg at Mulhouse. This association highlights the importance of financial interests linking the textile manufacturers of Alsace with the merchant traders of the Dauphiné (Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.52 & 357).

²⁷⁸ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.52.

²⁷⁹ Waresquiel, *FLSP*, p.266.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.308.

²⁸¹ See André Cottet, *Un fermier général sous le Consulat et l'Empire. L'Octroi de Lyon (5 fructidor an VIII-21 mars 1807)*, Paris, Sirey, 1938 – especially Chapter 2, 'La Régie Ricard'.

²⁸² Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.246.

²⁸³ AN, AF/III/184, dossier 848:165-166, *Contract of the Compagnie Bodin for the extraordinary supply of the Armée d'Italie and 23rd military division*, 28 pluviôse V/16 Feb. 1797 – The contract ran from 1 germinal V/21 March 1797 until 1 germinal VI/21 March 1798. It was renewed for 1798 and 1799.

²⁸⁴ Hamelin, 'Douze ans de ma vie', p.22, footnote 2.

Roman Republic.²⁸⁵ An agreement signed between the French and Roman states conferred the supply of the French garrison at Rome on a ‘Company of General Munitions Suppliers’ (*Compagnie des munitionnaires généraux*) composed of French and Roman bankers. This conglomerate was to supply the French garrison in exchange for requisitioned goods and confiscated lands of Roman congregations seized as *biens nationaux* which it was entitled to sell at auction.²⁸⁶ Moreover, it promised to establish a discount bank to remove papal bank notes – known as *resti* – which the French Directory wanted taken out of circulation due to their depreciation.²⁸⁷

As part of this accord, a secret convention was ratified by the new Roman legislature on 6 germinal IV/26 March 1798 which engaged it to:

- 1) Pay 15 million francs to France in six payments at one-month intervals;
- 2) Supply the French garrison at Rome with uniforms and equipment worth 500,000 piasters (roughly three million francs);
- 3) Gratuitously furnish French troops stationed in Roman territory with food, forage, accommodation, wood, lighting (candles) and medical treatment in Roman hospitals.²⁸⁸

The Directory’s agents had therefore negotiated an extremely favourable settlement. But on 26 June, Bodin’s agents arrived in Rome and contested the deal’s terms, claiming they alone had exclusive rights to supply the French garrison.²⁸⁹ The civilian commission informed Paris that:

*...a company by the name of Bodin has presented itself at Rome and claims to be charged with all the services of the French army stationed in Roman territory. This company has argued that a directorial decree awards it the supply of troops at Rome and forces the Roman government to use its services. The other French suppliers do not believe such a decree exists; but even if it does, they don’t believe it would be fair to enact it.*²⁹⁰

²⁸⁵ AN, AF/III/498, dossier 3135, *Decree of 12 pluviôse VI/31 Jan. 1798* – The commission was composed of Daunou, Florent, Monge and Saint-Martin as their secretary. On 19 February, General Berthier deposed the Papal government and expelled Pius VI from Rome (see Chapter 2). Monge left on 15 April to join Bonaparte’s Egyptian expedition (AF/III/517, dossier 3310, *The Directory to Monge*, 26 germinal VI/15 April 1798) and was replaced by Faipoult, the Directory’s commissioner in Milan. Daunou left on 9 July to resume his seat in the *Cinq-Cents*.

²⁸⁶ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.629-631.

²⁸⁷ AN, AF/III/78, dossier 322, plaquette 1 – *Florent to the Directory*, 27 messidor VI/15 July 1798.

²⁸⁸ La Revellière, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.448 – *Faipoult to La Revellière*, 5 messidor VI/23 June 1798. See also AN, AF/III/77, dossier 321, plaquette 1, *Secret convention determining the contributions the Roman Republic will pay to France*, 8 germinal VI/28 March 1798.

²⁸⁹ AN, AF/III/77, dossier 322, plaquette 1, *The Compagnie Bodin’s claims to the supply monopoly of the Armée d’Italie*, 8 messidor VI/26 June 1798.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid*, dossier 322, plaquette 1, *The French commissioners at Rome to the Directory*, 8 messidor VI/26 June 1798.

Faipoult, who was serving on the civilian commission, warned director La Revellière of everything France stood to lose if the *Compagnie Bodin* prevailed and denounced its arrogant behaviour towards government officials:

*“A company of the foremost banking houses in Italy offered the Roman Republic to ensure the supply [of its French garrison]...in exchange for payment in Roman biens nationaux...this guaranteed the Roman Republic the subsistence of its own army, the supply of its two ports at Ancona and Civita Vecchia, the supplies for its navy...reparations of its fortresses, 30,000 rifles for its arsenals, cannons for its strongholds and campaigns and finally, the creation of a caisse d’escompte with public offices making cash payments, thereby facilitating the elimination of the Roman assignat...But all this was found to contravene certain articles of a contract signed by the war minister who...announced the French Directory had decided to revoke the agreement concluded between the Roman Republic and its contractors...I have learnt today that the Compagnie Bodin’s agents are confident of their success in the struggle pitting them against the [Roman] Republic. They have intimated they have the most powerful supporters in government. They dare to calumny the foremost government in the world believing they can attenuate the zeal of those who could put truthful observations before their eyes.”*²⁹¹

But Schérer adamantly backed the *Compagnie Bodin*, claiming its contract would save money.²⁹² General Brune, who replaced Berthier at the head of the *Armée d’Italie* in March 1798, also supported Bodin and argued the civilian commission should be dissolved because military authorities were not subject to civilian oversight in occupied territories. An exasperated Faipoult accused Schérer and his staff of deliberately misinterpreting the terms of the convention with the Roman Republic to exonerate themselves. He cautioned the Directory’s commissioners in Rome not to entrust the garrison’s supply to “*a company which...is bound to let shortages reappear in all their dreadful intensity.*”²⁹³ A heated exchange lasting several weeks ensued culminating in the deposition of the war ministry’s secretary-general – who was Schérer’s own brother – and four other high-ranking officials on 19 August. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Brune’s deputy in command of the Roman garrison, was replaced by General MacDonald. Nevertheless, Schérer kept his post as war minister and Bodin’s contract was upheld.²⁹⁴

Seeking to alleviate tensions, the Directory renewed most of the Roman civilian commission which now fell under the influence of Jean Bassal, a Vicentian and former constitutional priest of the parish of Saint-Louis in Versailles who had been a deputy of the

²⁹¹ La Revellière, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.449-450 – *Faipoult to La Revellière*, 5 messidor VI/23 June 1798.

²⁹² See Appendix XII.

²⁹³ La Revellière, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.451 – *Faipoult to Daunou and Florens, the Directory’s commissioners at Rome*, 5 messidor VI/23 June 1798.

²⁹⁴ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.510 & 629-631 – Schérer later suggested the Cisalpine Republic could furnish wheat to the Roman garrison (AN, AF/III/150A, dossier 704:82-83, *Report of the war minister to the Directory suggesting the Cisalpine Republic supply the Armées d’Italie et de Rome with grain to avoid complaints against the Compagnie Bodin*, 27 nivôse VII/16 Jan. 1799).

National Convention and the Directory's spy at Basel in Year IV.²⁹⁵ Bassal wanted to put the Vatican's *resti* notes back into circulation because a number of speculators – notably the *Compagnie Bodin* – had purchased them at extremely low cost and hoped their value would soar if they were rehabilitated.²⁹⁶ Eventually, he had his way and the *resti* were returned to circulation despite the protests of the Roman consuls. Thus, Bodin's henchmen were able to use depreciated *resti* notes to purchase Roman *biens nationaux* at grossly undervalued prices which they promptly resold for profit.²⁹⁷ The Roman civilian commission, initially set up to check the transgressions of contractors, ultimately facilitated their abuses.

Upstanding officials like Faipoult already sensed the excesses of contractors in levying contributions and effecting requisitions were turning civilians against the Directory and imperilling its position in Italy. The only solution to eliminate their nefarious influence, he argued, was to conclude peace:

*“If peace were concluded with the Empire, you could suppress the generalship-in-chief and its staff, reduce the army to 8,000 men in Piedmont, 25,000 in the Cisalpine Republic, 3,000 in Liguria 10,000 in Roman territory. You could purvey to all this with very little funds expedited from France and Italy would be at your feet.”*²⁹⁸

General Brune certainly had a financial interest in upholding the *Compagnie Bodin*'s claims and proved to be one of its most valuable allies in Italy. He was a longstanding friend of Barras whom he had met in May 1795. At the time, Barras was overseeing Paris's grain supply while Brune was chief of Paris's 17th military district.²⁹⁹ When the Directory decided to endow the Cisalpine Republic with a new constitution in August 1798, it charged Daunou to draft the text and appointed its 24-year-old *chargé d'affaires* at Naples – Charles Joseph Trouvé – as the new French ambassador in Milan to oversee its implementation. But Daunou and Trouvé were close to directors Reubell and La Revellière, and Barras feared they would dominate Lombard politics and undermine Italian Jacobins – which was why he had engineered Brune's appointment to the *Armée d'Italie* in March. From the moment of his arrival, Brune began to undermine Trouvé's mission. For La Revellière, there could be no doubt he was modelling his behaviour on Bonaparte:

²⁹⁵ AN, AF/III/316, dossier 1252, *Directorial decree ordering Citizen Bassal to Basel*, 24 brumaire IV/15 Nov. 1795 – His mission was to ensure supplies got through to the *Armée d'Italie* and to keep an eye on François Barthélémy, French ambassador at Basel.

²⁹⁶ AN, AF/III/78, dossier 322, plaquette 1, *Florent to the Directory*, 27 messidor VI/15 July 1798 – The *resti* were returned to circulation by a law passed on 17 messidor.

²⁹⁷ Woronoff, *La République bourgeoise...op. cit.*, p.183.

²⁹⁸ La Revellière, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.469-470 – *Faipoult to La Revellière*, 11 thermidor VI/29 July 1798.

²⁹⁹ Waresquiel, *FLSP*, p.265.

[Bonaparte's departure from Italy] resulted in widespread confusion and deplorable disorder throughout the Cisalpine Republic. The insolence of General Brune who was in command, that of his general staff and of all the generals, the pillaging of these same men, their tyranny and discarding of any justice and propriety, and the scandalous thefts of contractors whose loot they shared raised the misfortunes of that land to new heights...Bonaparte, it is true, had given the example of military despotism by ordering about the civilian authorities of the country with contempt. The system of pillaging enacted by generals was of his design. "Those who serve the Republic," he often repeated, "must profit by all the means of fortune which its service offers." But at least his tyranny was not grotesque and brutal like that of Brune, and his conduct was not heinous.

*Brune was a mediocre man of little capacity, mostly preoccupied by his pleasures, and like all the Dantoniens – to whom he belonged – a great partisan of disorder through which he drew with impunity the treasures necessary to maintain his luxury...He began by joining forces with all the radicals who – by usurping the character of patriots – nonetheless incensed his intolerable despotism. They agreed to discredit honourable men in the eyes of public opinion and seize all the places and means of swindling money – either from the Public Treasury or from private citizens. Brune's subsequent conduct at Hamburg indicates what he must have done in Italy. He was powerfully seconded in his culpable behaviour by his general staff whose chief was Suchet, now a maréchal d'Empire, an insolent officer and one of the most shameless plunderers.*³⁰⁰

In September 1798, Brune and Barras succeeded in obtaining Trouvé's recall and his post in Milan was awarded to Fouché on 25 September. Fouché arrived in Milan on 12 October accompanied by his old acquaintance – François Laporte – one of the directors of the notorious *Compagnie Flachet, La Porte et Castelin*.³⁰¹ We have already seen Fouché's links to Laporte, Hainguerlot (via *D'Hautmesnil & Cie.*) and *Jubié & Basterrèche* in chapters two and three. After 18 Fructidor he began significantly expanding his commercial activities, investing large sums in military contracting. In November 1797, for example, his friend Pierre-François Réal helped him become a partner in the *Compagnie Ouin* (owned by Jean-Baptiste Ouin) which was granted a contract by Schérer to furnish "supplies, transports and the handling of victuals, bread, meats and forage" for ten military divisions – including all units of Bonaparte's *Armée d'Angleterre*. Fouché vouched 200,000 francs in the firm's overall guarantee of a million francs and mortgaged property he owned in Saint Domingue to back his investment.³⁰² In 1798, he ceded his

³⁰⁰ La Reveillère, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.290-291.

³⁰¹ This was how La Reveillère reacted to Fouché's appointment as ambassador in Milan: "Trouvé was recalled from his embassy in Milan and sent to Stuttgart...And who was his successor? It was Fouché! He arrived, accompanied by the notorious contractor Laporte, and preceded by the horrible reputation he had earned at Nevers and Lyon" (*Mémoires*, Tome II, p.303-304).

³⁰² MCN/ET/XLV, 661, 13 brumaire VI/3 Nov. 1797 – Another partner in this venture was Tallien. See also Barras (*Mémoires*, Tome III, p.73-74), Louis Madelin (*Fouché*, Tome I, Paris: Plon, 1900, p.209-210) and Waresquiel, *FLSP*, p.257-259.

stake for an annual pension of 20,000 francs.³⁰³ Madame de Chastenay recalled meeting Fouché at the *Compagnie Ouin*'s offices in the Rue Taranne near Saint-Germain-des-Près, noting how “*he displayed the most obliging interest in me...and gave me judicious advice on people and matters.*”³⁰⁴ Fouché was also involved with the *Compagnie Petit* which furnished the *Armée du Rhin* and the *Compagnie Rochefort* that held the general supply of troops on campaign (and in which Ouin was also a partner).³⁰⁵

Thus, Fouché's posting to Lombardy clearly signalled the faction of contractors and generals was in the ascendant. On the night of 18-19 October Brune carried out a military coup, removing fifty-eight deputies from the Cisalpine Republic's legislative councils by force and installing a puppet government. He compelled two Lombard directors to resign and evicted another – Sopranzi – from the directorial palace *manu militari*.³⁰⁶ La Reveillère believed this ‘Cisalpine 18 Fructidor’ was nothing more than a plot orchestrated by Barras, Brune, Fouché and the *Compagnie Bodin* who did not wish to see strong institutions emerge in Milan:

*It is clear to my eyes that everything which happened at Milan...was the result of a concerted plot elaborated with Barras and Fouché who despaired of seeing the Cisalpine Republic wrenched from their oppression and pillaging, and the Compagnie Bodin whose infamous thefts they favoured and benefited from...One can also believe without temerity that they were being paid by Austria to prevent the consolidation of the Cisalpine government, which would have rendered its return to Italy more difficult.*³⁰⁷

Faipoult was appalled by the new Cisalpine regime, writing to La Reveillère: “*You see how the arrogant Cisalpine Directory scoffs audaciously at the French Directory, General Brune is the cause of all this.*”³⁰⁸ Moreover, Brune had also set his sights on Piedmont. The French ambassador in Turin – Ginguené – assured La Reveillère that “*several million sent*

³⁰³ Michel Golinelli, ‘Joseph Fouché, duc d’Otrante, ministre de la Police et notre région’, *Société d’histoire et d’archéologie de la Goële*, n°29-30, 1999-2000, p.13-16.

³⁰⁴ Victorine de Chastenay, *Mémoires*, Tome I, Paris: Plon, 1896, p.337 – Madame de Chastenay is believed to have been Pierre-François Réal’s mistress (Waresquiel, *FLSP*, p.258).

³⁰⁵ Some of Fouché’s letters to his sister Louise, who resided Quai de la Fosse at Nantes, reveal the multiplicity of these business connections. See Dominique Caillé, *Le duc d’Otrante d’après une correspondance privée inédite*. Vannes: Imprimerie de Lafoyle, 1893.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.304 – Faipoult notes that “*Sopranzi...is one of the men who regularly visited Trouvé and supplied us with the most information*” (*Ibid*, Tome III, p.464 – *Faipoult to La Reveillère*, 3 thermidor VI/21 July 1798). For Fouché’s version see his *Mémoires*, p.81-89.

³⁰⁷ La Reveillère, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.306 – La Reveillère further notes that Brune and Fouché were “*thermidorian comrades from the same political coterie*” (*Ibid*, p.307) who coordinated the coup – Fouché arriving in Milan to take up his embassy on 12 October and Brune carrying out the operation on 18 October. Moreover, Fouché refused to carry out orders from Paris instructing him to remove Brune’s puppet government (AN, AF/III/71, dossier 290, plaquette 3, *Complaint against Ambassador Fouché*, 27 brumaire VII/17 Nov. 1798).

³⁰⁸ La Reveillère, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.464 – *Faipoult to La Reveillère*, 3 thermidor VI/21 July 1798.

to Balbi, Piedmontese ambassador with the French government, were destined to spread corruption into the heart of the [Piedmontese] government.”³⁰⁹

The *Armée d'Italie*'s civilian commissioner, Amelot de Chaillot, was powerless to check Brune's abuses, observing that “*Brune is surrounded by a corrupt general staff...his confidence is easily won through flattery,*” and complaining that Fouché and Laporte were envenoming his relations with the army.³¹⁰ What is more, Brune's strong-arm tactics incited his subordinates to indulge in all kinds of rapacious looting. In early 1799, multiple reports were coming in from across northern Italy denouncing embezzlements by French officers, such as General Liger-Bélaïr at Ancona.³¹¹ Visibly outraged by the scale and ubiquity of the army's plundering, Amelot remarked exasperatedly that:

*Corruption is so great in this army that you see generals proposing to pay you with a requisition in arrears because they know they will receive half of it. Chief ordnance officer Aubernon is among those who know how to stipulate their interests in these affairs, and it is a common affliction among war commissioners.*³¹²

As for military contractors, Amelot reported their conduct was “*revolting...every day, they threaten to cease their services, claiming they cannot make good with the sums they were given in Paris, and asking for more funds which I cannot give them.*”³¹³ But this did not prevent Schérer from awarding the *Compagnie Bodin* the contract to supply French troops in the Levant (Corfu, Corcyra, Ithaca and several islands in the Aegean) on 25 November.³¹⁴

Brune and Fouché knew they had overreached themselves with their coup in Milan and therefore began pilfering funds from military and Cisalpine repositories in anticipation of their recall. A Lombard Treasury commissioner informed Faipoult that:

*“Two days before his departure, Brune needed funds for his journey. He notified the Cisalpine Directory about this so that he could not be refused. It was resolved to award him 200,000 livres...As is often usual, there was nothing in reserve on that day. Money was sought, but only 96,000 livres were found for Brune and his staff. The thieves nonetheless took it for want of a better alternative.”*³¹⁵

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.317 – I have been unable to ascertain whether this ‘Balbi’ was the Genoese banker Emmanuel Balbi.

³¹⁰ AN, AF/III/71, dossier 290, plaquette 3, *Complaints against General Brune*, 16 brumaire VII/6 Nov. 1798.

³¹¹ See Appendix XIII.

³¹² AN, AF/III/71, dossier 290, plaquette 3, *Complaints against chief-of-staff Suchet*, 27 brumaire VII/17 Nov. 1798.

³¹³ *Ibid*, dossier 290, plaquette 5, *Letter of Amelot to the Directory affirming Fouché was given 24,000 écus the day he left for Milan*, 4 frimaire VII/24 Nov. 1798.

³¹⁴ AN, AF/III/150A, dossier 703:14-15, *Decree conferring the supply of French possessions in the Levant on the Compagnie Bodin*, 5 frimaire VII/25 Nov. 1798.

³¹⁵ La Revellière, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.480 – *Faipoult to La Revellière*, 25 frimaire VII/15 Dec. 1798.



Figure 5:9
Portrait of General Guillaume Marie-Anne Brune
Engraving by François Bonneville, 1802
© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France
(authorised for non-commercial use)



Figure 5:10
Portrait of Joseph Fouché
by an unknown artist, c. early 1800s
Château de Versailles
© Château de Versailles/ RMN
Photo: Christophe Fouin
(authorised for non-commercial use)

Faipoult also advised La Revellière there were widespread rumours Fouché and Laporte were stoking anarchy in Cisalpine politics:

“The choice of Citizen Fouché has surprised this country. It is known he enriched himself during the Revolution. He was accompanied by Laporte...his delays have conferred the impression he has been won over by the anarchists. People are convinced they gave 3,000 louis to Brune prior to his departure. It is alleged 2,000 were given to the ambassador to uphold the intruders. I cannot confirm public gossip, but I must inform you of it...”³¹⁶

These allegations were based on denunciations by Cisalpine deputies such as Louis-Victor Savioli who condemned Brune and Fouché’s duplicity:

“Brune has reaped the rewards of military encroachments on civilian authority...Fouché, surrounded, seduced – bought as is even alleged – procrastinates, emboldens the villains and foments disorder. I don’t know how to express, Citizen Director, the discontentment of the Cisalpine Republic when it observed the rise to power of an administration headed by those who have nothing to lose and which does not enjoy the people’s confidence.”³¹⁷

On 13 December 1798, Amelot noted that Brune had set aside 24,000 *écus* for the expenses of Fouché’s ambassadorial mission, but that only 6,000 had been spent so far. The day of his departure from Milan, Fouché retrieved the remaining 18,000 from the army’s paymaster and took them with him.³¹⁸ His replacement as ambassador – François Rivaud – noted on 28 December that 30 million francs had been levied on the inhabitants of the Cisalpine Republic in three months, while Piedmont had only paid 2 million.³¹⁹ Moreover, to pay its contribution, Piedmont had advanced 680,419 francs in hard currency and 1,319,580 in bills of exchange. On these effects, the *Compagnie Bodin* received the following sums:

- 40,000 francs in bills for supplying the Valtellina on 18 December;
- 100,000 francs in bills for additional extraordinary supplies at the request of the *Armée d’Italie*’s chief ordnance officer on 20 December;
- 60,000 francs in hard currency following that army’s departure from Turin plus 20,000 francs in hard currency for transports on 24 December;

³¹⁶ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.476-477 – Faipoult to La Revellière, 27 brumaire VII/17 Nov. 1798 – La Revellière reproduces this anecdote to support his accusations against Brune (*Ibid*, Tome II, p.309-310).

³¹⁷ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.350-351 – Savioli to La Revellière, 13 frimaire VII/3 Dec. 1798.

³¹⁸ AN, AF/III/71, dossier 290, plaquette 5, *Letter from Amelot to Treilhard on pillaging committed by the Armée d’Italie*, 23 frimaire VII/13 Dec. 1798 – Fouché was sent to Holland where he reunited with his business associate Édouard de Walckiers. According to Barras (*Mémoires*, Tome III, p.79), “there were extremely advantageous affairs of contraband along certain points of the new frontier with which Fouché became associated.”

³¹⁹ AN, AF/III/72, dossier 292, plaquette 1, *Complaint against war commissioner Allard*, 8 nivôse VII/28 Dec. 1798.

- 70,000 in hard currency plus 230,000 in bills to help maintain its service – again at the request of the *Armée d’Italie*’s chief ordnance officer on 27 December.³²⁰

In total, *Bodin frères* swept up 500,000 francs (370,000 in bills and 130,000 in hard currency) within the space of ten days amounting to a quarter of Piedmont’s contribution! These figures – along with the litany of grievances sent back to Paris – confirm that Brune’s posting in Italy coincided with a period during which *Bodins frères* were involved in numerous cases of corruption and embezzlement. Rivaud, who got along no better with Brune than Amelot, noted that the general – prior to his departure for Holland – had “*exchanged 8,000 pieces of gold into louis which earned him 846,000 francs – it is believed he has taken no less than a million which Switzerland furnished him.*”³²¹

Naturally, the Cisalpine Directory did not take kindly to such excesses. It complained to Rivaud that:

*...the agents of [war commissioners and the Compagnie Bodin] are taking out requisition orders on nearly all the départements of the Republic such that partial and arbitrary confiscations are producing desolation among the citizens, the debasement of civilian authorities, universal discontent and are dealing a mortal blow to finance.*³²²

The Lombard state estimated it had already paid four million francs in contributions, plus twelve million for the convention it signed with France on 7 October 1798 and another twelve million to supply garrisons – all within the last three months.

Complaints against *Bodin frères* reached a tipping point in Nivôse and Pluviôse Year VII. In one particularly striking letter dated 31 December 1798 a Mr. Blanchon – *commissaire ordonnateur* at Mantua – informed the war minister that since the *Compagnie Bodin* had delivered nothing, the garrison had been forced to tap into the city’s siege reserves:

Hindrances are reappearing every minute. The shambolic service of the Compagnie Bodin is transforming Mantua into the sieve of the Danaïdes. Convoys are constantly arriving, but the supply level is not increasing because the army cannot live off thin air while awaiting sieges and battles. It pains me to confirm there wasn’t a single piece of wood available for the daily service when rigorous cold weather began to settle in. We had to requisition some from administrations, private citizens and were forced to replenish stocks by puncturing siege reserves. The same goes for all other goods, particularly meat... Twice in the last eight days, we had to deprive inhabitants of it by removing what was on sale at civilian butchers... horrible injustices are being committed all across Italy... for the personal benefit of a few individuals whose only

³²⁰ *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 1, *Summary of the use of two million from the contribution imposed on Piedmont by the general-in-chef*, undated.

³²¹ *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 1, *Complaint against Général Brune*, 9 nivôse VII/29 Dec. 1798.

³²² *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 1, *Complaint against war commissioner Allard*, 8 nivôse VII/28 Dec. 1798.

*zeal and activity is to gather military bonds and empty the coffers of both Republics...*³²³

This was not an isolated incident, for the Cisalpine Directory wrote to Amelot that soldiers in many other garrison towns had been forced to consume reserves for their daily needs. Milan conceded it was powerless to check these transgressions and shifted responsibility to intervene back onto the new general-in-chief Joubert (who had arrived in Milan on November 2) and his commissioner Amelot.³²⁴ In response to these recriminations, the *Compagnie Bodin* merely affirmed that:

...the assertions of the Cisalpine government are complete falsehoods, and its accusations are perfidious. One could believe they form part of a combined plan to halt the French army's victories and disorganise its services."³²⁵

Clearly, the company was confident its political and military protectors would shield it from any investigation, despite the fact its shortcomings were forcing Italian cities to provide more supplies.³²⁶ Nonetheless, Amelot pursued the case vigorously. In a landmark letter addressed to the Directory on 2 January 1799, he emphasised that his contemptuous treatment by the army and the *Compagnie Bodin*'s repeated abuses were the direct result of the system Bonaparte had installed:

*I have threatened several times to make this company responsible for the inconveniences resulting from [its lack of service], it objected that it lacked the means to make the advances for a service that is growing daily...I solicited from you financial aid which could remove any pretext it could have not to honour its engagements...It promised the [war] minister to ensure its service with these funds up to and including the month of Nivôse. Never has a company been so advantageously treated – by the price awarded for its markets and by the nature and quantity of the advances it received – and nonetheless it is at the moment when it should have made people forget requisitions that...an even greater negligence in its service multiplied these odious requisitions causing it to petition me for even more funds...This country has spent in the last three months...over 30 million, and it is this country – which isn't about to stop being drained – which has made great sacrifices for the French army...I warned General Brune before his departure, I warned General Joubert after his arrival...but I have been accused of intrigue and of disrupting the service...The presence and opinions of itizen Fouché have made me lose all hope of achieving anything good...**Bonaparte has vanquished the enemies of France; but the independence he has often exerted from the Directory's authority, the principles that were propagated in the administrations of his army, the***

³²³ *Ibid*, dossier 293, plaquette 1, *Complaint of commissioner Blanchon against the Compagnie Bodin*, 11 nivôse VII/31 Dec. 1798.

³²⁴ *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 2, *Letter from the Cisalpine Directory concerning thefts by contractors at Mantua*, 11 nivôse VII/31 Dec. 1798.

³²⁵ *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 2, *Letter from the Compagnie Bodin concerning complaints of the Cisalpine Directory*, 12 nivôse VII/1 Jan. 1799.

³²⁶ See Appendix XII.

*profound seeds of corruption which have remained, are evils which are difficult to repair.*³²⁷

Amelot concluded by stating that: “*It is not only the Cisalpine government which is complaining, but war commissioners and those officers of the general staff who do not partake in the abuses and are telling the truth.*”

Unfortunately for Amelot his new commander, Joubert, was a political ally of Fouché who – although he knew corruption was rife and frowned upon such abuses – was even more irritated at having a civilian commissioner monitor his activities. Therefore, instead of punishing the Bodins, Joubert berated Amelot for not providing him with Piedmont’s contribution:

*I am astonished to learn that the two million from Piedmont have been destined to various services of the army without informing me...woe to him who would attempt to hamper my march in order to favour contractors in Milan who eat the money they receive for the army in Paris...How could 30 million have been devoured in three months by the Cisalpine Republic for the Armée d’Italie?*³²⁸

Amelot responded that the court in Turin had been forced to advance fourteen of these thirty million to make up for the *Compagnie Bodin*’s shortcomings.³²⁹ By this time, the commissioner was probably all but convinced the Bodins were above the law – and he was not the only one. On 7 January, Ambassador Rivaud complained to the Directory that:

*...apparently, the credit of the Compagnie Bodin is such that it has the effect of silencing those who could enlighten me the most. The chief ordnance officer has...tasked someone else with drawing up an inventory of all requisitions made to compensate the deficiencies of contractors...This was truly answering my request with something I had not requested.*³³⁰

What is more, when efforts were made to curb the *Compagnie Bodin*’s illicit activities, it displayed treasures of ingenuity to circumnavigate the rules. On 15 January, for instance, Rivaud reported that *Bodin frères* was buying back bonds which war commissioners were distributing to various cities as down payments for additional supplies, thereby dissimulating records of its abuses.³³¹

³²⁷ AN, AF/III/72, dossier 292, plaquette 2, *Complaint of the Directory against the Compagnie Bodin*, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799.

³²⁸ *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 2, *Letter of Joubert concerning thefts by contractors*, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799.

³²⁹ *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 2, *Response to Joubert’s letter and summary of the funds placed at the Compagnie Bodin’s disposal*, 15 nivôse VII/4 Jan. 1799.

³³⁰ *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 1, *New complaint against the Compagnie Bodin*, 18 nivôse VII/7 Jan. 1799.

³³¹ *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 1, *Rivaud to the Directory giving information on requisitions in the Cisalpine Republic made to compensate the Compagnie Bodin’s negligence*, 26 nivôse VII/15 Jan. 1799.

Eventually, even Joubert acknowledged the *Compagnie Bodin* needed taking down a peg and instructed Amelot not to give it any additional funds.³³² In Year VII alone, it had been awarded over 17,000,000 francs in advances, of which 11,000,000 on Italian contributions and logging concessions.³³³ Despite this generosity, the deficiencies of its service had caused the *Armée d'Italie*'s monthly expenses to top 4,000,000 francs.³³⁴ Nonetheless, there were some mitigating factors accounting for *Bodin frères*'s failings. On 25 January, for example, Amelot disclosed the company had been adversely affected by the Monneron scandal:

*Citizen Bodin has sent me a letter...responding to the reproaches made against the Compagnie Bodin...He asserts that despite the aid received from the government, the event which occurred at the Caisse des Comptes Courants has wiped out all credit and removed any means for him to negotiate the effects which were advanced to him, and that he is unable to transfer hard currency into Italy or exchange bills for francs.*³³⁵

To alleviate these difficulties, Amelot suggested the Directory instruct the Cisalpine Republic to forward its monthly contributions of 1,500,000 francs to Bodin in exchange for *biens nationaux* acquired by France in Piedmont. We have already seen how Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller swindled the Cisalpine government out of a great deal of money in this transaction.³³⁶

Although Schérer filed a report on 16 January recommending the company's contract be rescinded, it continued to operate for several months.³³⁷ While other contractors were suffering losses incurred by the economic crisis of Year VII, General Championnet's offensive against Naples afforded *Bodin frères* an unexpected opportunity to recoup some of its losses. Records do not show whether the firm was involved in the notorious acts of pillage committed during Championnet's campaign, of which the most infamous incidents took place in late January when Faipoult – now Championnet's civilian commissioner – reported that:

...horrendous plundering has just been denounced to me: the entire château of Caserta has been devastated – everything has been taken down to the billiard cloths,

³³² *Ibid*, dossier 292, plaquette 1, *Joubert to Amelot*, 28 nivôse VII/17 Jan. 1799.

³³³ See Appendix XII.

³³⁴ AN, AF/III/72, dossier 292, plaquette 2, *Request of the Directory to know the real situation of the Compagnie Bodin*, 30 nivôse VII/19 Jan. 1799.

³³⁵ *Ibid*, dossier 293, plaquette 1, *The Directory to Amelot concerning the response he received from the Compagnie Bodin dated 29 nivôse VII*, 6 pluviôse VII/25 Jan. 1799.

³³⁶ See Chapter 2.

³³⁷ AN, AF/III/152A, dossier 713: 117-118, *Military bureau's analysis of war minister Schérer's report of 27 nivôse VII recommending the termination of the Compagnie Bodin's contract*, 1 pluviôse VII/20 Jan. 1799.

*the velvet upholstery on chairs...the same has occurred at the château of Carditello, where everything that could not be removed was hacked to bits with axes.*³³⁸

The company may well have influenced Championnet's decision to impose a contribution of 60 million francs on Naples, especially since it probably wished to deflect the costs of supplying his army. Indeed, on 3 February Faipoult informed Paris that:

*Nothing has been planned for the services and supply of the army...General Championnet has not decreed anything. It is said he intends to have the army supplied by the Neapolitan government. The result of this uncertainty is that the Compagnie Bodin is in no hurry to carry out its service and the new government cannot take any measure to assist it. Consequently, we are in need of everything and live off requisitions...*³³⁹

As late as 12 June 1799, we find General Cambray, commanding the *Armée d'Italie*'s 1st brigade, complaining to Merlin de Douai that Bodin's agents were embezzling funds on wine supplies!³⁴⁰ Moreover, the company was also embroiled in the Schérer scandal of Year VII. On 20 July, Joseph Dabray – a deputy of the Alpes-Maritimes – warned the *Cinq-Cents* that *Bodin frères* had royalist sympathies and was indulging in counter-revolutionary activities:

*I have more than thirty letters which affirm the Compagnie Rochefort and later the Compagnie Bodin since the last four months...have performed almost no service and that private citizens have had to make up for it as they could. Such conduct would lead one to believe they wished to irritate the soldiers and the population to make the former desert and the latter rebel. These suspicions are reinforced by the observation that they are protected by Troussset, the commissaire ordonnateur of Marseille, and Renaud, war commissioner at Nice, who have only employed undesirables whose patriotism is doubtful...*³⁴¹

In Years VIII and IX, *Bodin frères* transferred most of its business from contracting in Italy to speculations on French and Belgian *biens nationaux*. Between Brumaire and Prairial Year VIII, it acquired 1,978,817 francs of *biens nationaux* in 475 lots in the Belgian *département* of the Dyle.³⁴² Most purchases were made in devalued government bonds.³⁴³ Bodin resold nearly 400,000 francs of these lands to the banker Pierre Joseph Fleury Jubié

³³⁸ AN, AF/III/78, dossier 322, plaquette 2, *Faipoult complains to Championnet about his inability to prevent the pillaging of Caserta and Carditello*, 3 pluviôse VII/22 Jan. 1799.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, *Contribution of 60 million demanded by Championnet from Naples; difficulties of the Compagnie Bodin*, 15 pluviôse VII/3 Feb. 1799.

³⁴⁰ AN, AF/III/152A, dossier 714:32, *Cambray to Merlin de Douai on the conduct of Bodin's wine agents, General Macdonald and Bertolio* [Antoine-René-Constance], *French ambassador at Rome*, 24 prairial VII/12 June 1799.

³⁴¹ AN, AF/III/158, dossier 747:79, *Dabray on the purchase and export of weapons by administrators of the Alpes-Maritimes département and the Compagnies Rochefort and Bodin*, undated [Year VII].

³⁴² Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.350, footnote 123.

³⁴³ For records of these sales, see MCN/ET/XVIII/975-979 & 984-986. Drawing a complete summary of these purchases presents a near-impossible task.

Map II

The Exploitation of Central & Southern Italy 1796-1799



This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com (https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=2324&lang=en).
 Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.
 Treasure Chest & Treaty icons download and used with permission under Free license from www.icons8.com.
 All other modifications created by the author.

and another 350,000 francs to Hippolyte Charles.³⁴⁴ Charles Bodin also bought the Capucin and Jacobin convents in the Rue Saint-Honoré for 800,000 francs each in 1799.³⁴⁵ As previously noted, Victor Bodin and the contractor Jean-Baptiste Paulée had also purchased about a quarter of all *biens nationaux* sold in the department of Jemappes in Year V.³⁴⁶

There is no direct evidence proving the Bodin brothers were implicated in the Brumaire conspiracy.³⁴⁷ Nonetheless, *Bodin frères*'s track record in Italy during 1798-1799 provides an excellent example of how contractors were directly caught up in the increasingly bitter struggle opposing the 'faction of the generals' to the Directory's civilian officials in occupied lands. All the symptoms prefiguring a military coup in France were already visible in the manner which the army impaired the Directory's administration of Italy during this period.

Conclusion

The military contractors who rose to prominence under the Directory came from a variety of different backgrounds. A few had already been established suppliers during the *Ancien Régime*, such as Vanlerberghe (Paulée's associate) or Baruch Cerf Berr (Lanchère's partner), but most including Ouvrard and Michel *jeune* were *nouveaux riches* speculators who seized the opportunity provided by revolutionary turmoil to accumulate vast fortunes. Some like Armand Seguin were converts from other professions. There was no uniformity in the social origins of these individuals. Michel Simons and Pierre Louis Hanet-Cléry, for example, came from affluent and privileged backgrounds; the Bodin brothers were sons of a merchant trader, while the Michel brothers presumably hailed from a far more modest and less cultivated *milieu*. As we have seen, many of these men could be ruthless when circumstances required. Remorse was a luxury they could ill afford if they were to survive in the business world; and some did not recoil from committing crimes to further their commercial ambitions.

When examining the careers of these contractors, one recurring feature emerges which clearly constituted an essential element in their success: the necessity of attaching oneself

³⁴⁴ See Appendix XII.

³⁴⁵ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.23 – Based on information from Henri Monin & Louis Lazard, *Sommier des biens nationaux de la Ville de Paris*, 3 vols., Paris, Léopold Cerf, 1926.

³⁴⁶ See *supra* p.10.

³⁴⁷ See Chapter 6.

to a general commanding a major army. All the barons of military supply formed links with the army's high command which they reinforced through political connections. The Michels, for instance, probably owed their survival to Cambacérès. The affairs of Michel Simons flourished after he secured the supply of General Dumouriez's army and befriended Talleyrand and Radix. The *Compagnie Bodin*'s interests were guarded by General Brune, Fouché, Barras and Joséphine de Beauharnais. Ouvrard employed Cambacérès as his litigation expert and was good friends with Barras and Admiral Bruix;³⁴⁸ while Armand Seguin formed an unofficial alliance with General Schérer who conveniently served as war minister. Even Bonaparte – who despised military contractors and publicly refused to be associated with any of them – was close to Jean-Pierre Collot. The development of these networks therefore indicates that generals, contractors and politicians were engaged in a form of triangular symbiotic relationship. Generals who sought victories required operatives to pay and supply troops; contractors needed the patronage of generals and state officials to secure contracts and shield them from prosecution; and politicians depended upon contractors to supply Paris and the military with food and equipment. Those businessmen who failed to secure the patronage of leading commanders and politicians were considered expendable and condemned to run the administrative gauntlet to obtain repayments.

Thus, the financial preponderance of private contractors went hand-in-hand with the army's resurgent role at the forefront of revolutionary politics. The strength of the military's position had been reasserted after its suppression of the Insurrection of 1st Prairial Year III and fully restored by its role in the 18 Fructidor coup. By 1799, the generals were powerful enough to constitute their own faction which rivalled that of the republicans and neo-Jacobins. Some of them like Schérer and Bernadotte were even appointed ministers; and naturally it was in the contractors' interests to side with generals in their struggle to shake off the Directory's civilian oversight. The 1799 Schérer scandal was symptomatic of this complicity. But the best example was in Italy where the *Compagnie Bodin* had forged agreements with Generals Brune and Championnet and probably participated in planning the 'Cisalpine 18 Fructidor' – an event which foreshadowed the 18 Brumaire in France.

³⁴⁸ Jacques Wolff, *Le financier Ouvrard*, Paris: Tallandier, 1992, p.31 & Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.156 – Ouvrard employed Cambacérès and Gérard-Maurice Turpin (ex-director of litigation at the *Trésor public* who later served as an administrator of the Consular Treasury) at his firm's headquarters in the Rue d'Amboise. Cambacérès left to become justice minister after the 30 Prairial coup. See Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.70.

All these problems would probably not have posed a real threat to the Directory had war not been renewed in 1799 with its string of military setbacks which focused popular discontent against the government. Warnings of a military takeover intensified after the coup of 30 Prairial when the Directory's commissioners were indicted for overstepping their mandates by having Championnet arrested. The generals had friends in the *Cinq-Cents* and the *Anciens* and even made allies of the neo-Jacobins who shared their contempt for the government's civilian commissioners whom they regarded as bourgeois *arrivistes*.³⁴⁹ The conflicts of France's domestic politics were therefore inextricably linked to those of its foreign policy;³⁵⁰ and Fouché must have reflected satisfactorily on how the wheel of fate turned when – as the new police minister – he presided over the trial of Amelot and Rivaud – the very administrators who had denounced his actions as ambassador in Milan.³⁵¹ Eventually, all civilian commissioners were suppressed on 15 & 18 October 1799.³⁵² What is more, these politico-financial conflicts which continually lurked in the background during the crisis of Year VII indirectly contributed to furthering Bonaparte's cause. By undermining the Directory's authority, they proved an important factor in its overthrow.³⁵³

Studying the affairs of contractors reveals – far more than those of bankers – how central a tenet the financial exploitation of foreign occupied territories had become in the Directory's economic policy. Hanet-Cléry's memoirs, for instance, openly admit the invasion of Switzerland was largely undertaken to finance Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition and pay the wage arrears of French armies. In Belgium, the French government repaid Paulée by allowing him to acquire *biens nationaux* at discount rates and sold others at auction to raise funds. In Italy, tax-farming contracts covering vast swathes of the country were entrusted to the *Compagnie Bodin* as repayment for military supplies. In exceptional cases, the Directory even allowed certain contractors to act as agents of the Treasury abroad (e.g. Paulée, Simons and Hanet-Cléry). Naturally, this system whereby private operators advanced the government sums which it did not have the revenues to reimburse was tenuous and only ever considered as a temporary solution – which goes a

³⁴⁹ The 30 Prairial – known in France as '*la revanche des conseils*' – in fact represented a triumph for the generals who played a great part in the day's success. Joubert was rewarded by being sent back to Italy as commander-in-chief and Bernadotte was appointed war minister. General Moncey, disgraced as a royalist in Year V, was rehabilitated. But the principal victor was Championnet who was triumphantly released from captivity and reinstated into active service. On 23 June, the Directory cancelled all charges against him. His officers and friends were released, and Championnet himself was given command of a new army that was being assembled in the Dauphiné for the protection of the Alps.

³⁵⁰ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.651-652.

³⁵¹ Waresquiel, *FLSP*, p.272.

³⁵² Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.669.

³⁵³ *Ibid*, p.511.

long way to explain the corruption and rapacity of contractors since they knew such an organisation would inevitably collapse.

Contractors enjoyed great advantages when operating abroad. They could increase the price of their supplies by arguing it was worth paying more to deprive France's enemies of them. They were also much less accountable to civilian authorities than at home and could easily divert attention from their abuses by playing off the Directory's administrators against its generals. Jurisdictional rivalries opposing civilian and military authorities enabled supply agents to regularly breach their contractual terms and requisition far greater amounts than they were legitimately entitled to. Furthermore, middling officials in army and government administrations were especially prone to bribery and corruption in foreign lands, tempted as they were by the scale and extent of the plundering they witnessed first-hand. The amount of peer-pressure to indulge in corruption must have been substantial, especially when all a contractor need say was that both he and his referring administrator stood to benefit from a particular transaction.


But the most alluring magnet for ambitious suppliers seeking vast profits was probably the navy. Ouvrard – the most successful of all contractors – was awarded a tailor-made contract granting him a monopoly for the supply of the entire French Atlantic fleet in 1798; and many other businessmen like Michel *jeune* and Michel Simons jumped at the opportunity to become subcontractors in his extensive naval supply networks. The navy's gargantuan requirements included several products which had to be imported from abroad at high prices such as wood, hemp, tar, salt, etc. Profits from naval supplies were so considerable that even bankers sought partnerships with Ouvrard;³⁵⁴ and his most canny associates attempted to impose themselves as indispensable intermediaries for particular goods. Antoine Roy and Michel Simons, for example, both purchased forests and logging concessions to command the navy's wood supplies.³⁵⁵ Furthermore, the case of Simons and his pharaonic project to resurrect Antwerp as a colonial trading port shows the financial stakes were so high that some contractors were bold enough to challenge Ouvrard's supremacy. It is difficult to determine whether Bonaparte intentionally scuttled the Antwerp project, but Simons would certainly have stood to make immense gains had the port not been converted into a naval base for the planned invasion of Britain.

³⁵⁴ Alexandre Barrillon and the *Limoges & Mazère* bank supplied wine to the French fleet. See Chapter 3.

³⁵⁵ Antoine Roy, one of Ouvrard's principal logging associates who later briefly served as finance minister in December 1818, had inherited vast swathes of forest in Navarre from the duc de Bouillon.

One final observation of note is that all leading contractors safeguarded their earnings by investing them in *biens nationaux* and property. We have noted how Michel *jeune* and Ouvrard used real estate deals as a means of channelling funds and payments; and how Armand Seguin owed his rise to the purchase of his tannery on the Ile de Sèvres as a *bien d'émigré*. The controversial auctioning of Belgian *biens nationaux* in 1796 accelerated this scramble for land and played a conspicuous role in the activities of several contractors – especially Paulée and Michel Simons whose project at Antwerp centred on the *Abbaye de Saint-Michel* (which he had bought from Paulée). Profits from real estate speculation further convinced the *Compagnie Bodin* to refocus its activities in Belgium during Years VIII and IX. These examples confirm that land remained the only stable economic commodity whose value reassured investors during the late directorial period. They also indicate that *biens nationaux* were one of the principal means by which the Directory subsidised those of its business partners who enjoyed preferential status.

By 1799, all these factors were accentuating the Directory's reliance on bankers and contractors for its finances, foodstuffs and military supplies. The granting of so many gifts and privileges to particular interests had entangled the government in an inexorable spiral drawing it towards a perilous confrontation with the military faction. Its decision to abolish nationalised paper currency following the 18 Fructidor coup and hand back complete control of the economy to the private sector had proven a grave political miscalculation. The Treasury was borrowing money in foreign markets which it could not repay, while the renewal of hostilities was exacerbating the crisis and plunging France into ever greater debt. In such dire economic conditions, it was only a matter of time before the financial aristocracy grew disaffected and began to wonder whether a popular and successful general couldn't perform a better job of ruling France than two incapacitated legislative councils and five corrupt and inefficient directors.



CHAPTER 6 – BRUMAIRE & THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BANQUE DE FRANCE



“Dans les révolutions, il y a deux sortes de gens : ceux qui les font et ceux qui en profitent.” – Napoléon Bonaparte.

*“The vessel of state will float directionless until a helmsman presents himself who can steer it out of port.”*¹ – Joseph Fouché.

The Financial Spark of Brumaire: The Forced Loan of Year VII

Historians have long debated the long-term causes of the coup which saw Napoleon seize power and establish a military dictatorship in France, often pointing to issues dating back to the *Ancien Régime* and early Revolution. But from a financial perspective, the spark which lit the fuse of 18 Brumaire was the voting of the forced loan of 6 August 1799.

The curtain lifted on the opening act on 28 June. Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities against the Second Coalition, two leading Jacobin deputies in the *Cinq-Cents* – General Jean-Baptiste Jourdan and Pierre Delbrel – had passed a conscription law on 5 September 1798 to accommodate an expected surge in military needs (the ‘Jourdan-Delbrel’ law). But the string of French defeats in early 1799 now enabled Jourdan to secure an extension to this law calling up for service all young men who hadn’t yet been drafted (200,000 recruits). To fund this mobilisation, a progressive forced loan of 100 million francs levied on the well-to-do classes was approved and all unsold *domaines nationaux* were affected to its payment.² This was accompanied on 12 July by an ominous new hostage law authorising local administrations in *départements* to arrest and fine relatives and friends of *émigrés* who would now be held financially liable for any damages caused by local unrest.³ As Marcel Marion notes, this rapid succession of measures targeting the wealthy raised fears of a throwback to more sinister times:

The war against fortunes was declared...The war against persons, the re-establishment under another name of the law of suspects...The return of imprisonments, sequestrations, revolutionary taxes and the spectre of the Terror reappeared on the horizon. In the ministries, the neo-Jacobins were placing their men. Ramel, under constant attack...was succeeded by...Robert Lindet, the acquitted of Vendôme, former member of the Comité de Salut public, an obstinate longstanding partisan of the assignat, the adversary of bankers...An even graver omen was the resurgence of the Club des Jacobins where one could hear the most outrageous proposals and declamations...A chamber of justice to make the wealthy pay up...continuous threats were proffered against the 200 richest citizens accused of hoarding the debris of the nation’s wealth...The question was debated as to whether if “at the moment when all citizens are called to arms to defend the Republic it would not be just to recognise all of them as landowners”...France trembled and called

¹ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.123.

² Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.148.

³ The law of 24 messidor VII also targeted former nobles and ‘associates of outlaws’. Designated hostages had to constitute themselves prisoner to the authorities within ten days under pain of being declared *émigrés*.

*with all its heart upon a man or a regime which would guarantee the rights won by the Revolution without veering into counter-revolution.*⁴

Yet the anxieties fuelling this panic were largely exaggerated, for the Jacobins didn't wield enough popular support to entertain any realistic prospect of seizing power and reviving a terrorist regime – as subsequent events were to prove.⁵

The main threat was unmistakably in the economic sphere. Twice already in 1793 and 1795, the revolutionary government had resorted to progressive forced loans which had largely been paid in worthless paper currency,⁶ and now once again the Jacobins had manoeuvred skilfully by wrapping their offensive in the cloak of national security. Indeed, who could oppose the necessity of raising more troops to defend the country without being exposed to accusations of treasonous intent? What is more, the existential threat of invasion was enough to sway – at least temporarily – most conservative republicans behind the loan since military priorities required funds be levied wherever they were most abundant. Affluent citizens weighed these considerations apprehensively and realised just how much they stood to lose. All the efforts undertaken to liberalise the economy since the fall of Robespierre were suddenly jeopardised by this untimely resolution.

Having lost the first round following the loan's approval on June 28, the wealthy classes still hoped to alleviate its impact in the crucial forthcoming parliamentary deliberations set to define its eligibility and personal revenue assessment criteria. Initial discussions confirmed their sense of foreboding when the deputy René Doche-Delisle proposed to institute citizen juries in *départements* composed of nine members drawn from local central administrations (six of whom would be too poor to pay the loan). These would be specifically tasked with investigating citizens who had signed contracts with the government, accrued vast fortunes in record time or bought and sold buildings worth more than 40,000 francs since 1792.⁷

⁴ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.148-150 – The *Club des Jacobins* was closed on 13 Aug. 1799.

⁵ The Jacobins had their own plans for a parliamentary coup. On 13 September, Jourdan demanded a state of emergency be declared. The following day, his motion was defeated by 245 votes to 172 in the *Cinq-Cents*. Sieyès seized this opportunity to dismiss the other leading Jacobin general – Bernadotte – from the war ministry, sending him a letter without even summoning him to a meeting. Jacobins agitators attempted to rouse Parisians to insurrection, assembling 800-900 partisans in the Place de la Concorde and its vicinity. But Fouché and General Lefebvre ensured the Palais-Bourbon was heavily guarded. Thus, the '*journée du 28 fructidor*' saw the Directory unseat the only general capable of opposing Bonaparte, while the Jacobins discredited their political legitimacy. Both parties had once again played into Bonaparte's hands. See Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.186-196.

⁶ For the forced loans of 3 Sep. 1793 and 19 frimaire IV/10 Dec. 1795, see Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.82-89 & 411-417.

⁷ Vandal calls these juries "*committees of confiscation*" (*ADB*, Tome I, p.200). It was also suggested they verify how many children wealthy citizens had enlisted for the defence of the nation.

After prolonged debate, this project was discarded in favour of a scheme based on Joseph Clément Poullain-Grandprey's proposal (with amendments by Hugues Destrem) which called for forced loan contributions to be determined through both a citizen's jury and past tax records.⁸ One particularly contentious clause was article 13 which invited private citizens to inform on their wealthier counterparts and instructed juries to apply additional taxes on fortunes invested in real estate or bonds. Contractors, speculators and former nobles could be charged an entire year's income as an extraordinary contribution to the loan.⁹ Adding fuel to the fire, Poullain-Grandprey didn't even bother denying his target was business, openly stating in the *Cinq-Cents* on 16 July that "*the imposable assets here aren't revenues – which often prove insufficient – but capital.*"¹⁰ The loan's designated *rapporteurs* – Emmanuel Crétet in the *Cinq-Cents* and Charles-François Lebrun in the *Anciens* – both denounced its progressive character. But the plan was adopted in the *Cinq-Cents* on 1 August and ratified by the *Anciens* on 6 August.¹¹

Certain administrations, galvanised by this decision, interpreted the loan's remit as giving them free rein to clamp down on the prosperous. On 12 August, the *département* of the Seine went so far as to demand the names and residences of contractors residing in its jurisdiction who did business with the naval ministry because it "*desired to reach all the colossal fortunes erected on the misery of the people and privations of the defenders of the nation.*"¹² The naval minister responded that:

*...these contractors being known to me only through the considerable sums they have advanced my department – and the government having thus far been unable to fulfil its engagements towards them due to its lack of finances – I didn't deem it appropriate to respond to the département of the Seine's request without first deferring it to the Executive Directory. After reviewing the consideration I have just exposed, it has decided I should abstain from communicating the list that has been requested of me.*¹³

⁸ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.150-159 and Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.199-201 – Citizens taxed between 300-400 francs paid 3/10ths of their tax contribution for the forced loan; those taxed between 400-500 francs paid 4/10ths, etc. with the increment increasing in tenths every 100 francs up to those taxed between 3,000-4,000 francs who paid 20/10ths. Beyond this limit, the juries determined the contribution's amount which couldn't exceed 75% of taxes paid. There were appeal juries, but these were mostly powerless. One-sixth of the total payment was to be made within the *décade* after the voting of the law, another sixth within the month and the rest by quarters every two months as of 1 vendémiaire VIII.

⁹ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.159 – Only former nobles with children serving under arms were exempted.

¹⁰ *Le Publiciste*, 29 messidor VII/17 July 1799 (quoted in Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.200, footnote 1).

¹¹ Over the course of these discussions, the *tiers consolidé* dropped from 11 francs in late May to between 8.75 and 7.76 francs in July and August. Only news of Bonaparte's return from Egypt lifted its value back above 10 francs on 25 October (Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.152, footnote 2 & Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.197).

¹² Quoted in Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.156-157.

¹³ AN, F/4/1059, *The Naval Minister to the Seine Administration*, 14 fructidor VII/31 Aug. 1799.

Much of the mainstream press was up in arms against the loan. *Le Publiciste* commented that:

*...today, one puts as much affectation in hiding one's fortune as one previously took in displaying and even exaggerating it... There are also people who intentionally go bankrupt to better prove their misery.*¹⁴

The *Gazette de France* decried the “Visigoths” who had “moulded this masterpiece of absurdity;”¹⁵ while *Le Surveillant* expressed alarm at the perspective of “an immense number of workers who will be unemployed by the start of winter.”¹⁶ *L'Ami des lois* complained that:

*...the forced loan of 100 million francs is killing business in Paris... Everyone is hiding their gold in case of future hardships: our resources are annihilated by stupidity, obstinacy and ignorance.*¹⁷

Even the traditionally docile *Moniteur* was outraged by what it viewed as the loan's encouragement of whispering campaigns:

*Who can guarantee the first denunciator won't single me out as a vile thief at the rostrum of his club – for we all know how easily flouted and banal such denunciations are? Who can assure me that allegations often bred from personal animosities and which more often are the fruit of ignorance and inconsideration won't be adopted by a jury essentially constituted of people who aren't subject to the loan? This leaves the fate of all the reputedly affluent classes in the hands of the poor who are always disposed to arbitrary measures and vexation.*¹⁸

But those most incensed by the loan's creation were military contractors. One Prussian diplomat reported that Jean-Pierre Collot was hit particularly hard by the loan. Being already in arrears on his tax payments, he offered the Directory a lump sum of 50,000 francs to settle his obligations. Upon being refused Collot stormed off in a rage, reportedly shouting: “*You don't want it. Then you won't get anything. Adieu!*”¹⁹ Armand Seguin was taxed 100,000 francs. He too offered to pay only 50,000, arguing his activities employed 500 families in the Sèvres area.²⁰ These brusque reactions confirm the exasperation of military entrepreneurs; and while most were resourceful enough to deflect the loan's impact, they weren't about to take such a blow lying down nor forgive this slight so easily. As Albert Vandal notes:

¹⁴ *Le Publiciste*, 14 messidor VII/2 July 1799.

¹⁵ *La Gazette de France*, 6 thermidor VII/24 July 1799.

¹⁶ *Le Surveillant*, 9 thermidor VII/27 July 1799.

¹⁷ *L'Ami des lois*, 5 fructidor VII/22 Aug. 1799.

¹⁸ *Moniteur*, 26 thermidor VII/13 Aug. 1799.

¹⁹ *Gazette de France*, 9 Fructidor VII/26 Aug. 1799 – Quoted in Paul Bailleu (ed.), *Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807: Diplomatische Correspondenzen*, Volume 1, p.319 & Vandal, *ADB*, Tome II, p.202.

²⁰ Archives des Yvelines, 36 L 3.

*The leading military contractors...weren't people who were prepared to be fleeced without a struggle. They debated with the juries, quibbled, chicaned; they knew how to spread and dissimulate their capital, how to adulterate their fortunes. Besides, the sole quality of being rich afforded them a thousand means to influence the jury – to lead it down the path of collusion and fraud. A few preeminent thieves were affected, but most slipped through the nets attempting to ensnare them. Nonetheless, their hatred attached itself to a government which treated money suspiciously – as a mark of nobility and a public enemy. They swore to one another, as soon as the opportunity would present itself, to take the offensive against this regime and overthrow it.*²¹

While the loan discontended financial elites, its most nefarious consequence was the tragic and absurd puncturing of funds from an economy desperately in need of investment. The necessities of war had cornered the Directory into a position which compelled it to seize money arbitrarily from the only class that still possessed disposable income – effectively inflicting permanent financial damage on the country to temporarily salvage its military fate. With an estimated 500 million francs to be siphoned from the entrepreneurial classes, businessmen now rushed to withdraw their money from circulation and cancel their investments.²² The effect was devastating and transactions ceased instantaneously.²³ Consequently, the loan yielded disappointing returns – especially where financiers were concerned. Only four tycoons were taxed between 200,000 and 400,000 francs; nine paid between 100,000 and 200,000, while a mere twelve were imposed between 50,000 and 100,000.²⁴ The banker Perregaux – who was in the highest tax bracket – paid the first sixth of his contribution so rapidly he received the official congratulations of the Seine administration!²⁵ But most magnates were reluctant to follow his example. Thus, these meagre results indicated “*the forced loan terrorised and exasperated great fortunes instead of truly denting them. The real victims were people of middling or modest affluence.*”²⁶

Numerous observers – including many legislative deputies – voiced scathing indictments of the loan's monetary ramifications. Referencing Montesquieu, Raymond Barennes – the *Anciens* deputy of the Gironde – noted that “*when the savages of Louisiana want fruit, they cut down the tree – that is despotic government.*”²⁷ Martin Gaudin – Napoleon's future finance minister – recalled the forced loan as “*a deplorable resource...drying up all the currents of monetary circulation and condemning the industrious classes to misery by*

²¹ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.201.

²² *Ibid*, Tome I, p.198.

²³ *Ibid*, Tome I, p.196.

²⁴ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.158, footnote 2.

²⁵ Aulard, *PPRTSD*, Tome V, p.703.

²⁶ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.203.

²⁷ Quoted in Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.154.

appearing to make the necessary contribution weigh only upon the wealthy.”²⁸ In a widely-circulated financial pamphlet, the journalist Camille Saint-Aubin lamented that:

*...it is impossible to borrow even an écu against any asset. Buildings are worthless because maintenance costs, taxes and the price of wheat render it impossible for a host of farmers to pay their landlords...the real way of [increasing state revenues] is to lower interest rates through soft and judicious measures instead of raising them by tyrannical and extravagant proposals...the forced loan is giving diarrhoea not only to those who inadvertently swallowed a dose but to all those whom the doctor had dispensed from taking the potion!*²⁹

Discussions on the forced loan in the *Cinq-Cents* continued right up to the Brumaire coup. In the days preceding the putsch, there were debates about replacing it by a more modest contribution. This worried the Brumaire conspirators as they didn't wish public opinion to veer back towards supporting the Directory.³⁰ On 25 October, the deputy Jacques-Antoine Creuzé-Latouche delivered a report to the *Cinq-Cents* highlighting some particularly telling statistics. In the space of two months, the loan had only raised 4,031,456 francs in hard currency and 1,601,079 francs in depreciated paper notes.³¹ A week later, Creuzé-Latouche published a detailed financial pamphlet contrasting revenues for Years VI and VII which referenced even more damning figures. Payments to the land registry and for stamp duty had dropped from 604,000 francs in Fructidor Year VI to 284,000 in Fructidor Year VII. Direct taxes down to the second *décade* of Fructidor Year VI had reached 14,156,344 francs but fallen to 6,919,937 for the same *décade* in Fructidor Year VII. The product of other taxes over the same period had crumbled from 31,823,837 francs in Year VI to 6,454,307 in Year VII; while Treasury revenue in hard currency had diminished from 110,985,340 francs in the last quarter of Year VI to 70,413,820 in the last quarter of Year VII.³²

Ultimately, the loan's arbitrary measures and ruinous effects rendered the Directory “odious” to the public and made “a liberator even more desired.”³³ Even the mildly-

²⁸ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.135.

²⁹ Saint-Aubin, *Ne peut-on pas sauver la République en la faisant aimer ? N'y-a-t'il pas moyen d'emprunter 100 millions sans ruiner la France et mécontenter tous les citoyens ? Ou Réflexions isolées sur l'emprunt des 100 millions*. Paris: Imprimerie de A. Bailleul, undated (BN, Lb⁴² 726).

³⁰ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.291.

³¹ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.159 – Others say about 50 million francs in taxes had been imposed of which only 7 or 8 million had already been paid, mostly in depreciated paper currency (Sciout, *Le Directoire*, Tome IV, p.529 & Stourm, *LFARR*, Tome II, p.385). The last report delivered to the *Cinq-Cents* on 13 Brumaire VIII/4 Nov. 1799 – three months after the loan was voted – indicated 70,800,000 francs imposed in 95 *départements*, of which only 10,424,000 francs had been raised.

³² Creuzé-Latouche, *Réflexions sur les finances*, 11 brumaire VIII/2 Nov. 1799 (BN, Le⁴³ 4036), p.4-8 & 11.

³³ Bainville, *Le Dix-huit brumaire*, p.7.

tempered Mollien says the Directory left France “*under the double oppression of all the disorders of anarchy and all the excesses of despotism.*”³⁴ As one historian concludes:

*...the forces of capital were henceforth committed to the first who would undertake to do away with this despoiling regime. When Bonaparte returned from Egypt, the capitalists welcomed him as a liberator. The military contractors went to him straight away, on the eve of Brumaire. The bankers came more timidly the following day – adventurous fortune followed by the more prudent and circumspect money.*³⁵

Lindet’s Appeal to the Bankers & the Creation of the Syndicat du Commerce

Perhaps the most fateful repercussion of the loan was its alienation of a considerable part of the banking community which had made substantial efforts to support the Directory in the weeks after the 30 Prairial coup. The state’s credit rating had become so toxic following this upheaval that it was no longer able to sell government obligations and Treasury bonds on the market. Robert Lindet – the Jacobin deputy who replaced Ramel as finance minister – had been forced to solicit help from leading Parisian bankers, fifteen of whom graciously extended their assistance by constituting themselves in an association known as the *Syndicat du Commerce*.³⁶ In an initial agreement concluded on 25 July, this syndicate consented to forego cashing in 30 million francs of rescriptions owned by its members – representing a quarter of direct tax contributions for Year VII – advancing them instead to Lindet in return for an equivalent sum in Treasury bonds staked on the proceeds of the forced loan.³⁷ This arrangement enabled Lindet to begin issuing and selling bonds of the *Syndicat du Commerce* guaranteed by its 30 million advance and backed by the collective signature of its members. The deal’s formalities were finalised in a second document dated 6 August – the same day the forced loan was definitively adopted.³⁸ A visibly relieved Lindet wrote to his father-in-law (Mr. Mesnil):

The bankers and traders have signed a convention with me enabling us to cover half the expenses of the government’s services...I have met and continue to see all the

³⁴ Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.26.

³⁵ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.203.

³⁶ They included Perregaux, Mallet l’ainé, Sévène, Fulchiron, Germain, Sabatier, Davillier, Barrillon and Dejoly.

³⁷ AN, AF/III/617, 7 thermidor VII/25 July 1799 – note that this document is recorded in the archival registry but missing in the actual file!

³⁸ AN, AF/III/619, plaquette 4373:12-14, 19 thermidor VII/6 Aug. 1799 – Article 6 of the agreement stipulated the 30 million franc advance was to be disbursed in bills of exchange with validities of 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110 and 120 days. Article 3 entitled the Directory to requisition from the syndicate any payment orders (*mandats*) drawn on *receveurs* – equivalent to 1/3 of the 30 million francs.

*bankers. This mustn't be an object of surprise. The leading ones have kept fond memories of me.*³⁹

Unfortunately for Lindet, the forced loan's approval frustrated the syndicate's bankers and shattered their remaining confidence and goodwill. As Albert Vandal observes, many of them felt unfairly targeted and betrayed by the loan's provisions after offering to help the Directory in its hour of need:

*When the forced loan was finalised, the jury taxed [the syndicate's bankers] all the more cruelly since they had revealed the eminence of their financial situation – designating themselves a target through the aid they had furnished. This manner of acknowledging a rendered service made them indignant. In truth, their credit and reserves had enabled their houses to survive the supreme financial test of Jacobinism...but the remarks of bankers after Brumaire proved the wound was still open.*⁴⁰

Incidentally, nearly all the syndicate's members were shareholders of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*, and an examination of that bank's correspondence confirms how closely these two organisations were associated. Having opened an account for the *Syndicat du Commerce* two days after its foundation (8 August), the *caisse* discounted thirty-three of the syndicate's bills of exchange worth 164,335 francs on 18 August.⁴¹ Manifestly, the *caisse* was anxious about the solvability of these bills for it enquired as to why they had not officially been granted legal tender and were only signed on the government's behalf by the mathematician Pierre-Simon de Laplace.⁴² Its concern was entirely justified given syndicate bills depreciated by up to 50% shortly after their marketisation.

And yet, a log entry for 3 October shows that *Jubié, Basterrèche & Cie.* deposited twelve of these bills worth 50,095 francs with the *caisse*.⁴³ This seemingly trivial piece of information could in fact provide us with crucial evidence linking the banking sector to Brumaire – for not only does it demonstrate that syndicate bills had become an object of speculation, but it also raises the possibility that financiers of the syndicate discounted

³⁹ Letter dated 20 thermidor VII/7 Aug. 1799 quoted in Amand Montier, *Robert Lindet*, Paris: Alcan, 1899, p.371 – Lindet had been finance minister under the Terror. For the *Syndicat du Commerce* see also Gohier, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.79-80 & Stourm, *LFC*, p.137-139.

⁴⁰ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.202 – See the section on the bankers' meeting at the Luxembourg.

⁴¹ ABF, *RCLD*, 21 thermidor & 1 fructidor VII/8 & 18 Aug. 1799, p.105-106 & 109 – Jean-Baptiste Moïse Jollivet was appointed the syndicate's director (see his entry in the Biographical Index).

⁴² Martin Garat, director of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*, wrote anxiously enquiring whether these bills had legal tender (ABF, *RCLD*, 22 fructidor VII/8 Sep. 1799, p.117).

⁴³ *Ibid*, 11 vendémiaire VIII/3 Oct. 1799, p.125 – The reason for this is probably that the syndicate's bills continued to be accepted as tax payments – both for the forced loan and the war tax which replaced it on 18 November after the Brumaire coup (see below). They were also accepted to pay for Treasury bonds, down payments forwarded for delegations and various other government securities. The *Syndicat du Commerce* was disbanded on 5 Jan. 1800. See Stourm, *LFC*, p.137-139 & Payard, *LFO*, p.36-37.

these bills with the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* to obtain cash advances to fund Napoleon's putsch. Admittedly, this remains an implausible scenario considering there is no surviving documentation establishing any connivance between the two; besides which, bankers were far too vigilant to openly incriminate themselves. Nevertheless, dissimulating the coup's finances behind routine bill discounting operations could have constituted one method of discreetly channelling funds to Napoleon's faction without outwardly appearing to do so.

Furthermore, we should keep in mind that the temptation of depicting Brumaire as a premeditated capitalist conspiracy which sealed "*Bonaparte's alliance with the bankers...in such a manner that we can consider the list of the first shareholders of the Banque [de France] as reflecting that of the Brumaire conspirators*" has always been popular with Napoleon's detractors.⁴⁴ Perregaux, for example, is often considered a top suspect and even the eminent historian Albert Mathiez claims he was "*one of the sponsors of the revolution of 19 Brumaire.*"⁴⁵ As we shall see, while it is conceivable that individual bankers did advance funds, the idea that the banking elite rallied behind Napoleon's banner driven by a single overriding impetus presents an exceedingly reductionist argument which is simply unsubstantiated by the evidence. What is more, it overlooks the financial complexities lurking behind the political arena. On the other hand, Bonaparte's critics stand on much firmer ground when they argue that bankers regarded the forced loan as an insufferable tax on capital designed to "make the rich pay", and that its disappearance would clear the way for the creation of "*the great bank of merchant and military contracting deposits which could borrow public funds from the state*" – a national bank – which they had been demanding for years.⁴⁶

By the same token, we shouldn't dismiss the funding of Brumaire by financiers as a myth. On the contrary, many magnates undoubtedly desired regime change – or at least extensive institutional reform. In fact, a few furtive meetings in the run-up to Brumaire indicate the lobbying of financial circles had already begun prior to the coup. Jean-Pierre Germain and Guillaume Mallet '*l'ainé*' – two leading Parisian bankers and founding Regents of the *Banque de France* – both met Napoleon at his home in the Rue de la Victoire a few days

⁴⁴ Dauphin-Meunier, *La Banque de France*, Paris: Gallimard, 1936, p.20.

⁴⁵ Mathiez, 'Le Banquier Perregaux', p.242 – Likewise, Robert Bigo affirms that "*Perregaux had perhaps hired [Bonaparte]*" to carry out the coup (*La Caisse d'escompte (1776-1793) et les origines de la Banque de France*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1927, p.222).

⁴⁶ Francis Delaisi, 'La Banque de France et le 18 Brumaire', *Europe*, 40 (159), 15 mars 1936, p.320 – See also his *La Banque de France aux mains des 200 familles*, Paris: Comité de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes, 1936.

before the operation;⁴⁷ while Bonaparte himself spent an evening in Sèvres at the residence of the former mayor and leading magistrate of Besançon – Antoine-Melchior Nodier – from which he “*returned extremely content.*”⁴⁸

Broadly speaking, the consensus among scholars is that the business lobby wasn’t averse to the Brumaire operation but preferred to wait until the coup’s success was assured before opening its coffers to the new regime.⁴⁹ Previous revolutionary experience dictated it would be wiser not to overtly back the system’s overthrow, and businessmen therefore waited to see how events unfolded. Jacques Bainville argues that:

*...the higher classes of finance abstained [from funding the coup] even though they desired the fall of a government which troubled them...they desired [the coup’s] success but weren’t convinced of it, and the prudence of men who were used to calculating and forecasting demonstrates that the outcome appeared uncertain. Banks would furnish everything that was needed once the coup had succeeded, but nothing before.*⁵⁰

This view is shared by Albert Vandal who remarks that:

*It doesn’t seem...that the great bankers immediately contributed [to the coup] or at list appeared on the list; although they certainly desired its success and would lighten the difficulties of the morrow.*⁵¹

Bankers therefore initially manoeuvred tentatively and exercised caution. But as we shall see, their subsequent collaboration would prove critical in making Brumaire an enduring success and safeguarding the Consulate’s survival.

The Conflict over Suspending Delegations

With financiers still reeling from the forced loan’s backlash, the Jacobins seized the opportunity to build on their momentum by focusing parliamentary scrutiny on the affairs of contractors. The *Cinq-Cents* had already issued a circular on 1 August 1799 (14 thermidor VII) inviting ministers to provide detailed accounts with supporting documentation on all agreements and cash advances made to entrepreneurs since the Directory’s advent which remained unanswered on 24 August.⁵² They therefore succeeded

⁴⁷ Lentz, *Le 18 brumaire*, p.246.

⁴⁸ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.283.

⁴⁹ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.127 – Lentz (*Le 18 brumaire*, p.246) notes the tobacco manufacturer Richard, the Perier brothers (Jacques-Constantin and Auguste Charles) and Récamier all waited for the coup to succeed before lending the Consulate money.

⁵⁰ Bainville, *Le Dix-huit brumaire*, p.36-37.

⁵¹ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.284.

⁵² Payard, *LFO*, p.11.

in passing a law on 4 October (12 vendémiaire VIII) ordering every state contractor to submit “*a general and definitive account backed by supporting documents of their service.*” Fortunately for suppliers, the law wasn’t enacted because “*civil servants held an interest in sparing the real culprits.*”⁵³ But this warning shot merely constituted the opening salvo of a far more sustained legislative assault.

Tensions suddenly heightened on 28 October when Pierre Delbrel – the Jacobin deputy from the Lot – abruptly proposed to raise a loan of fifty million francs pledged on the preliminary tax intake for Year VIII to support the war effort. To secure these funds, it would be necessary to indefinitely suspend the payment of all special delegations wagered on the tax revenues for that year. In effect, Delbrel was recommending nothing less than the suppression of the system which entitled contractors to priority reimbursements on public coffers. His motion was passed by the *Cinq-Cents* amidst a storm of recriminations from conservative benches and consequently pushed many contractors into the camp of those who desired regime change.⁵⁴ Bonaparte, who had just returned from Egypt a few days prior, had arrived in Paris on 16 October.

But Delbrel’s motion still had to be adopted by a confirmatory vote in the *Anciens* where the leading voice opposing his project was none other than its designated *rapporteur* – Charles-François Lebrun. In a report published after Brumaire, Lebrun explained that the suspension of delegations would unfairly penalise contractors and the state because they:

*...had been issued suddenly and spread haphazardly across the marketplace, losing 40% of their value and sometimes even more despite the fact the intake of direct taxes had ended up refunding all of them in hard currency. Thus, if a contractor charged honest prices, he was ruined by the depreciation in value – and if by contrast he was able to recoup his losses by charging inflated prices – the loss was entirely borne by the Republic.*⁵⁵

Thus, when Delbrel’s resolution was debated in the *Anciens* on 28 October, Lebrun denounced it:

The proposed law being laid before you would either be [unjust or arbitrary]. It conflates in the same prescription the contractor who has punctually honoured his engagements and the corrupt supplier. Moreover, it amalgamates them both without any discussion or examination – in the manner of a despot. And yet you claim to be the legislators of a free people? It would be an even greater evil if – in attempting to target the contractor who has enriched himself through his rapine and speculations – you only struck the unhappy citizens who supplied him with their goods or

⁵³ Stourm, *LFARR*, Tome II, p.352.

⁵⁴ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.283 & Lentz, *Le 18 brumaire*, p.243.

⁵⁵ AN, AF/IV/248 – *Explanatory note appended to the minutes of the Conseil des Finances*, 17 thermidor VIII/5 Aug. 1800. This analysis contains a very interesting summary of the system of rescriptions and delegations under the Directory.

*merchandise in exchange for these delegations which you are about to wipe out of their hands... The end result of this resolution... would be to consecrate the most flagrant violation of public faith...*⁵⁶

This confrontation over delegations had a particularly nefarious effect on the stock market, with the government *rente* yielding 5% (the *tiers consolidé*) dropping to 11.38 francs on 17 Brumaire.⁵⁷

The matter was still unresolved on the first day of the Brumaire coup (9 Nov.) when the conspirators initiated their plans by passing a motion in the *Anciens* to remove the legislative councils to Saint Cloud. After adopting this measure, the *Anciens* deputies agreed before adjourning to schedule a final debate and vote on Delbrel's proposal for their next session. And so, at the height of the coup's second day on 10 November – with all attentions focused on the drama of Bonaparte's tumultuous theatrics in the *Cinq-Cents* – the *Anciens* discreetly voted against the suspension of delegations and the proposed loan of fifty million was dropped. “*It was as if the council had wanted to tailor the reform of the state to the satisfaction of finance,*” notes Albert Vandal.⁵⁸ The economic historian René Stourm concurs, saying this vote was “*a manoeuvre of the eleventh hour... the execution of a promise to conciliate contractors to the new government.*”⁵⁹ In a base moment of parliamentary hypocrisy, the Calvados deputy Charles Cailly applauded the move by stating that: “*Nothing is more honourable for legislators of a great people than to look after the private interests of citizens in the midst of the gravest dangers.*”⁶⁰ Delbrel himself later wrote:

*I have grounds to believe these [contracting] companies were extremely useful auxiliaries in the accomplishment of the projected revolution. No doubt, they only lent their assistance on condition the resolution I had proposed and which was adopted by the Cinq-Cents be rejected by the Anciens...*⁶¹

Thus, by making the suspension of delegations one of its first targets and pre-emptively striking down Delbrel's plan, the Brumaire conspiracy recruited several contractors into its ranks. But suppliers who believed the matter was closed were in for a nasty shock, for the new consular regime would soon take back with one hand what it had given with the other.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Payard, *LFO*, p.38.

⁵⁷ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.170.

⁵⁸ Vandal, *LDB*, Tome I, p.334.

⁵⁹ Stourm, *LFC*, p.128, footnote 1.

⁶⁰ Quoted in Lentz, *Le 18 brumaire*, p.243.

⁶¹ Quoted in Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.283.

The Direct Involvement of Financiers in Brumaire

Admittedly, there is very little documentary evidence irrefutably proving Napoleon's coup was bankrolled by financiers. According to various contemporary newspapers consulted by Albert Vandal, "two million francs were brought [to the conspirators] before three in the morning" on the 18 Brumaire, plus "another two million which had been promised for the following day" later that afternoon.⁶² Needless to say, such reports must be treated with caution since the precise identity of the patrons who allegedly forwarded these sums remains a mystery and their amounts appear somewhat exaggerated. But the fact money was advanced is confirmed by Martin Gaudin whose generally reliable memoirs record that 300,000 francs were indeed obtained on the morning of 18 Brumaire.⁶³ Vandal also suggests the Treasury commissioner Jacques Defermon could have provided the conspirators with money taken from public coffers – an entirely plausible theory in view of the brilliant career he enjoyed under successive Bonapartist regimes.⁶⁴

Considering their violent reaction to the forced loan of August 1799, contractors are often suspected of having numbered among Brumaire's principal financial sponsors. One oft-repeated claim is Fouché's assertion that Jean-Pierre Collot advanced two million francs to "put wind in the project's sails."⁶⁵ The historian Jules Michelet, who knew Collot personally, also affirms that he financed the coup.⁶⁶ Another military supplier – Michel *jeune* – addressed a letter to Treasury minister Mollien on 18 April 1810 in which he purported to have advanced two million francs on 18 Brumaire that were spent over the ensuing three days. He further claimed to have delivered six million francs to the Treasury when it sought to raise a loan using a special delegation of three million florins in Batavian rescriptions as down payment (see Chapter 5); plus an extra four million at the request of his friend – Second Consul Cambacérès – to finance Masséna's *Armée d'Italie* which was about to embark on the Marengo Campaign.⁶⁷

⁶² Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.334. Dauphin-Meunier (*La Banque de France*, p.19) quotes the same sum based on the same newspapers.

⁶³ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.134.

⁶⁴ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.247 – Defermon, who was nicknamed 'fermons la caisse' (Vandal, *ADB*, Tome II, p.216), had played an ambiguous role during the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal. After Brumaire, he was appointed president of the *Conseil d'État's* financial section, a minister of state and administrator of Napoleon's 'domaine extraordinaire' – earning him a fortune of several million francs. See Michel Bruguière, 'Defermon ou Fermon des Chapelières' in Jean Tulard (ed.), *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, Paris: Fayard, 1987, p.582.

⁶⁵ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.134 – See also Madelin, *L'Ascension de Bonaparte*, p.334.

⁶⁶ Jules Michelet, *Histoire du XIX^e siècle*, Tome II, Paris: Librairie Germer Baillière, 1872-1875, p.376.

⁶⁷ AN, F/7/6554, *Michel jeune to the Treasury minister*, 18 April 1810.

Michel *jeune*'s biographer, André-Félix Aude, corroborates these claims but presents different figures. He states Michel *jeune* offered 300,000 francs in cash on 18 Brumaire to the comte de Fermon, one of the Treasury commissioners; advanced 614,000 francs in *écus* to the new regime shortly after the coup; and furnished 500,000 francs in bills of exchange drawn on Madrid on 22 December plus another 300,000 francs two days later – half in gold and half in bills of exchange drawn on Marseille traders – to pay the costs of Masséna's army. Aude also mentions that upon learning finance minister Gaudin urgently needed another 50,000 francs in early January, Michel *jeune* presented this sum to him within twenty-four hours.⁶⁸

Although the evidence is lacking, Cambacérès himself could have acted as one of Brumaire's financial coordinators, for he was one of the conspirators with the most extensive business connections.⁶⁹ The participation of Jean-Baptiste Paulée – the contractor from Douai – remains unclear, despite the fact a number of his lieutenants were awarded high-ranking administrative positions in the Consulate.⁷⁰ Other speculators like the Bodin brothers and Ouvrard were probably deliberately excluded from the conspiracy due to their proximity with Barras and Josephine.⁷¹ As for bankers, we have previously noted how their natural caution inclined them to wait until the coup's success was assured before lending any pecuniary support. But if financial aid was indeed sought from the banking community, it was more likely negotiated beforehand via Sieyès – the real organiser of the coup and personal friend of Le Couteulx – or through Talleyrand and his connection to Perregaux, with Bonaparte ratifying these agreements later on.⁷²

Fouché himself may also have advanced money from the secret funds of the police ministry which he took over on 20 July 1799.⁷³ His predecessor, Claude Sébastien Bourguignon, had left over 700,000 francs in its coffers;⁷⁴ and Fouché – who didn't want to depend on the government for his budget – rapidly transformed the police into a

⁶⁸ Aude, *UACAFMJ*, p.57-58 – Aude doesn't quote any references to support these figures. Gaudin (*Mémoires*, Tome I, p.134) confirms he received 300,000 francs on 19 brumaire VIII/10 Nov. 1799 but doesn't mention the Michel brothers.

⁶⁹ Following the Directory's inauguration, Cambacérès had fallen out of the spotlight. He established a legal practice in 1797 at the instigation of his friend Pierre-François Vieusseux (a wealthy Parisian landowner). Being one of the foremost legal experts in the country, Cambacérès had many clients and earned a fortune defending the interests of bankers and contractors like Bastide, Sabatier, the Durand brothers, Ouvrard and Michel *jeune*. See Pierre-François Pinaud, *Cambacérès*, Paris: Perrin, 1991, p.92; Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.156 & Lentz, *Le 18 brumaire*, p.245-246.

⁷⁰ Lentz, *Le 18 brumaire*, p.247.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.246.

⁷² Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.45-47.

⁷³ The police ministry was located in the Hotel de Juigné on the Quai Voltaire (Jean Tulard, *Le 18 Brumaire*, Paris: Perrin, 1999, p.74).

⁷⁴ Emmanuel de Waresquiel, *Fouché : dossiers secrets*, Paris: Tallandier, 2017, p.110.

veritable cash-raising machine by multiplying its sources of income.⁷⁵ He levied vast sums from Parisian gambling houses which his administration licensed and operated as spy dens, such that between 1799 and 1800 police revenues rose from 1,200,000 to 1,700,000 francs – 916,000 of this coming from betting joints. In September 1799, Fouché sold the license to operate Parisian gambling for 80,000 francs per month to the Perrin brothers – two businessmen from Lyon.⁷⁶ As he admits in his memoirs:

*I soon had money in my coffers by making vice – which was inherent to any great city – the tributary of national security.*⁷⁷

The discovery of plots – both imaginary and real – became so frequent under Fouché’s tenure that every time newspapers revealed the uncovering of a new conspiracy his detractors would joke that “*Fouché is going to buy a farm!*”⁷⁸ But what is truly eye-raising is that in the three months between his arrival at the ministry and Brumaire, he spent over 230,000 francs!⁷⁹ No wonder then that when Fouché was imprudently rebuffed by the presiding director Gohier after showing him the decree removing the government to Saint Cloud on the morning of 18 Brumaire, he informed the conspirators his secret funds were at their disposal and that he would answer for the security of Paris while they overthrew the Directory.⁸⁰ Fouché himself boasted that:

*The Revolution of Saint Cloud would have failed if I had been opposed to it. I could have misled Sieyès, warned Barras, enlightened Gohier and Moulin; all I need have done was second Dubois-Crancé, the sole opposing minister, and everything would have crumbled.*⁸¹

Overall, however, the scarcity of incriminating evidence on the coup’s funding has discouraged scholars from delving more deeply into the financial underworld of Brumaire. Many simply content themselves with quoting allegations in memoirs before moving on to discuss the plot’s more enticing political aspects. And yet a review of sources attests that businessmen remained in Bonaparte’s entourage throughout the coup’s duration –

⁷⁵ Until September 1799, the police ministry’s funds were entirely supplied by the Treasury (*Ibid*, p.111).

⁷⁶ This license was renewed shortly after Brumaire for a staggering 180,000 francs per month (*Ibid*, p.111-112).

⁷⁷ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.105.

⁷⁸ See Emmanuel de Waresquiel, ‘L’argent de la pieuvre : les fonds secrets de monsieur Fouché (1799-1810)’ in Branda (ed.), *L’économie sous Napoléon*, p.111-128.

⁷⁹ Waresquiel, *Fouché : dossiers secrets*, p.111.

⁸⁰ Comte de Montgaillard, *Souvenirs*, Corbeil: Paul Ollendorff, 1895, p.233 – Fouché obtained a copy of the decree from Regnaud de Saint Jean d’Angély and Antoine-Vincent Arnault. He describes his interview with Gohier at the Luxembourg in his *Mémoires* (p.142-144). Gohier (*Mémoires*, Vol. I, p.236-237) corroborates his account. Jean Tulard (*Le 18 Brumaire*, p.119) also believes Fouché could have advanced funds.

⁸¹ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.131 – Edmond Louis Alexis Dubois-Crancé (1747-1814), a former Dantonist known for his role during the 1793 Siege of Lyon, had been appointed war minister on 14 Sep. 1799. He retired to his estate of Balham (Ardennes) after Brumaire.

demonstrating their presence influenced the course of events. Four of these financiers held particularly conspicuous roles – Le Couteulx, Collot, Michel Simons and Ouvrard. An examination of their respective actions is crucial if we are to shed more light on our study.

Le Couteulx is Offered the Finance Ministry

We saw in Chapter 3 how Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx was introduced to Napoleon at a reception held by Barras at the Luxembourg in January 1796. The Norman banker describes in his memoirs how he progressively gravitated towards Bonaparte's circle after 18 Fructidor:

*Bonaparte, since his return from Italy, had given me honourable tokens of his esteem, his confidence, and dare I say his friendship. He often bid me dine with him and eagerly sought out the society of Madame Le Couteulx. My wife and I could say we were then in the greatest confidence of his household.*⁸²

Both Le Couteulx and Perregaux were leading Parisian bankers associated with Talleyrand's faction.⁸³ But contrary to Perregaux who shunned political responsibilities, Le Couteulx had been an active legislative deputy since the Revolution's outbreak. His business expertise naturally led Bonaparte to recruit him as his most important financial advisor. When Napoleon was appointed commander of the newly formed *Armée d'Angleterre*, Le Couteulx led a delegation of bankers which presented the Directory with a loan project of 80 million francs "to prepare a descent in England" which was voted on 16 nivôse VI/5 Jan. 1798;⁸⁴ and he may well have been anticipating a role in Napoleon's future cabinet when he published an essay later that year on the proposed tax contributions to be levied in France for Year VII, basing himself on the British model.⁸⁵ Le Couteulx was certainly inclined to please his new protector and even became Josephine's personal banker. She had been recommended to him by Fouché who describes her in distinctly unflattering terms:

"We know by what reckless profusion [Josephine] perpetuated disorder and distress in her house: she never had an écu. The 40,000-franc income which Bonaparte assured her prior to his departure for Egypt didn't suffice her; and yet, two extraordinary money transfers of equivalent amounts had been sent her from Egypt

⁸² Lescure (ed.), *MJR*, Tome II, p.209.

⁸³ A former commis of *Le Couteulx & Cie.* – Jacques Gilles Fléchelle – served as deputy-chief of the *Direction des fonds* at the foreign ministry under Talleyrand. See Frédéric Masson, *Le département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787-1804*, Paris: Plon, 1877, p.408 & 489 (hereafter '*LDAEPF*').

⁸⁴ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.78-81 – The bankers' delegation included Joseph Fulchiron, Récamier, Barrillon, Desprez and Jubié.

⁸⁵ *Essai sur les contributions proposées en France, pour l'an sept, sur celles qui existent actuellement en Angleterre, et sur le crédit public*, Paris: Imprimerie Du Pont, 1798.

*in less than a year. Moreover, Barras having recommended her to me, I had included her in the clandestine distributions of revenues drawn from gambling houses. I personally gave her a thousand louis – a ministerial gallantry which ensured her favourable disposition towards me.”*⁸⁶

Yet during her husband’s absence in Egypt, Le Couteulx had no hesitation in advancing Josephine the necessary funds to purchase the estate of La Malmaison at Rueil which was owned by his cousins, the Le Couteulx du Molay. The notarial bill of sale indicates Josephine acquired the manor for 225,000 francs on 21 April 1799, plus an additional 37,516 francs for the furniture;⁸⁷ but the real sale price appears to have been 325,000 francs excluding furniture.⁸⁸

Unfortunately, Le Couteulx’s recollections don’t disclose whether he contributed financially to Brumaire – restricting themselves to a purely political narrative. He presents contradictory statements about his knowledge of the operation, affirming in one passage that the coup had been “*in preparation several months prior to General Bonaparte’s return to France;*”⁸⁹ but relating in another how he dined with Cambacérès on the eve of the putsch and was only then informed of the plot.⁹⁰ Le Couteulx did in fact play an important preliminary role when he was appointed president of the *département* of the Seine by Sieyès who wished to remove that assembly from Jacobin control. Working in collaboration with Pierre-François Réal – the Directory’s commissioner of the Seine and Fouché’s superior for Parisian surveillance – he secured that district’s loyalty to the conspirators.⁹¹

On 30 October 1799 at 11am– ten days before the coup – Le Couteulx met Bonaparte at the general’s residence in the Rue de la Victoire. Napoleon questioned him on the likely reaction of Parisians to regime change. The following is an excerpt of their conversation:

Bonaparte – *I would like to talk with you about the situation in Paris.*

Le Couteulx – *Does this concern the situation we find ourselves in regarding finances, commerce or political disturbances?*

Bonaparte – *It concerns all aspects.*

⁸⁶ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.124-125 – Josephine had no personal income despite her extravagant lifestyle. Her debts reportedly exceeded a million francs upon Napoleon’s return from Egypt. He purportedly reimbursed approximately two million francs to his wife’s creditors after Brumaire (Lentz, *Le 18 brumaire*, p.239).

⁸⁷ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.239.

⁸⁸ For full details of the sale see Bernard Chevalier, *Malmaison, château et domaine des origines à 1904*. Paris: Éditions de la Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1989.

⁸⁹ Lescure (ed.), *MJR*, Tome II, p.213.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.214.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.213 – Réal and Fouché monitored Barras in case he allied with the two remaining directors – Gohier and Moulin (*Ibid*, p.220-222). The Seine administration was located in the Place Vendôme.

Le Couteulx – *Money, credit and public revenues – everything has run dry, wasted by bad laws. There is no work, but Paris will not stir. There can only be disturbances between the governing classes. The people of Paris will remain mere spectators.*

Bonaparte – *Don't people desire a more centralised government?*

Le Couteulx – *People desire a government.*

Bonaparte – *Aren't people apprehensive about the next elections?*

Le Couteulx – *It is widely held that a means to lower the frequency of elections is desirable.*

Bonaparte – *Don't people fear that the Directory – which is divided – will be swept up in this new crisis, that of elections I mean?*

Le Couteulx – *The majority in the legislative councils will determine the outcome.*

Bonaparte – *Don't you fear the strength of the party which wanted to declare the motherland in danger and what do you think of their capabilities? Will the people side with them?*

Le Couteulx – *They could have groups of supporters among the vilest populace, but the people of Paris will not join them. There are fewer commoners in Paris today than people think. Never have there been so few. Many small fortunes have been made in Paris during the Revolution, which has extended the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie. And this is the class which I call the people of Paris whom, I repeat, shall watch the governing classes or the leaders settle matters between themselves.⁹²*

Bonaparte – *All of France, all the classes expect much from me. If they are but councils, we must persuade ourselves that [they] will be of no use to a Directory that deliberates without action, without execution, without unity. There needs to be a government and there is no government.*

Le Couteulx – *That is true. However – general – are we going to be given more days like the 18 Fructidor, 22 Floréal and 30 Prairial?*

Bonaparte – *Assuredly not. Those three days are three cannonballs that pierced and sank the vessel. You no longer have a constitution nor liberty.*

Le Couteulx – *So you want to give us a new constitution?*

Bonaparte – *Yes, and along with me all true friends of liberty.*

Le Couteulx – *Do you want to install a hereditary government?*

Bonaparte – *Certainly not.*

Le Couteulx – *Ah!... You will give us consuls, two consuls.*

Bonaparte – *That could do.*

⁹² Le Couteulx offers an interesting explanation as to why common people had become apathetic towards politics. Aside from political despondency, there were also financial reasons. Despite the economic downturn and destruction of industry, the abolition of *Ancien Régime* privileges and feudal dues had enabled many peasants and workers to elevate their social standing by purchasing land, opening a business or renting a store – thereby earning more income. These new landowners and merchants had grown resolutely conservative and attached to their savings, which partly explains why the Parisian populace increasingly left politicians to play out their quarrels without intervening. Successive *coup d'états* now succeeded one another without any accompanying popular insurrections. See Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.50.

Le Couteulx – *You will not part ways with Sieyès?*

Bonaparte – *No, the strength I wield will not alienate the wisdom of a counsel.*

Le Couteulx – *Will your new revolution be carried out by military force?*

Bonaparte – *No, we shall employ purely civilian means. No doubt military force will be in support. But tell me what is the general opinion concerning Barras? Quite poor I would think, he is finished!*

Le Couteulx – *Barras enjoys no public esteem. But the majority of Frenchmen still prefer a man with a famous name in government than one who is unknown and ignoble. What I mean by a famous name is an ancient name, an extolled name, renowned. In sum, people want a well-advised man who leads an honourable existence.*

Bonaparte – *Sieyès conducts himself well since becoming director.*

Le Couteulx – *Yes, he appears determined today to take men for what they are and is persuaded that you can profit from all of them when you know how to govern them.*

Bonaparte – *Yes, people are happy with him, but you won't have peace with this Directory. It offers no guarantee – neither domestically nor abroad. There must be a government and you don't have one.*

Le Couteulx – *There must be one specially to provide revenue and finances to the state. The Directory has been given every means to spend the money paid into the National Treasury but has no means to secure and regularise this income. In reality, it doesn't have the strength to set up a good administration.⁹³*

Interestingly, Bonaparte – aware of Le Couteulx's friendship with Sieyès – didn't divulge his plans to eclipse his directorial ally. And his instinct proved correct, for the following day (31 October) Le Couteulx consulted Sieyès at the Luxembourg where they discussed the coup's preparations with Talleyrand, Roederer and Boulay de la Meurthe.⁹⁴ Yet despite these apprehensions, Napoleon valued Le Couteulx's advice and planned to include him in his future government. The Rouen banker recalled that early on the morning of 19 Brumaire – before setting off for Saint Cloud – Bonaparte met him at the Seine administration and offered him the finance ministry:

Le Couteulx – *General, what will you do today?*

Bonaparte – *We will create two consuls, change the ministers, create two temporary commissions that will take over from the legislative councils and dissolve the legislature.*

Le Couteulx – *I am impressed by your forces in attendance. What an antechamber! The elite of French generals. But what civilian representatives have you?*

Bonaparte – *The strongest and most resolute in both councils. Boulay de la Meurthe, Chazal, Chénier, Regnier, etc. But there are few men in these councils. I have seen and heard them all day yesterday. What a poor spectacle! What vile interests! Very*

⁹³ Lescure (ed.), *MJR*, Tome II, p.215-217.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.217-220.

few of them, almost none dealt with the higher politics of states, of nations. But let us talk of you. You shall be finance minister, would that please you? Wouldn't you be well-suited to that position?

Le Coutuelx – *Good intentions do not suffice. I would constantly be in fear of intriguers who are shrewder than myself. I would be duped and only realise it ten minutes later.*

Bonaparte – *Well, take ten minutes to answer then! In any case, **we need a man to present to commerce, to honest people, to the financial and trading communities of Europe, and you are that man.***

Le Couteulx – *But general, you have stronger men than I. Talleyrand, aren't you going to make him a minister?*

Bonaparte – *Talleyrand a minister of finance? No!*

[*General Leclerc enters the room and Bonaparte orders him to go ahead to Saint Cloud to finalise preparations with General Serrurier. An aide-de-camp enters and informs Bonaparte his wife wishes to speak with him before his departure for Saint-Cloud.*]

Bonaparte – *Very well, I will go up and speak with her. But this day is not a day for women.*

Le Couteulx – *General, would you like her to come to my house at Auteuil? You know that my house is at your disposal.*

Bonaparte – *I may go and sleep there. I might need a good night's sleep. But no women. This business is too serious. Let's go.*⁹⁵

Le Couteulx accompanied Bonaparte to Saint Cloud on that day.⁹⁶ But although he was promised the finance portfolio, the position eventually went to Martin Gaudin (see below). Nonetheless, Jean-Barthélémy's financial influence remained paramount and he was one of the few financiers to be included in all the Consulate's early business partnerships – the *Vingt and Dix négociants réunis* (see below) and the Regents of the *Banque de France* – serving as *premier président du Comité Central de Direction de la Banque de France* from its creation in January 1800 to 1 October 1801 when he resigned and was succeeded by Perregaux.⁹⁷ He was also appointed a member of the *sénat conservateur* (24 December 1799) and showered with honours by successive Bonapartist regimes, although this didn't prevent him from ultimately rallying the Bourbons in 1814.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.225-226.

⁹⁶ For Le Couteulx's role in Brumaire, see also Paul Bastid, *Sièyes et sa pensée*, Paris: Hachette, 1970, p.242.

⁹⁷ Le Couteulx remained a Regent of the *Banque de France* until 1804. See Appendix XV.

⁹⁸ See Le Couteulx's entry in the Biographical Index.

Collot's House in Saint Cloud & Reminiscences on the Creation of the Consulate

Another financier who was present at Saint Cloud on 19 Brumaire was Jean-Pierre Collot.⁹⁹ By the time of Brumaire, Collot's relation with Bonaparte had already experienced several twists and turns. The first jolt, which Collot described in a brief notice on Bonaparte's Italian Campaign published in 1846, occurred when their mutual friend – the *Armée d'Italie's* chief ordnance officer Chauvet – died suddenly during the opening stages of the campaign on 2 April 1796:

A courier from Genoa brought the news. General Bonaparte (I was standing next to him) opened the dispatch and learnt of the death of chief ordnance officer Chauvet who had been a sincere friend to both of us and with whom we had just spent the winter:

“Chauvet is dead,” the general told me, “who shall we name in his stead?”

No expression of regret, no sigh, not one word of praise.

I cannot say how this indifference, this bluntness struck me. Instead of answering the question, I wanted to confide my grief, to express feelings of sorrow:

“This isn't the time to moan,” he told me, “we must think solely of the army.”

This language gave me a heavy heart. I didn't seek to understand the grandeur of this stoicism, which may be necessary for men who seek to govern the world. I was aggrieved, and I only saw before me a soul made of ice. This first impression had a strong influence on my life and led me to part ways with him at Malta, when he was en route to conquer Egypt.¹⁰⁰

Bonaparte and Collot therefore parted ways at Malta over an unspecified difference of opinion.¹⁰¹ But they reconciled in Paris shortly after Napoleon's return from Egypt. According to Boulay de la Meurthe, the general was eager to recapture Collot's friendship and asked Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély to invite him to a private meeting where the contractor was recruited into the Brumaire conspiracy.¹⁰²

Collot related his experiences of Brumaire to Bourrienne whom he met in Milan five days after the Battle of Marengo. According to his account, Napoleon instructed him on 16 Brumaire to rent a house in Saint-Cloud and prepare hosting a dinner there – ostensibly to celebrate the coup's success:

⁹⁹ See Chapter 2.

¹⁰⁰ Collot, *Notes sur les premières journées de la première campagne du général Bonaparte en Italie*, 1846 (quoted in Payard, *BFC*, p.130). This document is reprinted in the *Fondation Napoléon's Revue du Souvenir Napoléonien*, n°381, février 1992: 2-9.

¹⁰¹ Bourrienne (*Mémoires*, Tome II, p.319) also records this incident between Collot and Bonaparte.

¹⁰² Bourrienne (*Mémoires*, Tome II, p.318) says Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély wrote to Collot on Bonaparte's behalf. Boulay de la Meurthe confirms this (*Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, Tome II, Paris: Charles Heidelhoff & Urbain Canel, 1830, p.8-9).

After they reconciled in Paris, Collot went to see the general every day... On 16 Brumaire, [Bonaparte] told him: "Collot, get a house in Saint-Cloud. Prepare it for a dinner at an evening's notice for twenty-five or thirty people." Acting on Bonaparte's wishes, Mr. Collot immediately sent a person of trust to Saint-Cloud. The house was rented and arranged according to his intentions, and on the morning of 18 Brumaire [Bonaparte] told him: "We will dine there tomorrow."'¹⁰³

The dinner requested by Bonaparte apparently took place on 19 Brumaire but was only attended by seven or eight people.¹⁰⁴

Of course, the house in Saint Cloud was earmarked for a less conspicuous but far more practical purpose – serving as a secondary headquarters for several of Bonaparte's partisans on the morning of 19 Brumaire. It also doubled as a refuge in case matters went awry. Talleyrand, for instance, used it as his base of operations to observe events at a distance and send messages offering advice.¹⁰⁵ He was joined there by other associates including his secretary the Abbé Martial Borie-Desrenaudes, his confidant Casimir de Montrond, Rœderer and his son Antoine, Adrien Duquesnoy, the lawyer Moreau de Saint-Méry and Collot.¹⁰⁶ These dispositions are confirmed by Rœderer who recalls meeting Collot at Saint Cloud with Talleyrand:

At the meeting place we had agreed in Saint Cloud, we found several other people attached to Bonaparte including Mr. Collot, former supplier of the Armée d'Italie, who told Talleyrand and I: "Bonaparte has told me nothing, but out of precaution I've put 500 louis in my pockets, it can be useful."'¹⁰⁷

Antoine-Vincent Arnault also notes that Collot had rented this house in Saint Cloud:

Those of [Bonaparte's] adherents who weren't members of the legislative councils or soldiers in the troops assembled at Saint Cloud waited for the decrees which were to confirm and complete what had been undertaken the day before... They joined M. Talleyrand in a house which had been rented for a year by Collot but was only to be occupied for a day. These civilian conspirators, among whom were more than one lawyer – and even more than one abbot – were surprised to see the hours go by without any results. They had learned with concern about the dilatory means the Council of Five Hundred was employing, and since I had imparted them the advice given by Fouché, they pressed me to join the general and communicate it to him.'¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.320.

¹⁰⁴ Bourrienne *et ses erreurs*, Tome II, p.10.

¹⁰⁵ Talleyrand took the precaution of keeping a coach ready with fresh horses in case he should have to flee precipitously. Lentz (*Le 18 Brumaire*, p.297) says: "There must have been several coaches standing by that day, for Sieyès and Roger Ducos had taken the same precaution."

¹⁰⁶ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.352.

¹⁰⁷ Rœderer, *Œuvres*, Tome III, p.301.

¹⁰⁸ Arnault, *Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire*, Tome IV, p.390.

Bourrienne claims that Collot “*knew all the schemes and machinations*” and “*attended all the great conciliables*;”¹⁰⁹ but these assertions along with Rœderer’s recollections were partly contradicted by Boulay de la Meurthe who argued in *Bourrienne et ses erreurs* (published in 1830) that Collot in fact knew far less about the plot than he had led Bourrienne to believe:

I can on this matter reveal a fact which neither [Collot] nor Bourrienne have mentioned. On the morning of 18 Brumaire, having learnt that Talleyrand, Rœderer, Admiral Bruix and Réal were to meet at the administration of the Seine, [Collot] hurried there with his pockets filled and offered to advance funds for the success of the operation.

Bourrienne claims that Collot attended all the great conciliables where the 18 Brumaire was planned. I believe I can affirm that prior to the event, there were no great conciliables. It would have been greatly imprudent. The operation demanded – was in effect conducted – in great secrecy in clandestine committees...¹¹⁰

But despite the discrepancy between these two accounts, the confidences of Collot represent one of the most singular testimonies of any financier on Brumaire and contain several memorable observations, such as his contention that:

If a single representative had seized Bonaparte in the Cinq-Cents when he entered the chamber [on 19 Brumaire], his supporters wouldn’t have been strong enough to save him, and if the moment after his bloodied head had been presented at the balcony and declared a traitor to the country, the soldiers – little moved by this ordeal – would neither have asked nor exacted revenge.¹¹¹

Most striking of all is Collot’s description of the foundation of the Consulate in the coup’s aftermath which reveals that Bonaparte’s confidence still wavered even after his victory was assured:

You know what noise, what tumult accompanied the flight of the deputies, and the sinister calm that followed it. You probably know about the difficulties encountered to put together the shadow of an assembly – they gathered, I believe, about eighty deputies from both legislative councils at the most. I remember Bonaparte’s anxiety during that time. His usual confidence abandoned him for a few moments, and he was greatly in need of the presence of Mr. Talleyrand who didn’t cease to encourage him. He wanted the session to begin at ten o’clock (in the evening) – I was there, and what a spectacle that nocturnal session was, in the same chamber that had just been violated by armed men! It was from this legislative hovel that the consular government originated, and who knows what influence it will have on the destinies of France and the fate of Europe! Nothing, in truth, is more disillusioning than to return to the cradle of human greatness – one finds too many miseries there!

I do not know – my dear Bourrienne – if I am destined to live a long life. But as long as I live, I will have before my eyes the aspect of the Orangerie at Saint-Cloud such

¹⁰⁹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.320 & 322.

¹¹⁰ *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, Tome II, p.13.

¹¹¹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.330.

as it was disposed at the moment of that lugubrious scene – how silent it was! How gloomy and sorrowful were the actors who took their seats there!...Picture a long and wide barn filled with overturned benches, a pulpit in the centre backed up against the naked wall, beneath the pulpit and slightly before it a table and two chairs; on the table, two candles, and as many on the pulpit; no chandelier, no lamp, no other light under the vaults of this long enclosure.

Picture in the pulpit the pale figure of Lucien [Bonaparte] reading the new constitution, and two deputies speaking in front of the table. Facing them were a group of representatives huddled together in a confined space, indifferent to everything being said to them; most of them were lying on three benches: one of them serving as their seat, the other as their footstool and the third as their pillow. Amongst them pell-mell in the same stance were ordinary citizens interested in the day's success. Nearby, at the back, one could distinguish servants who had come in seeking shelter from the cold and were sleeping or waiting for their masters. Such was the strange Aeropagus which gave France a new government.¹¹²

Collot further informs us that Saliceti was not among the Brumaire conspirators. Upon receiving erroneous news the Jacobins had been victorious, Saliceti hastened to Saint-Cloud only to discover that Bonaparte's party had been successful. Attempting to ingratiate himself with the general's supporters, he was begrudgingly admitted in their ranks thanks to the intercession of Joseph Bonaparte.¹¹³

In similar fashion, Collot – having been one of Napoleon's staunchest and most active supporters during the coup – was very poorly rewarded for his efforts. As Boulay de la Meurthe explains:

Collot had asked for the post of counsellor of state and had lobbied several people to secure its acquisition. But Bonaparte constantly refused to grant it, saying he didn't want a meat seller in his Conseil d'État. I believe that Bonaparte didn't give enough credit to Mr. Collot's merit; but perhaps he didn't realise the full extent of this merit – and could not his refusal be imputed to this misunderstanding rather than to a malicious vice as odious as the one implied here?¹¹⁴

Apparently undeterred by this lack of consideration, Collot didn't hesitate to give Murat a favourable response when the cavalry officer sought his advice about marrying Caroline Bonaparte.¹¹⁵ Napoleon did eventually solicit his services for the Marengo Campaign, but Collot was practically forced to promise his assistance against his will:

Well Collot!" he told him, "I am going to Italy. This is a big deal. The campaign will be short. Echoes in Italy repeat my name. I need you. I am taking you with me." Collot told the First Consul that he didn't care to take back the supply of the army which the chief had given him; that everything would be pillage; that it would be

¹¹² *Ibid*, Tome II, p.333.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.331.

¹¹⁴ *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, Tome II, p.15.

¹¹⁵ *Bourrienne, Mémoires*, Tome II, p.191 – Murat married Caroline Bonaparte in a civil ceremony at Joseph's estate of Mortefontaine on 18 Jan. 1800. Their religious wedding was held in Paris on 4 Jan. 1802.

*impossible to run a good service. “Ah well! It’s for good measure. Do you think I would have trusted my army to Berthier if I weren’t there? Berthier doesn’t know how to command, but he knows how to execute my orders, and I am used to his manner. You must absolutely come.” Mr. Collot didn’t seem very keen to go on this campaign, but the more he hesitated, the more Bonaparte insisted and cajoled him. Finally, it was agreed that Collot would go to Italy provided the First Consul took command of the army. No sooner had he arrived than Bonaparte treated him with the greatest indifference, despite all his services, or rather because of all the services he had rendered him.*¹¹⁶




Figure 6:1

The 18 Brumaire: The Chamber of the *Cinq-Cents* at Saint Cloud
(in fact a depiction of the chamber on the evening of 19 Brumaire)
by Jacques Sablet, 1799, Musée d’Arts de Nantes

© RMN-Grand Palais – Photo: Gérard Blot/<https://www.photo.rmn.fr>
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

Bourrienne suggests that Bonaparte began to treat Collot inconsiderately after his arrival in Italy because he was embarrassed about having confided his marital problems to him:

Mr. Collot had been on the most intimate footing with Bonaparte and had rendered him many valuable services. These circumstances sufficiently accounted for Bonaparte’s coolness, for he would never acknowledge himself under obligations to anyone, and he didn’t like those who were initiated into certain family secrets which he had resolved to conceal.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.282-283.

*The day after the First Consul received Mr. Collot so coldly, I had a long conversation with him while Bonaparte had gone to review some corps stationed at Milan. Mr. Collot perfectly understood the cause of the unkind treatment he had experienced...Some days before the Consulate, that is to say two or three days after our return from Egypt, Bonaparte – during a jealous fit – talked to Mr. Collot about his wife, her levities and their publicity.*¹¹⁷

Although briefly awarded the general contract for the navy in Year X after it was taken away from Ouvrard (see below), Collot never recovered his preeminent position in Bonaparte's inner circle after the Marengo Campaign. His marriage to Anne Victorine Lajard, whose sister was the wife of Jean-Antoine Chaptal (interior minister in 1801), doesn't seem to have improved his standing. In 1803, Collot's company – *Collot, Caillard & Cie.* – folded following the bankruptcy of *Carié, Bézard & Cie* which owed it 1,200,000 francs.¹¹⁸ In 1808, he was listed as an investor in the *Compagnie des canaux d'Aigues-Mortes à Beaucaire*.¹¹⁹ Ironically, Collot became a civil servant under the Restoration, serving as *receveur général* of the *Bouches-du-Rhône* (1815-1821) and director of the National Mint (1821-1842).

The Dinner with Michel Simons at Meudon on 19 Brumaire

One of the more light-hearted anecdotes on Brumaire concerns an incident which occurred on the evening of 19 Brumaire at the estate of Montalais in Meudon – the country residence of financier Michel Simons. He and his wife – Mademoiselle Lange – had been enjoying a spell along the Seine that day when a party of guests turned up at the door that evening. It was Talleyrand and his boisterous company of friends – Radix de Sainte-Foix, Casimir de Montrond, Rœderer and his son Antoine and the playwright Antoine-Vincent Arnault – all of whom had come from Saint Cloud just down the road to dine with them. Rœderer briefly relates this jovial encounter in his memoirs:

*After the expedition [to Saint Cloud], Mr. Talleyrand told me: “We must dine.” He led us – my son and I – to Madame Simons who had a lovely country residence a few leagues from Saint-Cloud which Talleyrand subsequently owned. Montrond came as well. Upon arriving there dinner was waiting for us. All evening, Montrond couldn't stop repeating the words: “General Bonaparte, this is not acceptable!” – mocking Bonaparte's reaction at being declared an outlaw.*¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.301-304.

¹¹⁸ AN, F/7/3831, *Rapport de police du 25 nivôse XI/15 Jan. 1803* & Aulard, *PSC*, p.574 – *Carié, Bézard & Cie.* was the firm of Henry-Liévain Carié, one of the founding Regents of the *Banque de France*.

¹¹⁹ AP, D31U3 4, dossier 16.

¹²⁰ Rœderer, *Œuvres*, Tome III, p.302.

These few intriguing lines raise several questions. If Simons had dinner “*waiting for*” Talleyrand and his friends, could this imply he had prior knowledge of the Brumaire conspiracy? And given the extensive business links they shared, had Simons been advised to make certain judicious financial placements to take advantage of the coup? We know that when Talleyrand was later asked by Bonaparte how he had made his fortune, he famously replied: “*Oh, it’s quite simple. I purchased some state bonds on 17 Brumaire and sold them three days later.*”¹²¹ Perhaps Simons benefited from similar insight?

Arnault also mentions this dinner in his memoirs, noting that:

*I only left Saint Cloud once the affair was finished to go to Meudon where I found Mr. Talleyrand in the company of an amiable and beautiful woman – Madame Simons – thanks to whom we dined as gaily as one could on a day of victory, and much better than one dines on the field of battle.*¹²²

This episode also reflects the contempt in which experienced courtiers of the *Ancien Régime* like Talleyrand and his associates held the upstart Bonaparte. Montrond’s parody clearly shows he considered the general as just another ambitious and unrefined officer who was fated to melt away like Lafayette, Dumouriez, Pichegru and others before him. Evidently, they didn’t expect Napoleon to survive. Talleyrand himself reportedly opined that “*if he lasts a year, he will go far.*”¹²³

Ouvrard’s Letter to Admiral Bruix

One of Brumaire’s greatest paradoxes was that the leading financier of the age – Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard – wasn’t privy to the conspiracy. Bonaparte suspected him because of his proximity to Barras; and when all three met at Barras’s Luxembourg office two days before the coup, the Corsican general attempted to distract attention by discussing plans to invade England. Ouvrard recalled that:

The uncertainty and agitation of spirits gave rise to the most contrary rumours. Bonaparte talked much of the invasion of England. On the 16 Brumaire, I met him at Barras’s office. My relations with this director probably persuaded him that it was necessary to mislead me like the others. He spoke to me with some eagerness of his plans to bring the Revolution to England and offered me the contract to supply the military expedition; but he could sense that I wasn’t taking the bait, and that I believed him less likely to attack England than the Luxembourg...I spoke to Barras about this on the same day...shortly afterwards, generals Beurnonville and MacDonald asked me to warn Barras that Bonaparte was making overtures to them;

¹²¹ Quoted in Georges Lacour-Gayet, *Talleyrand*, Paris: Payot, 1990, p.376-377.

¹²² Arnault, *Souvenirs d’un sexagénaire*, Tome IV, p.395.

¹²³ Quoted in Louis Madelin, *Histoire du Consulat et de L’Empire*, Tome III, Paris: Hachette, 1938, p.26.

*they wished to know if he had been informed about them, and what they should do; but Barras answered impatiently: "Let them take Bonaparte's orders!"*¹²⁴

Early on the morning of 18 Brumaire, Ouvrard happened to observe Bonaparte's cavalcade pass by his window on its way from the Rue de la Victoire to the Tuileries.¹²⁵ He immediately understood something was afoot and addressed the following letter to Admiral Bruix, offering his services in a desperate attempt to cover himself:

Citizen Admiral,

*The passage of General Bonaparte on his way to the Conseil des Anciens, some accompanying troop movements, lead me to sense that political affairs are about to change. This circumstance can necessitate funds. I pray you, my dear Admiral, to be the interpreter of the offer which I am prepared to deliver immediately. I thought that the person entrusted with the most important service in the branch which you command could – with discretion – make such an offer and that you would only see in this a proof of his devotion for the public good, whose success he has always sought to cooperate with.*¹²⁶

Note that Ouvrard kept his missive sufficiently vague so it couldn't be used against him were Bonaparte's coup to fail.¹²⁷ His offer of financial assistance was too late, however, and we can thus rule out his participation in Brumaire with some confidence.

Ouvrard was also with Barras at the Luxembourg later that morning when Talleyrand and Admiral Bruix arrived to demand the director's resignation, presenting him with a ready-to-sign declaration pre-drafted by Rœderer.¹²⁸ Talleyrand had been authorised to offer the 'Victor of Thermidor' two million francs – possibly derived from the money advanced by Collot or Michel *jeune* – as compensation for stepping down.¹²⁹ Barras made no attempt to resist and calmly signed the document. He subsequently claimed Talleyrand had been instructed to offer him ten million francs but had stolen this bribe and shared it with Bruix and Fouché instead.¹³⁰

¹²⁴ Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Vol. I, p.55-56.

¹²⁵ Ouvrard's resided at the corner of the Rue de la Chaussée d'Antin and the Rue de Provence.

¹²⁶ Quoted in Jacques Wolff, *Le financier Ouvrard*, Paris: Tallandier, 1992, p.61.

¹²⁷ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.244-245.

¹²⁸ Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.57 & Rœderer, *Œuvres*, Tome III, p.301.

¹²⁹ See Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.324-327 & Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.283 – It is unclear whether these were the same two million francs mentioned by Fouché which Collot had advanced (see *supra*), or if they represented an additional sum. Barras was confirmed in his ownership of the château of Grosbois – which he had purchased as a *bien national* in November 1797 – and departed there immediately escorted by a hundred dragoons. Madame de Staël, who was traveling back to Paris from her residence at Coppet, just missed his convoy at the toll gate of Charenton (Staël, *Considérations*, p.572).

¹³⁰ Barras is rather murky on this entire episode. He asserts he was paid nothing and makes no allusion to any payment in his recollections (*Mémoires*, Tome IV, p.79-80), but later claims Talleyrand pocketed four of the ten million intended for him (*Ibid*, Tome IV, p.263). Understandably, Barras blamed Talleyrand for masterminding his resignation, and he presents a detailed list of all the bribes and gratifications Talleyrand pocketed from the Directory to the Restauration – amounting to 117,690,000 million francs (*Ibid*, Tome IV,

Witnessing the downfall of his political protector undoubtedly made Ouvrard perceive that Bonaparte didn't hold him in high esteem. But little did he know the new ruler of France was planning to make an example of him to intimidate other financiers and make them fall into line.

Gaudin's Appointment as Finance Minister & the Forced Loan's Suppression

One of the first things Bonaparte did as First Consul after Brumaire was to appoint Martin Gaudin the new finance minister. Business circles needed immediate reassurance after the coup, and it was out of the question that a Jacobin associated with the Terror like Robert Lindet remain in charge of state finances. Although Napoleon had initially selected Le Couteux as Lindet's successor, Sieyès ultimately convinced him to appoint his friend Gaudin instead. This former *Ancien Régime* tax official, who began his career as a *surnuméraire aux impositions* at the Royal Treasury in 1773, had been a disciple of Maupeou and Turgot and served nearly all successive finance ministers down to 1789. His long experience had made him a specialist of direct taxation (*contributions directes*) and acquainted him with the entire range of duties encompassed by French finances. In 1791, Gaudin had become a Treasury commissioner thanks to the patronage of his former colleague – Louis Hardouin Tarbé – remaining in this capacity until June 1795.¹³¹ A few months later in March 1796 he crossed paths with Bonaparte, finding himself “*by a singular coincidence*” in finance minister Ramel's office when the general strolled in to demand funds for his Italian Campaign.¹³²

Being a respected and valued administrator, Gaudin had already thrice declined the finance ministry – once following the Directory's advent in 1795, a second time shortly before 30 Prairial when Sieyès offered him the post to prevent Lindet taking the job and a third immediately following the coup.¹³³ Gaudin had judged these offers inauspicious, opting instead to head the postal service.¹³⁴ This sensitive position placed him in charge of overseeing the *cabinet noir* which spied on diplomatic correspondence.¹³⁵ It also held

p.257-263). Lentz (*Le 18 Brumaire*, p.283) and Vandal (*ADB*, Tome I, p.325-326) believe Barras received something considering he lived a comfortable retirement at Grosbois.

¹³¹ See Gaudin's entry in the Biographical Index.

¹³² Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.14.

¹³³ Gaudin had known Sieyès since at least 1787. Ironically, he claims Sieyès was “*entirely unknown*” to him when he was offered the finance ministry in May 1799 (Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.40). This was because Gaudin's memoirs were published in 1826 during Charles X's reign – when Sieyès was an exiled regicide in Brussels while the prudent Gaudin was still governor of the *Banque de France*!

¹³⁴ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.171 – He became the Directory's commissioner for postal services in 1798.

¹³⁵ A law of 30 Sep. 1797 had privatized messaging services and restricted state postal services to the dispatch and receipt of letters.

economic importance due to the large number of horses it requisitioned for various armies and which were needed for mail deliveries. Jean Lanchère, former *concessionnaire des transports* of the *Armée d'Italie*, knew Gaudin well and also lobbied for his investiture.¹³⁶

Gaudin was thus a recognised expert in the field and perfectly well-qualified to become finance minister. In a well-known passage of his memoirs, he describes meeting Bonaparte at the Luxembourg on the evening of 20 Brumaire and the sense of urgency surrounding his appointment:

*I found...a character known to me by the high renown he had already acquired; of small stature, dressed in a plain grey coat, extremely thin, with a yellow complexion and the eye of a hawk, making brisk and animated movements...He came to me with the most gracious demeanour. "Have you worked long in finance?" – "For twenty years, mon général!" – "We have great need of your assistance, and I am counting on you. Come then, take the oath of office, we are in a hurry."*¹³⁷

Ironically, Gaudin – the pupil of Maupeou who had repressed the Parisian and provincial parliaments in 1771 – now found himself in the same government as justice minister (and future Second Consul) Cambacérès who had been Maupeou's arch-enemy during that episode. Their mutual appointments reflected Bonaparte's standard political technique of amalgamating rival factions of the *Ancien Régime* to forge compromise solutions to the revolutionary crisis. In any event, the pressing necessities of remedying the government's abysmal finances cast these bygone quarrels aside. As Thierry Lentz notes:

*Bonaparte and his government went straight to work. Admittedly, they weren't operating against the "bourgeois republic" which the Directory had represented. We can even say that businessmen and notables were the prime beneficiaries of the change of government, then of regime.*¹³⁸

On 13 November, the infamous hostage law was abolished;¹³⁹ and the following day the forced loan of 100 million francs was scrapped. A message from the consuls to the *Cinq-Cents's commission intermédiaire* demanded it "make this law which dishonours our legislative code disappear."¹⁴⁰ It was therefore replaced on 18 November by an extraordinary war tax (*contribution de guerre*). Gaudin recalls that:

The consular government took the reins of administration on 20 brumaire and by the 27th the uncertain and disastrous expedient of the forced loan was replaced by an extraordinary subvention – fixed at 25 centimes per every franc paid on income and property tax – payable on the tax rolls of Year VII, half in hard currency or bonds of

¹³⁶ Lentz (*Le 18 Brumaire*, p.351) suspects Lanchère may have funded Brumaire.

¹³⁷ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.45-46.

¹³⁸ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.428-429.

¹³⁹ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.172.

¹⁴⁰ Report of Alexandre Thibault to the *commission intermédiaire des Cinq-Cents*, 26 brumaire VIII/17 Nov. 1799 (quoted in Stourm, *LFC*, p.44).

*the forced loan...or in paper currency notes issued by the syndicat [du commerce]...which hadn't been reimbursed and remained useless. Various other worthless assets (valeurs mortes) were admitted in payment of the other half...*¹⁴¹

Anticipating this measure would draw criticism, Gaudin published a justification in the *Moniteur*:

*In all measures of finance, one must first consider their effects – either material or political – on people who have money, goods or credit in Paris. We can confidently advance that, given the situation in which the Republic finds itself, a tax which would cause lasting damage to agriculture and commerce but that wouldn't send Parisian capitalists running would have less disastrous consequences than another which might present fewer inconveniences but attack the opinion of capitalists; for the present circumstances require the government to resort to their aid nearly every day. It is assuredly regrettable to find ourselves in the hands of men whose interests don't always conform with those of the public good; but this depends on realities which we cannot separate in an instant. It is the talent of the administrator, as well as the wisdom of the legislator, to make the best use of men – of events and circumstances – as they are one and the other.*¹⁴²

In short, Gaudin was alleviating pressure on the entrepreneurial classes and placing most of the fiscal burden to replenish state coffers on taxpayers.¹⁴³ This broadly explains why Parisian business circles welcomed Brumaire with great anticipation. They were glad the forced loan and suspension of delegations had been repealed and hoped a change of regime would lead to economic resurgence. The Lyon banker Alexandre Barrillon, for instance, expressed his optimism to Greffulhe – his exiled business partner in London:

*Then came the 18 Brumaire, and the healing government of Bonaparte. All minds were then exalted and each foresaw the dawn of happiness and domestic tranquillity. Men followed other ideas and the face of things changed.*¹⁴⁴

Of course, not all bankers were so enthusiastic. On 20 December 1799, the Zürich financier Jean-Conrad Hottinguer wrote to his friend Gaspard Escher that:

¹⁴¹ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.137-138 – The law of 27 brumaire stated that: “*There shall be levied, in the guise of an extraordinary war tax, 25 centimes per franc paid on the principals of property tax and personal income and sumptuary tax for Year VII.*” The law didn't apply to taxes on patents or doors and windows. The war tax was expected to yield 52 million francs on property taxes (total estimated intake 210 million francs) plus an additional 10 million on income taxes (total estimated intake 40 million francs). It raised 30 million in Year VIII of which about 8-10 million in hard currency. See Stourm, *LFC*, p.42-46 & Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.173.

¹⁴² *Moniteur*, 28 brumaire VIII/19 Nov. 1799.

¹⁴³ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.372-373.

¹⁴⁴ Letter of 12 Jan. 1802 quoted in Bertrand Gille, ‘Contributions à l'étude de la crise de 1805’, *Bulletin du Centre de Recherches sur l'Histoire des Entreprises*, Bulletin n°3, 3 juin 1954 & Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.343, footnote 5.



Figure 6:2
Portrait of Martin Michel Charles Gaudin (here portrayed as Duc de Gaète)
by Joseph-Marie Vien le jeune, 1806, Banque de France
© RMN-GP/Agence Bulloz
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

*Everything here is as frozen as the weather. The constitution [of Year VIII] is having a lukewarm reception, and I fear it may not prove the definitive version.*¹⁴⁵

But overall, business reaction to Brumaire was overwhelmingly positive. *Tiers consolidé* bonds (the “*rente*”) – regarded by Bonaparte as the principal barometer of public confidence in state finance – rose from 11.37 francs to 12.88 francs on the morning of the coup’s first day.¹⁴⁶ The *rente* climbed to 14 francs on 20 Brumaire and reached twenty on 21 Brumaire. Eventually, it hit 70 francs in 1801 and peaked at 90 francs in 1807.¹⁴⁷

Reflecting on this period, Gaudin explained how the *Caisse d’amortissement* – the newly-established state bank in charge of managing the national debt – gradually recovered from the revolutionary crisis during the consular and imperial era:

*The results of this institution answered the respective declamations initially put forward by its detractors. Its foundation alone, despite the mediocrity of the means it received for the amortisation of the debt, which weren’t great at the time, nevertheless exerted a real influence on the amelioration of the public debt, whose market price was less than ten francs on 18 Brumaire, yielding five francs of ‘rente’...The gradual elevation of the market price, which eventually rose to over 80 francs, was also profitable for public credit – government operations feeling the beneficial effects of these operations – and for private fortunes which regained the considerable capital they had lost to depreciation. Indeed, 38 million shares of ‘rente’ which had been worth 76 million francs when the share price was ten francs represented more than 600 million francs when the share price rose to 80 francs per share. The property of landowners had therefore experienced an increase in value of over 500 million francs.*¹⁴⁸

Bonaparte Convenes the Bankers at the Luxembourg (24 November 1799)

Bonaparte’s most immediate concern following his seizure of power was to urgently raise cash for his upcoming military campaign against the Austrians in Italy who had recaptured much of the peninsula from French control and were threatening to invade France itself. The situation was indeed critical, for as Gaudin famously notes the state’s coffers were desperately empty:

On 20 Brumaire Year VIII, there were no more relics of finance in France. At this time, a miserable sum of 167,000 francs in hard currency was all that the Treasury of a nation of thirty million people possessed! It was the product of an advance of 300,000 francs obtained the previous day for the expenses of the service. The armies

¹⁴⁵ Archives d’État de Zurich, papiers de famille Escher vom Glas, 171205/2, Correspondance (quoted in Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.343, footnote 5).

¹⁴⁶ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome II, p.334 & Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.289-290.

¹⁴⁷ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.371 & 469, footnote 30 – The *rente* was created after the ‘bankruptcy of two-thirds’ which followed the 18 Fructidor coup. It offered a fixed rate of 5% interest for 100 francs.

¹⁴⁸ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.156-157.

were without pay; those civil servants directly remunerated by the Treasury had no salary. Ministerial offices hadn't been given their endowments for ten months. Most employees had exhausted their savings or credit and were reduced to the last expedients to survive.¹⁴⁹

Bourrienne confirms this insolvency with an anecdote of his own:

*What a dire condition French finances were in after Brumaire! Could one even believe it? On the second day of his consulship, Bonaparte wanted to send a courier to General Championnet, commander-in-chief of the Armée d'Italie. Well, it wasn't even possible to find 1,200 francs in the Treasury to give the courier!*¹⁵⁰

What money was available in the days immediately following the coup was extremely limited. According to Bourrienne, Collot once again came to Bonaparte's assistance, advancing another 500,000 francs in gold to help the consular government get off the ground:

*It may be supposed that in the first moments of a new government money may be needed. Mr. Collot, who had served under Bonaparte in Italy, and whose conduct and administration deserved nothing but praise, was one of the first who came to the Consul's assistance. In this instance Mr. Collot was as zealous as disinterested. He gave the Consul 500,000 francs in gold, for which service he was badly rewarded. Bonaparte afterwards behaved to Mr. Collot as though he were anxious to punish him for being rich. This sum, which at the time made so fine an appearance in the Consular treasury, wasn't repaid for a long time after, and then without interest. This was not, indeed, the only instance in which Mr. Collot had cause to complain of Bonaparte, who was never inclined to acknowledge his important services, nor even to render justice to his conduct.*¹⁵¹

Marmont claims Collot actually lent 800,000 francs.¹⁵² His subsidy was probably not as disinterested as Bourrienne claims considering his expectations of being rewarded with the position of state counsellor.

The general secretary of the Directory – Lagarde – also brought to attention funds set aside for the directors' extraordinary expenses deposited in a safe at the Luxembourg. A total of 214,613 *livres* in hard currency plus another 120,000 francs in paper currency and bonds was discovered and used to pay for “*expenses incurred by the events of 18 and 19 Brumaire.*”¹⁵³ Neither sum was recorded in public registers. Miot de Mérito, who quotes a higher amount, claims this money was used to bribe Sieyès out of the picture:

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, Tome I, p.134.

¹⁵⁰ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.79.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid* – Joseph Bonaparte, writing under the pseudonym of ‘Comte de Surville’ (Surville was a village close to his Mortefontaine estate), claims Collot lent these 500,000 francs at no interest (*Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, Tome I, p.254). See also Payard, *BFC*, p.131.

¹⁵² Marmont, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.106.

¹⁵³ AN, AF/IV/3 & CN, Tome VI, n°4421, *Decree of 21 frimaire VIII*/12 Dec. 1799.

*Sieyès was amply compensated by the riches bestowed upon him for the slight endured by his vanity. In the division of a sum of 600,000 francs discovered in the fund of the executive directors at the moment of their overthrow, Sieyès received 350,000 francs and Bonaparte further presented him with the estate of Crosne.*¹⁵⁴

However, most economic specialists of the period – such as René Stourm – are doubtful this embezzlement took place since it would only further have deepened the Consulate’s financial woes.¹⁵⁵ In fact, the story of the Luxembourg safe was deliberately instrumentalised by Napoleonic devotees to blacken Sieyès and Ducos for propaganda purposes.¹⁵⁶

Regardless of how these sums were employed, they represented mere triflings in comparison to the requirements of Napoleon’s war chest. Moreover, the creation of the war tax did nothing to resolve the government’s pecuniary difficulties. On the contrary, the fact that it could mostly be acquitted in depreciated paper currency or state bonds meant the government would irremediably lose considerable revenue – and contributions would take months to collect. But Bonaparte couldn’t afford to delay his departure on campaign, and he therefore turned to the only group of people who could advance him funds forthwith – financiers. The forced loan’s abrogation had given them a tacit guarantee that progressive taxation and arbitrary levies on capital were definitively abolished – the time had now come for them to return the favour.¹⁵⁷

Napoleon began by approaching Ouvrard for a loan of twelve million francs which the magnate refused (see below). This left him with little choice but to solicit the bankers. On 24 November at 11 am, he held a meeting with twelve representatives of leading Parisian banks in his Luxembourg office.¹⁵⁸ The First Consul underscored his government’s determination to restore social order and uphold property rights, but insisted this couldn’t be ensured unless businessmen closed ranks with his regime and displayed their patriotism by contributing funds for the nation’s defence and immediate expenses.¹⁵⁹ It was at this conference that the bankers’ veritable sentiments on the situation surrounding Brumaire

¹⁵⁴ Miot de Mérito, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.268 – Miot claims the sum was divided as follows: Sieyès – 350,000 francs, Roger Ducos – 150,000 and Lagarde (the Directory’s secretary-general) – 100,000. Fouché (*Mémoires*, p.156) – an unremitting enemy of Sieyès – claims the directors’ private fund contained 800,000 francs of which Sieyès received 700,000. He affirms the estate of Crosne was worth a million francs and that Sieyès benefited from a 25,000-franc annual salary as a newly appointed senator (*Ibid*, p.169). Lentz (*Le 18 Brumaire*, p.404) values the estate of Crosne at 430,000 francs.

¹⁵⁵ Stourm, *LFC*, p.40.

¹⁵⁶ See Las Cases, *MSH*, Tome II, p.923-924.

¹⁵⁷ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.421.

¹⁵⁸ These were Perregaux, Le Couteulx, Davillier, Germain, Sévène, Fulchiron, Mallet, Delessert, Récamier, Doyen, Sabatier and Claude Perier. See Stourm, *LFC*, p.56-61 & Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.423.

¹⁵⁹ *Minutes of the Meeting of Bankers and Traders Summoned to the Consul Bonaparte’s Office*, 3 Frimaire VIII/24 Nov. 1799 (BN, 4° Lb⁴³ 388), p.1-2.

finally transpired. Jean-Pierre Germain, an associate of Delessert and major landowner in the Loire Valley, began by lambasting the Directory's forced loan, deploring:

*...this unhappy regime which destroyed all confidence, where those citizens who put themselves forward most liberally were precisely those struck with the most vigour, by calculating through a combination as impolitic as it was perfidious the extent of their presumed fortune in proportion to the efforts they had made to render themselves useful.*¹⁶⁰

Jean-Charles Joachim Davillier, a leading representative of the Swiss textile manufacturing lobby, then warned that:

*...the bankers and merchants of Paris cannot dispense with spreading their capital and credit across several urgent matters. Aside from helping the government, they must supply manufactures, employ numerous workers...and their means are far less well-proportioned than they would like...*¹⁶¹

The bankers were displaying their usual cautious approach.

After acknowledging their concerns Bonaparte withdrew, leaving Gaudin to submit a proposal for a twelve-million-franc subscription loan to be repaid by contributions levied for the war tax. The bankers initially hesitated and decided to hold an impromptu emergency session presided by Le Couteulx to debate the formalities of raising this sum:

*Mssrs. Barrillon, Fulchiron, Récamier and Jubié having successively presented their ideas on the means of execution, it was agreed the loan could be considered as a service of credit rendered [to the government] by the Parisian community of bankers and traders.*¹⁶²

Outwardly, the bankers all agreed the war tax's forecasted revenues would more than make up for the bills of exchange they were to advance to cover the loan. "*We shall all subscribe,*" Guillaume Mallet enthusiastically exclaimed, "*for which Parisian banker or trader wouldn't bitterly regret the failure to provide such a statement of confidence to a government which has so justly deserved it in such exceptional circumstances?*"¹⁶³ All twelve of them promised to raise a million francs each, and a commission of seven members (Fulchiron, Mallet, Perregaux, Germain, Sévène, Doyen and Récamier) was elected to administer and raise subscriptions.¹⁶⁴

The following day, a consular decree authorised the Treasury to set aside a sum of twelve million francs to be reimbursed by war tax contributions, and Gaudin sent a memorandum

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p.3 – See Germain's entry in the Biographical Index.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, p.4.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, p.5-6.

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, p.6.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.7 & AN, AF/IV/1, plaquette 4.

to administrators of *départements* informing them of this decision.¹⁶⁵ But suddenly the bankers reneged on their engagement and lowered their promised stipend from twelve to three million francs. No explanation was provided for this retraction, except an intriguing excerpt in the *Moniteur* of 20 December:

*The zeal and loyalty [of commerce] would have kept this engagement; but it would thereby have accrued embarrassments which were already rendering transactions impracticable. Consequently, it desired to find a method which could facilitate the execution without incurring such a disagreeable result.*¹⁶⁶

In other words, the bankers didn't sufficiently trust the new regime's credit to advance it the agreed sum.

To raise the remaining nine million, the subscription loan was replaced by a lottery organised by the commission of bankers – apparently indicating the government hadn't fallen out with them. The lottery's target was set at 12 million francs instead of nine million – possibly indicating the bankers converted the three million they had pledged into lottery tickets which they later resold.¹⁶⁷ Forty thousand tickets of 300 *livres* were issued.¹⁶⁸ According to Bourrienne, the bankers were given letters of credit drawn on the Treasury with 33% discount rates as security for their investments.¹⁶⁹ The amount raised by this lottery isn't recorded in any official document.¹⁷⁰ Finally, we should note that the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* experienced a huge surge in its volume of discounted funds the day after the Luxembourg meeting. These rose from 189,312 francs on 22 November (1 Frimaire VIII) to 1,097,804 francs on 25 November (4 Frimaire VIII) – an increase of 479% over two discounting sessions!¹⁷¹ Assuredly, the bankers viewed this lottery as a lucrative operation even though they held the Consulate's finances in low regard.

The Vingt & Dix Négociants Réunis (20 December 1799 & 9 March 1800)

Incidentally, Bonaparte doesn't seem to have been satisfied at the prospect of leaving the lottery's administration entirely in the hands of bankers – probably because he considered the stakes were too high given the success of his second Italian campaign rested on these

¹⁶⁵ Stourm, *LFC*, p.57-58.

¹⁶⁶ *Moniteur*, 29 frimaire VIII/20 Dec. 1799 (quoted in Stourm, *LFC*, p.58, footnote 2).

¹⁶⁷ Stourm, *LFC*, p.59-60 – The twelve million raised by the lottery were to be repaid over seven successive months. The cost of organising the lottery was 903,900 francs (7.5% of the 12 million lottery-loan).

¹⁶⁸ AN, AF/IV/3, plaquette 11 – *Consular decree of 24 frimaire VIII/15 Dec. 1799*.

¹⁶⁹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.156.

¹⁷⁰ Stourm, *LFC*, p.60 – The sums raised by the lottery were probably included in war tax accounts. Stourm suggests the lottery was essentially a Treasury discounting operation to obtain advance funds on the war tax.

¹⁷¹ See Appendix IV.

funds. Moreover, the First Consul had also given his consent for the bankers to set up the *Banque de France* – an institution which would soon endow them with far greater control over state finances (see below). He therefore set aside his personal dislike of contractors and deferred to reasons of state by awarding them a share in the lottery. On 20 December 1799, the first of a series of private fundraising consortiums linked to the Treasury named the *Vingt Négociants Réunis* was established.¹⁷² This new company – which interestingly included Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard – was specifically designed to take over the lottery’s administration and its associated twelve-million-franc loan, promising to lend the Treasury three million francs up front plus another nine million to be raised by the sale of lottery tickets.¹⁷³ It was dissolved on 16 September 1800 – in the aftermath of the Marengo Campaign – after all transactions had been concluded.¹⁷⁴

The success of this first conglomerate led to the launch of a second company on 9 March 1800 – the *Dix Négociants Réunis* – regrouping the first ten partners of the *Vingt Négociants* who were all bankers. The immediate purpose of this undertaking was to lend three million francs to the Treasury – half in hard currency and half in bills of exchange – to fund the Italian and Rhine armies. This sum was to be supplied within the first two *décades* following the publishing of the consular decree of 5 March 1800 accepting the company’s loan offer. The firm’s partners were awarded a 5.8% monthly interest rate on the sums they advanced, an extra commission of 2% plus additional recovery expenses of 2%.¹⁷⁵ Refunds were to be paid either directly at the *Banque de France* or in any other location specified by the bankers.¹⁷⁶ Each of them held a 10% stake in the venture. The company’s stated objective was “*to conduct operations of shared benefit which the government deems fit to entrust us with, and all other commercial speculations which the present company will judge advantageous to undertake.*”¹⁷⁷ Indisputably, the bankers had returned to the fold and recovered their preferential status in business dealings with the state. Their conversion had been a matter of a few weeks. In fact, many of the *Dix Négociants*’s bills of exchange marketed by the Treasury were purchased by *receveurs généraux*.¹⁷⁸ Louis Bergeron concludes: “*Thus began to stabilise, at the dawn of Year IX, a*

¹⁷² MC/ET/XV/1130, 29 frimaire VIII/20 Dec. 1799 – See Appendix XIV for the list of its partners.

¹⁷³ MC/ET/XV/1135, 29 fructidor VIII/16 Sep. 1800.

¹⁷⁴ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.147-148.

¹⁷⁵ MC/ET/XV/1132, 18 ventôse VIII/9 March 1800 – See Appendix XIV for the list of its partners. They initially approached the Treasury with a loan offer on 2 March 1800.

¹⁷⁶ AN, AF/IV/8, plaquette 35, *Loan agreement for 3 million francs between the Consular government and a group of bankers.*

¹⁷⁷ MC/ET/XV/1136, 27 brumaire IX/18 Nov. 1800, *Minutes of the general assembly of the Dix Négociants Réunis.*

¹⁷⁸ Louis François Passy for instance, the *receveur* of the *département* of the Dyle, acquired bills worth 126,725 francs (MC/ET/XV/1136, 16 brumaire IX/7 Nov. 1800).

*sort of syndicate regrouping the most powerful and prestigious bankers for the permanent service of the Treasury.”*¹⁷⁹

Nevertheless, as of Year XII the French government increasingly turned to contractors rather than bankers to obtain cash advances – notably the Michel brothers and especially Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe (former associate of Paulée and Hottinguer) who vouched for six of the government’s ten million francs in monthly expenses.¹⁸⁰ Perhaps Bonaparte felt contractors were more dependent on his campaigns for their revenues and therefore more susceptible to government pressure. In any case, these intricate business dealings between the Treasury and financiers have led many scholars to deduce – often rather hastily – that most members of the *Dix and Vingt Négociants Réunis* – Ouvrard being the notable exception – financed Brumaire to some degree.

One may legitimately enquire why the Treasury had so little say in these proceedings. Having been weakened by its conflict with the finance ministry during the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal, it was still reeling on the eve of Brumaire and in no position to demand any say in Bonaparte’s economic reforms. What is more, Treasury commissioners had politically compromised themselves with contractors under the Directory and there were no hard currency reserves left in public coffers.¹⁸¹ The Constitution of Year VIII – presented on 13 December 1799 – made no mention of the Treasury, merely stating that: “*One of the ministers is specially tasked with the administration of the public Treasury: he directs its collection of taxes, orders the transfer of funds and validates payments authorised by the law.*”¹⁸² This constituted a clear warning to the Treasury not to interfere in the finance ministry’s affairs. Only the *commission de comptabilité intermédiaire* was acknowledged in the new constitution.¹⁸³

The change of regime inaugurated by Brumaire tempted several veteran revolutionary brokers to offer their services anew. Tort de la Sonde, for example, sent Fouché a proposal to supply France with wheat via Antwerp; but Bonaparte turned it down, arguing much of this wheat was purchased cash-in-hand by British agents.¹⁸⁴ Clearly, the First Consul had resolved to adopt a more intransigent attitude towards financial operatives and would now only deal with them through state-sponsored ventures under his control. Nor could they

¹⁷⁹ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.148.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.149.

¹⁸¹ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.144.

¹⁸² Article 56 of the Constitution of 22 frimaire VIII/13 Dec. 1799, *Bulletin des Lois de la République*, 9^e partie, 1 vendémiaire-27 nivôse VIII, Paris: Imprimerie de la République, Pluviôse VIII, n°333, p.11.

¹⁸³ Article 89 of the Constitution of 22 frimaire VIII/13 Dec. 1799, *Ibid*, p.18.

¹⁸⁴ CN, Tome VI, n°4436, *Bonaparte to Fouché*, 1 nivôse VIII/22 Dec. 1799.

hope any longer to influence the government's monetary policy which would henceforth be the preserve of the finance ministry and *Banque de France*.

Additional Emergency Measures to Raise Funds

While opening public finances to the private sector generated some results, it would take time before the benefits of this policy came into full effect. In the meantime, the sums collected fell far short of meeting government expenses, indicating other solutions would rapidly have to be devised to balance the budget and tackle the national debt. Since there weren't enough national assets to sell, Napoleon resorted to two other expedients involving financiers: raising loans from foreign powers and indefinitely suspending delegations.

Negotiations with Foreign Powers

During the course of his first campaign in Italy, Napoleon had learnt from Saliceti and Haller how the imposition of loans and contributions on tributary states was a diplomatic privilege military victors could exploit. It was therefore natural for him to turn his gaze back to Italy at this moment of financial duress. Bonaparte hadn't forgotten the affluence of Genoese commerce, and in a note of 18 December to foreign minister Talleyrand he insisted that:

It is indispensable the trading community of Genoa deposit two million francs in the coffers of the [Armée d'Italie's] paymaster as soon as possible...[otherwise] Masséna shall be authorised to raise a contribution on its principal traders...The lords of Genoa have already paid much, but the traders of this city haven't been overburdened...Bring home the example of the Dutch who are lending us six million francs of their own initiative.¹⁸⁵

As the First Consul intimated, the Dutch had been approached for credit – although they hadn't offered it “*of their own initiative*.” In reality, General Marmont had been dispatched to Holland to negotiate a substantial loan using the ‘*Régent*’ – the most beautiful diamond of the French crown jewels – as security. Marmont references this mission in his memoirs:

The extreme urgency of financial needs gave birth to the idea of raising a loan in Holland, and the First Consul decided to entrust me with this mission...A sum of twelve million francs was necessary to start campaigning. Logging concessions which had already been sold and that were to be repaid at the end of the year were offered as security. The records of their adjudication were forwarded as deposits,

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, n°4425, *Note for the Minister of Exterior Relations*, 27 frimaire VIII/18 Dec. 1799.

*and all formalities were undertaken to honour their value. I also had the diamond known as 'le Régent' to offer as collateral. I was given full powers and seconded by Mr. Sémonville, French ambassador in Amsterdam...but logging concessions worth twelve million and negotiations led by a young general appeared strange to people who inhabited a land of hedges, and in vain did I move heaven and earth to succeed...the opposition of the Batavian government and foreign intrigues condemned my efforts to naught. **It must be said this manner of proceeding was unusual – I would have had a greater chance of success had I presented myself as the son-in-law of Mr. Perregaux endowed with his full recommendation to negotiate with his correspondents.***¹⁸⁶

It was indeed bizarre that Napoleon failed to use Perregaux's extensive international connections to support this loan request. Perhaps he thought the distinguished banker was too absorbed in setting up the *Banque de France*; or maybe he no longer wished to rely on Perregaux as much now that he held the reins of government. At any rate, the Dutch declined Marmont's entreaties as they believed the Consulate wouldn't survive long.¹⁸⁷

Undeterred, Bonaparte attempted a different approach and instructed Talleyrand on 13 January 1800 to try and sell the city of Vlissingen (Flushing) to the Batavian Republic:

*If it were true that we could obtain for this object [the sale of Vlissingen] from Holland: 1.) 12 million discountable before the end of April; 2.) 18 million discountable before the end of next September; 3.) 10-15 million for the whole of Year IX, I think this would be of such consequence in our present position that such a negotiation would be considered as important as those we are to open with the courts of London or Vienna.*¹⁸⁸

That same day, a loan of four and a half million francs was solicited from the bankers and traders of Hamburg – the price of French forgiveness for that city's extradition to England of two United Irishmen (James Bartholomew Blackwell and James Napper Tandy) who had been granted French citizenship.¹⁸⁹ Bonaparte had already advised the Hamburg senate of his displeasure on 30 December 1799 and counselled Talleyrand to employ underhand tactics to extort this sum:

Four million would be absolutely essential for us at the present moment. Apparently, Hamburg could provide us with them. I know they have solicited the Dutch to be their intermediaries with us...My answer to the senate of Hamburg has so disconcerted them that they dare not make any move. They even believe an arrangement exists between Prussia and us to deliver Hamburg. Take advantage of all this – have the Batavian minister in Paris publicly inform you that his government accords the greatest interest to Hamburg, and that he would be pleased to patch

¹⁸⁶ Marmont, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.107-108.

¹⁸⁷ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.373.

¹⁸⁸ CN, Tome VI, n°4519, *Bonaparte to Talleyrand*, 23 nivôse VIII/13 Jan. 1800.

¹⁸⁹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.234-236 – Blackwell and Napper Tandy were arrested in Hamburg by request of the British *chargé d'affaires* James Craufurd. Their extradition was ensured thanks to Russian influence (see Marianne Elliott, *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1982, p.261-265).

*things up with us. Let it then be known that...the French government might be prepared to normalise relations with Hamburg, and that once so disposed we would be happy to employ the Dutch government as our mediators. Six or even four million – if they could be discounted to us – would be enough to pay for a campaign.*¹⁹⁰

According to Bourrienne, the Hamburg senate sent four and a half million francs to Bonaparte via the banker Jacques Chapeaurouge. Funnily enough, Napoleon's secretary adds that:

*...the Treasury didn't receive a penny of this sum...I had had the four and a half million in coupons bearing interest on Holland stashed in a desk for eight days when Bonaparte decided to spend them. After having paid Josephine's debts and the expenses of La Malmaison, he enumerated the list of people whom he wished to reward. My name didn't cross his lips...but some time later he told me with the most affable benevolence: "Bourrienne, I didn't give you any of the money from Hamburg, but I will compensate you." He took out a large printed paper with blank spaces from a drawer and handed it to me, saying: "Here is a bill of exchange for 300,000 Italian livres drawn on the Cisalpine Republic in payment of the cannons sold to them. It is payable with Haller and Collot – it's yours."*¹⁹¹

Unfortunately for Bourrienne, the bill's validity had long since expired and he was unable to cash it in with the French Treasury.

Lebrun Convinces Bonaparte to Suspend Delegations

Desperate times require desperate measures; and one of the Consulate's most dramatic financial resolutions after Brumaire concerned the retraction of its pledge to uphold delegations. The principal instigator behind this deceitful act was none other than Charles-François Lebrun – the *Anciens* deputy who had so virulently castigated Delbrel's proposal to suspend delegations before the coup. Lebrun – like Gaudin – had been a disciple of Maupeou and served as his secretary during the suppression of parliaments in 1771. He had first met Bonaparte prior to the general's departure for Egypt at a dinner hosted by finance minister Ramel.¹⁹² After Napoleon's return, he became one of his trusted financial tutors. Las Cases, for example, emphasizes Lebrun's prominence in Bonaparte's circle:

...Bonaparte had arrived from Egypt. He had left France young and inexperienced. He knew no one, and this at first caused him great embarrassment. Lebrun was for him, in these first moments, an extremely precious tutor. The bankers and businessmen at the time were those who set the tone. No sooner had [Bonaparte] been appointed consul than several of them hurried to offer considerable loans. This

¹⁹⁰ CN, Tome VI, n°4520, *Bonaparte to Talleyrand*, 23 nivôse VIII/13 Jan. 1800.

¹⁹¹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.236-237.

¹⁹² Lebrun, *ORCEP*, p.72.

*devotion appeared generous, but in fact concealed ulterior motives. These were generally people of ill-repute, and they were turned away.*¹⁹³

Lebrun played a key role in convincing Bonaparte to exclude contractors from government ranks. The biographical notice in his memoirs states that:

*...military contractors, gorged on the corpses of our armies, grown rich on the privations of our soldiers; speculators, negotiators, their wives and mistresses, held pride of place at that time. But they couldn't obtain legitimate consideration and consoled themselves by arousing the envy of others through the scandalous luxury of their feasts. They yearned to take over the salons of the Tuileries which the facility and generosity of Madame Bonaparte had granted them access to. The First Consul, who despised them, felt the inconvenience of admitting them into his company, but still hesitated. Lebrun's advice determined a prompt resolution. He intimated that their association would degrade the government and that corruption would insinuate itself through them, leading honest people to turn their backs on the state. They were banished from the Tuileries and replaced in [Bonaparte's] inner circle by military officers, scholars, poets and distinguished men of all fields, and by ladies who were entitled to consideration.*¹⁹⁴

Following up on these exclusions, Bonaparte decided to free his new government from the grip of contractors and issued a consular decree on 5 January 1800 forbidding *receveurs* from reimbursing delegations: “...in each *département*, all payments to bearers of delegations drawn on tax contributions and other public revenues in arrears for Years V, VI and VII will cease to be made by *receveurs généraux*.” The decree ended by stipulating that:

*It is expressly prohibited for any civilian or military authority – under pain of personally answering for it – to dispose of any sum paid into public coffers except in virtue of the competent ministerial ordinances adorned with the appropriate constitutional forms.*¹⁹⁵

Special inspectors were sent to ensure *receveurs* immediately transferred the sums in their coffers to paymasters of *départements* so that contractors could no longer access them.¹⁹⁶ No mention was made of any substitute method of payment for suppliers. Instead, they were offered a full refund of their delegations provided they forwarded their equivalent

¹⁹³ Las Cases, *MSH*, Tome I, p.694 – François Furet (*La Révolution, de Turgot à Jules Ferry*, Paris: Hachette, 1988, p.395) argues the nomination of Cambacérès and Lebrun as Second and Third Consuls represented the mooring of the *Ancien Régime* (Lebrun) and Revolution (Cambacérès) to Bonaparte's cause.

¹⁹⁴ Lebrun, *ORCEP*, p.84 – The biographical notice was authored by the magistrate and deputy of the Lozère Arsène Valette des Hermaux.

¹⁹⁵ AN, AF/IV/5, *Decree 15 nivôse VIII/5 Jan. 1800* – See also Stourm, *LFC*, p.129.

¹⁹⁶ Stourm, *LFC*, p.129.

value in down payments to the Treasury! This measure netted 50 million francs in the Consulate's coffers.¹⁹⁷

The legality of this decree was controversial to say the least. Gaudin was perfectly aware of this and must have hesitated before issuing the decree because he condemns the decision in his memoirs, explaining that: “*One must not lose sight of the fact that the first bearers of delegations had been authorised by the previous government to market them – the public's trust was therefore at stake.*”¹⁹⁸ Nonetheless, Gaudin attempted to reason with financiers, unsuccessfully appealing to a leading contractor to help persuade other suppliers to abandon the delegations system which was so detrimental to public finances:

*I attempted to make the bearers of delegations drawn on tax returns understand that it was in their interest to help the government – to which their fortunes were linked. I had conferred with one of them in particular who held much influence among his peers... Finally a meeting was held at which my request was discussed, but the result of this deliberation was that I was told to expect nothing!... Confronted by the alternative of either straying from the rigorous execution of the engagements which the previous administration had perhaps imprudently contracted, or exposing the safety of the state, the government had no other choice but to safeguard the public interest.*¹⁹⁹

Simply put, Gaudin was forced to violate private interests to salvage public finances.²⁰⁰ Albert Vandal notes that “*Bonaparte's theory whereby a government was the judge of the contractual engagements of its predecessor contravened all the principles of public faith.*”²⁰¹ One of the decree's signatories was Lebrun – newly appointed Third Consul on 10 December – who thereby executed a shameless *volte-face* and betrayed his former convictions. What made his sell-out even more ignominious was that he had also invoked ‘public faith’ as the reason not to suspend delegations prior to the coup – the very same motive that was now being used to justify their suspension! This flagrant defrauding of contractors rendered delegations undesirable and practically worthless. They became so shunned by investors that in Thermidor Year VIII there was still an estimated 62,923,804 francs of them in circulation.²⁰²

The Consulate subsequently tampered with the rescription system via its decree of 16 June 1800 allowing ministers to pay contractors in rescriptions guaranteed by a reserve of state-

¹⁹⁷ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.140-143 – Many delegations had been sold to third parties, and since they were signed by the finance minister, annulling them risked a litany of court cases against the Treasury (Stourm, *LFC*, p.133-134). Gaudin allowed them to be accepted as payment for *domaines nationaux*.

¹⁹⁸ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.143.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p.139-140 – I believe the contractor Gaudin consulted may have been Michel jeune.

²⁰⁰ Stourm, *LFC*, p.131.

²⁰¹ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome II, p.108.

²⁰² AN, AF/IV/1248, *État de la situation des délégations*, 17 thermidor VIII/5 Aug. 1800.



Figure 6:3
 The Second Consul Cambacères and Third Consul Lebrun
 Engraving by an unknown artist, c. early 1800s
 © Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)

owned land rents (*rescriptions en capitaux de rentes*). These rents were worth three million francs and used as collateral to issue over 45 million francs of rescriptions.²⁰³ Mollien records these bonds rapidly depreciated by up to 60% in value and that the *Caisse d'amortissement* was given fifteen million worth by the Treasury in exchange for a lump payment of six million francs.²⁰⁴

Along with the delegations affair, Lebrun's influence also weighed heavily in Bonaparte's ministerial choices (Talleyrand for Foreign Affairs, Abrial for Justice, his friends Carnot for War and Barbé-Marbois for the Treasury) and for *Conseil d'État* appointments,

²⁰³ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.142 & Stourm, *LFC*, p.69-70.

²⁰⁴ Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.287-289 – The *Caisse d'amortissement* resold these rescriptions to various *départements* for over 80% of their value.

prefectural seats and high-ranking financial administrators.²⁰⁵ One of Lebrun's close friends was Bertrand Dufresne, a veteran of the *Caisse d'Escompte* and former Neckerian associate whom Louis XVI had appointed director of the *Trésor royal* in September 1790.²⁰⁶ Bonaparte found Dufresne excessively rigid but respected his exceptional financial talents, saying he was “*like stupid on any other subject except finances, but on these he excelled: his nerves immediately seized the most intricate question.*”²⁰⁷ The First Consul appointed him a counsellor of state on 25 December 1799 and director of the Treasury on 17 August 1800, making Dufresne one of the great financial officers of state who carried over from the *Ancien Régime* to the consular era.

The Arrest of Ouvrard

While military suppliers were caught unawares by the Consulate's duplicitous reversal on delegations, few expected to be singled out for persecution. In fact, their glee at the forced loan's demise had lulled them into a false sense of security; for the government's chronic lack of funds – coupled with Napoleon's ingrained dislike of contractors – inexorably directed the First Consul's attentions against them. As early as 30 November 1799, the press was reporting that “*Bonaparte is displaying a great aversion to businessmen, dilapidators, scoundrels and others.*”²⁰⁸ Fouché confirms this repugnance:

*Bonaparte couldn't stand the idea of these colossal fortunes acquired so swiftly. It was as if he feared being enslaved to them. He generally regarded them as the fruits of shameless dilapidations and state erosion.*²⁰⁹

Napoleon already had a designated target in mind – Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard, the wealthiest of all contractors – who had just refused him a twelve-million-franc loan and whom he wished to punish for remaining loyal to Barras during the coup. Relations between the two had always been jittery. They had first met at the residence of Ouvrard's mistress – Madame Tallien – shortly before 13 Vendémiaire. “*I was far from imagining then that one day he would hold the destiny of the world in his hands, and that his enmity would exert such a dreadful influence on my life,*” Ouvrard later recalled.²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ Lebrun, *ORCEP*, p.82-83 – Lebrun's proximity to Napoleon is recorded by Thiébaud (*Mémoires*, Tome III, p.63): “*Napoleon used to say: If you want to dine well, eat at Cambacérès's. If you want to dine badly, eat at Lebrun's. If you want to dine quickly, eat with me.*”

²⁰⁶ See Bertrand Dufresne's entry in the Biographical Index.

²⁰⁷ Charles Durand, *Étude sur le Conseil d'État napoléonien*, Paris: PUF, 1949, p.280.

²⁰⁸ *L'Ami des lois*, 9 frimaire VIII/30 Nov. 1799.

²⁰⁹ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.175.

²¹⁰ Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.34-35.

Naturally, there were more than simply pecuniary motives underlying Bonaparte's decision to go after Ouvrard. Having suspended delegations through his decree of 5 January 1800, he wished to send a clear message that contractors could no longer hold the government to ransom – and what better target to drive home this point than Ouvrard, the prince of contractors? Napoleon also probably held a grudge against him for lending money to Josephine during the Italian Campaign without his knowledge.²¹¹ As Ouvrard imparts in his memoirs, the parlous state of public finances afforded an easy pretext to instigate proceedings against him:

*A few days after [Brumaire], the First Consul summoned me to demand a loan of 12 million. The state of my affairs allowed me to acquiesce to his demand, however I refused. He called a meeting of bankers to whom he made the same proposal which met with as little success. Either because he saw a kind of coalition in this outcome, or because the lack of money – in such decisive circumstances for him – disrupted some of his projects, his dispositions towards me grew hostile. When I demanded shortly afterwards the repayment of a loan of ten million I had advanced the Directory, my demand appeared as a new slight to his authority...*²¹²

Bonaparte began by placing Ouvrard's general contract with the navy under investigation on 25 January 1800 before decreeing the contractor's arrest on 27 January.²¹³ Josephine, to whom Ouvrard had rendered many services, alerted him of her husband's plan to prosecute him before a military commission at Marseille. This news so alarmed the business sphere that four bankers (Sévène, Barrillon, Doyen and Germain) addressed an open letter to the Consulate entitled '*Le commerce de Paris aux Consuls de la République*' which clearly petitioned for Ouvrard's release. In response, Bonaparte held a meeting on 6 February with twelve delegates of leading Parisian banks (including Perregaux, Le Couteulx, Barrillon, Fulchiron, Basterrèche, Davillier, Benjamin Delessert, Robillard and Mallet) at which a second letter from the capital's trading community was discussed.²¹⁴ No record of this document survives and some historians like Albert Vandal believe it was deliberately kept out of the press.

²¹¹ Stourm, *LFC*, p.54, footnote 2.

²¹² Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.58 – Ouvrard also submitted a plan to balance the Consulate's budget which was not taken up (*Ibid*, p.60).

²¹³ The decree ordering Ouvrard's arrest stated: "...Given that Citizen Ouvrard fails to recognise any responsibility for the 62 million he has received, nor offers any guarantees for the continuation of the service he has undertaken and which everything – the text and execution of the contract – accuse of dilapidation and infidelity... Citizen Ouvrard shall be placed under arrest, his papers placed under seal and his movable and immovable effects temporarily confiscated..." (CN, Tome VI, n°4555, *Consular Decree of 7 pluviôse VIII/27 Jan. 1800*). Ouvrard gave himself up to the authorities on 30 January after three days hiding. For the circumstances surrounding his imprisonment, see Payard, *LFO*, p.21-43.

²¹⁴ For the minutes of this meeting, see AN, AF/IV/1248, *Particularities of a Conference held in the First Consul's Office on the 7th of the current month* – the "7th" apparently mistaken for 17 pluviôse VIII/6 Feb. 1800. Extracts are reproduced in Vandal, *LDB*, Tome II, p.109-113.

According to the minutes of the meeting, the delegates identified five specific problems they claimed were harming the economy: the continued existence of the *émigré* register; the growing number of cases where merchandise was seized by the state; the discredit of bonds issued by the *Syndicat du Commerce*; the suspension of delegations without any effective replacement and – most importantly – Ouvrard’s imprisonment. Bonaparte was reluctant to consider these grievances and categorically rejected rehabilitating Ouvrard’s naval contract, telling the delegates:

The advantage of suspending delegations is evident. Is the injustice incurred truly of equal measure? Which government is obliged to honour engagements concluded in peacetime during hostilities? To which government succeeding a disastrous regime is it forbidden to pass judgments on engagements taken before its accession? Do delegations result from the examination of established rights or audited accounts? They are ordonnances from ministers. And of which ministers? Those who have carried disorder and corruption into the war ministry’s administration and signed contracts such as Ouvrard’s. At what rate did bearers of delegations acquire them? Is it really so unjust to postpone payments until the conclusion of peace which will then be based on real capital value and yield their owners a stronger interest rate that will compensate the length of their wait?

As for Ouvrard’s release, Napoleon adamantly refused to countenance it, arguing:

How has the measure taken against Citizen Ouvrard impacted commerce? What do a trader and a contractor have in common?...A contractor...is a civil servant – and one who is far too important not to represent a threat if he is disloyal...He started his service with 14 million worth of goods in advance and successively received sums which consistently exceeded the value of what he supplied. He was paid 20 sols 9 deniers for each ration when it would already have generated a considerable profit if paid 15 to 17 sols...His proceedings, his contracts – everything has been meticulously examined by several administrative board meetings which lasted well into the night and were composed of the most probe and enlightened men...Citizen Ouvrard has been placed under house arrest until he produces an acceptable statement of accounts...The government has done what it had the right and duty to do.

Bonaparte did not hesitate to adjoin a thinly veiled warning to the financiers:

If the old administration of France perished, it was due to finances. The same evil caused the Directory’s power to crumble. By neglecting to audit its administration, the Directory has conferred upon the Consuls the duty of checking right down to the minutest detail because none remain where disorder has not penetrated...Three years are necessary to perceive the benefit of a government’s policies, while a bad measure produces calamities within twenty-four hours...This science which is often necessary in the army is absolutely required in the Council of State.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*



Figure 6:4
Portrait of Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard
Engraving by an unknown artist, undated, Musée Carnavalet
© Paris Musées/Musée Carnavalet
CC0 1.0 Universal Licence/Public Domain

But these words did little to reassure the bankers. Ouvrard had been arbitrarily arrested, and his naval contract entitled him to a trial-by-jury in accordance with the decree of 9 March 1793 which stipulated that government suppliers who failed to honour their engagements should be indicted by their local court.²¹⁶ Moreover, Bonaparte flagrantly discarded the fact that Ouvrard's contract had been concluded with former naval minister Admiral Bruix, one of the foremost Brumarian conspirators who – with Talleyrand – had helped secure Barras's resignation as director!²¹⁷ Even Collot cautioned his protector: “*It's a bad start, general, to go after everyone like this.*” Bonaparte countered saying: “*A man who has thirty million and doesn't care for them is too dangerous for someone in my position.*”²¹⁸ Sustained pressure from financial circles eventually compelled him to release Ouvrard a few months later, but not before the financier agreed to pay 14,167,620 *livres* plus various other expenses in a plea bargain.²¹⁹

Some of Bonaparte's assertions at this conference reveal how limited his knowledge was of the contracting world. His claim Ouvrard could make a profit supplying rations for 15-17 *sols* was later debunked by the setbacks of naval suppliers who succeeded Ouvrard. Collot, for instance, was awarded the general contract for the navy on 23 September 1801.²²⁰ He didn't forward any down payment and wasn't even mentioned in the consular decree of 11 October 1801 announcing a change of supplier for the navy.²²¹ For the first month of his service, Collot was advanced 1,200,000 francs but incurred expenses of 1,543,983 francs, resulting in a debt of 343,983 francs.²²² A few months later on 10 March 1802, the state counsellor for naval affairs – Jean-Claude Redon de Beaupréau – informed the *Conseil de la Marine* that Collot was owed 1,749,600 francs.²²³ Nonetheless, the

²¹⁶ Payard, *LFO*, p.42.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.39 – A consular decree of 23 frimaire VIII/14 Dec. 1799 appointed Bruix commander of the fleet at Brest with a 30,000-franc annual salary.

²¹⁸ Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I p.63-64 – Ouvrard says his fortune at this time was estimated at 29 million francs. See also Wolff, *Le financier Ouvrard (1770-1846)*, p.69 & Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.374.

²¹⁹ Ouvrard presented a detailed statement of his accounts on 25 February 1800 indicating 41,439,535 *livres* in expenses for Years VI & VII plus a projected 11,468,961 *livres* for the first five months of Year VIII against 39,032,488 *livres* in revenue. According to this calculation, the government owed him 13,876,008 *livres* (Payard, *LFO*, p.48-49). On 28 April 1800 – after meticulous auditing of his contracts – Ouvrard struck a deal to forward 14,167,620 *livres* to the government and pay various other expenses in return for a consular decree confirming his release (AN, AF/IV/12, *Decree of 28 floréal VIII/18 May 1800*). A final undated audit of Ouvrard's contract probably issued by naval minister Forfait in late August 1801 concluded – after examining over 16,000 supporting documents – that Ouvrard was still owed 446,892 francs on all supplies furnished (AF/IV/1282 – *Report to the Consuls on the Accounting of Citizen Blanchard aîné, former supplier general under the guarantee of Citizen Ouvrard*, undated but probably 31 Aug. 1801)!

²²⁰ Collot inherited the navy's supply from the *Compagnie Robin* whose tenure had proved short-lived. His contract was ratified on 29 September 1801 by the *Conseil d'Administration de la Marine* which confirmed the consular decision in his favour.

²²¹ The contract's first article states: “*The new supplier of the navy will begin his service as of 1st vendémiaire an X*” (quoted in Payard, *BFC*, p.142).

²²² AN, AF/IV/*/191, *Minutes of the navy's administrative board*.

²²³ *Ibid.*

conseil retained 500,000 francs for supplies already in warehouses and fined Collot another 500,000 francs for failing to provide two million francs in property deeds as security for his service – all in flagrant breach of the contract’s terms which didn’t require him to pay any down payment!²²⁴ Nothing else is known of Collot’s tenure except that he didn’t apply to renew his service at the end of Year X. His successor, Henry Liévin-Carié, signed a contract to supply the navy for six years on 13 September 1802 but lasted less than a year.

These difficulties demonstrate how Bonaparte exploited contractors for his own ends. According to Bourrienne, his sole purpose in awarding the contract to Collot was to provide his brother Joseph with regular bribes:

The First Consul was harassed by the continual demands for money made on him by his brothers. To get rid of Joseph, who expended large sums at Mortefontaine, as Lucien did at Neuilly, he gave Mr. Collot the contract for victualling the navy, on the condition of his paying Joseph 1,500,000 francs a year out of his profits. I believe this arrangement answered Joseph’s purpose very well; but it was anything but advantageous to Mr. Collot. The First Consul had told him that he would be regularly paid each month and that he wouldn’t have to sacrifice anything to the naval bureau. I think a whole year elapsed without his pocketing a single farthing. He obtained – through the intermediary of Junot – an audience with the First Consul. He came to the Malmaison and talked with [Bonaparte] to whom he stated his grievances. The outlays he showed were enormous, and he could get no payment from the navy office. He reminded the First Consul of the promises made to him when he had taken on the contract for the navy. He was owed millions on a service of 20 to 24 million. Upon which the Consul angrily interrupted him, saying: “Eh, foutre! Do you think I am a mere capuchin? Decrès must have 100,000 crowns, Duroc 100,000, Bourrienne 100,000; you must make the payments and don’t come here troubling me with your long stories. It is the business of my ministers to give me accounts of such matters; I will hear Decrès, and that’s enough. Let me be teased no longer with these complaints; I cannot attend to them.” Bonaparte then very unceremoniously dismissed Mr. Collot. I learned afterwards that he didn’t get a settlement of the business until after a great deal of trouble. Mr. Collot once said to me: “If he had asked me for as much money as would have built a frigate he should have had it. All I want now is to be paid, and to get rid of the business.” Mr. Collot had reason and honour on his side; but there was nothing but shuffling on the other.²²⁵

All these unwarranted slights against contractors were an early indication of Napoleon’s looming authoritarian streak. Fouché – a regular recipient of the Corsican’s wrath – drew clear parallels with oriental despotism:

I was at great pains – as was Consul Lebrun – to calm [Bonaparte’s] impulses against bankers and contractors and divert the acerbic measures he wished to direct against them. He had very little understanding of the theory of public credit, and one could see he had a secret penchant for the humiliating systems adopted in Egypt,

²²⁴ For Collot’s contract with the navy, see Payard, *BFC*, p.129 & 141-143. Note that Payard was unable to find this document in the *Archives nationales*.

²²⁵ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.173.

*Turkey and the Orient. Nevertheless, he had to resort to Vanlerberghe's services to open the [Marengo] Campaign.*²²⁶

Ironically, another scandal which broke two days prior to Ouvrard's arrest reminded observers that corrupt politicians were just as much to blame as venal contractors for the dire state of French finances. Edme-Bonaventure Courtois, a member of the Tribunal known for his role during 9 Thermidor, sued the banker Joseph Fulchiron and three of his associates in a military contracting venture formed in Prairial Year III that was in the process of being liquidated. Courtois accused his former partners of embezzlement, but they retorted Courtois's investment had been entirely fictitious and that they had paid him bribes to secure contracts: "*You received 132,000 francs for a business in which you didn't invest a shilling, excepting the cost of your legislative formalities and political standing.*"²²⁷ The case went before the *Tribunal de la Seine* and did much to discredit old-guard politicians like Courtois.

Ultimately, Bonaparte and his allies succeeded in raising the necessary funds to cover immediate expenses and finance the Marengo Campaign. In the short-term, however, they were forced to borrow money and drive the state further into debt. To the ninety million francs the government owed in arrears for Year VII were added another twenty million for Year VIII. This excluded the accumulated national debt of successive revolutionary regimes estimated at approximately 500 million francs. To reimburse these sums, the Consulate embarked on a long period of issuing low-yield bonds which didn't threaten public finances but represented a mediocre investment for speculators.²²⁸

The Foundation of the Banque de France

The Banque de France is Established with Special Privileges

On 6 January 1800, six prominent business magnates (Le Couteulx, Perregaux, Demautort, Mallet, Perier and Perrée-Duhamel) addressed a letter to finance minister Gaudin reminding him he had "*already been instructed by the delivery of a project of general statutes for a bank, and that some citizens were in the process of forming this important establishment.*" The six financiers announced that "*the project is being realised today*" and

²²⁶ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.175-176.

²²⁷ *Journal des Hommes libres*, 5 pluviôse VIII/25 Jan. 1800 (quoted in Vandal, *ADB*, Tome II, p.115).

²²⁸ See Jacques Wolff, 'Les insuffisantes finances napoléoniennes. Une des causes de l'échec de la tentative d'hégémonie européenne', *Revue du Souvenir Napoléonien*, n°397, septembre-octobre 1994:5-50 & the chapters dedicated to consular finances in Pierre Branda's *LPG*.

that they had already been elected Regents of this new bank. Gaudin was informed he would soon receive memorandums outlining “*the general points of protection and accession which they require from the government.*”²²⁹ This missive confirms that plans for a national bank had previously been forwarded to Gaudin and presumably seen and approved by Napoleon.

It is therefore entirely conceivable that Le Couteulx, Perregaux and other speculators devised this project – or more accurately updated their pre-existing blueprint of 1795-1796 for such an institution which we examined in Chapter 3. Although the economic context had changed, the venture’s objectives ostensibly remained the same – encourage commercial activity while simultaneously emitting bank notes into circulation. The name “*Banque de France*” was probably suggested by the bankers during their meeting with Bonaparte at the Luxembourg, even though the creation of a national bank wasn’t mentioned in the minutes.²³⁰

Considering the Consulate was only definitively established on 25 December 1799, it seems unlikely Bonaparte had enough time to personally elaborate the statutes of the *Banque de France* between Christmas Day 1799 and 6 January 1800. In fact, there is some ambiguity concerning who drafted them. Some historians attribute their design to Grenoble banker Claude Perier;²³¹ while others believe they were collectively authored by the bankers with the help of business lawyer Pierre-Nicolas Berryer whose memoirs describe their redaction: “*Thus, in Year 8, with Messrs. Lecouteulx & Cie., Perregaux, Laffon-Ladébat, I elaborated the statutes of the Banque de France.*”²³² What is clear is that “*Bonaparte didn’t need to invent anything, finding himself in the presence of ideas which had already been studied and maturely elaborated.*”²³³

The *Banque de France* was founded on 18 January 1800 (28 nivôse VIII). Its first general assembly of shareholders held on 13 February approved its statutes and ratified the nomination of its first eight Regents (the six who wrote the letter to Gaudin plus Hugues-Lagarde and Robillard).²³⁴ The institution was to be “*administered by fifteen Regents and*

²²⁹ ABF, dossier 1069200901/1 & AN, AF/IV/6, *Letter of the Regents to finance minister Gaudin on the formation of the Banque de France*, 16 nivôse VIII/6 Jan. 1800 – Demautort was a Parisian notary and Perrée-Duhamel was a merchant trader. The other five Regents were all bankers.

²³⁰ Adolphe Thiers (*Histoire du Consulat et de l’Empire*, Tome I, Paris: Paulin, 1845, p.176) attributes the initiative of the *Banque de France*’s creation to Perregaux.

²³¹ See Stourm, *LFC*, p.240-243 & Ramon, *Histoire de la Banque de France d’après les sources originales*, Paris: Grasset, 1929, p.9-37 (hereafter *HBF*).

²³² Berryer, *Souvenirs*, Tome II, p.399.

²³³ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome I, p.269.

²³⁴ See Annex XV for a list of the *Banque de France*’s founding Regents and Censors.

overseen by three Censors selected by the general assembly.”²³⁵ Regents chaired various committees devoted to different fields, while Censors ensured the bank’s activities were in conformity with the law and had access to accounts, investment portfolios and administrative dossiers. The bank’s capital was divided into 30,000 shares of 1,000 francs and its general assembly was comprised of the 200 largest shareholders. Five sectors of operations were outlined in its foundational statutes:

- Bill discounting and letters of credit signed by three guarantors;
- The recovery of assets pawned by clients with the bank in exchange for cash advances;²³⁶
- The management of current accounts of individual clients and public institutions;
- The printing of bank notes: “*These notes shall be emitted in proportion to the bank’s cash reserves and the validity limits of notes already in circulation, and they can under no circumstances defer the payment of its engagements when they are presented for refund.*”²³⁷
- The establishment of a savings bank (*caisse d’épargne*) accepting deposits on which it paid interest, with dividends distributed at set intervals.

Despite its name, the *Banque de France* wasn’t a state institution but a private bank. While its statutes stipulated that “*a public bank will be established under the denomination ‘Banque de France’*,” this classification wasn’t understood by contemporaries to denote a state-owned bank but rather an establishment which raised funds by appealing to members of the general public.²³⁸ Gilles Jacoud, the most recent scholar to examine the bank’s inception, describes its mission as “*a currency-emitting institution which exists thanks to the good will of the state but operates independently from its requirements.*”²³⁹

As the authors of one *Banque de France* study explain, it was “*indispensable if the [bank’s] notes were to enjoy the public’s confidence that the institution...be entirely independent of government authority.*”²⁴⁰ Indeed, memories of the *assignat* and *mandat*

²³⁵ ABF, dossier 1069200901/1, *Founding Statutes of the Banque de France*, 24 & 27 pluviôse VIII/13 & 16 Feb. 1800, p.5 (hereafter ‘*FSBDF*’).

²³⁶ The statutes remain unclear as to the precise details of this business, although it was probably linked to a variant form of bill discounting not related to the traditional commercial sector.

²³⁷ ABF, dossier 1069200901/1, *FSBDF*, p.3.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.1.

²³⁹ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.47.

²⁴⁰ Félix Aubert; François de Juvigny; André Messin; André Charriaux *et al.*, *La Banque de France*, Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1975, p.13.

territorial still discredited the regime's monetary policy. The *Gazette de France* argued that:

*The establishment of a bank always presupposes a lack of available cash and public credit. The lack of available currency is an undeniable fact, although one cannot say as much for public credit; but it is incumbent on the government to make it grow.*²⁴¹

Market considerations therefore trumped accountability, especially since there were some initial rumblings surrounding the bank's foundation. A police report dated 20 January 1800 noted that traders “*are insinuating [the Banque de France] cannot inspire confidence since it is linked to the government.*”²⁴² Three days later, another surveillance note outlined “*serious doubts as to the success of the bank*” and highlighted comparisons investors were making with the 1797 crisis in Britain when the Bank of England had been forced to postpone the convertibility of its notes.²⁴³ Thus, it was paramount for the *Banque de France* to emphasize its complete independence so that its cash reserves could rely on solvable private investments instead of vulnerable public funds.²⁴⁴

Although Napoleon had little business experience, he certainly appreciated the significance of these factors. It would probably be a step too far to assert as François Hincker does that the *Banque de France*'s creation was imposed on him and that he “*had no alternative but to give the green light to the initiative of the bankers who had financed the coup.*”²⁴⁵ It seems more plausible the bank's conception resulted from a community of interests regrouping political and economic factors. Alain Prate, who studied the *Banque de France*'s interaction with successive governments, suggests a similar interpretation:

*The creation of the Banque de France resulted from the convergence of experienced financiers who projected the establishment of a private emissions bank and a strong political leadership which understood the necessity of equipping France with a solid financial system.*²⁴⁶

Louis Pommier, another *Banque de France* historian, argues the bank was a product of necessity:

²⁴¹ *Gazette de France*, n°774, 6 pluviôse VIII/26 Jan. 1800, p.503.

²⁴² Aulard, *PSC*, p.118.

²⁴³ *Ibid*, p.121.

²⁴⁴ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.49-50.

²⁴⁵ Hincker, *La Révolution française et l'économie*, Paris: Nathan, 1989, p.203.

²⁴⁶ Prate, *La France et sa monnaie. Essai sur les relations entre la Banque de France et les gouvernements*, Paris: Julliard, 1987, p.46.

*There was a need for a new bank which could advance sufficient capital to [both] cover its affairs with individual [investors] and do business with the Treasury. There were as many profits to be made as services to be rendered.*²⁴⁷

Besides, the idea of a national bank was popular with the general public. A police report issued the day the *Banque de France* was founded (18 January 1800) declared that:

*...[the people's] only hope of succour lies in the existence of a bank founded by an association of individuals which would be outside the government's control...the activities of this bank, by doubling the amount of hard currency in circulation, would facilitate payments and confer a new impulse to commerce.*²⁴⁸

Anticipating the importance of the *Banque de France*'s future role in the French economy, its Regents lost no time in demanding privileges from Bonaparte's government. They had already prepared the ground for their most controversial demand in their letter to Gaudin by advancing Le Couteux's argument that the bank needed immediate injections of public funds to survive because its projected starting capital of thirty million francs couldn't be gathered quickly enough by relying solely on private investors. To remedy this cash shortage, the Regents had requested the *Banque de France* be granted a special privilege originally awarded to the *Caisse d'amortissement* – a second public bank Bonaparte had established on 27 November 1799 under the direction of François-Nicolas Mollien to collect tax down payments from *receveurs généraux* and manage the national debt.²⁴⁹ The Regents now requested these tax down payments be transferred to the *Banque de France* as cash advances. The first instalment due exceeded ten million francs, and the Regents proposed half this sum be deposited in a current account at the *Banque de France* which the *Caisse d'amortissement* could access freely. The other half would be converted into *Banque de France* shares owned by the *Caisse d'amortissement*. In return, the *Banque de France* promised to guarantee all unpaid tax obligations of the *receveurs généraux*.²⁵⁰

However, this arrangement raised the possibility the *Caisse d'amortissement* – and therefore the government – might take control of the *Banque de France* since it would become the national bank's largest shareholder through the large number of shares it would receive as compensation for losing the *receveurs généraux*'s tax payments. The Regents solved this problem by tailoring a special article in the *Banque de France*'s statutes

²⁴⁷ Pommier, *La Banque de France et l'État depuis sa création jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris: Rousseau, 1894, p.45.

²⁴⁸ Aulard, *PSC*, Tome I, p.95.

²⁴⁹ See Mollien's entry in the Biographical Index.

²⁵⁰ 'Unpaid obligations' were promissory notes of payment given by citizens to local authorities who then forwarded them to the local tax office. The reimbursement of these obligations had originally been devolved to the *Caisse d'amortissement*.



Figure 6:5

Portrait of François Nicolas Mollien
by Robert Lefèvre, 1806
Château de Versailles

© Château de Versailles/RNM-GP

Photo: Daniel Arnaudet/Jean Schormans/<http://www.photo.rmn.fr>
(authorised for non-commercial use)

(Article 9) stipulating that “each voter shall earn a vote for every five shares he can gather, with the limit being set at four votes [per shareholder].”²⁵¹

Bonaparte rapidly acceded to the Regents’ demands. On the day the *Banque de France* was founded, two decrees transferred the reception of the *receveurs généraux*’s down payments to the bank and awarded it the state-owned *Maison de l’Oratoire* (located at the juncture of the Rue Saint-Honoré and Rue de l’Oratoire) as its new headquarters.²⁵² Thus, not only were the Regents allowed to infringe on the rights of the *Caisse d’amortissement* – a major financial state institution – they also borrowed and used several million francs worth of government tax revenues at no cost to their own bank.²⁵³ What is more, the First Consul personally subscribed to thirty *Banque de France* shares and was immediately emulated by several members of his entourage. Ironically, this decreased the public’s confidence in the bank – reflecting how little the population trusted the revolutionary government.

Mollien understandably expressed strong reservations about the *Banque de France* to Bonaparte. In his opinion, the bank’s founding statutes had essentially been cut-and-pasted from those of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*.²⁵⁴ He was concerned the Regents would abuse their privileges by using the bank to discount their own bills of exchange, and he was particularly indignant it didn’t have to pay for the privilege of minting currency like the Bank of England:

*A bank which takes its duties seriously must guard itself from discounting [bills of exchange which don’t represent real market transactions]...and some of these can be [bills] only endorsed by two signatures which are rendered acceptable to the bank by the signature of one of its Regents...It wouldn’t be absurd to maintain that [the privilege of minting money] could be sold or farmed out. But far from having imposed this condition upon the bank, the consular government has displayed an unparalleled generosity...instead of demanding advances, it has forwarded them! This limited partnership formed under the denomination of ‘Banque de France’ was supposed to deposit capital equivalent to thirty thousand shares...but it’s the government which deposited the first security payments and thereby became the bank’s first shareholder...If this sacrifice had any merit, it would be that of singularity.*²⁵⁵

Mollien put these irregularities down to Napoleon’s limited grasp of financial theory:

*It hadn’t crossed [Bonaparte’s] mind that obligations circulated by the Treasury were repurchased by *receveurs* – who thereby were the real discounters the Treasury used – and that bankers who provided these discounting services were useless*

²⁵¹ ABF, dossier 1069200901/1, *FSDBF*, p.5.

²⁵² ABF, dossier 1069200901/1, *Consular Decrees of 28 nivôse VIII/18 Jan. 1800*.

²⁵³ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.48-49.

²⁵⁴ Mollien described them as “a few articles...derived from common banking statutes” (*Mémoires*, Tome I, p.237).

²⁵⁵ Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.294 & 300.

*intermediaries between the Treasury and its own accountants, merely advancing the Treasury its own funds...since the sums the receivers gave them came from tax contributions...*²⁵⁶

But this, as he pointed out, was not the First Consul's primary concern:

*General Bonaparte, who had only just assumed the title of First Consul, and to whom it was doubtless permitted not to comprehend the exact theory of banks, fulfilled his principal objective – that of attracting and satisfying the leading banking houses of the capital...*²⁵⁷

The Banque de France Absorbs the Caisse des Comptes Courants

The financial context in Paris in January 1800 was one of apparent extremes: a well-established private bank – the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* – had successfully earned the public's trust after operating for a number of years, while the newly-founded *Banque de France* hadn't yet opened its doors but was already being regarded with suspicion by investors. The administrators of both these banks wanted to facilitate access to credit and increase the amount of bank notes in circulation.

These shared objectives led the *Banque de France*'s Regents to seek the takeover of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* after Bonaparte granted their demands. Since the Monneron scandal the *caisse* had restored its reputation, effectively reorganised and was emitting bank notes that were proving very successful with the public. Its acquisition would provide the national bank with a strong base on which to develop its activities. On 19 January 1800, the Regents informed the *caisse*'s board that “*the Banque de France is on the point of being set up and commencing its operations*” and invited it to consider the possibility of a merger.²⁵⁸ In response, the *caisse* administrators convoked a general assembly for 23 January to discuss the offer.²⁵⁹

On 29 January, a prominent shareholder of the *caisse* – the Bayonne trader Pierre-Léon Basterrèche – presented arguments to its shareholders in favour of the proposed merger. Maintaining a national bank was in the country's interest, Basterrèche pointed to the success of similar establishments in Amsterdam, Venice, Hamburg and London. He

²⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.307-308.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p.237-238.

²⁵⁸ ABF, *PVRCA-2*, 29 nivôse VIII/19 Jan. 1800.

²⁵⁹ ABF, *RDAGA-2*, 3 pluviôse VIII/23 Jan. 1800.

discussed the case of the Bank of England at length, emphasising the positive impact its creation had exerted on economic activity:

*The extreme rarity of hard currency led to its foundation. Its creation caused all the signs of abundance to return. Monetary circulation and confidence were reborn, credit was re-established, while gold finally reappeared.*²⁶⁰

Basterrèche claimed commerce had directly benefited from the creation of this institution which had lowered interest rates and made borrowing money easier. The British government, he argued, had also gained – both directly when the bank financed its war expenses by marketing loans to the public – and indirectly thanks to the economic upturn it generated. The role of bank notes was salutary in this system:

*Bank notes are received and exchanged for hard currency everywhere in full confidence, and these notes are transformed in a moment – through a unanimous and simultaneous accord – as the most efficient means of facilitating exchanges.*²⁶¹

He dismissed fears the *Banque de France* might be hampered by political interference, affirming that “*the government wouldn’t destroy such a useful instrument.*”²⁶² Nor did he see a contradiction in the bank serving both business and state interests.

Having demonstrated the necessity of a national bank, Basterrèche attempted to convince the *caisse*’s shareholders that a merger with the *Banque de France* would extend their operations across the country and prevent both banks from becoming competitors:

*...our sphere, having become too narrow, exposes us to all the dangers of inferiority and confronts us with the greater means of our rival. Thus, if these two institutions remain independent of one another, it is inevitable that one of the two will be frustrated in its operations.*²⁶³

Indeed, problems were likely to arise because the *Banque de France* had announced its intention of discounting bills at 5% interest while the *caisse* offered the same discounting services at 6%.²⁶⁴ Another argument Basterrèche put forward was that a merger would entail a re-valuation of the *caisse*’s shares from 3,000 to 5,000 francs.²⁶⁵ A union of both

²⁶⁰ ABF, dossier 1069200401/284, pièce 6, *Speech delivered by Pierre-Léon Basterrèche during the Assembly of Shareholders of the Caisse des Comptes Courants*, 9 pluviôse VIII/29 Jan. 1800, p.6.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.7.

²⁶² *Ibid.*, p.9.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.11.

²⁶⁴ In fact, the *Banque de France* began discounting bills at 6% interest (Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.119), but subsequently lowered this rate to 5% (ABF, dossier 1069201116/1, *Registre des délibérations du Conseil General de Régence de la Banque de France. Tome 1 : Du 29 pluviôse an VIII au 1er vendémiaire an XI*, 8 ventôse VIII/27 Feb. 1800, p.8 – hereafter *RDCGRBF-1*).

²⁶⁵ The shares of the first *Caisse des Comptes Courants* had been valued at 5,000 francs, while those emitted by its second entity had reached 8,000 francs (see Chapter 3). Basterrèche explained the low figure of 5,000 francs was attributable to “*losses on mobile goods, and others resulting from several unhappy operations*”

banks would thus benefit *caisse* shareholders while enabling the *Banque de France* to save close to half a million francs (the estimated value of the property owned by the *caisse* which it stood to inherit).

Only two options were offered to *caisse* shareholders: they could either cash in their investments or exchange them for shares of the *Banque de France*. However, the *Banque de France* refused to refund more than a quarter of *caisse* shares and wouldn't reimburse them at face value.²⁶⁶

Meanwhile, measures were taken to enact the merger at the *Banque de France*'s first general assembly of shareholders held in the *Maison de l'Oratoire* on 13 February 1800:

*The assembly invites Citizen Perregaux, one of the Regents of the Banque de France, and Citizen [Henry Liévain-Carié], a shareholder of the Banque de France – both of whom are also shareholders of the Caisse des Comptes Courants – to attend the Extraordinary Assembly of the caisse tomorrow to hear the report which shall be delivered by the commissioners, inform this assembly of the persistently-expressed desire of the shareholders of the Banque de France to unite both establishments and level the difficulties which could arise from this. They can touch on all these points in their Report to the Regents of the Banque de France, and this assembly delegates all necessary powers to them for the conclusion of this merger at the conditions which they shall deem appropriate.*²⁶⁷

Perregaux and Carié were thus at the centre of negotiations leading up to the merger. The following day on 14 February, these two negotiators attended a general assembly of the *caisse*'s shareholders but failed to agree a refund price for its shares.²⁶⁸ The next day (15 February), the *Banque de France*'s Regents instructed Perregaux to pursue negotiations and gave him *carte blanche* to make any concessions necessary to seal the merger.

Perregaux offered a share price of 4,500 francs to be paid in hard currency taken from the *caisse*'s reserves.²⁶⁹ The Regents also signed a notarial agreement promising to set aside

(ABF, dossier 1069200401/284, pièce 6, *Speech delivered by Pierre-Léon Basterrèche... op. cit.*, 9 pluviôse VIII/29 Jan. 1800, p.12).

²⁶⁶ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.53.

²⁶⁷ ABF, dossier 1069200401/284, pièce 7 – *Procès-verbal et extrait de la première Assemblée des Actionnaires de la Banque de France, tenue à Paris, dans le local de l'Oratoire*, 24 pluviôse VIII/13 Feb. 1800.

²⁶⁸ The *Banque de France* initially offered a refund price of 4,200 francs per *caisse* share, while the *caisse* itself estimated its share value at 4,634 francs. The *caisse* was also concerned about the *Banque de France*'s solvability and monetary policy and sent it a list of questions it wished answered before consenting to any merger – How will the BdF reimburse *caisse* shares? At what amount will the BdF consent to a full reimbursement of shares? What measures will the BdF take to facilitate the reimbursement of *caisse* shares? How will the BdF ensure the repayment of the first *caisse*'s liquidated notes signed by Monneron? What is the real capital of the BdF? If a merger is approved, will the BdF accept the nomination of commissioners to negotiate statutes and further points of contention? (ABF, *RDAGA-2*, 25 pluviôse VIII/14 Feb. 1800).

²⁶⁹ ABF, dossier 1069200401/284, pièce 7 – *Procès-verbal et extrait de la deuxième Assemblée des Actionnaires de la Banque de France, tenue à Paris, dans le local de l'Oratoire*, 27 pluviôse VIII/16 Feb. 1800 (hereafter *PVEDAABDF*).

500,000 francs in a special 3-key vault to repay all notes of the defunct first *caisse* signed by Monneron.²⁷⁰ This had the requisite effect and the *caisse*'s shareholders voted to merge with the *Banque de France*.²⁷¹ Perregaux's deal was definitively approved at the *Banque de France*'s second general assembly of shareholders on 16 February.²⁷²

Less than a month had elapsed between the *Banque de France*'s merger offer and the binding vote of the *caisse*'s shareholders accepting the takeover. For Gilles Jacoud:

The creation of the Banque de France represented a real opportunity for the Caisse des Comptes Courants. By accepting the merger, the caisse now had access to a level of development which its statutes and the weakness of its cash reserves had previously denied it. The Caisse des Comptes Courants, as an emitting bank, had everything to gain by accepting its integration into the Banque de France.

Furthermore, the *Banque de France* profited from the merger because it “could begin its activities using already existing infrastructure.”²⁷³

By contrast, Achille Dauphin-Meunier presents a far more sombre picture of this fusion:

*The Banque de France had neither resources, nor headquarters, nor personnel, nor clients. On paper, it remained a purely theoretical company outlined in a prospectus. It soon became the butt of people's jokes, in particular of businessmen linked to the financier Ouvrard.*²⁷⁴

Dauphin-Meunier argues Ouvrard's imprisonment was a deliberate ploy to stifle opposition to the national bank's creation and that “immediately [after Ouvrard's arrest] the *Banque de France* and its shareholders ceased to be an object of derision.”²⁷⁵ According to him, the merger with the *caisse* was the result of Perregaux's personal ambitions:

*To remedy the poverty of the Banque de France and on the instructions of Perregaux...Bonaparte pressured the administrators of the caisse so that their organisation, resources and clientele would be transferred to the Banque de France under cover of a merger. By means of this stratagem, Perregaux wanted to evince Récamier from the direction of the largest discounting bank in Paris and consolidate the hegemony of his own creation. The arrest of Ouvrard removed all the hesitations of Récamier and his friends.*²⁷⁶

²⁷⁰ ABF, *RDAGA-2*, 27 pluviôse VIII/16 Feb. 1800 – The *caisse* was concerned about honouring the repayment of its first entity's assets which were still being liquidated. See Chapter 3.

²⁷¹ *Ibid* – The *caisse*'s shareholders approved the merger on 16 February and voted to confirm it on 19 February. An audit of the *caisse*'s accounts established there were 17,184,230 francs in its cash reserves (11,241,369 in notes and 5,942,911 in hard currency), 6,056,096 francs in its discounting portfolio and 306,481 francs in its asset portfolio for a total of 24,562,802 francs (ABF, *RDACGRBF*, p.2-3).

²⁷² ABF, *PVEDAABDF*.

²⁷³ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.54.

²⁷⁴ Dauphin-Meunier, *La Banque de France*, p.21.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p.22.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*.

Another *Banque de France* historian, Gabriel Ramon, concedes that:

*...it was natural for the Regents to seek the double advantage of an already existing organization and of a well-established credit through the merger of the Banque de France with the Caisse des Comptes Courants.*²⁷⁷

Considering most *Banque de France*'s Regents were also administrators of the *caisse* and the lack of any concrete opposition to the merger from either bank, it is entirely plausible their union was planned well before the foundation of the national bank. We have already seen how Bonaparte had conferred with Monneron following his return from Italy. The offer to merge elicited no surprise from the *caisse*'s board, whereas minutes of its previous general assemblies record the dismay of shareholders following the Monneron scandal. Moreover, the *caisse*'s administrators unanimously approved Perregaux's share price offer in the lead-up to the merger's approval. The indications pointing to a pre-agreed outcome are therefore plentiful. Gilles Jacoud concludes that:

*...the creation of the Banque de France can therefore be analysed as a means which the directors of the Caisse des Comptes Courants gave themselves to extend their activities thanks to more extensive assets and a significantly notable increase in capital, under the benevolent protection of the government.*²⁷⁸

One final observation on this merger is that immediately after its conclusion, seven more Regents and two Censors of the *Banque de France* were elected – all of them major shareholders and administrators of the *caisse* – bringing the total number of Regents on the national bank's Regency Council to fifteen plus three Censors.²⁷⁹ Surveying this Council at a glance reveals Napoleon had organised it around a core group of individuals drawn from *Ancien Régime* banking aristocracy (Perregaux, Le Couteulx, Mallet and Sabatier).²⁸⁰ While Le Couteulx and Mallet didn't head the largest Parisian banks, the fact that theirs were the two oldest confirms Bonaparte was relying on tradition to reassure the business community.²⁸¹ Complementing this inner circle were other financiers specialised in various fields: bankers who had prospered from military contracting and the Treasury's opaque dealings (Récamier, Carié, Barrillon, Sévène), *indiennes* traders (Soehnée, Perier), the tobacco lobby (Robillard), the great seaport merchants – Perrée (Granville), Hugues-Lagarde (Marseille), Journu-Aubert (Bordeaux), Basterrèche (Bayonne) – along with the

²⁷⁷ Ramon, *HBF*, p.20.

²⁷⁸ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.55.

²⁷⁹ ABF, *PVEDAABDF* – The seven Regents elected were Récamier, Germain, Carié, Basterrèche, Sévène, Barrillon and Ricard, and the two Censors were Journu-Aubert and Soehnée.

²⁸⁰ See Appendix XV.

²⁸¹ *Le Couteulx & Cie.* was founded in 1670 (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.213). The Mallet bank in Paris was established circa 1715 (Lüthy, *LBBF*, Tome I, p.247).

Parisian notarial lobby (Demautort).²⁸² These appointments also reflected the alliance of regional trading communities – Lyon (Récamier, Ricard, Barrillon), Rouen (Le Couteulx, Robillard), the Bordeaux-Bayonne trading node (Basterrèche, Journu-Aubert), Montpellier and the Occitan area (Sabatier, Sévène), the textile lobbies of Isère (Perier) and Alsace (Soehnée), and the bankers with Swiss connections (Perregaux and Mallet). In 1801, the resignations or deaths of some of these men saw others take their place including Bastide (associate of Ouvrard and Hainguerlot), Médard Desprez, Doyen, Thibon (protégé of Cambacérés) and Davillier.²⁸³ The single most glaring omission in the Regency's composition was the lack of any military contractor *per se* with neither Collot, Michel *jeune* nor Ouvrard being offered a seat. Clearly, Bonaparte envisaged the national bank as the exclusive preserve of bankers and 'respectable' merchants.

This re-arranging of chairs in the upper echelons of the business world wasn't an event intended for public scrutiny and probably explains why so few details subsist concerning the *Banque de France*'s creation. The government wanted the general public to view the national bank as a continuation of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*; and to maintain this impression of distance from the state the *Banque de France* opted to abandon the *Maison de l'Oratoire* and set up its headquarters in the *caisse*'s old locale at the *Hôtel Massiac* in the Place des Victoires where it opened for business on 20 February 1800.²⁸⁴ In effect, the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* was reopening its doors under another name and with new statutes. It employed the same staff down to the director-general (Martin Garat) and controller-general (Jean Devaines), and *caisse* notes continued to circulate after having been stamped with *Banque de France* markings.²⁸⁵

In its first semester of operation, the *Banque de France* used notes exclusively issued by the *caisse*. The Regency Council held on 21 February 1800 declared its intention of progressively replacing these, advising that “*the mention: “payable to the Banque de France” will be stamped on all [Caisse des Comptes Courants] notes in the bank's coffers, and all notes in circulation bearing this mention shall be withdrawn and returned to the*

²⁸² The appointment of Joseph Hugues-Lagarde as Regent was a mark of special consideration by Bonaparte who in 1793 had been scandalized after witnessing the execution of Lagarde's infirm eighty-year-old father – also Joseph Hugues-Lagarde (Hugues l'*ainé*) – Marseille's most prominent trader (see Las Cases, *MSH*, Tome I, p.97). Hugues l'*ainé* was the uncle of Étienne Clavière's wife and his principal contact in the Marseille trading community. He was known as 'Hugues-Lagarde' because he had purchased the marquisate of La Garde-Adhémar (Drôme). See Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.177-188.

²⁸³ For an overview of these links, see Bruguière, *GPR*, p.150

²⁸⁴ ABF, *PVEDAABDF* – François Crouzet (*La grande inflation*, Paris: Fayard, 1993, p.531) points out that “*the awarding of a state house to the new bank had a negative effect on public opinion – which had nevertheless been favourable to the establishment of a national bank – such was the patronage of the state still regarded as a compromising factor.*”

²⁸⁵ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.55 – Many *Banque de France* administrators were *Ancien Régime* experts. For its personnel see ABF, dossier 1069200401/195, *liste des employés de la Banque de France & Appendix XV*.

bank.”²⁸⁶ Nevertheless, *caisse* notes continued to circulate widely and the Regents acknowledged in a meeting of 23 April that there were still 83,000 francs of these notes bearing Augustin Monneron’s signature!²⁸⁷ The *Banque de France* eventually released a first batch of 3.5 million francs of its own printed bills on 17 July.²⁸⁸

On 25 February 1800, Bonaparte met the *Banque de France*’s Regents to review their progress and Le Couteulx took the opportunity to solicit his assistance:

*...lend your support to those whom you have already seconded the first efforts by useful and honourable dispositions, and receive the promise that the Regents and Censors of the Banque de France make to you: of never having any other objective in their work and vigilance than being of the greatest public utility, and of having no other ambitions than to conserve through this durable institution the Revolution of 18 Brumaire.*²⁸⁹

Le Couteulx carefully phrased his request in a manner suggesting the *Banque de France* owed its existence to Bonaparte and that he was its natural patron. The First Consul reiterated his support, announcing that:

*...he would receive with interest the statutes of the Banque de France, that we should rest assured the government would do everything to favour this establishment – not to make liberal use of the credit it might provide him – but to achieve major results for public benefit in the circulation and interest of money. We shouldn’t doubt the government’s views in this regard, given it was sacrificing such an important part of its revenues by relinquishing tax revenues to the bank in order to transform them into shares.*²⁹⁰

On the same day this meeting took place, the *Banque de France* received a payment of two million francs of tax payments from the *Caisse d’amortissement*. This was the starting point for a series of measures designed to fill the bank’s coffers with hard currency. A few days later, it received more funds from the *Caisse de reserve de la lotterie nationale* which had been set aside to cover any outstanding government expenses should funds be lacking after the Brumaire coup. More money was also sent by the *receveur général* of the Seine, and the *Banque de France* was awarded the right to manage payment of all state grants and pensions by a consular decree of 11 August 1800.²⁹¹

²⁸⁶ ABF, *RDCGRBF*, 2 ventôse VIII/21 Feb. 1800, p.3-4.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 3 floréal VIII/23 April 1800, p.35.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 28 messidor VIII/17 July 1800, p.82.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 6 ventôse VIII/25 Feb. 1800, p.11.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid*, p.11-12 – Jacoud (*LBBF*, p.120-121) notes Bonaparte’s comments already imply the *Banque de France*’s independence would soon be restricted.

²⁹¹ The payment of state rents and pensions was returned to the Treasury in Year XII, as was the management of the lottery in Year XIII (Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.188, footnote 38).

Nevertheless, the national bank didn't obtain all the privileges it petitioned the government for. It was, for example, denied the right to forgo paying a tax on the conversion of precious metals into coin (known as the *droit de seigneurage*).²⁹² Seeking to stem the flow of hard currency from the French economy, the Directory had passed a law on 29 November 1795 allowing owners of precious metals to deposit them in government mints in exchange for an equivalent amount of coins free of charge. However, the *Cinq Cents* had restored certain fees for the minting of coins in a decree of 13 October 1796. The *Banque de France* wished to avoid paying these dues, but a letter from Gaudin of 16 January 1802 indicated the Consuls' refusal to grant such a privilege.²⁹³ Nonetheless, this only constituted a minor setback in comparison to the entitlements secured by the bank.

What ultimately stands out from this brief analysis is that the *Banque de France* was set up in a skilfully led operation coordinated by experienced financiers who were supported by the new regime at every step of the way. The bankers now controlled a legally sanctioned discounting service which placed their affairs in a supremely advantageous position by granting them access to regular cash advances drawn from public funds. Moreover, the national bank was entirely independent from government administrations and only accountable to the First Consul and his finance minister. This invaluable privilege was emphasised at the *Banque de France*'s first general assembly of shareholders for Year IX (held on 17 October 1800) when acting president Le Couteulx stressed the private character of its operations:

*The bank is...by no means a public institution. Freely created solely by individuals, independent through its statutes, unburdened by the contacts which a contract with the state or a legislative act imposes...it only negotiates with the government when it finds it convenient to do so.*²⁹⁴

The Censor Journu-Aubert added that:

*The bank has conserved its dignity and entire liberty in its relations with the state...Knowing where its interests lie, the government recognises that any contact with its authority would alter the opinion of a perfect independence.*²⁹⁵

But this autonomy was destined to be short-lived.

²⁹² The *Banque de France* requested this privilege because it was forced to regularly purchase hard currency to shore up its cash reserves, including Spanish piasters via Bordeaux (the *Les fils de Roderigue* trading house) and Marseille, and precious metals from Belgium (Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.229-230).

²⁹³ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.121, footnote 90.

²⁹⁴ ABF, other documents, *Speech delivered by the President de la Banque de France on behalf of its Regency Council to the general assembly of shareholders*, 25 vendémiaire IX/17 Oct. 1800, p.17.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.32.

If we keep to the volume of discounted bills, the *Banque de France*'s success was indisputable. This figure rose from 110.5 million francs in Year VIII to 320.7 million francs in Year IX and reached 627.9 million francs in Year X. Yet in terms of the number of bank notes emitted its results were modest: 15.5 million francs in Year VIII, 20.6 million francs in Year IX and 29.1 million francs in Year X.²⁹⁶ This limited progression leads Gabriel Ramon to observe that “*the role of the Banque de France as an emitting institution was more or less nil in its first three years of existence.*”²⁹⁷ Although it had taken over the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*'s clientele, the national carrier was still only one of several banks operating in Paris; and it wasn't until it forcibly amalgamated its main competitors (the *Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce* and the *Banque Territoriale*) and was subsequently attributed the monopoly of paper currency emission by the law of 14 April 1803 that it truly began to assert its pre-eminence over Parisian banking.

Conclusion

While the political conspiracy and unfolding of Napoleon's coup on 18 Brumaire have been well-documented and discussed, its underlying financial interests remain concealed in historical obscurity. Everyone agrees the Directory's economic shenanigans had manifestly reached a point of terminal decline, and discontent had evidently been brooding in business circles for several months in the coup's lead-up – with the forced loan and threatened suspension of delegations racking up tensions every step of the way. What is far more difficult to ascertain is whether any distinct elements of financial premeditation were intermingled in the plot. Deciphering this enigma requires extensive investigation through various archival repositories and primary sources which has discouraged many scholars from undertaking comprehensive enquiries. Yet upon closer examination, there is clearly an abundant amount of circumstantial evidence suggesting at least some financial complicity in Brumaire.

Equally interesting is the manner in which more scrupulous historians have framed the general implications of Brumaire for financiers – arguing they weren't so much driven by regime change as motivated by the necessity to enshrine economic privileges recently acquired through the incompetence and venality of the directorial regime. Michel Bruguière, for example, argues that “*...it is starting to be held for certain that the 18 Brumaire was first and foremost the opportunity of crystallising a recent past desirous of*

²⁹⁶ See the bank's *situations mensuelles* reports in ABF, dossier 1069200401/212 (Emploi du capital).

²⁹⁷ Ramon, *HBF*, p.29.

perpetuating itself.”²⁹⁸ Such a view presents a far more logical and consistent explanation than that of traditional Napoleonic lore which all too frequently dissuades its readers from critical thinking. This isn’t to say research conducted by Bonapartist historians hasn’t yielded crucial insights in Napoleon’s economic policies. But from a financial perspective, it no longer appears satisfactory merely to assert that on 18 Brumaire “*the country had to be saved from certain ruin and a new regime established. Being a saviour and a founder, nothing could better suit the genius of Bonaparte. He fulfilled both roles marvellously.*”²⁹⁹

In fact the First Consul’s financial role was minimal, and we have seen how businessmen were constantly lurking behind the scenes during the coup with Le Couteulx advising Bonaparte on the reaction of Parisians, Collot establishing a secondary headquarters in Saint Cloud and Michel Simons dining with Talleyrand and his friends at Meudon! We may also legitimately wonder whether – since Bonaparte used Talleyrand’s financial connections to raise funds abroad after the coup – he might not previously have used these networks to obtain money for Brumaire? Whatever the case, the fact speculators were in the back of Napoleon’s mind is attested by his imprisonment of Ouvrard which was clearly intended as a warning to capitalist lobbies.

Indeed, Brumaire in many ways constituted a ‘Day of Dupes’ at the expense of several of these entrepreneurs. Le Couteulx was promised the finance ministry which ultimately went to Gaudin and Collot advanced considerable sums but wasn’t rewarded with the position of state counsellor. When it came to filling government posts, Bonaparte kept the contractors at bay. Only a few leading bankers were appointed senators (Le Couteulx, Perregaux) as Bonaparte preferred to staff his administrations with *Ancien Régime* experts (Gaudin, Lebrun, Mollien, Dufresne, Devaines, Defermon, etc.).³⁰⁰ Moreover, those contractors who believed the Consulate would uphold delegations were naïve enthusiasts, for any sensible economic forecaster could see the delegation system was untenable and ruining public finances – and therefore had to be scrapped.

The financial victors of Brumaire were unquestionably the bankers. Their caution and patience reaped spectacular dividends with the *Banque de France*’s creation which may have been agreed prior to the coup, although it could also have been determined during Bonaparte’s Luxembourg conference with the bankers. The incidence of this meeting suggests the Directory hadn’t truly benefited from the liberalization of the economy since

²⁹⁸ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.138.

²⁹⁹ Stourm, *LFC*, p.354.

³⁰⁰ Le Couteulx and Perregaux were appointed to the *sénat conservateur* on 24 & 25 December 1799 respectively (AN, AF/IV/13, plaquette 67).

Napoleon was forced to call upon the banking lobby for financial assistance (which it only partially furnished). According to François Desauany: “*The day of the Battle of Marengo (14 June 1800), the Treasury still had to pay 60% of its annual cash intake to discounters who granted it advances on its future revenues.*”³⁰¹ Desauany claims the *Banque de France*’s foundation represented a pact between the state and prominent financiers aimed at lowering the rate of interest to borrow money:

*The field having been cleared, the state and the bankers were now going to be able to assist each other in the creation of a new establishment aimed at lowering the rate of interest: the objective of this fundamental pact...It was to lower the rate of interest that the [bankers] and the Treasury, the state and the Banque de France, mutually supported one another.*³⁰²

Michel Bruguière advances similar reasons for the government’s support of the *Banque de France*:

*It was...desirable, as the British government had done with the Bank of England...to be able to rely on a powerful financial establishment, qualified to provide the Treasury with either regular cash advances or extraordinary loans. Failing this, the government was reduced to borrowing money in a disorderly fashion and placing the security of all future revenues in private hands.*³⁰³

It was therefore as much a case of Napoleon needing the bankers as of the bankers needing him. Fouché, in his appraisal of Brumaire, may have been alluding to these financial calculations when he commented that:

*Bonaparte judged the situation more wisely. He understood he still needed to overcome obstacles; that it wasn’t enough merely to win, but that he would also have to tame...*³⁰⁴

There were two main reasons why Bonaparte wanted to create a national bank. The first was to grant the state greater control over the distribution of credit in the economy. The second was to enable the government to rapidly access large amounts of cash and attenuate the Treasury’s recurring liquidity problems.³⁰⁵ As Gilles Jacoud notes:

The freedom to print bank notes was intended to favour the development of commerce, but especially to enable the replenishment of the state’s coffers, either through direct advances granted to it through the discounting of public funds, or

³⁰¹ François Desauany, ‘L’État centralisé de l’an VII et la fondation de la Banque de France’, *La revue administrative*, Tome 29, septembre-octobre 1952, p.474.

³⁰² *Ibid*, p.475.

³⁰³ Bruguière, ‘Banque de France’ in Jean Tulard (ed.), *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, Paris: Fayard, 1987, p.158.

³⁰⁴ Fouché, *Mémoires*, p.157.

³⁰⁵ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.283-284.

*indirectly via the lowering of the rate of interest resulting from an economic upturn, which would in turn allow the Treasury to borrow money at less cost.*³⁰⁶

The factors behind the *Banque de France*'s success were therefore political and not economical. Bonaparte required a commercial institution sturdy enough to ensure his regime's survival, and it is in this context one must place the national bank's union with the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*. Why else would Perregaux have overseen this merger if not to rapidly guarantee its successful outcome? No doubt the *caisse*'s administrators were confidentially promised handsome individual compensations to alleviate any inconveniences considering seven of them were promptly elected to the *Banque de France*'s Regency Council! And we can ascertain from Basterrèche's speech that the *caisse*'s top brass favoured the merger.

Thus, Bonaparte instituted a kind of *ménage-à-trois* at the head of French finances regrouping the *receveurs généraux* of the *Agence des contributions directes* (created by the Directory in 1796), the *Caisse d'amortissement* set up to repay the national debt and the *Banque de France* established to promote banking and commerce – a triumvirate which would dominate the French economy for most of the nineteenth century. This reflected the various groups which had profited from the Revolution: the bureaucrats of the Treasury and financial administrations, the old tax-farming nobility and the *nouveaux-riches* speculators.³⁰⁷ But while the *Banque de France* did advance funds to the state by managing certain government financial services (e.g. the payment of state rents and pensions, the national lottery and the discounting of funds advanced by *receveurs généraux*), these sums were never enough to satisfy Napoleon's needs.³⁰⁸ In fact, the bank rapidly began sinking into an increasingly paradoxical situation, torn between the desire to maintain its independence and the economic role it was expected to fulfil.

When the law of 14 April 1803 attributing the *Banque de France* a monopoly over paper currency emission was being discussed, Mollien raised the issue of government oversight of the bank's activities with Bonaparte, claiming this could be performed by public agents:

*...I do not doubt the Treasury minister will take measures to be [privately] informed of the bank's activities on a daily basis. This information must remain [confidential] and exempt from any hierarchical control; but it seems of the greatest importance to me – given the current circumstances – that each operation, each resolution of the bank be known in their motives and anticipated in their result.*³⁰⁹

³⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p.280.


³⁰⁷ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.147.

³⁰⁸ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.281.

³⁰⁹ AN, AF/IV/1073, 3^{ème} dossier:129, Mollien to the First Consul, 23 germinal XI/13 April 1803.



Recto



Verso

Figure 6:6 – The 100-franc Bonaparte note created by the *Banque de France* on 5 March 1959 and put in circulation on 4 January 1960. This note perfectly illustrates how the erroneous idea that Bonaparte created the *Banque de France* endured for many years in the French public’s perception.
 Recto side: Designed by Clément Serveau and André Marliat
 Verso side: Designed by Clément Serveau and Jules Piel
 Photo: <https://commons.wikimedia.org> (uploaded by ‘Numizmat 675’)
 CC-PMD (Public Domain)

Several historians claim the *Banque de France* forfeited its independence following the voting of this law. Bernard Courbis asserts that “*contrary to the Bank of England – which purchased its privilege by a loan to the government – the Banque de France paid her privilege by the loss of its independence.*”³¹⁰ Gabriel Ramon agrees: “*Undoubtedly, the fiction of its independence remained absolute; but [state] control of the bank, albeit occult, had nonetheless become real.*”³¹¹ Perhaps the most striking proof of this loss of autonomy was that Perregaux, who succeeded Le Couteulx as President of the *Banque de France*’s Regency Council, began addressing regular reports on the bank’s activities to Bonaparte in July 1802.³¹²

Eventually, the unbridled latitude afforded to the bank’s Regents proved its undoing when the catastrophic speculations of Médard Desprez on shares of the *Banco de San Carlos* triggered the financial crisis of 1805-1806 (*crise des Négociants Réunis*), prompting the French state to seize control of the *Banque de France*. The law of 22 April 1806 extended the bank’s paper currency monopoly to 24 September 1843 but placed it under the supervision of a governor and two deputy-governors who answered directly to the government.³¹³ The Regents became civil servants subject to civilian oversight, thereby ending the long period of subjugation during which public finances had been enthralled to the interests of the great revolutionary speculators.

³¹⁰ Bernard Courbis, ‘L’origine de la “monnaie banque centrale” : étude comparée des expériences française et anglaise à la fin du XVIII^e siècle et au début du XIX^e siècle’, *Cahier Monnaie et Financement*, Université Lyon 2, n°3, novembre 1976, p.17.

³¹¹ Ramon, *HBF*, p.47.


³¹² These reports are mostly conserved in AN, AF/IV/1070-1071.

³¹³ Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.288.



Figure 6:7 – “Ah, how relieved I feel. Seven hundred and fifty [deputies] were crushing me!”
Engraving by an unknown artist, 1799

© Gallica/Bibliothèque Nationale de France (authorised for non-commercial use)



CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL CONCLUSIONS



The coup d'État of 18 Brumaire takes on its precise and authentic significance when one considers what had happened since 1789 and how this incident assumed its rightful place in the succession of events – Henri Guillemin.¹

This thesis has adopted a financial perspective to develop new interpretations of the late French revolutionary era, conducting an updated appraisal of the influence exerted by leading business magnates over the Directory's economic and political policies and ascertaining their connection – or possible collusion – in Napoleon's coup of 18 Brumaire. By reassessing previous research and examining new statistical and archival evidence, it has attempted to answer several fundamental questions. Why was the Directory unable to remedy the catastrophic state of its economy? What reasons compelled it to relinquish control of its financial policies and military supplies to the private sector – thereby allowing corruption to percolate through government administrations? How did the business lobby reassert its supremacy in such a short period of time, and how did the combination of all these factors accelerate Bonaparte's rise to power?

The first observation to make concerns the inherent contradiction confronting any scholar seeking to unravel the Revolution's politico-financial nexus. On the one hand, economic sources revealing politically sensitive information are scarce and dispersed across a multitude of different archives rendering them difficult to access. On the other, the sheer range of economic records means uncovering compromising documents equates to finding a needle in a haystack. The evidence base linking the Revolution's political and economic elites has largely been destroyed – by financiers themselves or their government backers – and we will probably never succeed in reconstituting a complete picture. Three years of research were devoted to this enquiry, yet its findings merely skim the surface of a much broader field. As Louis Bergeron remarks, an all-encompassing study of business classes under the Revolution would require “*developing the inventory and structural analysis of companies and their directors in France and Europe beyond 1815 and prior to 1795*” – a truly herculean task for which the body of evidence remains frustratingly incomplete.²

A second recurring obstacle is the difficulty in evaluating the subjectivity of primary sources – particularly memoirs of former revolutionary deputies, administrators, military officers, etc. Most personal recollections referenced by this enquiry were written during the Bourbon Restoration or July Monarchy – i.e. after Napoleon's downfall and the defection of much of the Revolution's surviving *nomenklatura* to the Bourbons – when political expediency inclined these officials to minimise their responsibility for the calamitous

¹ Guillemin, *Napoléon : Légende et vérités*, Paris: Éditions d'Utopie, 2005, p.64.

² Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.317.

economic legacy of the revolutionary and Napoleonic regimes. How far can we therefore rely on the memoirs of Bourrienne, Fouché and Ouvrard – all of whom nurtured a genuine dislike of Bonaparte – or on those of Marmont who served the ultra-royalist faction, to accurately and impartially recount complex financial issues? We have, moreover, seen that many revolutionary actors involved in financial matters who bequeathed memoirs – Le Couteulx, Lebrun, Gaudin, Mollien, Berryer, etc. – were either constitutional monarchists or conservative actors sympathetic to reaching an accommodation with reactionary forces. Nearly all their accounts depict the Revolution's economic policies as deeply misguided and irretrievably corrupt, conferring the impression they were doomed from the start; yet they provide almost no supporting records detailing the intricacies of monetary policy and Treasury operations. Hence, while these commentaries formulate perfectly acceptable critiques, they can also be extremely misleading; for we have established how presenting Napoleon's coup as the inevitable consequence of the Revolution's financial turmoil obfuscates a wide range of circumstantial evidence pointing to a much more convoluted web of factors and interests at play.

Consequently, there are many things historians still ignore. We have yet to determine the real importance of the circulation of bills of exchange and paper currency for the development of French commerce at this time.³ Many bonds and bank notes used by the revolutionary government have not survived, and most of what remains concerns purchases of hard currency by the national mint or emissions of gold and silver ingots. This lack of documentation proves financiers were resolved not to let money rest in one place for too long since their power relied on the movement of funds.⁴ We have seen how magnates like Ouvrard, Michel *jeune*, Paulée and the *Compagnie Bodin* purchased *biens nationaux* to channel funds, and others like Récamier and the *Compagnie Dijon* recycled Batavian Rescriptions as down payments in Treasury operations. This study has tried to construct a more intelligible picture of the emerging commercial geography of this period by cross-referencing banking, industrial and merchant activities, but there are countless other documents in private collections, commercial court records, notarial minutes and other repositories which have yet to be examined. In fact, the Revolution's economic maze is so vast even a multi-volume work compiling selected evidence would barely suffice for introductory purposes. Yet until such research is undertaken, our knowledge of

³ For more on the circulation of bills of exchange and bank notes, see Johannus Bernardus Manger jr., *Recherches sur les relations économiques entre la France et la Hollande pendant la Révolution française (1785- 1795)*, Besançon: Imprimerie Jacques et Demontrond, 1923; Raymond de Roover, *L'évolution de la lettre de change, XIV^e-XVIII^e siècles*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1953 and Jean Bouchary, *Le Marché des changes à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle*, Paris: Hartmann: 1937.

⁴ See the section on Methodological Problems in the Introduction.

revolutionary businessmen will remain far more restricted than our understanding of the economic changes which underlay their activities.⁵

Who were, then, these elusive and versatile moneymen who by no means conformed to a stereotypical profile type? Generally speaking, they were either bankers, state officials, merchant traders or military contractors – although each individual had his own particular career history. One trait many shared was immersion in international culture. All the Le Couteux spent a few years of their adolescence in Cadix and spoke English and Spanish fluently. Basterrèche, Haller and Perregaux received their commercial education in Holland and England. Récamier was as comfortable in Spain as in Italy. Numerous high-ranking civil servants – particularly in the Treasury – followed a similar cursus; and many financiers who had served the *Ancien Régime* were linked to Calonne's *Compagnie des Indes* such as the Monnerons, Le Couteux and the Treasury commissioner Declerck.⁶ While it is true bankers and financial administrators were frequently drawn from the aristocracy or affluent bourgeoisie, several leading contractors were converts from the liberal professions or even hailed from lower-middle or working class backgrounds. Ouvrard, for instance, was the son of a paper manufacturer, Jean Lanchère had been a coachman at Metz and Paulée a waiter in a hotel at Douai.

That the Revolution enabled these men to accumulate vast fortunes in record time indicates business conventions in place since the seventeenth century were rapidly changing. The distinction between 'finance' – i.e. *Ancien Régime* ministers and bureaucrats specialised in importing hard currency – and 'bankers' who were mostly private entrepreneurs providing financial services to merchants – was rapidly fading.⁷ Moreover, social norms were evolving to amalgamate these changes. Magnates like Haller and Perregaux who had earned their spurs gravitating in Court circles didn't hesitate to offer their services to an upstart general like Napoleon; while unscrupulous courtiers such as Talleyrand and Radix showed little compunction in taking the reverse course and abandoning the monarchy to embrace the new revolutionary order. Thus, not only did the Directory's gargantuan financial and military needs encourage alliances between politicians, businessmen and army officers – it also levelled the social playing field by opening merchant professions to a much wider category of the population.⁸ This being said, we should also bear in mind the

⁵ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.317.

⁶ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.184-185.

⁷ For a detailed discussion of this point, see Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.774-777.

⁸ Nothing evidences this shift more clearly than the contrast between the shocked reactions greeting Necker's appointment as superintendent of finances in 1777 and the indifferent response to Ramel's nomination as finance minister in 1796.

gulf separating financiers who kept double accounts and conducted operations on a global scale from the common man in the street who was frequently illiterate.

In Chapter 4, we endeavoured to shed more light on the activities of financiers by focusing on the Swiss banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux. Analysing the customer registers in Perregaux's inventory after decease and that of his wife enabled us to partially unveil his European commercial networks and strong ties with Britain and Switzerland.⁹ Equally important was the retracing of Perregaux's career during the Terror which provides extremely useful insights regarding the true nature of the relationship between revolutionary leaders like Barère and Cambon and the barons of finance. All was obviously not what it seemed during this turbulent period, and there is little doubt the Revolution – far from severing the ties binding French politics to Swiss finance established in the previous century – relied heavily on indispensable agents like Perregaux to raise funds and purchase supplies in foreign markets. How else could one explain Perregaux's remarkable skill at escaping the guillotine and continuous presence at the forefront of French finance throughout the raging storm?

The Neuchâtel financier's effortless transformation from financial state intermediary to leading business aristocrat connected with Talleyrand's foreign ministry reflects the emergence of a new plutocracy under the Directory. This was not lost on Bonaparte whose leadership ambitions benefitted immensely from his association with Perregaux. Even though we lack incriminating evidence directly linking him to Brumaire, Perregaux's role in merging the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* with the *Banque de France* is an unmistakable sign he was lurking behind the scenes.¹⁰ Additional information on his assets and dealings and those of other bankers with Swiss affiliations (Mallet, Haller, Davillier, Hottinguer, etc.) could be uncovered by consulting the Swiss Federal Archives in Geneva, Neuchâtel, Berne, Lausanne and Zürich; and these would doubtless yield further data on sums pillaged from Swiss municipal coffers by French armies in 1798.

Perregaux's career demonstrates one of the keys to the success of revolutionary financiers was their ability to forge alliances with unscrupulous politicians, corrupt civil servants and especially the 'military faction' whose nascent power began to seriously undermine the government after 18 Fructidor. These politico-financial networks became so ubiquitous that we can confidently speak of interconnecting clans emerging at the heart of power

⁹ See Appendices 5 & 6.

¹⁰ After the advent of the Consulate, Perregaux re-established connections with Radix and his nephew Antoine Omer Talon, both of whom had played crucial roles in the monarchy's attempts to corrupt popular leaders during the early Revolution. See AN, F/7/6374.

during the twilight of the Revolution. Nearly all these groups were built around a core membership of influential financial, military and political actors – some individuals acting as liaisons between various cartels.¹¹ Ouvrard's circle, for example, included Barras, Admiral Bruix and especially Cambacérès – whose prominent position in the Montpellier trading community granted Ouvrard access to new business contacts. Cambacérès also protected the Michel brothers who became important investors in Ouvrard's naval supply chains and participated in his Spanish speculations. General Brune and Fouché were among the *Compagnie Bodin's* acolytes – with Fouché also linked to the *Compagnie Ouin*, Hainguerlot and *Jubié, Basterrèche & Cie*. We have also briefly touched on Armand Seguin's association with General Schérer and the bonds linking Jean-François Reubell to the *Compagnie Flachet*. But the most conspicuous of all these factions was that of Talleyrand who sponsored Bonaparte and numbered many financiers among his personal friends (Perregaux, Le Coutuelx, Collot, Michel Simons, etc.).¹²

These alliances were frequently sealed by marriages and other family ties. Perregaux, for instance, married his daughter Hortense to General Marmont and his son Alphonse to General MacDonald's daughter. The contractor Vanlerberghe wed his eldest daughter to General Rapp and married another to the son of his associate Paulée. One of Ouvrard's daughters was betrothed to the duc de Richelieu. Hainguerlot's son was matched with a daughter of Marshal Oudinot. Even Ramel, who came from a distinguished family of Carcassonne *notables*, was married to the sister of Lille banker Placide-Joseph Panckoucke. All these structures of influence undoubtedly inspired Bonaparte to establish his own relations with businessmen and motivated his search for a wife drawn from the merchant bourgeoisie (i.e. the Clary from Marseille and ultimately the Tascher de la Pagerie – Josephine's family). Several children of the Revolution's *nouveaux riches* were also ennobled under the *Premier Empire*. Jacques Laffitte's daughter, who married Marshal Ney's eldest son, was created a *Princesse de la Moscova* and Alphonse Perregaux a *comte de l'Empire*.¹³

¹¹ We should draw a distinction here between 'networks' of individuals and structured regional financial lobbies of which there were only really two in France – that of the Languedoc with its links to the colonial trade of Marseille and the textile manufactures of Switzerland, and that of the North in close proximity to the Low Countries and Hanseatic ports (Bruguière, *GPR*, p.167).

¹² There is still much more information to be uncovered on financiers in the *Saisie Michel Jean et Henry Simons* at the Belgian Royal Archives (for the networks of Michel Simons, Paulée and Ramel), the Spanish National Archives (Ouvrard, the Michel brothers, Le Coutuelx, Récamier), the UK National Archives (especially British Library manuscripts detailing Royal Navy communications) and correspondence records of the War Office's intelligence networks.

¹³ For these marriage-alliances, see two articles by Michel Bruguière: 'L'aristocratique descendance des affairistes de la Révolution' in *Les noblesses européennes au XIX^e siècle*, Actes du colloque de Rome, 21-23 novembre 1985, Rome: École Française de Rome, 1988: 105-120 and 'Finance et noblesse : l'entrée des financiers dans la noblesse d'Empire', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 17 (3), 1970: 664-670.

What is particularly striking about these vested interest groups is the number of characteristics they share with modern-day criminal organisations – corrupt business practices, infiltration at the highest political and administrative levels, predation on public funds and markets, dissimulation of real business owners behind layer upon layer of bogus partners and front companies, real estate speculation, intimidation of rivals and honest public officials, etc. Clearly, the Directory's economic collapse enabled these networks to gradually seep into places where the state's authority was receding or non-existent. While it may be going too far to assert these groups constituted 'a state within a state', they were certainly powerful enough to influence and undermine the government's economic and foreign policies – as the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal and the *Compagnie Bodin*'s interference in Milanese and Roman politics demonstrated. Several contractors committed widespread abuses with complete impunity and even jeopardised military supplies – inexplicably evading prosecution thanks to their political accomplices.¹⁴ The Directory did attempt to check their nefarious influence by establishing civil commissions in Rome and in Switzerland – but to no avail.

Surveying the preponderance of these financiers from a wider perspective naturally raises the question of why the French economy had been allowed to degenerate to such an extent that it was forced to depend on these networks for financial sustenance. The concise answer is that the revolutionary upheaval had paralysed France just as it was transiting from an economy based on colonial trade to an early pre-industrial model. By incapacitating the government's ability to manage and oversee this transformation, the political crisis had opened a major power vacuum at the heart of French finances which undermined successive revolutionary regimes. Perhaps the most damning indictment of this implosion was that the country's abysmal national debt – which had triggered the convocation of the Estates-General in 1789 – remained largely unaddressed by the time of Brumaire.

These recurring economic problems highlight one of the Revolution's greatest failures – the inability to train its own breed of financial experts. It was never able to produce a visionary economist like Adam Smith or a great financial statesman like Colbert – being forced to rely instead on administrators trained by the *Ancien Régime* who were versed in its inegalitarian fiscal system. As Michel Bruguière observes, the dearth of technical specialists hampered the Revolution practically from the outset:

¹⁴ We should also point out that many of these cliques were linked to the '*bande noire*' – an association of unscrupulous speculators who targeted valuable properties which they purchased at depreciated prices for the sole purpose of reselling their assets piece by piece.

“...the members of the [Legislative Assembly], completely inexperienced in matters of finance, were left with no other choice than to employ a Treasury which had existed before them and housed...most of the specialists of the [Royal] Trésor. More importantly, the Treasury was constituted in the English fashion, with a reciprocal measure of independence between legislative and executive powers. The frequent changes in government personnel could only strengthen its autonomy.”¹⁵

Another determining factor bolstering the rise of financiers was the Directory’s decision to prolong the war against Austria and Britain. The groundwork to pursue an expansionist foreign policy had already been laid by the occupation of Belgium in 1792-1793 and the Treaty of The Hague in 1795. But the resolution to continue hostilities – largely motivated by pecuniary gain – condemned France to a perpetual war economy and ensnared French finances in an inextricable paradox. It was manifestly obvious a permanent war economy was incompatible with the government’s stated objective of abolishing the nationalised system and operating a return to free-market economics. No advance preparations had been made for this transition and the financial control mechanisms of Year II (like the *maximum*) which could have helped avert economic ruin were removed without providing any compensatory safety nets in return.

The result was that an increasingly large share of the economy was outsourced to bankers and contractors because they were the only ones capable of advancing large quantities of supplies, equipment and credit at extremely short notice. Hence, the influence of speculators over state policy increased in proportion to the government’s reliance on their services. Whether the Directory could have concluded peace with Britain at Lille in 1797 or with Austria at the Rastatt Conference is debatable. But the failure to do so removed any possibility of rebuilding a viable economy and shackled the government’s budget to short-term and high-risk venture capital. By the time the Directory embarked upon yet another conflict against the Second Coalition in late 1798, its financial enfeoffment to the private sector was a *fait accompli* with nearly all military and naval supplies – and a significant portion of fiscal services – in the hands of profiteers. This rampant privatisation impaired the rule of law. The more the regime’s credit rating tumbled, the more entrepreneurs began directly negotiating agreements with generals from whom they stood better chances of securing refunds than government administrations. The case studies of contractors in Chapter 5 emphasise this growing proximity to army commanders and expose how corruption in the military supply system relied on the government’s inability to keep precise accounts of its tax intake.¹⁶

¹⁵ Bruguère, *GPR*, p.65.

¹⁶ As Lefebvre (*LFSD*, p.164) points out, this corruption was a legacy of the *Ancien Régime*.

Bonaparte's military expeditions held a share of responsibility in the erosion of the state's economic authority while simultaneously providing him with a fast-track initiation to the business world. Our examination of his Italian Campaign has emphasised just how striking the rapidity and success of the young general's financial apprenticeship was under the tutelage of Saliceti and Haller. It was Saliceti who taught Napoleon how to manage army finances, exact contributions from regional powers and imparted that economic opportunism which became an essential factor in keeping the campaign afloat. He mentored Bonaparte in implementing the policy of maintaining Italian states in economic subservience by preventing them from developing independent financial institutions and was instrumental in setting up the Balbi network to channel plundered Italian wealth back to France. The Corsican deputy also possessed the art of justifying financial excesses – such as the ransoming of Italian cities and looting of *monti-di-pièta* – through reasons of state: a skill Bonaparte mastered instinctively.¹⁷

Ironically, Saliceti's guidance accentuated Napoleon's disdain for the army's civilian commissioners. Having ascertained financiers and contractors were more efficient at extorting funds than the Directory's bureaucrats, he systematically began replacing state officials with administrators personally loyal to him. The most notable of these – Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller – enjoyed such predominance over campaign finances that he was entrusted with treaty negotiations which enabled him to expropriate considerable sums from the Lombard Council, the Papal States and the sale of Piedmont's *biens nationaux* to the Cisalpine Republic. Some of these funds were probably used to subsidise Brumaire. Moreover, Haller's negotiating techniques were clearly emulated by Bonaparte in his efforts to raise loans from foreign powers after Brumaire.

Drawing inspiration from these tutors, Napoleon progressively usurped control of the *Armée d'Italie*'s finances and developed a strategy of personal aggrandisement at the expense of civilian powers which proved highly effective because it was implemented in a foreign occupied territory where the Directory's jurisdiction was weak and its agents susceptible to corruption. The experience accumulated in Italy also invested Bonaparte with financial credibility. Indeed, he was one of the few revolutionary dignitaries who personally practiced the collection and management of 'extraordinary finances'.¹⁸ This in turn brought him to the attention of Parisian magnates and endowed him with the business acumen to form alliances with Le Couteulx, Perregaux and Collot – thereby paving the

¹⁷ The fact the *Armée d'Italie*'s motto was '*war unto castles, peace unto households*' suggests he had already reflected on this argumentative strategy prior to entering the peninsula. See AAE. Sardaigne, 272. Paris 20 ventôse IV/10 March 1796.

¹⁸ Bruguère, *GPR*, p.142.

way for his seizure of power. Jacques Godechot was struck by this commercial dimension linking the Italian Campaign and Brumaire, noting in the introduction to his study on the Directory's civilian commissioners that:

*"I believe I have brought to light the deeper reasons underlying the coup of 18 Brumaire and the establishment of military dictatorship in France, while simultaneously exposing the growing disaffection in conquered lands or territories occupied by French armies towards those republicans whom they had called forth with all their heart in 1795."*¹⁹

Unravelling the financial intricacies of Bonaparte's Italian operations would certainly merit a detailed study of its own. While this enquiry has principally relied on the *Armée d'Italie's* accounts in the French National Archives, these only present a limited picture since they were compiled by Garrau who was recalled to Paris in late 1796. A more precise inspection would aim to encompass data from municipal records of various Italian cities (Rome, Milan, Naples, Venice, Piacenza, Modena, Pavia, etc.) and from the Vatican's archives. Only then could a more accurate calculation of the sums extorted by Haller and other contractors be produced and the funds exfiltrated by Balbi verified.

While Bonaparte's infringements underscored the ineptitude of the Revolutionary government's foreign administrations, they merely reflected a symptom of a much wider malaise. As we observed in Chapter 3, the field in which hostility to the Directory was most intensely displayed was finances – and this was a completely unexpected development.²⁰ Recriminations over the government's economic policy exacerbated the clash between its legislative and executive branches. Our research corroborates the rise of financiers can only be fully understood in light of this internecine conflict. The run-up to 18 Fructidor when the finance ministry and Treasury were marred by accusations of corruption in the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal constituted a pivotal moment in this confrontation. Historians should more readily acknowledge how the royalist party's success in attacking the Directory's financial record was one of the principal factors which triggered the Fructidor coup and led to the purging of monarchist deputies from the legislative chambers. By effectively severing a limb to ensure its survival, the regime was forced to sacrifice its financial credibility. The *mandat territorial's* abrogation defrauded state creditors, rendered the Treasury politically powerless and permanently smeared the government with a reputation for incompetence.

¹⁹ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.XI.

²⁰ For more on this issue see Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.303.

Fructidor therefore represented a pact between business, the army and the republican majority whereby control of the economy was surrendered to speculators in return for their continued support of the Directory.²¹ With state oversight severely weakened, serious parliamentary opposition to the dominance of financial lobbies in monetary policy and public markets was all but extinguished. The state had effectively given up on the economy because government regulation had failed. Once the privatisation of monetary supply and military equipment was secured by Fructidor, a predatory economy was permanently established through which profit extracted from public subsidies was overwhelmingly redistributed to wealthy businessmen whose activities evaded any meaningful accountability.

Given how similar this destructive economic model and its corrupt practices were to those of the defunct monarchy, can we really assert the Directory witnessed the birth of a modern class of capitalist entrepreneurs – or were they merely *Ancien Régime* financiers and speculators creeping back in a new guise? This consideration is of prime importance, for if the Directory represented a restoration of pre-revolutionary nepotism and venality it would suggest Thermidor, Fructidor and Brumaire were reactionary events which rehabilitated the old order's financial *modus operandi*. It wasn't just that revolutionaries had failed to devise a fairer economic system – they were openly conceding the *Ancien Régime*'s blatantly corrupt methods were more efficient than theirs! What is more, such financial criticism undermines the Revolution's traditional depiction as the driving force behind the creation of modern political culture. There was nothing modern or democratic in elitist networks embezzling vast sums from public markets.

What our research findings effectively demonstrate is the enduring tenacity of these *Ancien Régime* networks of corruption which had remained dormant during the Terror and only fully re-emerged under the Directory. So embedded were they in French finances that no amount of Robespierre or Napoleon could reform or eradicate them. Thus, what this thesis has described is the Revolution's inability to deal with multiple self-reinforcing failures across different levels – systemic, political, technical, logistical, hierarchical, etc. – all of which ensured the survival of these power structures and facilitated their resurgence.

The records the Treasury published in compliance with the public inquiry which followed the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal offer a fascinating glimpse into its affairs with financiers.

²¹ It is also important to understand that the continuation of an aggressive foreign policy – which benefitted generals like Bonaparte and military contractors – required the Directory stay in place. If the royalists had won, Bonaparte and the contractors would have lost everything they had set up in Italy and other occupied territories. See Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.307-312.

Our analysis in Chapter 5 reviewed some of these previously unpublished files which confirm speculators became direct intermediaries of the Treasury as early as 1794 and were indispensable in procuring cash advances for the state's military expenses. They also reveal contractors were paid to raise cash for the Treasury in foreign markets by selling bills of exchange which were frequently insolvent. Many foreign investors who purchased these bills were defrauded or only partially reimbursed. No wonder the Treasury was accused of gross incompetence and its commissioners dismissed in the scandal's wake! Incidentally, these were precisely the types of operations Haller was conducting in Italy – acting as Napoleon's fundraising tsar and selling bills of exchange guaranteed by the *Armée d'Italie's* tenuous coffers. Furthermore, we note the Treasury logs contain very little on Ramel's role in negotiating contracts beyond simply confirming he approved them. Whether he was protected during the inquiry or the records edited to exonerate him remains a mystery.

Despite the lack of archival evidence, it would definitely be worth exploring the whole financial aspect surrounding Fructidor more rigorously – paying particular attention to Treasury documents in the French National Archives (especially files C//503 & C//504) and the correspondence of Ramel, the directors and legislative deputies involved in the crisis (e.g. Gibert Desmolières, Thibaudeau, Armand-Gaston Camus, etc.). The Fructidor putsch obviously encapsulated a moment when business rivalries which had languished since the closing days of the *Ancien Régime* suddenly came to a head. A treasure trove of information pertaining to these feuds can be found in records of commercial litigation cases adjudicated by the *Tribunal de Commerce de Paris* conserved at the Archives of the City of Paris. Many of these obscure files date from the 1780s or early Revolution and involved prominent financiers then in the early stages of their careers. Additional eye-raising details could surely be uncovered by scouring notarial records for major financial deals concluded in the aftermath of Fructidor.

Our own attempts to measure the financial lobby's reaction to Fructidor by monitoring the *Caisse des Comptes Courants's* activities have yielded some interesting results. There was, for example, a significant drop in discounted funds immediately after the coup (as indeed after Brumaire) which shows *caisse* shareholders remained extremely apprehensive of political developments and placed little confidence in the government's capacity to maintain stability. Even more arresting are indications gleaned from various financial deals consulted in notarial archives exposing how the banking community responded to economic uncertainty by adopting a short-term business approach. Bankers who were traditionally opposed to war and suspicious of nationalised paper currency effected a

rapprochement with contractors and began serving as their guarantors in military supply ventures and hazardous speculations on *assignats*, *mandat territoriaux* and *biens nationaux*. The *Caisse des Comptes Courants*'s correspondence corroborates this change and proves the bank felt it had little choice but to fund the Directory's war effort and collaborate with contractors following the outbreak of hostilities against the Second Coalition and advent of economic recession in Year VII. Bankers therefore diversified their investments to shield themselves from insecurity.

Perhaps this sudden embrace of high-risk speculation in defiance of rational economic practice explains why there was no real *esprit de corps* among financiers. Although they were prepared to close ranks when political developments jeopardised their interests, solidarity rarely prevailed when a particular bank or company found itself on the brink of bankruptcy. When the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*'s existence was imperilled by the Monneron scandal, some of its leading shareholders like Perregaux and Girardot attempted to profit from its demise rather than come to its aid. It was only when bankruptcy threatened to harm the collective interests of financiers that creditors earnestly assisted their beleaguered business partners. This is what happened in 1798 when Ouvrard and the *caisse* advanced funds to try and save *Girardot & Cie.*, and after Brumaire when leading Parisian bankers remonstrated against the arrest of Ouvrard.

No doubt financiers were motivated as much by the allure of rapid gains as the necessity of self-preservation – but a more fundamental explanation underscored their determination to take risks. The Directory had committed a critical error in 1795-1796 by failing to establish a national bank and thereby missed a crucial opportunity to reassure business circles. Had the government yielded to the universal clamour for such an institution and adopted one of the projects spearheaded by Johannot, Faipoult and Laffon-Ladébat and Le Couteulx which had garnered the support of many leading merchants – or even consented to a revised version of Paulée's plan – it might have ensured its survival and curtailed the possibility of subsequent coup attempts. Moreover, the foundation of a national bank would have signalled the Directory's determination to make economic recovery a priority and demonstrated its refusal to be permanently obstructed by party-political infighting.

Unfortunately, lack of political leadership and petty legislative quarrels squandered this singular chance to redress the economy and compelled the Directory to resort to highly unpopular forced loans. As a result, bankers grew increasingly convinced their interests no longer coincided with those of the regime – as Augustin Monneron's meeting with Bonaparte after Fructidor implies – and since the government wouldn't act, they resolved

to create their own ‘national bank’ in the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*. Napoleon was careful not to repeat this mistake and made sure he enlisted the support of business by establishing the *Banque de France* immediately after seizing power.²² He didn’t mind temporarily relinquishing a part of state finances to the banking community provided it served his interests; and he knew he could wrest back control of their bank as soon as they overstepped the mark – which was exactly what happened a few years later in 1805-1806.

Thus, we can see how Napoleon’s coup of 18 Brumaire represented the *denouement* to all these latent financial conflicts simmering beneath the Revolution’s political surface. Everyone agreed the Directory’s shambolic and arcane practices were counter-productive and that France required deep-rooted reform to address its economic woes. Bankers were frustrated by the regime’s inadequate measures to support the private sector and the chronic lack of hard currency for investment. Military contractors had to pay bribes to secure contracts and were locked in never-ending struggles to obtain reimbursements from corrupt state officials. Merchant traders lamented the permanent state of war which was destroying commerce; and financial administrators were blocked from implementing changes by unbridled nepotism and political expediency. All these disappointments drew many financiers to Bonaparte’s side.

While the dread of seeing a new Jacobin regime emerge undeniably constituted one of the driving forces behind Brumaire, we shouldn’t be too easily lured by a Manichean interpretation of the coup suggesting the entire business corps unreservedly threw its weight behind Bonaparte. The reality was far more complex and convoluted. There is no doubt the evidence we examined in Chapter 6 – such as Le Couteulx’s briefing of Bonaparte on the reaction of Parisians, Collot’s activities at Saint-Cloud, Talleyrand’s dinner party with Michel Simons at Meudon and the legislative manoeuvres of Lebrun – confirms there were many opaque networks operating behind the scenes; and it is undeniable the voting of the forced loan and touted suppression of delegations aroused universal indignation in business ranks. But from there to assert these networks were powerful enough to single-handedly topple the Directory would probably be a step too far, since the putsch wouldn’t have succeeded without the army’s intervention. A more accurate reading would be that such groups laid the ground for the coup by raising funds and mobilising support in financial and political spheres.

²² It was no coincidence that the *Banque de France*’s foundation sparked a surge in the amount of funds discounted by the *caisse*.

Another element justifying a more balanced analysis is how the banking lobby cautiously refrained from actively participating in the coup's preparations and preferred to adopt a wait-and-see approach. The fact the consular regime was desperate for cash after Brumaire – and the vigorous opposition displayed by Parisian bankers to Ouvrard's arrest – shows Napoleon by no means enjoyed the support of the entire business community.²³

Furthermore, although the assistance of bankers in establishing the *Banque de France* ultimately proved an essential factor in ensuring the Consulate's survival, the negotiations leading up to its foundation were far from reflecting “a kind of commercial miracle, owed to a government which had the gift of inspiring confidence” as Adolphe Thiers would have us believe.²⁴ In fact, there was a good degree of initial scepticism surrounding the economic viability of Bonaparte's new government, and the First Consul was even forced to finance his Marengo Campaign by resorting to a lottery administered by a consortium of speculators.

This in turn poses the more enduring question of who really benefitted from the alliances Napoleon forged with financiers. Did he successfully manipulate them for his own ends or was he in fact astutely played by them? Answering this question would require a far more extensive evaluation of French business circles covering the entire Napoleonic era and an in-depth assessment of how they consolidated their revolutionary gains, modernised their institutions and reasserted themselves as legitimate trading partners. What seems clear is that financiers were prepared to work with Napoleon provided his policies coincided with their long-term objectives. But once his personal ambitions began to impede the development of trade – and the privileges conferred on business elites no longer sufficed to compensate for losses incurred by war and the continental blockade – they increasingly turned against him. This explains why businessmen continued to operate on both sides of the Napoleonic divide regardless of political allegiances. In 1803, for instance, we find Pierre-César Labouchère – Francis Baring's brother-in-law and a leading partner of *Hope & Co.* – working hand-in-hand with Ouvrard to facilitate the Louisiana Purchase despite Britain and France being at war. Seven years later, both Labouchère and Ouvrard were key intermediaries in Fouché's attempts to negotiate a separate peace with Britain.²⁵ Around

²³ Ironically, Napoleon gave part of his personal fortune to Ouvrard for safekeeping after the Battle of Waterloo (Ouvrard, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.209).

²⁴ Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, Tome II, p.157.

²⁵ Labouchère delivered a memorandum by Fouché entitled *Avantages pour le cabinet britannique et désavantages pour l'empereur d'un traité de paix* (a.k.a. ‘la note de 20’) to Francis Baring on 22 March 1810 so he could give it to Wellington. See AN, AF/IV/1674 – *Note sur les déclarations contradictoires de Labouchère et d'Ouvrard*; G. Labouchère, ‘Un financier diplomate au siècle dernier : Pierre-César Labouchère’, *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, Tome XXVII, 1913: 425-455; Marten Gerbertus Buist, *At spes non fracta: Hope & Co. 1770-1815*, Den Haag: Bank Mees & Hope NV, 1974, p.365-369 and Waresquiel, *FLSP*, p.531-534. Napoleon was only informed of these talks by his brother Louis during an inspection tour

the same time, the *Banque de France* Regents Hottinguer, Davillier and Mallet – all of whom had Swiss connections – didn't hesitate to participate in a scheme elaborated by Nathan Rothschild to finance Wellington's army in Portugal!²⁶ To formulate a more accurate interpretation of Napoleon's relation to financiers, we must therefore recognise that what really mattered to him was to squeeze as much money as possible from them – regardless of whether they agreed with his politics – and that it was only when he required expertise he didn't possess that Bonaparte was prepared to defer to financial specialists.

If any single group emerged as the beneficiary of Napoleon's coup, it was the former officials of the *Ancien Régime*. Bonaparte revived and improved the old centralised royal administration of finances – not only because he hoped this would convince observers of his ability to restore order but also because he needed the services of experienced technical advisors to control the flux of money, fund his campaigns and pay government expenses. One only need look at the constellation of former royal intendants, officers and ideologues who staffed the various commissions of the new *conseil d'État* to ascertain how important this policy was in his overall strategy.²⁷ Its *section des finances* would come to play an important role in drafting laws, issuing government payments and especially adjudicating administrative litigations. Among the *section's* seven commissioners were Jean Devaines (former controller-general of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* who assumed the same duties at the *Banque de France*) and Bertrand Dufresne (the new director of the Treasury), while its president – Defermon – later oversaw the emperor's *domaine extraordinaire*. Another leading monarchist, Lebrun, was made Third Consul and later became Imperial Arch-Treasurer.²⁸ Many of these high-ranking functionaries would continue their careers

of Antwerp and was furious at not having been briefed (see his letter to Mollien dated 19 May 1810 in Mollien's *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.503-504). Ouvrard was imprisoned and Labouchère interrogated in Paris.

²⁶ Max Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer, banquiers à Paris*, Tome I, Paris: Draeger frères, 1968, p.210 – Nathan Rothschild sent his brothers to different strategic markets – Jacob in Dunkerque, Salomon in Paris and Kalmann to the Pyrenées – so that bills of exchange emitted by the paymaster of Wellington's army could be purchased and channelled back to London. Once the British government paid these bills, the money was sent back to Portugal via the same network to purchase more bills from Wellington's army. 65,000 *livres* worth were purchased by French capitalists who thereby helped finance an enemy army. Ironically, Jacob Rothschild persuaded Mollien this operation was financially beneficial to France.

²⁷ These included Boulay de la Meurthe (legislation), Rœderer (interior), Defermon (finances), Brune (war), Ganteaume (navy), Crétet, Petiet, Regnaud de Saint-Jean-d'Angély, Réal, Marmont, Moreau de Saint-Méry, Caffarelli (brother of the general killed in Egypt), Lacuée and Emmery (from Metz – like his friend Rœderer). See Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.397-399.

²⁸ The seven commissioners of the *conseil d'État's section des finances* were Defermon, Jean Devaines, Dubois des Voges (ex-deputy of the *Cinq-Cents*), Charles Duchâtel (ex-deputy of the Gironde in the *Cinq-Cents* and intimate of Paulée), Jean-Baptiste Moïse Jollivet (former colleague of Rœderer), Claude Ambroise Régnier (ex-president of the *Cinq-Cents*) and Bertrand Dufresne. On 21 January 1800, a consular decree placed Dufresne and the Treasury under the responsibility of Gaudin. Dufresne appointed three new administrators who replaced the five old Treasury commissioners of the Directory: Jacques-Claude Lemonnier (revenues), Charles-Louis Laquante (expenses) and Gérard-Maurice Turpin (accounting and legal). Lemonnier – the only directorial commissioner to survive – had managed the Treasury's verification bureau (*caisse des acquits*) since 1794. Laquante had been controller of war expenses since 1792. Turpin

through to the Restoration and July Monarchy.²⁹ By contrast, scarcely any merchants were honoured with government posts. Le Cousteulx, Perregaux and Journu-Aubert were appointed to the new *Sénat conservateur*. Fulchiron, Perier and Ricard became representatives of the *Corps législatif*; and Perrée-Duhamel joined the *Tribunat*. A few were ennobled such as Davillier, Delessert, Hottinguer, Journu-Aubert, and Mallet l'ainé.³⁰ Some like Delessert and Doyen also served as mayors of Parisian *arrondissements*. But most bankers were cantoned to their roles as *Banque de France* Regents. Those most poorly rewarded for their support were undoubtedly the contractors – such as Collot who was snubbed by Bonaparte despite advancing large sums.

Brumaire therefore marked the emergence of the civil servant as an unaccountable representative of state as the curtain fell on the regime's financial activities and those who grew wealthy from them. Government business would henceforth be conducted behind closed doors and away from public scrutiny.³¹ The new financial institutions (*Cour des comptes, Banque de France, Trésor impérial*, etc.) meticulously proofread and censored any compromising information in their reports. According to Guy Thuillier and Jean Tulard:

*“Never was an administration endowed with such prestige and greater authority than [the financial administration] under the Empire. The old commis of the Restoration and July Monarchy evoked with nostalgia the golden age of Napoleon's reign.”*³²

Interestingly, Albert Vandal argues Napoleon's inherent despotism indirectly benefitted the Revolution because his mistrust of financiers prevented them from effecting a complete takeover of the state. He wryly notes the First Consul was “*radically inapt*” at creating independent institutions because he only ever destined them to “*radiate his power*” – and postulates that “*it is impossible to say whether the task of [restoring France to liberty] was above the genius of Bonaparte, although it was certainly above his character.*”³³

When all is said and done, the 18 Brumaire would not have taken place without the support of financial circles and the tacit acquiescence of the monarchist bourgeoisie. It concluded

had been working for Ouvrard in his Parisian headquarters. The government's cash reserve (*Caisse général*) continued to be overseen by François Benoît Cornut de la Fontaine (Coincy), whose brother was the *caissier* of the *Banque de France*. Barbé-Marbois, General Kellerman's brother-in-law and Lebrun's future cousin, took over the Treasury after Dufresne died in February 1801. See Bruguière, *GPR*, p.145-152.

²⁹ Gaudin served as Governor of the *Banque de France* from 1820 to 1834. Barbé-Marbois was *premier président de la Cour des comptes* from 1807 to 1834 (excepting a brief interlude in 1815-1816). Mollien ran the commission overseeing the *Caisse des dépôts* from 1818-1825 and again after 1830.

³⁰ Several bankers were also awarded the *Légion d'honneur* for their services.


³¹ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.175.

³² Thuillier & Tulard, *Histoire de l'administration française*, Paris: PUF, 1984, p.19.

³³ Vandal, *ADB*, Tome II, p.527-529.

the liberal experiment inaugurated by the Thermidorians with the 1795 Constitution – an experiment which had proved premature since France ultimately reverted to military dictatorship. Fear of a tyranny rooted in the popular classes – coupled with a desire to safeguard revolutionary gains and enshrine property ownership – had veered the affluent classes towards authoritarianism. And while dismayed onlookers like La Reveillère denounced this betrayal of the spirit of 1789, many financiers probably considered it a small price to pay; for in the end, what subsisted of Bonaparte’s rule were the gifts conferred on the bourgeoisie, while everything associated with his person – the new dynasty, the European empire and the imperial nobility – crumbled.³⁴

³⁴ Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.727.



APPENDICES



NOTE ON CURRENCY EQUIVALENCIES

Many financial documents in archival records list sums in francs, *livres (livres tournois)*, *sols* (a.k.a. *sous*), *deniers*, *écus*, *louis* or even in foreign specie like Spanish piasters, pistoles and *reals*, Dutch florins, Italian *lira*, British pounds, American dollars and Hamburg banco marks.

It is very difficult to provide accurate valuations and determine precise equivalencies between each of these currencies for the revolutionary period, especially since exchange rates were highly volatile and fluctuated considerably from month to month or even week to week depending on political and economic circumstances. As the reader has no doubt ascertained, the principal objective of this thesis has been to focus on the methods financiers employed to maintain money flux and stay in control of the economy, rather than develop a purely economic or monetary analysis.

The most recent currency standardisation in France prior to the advent of the Revolution was that of the *livre tournois* in 1720 which established the following standard rates:

1 *livre* = 20 *sous* or 240 *deniers*

1 *sous* or 'sol' = 12 *deniers*

The medieval *écu* – commonly referred to as an '*écu blanc*' – was traditionally worth 3 *livres*. But following a set of monetary reforms in 1734, its value rose and hovered between 5 and 6 *livres* (or 100-120 *sols/sous*). The *écu* was sometimes called the *pièce de cent* ('coin of 100'). The *louis* was created by Louis XIII in 1640 and had many different variants. The most common – the silver *louis* – was worth 3 *livres* (or 60 *sols*); but a gold *louis (louis d'or)* was worth 20 *livres*. A Spanish silver piaster was worth 8 *reals* and therefore referred to as the *pièce de huit* (coin of eight) in France. In the 17th century, they were customarily worth 3 *livres* (or 60 *sols*), but by the time of the Revolution their value oscillated between 5 and 7 *livres*.

In 1795, the franc was introduced to replace the *livre* and the *écu* was replaced by the 5-franc coin. But the next currency standardisation only occurred following the law of 14 April 1803 which allowed the *Banque de France* to remint coins in circulation and led to the creation of Napoléon's *franc germinal*. This stabilised the franc's value until 1914.

APPENDIX I – SOURCES

I. Primary Sources - Archival Manuscripts

A. The French National Archives (*Archives nationales*)

The AF/II Series

The AF/II series contains papers and reports relating to the various committees of the National Convention and the Committee of Public Safety. Certain files in this series shed valuable light on the careers of individual financiers during the early phases of the Revolution. Carton 76, for example, contains the order of Jean-Baptiste Paulée's appointment to the commercial commission supplying the *Armées du Nord et de Sambre-et-Meuse*. Dossier 77 confirms that the banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux was one of the Convention's exchange agents abroad. The voluminous carton 219 includes details of Perregaux's role as Beaumarchais's financial guarantor in the playwright's business deal to sell muskets to the French Republic. Other boxes, such as 286B, are composed of early military supply contracts concluded by the Thermidorian Convention with various private contractors.

The AF/III Series

I have scrutinised the entire AF/III series which is an essential source for the study of the history of the Directory. Many of these documents have been extensively referenced in the works of distinguished French historians of this period, such as Ludovic Sciout, Raymond Guyot, Albert Mathiez and Georges Lefebvre, or have been published in Augustin Debidour's *Recueil des Actes du Directoire exécutif*. While it would be impossible to detail all of the evidence contained in these files, we should nonetheless highlight some of the most important items for this study.

Some valuable lists of personnel from the Ministry of Finance and National Treasury are contained in cartons 28 and 29, which include dates of service and notes on the vocations of individual employees ranging from their activities prior to the outbreak of the Revolution to the coup of 18 Fructidor. These records are of vital importance to historians wishing to track civil servants of the *Ancien régime* who survived the Revolution by recycling themselves in the financial administrations of successive Revolutionary governments. Indeed, several of these employees experienced tumultuous careers,

beginning their service under Louis XV or Louis XVI and only retiring under the Restoration or July Monarchy.

Cartons 52 to 90 cover the Directory's foreign relations and include several files bearing precious information for our study. The intercepted correspondence with Great Britain in carton 58, for instance, reveals a letter sent by Catherine Grand – Talleyrand's wife – suggesting her husband's possible complicity with his circle of British friends. Cartons 65 and 66 are devoted to relations with Genoa and contain some allusions to Bonaparte's civilian commissioner, Saliceti, and his attempts to negotiate a loan with Genoese bankers. Carton 71 contains dispatches sent by Faipoult and Amelot – the civilian commissioners attached to the *Armée d'Italie* in Years VI and VII – denouncing the corruption of Fouché (French ambassador in Milan), General Brune (Commander-in-Chief of the *Armée d'Italie* from mid-1798 to early 1799) and General Suchet (Brune's chief-of-staff).

Other letters sent by the civilian commissioner Rivaud in Year VII are preserved in carton 72. These confirm the corruption of the *Compagnie Bodin*, which had been granted the general supply of the *Armée d'Italie* by the war minister, Barthélémy Schérer, following Bonaparte's departure. More importantly, this file holds a significant part of General Henri Clarke's report on the conduct of General Bonaparte and his leadership of the *Armée d'Italie* which was written in December 1796. Clarke's report levels a number of corruption charges against several leading officers serving in Bonaparte's army.

Carton 77 regroups dispatches retracing the assassination of General Duphot, the French invasion of the Papal States and establishment of the Roman Republic in 1798, financial contributions and reparations levied on Rome and the looting of Papal treasures following the French occupation of that city. One of the principal culprits in these acts of pillage was Rodolphe-Emmanuel Haller, a financier from Berne who had been appointed as chief intendant of finances of the *Armée d'Italie* by Bonaparte. Carton 78 is devoted to affairs in the Roman Republic and the French occupation of Naples. It covers the conflict over the supply of the French army at Rome between the *Compagnie Bodin* and a conglomerate of Franco-Italian financiers called the *Compagnie des munitionnaires généraux*, debates surrounding the reintroduction of mortgaged shares as currency in Rome, supplemental financial contributions levied on Rome and Naples, and most importantly the conflict opposing General Championnet and his civilian commissioner, Faipoult.

Cartons 81-86 are devoted to affairs in Switzerland. There are some interesting reports submitted by French secret agents in carton 81, but the most valuable elements for our

purposes concern the French intervention in Switzerland in 1798 which are stored in carton 86. These include the seizure of the treasures of Berne, Freiburg, Solothurn, Lucerne and Zurich to finance Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, and contributions imposed upon the various Swiss cantons by the civilian commissioners Lecarlier and Rapinat (Reubell's brother-in-law).

One final dossier of interest in the foreign relations series is carton 88 which contains documents recording the pillaging of merchandise in the port of Livorno by the *Compagnie Flachet, Laporte et Castelin*. This operation infuriated Bonaparte because it failed to raise additional income for his *Armée d'Italie* and exposed his inability to bring military contractors to heel during the opening stages of his Italian Campaign.

Documents relating to the organisation and conduct of the Directory's wars are stored in cartons 143 to 201. It is in these files that records of the financial accounts, contracts, contributions and requisitions linked to the Directory's armies are kept. Carton 148A, for example, holds the contract for the general supply of Bonaparte's *Armée d'Italie* which the Directory signed with the *Compagnie Flachet, Laporte et Castelin*, along with several letters exchanged between its executive manager Laporte and his close friend, the director Reubell. These files also contain several denunciations of corrupt practices by military contractors, administrators and army officers. Carton 158 includes an entire dossier exclusively devoted to petitions addressed to the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents* in Year VII denouncing acts of corruption all over France. Among these are several accusations directed against Barthélémy Schérer – the war minister at that time – who is condemned for his pillaging and illegal sale of requisitioned goods in military warehouses.

Several bids for military supply contracts and agreements can be found in Carton 183. These include bids to supply meat to the *Armée d'Italie* and to supply its military hospitals tendered by the *Compagnie Souiris*. The contract for supplying the army's hospitals in Italy was eventually awarded to the *Compagnie Mannier*. Other correspondence relates to the *Compagnie Jean Lanchère père et fils* – the main supplier of artillery horses to the armies of the French Republic. In carton 184 can be found a very useful summary written by the war minister Aubert-Dubayet of all military supply contracts awarded by the Directory to private contractors up to the beginning of Year IV. This dossier also contains an early contract signed by the *Compagnie Bodin* with the war minister Petiet for the extraordinary supply of the *Armée d'Italie* (not to be confused with the contract it later signed with Schérer), complaints against the corruption of various contractors and some useful inventories of supplies stored in military warehouses.

By far the most important dossier in the war series for this study is carton 185, which comprises most of the material relating to the *Armée d'Italie* from Year II to Year VI. This voluminous file is a veritable goldmine of financial information on Bonaparte's Italian Campaign and includes decrees issued by the civilian commissioners attached to his army (Antoine Christophe Saliceti, Pierre-Anselme Garrau and Pinsot), records and inventories of financial requisitions and of contributions imposed upon various Italian states, and official reports on how these funds were used. It also includes correspondence relating to the *Compagnie Flachat, Laporte et Castelin* and the vast amounts of jewels and cash which were entrusted to it. I have therefore drawn extensively on this dossier to research information on the financial intermediaries of Bonaparte in Italy and requisitions carried out on his orders or on those of the civilian commissioners attached to his army, as well as to retrace the financial squabbles which took place between them.

All the published accounts of the *Armée d'Italie*'s finances for 1796 (Year IV to early Year V) are held in carton 198 which serves as an obvious complement to the material in carton 185. This file contains numerous accounts and tables of all recorded funds levied and spent in Lombardy, Liguria and Emilia-Romagna, including contributions and requisitions extorted from the principal cities of these various provinces such as Milan, Mantua, Bologna, Ferrara, Parma, Piacenza, Ravenna, Livorno and payments obtained from the Papal States in the Treaty of Tolentino.

Cartons 314 to 637 contain the decrees (*arrêtés*) of the Directory sorted in chronological order. Consequently, the evidence pertaining to this study is spread across a copious selection of these files. Carton 345 is notable for the instructions sent by the Directory to its agent in Genoa, Cacault, ordering him to negotiate a loan with bankers in that city. Furthermore, it holds secret discussions of possible terms to impose upon the Pope in a future peace treaty, and even contains an eye-raising proposal by the contractor Jean-Baptiste Paulée to establish a national bank in France in February 1796. Cartons 370 and 371 harbour instructions sent to the civilian commissioner Saliceti on how to raise tax contributions in Italy, while cartons 377 and 380 reveal the importance of the Genoese banker Emmanuel Balbi in laundering the riches plundered by Bonaparte's army in Italy.

Some dossiers present information which disclose the political motivations lurking behind certain financial decisions. One such example in carton 400 is the Directory's approval of the dissolution of the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie* – the agency initially set up to raise taxes in Lombardy – and the conferring of this task upon the newly-created Lombard Congress of State: an organisation controlled by Lombard patriots close to Bonaparte and

Saliceti. By contrast, the accusations of embezzlement directed against the chief ordnance officer of the *Armée d'Italie* – Denniée – in cartons 403 and 404 are explicit and unambiguous. Pinsot, one of the three civilian commissioners attached to Bonaparte's army in Italy, has bequeathed a valuable summary of his mission in carton 410. This important document sheds some light on the conflict over control of the army's finances between Pinsot and Bonaparte which resulted in the commissioner's recall to Paris. Dossier 410 also contains a list of objects confiscated from Bologna's *monte-di-pièta*, one of the wealthiest in Italy.

Additional cartons of note include number 498 which encloses the decrees appointing the civilian commission to establish the Roman Republic, and carton 508 that contains correspondence from this commission detailing the numerous acts of pillage perpetrated at Rome, notably by the financier Haller.

Finally, two other dossiers draw attention back to the dire financial situation plaguing France during the run-up to the coup of 18 Brumaire. Carton 617 contains a decree from May 1799 granting the financier Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard government rescriptions in exchange for five and a half million francs worth of depreciated *bons des deux tiers*, thereby divulging his influence in government circles. The same file also includes several alarming reports sent by the finance minister Robert Lindet to the Directory concerning the government's lack of funds and low tax intake for Year VII. Carton 619 preserves an agreement signed on August 6, 1799 between Lindet and a consortium of Parisian bankers who consented to lend the French government thirty million francs over a four month period to bail it out. This disguised forced loan is often referenced as one of the events which convinced several of these financiers to support Bonaparte's coup a few weeks later.

The AF/IV Series

The AF/IV series is composed of documents relating to Napoleon's consular government and *Premier Empire*. The principal importance of this series for our study resides in those cartons containing information pertaining to the *Banque de France*. Carton 6, for example, includes an extraordinary letter sent by the leading Parisian bankers to Martin Gaudin, Napoleon's first finance minister, informing him of the creation of the French national bank before he was even officially notified. Two other important consular decrees in this file announce the transfer of tax down payments from the *receveurs généraux* to the newly

created *Banque de France*, and the requisition of the *maison de l'Oratoire* to serve as the bank's new headquarters.

Of even greater importance are the documents held in carton 1070 which comprise most of the papers collected by the Ministry of Finance relating to the *Banque de France* from its creation in 1800 to 1807. These include a detailed report on various banking establishments in Paris by the *ministre du trésor*, François Barbé-Marbois, entitled *Rapport aux Consuls sur les banques*, along with a series of three extensive 'notes' on the banking system by the director of the *Caisse d'amortissement*, François-Nicolas Mollien. But the most significant papers in this carton are to be found in the individual 'booklets' (*livrets*) enclosing the correspondence of the administrators and shareholders of the *Caisse d'escompte du Commerce*, the *Comptoir Commercial* and the *Banque Territoriale* – the three main banking competitors of the *Banque de France*. These booklets include several pamphlets discussing monetary theory, various proposals (especially of mergers with the *Banque de France*) exchanged with the Directory and Consulate, minutes and reports of board meetings, and petitions addressed to the First Consul Bonaparte, his financial officials and the Treasury. These documents are crucial in retracing the acrimonious financial struggle pitting private banking establishments against Bonaparte's regime which culminated in the law of April 14, 1803 awarding the exclusive monopoly of printing paper money in Paris to the *Banque de France*. Moreover, carton 1070 includes the minutes of a decisive meeting held on April 2, 1802 between Bonaparte and the Regents of the *Banque de France* following the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens with Great Britain. It was at this conference – with the perspective of a universal European peace agreement clearly on the horizon – that the financiers who had lobbied for the creation of the national bank divulged their veritable intentions regarding the future direction of French economic policy. Additional sources of note in this carton include a report on the *Banque de France* conducted by state counsellor Emmanuel Cretet in 1802, objections to the law of April 14, 1803 raised by the banker Alexandre Barrillon – which prove that the *Banque de France's* monopoly on the emission of paper money was hotly contested within the bank itself by several of its shareholders – statements of the bank's accounts and debates concerning the best way to ensure its liquidity and cash flow.

Other files of interest in the AF/IV series include carton 1071, which holds numerous weekly and monthly banking and account statements of the *Banque de France* communicated by its president, Jean-Frédéric Perregaux, to Bonaparte and some

interesting letters written by Mollien in carton 1073 that reveal contentious discussions surrounding the drafting of the law of April 14, 1803.

The C Series

The C series holds the records of the various French national and legislative assemblies from 1787 onwards. Files C//387 to C//598 are devoted to the legislative councils of the Directory – *the Conseil des Cinq-Cents* and the *Conseil des Anciens*. Among these I have only made extensive use of dossier C//503 which contains important records of the Treasury's transactions with private bankers and contractors and dossier C//504 which holds most of the documents relating to the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal that rocked the government in late 1796 and 1797. The latter dossier includes the initial report on the scandal submitted by the *Cinq-Cent* deputy Armand-Gaston Camus in April 1797, the address delivered by the Treasury's commissioners to the *Cinq-Cents* in June 1797, and finance minister Ramel's own report on the scandal (also filed in June 1797). In addition, there are numerous supporting documents which were submitted to this dossier as evidence, such as the illegal decrees issued by *administrations départementales* allowing the *Compagnie Dijon*'s agents to withdraw *mandats territoriaux* from their coffers and the *Compagnie Dijon*'s correspondence with the Treasury's surveillance committee.

The F Series

In the F series, I have principally drawn on documents in the F/7 (*police générale*), F/11 (*subsistances*) and F/12 (*commerce et industrie*) series, comprised of reports drawn up by the French Ministry of the Interior for the Committee of Public Safety. Several police files on individual financiers provide crucial information on their activities from the outbreak of the Revolution to the advent of the Directory. Among these is a vital dossier compiled on Jean-Frédéric Perregaux (F/7/4775/68), along with surveillance reports denouncing him as suspect (F/7/3339 & F/7/3834). More detailed evidence of Perregaux's missions as an exchange agent in foreign markets can be found in file F/12/798B. Among the files listing entrepreneurs supplying Paris with food is a voluminous dossier (F/11/1229) on Jean-Baptiste Paulée covering the years 1795-1808. I have also looked over the correspondence of Georges Rumbold, the British consul at Hamburg (F/7/6453).

B. Foreign Archives

Due to financial and logistical constraints, I have unfortunately not been able to consult many documents in foreign archives, such as those in the *Saisie Michel-Jean et Henry Simons* dedicated to the contractors Michel-Jean and Henry Simons at the Belgian National Archives (*Archives du Royaume de Belgique*), and certain papers relating to Swiss financiers in the Swiss Federal Archives and the regional archives of Neuchâtel. I have been forced instead to rely on references noted in specific secondary sources, such as those in the collection of essays entitled *La guerre, la mer et les affaires : Enjeux et réalités maritimes de la Révolution française* which contains a chapter devoted to Michel-Jean Simons's project of rehabilitating the port of Antwerp.

C. The French National Archives's Notarial Records (*Minutier Central des Notaires*)

The notarial records of the French National Archives – along with all documents predating the Revolution – are conserved at the *Centre d'accueil et de recherche des Archives nationales* (CARAN) located in the *marais* in Paris. The multitude of records concerning property sales, registrations of new commercial entities and company dissolutions, bankruptcies, testaments and certified debt obligations have enabled me to form a much clearer picture of the individual financiers who were implicated with or linked to Bonaparte's rise to power.

Some of the most important documents for this study concern the banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux. The inventory of assets (MC/ET/X/813) belonging to his wife, Adélaïde de Praël, was established following her death in 1794 and provides a detailed list of all Perregaux's clients at that time. Other essential files include a debt obligation he acknowledged to the *Compagnie Winter et Cie.* (MC/ET/X/818), his marriage contract with Adélaïde (MC/ET/LIII/543) and the inventory of assets drawn up after his own death in 1808 (MC/ET/X/882). There are, moreover, several other posthumous inventories which hold important information on leading financiers of Bonaparte's era, including those of Jean-Baptiste Paulée (MC/ET/LV/340), Pierre Sévène (MC/ET/XVIII/988) and Jacques-Rose Récamier (MC/ET/XCIII/507).

Just as significant are the foundational act of the *Vingt Négociants Réunis* (MC/ET/XV/1130) and its act of dissolution (MC/ET/XV/1135); and the foundational act of the *Dix Négociants Réunis* (MC/ET/XV/1132) and minutes of its general assembly

(MC/ET/XV/1136) – two associations of financiers established to supply Bonaparte’s armies after the Brumaire coup.

There are also several military supply contracts of import in the notarial archives, such as those awarded to Jean-Baptiste Paulée’s *Compagnie Saint Victor* and to the companies of Jean-Baptiste Ouin, Armand Jean-François Séguin (all in MC/ET/XLV/661) and the *Compagnie Noé* (MC/ET/LXXXVI/921) which had the main contract to supply Bonaparte’s *Armée d’Angleterre*. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate the contract for the general supply of the French Atlantic Fleet which Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard signed in the name of his brother-in-law, Claude Blanchard, although there is a special procuration signed by Blanchard delegating his rights to Ouvrard (MC/ET/XCIII/225).

Finally, it is worth signalling the budget of the Michel brothers’ company published in June 1810 (MC/ET/XCIII/330), which constitutes one of the few extant documents on the activities of these powerful yet elusive financiers.

D. Archives of the City of Paris (*Archives de la Ville de Paris*)

The Archives of the City of Paris hold a certain number of personal and commercial records which I have used for this study. The inventories after death of Guillaume Mallet l’ainé (DQ7 3421, n°1243) and Jean Lanchère père (D2U1 70) are stored here, as is the testament of Jean-Frédéric Perregaux (D31U3 3). Certain decisions of the commercial court of the *département* of the Seine contain judgments and adjudications concerning the companies of Le Couteulx, Mallet l’ainé and Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron (D6U3 11). File D31U3 1 includes papers relating to the *Caisse d’escompte du Commerce* and *Banque Territoriale*, as well as documents pertaining to the *Compagnie Noé*, its Parisian banking guarantor *Limoges et Mazère*, and their contract to supply the *Armée d’Angleterre*. The *Limoges et Mazère* bank’s contract to supply the French navy with wine, concluded in partnership with the banker Alexandre Barrillon, is preserved in dossier D31U3 7. There are also files on *Chaptal, fils et Cie.* – the company of Jean-Antoine Chaptal (D31U3 4) – and some interesting reports on Michel-Jean Simons (VD* 17).

E. Archives of the French National Bank (*Archives de la Banque de France*)

The archives of the French national bank are composed of its own historical papers and additional documents relating to the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* – the largest private bank in Paris which was incorporated into the *Banque de France* after its foundation. The

files relating to the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* are further subdivided into its first (*1^{ère} société*) and second (*2^{ème} société*) entities because the *caisse* – originally created in June 1796 – had to be re-founded in December 1798 after its director, Augustin Monneron, fled to Guadeloupe with one and a half million francs.

File 1069200402/1 holds the minutes of the first *caisse*'s board meetings and general assemblies of shareholders, while file 1069200402/22 is composed of the minutes of the second *caisse*'s administrative board meetings and holds a list of its shareholders. The deliberations of the second *caisse*'s general assemblies of shareholders are kept in dossier 1069200402/23.

Carton 1069200402/32 comprises documents from both the first and second *caisses* and includes reports presented to their general-assemblies of shareholders, the statutes of the *caisse*, a list of shareholders established immediately prior to the *caisse*'s merger with the *Banque de France*, correspondence with clients and accounting records (budgets and extraordinary discounting operations). Box 1069200401/284 is divided into two dossiers devoted to the *Comptoir Commercial* bank and the merger of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* with the *Banque de France*.

Several cartons are dedicated to the *Caisse d'escompte du Commerce*, the *Banque de France*'s main Parisian competitor. File 1069199708/2 contains the observations of the directors of the *Caisse d'escompte du Commerce* on the proposed law to grant the *Banque de France* a monopoly on monetary emission. There is no list of the *Caisse d'escompte du Commerce*'s shareholders, although these can be gleaned from the bank's share subscriptions in Dossier 1069200401/305. Information on this bank's forced merger with the *Banque de France* can be found in cartons 1069201238/1 and 1069200401/283.

Probably the most important dossier for the *Banque de France*'s early history is carton 1069200901/1 which incorporates much of the legislation enacted to secure the bank's foundation and survival. This includes its original statutes, the minutes of its first assembly-general of shareholders and the law of April 14, 1803 conferring upon it the monopoly of paper money emission. Two imposing registers in file 1069201116/1 record the deliberations of the national bank's Regency Council from its foundation until 1804, while dossier 1069201214/1 contains a useful tome recapitulating all the financial crises weathered by the bank. Additional cartons of interest include those devoted to the bank's personnel (1069200401/195), correspondence addressed to the bank's director (1069200401/289), and tables of monthly and bi-annual results (1069200401/212).

F. Archives of the French Ministry of Defence (*Archives du Service Historique de la Défense / Archives de la Guerre*)

The archives of the French Ministry of Defence – commonly referred to as the *Archives de la Guerre* – are divided into two sections: historical archives and administrative archives. The historical archives are classified on a day-to-day chronological basis and are further subdivided into two divisions, the first of which comprises the vast majority of correspondence exchanged between the French government and its military officials (especially civilian commissioners attached to armies), while the second division is devoted to historical memoirs written by officers or administrators. For the purposes of my research, I have limited myself to examining letters exchanged between the Directory and the *Armée d'Italie* which are held in the B3 series. This is composed of correspondence with the *Armée d'Italie* and *Armée des Alpes* (B3/18-56), letters sent to the French army occupying Rome (B3/57-58), messages to the *Armée d'Italie, de Rome et de Naples* (B3/59-64) and to the *Armée d'Italie* in 1799 (B3/65-66). I have also made use of General Clarke's negotiations (B3*/210) and General Joubert's dispatches (B3*/211-216). The administrative archives are mostly devoted to personnel and not generally open to the public.

G. Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Archives des Affaires Étrangères*)

These archives are also divided into two sections. The first is composed of diplomatic correspondence organised by country and classified on a chronological basis, while the second is devoted to the ministry's personnel and is not open to the public. Here again, I have restricted myself to dispatches concerning the *Armée d'Italie* and the ramifications of Bonaparte's campaign upon Italian states. The files I draw upon in the diplomatic correspondence include: Genoa (169-176), Milan (55-58), Rome (919-922, 926-929, supplements 20-22), Sardinia (272-278) and Tuscany (147-152).

II. Primary Sources – Published Works

A. Collections

The two most valuable collections of primary sources for the directorial period are Augustin Debidour's *Recueil des actes du Directoire exécutif* (4 vols.) and François-Alphonse Aulard's *Paris pendant la réaction Thermidorienne et sous le Directoire* (5 vols.). Unfortunately, Debidour limits his collection to documents in the French National Archives and ends his work with Year V. Aulard draws on a wider range of documents and published an analogous collection on the Consulate (*Paris sous le Consulat* – 4 vols). We should also mention Buchez & Roux's forty-volume *Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française*, a vast compendium of the minutes of successive revolutionary legislatures, of which tomes 37 and 38 pertain to this study.

B. Correspondence

I have surveyed different editions of Napoleon's varied correspondence. The standard collection is the thirty-two volume *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier*, whose first three tomes are the most relevant for our subject. Further dispatches addressed to different European courts and relating to the Egyptian and Italian campaigns can be found in the *Correspondance inédite, officielle et confidentielle du Napoléon Bonaparte*. The Institut Napoléon is also in the process of publishing a major collection of Napoleon's general correspondence (*Napoléon Bonaparte : correspondance générale*) under the direction of Thierry Lentz, whose first two volumes (Tome I : Les apprentissages 1784-1797 & Tome II : La campagne d'Égypte et l'avènement 1798-1799) contain several rare and previously unpublished letters.

In the field of diplomatic correspondence, the first volume of Paul Bailleu's *Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807* contains dispatches written by the Prussian ambassador in Paris, Sandoz-Rollin, while Georges Pallain's compendium of Talleyrand's diplomatic missives during his tenure at the foreign ministry (*Correspondance Diplomatique de Talleyrand: Le Ministère de Talleyrand Sous Le Directoire*) is a late nineteenth-century standard.

I have also sought information in the correspondence of Joséphine (*Impératrice Joséphine – Correspondance, 1782-1814*), Jacques Mallet du Pan (*Correspondance inédite de Mallet du Pan avec la Cour de Vienne*), and in Lord Auckland's journals (*The Journal and*

Correspondence of Lord Auckland – 4 vols.) which contain some important letters addressed to Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.

C. Memoirs

The memoirs of Napoleon's contemporaries represent one of the main sources used to cross-check and verify information discovered in archival sources. I have therefore drawn upon the personal recollections and histories of a wide range of political, economic and military actors and socialites.

The sixteen volumes of the memoirs of the Duchesse d'Abrantès are a widely-referenced source, and her six-volume *Histoire des salons de Paris* represents a veritable who's who of Parisian salon society. Madame de Staël's famous writings on the Revolution are often regarded as prophetic, and I have noted ideas and commentaries in three of her works: *Considérations sur les principaux évènements de la Révolution française, Des circonstances actuelles qui peuvent terminer la Révolution française et des principes qui doivent fonder la république en France* and *Dix années d'exil*. The playwright Antoine-Vincent Arnault's four-volume *Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire* describes his close association with Napoleon and contains some notable passages on the 18 Brumaire coup.

Numerous politicians of the Directorial era have left written records. The executive directors Barras, La Revellière, Carnot and Gohier have all bequeathed memoirs, while some of Reubell's recollections were published in the *Nouvelle Revue retrospective* ("Conversation avec le Premier consul"). Talleyrand's memoirs are practically devoid of any incriminating material, but those of Fouché and Pierre-François Réal – while necessitating caution – are surprisingly revealing for such notorious intriguers. Lucien Bonaparte's memoirs are equally well-known, and I have made use of his recollections of the Brumaire coup published in the second volume of Mathurin de Lescure's *Mémoires sur les Journées Révolutionnaires et les Coups d'État*. This tome also contains the memoirs of Le Couteulx on Bonaparte's coup which present the rare testimony of a financier on this event. The legislative deputy Mathieu-Augustin Cornet has left a *Notice historique sur le 18 brumaire* offering his version of the coup. Thibaudeau's *Mémoires sur la Convention et le Directoire* and *Mémoires, 1799-1815* are often praised for their impartiality, as is Fabre de l'Aude's *Histoire secrète du Directoire*, the earliest personal history published on the Directory. We should also note Le Doulcet de Pontécoulant's *Souvenirs historiques et parlementaires* and Lavalette's *Mémoires et souvenirs* – which are both regularly

referenced – along with the anonymous *Mémoires et souvenirs d'un pair de France*. More recently, two volumes of Cambacérés's unpublished memoirs were released by Perrin in 1999.

Napoleons generals have left memoirs of varying worth. General Bertrand's *Cahiers de Sainte-Hélène* is a highly-respected source and Marmont's extensive nine-volume autobiography is popular with military historians. Bourrienne's memoirs are rightly considered a classic – but these must be treated with caution as they contain numerous errors and omissions. Masséna's memoirs can also be dubious despite their interesting anecdotes. Jourdan's account of the 18 Brumaire – 'Le dix-huit brumaire. Extraits des Mémoires du maréchal Jourdan' – was published in *Le Carnet Historique et Littéraire* in 1901. The *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* by Emmanuel de Las Cases was the basic text taught in all French schools for generations and represents the established canon of Napoleonic propaganda. General Gourgaud's *Journal de Ste-Hélène 1815-1818*, which completes the Saint Helena trilogy of military memoirs, makes practically no mention of financiers.

Very few bankers and military contractors active under the Directory have published memoirs. Aside from Le Couteux's account of 18 Brumaire mentioned above, the most important extant source are the memoirs of Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard. Unfortunately, these delve little into the details of his business affairs. Jean-Frédéric Perregaux burnt all his personal papers before his death, but the memoirs of his apprentice – Jacques Laffitte – do contain some noteworthy passages. The dearth of primary economic sources must therefore be complimented by the personal records of financial civil servants. The most important of these are the memoirs of Martin Gaudin and especially those of Nicolas-François Mollien, which both provide essential information on economic policy. The souvenirs of Pierre-Nicolas Berryer, one of the top lawyers in Paris who was heavily implicated in financial dealings, are also of value.

Finally, among the numerous memoirs from which I have extracted small parcels of information, let us note those of the Comtesse de Boigne and of Mme. Campan.

The Italian & Egyptian Campaigns

Records of Italian commentators and French officials posted in Italy are particularly valuable to the study of Napoleon's Italian Campaign. The aristocrat Paolo Greppi, an astute and intelligent observer, hosted the commissioners Saliceti, Garrau and Pinsot at his

palace in Milan. The second and third tomes of his letters (*La rivoluzione francese nel carteggio di un osservatore italiano*) constitute an important source. Several letters exchanged between the Italian philosopher and economist Pietro Verri and his brother Alessandro (*Lettere e scritti inediti*) contain information of interest, as does the six-volume compendium of laws, proclamations and decrees of the Lombard government published by Luigi Veladini (*Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi stati pubblicati dopo il cessato governo austriaco*). The correspondence of Godefroy Redon de Belleville, who served as French consul in Livorno and Genoa, touches on most of the significant events in Italy from 1796 to 1799. Francesco Melzi d'Eril's papers (*Memorie-Documenti e Lettere Inedite*) form an essential record on the French occupation of Lombardy. Two further indispensable memoirs are those of Miot de Mérito – the French ambassador in Tuscany – and of Adjutant-General Jean Landrieux, the head of Bonaparte's secret service in Italy. Landrieux has left additional memoirs in a manuscript preserved at the *Bibliothèque Nationale de France*. The French spy Costa de Beauregard has left souvenirs (*Un homme d'autrefois*) devoted to the early stages of the Italian Campaign. Two financiers who accompanied the *Armée d'Italie* have also published their recollections: Honoré Duveyrier (*Anecdotes historiques*) and more significantly Antoine-Romain Hamelin ('Douze ans de ma vie' in *La Revue de Paris*).

I have also used certain primary sources on the Egyptian Campaign which specifically mention Bonaparte's negotiations with Admiral Sidney Smith or detail the itinerary of his return voyage to France. These include Louis Reybaud's *Histoire scientifique et militaire de l'expédition française en Égypte* which was published by former members of the scientific expedition to Egypt, Niello Sargy's *Mémoires sur l'expédition d'Égypte* and the *Histoire de l'expédition des français en Égypte* by the Lebanese official Nigulà ibn Yusufal-Turk (Nakoula el-Turk).

Documents

Most of the primary documents I have consulted are linked to economic and political matters. Pierre Caron's *La Commission de subsistances de l'an II*, for example, is the main source recording all the contracts and agreements made by the National Convention's subsistence committee to purchase food both in France and abroad and mentions several of Bonaparte's future collaborators. Jean-Jacques Rapinat, the civilian commissioner dispatched to Switzerland, published a summary of his mission (*Précis des opérations du*

Cen. Rapinat en Helvétie) which acknowledges the seizure of treasures and funds in Swiss cities. The eight volumes of the works (*Œuvres*) of Pierre-Louis Rœderer are a well-known source and include memoirs, letters, press articles, government decrees and proclamations and many other materials. Tome III contains Rœderer's recollections of the Brumaire coup. Félix Rocquain's *L'état de la France au 18 Brumaire* gathers all the investigative reports on the financial situation of France's different regions addressed by counsellors of state to Bonaparte following his accession to power.

Several other documents relating to banking and monetary theory chart the debates and tensions lurking in financial circles under the Directory. There were, for instance, numerous proposals to establish a national bank in France, such as those of Jacques-Annibal Ferrières (*Plan pour rétablir solidement les finances, et payer sur le champ en numéraire, les rentiers, les fonctionnaires publics, et insensiblement toutes les dettes de l'État*) and of Martin Philippe Mengin (*Plan de finances...*). A report on these projects was submitted by the financial administrator Lecointe-Puyraveau to the *Cinq-Cents* in 1799 (*Rapport fait par Lecointe-Puyraveau sur les projets de Banques*). A number of pamphlets and treatises were published as a result of the conflict opposing financiers who wanted to stake paper money on landed wealth and bankers who preferred to guarantee it with precious metals. Laffont-Ladébat's *Observations sur le crédit territorial* is a defence of the physiocratic model, while speeches delivered to the National Assembly early in the Revolution by Le Couteulx and Talleyrand back a more speculative-based system. Equally significant are the minutes of the meeting of bankers held at Bonaparte's residence shortly after the Brumaire coup (*Procès-verbal de la séance des banquiers et négociants convoqués chez le Consul Bonaparte le 3 Frimaire an VIII*). Last but not least, I have also referenced certain documents relating to the eradication of the *Banque de France*'s competitors, such as Soufflot de Mérey's *Précis sur la banque territoriale et moyen d'assurer sa liquidation avec utilité pour les créanciers, et sans perte pour les débiteurs*, and Louis Costaz's introductory report (*Rapport fait par Costaz, au nom de la section des finances, sur le projet de loi concernant les banques*) presented to the *Tribunat* prior to the passing of the law of April 14, 1803.

Newspapers

I have only drawn on a very limited selection of articles excerpted from contemporary newspapers of the Revolution. These include:

- The *Moniteur universel*, the revolutionary government's official press organ. Tomes XXVI-XXIX cover the directorial period.
- *La Décade philosophique*, which was directed at notables and intellectuals of the social elite.
- *La Gazette de France*, already one of the oldest newspapers in France by the advent of the Revolution, generally toed the government line.
- Pierre-Louis Rœderer's *Le journal de Paris*, one of the main pro-governmental papers.
- *L'ami des lois*, which became one of the Directory's unofficial press relays in ventôse Year VI.

III. Secondary Sources – Published Works

Even prior to World War Two, historians were already lamenting the fact that the Directory was widely viewed as a transitional or preparatory phase, stuck between the fall of Robespierre and the rise of Napoleon. This perception still lingers today despite a revival of interest in the period during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Moreover, not only is there a chronic dearth of good secondary sources on the Directory, but most of those that do exist either date from the French Third Republic – when a renewed zeal for republicanism made it popular to criticise the forces of reaction during the Revolution – or they were published during the first half of the nineteenth century when it was considered poor taste to denounce the exactions perpetrated by French armies and their commanders. In addition, there are comparatively few works on this period published in English or in other languages by non-French historians.

A. General Reference

For many years, the classic textbook on the Directory was Georges Lefebvre's *La France sous le Directoire : 1795-1799*, written for a course he instructed at the Sorbonne during the Nazi occupation of France in the early 1940s. His individual tomes on the Thermidorian Reaction and the Directory were issued together in an edition which remains popular (*Les Thermidoriens/Le Directoire*). The other recognised specialist of the period is Jacques Godechot, a disciple of Lefebvre and of Albert Mathiez. Godechot's PhD thesis, *Les commissaires aux armées sous le Directoire*, obtained the Prix Théroutan from the *Académie française* in 1937 and presents an in-depth investigation of relations between

generals and civilian commissioners during the Directory which delves into political, economic and military affairs. This work, whose two volumes number over a thousand pages, has proven an invaluable asset to my own research. Another of Godechot's books, *La vie quotidienne en France sous le Directoire*, develops a social perspective on the Directory. The standard text issued to French undergraduate students today is Denis Woronoff's *La République bourgeoise, de Thermidor à Brumaire 1794-1799*, while Thierry Lentz's *Le Grand Consulat : 1799-1804* contains a good overview of the causes of the Directory's downfall. The best modern general reference dictionary is the *Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française : 1789-1799* published under the direction of Jean Tulard. The *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, also edited by Tulard, is an excellent source for concise biographies of Napoleonic dignitaries and military officers (many of whom began their careers under the *Ancien Régime* or Revolution).

Among the multitude of nineteenth century works, let us note Adolphe Thiers's *Histoire de la Révolution française*, Jules Michelet's *Histoire de la Révolution française*, Hippolyte Taine's *Les origines de la France contemporaine* and the more anecdotal *Histoire de la société française pendant le Directoire* by the brothers Edmond and Jules de Goncourt. The three peerage inventories published by Albert Révérend (*Armorial du Premier empire / Anoblissements et pairies de la Restauration / Titres et confirmations de titres. Monarchie de Juillet à la 3^e République*) are useful for identifying ennobled financiers. Finally, two classics that stand out in the field of foreign affairs are Raymond Guyot's *Le Directoire et la paix de l'Europe* and Albert Sorel's eight-volume *L'Europe et la Révolution française*.

B. 18 Brumaire

The 18 Brumaire – the event which brought Napoleon to power – has attracted considerable interest from historians, and its political developments have been investigated quite meticulously. Albert Vandal's *L'Avènement de Bonaparte*, published under the French Third Republic, is one of the main studies presenting a critical approach to Napoleon. By contrast, Jacques Bainville's *Le dix-huit Brumaire* and Louis Madelin's *L'ascension de Bonaparte* are very sympathetic towards the Corsican general. Albert Espitalier's *Vers Brumaire : Bonaparte à Paris, 5 décembre 1797 – 4 mai 1798* adopts a more extended focus by retracing Bonaparte's actions prior to the coup. Some notable works of the post-war years include studies by Jean Thiry (*Le coup d'État du 18*

Brumaire), Albert Ollivier (*Le dix-huit Brumaire*) and Pierre Bessand-Massenet (*Le Dix-huit Brumaire*). The 1990s and 2000s have witnessed additional works published by Jean-Paul Bertaud (*1799, Bonaparte prend le pouvoir*), Jean Tulard (*Le 18 Brumaire. Comment terminer une révolution*) and most recently a somewhat revisionist account by Patrice Gueniffey (*Le Dix-huit Brumaire : L'épilogue de la Révolution française, 9-10 novembre 1799*). But the most authoritative study is undoubtedly Thierry Lentz's *Le 18 Brumaire : Les coups d'État de Napoléon Bonaparte*, which at nearly four hundred pages leaves practically no stone unturned.

C. Biographies

Napoleon's life has given rise to a seemingly inexhaustible supply of historical biographies. Some of those I have used for my research include Jacques Bainville's *Napoléon*, Philip G. Dwyer's *Napoleon: The Path to Power 1769-1799*, Patrice Gueniffey's *Bonaparte : 1769-1802*, Jean Tulard's *Napoléon ou le mythe du sauveur*, Pierre Lanfrey's *Histoire de Napoléon I^{er}*, Luigi Mascilli Migliorini's *Napoléon* and Henri Guillemin's *Napoléon, légende et vérité*.

Biographies of financiers under the Revolution are rare, but the available studies are generally of high quality. Not surprisingly, Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard is the one who has attracted the most attention. Jacques Wolff published an excellent biography of Ouvrard in the early 1990s (*Le Financier Ouvrard. 1770-1846. L'argent et la politique*), but the most detailed source remains Maurice Payard's *Le financier G.-J. Ouvrard, 1770-1846*. The only work on the elusive Michel brothers is André-Félix Aude's *Un ancien châtelain d'Azay-le-Ferron, Michel jeune, 1771-1852* which contains some interesting information on their careers. Jean-Frédéric Perregaux is poorly referenced, and the only widely accessible source to the public is Jean Lhomer's *Perrégaux et sa fille la duchesse de Raguse*, but half of it is devoted to Perregaux's daughter. Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx and the Le Couteulx dynasty have attracted more interest, including two excellent studies by Geneviève Daridan (*MM. Le Couteulx et Cie, banquiers à Paris : un clan familial dans la crise du XVIII^e siècle*) and Michel Zylberberg (*Capitalisme et catholicisme dans la France moderne. La dynastie Le Couteulx*). One of the best works on a military contractor is Jean Stern's *Le mari de Mademoiselle Lange, Michel-Jean Simons (1762-1833)*, which dates from before World War II but is still very useful. Charles Poisson's *Les Fournisseurs aux armées sous la Révolution française. Le Directoire des achats 1792-1793* deals with the

agency set up by the National Convention to purchase weapons, which precedes our period but nonetheless includes several bankers and military contractors who later flourished under the Directory.

Guy Antonetti's study on the *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* bank (*Une maison de banque à Paris au XVIII^e siècle, Greffulhe, Montz & Cie : 1789-1793*) is a crucial source for the speculations of financiers during the early Revolution and can be complemented with the opening chapters of S.R. Cope's *Walter Boyd. A Merchant Banker in the Age of Napoleon* – an excellent biography of the Scottish financier who managed the *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* bank and served as Pitt's agent in Paris. Françoise Kermina's recently published *Heurs et malheurs des grands argentiers* deals mostly with pre-revolutionary financiers but contains a good section on Ouvrard. Numerous other financiers are still desperately in need of a proper biography such as Barrillon, Basterrèche, Bodin, Carié, Collot, Davillier, Delessert, Doyen, Fulchiron, Hainguerlot, Haller, Seguin, Sévène, Tiberghien, Walkciers, etc.

On the other hand, there are numerous interesting biographies of politicians under the Directory. Talleyrand has been a favourite of many scholars, including two excellent recent publications by Emmanuel de Waresquiel (*Talleyrand : Le prince immobile* and *Talleyrand : Dernières nouvelles du Diable*), but the definitive biographies remain Georges Lacour-Gayet's four-volume study and Michel Poniatowski's *Talleyrand et le Directoire, 1796-1800*. Frédéric Masson's *Le Département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787-1804* is an extremely useful source covering not only Talleyrand's agents at the foreign ministry but also all that administration's personnel during the revolutionary and consular periods. Fouché has also attracted the notice of many scholars, such as Louis Madelin (*Fouché, de la Révolution à l'Empire*) and more famously Stefan Zweig. Sieyès has been well-covered, notably in Jean-Denis Bredin's *Sieyès. La clé de la Révolution française*. There is no comprehensive study of Barras despite serious attempts by Jean-Paul Garnier (*Barras, le roi du Directoire*) and Éric Le Nabour (*Barras, le vicomte rouge*). T.T. Höjer's *Bernadotte maréchal de France* continues to serve as the authority on Bernadotte, while Louis Bigard's *Le comte Réal, ancien jacobin* is the sole biography devoted to Pierre-François Réal. Arnaud Montier's *Robert Lindet* is a respectable work but over a hundred years old, while Michel Massie's *Le troisième consul Roger Ducos* is all but unfindable on the market. There are, however, several biographies of Cambacérès, many of which refer back to Pierre-François Pinaud's *Cambacérès : 1753-1824*.

Finally, the *Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France* has recently published a trilogy of detailed biographies on French foreign ministers from the Revolution to modern times of which the first volume edited by Guy Antonetti (*Les ministres des Finances*

de la Révolution française au Second Empire. Tome I : dictionnaire biographique, 1790-1814) is an essential reference for financial and monetary policy analysis, biographical details of ministers (Clavière, Cambon, Johannot, Faipoult, Ramel, Gaudin, Mollien, etc.) and especially primary source references (great lists of documents in various national, regional and notarial archives).

D. Economic issues

Researching the economic issues of the French Revolution requires investigating a wide range of sources and thus represents an arduous task, which partially explains why this field of inquiry continues to be neglected by modern scholarship. A suitable starting place to collect more information on sources is Arnaud de Maurepas's *Économie et finances au XIXe siècle : Guide du chercheur, 1789-1870*.

Nonetheless, there are a few indispensable works in the field. The three volumes of Jean Bouchary's *Les Manieurs d'argent à Paris à la fin du XVIIIe siècle* offer invaluable information on a selection of bankers who were mostly active prior to the advent of the Directory. Bouchary has also published a trilogy concentrating on financial companies (*Les compagnies financières à Paris à la fin du XVIIIe siècle*) which serves as a useful complement to his study of bankers. Herbert Lüthy's monumental *La Banque protestante en France : de la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes à la Révolution* is the bible regarding the development of protestant banking in France during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and charts the rise of financial networks all over Europe. Unfortunately, he ends his study at the outbreak of the Revolution, but it still constitutes essential background reading. Another standard is Louis Bergeron's *Banquiers, négociants et manufacturiers parisiens du directoire à l'empire*, which is focused on our period of interest and was the first book to explore in detail the history of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* and *Caisse d'escompte du Commerce*. The work which best demonstrates how Louis XV's financial administrators survived the Revolution and ended up serving Napoleon is Michel Bruguière's *Gestionnaires et profiteurs de la Révolution* which contains an extremely useful index of financiers. Bruguière's work carried over many of the same themes explored by John Francis Bosher's earlier *French Finances 1770-1795: From Business to Bureaucracy*.

No doubt the best general history of French finances in the eighteenth century is Marcel Marion's six-volume *Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715*. René Stourm's two-

volume *Les finances de l'Ancien Régime et de la Révolution* also provides an in-depth examination of economic and monetary policy and quotes extensively from debates in the legislative councils. It is complemented by Stourm's *Les finances du Consulat* – another regularly referenced source which reviews the economic structure of Bonaparte's first regime with great precision. François Hincker's *La Révolution française et l'économie : Décollage ou catastrophe?*, published for the Revolution's bicentenary, is very basic but contains some useful comparative charts.

Corruption and nepotism in the French Revolution were favourite themes of French Marxist historians – especially Albert Mathiez – who authored two ground-breaking studies on the subject (*La Corruption parlementaire sous la Terreur & Un Procès de Corruption sous La Terreur: L'Affaire de La Compagnie des Indes*). These two works still constitute essential reading for specialists. After lying dormant for many years, the topic was explored anew in Olivier Blanc's *La corruption sous la Terreur : 1792-1794*, which appeared in the early 1990s and makes excellent use of archival material to uncover opaque networks and intrigues. Frédéric Lenormand's *La pension Belhomme : Une prison de luxe sous la Terreur* contains some cursory information on financiers who were imprisoned for embezzlement. We should also note William Stinchcombe's *The XYZ Affair*, the most comprehensive account of one of Talleyrand's most notorious financial scandals.

Research on colonial trade and international and regional trading networks during the Revolution is scarce. François Crouzet's well-known *De la supériorité de l'Angleterre sur la France* explores the naval trading war between France and Great Britain. A more recent collection of essays (*La guerre, la mer et les affaires : Enjeux et réalités maritimes de la Révolution française*) offers a welcome update of these maritime themes. For the study of the shipping dynasties of Marseille, nothing can beat Charles Carrière's *Négociants marseillais au XVIII^e siècle*, although the commercial splendour of that city was devastated by the Revolution and only fully recovered in the nineteenth century. The Périer family, which dominated trade in the region of Grenoble, has been the subject of several works, notably Pierre Barral's *Les Périer dans l'Isère au XIX^e siècle*. The economic exploitation of Belgium is discussed in works such as Ivan Delatte's *La vente de biens nationaux dans le département de Jemmapes*, and has experienced a revival of late as witnessed by the publication of Mathieu de Oliveira's excellent *Les routes de l'argent: Réseaux et flux financiers de Paris à Hambourg: 1789-1815* and of the collective tome *Bonaparte et l'Escaut : le spectaculaire développement d'Anvers à l'époque française* (edited by Carl Depauw). Franco-Spanish networks are comprehensively

explored in Michel Zylberberg's *Une si douce domination. Les milieux d'affaires français et l'Espagne vers 1780-1808*.

A small number of studies have focused on specific banks or trading houses active during the Revolution. Henry Hope's Amsterdam trading house – *Hope & Co.* – has been expertly studied by Dutch historian Marten G. Buist (*At spes non fracta: Hope & Co. 1770-1815. Merchant Bankers and Diplomats at Work*) in a work commissioned by ABN-AMRO bank. Max Gérard devoted two volumes to the history of the Hottinguer bank (*MM. Hottinguer, banquiers à Paris*), while Barings of London has been investigated by Philip Ziegler (*The Sixth Great Power: Barings 1762–1929*). The financial establishments of Hamburg have also received attention. The Warburg bank is the subject of Eduard Rosenbaum's *M.M. Warburg & Co. Merchant Bankers of Hamburg, 1798-1938*, and a study of Berenberg bank (*Change is the only constant: Berenberg. A history of one of the world's oldest banks*) appeared in 2015 edited by a trio of German scholars.

Conflicts in the banking sector and the history of the *Banque de France* have been covered in several works of varying worth. By far the best study that charts the struggle over control of paper money emission during the Directory is Gilles Jacoud's *Le billet de banque en France, 1796-1803*. Jacoud's book skilfully deciphers the motivations and objectives of both private bankers and government officials. Romuald Szramkiewicz's *Les Régents et Censeurs de la Banque de France nommés sous le Consulat et l'Empire* constitutes an invaluable and authoritative encyclopaedia on the lives of all the financiers offered seats on the Regency Council of the *Banque de France*, and regroups information that would require months to collect elsewhere. Two well-known general histories of the French national bank from the 1920s are Robert Bigo's *La Caisse d'escompte (1776-1793) et les origines de la Banque de France* and Gabriel Ramon's *Histoire de la Banque de France d'après les sources originales*, while Louis Pommier's earlier *La Banque de France et l'État depuis sa création jusqu'à nos jours* is more obscure and less familiar.

Today's leading authority on Napoleon and his relation to money is Pierre Branda, whose *Le Prix de la gloire: Napoléon et l'argent* presents a definitive overview of Napoleonic finances. Branda has also published a recent collection of intriguing essays entitled *L'économie selon Napoléon*.

E. Political and Military issues

Certain histories of individual Italian states written by Italian authors provide useful information on Bonaparte's Italian Campaign. These include Nicomede Bianchi's *Storia della monarchia piemontese*, Francesco Cusani's *Storia di Milano* and Antonio Zobi's *Storia della Toscana dal 1737 al 1848*. Carlo Botta's *Histoire d'Italie de 1789 à 1814* is a highly-respected general study of the period, while Alfonso Lazzari's *La sommossa e il sacco di Lugo nel 1796* concentrates on the *Armée d'Italie*'s exactions in Lugo near Ravenna.

Of course, there is also a plethora of French sources covering the same subject, several of which are classics, such as Félix Bouvier's *Bonaparte en Italie*, Gabriel Fabry's *Histoire de l'Armée d'Italie*, André Fugier's *Napoléon et l'Italie* and Eugène Trolard's *De Montenotte au Pont d'Arcole*. Other studies like Adrien Fleury Dry's *Soldats ambassadeurs sous le Directoire* and Albert Dufourcq's *Le régime jacobin en Italie* focus on the political ramifications of the French occupation of Italy and establishment of sister republics. For the Egyptian Campaign I have used a limited selection of works, including Clément de La Jonquière's *L'Expédition d'Égypte* and Alfred Boulay de la Meurthe's *Le Directoire et l'expédition d'Égypte*. Simon Schama's *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813* is one of the few works that covers revolutionary developments in Holland.

Last but not least, espionage was an activity intimately linked to finance during the French Revolution. Two important books by Olivier Blanc – *Les espions de la Révolution et de l'Empire* and *Les hommes de Londres : Histoire secrète de la Terreur* – have done much to shed new light in this field. The operations of the British secret services have also attracted attention in the works of Harvey Mitchell (*The Underground War against Revolutionary France: The Missions of William Wickham, 1794-1800*), Michael Durey (*William Wickham, Master Spy: The Secret War Against the French Revolution*) and especially Elizabeth Sparrow (*Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815*).

APPENDIX II

Extracts from Napoleon's letters to Joseph in 1795

During most of the spring and summer of 1795, Napoleon spent much of his time scouring the surrounding regions of Paris in search of a property for his brother Joseph to invest in. Bonaparte was keen on the idea of speculating on the *assignat*'s value and making easy profits by purchasing land with depreciated *assignat* notes. In sum, he wanted to indulge in the same types of real estate deals which leading financiers were conducting at the time. He repeatedly suggested that Joseph invest part of his wife's dowry in such a scheme. But Joseph was reluctant to commit. Bonaparte's search was cut short when he was suddenly recalled to Paris by Barras to defend the Convention against the Insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire. His sudden rise in stature following this event dramatically changes the tone of his correspondence as the perspective of a greater ambition opens before him.

3 Prairial III/22 May 1795

“All day yesterday I was at the estate of Ragny¹ which I told you about in my previous letter. This estate which belongs to Mr. Montigny² is in the best area of Burgundy for wheat and pasture. It has five or six well-stocked warehouses and comprises 18 villages. It was leased for 48,000 livres in silver. Prior to the Revolution it received bids of 1,800,000 livres but Mr. Montigny wanted 2,200,000. He was offered 6,000,000 livres in assignats a month ago.

I have been able to obtain the sub-leasing agreements which I enclose and will give you a precise idea of what the land and its dependencies are worth. The château is the main pavilion and is in the modern style. The rest is made up of servants' accommodation [logis] and warehouses. By knocking down three or four turrets which confer it an aristocratic air, this château would become a beautiful and vast private house. There is a superb park for walking, a very beautiful garden and two grand and superb alleys (behind the château and around the estate).

There are large hedges in the foreground. This estate is such that you only need to desire it to acquire it. The fields can provide food for all the animals. The pavilion which I told you about is composed of a superb dining room four times larger than ours in Ajaccio, a beautiful salon, two bedrooms, a hallway, a gallery, cabinets and a nice kitchen. On the second floor: eight bedrooms and a gallery. The same on the third floor. On the fourth floor is the attic.

Walls, ceilings, chimneys – everything is new and in good condition.

The domain attached to the estate of Ragny contains 400 acres [journaux] of land. The selling price for an acre [journal] of land was previously 300 livres, which would make 230,000 livres. There are prairies for 80,000 livres. There are two ponds, vineyards and the park. The house must have cost 110,000 or 100,000 livres. That would have made it worth 260,000 livres in silver in prior days...It was sub-leased for 1,790 measures of wheat...

¹ Located in the modern town of La Roche-en-Bresil in the Côte d'Or.

² The Chartraire of Montigny.

You can set up a contract to buy the entire estate. If you were a man looking for a good deal, you would have to obtain a bill of exchange [traite], raise 8 million in assignats and come and buy this land which was worth at least a million and a half in silver. You could pocket two or three million through this operation.

Farewell, I have said enough. Arrange things as you see fit and according to your projects. My wish and counsel is that you invest 60,000 livres in silver from your wife's dowry in this asset.

PS: Best regards to your wife and Désirée...

[The Estate of] *Beauvoir*

12,0002 measure of wheat and 90 of oats – 5,723 livres.

Over 80 acres of woods – 6,723 livres in silver.

Beauvoir comprises 300 acres [journaux] of land (fields and woods) – 134,000 livres in silver total.

There is stone to build a house. There is wood already. The site is very beautiful and picturesque. It would probably be worth 600,000-900,000 in assignats. While we would be having the house built, we could go down to the Château of Ragny which is only half a league from Chagno.³ We could include a 4 or 5 year lease for the pavilion in the contract of sale. If we bought Ragny and Beauvoir together, we could probably get them at a cheaper price.”⁴

The land was sold before Joseph could buy it.⁵

A law of 31 May 1795 authorised buyers to acquire *biens nationaux* without putting them to auction on condition they advanced as a down payment – in *assignats* – 75 times what its annual rental value would have been in 1790. Given the *assignat*'s soaring inflation, this was a real giveaway which sparked an immediate rush on *biens nationaux*. The law was rapidly revoked.

18 Messidor III/6 July 1795

Bonaparte asks Joseph to help him find a firm which could ship silk owned by Bourrienne's trading house from Genoa to Leipzig:

“If you yourself can deliver the silk [to Leipzig] or find a trading house which can ship this merchandise using your credit...[Bourrienne's] trading house is reliable and will pay cash at the Leipzig fair. The trader [i.e. the expediter] will even be able to draw a bill of exchange on it, payable in Leipzig...The person making this demand does business in Germany and has correspondents in all the marketplaces there. I am in business with him. He is very trustworthy. His name is Fauvelet le Jeune [i.e.Fauvelet de Bourrienne].”⁶

In the same letter, he alerts Joseph to a striking property he has found:

“I have here a wonderful house, with wood panelling, parquet floors, laden with marble chimneys and mirrors, an immense park, garden, pavilion and vines in the

³ Chagnot – modern Champeau near Saulieu.

⁴ NBCG-1, n°298, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 3 prairial III/22 May 1795.

⁵ NBCG-1, n°308, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 6 messidor III/24 June 1795.

⁶ NBCG-1, n°309, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 18 messidor III/6 July 1795.

superb valley of Montmorency three leagues from Paris. It requires 700,000 livres. I have written to Citizen Rabien⁷ to sell the forty quintals of coffee you put at my disposal. I am going to [ask] him for the other eighty quintals. I will only conclude the purchase in seven to eight days and will have one month to pay 400,000 of these 600,000 livres. It is difficult to find landed estates. Everyone is buying them.”⁸

Unfortunately, Rabien refused to sell the coffee and Napoleon was unable to buy this estate.⁹

24 Messidor III/12 July 1795

“I have opened for [Fesch] a commercial counter here [in Paris]. We will send him porcelain sets composed of twelve cups plus attire which cost 1,200 livres in assignats here and that he can sell for twice that in Basel.”¹⁰

10 Thermidor III/28 July 1795

“Estates are very expensive here [Paris]. The principle [to acquire one] is as follows: the greater sum you invest the more you profit. To get a good deal, you would have to buy a property worth 2,400,000 francs...If you only want to invest 1,200,000 francs overall, you should buy at the full-price first and then sell parcels [of the estate] to small landowners...Your brother-in-law [Nicolas Clary] would have to agree to lend you 1,200,000 francs and acquire half the estate in his name. If he wants his money back after a month, it would be easy for you to pay him by selling a tenant farm and several parcels of land. If, by contrast, he wants to invest money, it is better to place all of it together rather than separately...If you can arrange this, you will be making a good deal. You can easily earn two million, twenty thousand francs of rent, a beautiful house and gardens with dependencies. There are people who carry out such business without even having the money, that is to say they want to invest a million and they buy for two million. They have three months to pay up since letters of ratification are required. Meanwhile, they sell a million worth of land and raise enough money to pay. All those to whom I have spoken advised me to buy for two million and sell afterwards.”¹¹

26 thermidor III/13 August 1795

Napoleon has just been attached to the *Comité de Salut public*'s topographical bureau for campaign planning and coordination of armies on 18 Aug. 1795.¹² He hopes to get Joseph a post as consul in Italy or the Levant:

“It is possible that you will obtain a post as consul in Italy. I am working on it.”¹³ /

“Once you hear that we've concluded peace with an Italian state, you can be certain you'll have a consulate.”¹⁴

10 fructidor III/27 Aug. 1795

“[If I go on mission to Turkey], you will come with me as consul in the Levant...[If I remain in Paris attached to the government], I will get you appointed consul in Naples. [If I go to the Armée d'Italie], we will see each other in Savona.”¹⁵

⁷ A Marseille trader.

⁸ NBCG-1, n°309, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 18 messidor III/6 July 1795.

⁹ NBCG-1, n°313, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 7 thermidor III/25 July 1795.

¹⁰ NBCG-1, n°310, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 24 messidor III/12 July 1795.

¹¹ NBCG-1, n°316, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 10 thermidor III/28 July 1795.

¹² NBCG-1, n°327, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 3 fructidor III/20 Aug. 1795.

¹³ NBCG-1, n°317, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 12 thermidor III/30 July 1795.

¹⁴ NBCG-1, n°323, *Napoleon to Merle d'Aubigné*, 26 thermidor III/13 August 1795.

¹⁵ NBCG-1, n°330, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 10 fructidor III/27 Aug. 1795.

Napoleon sent his letters to Joseph in Genoa via the private postal agency established by Merle d'Aubigné in Geneva.¹⁶

10 fructidor III/27 Aug. 1795

*"I have found a property located along the Seine six leagues from Paris where there is a very beautiful house containing living rooms, an independent dining room, kitchen, cabinet, office, master bedroom, courtyard. On the first floor, four apartments coupled with those of Madame, a garden of 9 acres, 1,000 feet of fruit trees, a perspective [plan] of 30 acres...an enclosure of 14 acres, fields, 90 acres of woods. The opening bid is 900,000 [francs]. It may go up to 1,200,000."*¹⁷

15 fructidor III/1 Sep. 1795

*"Tomorrow is the adjudication for the estate I want to buy you. It is located 9 leagues from Paris near Saint-Arnoult-sur-la-Seine, near Melun. There are very beautiful buildings built only 18 years ago, gardens, a vegetable garden, 32 acres of park, near woods, arable land, the entire estate comprising 153 acres. Very good windmills for which the old rental lease was for 600 francs. It cost 145,000 francs in 1791. The adjudication is currently for 900,000 francs. I intend to go up to 1,500,000 francs. 6,000 piasters are worth 1,200,000 francs today.¹⁸ I will draw one or two thousand piasters on Genoa from Oudibert, a trader here [in Paris]...If I get the estate for 1,600,000 francs, that would be 7,600 piasters, that's to say nearly 35,000 francs. For 35,000 francs, you will therefore have an estate worth 145,000. You would earn over 100,000 francs in this deal and by keeping the land until the assignat disappears and selling it afterwards, you would have 135,000."*¹⁹

The estate was sold on 16 fructidor III/2 Sep. 1795 for 3,000,000 francs in *assignats*. After this, Napoleon despaired of buying property for his brother since land prices were increasing. He suggested Joseph invest in merchandise or porcelain.²⁰

17 & 20 fructidor III/3 & 6 Sep. 1795

*"I have obtained a position for Fesch [at Huningue] in the transports of the Armée du Rhin [for] 800 livres per month and three rations of bread and meat."*²¹

Fesch turned down the position, leading Napoleon to comment that *"it's a sign he doesn't lack of anything."*²²

25 fructidor III/11 Sep. 1795

*"Fesch must have received 10,000 francs worth of livres which he will sell at Basel, allowing him to double his capital."*²³

29 fructidor III/15 Sep. 1795

"I have found two estates in Beauce near Blois. The first is selling for 1,800,000 francs and comprises 156 acres of arable land and 8 acres fields, a house and two

¹⁶ NBCG-1, n°323, *Napoleon to Merle d'Aubigné*, 26 thermidor III/13 August 1795.

¹⁷ NBCG-1, n°330, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 10 fructidor III/27 Aug. 1795.

¹⁸ Napoleon had received a letter of credit for 6,000 piasters from Joseph on 21 thermidor III/8 Aug. 1795 (*Ibid*, n°327, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 3 fructidor III/20 Aug. 1795).

¹⁹ NBCG-1, n°334, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 15 fructidor III/1 Sep. 1795.

²⁰ NBCG-1, n°335, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 17 fructidor III/3 Sep. 1795.

²¹ NBCG-1, n°s335 & 337, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 17 & 20 fructidor III/3 & 6 Sep. 1795.

²² NBCG-1, n°338, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 21 fructidor III/7 Sep. 1795.

²³ NBCG-1, n°340, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 25 fructidor III/11 Sep. 1795.

windmills and another beautiful house, 120 acres of land, 80 acres of marshes flaunted as the best quality – at the least, this would have yielded 3,000 francs [annual rent] in 1790.

The second is the Château of Périgny, comprising a park of 20 acres, woods of tall timber, 10 acres of arable land, 3 acres of vineyards, 30 acres of arable land, 74 acres of woods, 8 acres of gardens plus a courtyard and house with water reservoirs, a windmill – in total at least 28 national acres [arpents nationaux]. They are asking for 1,600,000 francs. It is located between Blois and Vendôme. Twenty staging posts from Paris. I will wager 1,500,000 francs for the first estate, 1,300,000 for the second. I don't think that will suffice.”²⁴

1 vendémiaire IV/23 Sep. 1795

“A large estate is being sold at Provins between Nogent-sur-Seine and Paris. There are 28 lots. I'm going to see if there's a house with lots attached. The setting is superb, 22 leagues from Paris in beautiful country.”²⁵

5 vendémiaire IV/27 Sep. 1795

“The Comité de Salut public has decreed that the topographical bureau should sign a contract to complete the Armée d'Italie's ink supply. Mr. Clary [Joseph's brother-in-law] has ten days to write to Nice, offer the supply and claim payment. That shouldn't cause too many difficulties.”²⁶

19 vendémiaire IV/11 Oct. 1795

Napoleon has just played a major role in crushing the royalist insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire and writes to Joseph informing him of the appointments his newfound influence has enabled him to make:

“I've been named by decree general second-in-command of the Armée de l'Intérieur, Barras having been named commander-in-chief...I've had Chauvet appointed chief ordnance officer. Fesch is general agent for hospitals... You [Joseph] will be named consul as soon as peace is signed... [André] Ramolino²⁷ has been made inspector of transports at Marseille.”²⁸

28 frimaire IV/19 Dec. 1795

“The Treasury, Citizen Minister, should have paid 25 million for the forage of the army since the 25th. But three days later, it still persists in its system of depriving the Armée de l'Intérieur. I pray you, Citizen Minister, if it is true the army is deliberately being starved through a malevolent scheme, to harry the Treasury officials so forcefully that they will finally be obliged to reveal themselves.”²⁹

22 nivôse IV/12 Jan. 1796

“I have sent the family fifty to sixty thousand livres in assignats, 800 livres in silver and black ribbons and chiffons.”³⁰

²⁴ NBCG-1, n°342, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 29 fructidor III/15 Sep. 1795.

²⁵ NBCG-1, n°343, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 1 vendémiaire IV/23 Sep. 1795.

²⁶ NBCG-1, n°344, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 5 vendémiaire IV/27 Sep. 1795.

²⁷ Cousin of Letizia Bonaparte.

²⁸ NBCG-1, n°349, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 19 vendémiaire IV/11 Oct. 1795.

²⁹ NBCG-1, n°378, *Napoleon to finance minister Faipoult*, 28 frimaire IV/19 Dec. 1795.

³⁰ NBCG-1, n°397, *Napoleon to Joseph*, 22 nivôse IV/12 Jan. 1796.

3 germinal IV/23 March 1796

“The département of the Bouches-du-Rhône is not active enough. Neither the forced loan [of 1795], nor the grain contribution, nor the law of 7 vendémiaire on the contribution of farms, nor the horse levy – nothing has been initiated.”³¹

4 germinal IV/24 March 1796

“I have received, Citizens, your letter concerning the measures you are taking to activate the collection of the forced loan [of 1795]. This is an essential service you are rendering the country and the army. Lift all obstacles and promptly collect funds which are so vital to the army.”³²

7 germinal IV/27 March 1796

“It is said the Genoese are offering three million. My advice is to take it without causing a fuss and continue to live in amicable peace with this republic whose enmity would harm our commerce and supplies and hamper our military plans.”³³

8 germinal IV/28 March 1796

“The four départements attached to the army’s division have neither paid the forced loan, nor their grain contributions, nor their contingent of forage required by the law of 7 vendémiaire, nor begun to levy every thirtieth horse...The state of the army’s administration is distressing but not desperate. I am forced to threaten agents who have stolen much and have lots of credit, and I extract a great deal by eventually caressing them. The army will henceforth eat good bread and will have meat, and it has already received considerable advances on its loan in arrears.”³⁴

12 germinal IV/1 April 1796

The *Compagnie Navarre, Roy et Barry* supplied hay for the *Armée d’Italie*’s horses. Wheat was supplied by the *Compagnie Flosque*.³⁵

³¹ NBCG-1, n°418, *Napoleon to Barras*, 3 germinal IV/23 March 1796 – The law of 7 vendémiaire IV/13 Nov. 1795 regulated grain requisitions and was intended to improve the efficiency of raising military supplies.

³² NBCG-1, n°419, *Napoleon to the municipal administration of Marseille*, 4 germinal IV/24 March 1796.

³³ NBCG-1, n°422, *Napoleon to Faipoult*, 7 germinal IV/27 March 1796.

³⁴ NBCG-1, n°426, *Napoleon to the Directory*, 8 germinal IV/28 March 1796.

³⁵ NBCG-1, n°421, *Napoleon to chief ordnance officer Chauvet*, 7 germinal IV/27 March 1796 & n°453, *Napoleon to chief ordnance officer Sucy*, 12 germinal IV/1 April 1796.

APPENDIX III

The Finances of Bonaparte's 1796-1797 Italian Campaign

I. Contributions imposed on the provinces of Piedmont and Italy, funds seized in public coffers, etc. From the entry of the French army in Italy to the recall of civilian commissioners (December 20, 1796 / 30 frimaire an V)

Provenance	Tax intake in French currency	Funds employed by the army's paymaster-general	Various Expenses
Piedmont	1,176,968	1,031,597	145,371
Austrian imperial fiefs	158,693	105,170	53,523
Lombardy	18,536,439	18,536,439	-
Parma	1,980,119	1,980,119	-
Modena	7,342,370	4,237,693	3,104,677
Bologna	2,000,000	2,000,000	-
Ferrara	433,084	433,084	-
Rome	5,029,189	-	5,029,189
Mantua	419,904	419,904	-
Massa, Carrara, Lucca	340,600	-	340,600
Livorno	1,877,350	537,714	1,339,639
Public coffers	4,032,396	4,032,396	-
Partial contributions	138,607	138,607	-
Seized enemy property	979,849	979,849	-
Various taxes	1,260,922	1,260,922	-
Silverware - See Table II	-	-	-
Total	45,706,493	35,693,494	10,012,999

Source: AN, AF/III/198, dossier 911, Pièce 27 – *Tableau général récapitulatif, visé par Garrau, commissaire du Gouvernement près les armées d'Italie et des Alpes, de la recette et de l'emploi des contributions levées sur l'Italie et des saisies opérées depuis l'entrée de l'armée en Italie jusqu'au 30 frimaire an V* (Reproduced in Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.572).

**II. Silver ingots, plate, jewellery, diamonds, etc. seized in Italy
From the arrival of the French army in Italy to the recall of the civilian
commissioners (December 20, 1796 / 30 frimaire an V)**

Provenance	Quantity	Use	Estimated Value
Bologna <i>Contributions</i> <i>Monte-di-pièta</i>	40 cases of ingots 14 cases of jewels	Ceded to the <i>Compagnie Flachet</i> by the banker Emmanuel Balbi at Genoa	5,261,129
Ferrara <i>Contributions</i> <i>Monte-di-pièta</i>	17 cases of plate 11 cases of jewels		
Faenza <i>Contributions</i> <i>Contributions</i> <i>Monte-di-pièta</i>	6 cases of ingots 20 cases of plate 12 cases of jewels		
Milan <i>Monte-di-pièta</i>	21 cases of jewels & diamonds	Melted by Balbi	2,015 (jewels) / 500,000 (diamonds)
Lodi <i>Monte-di-pièta</i>	5 cases of plate		427,583
Parma <i>Monte-di-pièta</i>	7 cases of plate		-
Tortona <i>Monte-di-pièta</i>	5 cases of plate		-
Piacenza <i>Monte-di-pièta</i>	Ingots	Sold by Balbi	912,993
Pavia, Cherasco, Como	4 cases of ingots	Ceded to the <i>Compagnie Flachet</i> by Balbi	-
Rome	-	-	5,029,189
Total			12,132,909

Source: AN, AF/III/198, dossier 911, Pièce 26 – *État de l'argenterie, bijoux, diamants, etc., provenant des contributions, des monts-de-piété et des saisies, avec indication de leur emploi, sans date/undated* (Reproduced in Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.573).

III. State of contributions levied on conquered lands in Italy
Compiled by Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller
(Presumed Date: 25 May 1797 / 7 prairial V)

Provenance	Tax intake (prix)	Administrative Services (service des administrations)	Potential intake (éventuel)
Romagna	-	1,000,000	-
Silverware from churches	1,500,000	-	1,000,000
Silverware from Rome	-	300,000 approximately	-
Silverware from Verona	-	160,000	-
Gold ingots	600,000	-	-
Sale of Trieste	-	600,000	250,000
San Marino & (<i>illegible word</i>)	-	500,000 for arrears	-
Contributions from Venice	2,000,000	-	-
Contributions from Rome	7,000,000	2,000,000	250,000 + requisition costs
Hungarian College	-	750,000	-
Comacchio	-	500,000	500,000 for arrears
Remaining sums from Lombardy	-	1,800,000	2,000,000
Tobacco from Ferrara	-	508,000	
Contributions from Verona	-	500,000	-
Mantuan taxes	-	200,000	-
Merila (<i>illegible word</i>)	1,000,000	2,000,000	-
Total	12,100,000	10,818,000 in fructidor	

Source: Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er}, Tome III, n°1834, États des contributions. Levées sur les pays conquis en Italie, présumé du 7 prairial an V/25 mai 1797.

APPENDIX IV

The Caisse des Comptes Courants

Table I – Volume of Funds Discounted by the Caisse des Comptes Courants					
Date	Amount (francs)	Dividend (francs)	Date	Amount (francs)	Dividend (francs)
24 Brumaire V	369,000	N/A	17 Messidor V	2,448,022	9,335.1
28 Brumaire V	295,000	1,110.19	21 Messidor V	1,640,221	6,336.14
4 Frimaire V	391,000	1,493	24 Messidor V	1,625,213	6,131.2
8 Frimaire V	245,000	810	27 Messidor V	1,891,258	7,441.5
14 Frimaire V	307,000	1,063	1 Thermidor V	1,040,612	4,268.19
18 Frimaire V	127,560	464.19	4 Thermidor V	1,341,261	5,427.6
28 Frimaire V	462,300	1,640	7 Thermidor V	872,205	3,402.13
4 Nivôse V	339,763	1,201.4	11 Thermidor V	1,221,112	4,844.12
8 Nivôse V	307,316	1,089.17	14 Thermidor V	1,481,277	5,985.7
14 Nivôse V	470,818	1,637.10	17 Thermidor V	1,266,237	5,015.43
18 Nivôse V	410,224	1,489.6	21 Thermidor V	919,681	3,782.14
24 Nivôse V	493,397	1,876.14	24 Thermidor V	978,412	3,988.14
28 Nivôse V	504,109	1,714.18	27 Thermidor V	1,331,836	5,338.8
4 Pluviôse V	560,864	1,953.19	1 Fructidor V	750,412	2,866.5
13 Pluviôse V	439,994	1,431.4	4 Fructidor V	889,504	3,183.16
17 Pluviôse V	391,523	1,311.10	7 Fructidor V	895,062	3,270.12
23 Pluviôse V	271,160	846.18	11 Fructidor V	1,004,453	3,651.17
27 Pluviôse V	784,360	2,403.5	14 Fructidor V	1,440,028	5,504.2
3 Ventôse V	628,350	2,010.5	17 Fructidor V	1,172,203	4,202.6
7 Ventôse V	689,316	2,268.12	24 Fructidor V	547,185	2,014.13
13 Ventôse V	912,737	3,164.2	27 Fructidor V	869,299	3,181.12
17 Ventôse V	716,545	2,285.15	1 ^{er} jour comp. V	1,135,441	4,032.2
23 Ventôse V	638,434	2,072.13	4 ^e jour comp. V	895,240	3,317.7
27 Ventôse V	648,680	2,227.6	2 Vendémiaire VI	855,416	2,933.10
3 Germinal V	944,697	3,215.8	4 Vendémiaire VI	795,877	2,771.12
7 Germinal V	1,137,206	3,996.8	7 Vendémiaire VI	862,233	3,308.2
13 Germinal V	434,355	1,420.3	11 Vendémiaire VI	892,491	3,306.7
17 Germinal V	705,660	2,282.16	14 Vendémiaire VI	735,575	2,613.8
23 Germinal V	832,072	2,487.17	17 Vendémiaire VI	1,319,422	4,966.4
27 Germinal V	957,938	2,880.3	21 Vendémiaire VI	1,309,269	4,586.14
3 Floréal V	1,074,194	3,487.1	24 Vendémiaire VI	1,093,712	3,949.2
7 Floréal V	1,037,156	3,477.1	27 Vendémiaire VI	1,172,943	4,323.11
13 Floréal V	1,336,487	4,515.3	1 Brumaire VI	1,083,586	3,953.3
17 Floréal V	992,754	3,310.3	4 Brumaire VI	873,175	3,428.17
23 Floréal V	1,161,948	3,830.1	7 Brumaire VI	1,359,100	5,105.4
27 Floréal V	1,129,309	3,725.1	11 Brumaire VI	1,210,346	4,902.13
3 Prairial V	1,615,354	5,381.1	14 Brumaire VI	1,175,323	4,599.5
7 Prairial V	1,590,736	5,327.9	17 Brumaire VI	1,173,312	4,636.4
13 Prairial V	1,729,331	5,881.4	21 Brumaire VI	1,130,462	4,514.7
17 Prairial V	2,028,960	6,910.5	24 Brumaire VI	1,169,005	1,625.16
23 Prairial V	1,780,764	6,377.15	27 Brumaire VI	1,354,447	5,039.13
27 Prairial V	2,098,581	7,454.18	1 Frimaire VI	1,272,887	5,219.17
3 Messidor V	1,909,598	6,633.11	4 Frimaire VI	1,000,175	3,976.3
7 Messidor V	1,731,210	6,131.1	7 Frimaire VI	1,252,126	4,893.45
13 Messidor V	2,000,890	7,269.18	11 Frimaire VI	1,326,112	5,555.2

Table I – Volume of Funds Discounted by the Caisse des Comptes Courants

Date	Amount (francs)	Dividend (francs)	Date	Amount (francs)	Dividend (francs)
14 Frimaire VI	1,001,654	3,979.14	4 Prairial VI	1,574,072	5,919.2
17 Frimaire VI	1,169,217	4,558.5	7 Prairial VI	1,813,577	6,627.5
21 Frimaire VI	1,140,409	4,493.17	11 Prairial VI	1,685,310	6,367.4
24 Frimaire VI	1,187,011	4,521.11	14 Prairial VI	1,475,580	5,689.15
27 Frimaire VI	1,156,737	4,198.3	17 Prairial VI	1,784,455	6,692.14
1 Nivôse VI	1,327,582	5,300.12	21 Prairial VI	2,187,830	8,468.18
4 Nivôse VI	890,128	3,482.12	24 Prairial VI	1,429,970	5,853.16
7 Nivôse VI	958,897	3,651.18	27 Prairial VI	1,828,102	7,509.8
11 Nivôse VI	1,086,753	3,927.10	1 Messidor VI	1,512,993	6,526.13
14 Nivôse VI	1,362,839	5,184.7	4 Messidor VI	1,509,102	6,405.2
17 Nivôse VI	1,608,768	5,952.7	7 Messidor VI	1,730,277	7,098.6
21 Nivôse VI	1,467,581	5,431.2	11 Messidor VI	1,726,023	7,002.12
24 Nivôse VI	1,329,015	5,162.2	14 Messidor VI	1,697,758	6,899.19
27 Nivôse VI	1,496,086	5,853.3	17 Messidor VI	1,979,658	8,065.7
1 Pluviôse VI	1,805,706	7,272.3	21 Messidor VI	2,040,724	8,430.4
4 Pluviôse VI	1,393,556	5,588.1	24 Messidor VI	Closed for 14 July	
7 Pluviôse VI	1,513,078	6,203.15	27 Messidor VI	1,864,399	7,169.7
11 Pluviôse VI	1,803,083	7,635.16	1 Thermidor VI	1,927,728	7,640.1
14 Pluviôse VI	1,313,991	5,427.6	4 Thermidor VI	1,791,640	7,106.14
17 Pluviôse VI	1,441,956	5,912.4	7 Thermidor VI	1,717,347	6,636.1
21 Pluviôse VI	1,572,557	6,489.18	11 Thermidor VI	1,562,662	5,941.9
24 Pluviôse VI	1,218,264	5,201.6	14 Thermidor VI	1,757,281	6,404.19
27 Pluviôse VI	1,409,201	5,931	17 Thermidor VI	1,863,685	7,175.8
1 Ventôse VI	1,461,062	6,234	21 Thermidor VI	2,104,516	8,193.1
4 Ventôse VI	1,166,072	4,581.1	24 Thermidor VI	2,031,655	8,197.6
7 Ventôse VI	1,385,419	5,645.1	27 Thermidor VI	2,612,733	10,526.5
11 Ventôse VI	1,481,289	6,179.2	1 Fructidor VI	2,494,548	10,099.1
14 Ventôse VI	1,317,910	5,373.9	4 Fructidor VI	2,088,061	8,592.4
17 Ventôse VI	1,317,502	5,317.13	7 Fructidor VI	2,259,291	9,403.1
21 Ventôse VI	1,268,920	5,176.11	11 Fructidor VI	1,971,775	7,889
24 Ventôse VI	1,550,475	6,480.15	14 Fructidor VI	2,366,412	9,643.12
27 Ventôse VI	1,248,006	5,000.19	17 Fructidor VI	2,194,040	9,253.19
1 Germinal VI	1,221,424	4,937.19	21 Fructidor VI	2,188,736	8,771.15
4 Germinal VI	1,145,316	4,561.14	24 Fructidor VI	2,290,745	9,470
7 Germinal VI	1,195,233	4,452.1	27 Fructidor VI	2,048,129	8,376.17
11 Germinal VI	1,133,228	4,391.7	1 ^{er} jour compl. VI	2,204,502	9,536
14 Germinal VI	1,149,967	4,302.17	3 ^e jour comp. VI	1,572,094	6,477.19
17 Germinal VI	1,335,215	5,131.1	2 Vendémiaire VII	1,998,203	8,560.18
21 Germinal VI	1,200,338	4,416.16	4 Vendémiaire VII	1,831,128	8,193.61
24 Germinal VI	1,308,464	4,729.7	7 Vendémiaire VII	2,009,319	8,175
27 Germinal VI	1,492,974	5,536.4	11 Vendémiaire VII	1,822,476	7,549.18
1 Floréal VI	1,340,350	4,646.1	14 Vendémiaire VII	1,958,585	8,809
4 Floréal VI	1,631,124	5,801.18	17 Vendémiaire VII	1,875,908	7,915.69
7 Floréal VI	1,366,299	4,986.12	21 Vendémiaire VII	2,160,895	8,713.54
11 Floréal VI	1,553,144	5,565.11	24 Vendémiaire VII	1,821,315	6,936.24
14 Floréal VI	1,686,727	6,030.1	27 Vendémiaire VII	2,480,515	9,855.93
17 Floréal VI	1,559,792	5,544.11	1 Brumaire VII	2,031,150	8,044.26
21 Floréal VI	1,348,502	4,767.18	4 Brumaire VII	1,748,096	7,400.8
24 Floréal VI	1,503,948	5,331.1	7 Brumaire VII	1,844,125	7,142.23
27 Floréal VI	1,773,319	6,516	11 Brumaire VII	1,680,009	6,528.3
1 Prairial VI	2,013,339	7,399.2	14 Brumaire VII	1,470,382	5,590.6

Table I – Volume of Funds Discounted by the Caisse des Comptes Courants

Date	Amount (francs)	Dividend (francs)	Date	Amount (francs)	Dividend (francs)
17 Brumaire VII	1,805,728	6,929.26	14 Floréal VII	910,942	4,478.7
21 Brumaire VII	1,817,732	6,626.76	17 Floréal VII	973,761	5,289.25
27 Brumaire VII	Monneron Scandal		21 Floréal VII	670,222	3,367.58
8 Frimaire VII	1,317,651	4,644.37	24 Floréal VII	1,103,818	5,131.95
11 Frimaire VII	1,682,740	5,287.29	27 Floréal VII	677,616	3,361.78
14 Frimaire VII	1,472,252	6,142.28	1 Prairial VII	918,441	3,777.73
17 Frimaire VII	1,873,618	8,141	4 Prairial VII	1,107,298	4,753.55
21 Frimaire VII	1,707,844	3,723.5	7 Prairial VII	1,029,222	4,775.23
24 Frimaire VII	1,150,951	4,531.63	11 Prairial VII	1,219,553	5,654.26
27 Frimaire VII	1,094,139	4,572.76	14 Prairial VII	1,153,354	5,630.47
1 Nivôse VII	962,491	3,883.94	17 Prairial VII	1,177,113	5,018.98
4 Nivôse VII	1,183,403	4,672.92	21 Prairial VII	1,117,034	5,080.36
7 Nivôse VII	1,056,001	3,897.52	24 Prairial VII	893,026	3,590.94
10 Nivôse VII	2 nd caisse foundation		27 Prairial VII	1,183,347	4,838.97
11 Nivôse VII	801,841	N/A	1 Messidor VII	921,911	3,827.24
14 Nivôse VII	703,531	2,879.75	4 Messidor VII	762,600	3,229.18
17 Nivôse VII	739,657	2,957.34	7 Messidor VII	916,325	3,745.51
21 Nivôse VII	627,012	2,186.78	11 Messidor VII	811,684	3,448.91
24 Nivôse VII	952,571	3,306.7	14 Messidor VII	966,158	8,374.26
27 Nivôse VII	661,696	2,694.94	17 Messidor VII	793,517	3,886.79
1 Pluviôse VII	779,539	2,765.58	21 Messidor VII	812,711	3,213.21
4 Pluviôse VII	842,165	3,049.4	24 Messidor VII	1,135,453	6,874.92
7 Pluviôse VII	719,236	2,612.99	27 Messidor VII	1,027,536	5,350.11
11 Pluviôse VII	857,971	3,132.87	1 Thermidor VII	882,714	4,087.93
14 Pluviôse VII	698,790	2,356.16	4 Thermidor VII	642,636	2,431.5
17 Pluviôse VII	948,884	3,903.54	7 Thermidor VII	583,255	2,277.33
21 Pluviôse VII	497,113	2,033.69	11 Thermidor VII	569,044	2,369.41
24 Pluviôse VII	779,343	2,868	14 Thermidor VII	699,115	2,227.23
27 Pluviôse VII	619,067	2,394.88	17 Thermidor VII	710,302	3,180.20
1 Ventôse VII	696,387	2,738.99	21 Thermidor VII	1,057,484	4,725.27
4 Ventôse VII	934,823	3,666.65	24 Thermidor VII	678,371	2,472.45
7 Ventôse VII	672,911	3,150.21	27 Thermidor VII	959,299	3,907.98
11 Ventôse VII	882,226	4,092.86	1 Fructidor VII	543,538	2,070.84
14 Ventôse VII	557,129	2,514.1	4 Fructidor VII	747,633	2,720.3
17 Ventôse VII	1,116,294	5,961.87	7 Fructidor VII	701,798	2,653.85
21 Ventôse VII	795,817	4,144.36	11 Fructidor VII	764,186	2,652.61
24 Ventôse VII	944,367	4,619.32	14 Fructidor VII	841,340	3,456.81
27 Ventôse VII	725,405	4,203.6	16 Fructidor VII	827,012	3,335.17
1 Germinal VII	883,504	4,700.14	21 Fructidor VII	800,924	3,160.61
4 Germinal VII	810,102	4,107.75	24 Fructidor VII	368,850	1,465.1
7 Germinal VII	779,922	4,367.41	27 Fructidor VII	401,785	1,402.76
11 Germinal VII	834,998	4,393.95	1 ^e jour comp. VII	415,243	1,444.65
14 Germinal VII	1,405,429	6,827.69	4 ^e jour comp. VII	450,229	1,574.8
17 Germinal VII	1,627,580	8,643.13	2 Vendémiaire VIII	570,113	2,678.7
21 Germinal VII	884,046	4,713.72	4 Vendémiaire VIII	589,581	2,199.55
24 Germinal VII	1,270,380	6,582.77	7 Vendémiaire VIII	805,462	5,753.2
27 Germinal VII	893,799	4,354.25	11 Vendémiaire VIII	511,982	2,011.8
1 Floréal VII	1,331,272	8,210.67	14 Vendémiaire VIII	344,129	1,514.66
4 Floréal VII	1,280,519	7,343.47	17 Vendémiaire VIII	554,764	2,356.94
7 Floréal VII	905,761	4,437.31	21 Vendémiaire VIII	281,772	964.14
11 Floréal VII	1,188,484	5,516.67	24 Vendémiaire VIII	346,454	N/A

Table I – Volume of Funds Discounted by the Caisse des Comptes Courants

Date	Amount (francs)	Dividend (francs)	Date	Amount (francs)	Dividend (francs)
27 Vendémiaire VIII	451,960	2,024.8	4 Brumaire VIII	327,290	1,361.97
11 Brumaire VIII	622,581	3,747.5	7 Brumaire VIII	243,464	1,168.4
14 Brumaire VIII	328,733	2,232.77	4 Nivôse VIII	471,138	2,404.41
17 Brumaire VIII	596,963	3,598.2	7 Nivôse VIII	918,383	5,908.58
Coup of 18-19 Brumaire			11 Nivôse VIII	237,217	1,247.22
21 Brumaire VIII	221,245	877.29	14 Nivôse VIII	321,141	1,792.4
24 Brumaire VIII	330,600	1,915	17 Nivôse VIII	721,719	4,794.69
27 Brumaire VIII	321,143	1,857.22	21 Nivôse VIII	335,095	1,372.4
1 Frimaire VIII	189,312	972.25	24 Nivôse VIII	1,433,463	10,003.46
4 Frimaire VIII	1,097,804	9,025.26	27 Nivôse VIII	723,634	3,619.11
7 Frimaire VIII	509,038	2,577.5	1 Pluviôse VIII	498,195	2,383.41
11 Frimaire VIII	335,662	1,663.11	4 Pluviôse VIII	447,359	2,367
14 Frimaire VIII	1,162,791	7,911	7 Pluviôse VIII	956,980	5,959.13
17 Frimaire VIII	544,867	3,361.9	11 Pluviôse VIII	447,480	2,373
21 Frimaire VIII	332,721	1,891.3	14 Pluviôse VIII	584,846	3,377.5
24 Frimaire VIII	463,522	2,881.29	17 Pluviôse VIII	853,581	5,541.15
27 Frimaire VIII	351,901	1,833.61	21 Pluviôse VIII	399,911	2,277.8
1 Nivôse VIII	351,094	1,959.3	24 Pluviôse VIII	213,369	1,150.17
1 Brumaire VIII	373,000	1,478.32			

The *caisse*'s shareholders voted to merge with the *Banque de France* on 26 Pluviôse VIII/15 Feb. 1800.

Sources: ABF, *PVRCA-1* & *PVRCA-2*.

Table II – Administrators of the First Caisse des Comptes Courants (listed by order of admittance to the board)

Name	Domiciled Address	Parisian Section	Date Elected	End of Mandate
Joseph François Augustin Monneron	1037, Rue Saint Dominique	Fontaine de Grenelle	11 Messidor IV	27 Brumaire VII*
Jean François Godard	Rue Saint Honoré	Champs-Élysées	11 Messidor IV	3 Messidor V (resigned – ill health)
Jean Devaines	25, Rue de la Révolution	Champs-Élysées	12 Messidor IV†	12 Vendémiaire VIII
Charles Augustin Follope (de Caudebec)	Caudebec (Seine-inférieure)	-	14 Thermidor IV	12 Brumaire V
Louis-Céleste de Talhouët	?	?	26 Thermidor IV	9 Vendémiaire an V
Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu	56, Rue Saint Honoré / Place Vendôme	Champs-Élysées / Place Vendôme	29 Thermidor IV	12 Brumaire V
Pierre-Laurent Hainguerlot	77 Rue Saint Lazare	Le Pelletier (?)	1 Fructidor IV	12 Brumaire V
Aimé Gabriel Fulchiron	668, Rue Helvétius	La Butte des Moulins	1.) 12 Brumaire V 2.) 25 Ventôse VIII	1.) 10 Nivôse VII 2.) 30 Pluviôse VIII
Pierre Joseph Fleury Jubié	2, Place de la Concorde	Champs-Élysées	12 Brumaire V†	30 Pluviôse VIII
Jacques-Rose Récamier	19, Rue du Mail	Mail	12 Brumaire V†	30 Pluviôse VIII
Charles Martin Doyen	8, Rue de la Michodière	Le Pelletier	12 Brumaire V†	30 Pluviôse VIII
Jean-Charles Joachim Davillier	364, Rue Basse du Rempart	Place Vendôme	12 Brumaire V†	12 Vendémiaire VIII
Antoine Louis Girardot	6, Rue du Mont Blanc	Place Vendôme	12 Brumaire V	23 frimaire VII
Nicolas Louis Marie Magon (marquis de Gervaisais)	34, Rue du Mont Blanc	Mont Blanc	1 Frimaire V	23 Vendémiaire an VI (by drawing of lots)
Nicolas Claude François Villemillot	1, Rue et Carré de la Porte Saint Denis	Bonnes Nouvelles	1 Frimaire V	12 messidor VI (resigned voluntarily)
Jean-Louis-Ambroise Marmet (<i>aine</i>)	161 Rue de la Veillerie	Arcis	28 Vendémiaire VI	10 Nivôse VII
Médard Desprez	5, Rue Montmartre	Contrat Social	28 Vendémiaire VI	10 Nivôse VII
Jean-Pierre Germain	17 Rue de Provence	Mont Blanc	3 Brumaire VIII†	30 Pluviôse VIII
Jean-Auguste Sévène	7 Rue d'Amboise	Le Pelletier	23 Frimaire VII	30 Pluviôse VIII
Jean Joseph François Alexandre Barrillon	158 Rue Neuve du Luxembourg	Mont Blanc	10 Nivôse VII	30 Pluviôse VIII
Marcel Enfantin	Rue Coq Héron	La Halle aux Blés	10 Nivôse VII	30 Pluviôse VIII
Charles Geyler	Rue de Provence	Mont Blanc	10 Nivôse VII	30 Pluviôse VIII

Table II – Administrators of the First Caisse des Comptes Courants (listed by order of admittance to the board)

Name	Domiciled Address	Parisian Section	Date Elected	End of Mandate
Charles-Frédéric Hupais	Rue de la Place Vendôme	Place Vendôme	10 Nivôse VII	30 Pluviôse VIII
Charles Rougemont	Rue de la Place Vendôme	Place Vendôme	10 Nivôse VII	12 Vendémiaire VIII
Marc Dejoly	Rue des Jeûneurs	Brutus	10 Nivôse VII‡	12 Vendémiaire VIII
Jean-Conrad Hottinguer	3 Rue de Provence	Mail	25 Ventôse VIII	30 Pluviôse VIII
Louis-François Cordier	8 Rue du Faubourg Poissonnière	Poissonnière	25 Ventôse VIII	30 Pluviôse VIII

From 11 Messidor IV to 12 Brumaire V, the *caisse* was managed by a temporary board of administrators composed of Monneron, Jean Godard, Devaines, Follippe, Talhouët, Magon, Fulchiron, Le Couteulx, Hainguerlot and Jubié. The first *caisse*'s statutes were approved on 12 Brumaire V and called for a board of eleven administrators. The second *caisse*'s statutes were approved on 10 Nivôse VII and called for a board of twelve administrators. The *caisse* merged with the *Banque de France* on 30 Pluviôse VIII/19 Feb. 1800.

Future Regents of the Banque de France are highlighted in gold.

* Resigned by drawing of lots on 18 Vendémiaire VII but re-elected as administrator on 3 Brumaire an VII. Fled Paris for Guadeloupe with 2,500,000 francs of the *caisse*'s reserves on 27 Brumaire VII.

† Devaines's appointment as administrator is not mentioned in the *caisse*'s records, but presumably dates from 11 Messidor IV when he is first mentioned as a new shareholder. He was re-elected administrator on 10 Nivôse VII after the *caisse*'s re-foundation.

‡ Replaced Jean-Frédéric Perregaux who was elected an administrator on 10 Nivôse VII but immediately resigned.

Sources:

- ABF, *PV/RC-A-1*, p.74;
- ABF, 1069199708-2, *Liste de banquiers et négociants*;
- ABF, 1069200402/2, *Liquidation de la Caisse de Comptes courants (1^{ère} Société)*;
- Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*.

Table III – Rotating Presidency of the Caisse des Comptes Courants's Administrative Board

Month	Administrator	Month	Administrator	Month	Administrator
11 Messidor IV – 27 Thermidor IV	Devaines	Vendémiaire VI	Récamiar	Nivôse VII	Devaines
Fructidor IV	Le Couteulx	Brumaire VI	Doyen	Pluviôse VII	Barrillon
Vendémiaire V	Fulchiron	Frimaire VI	Davillier	Ventôse VII	Davillier
Brumaire V	Devaines	Nivôse VI	Girardot	Germinal VII	Dejoly
Frimaire V	Jubié	Pluviôse VI	Villemillot	Floréal VII	Doyen
Nivôse V	Récamiar	Ventôse VI	Marmet	Prairial VII	Enfantin
Pluviôse V	Doyen	Germinal VI	Desprez	Messidor VII	Germain
Ventôse V	Magon	Floréal VI	Fulchiron	Thermidor VII	Geyler
Germinal V	Davillier	Prairial VI	Devaines	Fructidor VII	Hupais
Floréal V	Girardot	Messidor VI	Jubié	Vendémiaire VIII	Jubié
Prairial V	Villemillot	Thermidor VI	Récamiar	Brumaire VIII	Récamiar
Messidor V	Fulchiron	Fructidor VI	Doyen	Frimaire VIII	Sévène
Thermidor V	Devaines	Vendémiaire VII	Davillier	Nivôse VIII	Barrillon
Fructidor V	Jubié	Brumaire VII	Girardot	Pluviôse VIII	Cordier
		Frimaire VII	Devaines*		

Directors-General of the Caisse des Comptes Courants

11 messidor IV – 27 Brumaire VII	Augustin Monneron (1 st <i>caisse</i>)
11 Nivôse VII – 20 Nivôse VII	Jean Devaines (interim caretaker)†
20 Nivôse VII – 4 Ventôse VIII	Martin Garat (2 nd <i>caisse</i>)

* Following the Monneron Scandal (27 Brumaire VII), Jean Devaines was appointed interim director-general and the bank's administration was overseen by a *comité de direction* composed of three members (two administrators and a commissioner) of which one was renewed daily.

† Devaines was elected interim president of the 2nd *caisse*'s administration on 11 Nivôse VII. He was replaced by Barrillon on 26 Nivôse VII. Article 8, Section 1 of the 2nd *caisse*'s statutes ratified on 4 Ventôse VII stipulated administrators would take it in turns alphabetically to serve as president of the board for one month.

Sources: ABF, *PVRC-A-1* & *PVRC-A-2*.

Table IV – List of Shareholders of the Caisse des Comptes Courants (4 Messidor IV – 30 Pluviôse VIII)

Name	Number of Shares		Name	Number of Shares	
	1 st caisse	2 nd caisse		1 st caisse	2 nd caisse
<i>Amelin Van Robais & Cie.</i>	5	-	Deladreue	5	-
Jean Baptiste Audeoud	5	5	Delfosse	5	-
Louis Audeoud	5	-	Marc Dejoly	5	5
Alexandre Barrillon	10	10	Médard Desprez	5	5
Jacques Barizon	5	-	Jean Devaines (père)	5	5
Pierre-Léon Basterrèche	5	6	L.C. Devaines (fils)	-	5
Antoine Bayard	-	5	François Devinck	-	2
Jean-Jacques Berard	-	5	Charles-Martin Doyen	10	5
Bézar (Carié-Bézar)	5	-	J.C. Dubra	5	5
Jacques Bidermann	5	5	Jean-Baptiste Durieux	5	5
Bidois	5	-	Marcel Enfantin (<i>Enfantin frères</i>)	5	5
Blondel	5	-	Frédéric Faber (<i>Faber frères</i>)	5	5
Charles Bodin (<i>Bodin frères</i>)	-	5	Louis Féline (<i>Féline fils aîné</i>)	5	5
Luc Callaghan	5	-	Gabriel Filliettaz	5	5
Jacques Carbonnel	5	-	Beer Léon Fould	-	5
Antoine Cardoze fils	5	-	Joseph Fulchiron (<i>ainé</i>)	5	5
Henry Liévain Carié	5	5	Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron	5	5
Louis Eugène Cavillier	5	-	Jean-François Gélot	5	5
Chéradame	5	5	Jean-Pierre Germain	-	10
Choulx-Tillemont	5	-	Charles Geyler	5	5
<i>Cinot & Charlemagne</i>	5	5	Antoine Louis Girardot	5	-
Louis-François Cordier	5	5	Jean Godard	40	-
<i>Adolphe Cottier père & fils</i>	-	5	Jacques Henri Grandin	5	5
Pierre Dallarde (père)	5	5	Jean-Albert Gumpelzhaimer	5	-
Jean Antoine Joseph Davillier (l'ainé)	5	5	<i>Haraneder & Cie.</i>	5	-
Jean-Charles Joachim Davillier	5	5	Jean-Conrad Hottinguer	5	5

Table IV – List of Shareholders of the Caisse des Comptes Courants (4 Messidor IV – 30 Pluviôse VIII)

Name	Number of Shares		Name	Number of Shares	
	1 st caisse	2 nd caisse		1 st caisse	2 nd caisse
Charles-Frédéric Hupais	5	5	Pierre Antoine Ravel	5	-
Louis André Jordan	5	5	Louis Nicolas Razuret	5	-
Pierre Joseph Fleury Jubié	5	10	Jacques-Rose Récamier	10	15
Lagrué	-	5	Antoine Revenaz	5	5
Jean Ernest Lang	5	5	Georges-Antoine Ricard	5	4
Beaucheron-Lavauverte	-	5	Joseph Roche	5	5
André Marcel Pierre Ledhuy	-	5	Roger frères & Cie.	5	5
Louis Lefebvre	5	-	Charles Abraham Rougemont	5	5
Léfilis	5	5	Denis Rougemont	5	-
Louis Charles Lemercier	10	15	Louis Alexandre Saint-André	5	-
Limbourg	5	-	J.B. Salom	5	-
Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy	-	10	Salom fils ainé	5	-
Bernard Marcelle	5	-	Pierre Sarrus	5	-
Jean-Louis-Ambroise Marmet	5	5	Serruel	5	-
Jean-François Martigny	5	5	Jean-Auguste Sévène	5	6
Meret & Cie.	-	1	A. Taffin	-	1
Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel jeune	5	5	Charles Henri Pierre Tellier	-	5
Étienne Millot	5	4	Ternaux frères	5	-
Augustin Monneron	8	-	Pierre-François Tiberghien	5	5
Jean-Claude Moynat	5	5	Jean Gabriel Tobler	5	5
Michel Paire	5	-	Louis Tourton	5	-
Jean-Frédéric Perregeaux	5	5	Nicolas Claude François Villeminot	5	-
Jean-François Pillot	5	5	Charles Louis Walz	5	5
Puybour	-	5	Olry Hayem Worms (de Romilly)	5	5

Note: This is not an exhaustive list of the caisse's shareholders and only records its main investors. Future Banque de France Regents are highlighted in gold.

Sources: ABF, RCLD & 1069200402-22, Journal d'actions de la Caisse des Comptes Courants (11 Nivôse VII – 5 Ventôse VIII); Bergeron, BNMPPDE, p.116-118.

APPENDIX V

Inventory After Decease of Adélaïde de Praël, Madame Perregaux Established 27 January 1794

The following chart presents an extensive selection of the most notable individuals and trading houses who were clients of the Neuchâtel banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux as listed in the inventory after decease of his wife, Adélaïde Harenc de Praël (or Presle) de Surville (1757-1794). We can broadly assume this document covers a timeframe of business activity ranging from the establishment of Perregaux's first bank in Paris (1778) to the death of his wife, although it may extend as far back as Perregaux's arrival in Paris (c.1765). No doubt he inherited many clients from his mentors – the bankers Nicolas Beaujon, Isaac Panchaud and Jacques Necker.

Since the inventory was established in 1794 at the height of the Terror, it is highly probable that several names were deliberately listed in a misleading fashion – such as by using abbreviations, initials, second names or maiden names – to conceal their identities and nationalities (consorting with foreigners attracted the suspicion of revolutionary authorities). What is more, the handwriting of the text is small and often not clearly legible.¹ Most revolutionary inquisitors would not have been familiar with the business world and there would have been a good chance they would not have recognised many of these clients should the inventory have been seized and examined. This has forced me in many cases to make educated guesses when attempting to determine the identity of individuals. Wherever possible, I have drawn on economic sources listed in the bibliography (notably Lüthy, Bouchary and Bergeron).² Nonetheless, several names remain obscure and it would require years of arduous and extensive research in Perregaux's correspondence and a multitude of public and private economic archives to unmask them. Moreover, as Perregaux burnt all his personal papers before his death, it would well-nigh be impossible to pinpoint all of them.

Nonetheless, this list confirms the large number of Perregaux's prestigious clients including Pourtalès & Cie. of Neuchâtel, Bethmann of Frankfurt, Brentani Cimaroli of Vienna, the Jacob trading house of Naples, the Thellusson banking family exiled in London, *Bourdieu, Chollet et Bourdieu* (also based in London), Isaac Mendez Furtado of Lisbon and many other distinguished individuals and firms. Note that some clients appear more than once which may indicate they had multiple accounts.

Perregaux also corresponded with several aristocrats and traders who are not on this list such as James Cecil 1st Marquess of Salisbury (Viscount Cranborne), George Nugent-Temple Grenville (3rd Earl Temple), James Hamilton (2nd Earl of Clanbrassil), Robert Clements (1st Earl of Leitrim), the Scottish entrepreneur and inventor Archibald Cochrane 9th Earl of Dundonald (father of Admiral Thomas Cochrane, the 'Sea Wolf'), the comte de

¹ The most frequent problems encountered were: 1.) 's' is written in cursive and resembles 'r'; 2.) 'a' often resembles 'e'; 3.) the cross of a 't' is often extended over an 'l' in the same word; 4.) whenever an 'r' ends a word, it is prolonged in a stylistic figure and looks like a 'u' or 'w'; 5.) a capital 'I' can easily be confused for a capital 'J' and 6.) wherever there is a double 's' ('ss'), the first 's' is capitalised and looks like an integral symbol (∫) which is easily confused with 'f' (as in late medieval and early-modern French).

² For information on London bankers see F.G. Hilton Price, *A Handbook of London Bankers*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1876.

Lauraguais, Count Pyotr Alexandrovich Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky, and his Neuchâtel compatriot Fauche-Borel (the printer who later served as the principal intermediary between Barras and Louis XVIII).³ See Appendix V for the list of Perregaux's clients in his inventory after decease (1808).

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
A.B. Craufurd	-	603
M.A. Craufurd	-	445
Richard Lovell Edgeworth	-	3,600
Le Sieur Beaulard (fashion designer)	-	32,620
Béfort	-	314,404
Bethmann & fils	Bordeaux	937
G. Bickerdicke & Co.	Manchester	66,653
Thomas Blakeford	Ostend	30
Robert Barclay	Aix-la-Chapelle	335
Thomas Coutts & Co.	London	18,655
Craufurd & Co. ⁴	Rotterdam	2,202
Dardelin de D.	Dijon	163,222
H.L. Dupasquier	Bordeaux	287
I. & A. Anderson	London	42,120
Thomas Keating	London	51
Louis Fontaine	Boulogne-sur-mer	3,491
Burtmann & Muller	Bollwiller (Alsace)	832
Cutler & Heigalin	Naples	805
C.H. Cole	Leipzig	11,378
Crettet	Dijon	88
L.D. ffaytehe [sic?]	-	3,100
Jean Charretier	London	13,541
John Hood & Cie.	London	1,568
P. & W. Grenfell	London	610
Suspended Account	-	3,007
Lefrançois l'ainé père & fils	Rouen	2,410
David Latouche & Cie.	Dublin	362
Linange	-	2,522
Motteux et Cie.	London	16,384
I. & J. Lockhart	London	-
Morgan père & fils	Amiens	68
Lardy & Meuron	Neuchâtel	958
P.H. Bethmann	Frankfurt	4,959
E. Boret & frères Roulet	Neuchâtel	46,156
Félix Battier	Basel	164
L. Barbier & Cie.	Rennes	24
Bradock, Edge & Crompton	Manchester	29,215
Couderc père fils et Papavant	Lyon	9,230
Courtois & Cie.	Toulouse	525
Chaillet d'Arnac	Neuchâtel	49,253

³ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.11-12 & 17; Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.9-11 and Blanc, *LERE*, p.146.

⁴ Firm of George Craufurd, brother of Quentin Craufurd.

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
Jos de Roy	Brussels	1,354
Dardelin	Dijon	28,222
Dureiz	Calais	15
Delaire l'ainé	La Rochelle	199
P.R. Daragona	Modena	44
And (Andrew?) French	London	4,516
Ant (Antoine?) Fornachon	Neuchâtel	2,309
P. Bernard & Cie.	Dunkerque	64
A.L. Desprez	Liège	11,612
La Masse ⁵ dutertre & Co.	Liège	44,466
Rosalie Gérard (Mlle. Duthé)	-	151,270
Girard	Neuchâtel	8,910
Harlé Ostervals	D? [illegible]	488
Daniel Giles	London	10,489
Louis Gall	Paris	16,095
N.G. Bassange & Cie.	Dresden	34
H. & L. Gigaud frères	Neuchâtel	488
Marie Hackett	London	2,266
James & James Lockhart ⁶	London	1,438
Samuel Lichigaray	London	4,270
Mark Lynch	Nantes	19
Letters of Credit to pay	-	4,000
Motteux et Cie.	London	7,189
James & James Lockhart	London	1,386
Meyer & Cie.	Worms	35
Colonel Meuron	-	5,746
I. Leveux	Calais	13
I. Moet & Cie.	Epernay	830
Mauri V. Dubrocut	Boulogne-sur-Mer	2,831
Mare & Lechevalier	London	9,139
March Reeves & Co.	London	56,097
Marois & Cie.	Bordeaux	63
C. & J. Floh	Crevels?	59,625
Merchandise	-	455
Le Chambrier de Castella	-	1,255
William Parr	Paris	12
Piat Lefebvre & fils	Tournay	438
F. Peltetreau & Cie.	Rochefort	308
Puget & Bainbridge ⁷	London	-

⁵ In French legal jargon, the term '*masse*' designates assets ruled by the same statutes. It can refer to a person's money supply or payroll for businesses.

⁶ James & James Lockhart was established in 1787 at 36, Pall Mall. It disappeared after the 1797 crisis.

⁷ Puget, Bainbridges and Company of 12 St. Paul's Churchyard, London had grown out of a mercantile firm in Warwick Lane established by Thomas Bainbridge of Bedford Row (Middlesex) and Croydon Lodge (Surrey) around 1780. Bainbridge had been a member of the organizing committee behind the London merchants' loyal declaration of 1795. Puget & Bainbridge also had Irish connections through its links to the Dublin bankers Latouche and Company, and through Thomas's ownership of a landed estate at Frankfield, county Cork, which passed to his third son John. Thomas died in 1798 and the leadership of his bank passed to his eldest son, Edward Thomas Bainbridge, who was elected as a Whig MP for Taunton in 1830. Source: <https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1820-1832/member/bainbridge-edward-1798-1872>.

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
I. Plovits	Brussels	1,700
Félix Mouvon frères	Calais	1,160
Uri Dawson	London	1,111
F. & H. Lindenkampf	Munich	1,220
C.M. Schroeder & Cie.	Hamburg	-
P. Joyes & fils	Madrid	2,942
T. & C. Wilkieson & Cie.	Amsterdam	-
Vanot Serret	Valenciennes	293
Luc White	London	10,213
D. Valloney	London	92
M.L. Rocher	London	22
Fornachon & Filliman	Neuchâtel	550
Chouard & Champy	Framont	1,803
Isaac F. Panchaud	Grandson (Switzerland)	1,899
Le Clerc & Cie.	Nice	248
Henckell & Erissbeke	Hamburg	58
Taylor & Edmonds	London	3,775
Eloz May	-	973
Joseph Brame	Genoa	138
Thomas Law	London	4,374
I.C. Schulthefts	Zürich	60
I. Achand	Paris	1,042
Preye & Jordis	Frankfurt	392
I. Lafargue	Bordeaux	100
P. Gamesen	Geneva	9
Jim Mathey	London	4,420
Donat Orii & fils	Florence	320
F.L. Perregaux	Neuchâtel	1,865
T.L. Pechotier	London	2,660
Gérard Plifion	Orléans	20
Puget & Bainbridge	London	1,445
I. Park	London	1,415
Guérin Doudet & Cie.	Nantes	202
Robinet frères	Dijon	19
J. Roy frères & Cie.	Chaux-de-Fonds (Neuchâtel)	2,619
Rouville	Rouen	2,495
I. Robins	London	8,961
Rippond frères	Moulins	30
A. Sharp Patterson	-	4,153
I.G. Rumpe	Altona	430
I.B. Vindevogel	Ghent	2,954
Lys & Metzler	Bordeaux	523
Fras Hanson	London	2,558
C.M. Schroeder & Cie.	Hamburg	476
Jos Sutton	-	922
Succession of Dr. Keaghry	Hamburg	9,545
Pat Joyes & fils	Madrid	606
T. & C. Wilkieson	Amsterdam	3,545
I. Wilkies	Marseille	59
Walter Hall & Cie.	Neuchâtel	40

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
Wigram Williams & Holder	London	245
Rob Murdoch	Dunkerque	1,359
Indows Gillyns	Ghent	67,768
Ohs Brunting	Amsterdam	28,197
Isaac Mendez Furtado ⁸	Lisbon/London	71,700
Wit Crosbie	-	710
Meuron & D. Ivernois	St. Sulpice (Neuchâtel)	3
Théodore Jenkins	Rome	210
P.H. Vanryhouvern	-	2,920
G. Choumist	London	3,496
Kejeljan	Namur	3,053
A. Binand fils & Cie.	Blaye (Gironde)	49
Samuel H. Fraytomens	-	1,201
Brentani Cimaroli ⁹	Vienna	44,937
Al Peschier	Marseille	64
I.B. Deloose	Ghent	3,530
Samuel Hartley	London	1,438
I. Petiraud	Limoges	181
Pybus Call & Cie. ¹⁰	London	252
Artervald frères	Neuchâtel	15
I. Maisner	Warsaw	84
Edward Murphy	Cadix	2,762
C.M. Jacob	Modena	526
Earle Hogson & Drake	Livorno	762
R. Mackenzie	-	543
Quilliard Cadet	Clairvaux (Franche-Comté)	430
Massieu l'ainé & fils	Caen	276
William Mackintosh	Avignon	7,130
David Pury	Neuchâtel	387
Puchelberg & Cie.	Lorient	1,745
I.B. O'Donnell	Blois	2,096
W.D. Dunburr	Neuchâtel	812
Dr. Dublé	Neuchâtel	508
I.P. Boive	Neuchâtel	243
Le L. et Ch. Boive	Neuchâtel	1,306
John Thornton ¹¹	London	535
John Mitchell & Cie.	Halifax	1,515
La société viagère de Gand	Ghent	21,980
F.A. Pilgram & fils	Munich	44,126
R. John Whitehill ¹²	-	493
R. Thompson	London	21,377
Succession of J.P. Robinson	London	33,279
Charles Kelly	Alicante	4,111

⁸ A leading Jewish trader from Lisbon.

⁹ Genoese bankers to the Viennese Court.

¹⁰ Headquartered at 25, Old Bond Street.

¹¹ John Thornton (1720-1790) was a director of the Bank of England and father of Henry Thornton (*Thornton & Power*).

¹² R. John Whitehill was an East India Company officer and governor of Madras.

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
H. Perret	Neuchâtel	3,997
Wedgewood fils & Byerly ¹³	London	688
Kockaert & Brinck	Brussels	11,609
John Dick ¹⁴	London	4,985
Hans Hoane	London	4,794
Th. Pattle	London	27,046
Du Bridgewater ¹⁵	London	375
Doenhoff (Dönhoff) ¹⁶	Berlin	16,970
A. Robarts	London	15,416
J. Hinckliff Peterborough ¹⁷	London	4,690
G. Colebrooke ¹⁸	London	1,050
J. Beaufort	London	5,145
Camelfort	London	13,412
A. Goldsmid & Eliason ¹⁹	London	18,917
D. Danoot <i>fils</i> & Co.	Bruges	43,786
Stockes Scott & Croskey	London	2,236
I.F. Schemid & Co.	Frankfurt	1,706
Minet & Fector	London	5,237
I.H. Sandoz	Neuchâtel	3,159
Eliz[abeth] Salugia née Pattle	Nice	8,243
Meuron Perregaux	Neuchâtel	15,863
Thomas Lewin ²⁰	London	5,070
R. Maltby ²¹	London	4,551
Twigg & Co. ²²	London	246
L. Mandrot & Cie.	Yverdun (Franche-Comté)	645
Thomas Swale ²³	London	304

¹³ Josiah Wedgewood II (1769-1843), son of the English entrepreneur Josiah Wedgewood (1730-1795).

¹⁴ Dutch Merchant from Rotterdam employed by the British Board of Trade to procure German settlers for Nova Scotia. He shipped convoys of settlers from Rotterdam to Halifax. See Abbot Emerson Smith, 'Some New Facts About German Eighteenth-Century Immigration', *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, 10 (2), April 1943: 105-117.

¹⁵ Probably Francis Egerton (1736-1803), 3rd Duke of Bridgewater, builder of the famous Bridgewater Canal.

¹⁶ The Dönhoff were a noble Prussian family whose seat was located at Friedrichstein Palace.

¹⁷ Possibly John Hinchliffe (1731-1794) who served as Master of Trinity College, Cambridge (1768-88), Bishop of Peterborough (1769-94) and Dean of Durham (1788-94).

¹⁸ Sir George Colebrooke (1729-1809), 2nd Baronet of Gatton (Surrey), was thrice elected chairman of the East India Company (1769-1770 & 1772) and served as MP for the rotten borough of Arundel (1754-1774). The city of Colebrooke in New Hampshire is named in his honour.

¹⁹ Aaron F. Goldsmid (1715-1782), born in Amsterdam, was the son of Benedict Goldsmid, a Hamburg merchant. He left Holland to settle in London in the 1740s where he founded Aaron Goldsmid & Son (subsequently Goldsmid & Eliason). This firm became very successful but was severely affected by the bankruptcy of Clifford & Sayer, one of the principal houses in Holland. Goldsmid's second son, Asher, was one of the founders of Mocatta & Goldsmid, bullion-brokers to the Bank of England. His third son, Benjamin, successfully bid for the management of the National Lottery in the 1770s; while his fourth son, Abraham, was a friend of Lord Nelson. Source: <http://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/6765-goldsmid>.

²⁰ Presumably Thomas Lewin (1753-1843), a lieutenant in the 52nd (Oxfordshire) Foot Regiment.

²¹ Possibly related to Thomas Maltby, a merchant of Norwich.

²² Button makers for the British Army.

²³ The Swale family came from Yorkshire.

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
William Agnew ²⁴	London	3,600
Bennett & Cure ²⁵	London	4,450
Thellusson <i>frères</i>	London	2,267
I.J. Golbeck	Danzig	1,740
Gortow & Thompson	London	8,766
Negri & Cie. ²⁶	Turin	2,743
I. Mulhens	Coblenz	1,910
Philippe von der Brucken	Boriette?	4,500
Shares of the Caisse d'Escompte	Paris	25,440
Théodore Kennedy	Cambrai	1,052
James de Winter & Co.	London	15,720
J.F. Wyns van Bellinghen	Brussels	17,500
William Pulteney ²⁷	London	1,180
Peter Hoare ²⁸	London	582
Charles Herbert ²⁹	London	3,473
Mary Harper	London	2,491
Veuve Duval ³⁰	London	1,342
M. & A. Giraud	Lyon (Ville Affranchie)	15,667
Delamotte & Cie. ³¹	Reims	73
J.B. Dumoulin	Amiens	2,813
Hennessy & Turner ³²	Cognac	21,562
Orofts Devaynes & Co. ³³	London	15
Borgnis Desbordes & [Samson?] ³⁴	Brest	3,846
Ransom Morland & Hammersley ³⁵	London	57,807

²⁴ The Agnews of Kilwaughter (Country Antrim) were an Irish merchant trading family based in Belfast. William's grandson, Edward Jones Agnew, served as an MP in the Irish Parliament (1792-1797) and hired the architect John Nash to embellish Kilwaughter Castle.

²⁵ Possibly linked to William Bennett, an English merchant who had settled in Ireland.

²⁶ Possibly linked to descendants or relatives of the Italian contralto Maria Caterina Negri (1704-c.1744).

²⁷ Probably William Pulteney, 5th Baronet (1729-1805), of Wester Hall (Dumfries), a.k.a. William Johnstone, MP for Shrewsbury (1775-1805) and reputedly one of the wealthiest men in Britain.

²⁸ One of the directors of Hoare & Co. of London.

²⁹ Probably Charles Herbert Sheffield (1706-1774), 1st Baronet of Normanby (Lincolnshire), the illegitimate son of John Sheffield, 1st Duke of Buckingham. He sold Buckingham Palace to George III in 1761.

³⁰ Possibly related to the French composer and dancer Mademoiselle Duval (1718-c.1775).

³¹ Probably linked to François Delamotte, a merchant and *échevin* of Reims who founded the Lanson champagne house in 1760.

³² Firm of Richard Hennessey (1724-1800), an Irish Jacobite officer from County Cork who served in the French army and established the Hennessey cognac dynasty in 1765.

³³ William Devaynes (c.1730-1809) was a London banker and director of the Global Insurance Company and African Company of Merchants. He was five times elected Chairman of the East India Company (he was a friend of Warren Hastings) and served as MP for Barnstaple and Winchelsea.

³⁴ François Marie Borgnis-Desbordes (1769-1848) was a merchant trader and manufacturer whose family originated from Morlaix. He was elected mayor of Henvic (Finistère) in 1801 and served as a deputy of the Finistère (1818-1820). His grandson, Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes (1839-1900), conquered French Sudan and fought in Indochina.

³⁵ Ransom, Morland & Hammersley (originally Ransom, Bouverie & Co.), was a leading London bank founded in 1786 by Griffin Ransom, William Morland (1739-1815) and Thomas Hammersley (1747-1812). It was headquartered at 57 Pall Mall. In 1792, it became the official bank of the Prince of Wales thanks to his friendship with one of its partners – George, 7th Lord Kinnaird (1754-1805), who had married Elisabeth, Ransom's daughter. Morland was elected MP for Taunton in 1796 and backed Pitt's administration.

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
Robert Ainslie 1 st Baronet ³⁶	Constantinople	1,198
La Compagnie de Fiume et de Trieste	-	1,396
John Hay ³⁷	Riga	1,098
Nesbitt & Stewart ³⁸	London	3,672
Leuba	Saint Quentin	2,393
J. Portau	Breda	2,028
J. Ripley ³⁹	London	219
Roger Hog ⁴⁰	London	4,222
H. Jameson & fils ⁴¹	Cork	31,416
Marin l'ainé & fils	Nancy	6,404
Bethmann frères	Frankfurt	3,421
Thomas Howard ⁴²	London	3,101
Durand & fils	Montpellier	374
Charles-Daniel de Meuron ⁴³	Saint Quentin	25
Thomas & R[ichard] Walker ⁴⁴	Manchester	30
George Croker Fox ⁴⁵	Falmouth	107
<i>Veuve</i> Texier Casteneaux ⁴⁶	Bordeaux	796
La Masse de Richard Walker	-	4,187

³⁶ Robert Ainslie 1st Baronet (from Dolphinton, Lanarkshire) was an orientalist and numismatists who was British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (1775-1793) and served as MP for the rotten borough of Milborne Port (Somerset).

³⁷ Hay, presumably linked to the Scottish Hay clan, purchased a well-known house in Riga which is named after him (the 'Hay Manor').

³⁸ John Nesbitt (c.1745-1817) had inherited this firm from his uncle, a West India merchant, along with a large estate in England and the West Indies. Originally based in Bishopsgate Street, the business was encumbered with debts, largely to the crown, of over £120,000. It was transferred to Aldermanbury as Nesbitt & Stewart by 1791, and in 1803 to more modest premises as Nesbitt & Rolleston at Tokenhouse Yard, Lothbury. John Nesbitt sat as an MP for Winchelsea, and later for the rotten boroughs of Gatton and Bodmin. Source: <https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/member/nesbitt-john-1745-1817>.

³⁹ Possibly a descendant of the architect Thomas Ripley (1682-1758).

⁴⁰ Roger Hog & Kinloch, Scottish merchants based in London.

⁴¹ Possibly linked to John Jameson (1740-1823), the Scottish lawyer who established his famous whiskey distiller in Dublin in 1780. The 'H' could stand for his wife, Margaret Haig, daughter of John Haig, another well known whiskey distiller from Scotland.

⁴² Possibly Thomas Howard (1721-1783) 14th Earl of Suffolk & 7th Earl of Berkshire, or another member of the Howard family.

⁴³ Charles-Daniel de Meuron (1738-1806) was the son of an army officer from Neuchâtel. He was a merchant trader in colonial goods from India and was involved in the wine trade. He also raised regiments which he hired out to the Dutch East India Company and various European powers. His extensive collection of natural history and ethnographic artefacts formed the basis of Neuchâtel's ethnographic museum.

⁴⁴ Thomas Walker (1749-1817), a leading cotton merchant from Manchester, was an abolitionist and member of the Society for Constitutional Information. He was well-connected in the British business world, maintaining links with James Watt, Matthew Boulton, Dr. Joseph Priestly and Josiah Wedgwood. Walker was a supporter of Charles James Fox and close to Whig reformers. His support for radical constitutional reform led him to be tried for treason in 1794 but he was acquitted. His brother Richard appears to have been his solicitor.

⁴⁵ The Fox family were Quakers who were influential in the development of Falmouth. George Croker Fox founded the family's ship-brokering business. In 1794, his son – Robert Were Fox (1754-1818) – was appointed US Consul for the port of Falmouth.

⁴⁶ Probably the widow of Pierre Texier, brother of the Amsterdam banker Jean Texier (*Texier & Streckeisen*) who had been an important correspondent of the Mallet bank. See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.260 & 263.

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
Grégoire père et fils ⁴⁷	Aix-en-Provence	2
David Peyer Imhoff ⁴⁸	Chaffhouse?	1,536
J.J. Guyard	Paris	1,515
Lawrence & Yates ⁴⁹	Manchester	14
George Graves	Rome	27,654
Robert Jones ⁵⁰	London	2,625
M.A. Forbes ⁵¹	London	1,553
Compagnie d'assurance de Dublin	Dublin	7,841
Stephen Lusington ⁵²	London	146
F. Liederiel	Berlin	17,050
Jeanne Desbarres ⁵³	London	764
Thomas Gorman ⁵⁴	London	368
Ann Smith (née Wesley) ⁵⁵	London	1,869
Rowand Carr & Co.	Moscow	36
Will Lyndon	London	2,547
Antoine Descamp	-	4,678
Du Pasquier & fils ⁵⁶	Neuchâtel	6,935
Henri Romberg Bapst & Co. ⁵⁷	Bordeaux	151
F.L. Perregaux	Neuchâtel	38,568
P.J. Frank	Hamburg	1,220
Bethmann fils ⁵⁸	Bordeaux	901
Caisse (Excess funds in reserve)	-	1,564,860
Pourtalès & Cie. ⁵⁹	Paris	200,000
Ransom Morland & Hammersley	London	21,771
Will Lyndon	London	1,890

⁴⁷ Probably descendants of Alexandre Grégoire, *député de Marseille au Conseil de Commerce* in the 1730s (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.296-297).

⁴⁸ Probably related to Guillaume Imhoff of Basel who managed a manufactory at Meulun with Philippe Koenig. (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.665).

⁴⁹ Possibly connected to the New York merchant Richard Yates.

⁵⁰ Possibly Robert Jones (1740-1788), a lieutenant in the artillery corps of the British Army and author of *A Treatise on Skating* published in 1772.

⁵¹ Probably related to the Forbes clan of Aberdeenshire. Sir Charles Forbes 1st Baronet (1774-1849) spent many years in Bombay developing Forbes & Co. which became a leading colonial firm.

⁵² Presumably a misspelling of Stephen Lushington 1st Baronet (1744-1807), of South Hill Park in Easthampstead (Berkshire), who was thrice elected Chairman of the East India Company (1790-1791, 1795-1796 and 1799-1800) and served as an MP for the rotten borough of Heston and subsequently for Helston, Mitchell, Penryn and Plympton Erle.

⁵³ Perhaps the sister of Joseph Frederick Wallet DesBarres (1721-1824), aide-de-camp to General James Wolfe and later Lieutenant-Governor of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island.

⁵⁴ Thomas O'Gorman (c.1760-?), an Irish merchant and doctor who served in the Irish Brigades in France and later founded the Gorman and Périchon family in the Río de la Plata.

⁵⁵ Lady Anne Culling Smith (*née* Wesley, 1768-1844), elder sister of Arthur Wellesley 1st Duke of Wellington.

⁵⁶ A leading banking family from Neuchâtel. They owned an *indiennes* manufacture nearby at Cortaillod.

⁵⁷ A company specialising in trade with Saint Domingue. See Françoise Thésée, *Négociants bordelais et colons de Saint-Domingue : liaisons d'habitations, la maison Henry Romberg, Bapst et Cie. 1783-1793*, Paris: Société française d'histoire d'outre-mer, 1972.

⁵⁸ Subsidiary of Bethmann frères of Frankfurt.

⁵⁹ Firm of Jacques-Louis Pourtalès (1722-1814) of Neuchâtel, nicknamed '*le grand*', probably the leading *indiennes* trader in Europe.

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
Duc de Lauzan ⁶⁰	Paris	8,021
Bourdieu Chollet & Bourdieu ⁶¹	London	1,725
J. Kendrick	Leuven	9,450
Weilnau ⁶²	Bristol	5,041
Carew Langton & Power ⁶³	Cadix	648
Veddick	London	1,627
N. & H. Modigliani	London	235
H. Fulton	London	550
La Masse de Dubois	London	25,137
Capital	-	400,000
Robert & <i>fil</i> s Courvoisier ⁶⁴	Chaux-de-fonds (Neuchâtel)	4,710
Dittmer Bafs ⁶⁵	Frankfurt	26,000
J. & R. Garvey ⁶⁶	Rouen	2,243
Dollé Père <i>fil</i> s Leuba ⁶⁷	Saint Quentin	8,918
Jean-Albert Gumpelzhaimer	Paris	7,332
Luc Preiswerck ⁶⁸	Basel	6,158

⁶⁰ Armand-Louis de Gontaut-Biron (1747-1793), was Count of Biron, Marquis of Gontaut (1758), Duke of Lauzun (1766), and created Duke of Biron and *Pair de France* (1788). He served under Rochambeau in the American Revolutionary War and was a member of the *Orléaniste* faction during the early Revolution. After serving on various fronts and leading the *Armée d'Italie* and *Armée des Côtes de La Rochelle*, he was accused of treason for offering to resign his command, tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal and guillotined on 31 Dec. 1793.

⁶¹ *Bourdieu, Chollet et Bourdieu* was the firm of James Bourdieu (1714-1804), former business partner of Jacques Necker and London representative of the *Compagnie des Indes*. See Bourdieu's entry in the Biographical Index for more details.

⁶² Possibly a member of the House of Nassau-Usingen which held the County of Weilnau.

⁶³ The Carew were an Irish family from Waterford. Laurence Carew (1684-1745) settled in Cadiz, probably because he was forced into exile by the Penal Laws. His descendants were the Langtons of Cadiz (see Richard Lahert, 'Some Charitable Institutions of Old Waterford', *Old Waterford Society Decies*, xxviii, Spring 1985, p.52 and <https://www.waterfordtreasures.com/news/lawrence-carew-from-waterford-to-cadiz>).

⁶⁴ Luxury mantle clock manufacturer.

⁶⁵ Possibly linked to Diogo Dittmer, a commercial agent based in Paris employed by the Portuguese government (see Buist, *At Spes Non Fracta: Hope & Co., 1770-1815*, p.412).

⁶⁶ The Garvey were an Irish Catholic family from Newry (County Down). Richard Garvey (died 1776) settled in Rouen around 1730. His son Robert took over the family firm which traded in a variety of goods (e.g. cotton and grain) and operated ceramic, textile and velvet manufactories. Several family members were naturalised French citizens in the 1750s and 1760s, including Robert (June 1756) who served as Second Consul to Rouen's *Chambre de Commerce* in 1770. See Guy Richard, 'A propos des Garvey : les gentilshommes commerçants irlandais de Rouen au XVIIIe siècle', *Annales de Normandie*, 11 (3), 1961, 239-242. Richard Cobb has examined Robert Garvey's petition to the National Convention dated 3 ventôse II/21 Feb. 1794 to release his mother imprisoned by the revolutionary authorities of Rouen (see Cobb, 'Une famille anglaise de Rouen au XVIIIe siècle', *Annales de Normandie*, 3 (2), 1953: 198-199 and AN, D/III/273, pièce 292).

⁶⁷ Bénigne Dollé was *caissier de la Banque de la Cour* and an associate of Jean-Baptiste Magon de la Balue (see MC/ET/XLVIII/132, 8 April 1769 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome, p.392). In this firm, he appears to have partnered with Leuba of Saint Quentin.

⁶⁸ Preiswerck was involved in a scheme to illegally smuggle hard currency (gold louis) out of France with a German merchant from Aix-la-Chapelle named Jacques-Henri Weidenfeld. The coins were dissimulated in boxes containing opiates. Weidenfeld was arrested, tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal and guillotined on 27 pluviôse II/15 Feb. 1794 (Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.110-114). Preiswerck also participated in Paul-Henri Mallet's piaster speculations in 1790-1791 (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.585, footnote).

Notable Trading Houses in business with <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i> Balance on 19 Pluviôse II/7 Feb. 1794		
Name of Trading House	Location	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
Michaux la Rosière & Co. ⁶⁹	Lorient	24,803
Guillebert H. ⁷⁰	Neuchâtel	5,779
A. Peterson	Hamburg	31,050
Merian l'ainé ⁷¹	Basel	12,720
J.H. & J.P. Reinstorff	Hamburg	44,200
Pertalotte	Zürich	4,800
J.J. Meuron	Paris	2,091
Leclerc père & fils	Liancourt (Oise)	3,824
Jean-Frédéric Perregaux	Paris	10,742
Francœur & Celerieu ⁷²	Paris	25,317
Lamarre & Flament	?	2,646
Bugnon & Piaget	?	10,000

Notable Individual Clients of <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i>	
Name of Client	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
Anne-Josèphe Théroigne de Méricourt	900
Quentin Craufurd (ex-East India Company officer & British agent)	60,568
Rosalie Gérard (Rosalie Duthé – assets based in Liège)	151,270
Charles Bingham (1 st Earl of Lucan)	4,500
George Biggin (pioneering aeronaut) ⁷³	207
Henry Seymour (son of Francis Seymour-Conway, 1 st Marquess of Hertford)	11,298
J.J. Liegeois	2,419
F. Leuba (trader from Saint Quentin)	8,953
Lord Mountjoy (Luke Gardiner) ⁷⁴	114
J.M. Laffitte (Jacques Laffitte?)	4,132

⁶⁹ An *armateur* and colonial trader from Lorient. In Year VI, he petitioned the government to compensate him for one of his ships – Le Superbe – which had been requisitioned to reconquer Guadeloupe (AN, AF/III/203B, pièces 8-13, 8 brumaire VI/29 Oct. 1797). In Year X, he addressed a report on Indian commerce to the consular government (AN, AF/IV/1211, pièces 126-130 – *Mémoires sur le commerce de l'Inde*).

⁷⁰ Probably a relative of the Neuchâtel pastor and teacher Alphonse Guillebert (1792-1861).

⁷¹ He was a correspondent of Antoine-Grégoire Geneste, the caretaker clerk of *Boyd, Ker & Co.* in 1793, and of Jean-Louis Grenus (Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.150 & 186-187).

⁷² Louis-Joseph Francœur (1738-1804) was administrator of the Paris opera and a friend of Perregaux (see Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.720, footnote).

⁷³ George Biggin (1757-1803) was an agriculturalist and a pioneering aeronaut. He was the assistant of Vincenzo Lunardi, a famous Italian aeronaut. Together they ascended in a hydrogen balloon from the Artillery Ground of the Honourable Artillery Company in London on 15 September 1784 before a crowd of 200,000 spectators which included the Prince of Wales and conducted a 24-mile flight. On 29 June 1785, Biggin and Mrs. Letitia Anne Sage ascended from St. George's Fields for another 90-minute flight and landed in Harrow, making Mrs. Sage the first British women to fly. Biggin was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1802.

⁷⁴ Luke Gardiner 1st Baron Mountjoy (1745-1798), represented Dublin County in the Irish House of Commons and was appointed to the Irish Privy Council in 1780. He was killed in action at the Battle of New Ross during the 1798 Irish Rebellion.

Notable Individual Clients of Perregaux et Cie.	
Name of Client	Sums held by Perregaux & Cie. (livres)
Pal Lullin ⁷⁵	5,046
The Duke of Dorset ⁷⁶	1,949
The Duchess of Devonshire ⁷⁷	797
Lord Fitzgerald (Robert Stephen Fitzgerald, British diplomat in Switzerland, 6 th son of James Fitzgerald 1 st Duke of Leinster)	8,171
Samuel Baldwyn (British agent)	335
Lord Gower ⁷⁸	3,951
P. Desbrosses (?)	24,725
Malatouré	1,700
O'Kelly ⁷⁹	3,004
Colonel Glover ⁸⁰	25,670
Lord Coleraine (George Hanger, 4 th Baron Coleraine)	9,120
Sir Ralph (Robert) Woodford, 1 st Baronet of Carleby	2,216
Stephen Sayre ⁸¹	2,340
Lady Spencer (Margaret Georgina Spencer, wife of John 1 st Earl Spencer)	1,354
Lord Elgin (Thomas Bruce, 7 th Earl of Elgin)	735
Vestris <i>films</i> (son of the ballet dancer)	4,884
Lord Fitzwilliams (William Wentworth-Fitzwilliam, 4 th Earl Fitzwilliam)	24,000
Eliz Fawkner [sic] ⁸²	2,394
Lady Louth ⁸³	12
Edward Onslow ⁸⁴	53,585

⁷⁵ No doubt part of the banking network established by the De la Rive, Lullin and Rillet families in the early eighteenth century, all of which were members of the Genevan merchant aristocracy. They operated banks in London, Paris and Geneva. See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.274-287.

⁷⁶ John Sackville, 3rd Duke of Dorset (1745-1799) was British ambassador in Paris (1784-1789).

⁷⁷ Georgiana Cavendish née Spencer (1757-1806), daughter of John Spencer, great-grandson of the Duke of Marlborough. She married William Cavendish, 5th Duke of Devonshire (1748-1811).

⁷⁸ George Leveson-Gower (1758-1833), known as Viscount Trentham from 1758 to 1786 and Earl Gower from 1786 to 1803, served as British ambassador in Paris between 1790 and 1792, and was MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme (1779-1784) and Stafford (1787-1799). He was created 1st Duke of Sutherland in 1833. His maternal uncle was Francis Egerton, 3rd Duke of Bridgewater.

⁷⁹ Possibly Dennis O'Kelly (1725-1787), an Irishman from Connaught and former Covent Garden conman who became a well-known breeder of thoroughbred racehorses.

⁸⁰ Colonel John Glover (1732-1797) was a fisherman, merchant and soldier from Marblehead, Massachusetts. He served as a brigadier general in the Continental Army under Washington and led the 14th Continental Regiment (Glover's Marbleheaders), an amphibious unit almost exclusively composed of mariners and seafarers. It was this regiment that ferried Washington up the Delaware prior to his attack at Trenton.

⁸¹ Stephen Sayre (1736-1818) was an American merchant who resided in London. He was a friend of the Lord Mayor John Wilkes. In October 1775, Sayre was accused of masterminding a plot to kidnap George III to favour American independence (the 'Sayre Plot') and was imprisoned in the Tower. The affair was widely viewed as farcical and dismissed as a hoax by the London press. Sayre was eventually freed on bail (see James Lander, 'A Tale of Two Hoaxes in Britain and France in 1775', *The Historical Journal*, 49 (4), December 2006: 995-1024). He then embarked on a career as a diplomatic fixer roaming through various European courts before spending time in France as an enthusiastic supporter of the French Revolution. After moving back to America, he was unsuccessful in securing a position in the federal government and retired to his estate in Virginia. See John Richard Alden, *Stephen Sayre: American Revolutionary Adventurer*, Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1983.

⁸² Possibly a misspelling of Elizabeth Faulkner (1719-1788), wife of the painter Arthur Devis (1712-1787).

⁸³ Probably Margaret Daly, second wife of Thomas Birmingham 1st Earl of Louth (1717-1799).

⁸⁴ Edward Onslow (1758-1829), younger son of George Onslow 1st Earl of Onslow, briefly sat as an MP for Aldborough in 1780 and was elected a member of the Royal Society that same year. He married a wealthy French bride named Marie Rosalie de Bourdeilles de Brantôme with whom he had a son, the composer

Notable Individual Clients of <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i>	
Name of Client	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
Moreau <i>filz</i> ⁸⁵	2,610
Rob Smith ⁸⁶	610
M. Elliot ⁸⁷	1,000
Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais (playwright)	691
James Craufurd (British <i>chargé d'affaires</i> in Copenhagen & Hamburg)	130
Lord Southwell (Thomas Arthur Southwell, Irish peer)	88
Jean De Vaines (ex- <i>premier commis</i> of Louis XVI & Treasury commissioner)	144
Bulkeley ⁸⁸	108
John Coxe Hippisley 1 st Baronet ⁸⁹	3,741
W. Beckford ⁹⁰	6,930
George Stratton (British agent)	10,634
Lord Cholmondeley ⁹¹	1,027
Richard Butler, 7 th Baronet ⁹²	1,180
C. Gray ⁹³	1,226
John Nesbitt	8,239
H. Hoare ⁹⁴	132
G. Dalrymple ⁹⁵	2,212
Buckleugh [sic] ⁹⁶	168
S. Barry ⁹⁷	47,502
Martinville ⁹⁸	9,959
Barthélémy Huber (Swiss financier established in London)	800

George Onslow (1784-1853). The couple resided in France at the Château de Chalendrat in Mirefleurs (Puy-de-Dôme) but lived in exile in Hamburg following the outbreak of the Revolution after Edward became involved in counter-revolutionary activities. Edward's brother, Thomas 2nd Earl of Onslow (1754-1827), served as an MP for Rye and Guildford and was a supporter of the Foxite Whigs.

⁸⁵ Possibly Jean-Michel Moreau (1741-1814 – known as 'Moreau le Jeune'), a draughtsman, illustrator, engraver and member of the *Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture*.

⁸⁶ Probably Robert Smith 1st Baron Carrington (1752-1838) of Upton (Nottinghamshire) who served as MP for Nottingham (1779-1797). His grandfather, Abel Smith (c. 1690 – 1756), founded Smith's Bank in Nottingham.

⁸⁷ Possibly linked to Gilbert Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, 1st Earl of Minto (1751-1814 – Elliot baronets of Minto, Roxburgh), the 'M' standing for 'Minto' or 'Murray'. We should remember this inventory was drawn up in 1794 during the Terror and this could be an example of a deliberate obfuscation.

⁸⁸ Thomas Bulkeley (1752-1822), 7th Viscount Bulkeley (Cheshire), was MP for Anglesey (1774-1784) and Beaumaris and Caernarvonshire (1784-1790). He was a supporter of Pitt's administration.

⁸⁹ John Coxe Hippisley 1st Baronet (1746-1825), British diplomat and friend of William Windham, worked for the East India Company at Tanjore (1781-1787) and served as an MP for Sudbury (1790-1796 & 1802-1818).

⁹⁰ William Beckford (1709-1770), twice elected Lord Mayor of London.

⁹¹ George James Cholmondeley, 1st Marquess of Cholmondeley (1749-1827), a.k.a. The Earl of Cholmondeley.

⁹² Richard Butler (1761-1817), 7th Baronet of Carlow (Ireland).

⁹³ Possibly a misspelling of Charles Grey, 2nd Earl Grey (1764-1845), future Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister of Britain. Alternatively, this could be Charles Gray (1696-1782), a long-serving Tory MP for Colchester (1742-1755 & 1761-1780).

⁹⁴ Henry Hoare (1705-1785), the well-known London banker.

⁹⁵ Probably Grace Dalrymple Elliot (1754-1823), a Scottish courtesan and mistress of the Duke of Orléans well known for her memoirs of the French Revolution (*Journal of my life during the French Revolution*).

⁹⁶ Possibly a misspelling of 'Buccleuch'. Henry Scott (1746-1812), 3rd Duke of Buccleuch and 5th Duke of Queensberry, was a Scottish peer who served as governor of the Bank of Scotland from 1777 to 1812.

⁹⁷ Probably the Irish actor Spranger Barry (1719-1777).

⁹⁸ Possibly related to the Scott de Martinville family which emigrated from Scotland to Brittany in the 17th century.

Notable Individual Clients of Perregaux et Cie.	
Name of Client	Sums held by Perregaux & Cie. (livres)
H. Munro ⁹⁹	12
Bicknell ¹⁰⁰	15
L. Stormont ¹⁰¹	19
MacDonogh	4,320
C. Wood ¹⁰²	144
Heneage ¹⁰³	7
Barrow ¹⁰⁴	12
Busoni <i>père</i> ¹⁰⁵	94
William Bellingham 1 st Baronet ¹⁰⁶	510
Ferrers ¹⁰⁷	448
S. Milnes ¹⁰⁸	2,834
Breguet ¹⁰⁹	510
A. Roy ¹¹⁰	4,000
Priestly ¹¹¹	650
Purling ¹¹²	2,836
W. Wilkinson ¹¹³	2,850
Hassard ¹¹⁴	27,616
Grimm ¹¹⁵	16,641

⁹⁹ Hector Munro 8th Lord of Novar (1726-1805), was Commander-in-Chief India (1764-1765) and fought in the Anglo-Mysore Wars. He also served as MP for Inverness Burghs (1768-1802).

¹⁰⁰ Possibly William Bicknell, a serge manufacturer based in Blackman Street, London and father of Elhanan Bicknell.

¹⁰¹ Probably ‘Lord Stormont’, David Murray, 2nd Earl of Mansfield (1727-1796), a.k.a. Viscount Stormont, who served as British ambassador in Paris during the American Revolutionary War. He owned Kenwood House in Hampstead Heath.

¹⁰² Possibly Charles Wood (1702-1774), an English ironmonger known for his experiments with platinum.

¹⁰³ Probably linked to the Heneage family of Hainton Hall, Lincolnshire.

¹⁰⁴ Possibly John Barrow, 1st Baronet (1764-1838), British diplomat and Second Secretary to the Admiralty (appointed 1804).

¹⁰⁵ Jean-Marie-Gaspard Busoni was a Genoese banker settled in Paris whose establishment (*Sponton, Busoni & Cie.*) was located at 59, Rue Thévenot (near the Place de l’Étoile). The bank first appeared in the Royal Almanach in 1776. On 8 Sep. 1793, it was searched by revolutionary authorities of the Bonne Nouvelle section and its correspondence examined. Busoni was arrested in 1794 but eventually released. See Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.69-75.

¹⁰⁶ William Bellingham 1st Baronet (1756-1826) was Controller of Storekeepers Accounts for the Royal Navy. He was a secretary of Pitt the Younger and served as MP for Reigate (1784-1789). The city of Bellingham in the state of Washington is named after him.

¹⁰⁷ Either Washington Shirley, 5th Earl Ferrers (1722-1778), Vice-Admiral of the Royal Navy, or his younger brother Robert Shirley, 6th Earl Ferrers (1723-1787), or Robert Shirley, 7th Earl Ferrers (1756-1827).

¹⁰⁸ Possibly Richard Slater Milnes (1759-1804), a wealthy cloth merchant who graduated from the University of Glasgow and served as MP for York (1784-1802).

¹⁰⁹ Abraham-Louis Breguet (1747-1823) was a clockmaker and inventor from Neuchâtel, considered the leading watchmaker of his day.

¹¹⁰ Antoine Roy (1764-1837), business partner of Ouvrard, future French finance minister (1828-1829).

¹¹¹ Dr. Joseph Priestly (1733-1804), the well-known English scientist and theologian.

¹¹² John Purling (c.1722-1800), a director of the East India Company who served as MP for East Looe (1772-1774) and Weymouth (1774-1790). In 1770, he purchased the Bradford Peverell estate in Dorset.

¹¹³ Younger half-brother of John Wilkinson (see below).

¹¹⁴ Possibly the Irish Hassard family from Waterford. There is also a Rue Hassard in Paris’s 19th *arrondissement* named after the landowner who owned the title deeds to the surrounding vicinity.

¹¹⁵ Friedrich Melchior, Baron von Grimm (1723-1807), a German journalist and contributor to Diderot’s *Encyclopédie*, was a friend of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and patron of the Mozart family. Catherine the Great of Russia appointed him Russian Consul to Hamburg in 1792.

Notable Individual Clients of <i>Perregaux et Cie.</i>	
Name of Client	Sums held by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (livres)
T. Hill ¹¹⁶	3,271
Amedroz	151
Chenevix	9,380
L. Regnier	27,000
Sejourné	4,610
C. Cousmaker ¹¹⁷	273
St. Germain ¹¹⁸	610
J. Wilkinson ¹¹⁹	100
J. Trevor ¹²⁰	249
Civrac ¹²¹	37
Plunckett [sic] ¹²²	24
Wyndham ¹²³	270
Tarleton ¹²⁴	32
Chamberlaine ¹²⁵	33
Auricane	999
Barthélémy ¹²⁶	50
P. Bureau	2,144
Gentil ¹²⁷	1,542
D. Hailer	2,897
Kearney ¹²⁸	600
Le Normand ¹²⁹	400

¹¹⁶ Possibly Thomas Hill (1721-1776) of Court Hill (near Ludlow) who served as MP for Leominster (1774-1776).

¹¹⁷ Probably related to Edmond de Cousse-maker (1805-1876), a French jurist and medievalist.

¹¹⁸ Claude-Louis-Robert, comte de Saint-Germain (1707-1778), fought in the Seven Years War and served as French finance minister (1775-1777). He was a friend of Turgot and Malesherbes.

¹¹⁹ John Wilkinson (1728-1808), a leading Birmingham industrialist.

¹²⁰ John Hampden-Trevor (1748-1824), 3rd Viscount Hampden, served as British ambassador in Munich (1780-1783) and Turin (1783-1798).

¹²¹ Jean-Laurent, *comte de Durfort-Civrac* and *duc de Lorges* (1746-1826), was the *chevalier d'honneur* of Madame Victoire (fifth daughter of Louis XV). He left France in 1791 to recruit a counter-revolutionary corps at Limburg which campaigned against French troops the following year. He moved to England in 1794 in the vain hope of being assigned a command. After Napoleon's abdication in 1814, he returned to France and was created *lieutenant-général des armées* and *pair de France*.

¹²² Possibly a misspelling for 'Plunckett' which could refer to Edward Plunckett, 12th Baron of Dunsany (1713-1781) or Arthur James Plunckett, 8th Earl of Fingall (1759-1836).

¹²³ Possibly Charles William Wyndham (1760-1828), who served as MP for Midhurst (1790-1795), New Shoreham (1795-1802) and Sussex (1807-1812).

¹²⁴ Either Banastre Tarleton, 1st Baronet (1754-1833), the well-known British soldier of the American Revolutionary War and MP for Liverpool (1790-1806 & 1807-1812), or his brother John Tarleton (1755-1841), a Liverpool West India merchant who was MP for Seaford (1792-1796).

¹²⁵ Possibly John Chamberlaine (1745-1812), antiquary and keeper of George III's drawings, coins and medals.

¹²⁶ Probably the French diplomat François Barthélémy (1747-1830), French ambassador in Basel (1791-1797) and executive director (elected 20 May 1797) who was deported to Sinnamary after 18 Fructidor. Returning to France after 18 Brumaire, he was made a member of the *sénat conservateur* and created a *comte de l'Empire* (1808). Louis XVIII subsequently made him a *pair de France* (1814) and created him marquis (1817).

¹²⁷ Possibly a *directeur de l'Agence du droit d'enregistrement* (Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.13).

¹²⁸ Possibly James Kearney, MP for Kinsale in the Irish Parliament (1768-1790).

¹²⁹ Probably Simon-Emmanuel-Julien Le Normand (c.1750-), a trader based in Cadix who was a banker of the Spanish Court and a *receveur des finances* and administrator of the *Caisse d'Escompte* in France during the *Ancien Régime*. He went bankrupt in March 1792 and was arrested on 27 vendémiaire II/18 Oct. 1793. Le

Notable Individual Clients of Perregaux et Cie.	
Name of Client	Sums held by Perregaux & Cie. (livres)
C. Mathews	4,820
Swinburne ¹³⁰	15,745
Charles Whitworth ¹³¹	3,414
Douglas ¹³²	134
J.G. Rumbold ¹³³	23
Coindet	8,522
Servan ¹³⁴	4,575
J. Hunter ¹³⁵	4,545
D. Sheldon	1,527
Pierry	4,000
Godineau	11,529
Rustan ¹³⁶	6,270
Leeuwerghem ¹³⁷	4,633
J. Hare ¹³⁸	8,054
J. Palmer ¹³⁹	900
Palmerston ¹⁴⁰	36
J. Lindsay ¹⁴¹	668
Claude Étignard Lafaulotte (Parisian wood trader)	2,131
Hanquet	3,600
Beaulieu ¹⁴²	1,500

Normand was released but immediately prosecuted by his creditors. The rest of his career is unknown. See Bouchary, *LMP*, Tome II, p.115-121.

¹³⁰ Henry Swinburne (1743-1803), English travel writer.

¹³¹ Charles Whitworth (1752-1825), 1st Earl Whitworth, was British ambassador to Poland (1785-1788), Russia (1788-1800) and France (1802-1803).

¹³² This could be several possibilities: William Douglas 4th Baronet of Kelhead (1730-1783), alumnus of Glasgow University and MP for Dumfries Burghs (1768-1780) who inherited the fortune of his uncle Charles Douglas (died 1770), an East India merchant; George Douglas 16th Earl of Morton (1761-1827), Grand Master Mason of the Grand Lodge of Scotland; and George Douglas 2nd Baronet (1754-1821), MP for Roxburghshire (1784-1806).

¹³³ Possibly George Rumbold 2nd Baronet (1764-1807), British *chargé d'affaires* in Hamburg (1803-1804).

¹³⁴ Joseph Marie Servan de Gerbey (1741-1808), army officer and French foreign minister during the Revolution (1792).

¹³⁵ Probably John Hunter (1728-1793), who was appointed surgeon of George III (1776) and surgeon general by William Pitt (1790).

¹³⁶ Pascal Rustan, a Paris trader and business partner of Isaac Panchaud with considerable assets in Guadeloupe (Lüthy, *LMP*, Tome III, p.425, footnote 6).

¹³⁷ Possibly linked to Leeuwerghem Castle in Zottegem (Belgium)?

¹³⁸ Probably James Hare (1747-1804), a noted conversationalist and faro player who served as MP for Stockbridge (1772-1774) and Knaresborough (1781-1804).

¹³⁹ Possibly the English actor John Palmer (1742-1798).

¹⁴⁰ Henry Temple 2nd Viscount Palmerston (1739-1802), was MP for East Looe (1762-1768), Southampton (1768-1774), Hastings (1774-1784), Boroughbridge (1784-1790), Newport, Isle of Wight (1790-1796) and Winchester (1796-1802). He also served as a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty (1766-1777) and a Lord of the Treasury (1777-1782). His family owned a vast estate in County Sligo, Ireland with an annual income of £12,000. Palmerston travelled extensively in Europe and was a friend of Voltaire.

¹⁴¹ John Lindsay (1737-1788) of Evelix (near Dornoch, Ross), was a Rear-Admiral in the Royal Navy. He served in the Seven Years War, was commander-in-chief of the East Indies Station (1769-1772), fought at the Battle of Ushant (1778) and was commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean (1784). He was also an MP for Aberdeen Burghs (1767-1768). Dido Elizabeth Belle (1761-1804) was his illegitimate daughter.

¹⁴² Presumably Jules-Émile-François Hervé de Beaulieu (1752-1807), an ex-director of the *Compagnie des Indes* who briefly served as French finance minister in 1792. See Antonetti, Guy; Fabien Cardoni & Mathieu de Oliveira (eds.), *Les ministres des Finances de la Révolution française au Second Empire. Tome I* :

Notable Individual Clients of Perregaux et Cie.	
Name of Client	Sums held by Perregaux & Cie. (livres)
Berthold Proly ¹⁴³	2,000
Vestris père ¹⁴⁴ (ballet dancer)	2,000
J.C. Clarmont	3,167
Fanny Wright ¹⁴⁵	1,200

Source: MC/ET/X/813, 8 pluviôse an II – Inventaire après-décès d'Adélaïde de Praël, Madame Perregaux.

dictionnaire biographique, 1790-1814, Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, 2007, p.99-112.

¹⁴³ Berthold Proly was a leading Belgian financier and Orléaniste who formed links with the *Exagérés*. See his entry in the Biographical Index.

¹⁴⁴ Gaëtan Vestris (Gaetano Apolline Baldassare Vestris, 1729-1808), a leading Italian ballet master settled in Paris.

¹⁴⁵ This cannot be Frances Wright (1795-1852), the Scottish writer and abolitionist, since this inventory was drawn in 1794 – a year before her birth!

APPENDIX VI

Inventory After Decease of Jean-Frédéric Perregaux Established 25 February 1808

Notable Trading Houses doing Business with <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> in 1808		
Debtors (<i>Débiteurs</i>)		
Name of Client	Location	Sums owed to <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (francs)
Alexandre Adams	Boulogne-sur-mer	9,522
Dufourcq & Cie.	Bayonne	21,040
M. & Hutret	Rouen	29,465
Samuel Joly & <i>fil</i> s	Saint Quentin	16,490
Pellow Laffitte & Cie.	Saint Quentin	16,529
A.F. Rall	St. Petersburg	79,620
H. Schroöder & Cie.	Bremen	9,205
Thomson Rowand & Cie.	Moscow	21,420
John Moore & Cie.	Alicante	31,165
Falconnet Cie.	Naples	5,513
Lohr & Cie.	Leipzig	5,523
Alex Delamotte et Cie.	Reims	6,667
C.M. Schroöder & Cie.	Hamburg	4,977
DuPasquier & Cie.	Neuchâtel	13,510
Ballabene & Cie.	Prague	5,788
Meuron & Bovet	Neuchâtel	13,810
Le Baron Dervé	Caen	4,036
J. M. Fourbow Cie.	Tarbes	11,658
Roger [?] <i>frères</i>	Pisa	8,069
F. & Co. Deluis	Bremen	10,460
C. F. Weigel & <i>fil</i> s	Breslau	8,060
Quenoville Lanchow Hanin Cie.	Dieppe	6,870
J. Ducornaw	Bordeaux	5,620
Conrad Klermondts Cie.	Burtscheid (Aachen)	5,110
D. Parish & Cie.	Antwerp	4,970
Barteh & Cie.	Brussels	4,450
Charlier Darber & Remy	Köln	11,500
Boussion [?] <i>frère & fil</i> s	Angoulême	6,230
Pouliguen	Brest	10,850
Richard Augustin Cie.	Rouen	7,496
Leffes [?] A. Hertz Cohen	Hanover	13,470
La direction de commerce maritime	Berlin	8,036
H. F. Pappenheimer	Munich	8,290
Pheffel Wich Cie.	Antwerp	4,975
F. Scherburne	Nantes	22,153
Wolff Levy	Berlin	18,510
Amelin	Châteauroux	16,651
J. & H. van der Ligen	Cuvelde [Cuxhaven?]	8,521

**Notable Trading Houses doing Business
with Perregaux & Cie. in 1808**

Debtors (<i>Débiteurs</i>)		
Name of Client	Location	Sums owed to Perregaux & Cie. (francs)
Compte & Cie.	Barcelona	19,424
Glinte & Schnell	Frankfurt	15,320
Mayer Amschel Rothschild	Frankfurt	58,121
Deleutre <i>fils</i> & Mantet [?]	Avignon	29,555
Gabrine & Cushing	Marseille	6,232
Capaux <i>frères</i> & Cie.	Bordeaux	6,511
Ryberg & Cie.	Copenhagen	26,005
D. Seeligmann & Cie.	Karlsruhe	18,279
Les <i>frères</i> Schickler	Berlin	61,109
Le Cavelier <i>fils</i>	Caen	22,780
Marc Betton	Périgueux	17,707
P. In. Franck	Strasbourg	4,912
Charrière	Agen	11,612
And. Westemann & <i>fils</i>	Basel	16,037
J. Cassaing & Cie.	Toulouse	4,049
Heirs of J. M. Lévy	Berlin	73,487
J. Moet & Cie.	Epernay	90,461
Th. H. Schmaltz & <i>fils</i>	Mannheim	49,850
Mercier <i>fils</i>	Alençon	22,286
Blandeau <i>ainé</i>	Angoulême	130,070
Meyssonnier	Clermont Ferrand	18,362
Delaroche & Cie.	Nantes	66,185
D. M. & C. Watering	Amsterdam	5,190
Pochet <i>père</i> & <i>fils</i>	Besançon	24,320
Jn. Bte. Negra Cie.	Turin	24,460
Constantin Laflèche	Paris	22,800
Fraissinet Cie.	Naples	4,907
Vilar <i>frères</i> Cie.	Marseille	14,640
Jn. Gn. Schuller Cie.	Vienna	5,241
Patrick Joyes & Sons	Madrid	47,163
Marin Torlonia	Rome	14,809
Debrais <i>frères</i>	Le Mans	13,590
Shares of the <i>Banque de France</i>	-	298,234
Greffulhe <i>frères</i>	London	44,374
Bills drawn on Spain	-	4,772
Annuities	-	21,200
Matthiessen & Sillem	Hamburg	6,672
Puget Bainbridge & Parnell	London	17,779
Ransom Morland Cie.	London	25,931
Minet & Fector	London	188,814
Discounted bills of exchange (<i>Lettres à l'escompte</i>)	-	1,754,114
Remittances (<i>Lettres à recevoir</i>)	-	237,714
Herries Farquhar Cie.	London	33,714
Banque de France	-	179,819

Notable Trading Houses doing Business with <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> in 1808		
Debtors (<i>Débiteurs</i>)		
Name of Client	Location	Sums owed to <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (francs)
Raymond & Théodore de Smeth	Amsterdam	23,961
Bills drawn on Italy	-	9,360
Braunsberg & Cie.	Amsterdam	13,657
Hope & Co.	Amsterdam	79,226
Bills of exchange drawn on Hamburg	-	50,472
Durand R. F.	Lyon	21,790
Caisse	-	250,419
General Marmont	-	55,737
Ministry of the Interior	-	6,000
Th. Coutts & Cie.	London	172,001
J. Fréaux & Cie.	Valenciennes	5,206
Hammersley & Cie.	London	49,800
Bills of exchange drawn on Holland	-	166,785
Bills of exchange drawn on <i>départements</i>	-	44,291

Notable Trading Houses doing Business with <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> in 1808		
Creditors (<i>Créanciers</i>)		
Name of Client	Location	Sums owed by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (francs)
Audibert <i>ainé</i>	Boulogne-sur-mer	8,490
Jacob Dohrman & Co. ¹	Lisbon	30,870
Franck Cie. (Johann Jakob Ritter von Franck)	Vienna	41,694
Greffulhe <i>frères</i> & Cie.	London	5,481
R. Landerer	Basel	5,020
Minet & Fector	London	35,690
W. Karsten	Bremen	10,671
Jacques Roux	Cassel	12,610

¹ Jacob Dohrman was the brother of Henry Arnold Dohrman (1749-1813), a Dutch merchant in Lisbon who provided relief and means of repatriation to American sailors captured by the British during the American Revolutionary War. In 1780, he was appointed as a US agent in Portugal by the Continental Congress. In 1786, he embarked for American and petitioned Congress to reimburse his expenses. He eventually settled in Steubenville (Ohio) on the land Congress granted him on 1 Oct. 1787. His brother Jacob continued as his representative in Lisbon until at least 1792. See 'To George Washington from David Humphreys', 12 May 1791 in Mark A. Mastromarino (ed.), *The Papers of George Washington*, Presidential Series, vol. 8, 22 March 1791–22 September 1791, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999, pp. 174–175. Available online at: <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-08-02-0136>.

**Notable Trading Houses doing Business
with Perregaux & Cie. in 1808**

Creditors (*Créanciers*)

Name of Client	Location	Sums owed by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (francs)
Schweighauser & Doberé	Nantes	6,209
J. F. des Jomiges	Dantzig	29,004
J. Laporte	Bordeaux	5,710
J. A. Morten	Bordeaux	35,225
Veuve Homberg & Homberg <i>frères</i>	Le Havre	4,270
J. Batbedat	Bayonne	6,000
Lemonnier de Lorieère Cie.	Laval	63,340
Jourdaw [?] & <i>frs</i>	Tain (Scotland?)	15,180
Roger & Pitcairn	-	5,210
Jarvis & Cie.	Lisbon	3,561
<i>Frères</i> Mulhens	Frankfurt	5,340
J. Hefse	Hamburg	11,040
Domièrgue <i>père & frs</i>	Clermont	8,347
Gérard Nagle [?]	Cambrai	18,467
Ruisart [?] <i>pères & frs</i>	Reims	5,984
C. & Jn. Floh	Crevele [?]	42,708
Sedneking Cie.	Hamburg	13,264
Amstein & Eskeles	Vienna	13,890
Charron <i>ainé</i> & Jn. Jn. Gabiow	La Tremblade	36,600
Frederic Hoffmann	Düsseldorf	4,776
Comptoir du Commerce de la Banque de Vienne à Trieste	Trieste	8,400
Geymuller Cie.	Vienna	8,071
Mac Carthaw Duhamel	Rouen	16,546
Veuve Martell La Herriand Cie.	Cognac	18,122
Jn. de Leuvereigh	Burtscheid (Aachen)	41,020
Jn. & J. T. Civbauck	Valenciennes	33,030
Jn. Th. Daubur	London	33,448
Bupne [?] Ratye & Cie.	Cette (Sète)	11,978
O. Lavaggi	Rouen	65,420
Leuba Delahaye Cie.	Saint Quentin	27,179
Fuge Cie.	Leipzig	9,530
Mena & Cie.	Monthermé (Ardennes)	27,880
Bills of exchange to pay	-	6,814
French prisoners in England	-	5,589
Charles Decroix	-	86,475
Hirseiger [?]	-	15,970
Charles-Frédéric Reinhard (foreign minister)	-	13,490
Maupertuis	Saint Malo?	23,820
Jacques Laffitte	-	51,265
Jean-Baptiste de Nompère de Champagny	-	10,867
Bethmann Cie.	Bordeaux	126

Notable Trading Houses doing Business with <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> in 1808		
Creditors (<i>Créanciers</i>)		
Name of Client	Location	Sums owed by <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (francs)
Bills of exchange drawn on England	-	9,174

Notable Individual Clients of <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> in 1808	
Debtors (<i>Débiteurs</i>)	
Name of Client	Sums owed to <i>Perregaux & Cie.</i> (francs)
Ch. Beamisch	8,185
Quentin Craufurd	95,876
Colonel Edw. Roche	8,038
P. Lattin	21,911
Lord Elgin	66
Francis Egerton	9,733
John Leatham	2,239
Lord Holland (Henry Richard Vassall-Fox, 3rd Baron Holland)	32
Lord Wycombe (William Petty-Fitzmaurice – The Earl of Shelburne, or his son John Petty?)	153
Lord Shaftesbury (Cropley Ashley-Cooper, 6th Earl of Shaftesbury)	6
Langley [?]	1,664
Dreyer	11,100
F. Leuba (Saint Quentin trader)	1,820
British war prisoners at Verdun	345
Honoré-Nicolas-Marie Duveyrier (ex-commissioner of the <i>section des Piques</i>)	286
Louis Greffulhe	1,431
General Charles Laure de Mac-Mahon	467
de Cruquenbourg (Brussels family)	2,497
Ferrère (the town in the Hautes-Pyrénées or a family of 18 th century sculptors?)	12,766
Lady Caroline Melfort (daughter of William Mackenzie, 1 st Earl of Seaforth)	1,185
H. W. J. Knox	21,558
Moulard	12,000
Pouté de Lombriarque	12,099
du Brockhausen	4,242
Lady Maynard (Anne Parsons aka Mrs. Horton)	17,885
Count Metternich	12,680
Jean-Louis David (painter)	1,665
Richard Fitz-Gerald (Lt.-col. of 2nd Regiment of Life Guards. Killed at Waterloo?)	5,480
General Dupont (Pierre Dupont de l'Étang)	6,000
Le Chevalier de Reul	40,000

Notable Individual Clients of Perregaux & Cie. in 1808	
Debtors (<i>Débiteurs</i>)	
Name of Client	Sums owed to Perregaux & Cie. (francs)
General Augustin de l'Espinasse	486
Walter Boyd Jr. (nephew of Walter Boyd)	3,927
X. [?] D. Blancmesnil (a relation of Malesherbes?)	118,529
General Benoît de Boigne	1,463

Notable Individual Clients of Perregaux & Cie. in 1808	
Creditors (<i>Créanciers</i>)	
Name of Client	Sums owed by Perregaux & Cie. (francs)
Bacher (French agent in Switzerland)	13,480
Pierre Ochs	28
Bogne [Benoît de Boigne?]	11,935
The city of Neuchâtel	1,619
de Mello [?]	25,227
Th. Duchezaulse	6,901
Jacques Laffitte	4,146
Jean-Frédéric Perregaux	1,784,600
General Marmont, duc de Raguse	411,589
General Cuillier Perron (French military adventurer in India)	864,940
Succession of Gumpelzhaimer	547
Isaac Titsingh (senior officer of the Dutch East India Co. in Japan)	26,792
Henry Tufton, 11 th Earl of Thanet	466
W. Ogle (possibly from the Ogle family of Northumberland?)	669
F. M. Boyd (a relation of Walter Boyd?)	2,080
Madame Derville (possibly linked to the Derville faïence company from Aire-sur-la-Lys in Pas-de-Calais?)	3,545
Henry Seymour (son of Francis Seymour-Conway, 1st Marquess of Hertford)	9,356
The Count of Posadowsky (German aristocrat)	2,633
In. C. Clarmont	16,454
General Antoine-Guillaume Rampon (Senator of Rouen)	431
The Margraves of Ansbach	45
B. J. Hopkinson (possibly Joseph Hopkinson of Pennsylvania?)	67
Edward Cooper (Edward Synge Cooper of County Sligo?)	26
Gustave Hamilton (possibly a descendant of Gustav Hamilton of Enniskillen?)	257
The Count of Fernando Heridia	166

Notable Individual Clients of Perregaux & Cie. in 1808	
Creditors (Créanciers)	
Name of Client	Sums owed by Perregaux & Cie. (francs)
Madame Grant (probably not Talleyrand's wife)	72
Lady Ann Stuart (possibly Anne Stewart, wife of Castlereagh?)	511
John Nicholls (MP for Bletchingley and Tregony)	484
Pelisson (possibly a descendant of Paul Pellisson?)	3,000
General Emmanuel de Grouchy	356
Siméon Boronnet	11,241
Maréchal Édouard Mortier, duc de Trévise	63,005
Count Andrey Kirillovich Razumovsky	4,938
Lord Beverley (Algernon Percy, 1st Earl of Beverley)	9,358
Roger Palmer (from the family of the Earls of Castlemaine?)	1,500
Andras (a relation of Field Marshal András Hadik?)	116,823
Lady Smith (Rosetta Smith, mistress of Thomas Picton?)	4,345
Melanie de Salm	2,496
N. A. Cope (possibly a relation of General John Cope?)	5,138
Le Chevalier Beaumont (d'Éon?)	159
Maréchal Laurent Gouvion de Saint-Cyr	13,380
Le Comte de Seneffe	77
Committee for British war prisoners	4,131
H. Waring Knox	1,600
John Parry (Welsh harpist?)	5,017
General Jean Rivaud	41,355
Le marquis de Lambert (Jean-François de Saint-Lambert?)	49,629
F. F. Martigny	30,010
General Boyer (Henri Jacques Jean Boyer)	1,185
General Guillaume-Charles Rousseau	600
John Whitehill (Pennsylvania trader & former lover of Madame Grand)	100
R. Middleton (trading family from Glasgow?)	15,179
General Henri Clarke	330
The Duchess of Cumberland (Frederica of Mecklenburg-Strelitz)	600
Edward Stephens	11,002
Madame de Bonneuil	63
Prince Th. Golitsyn	11,250
François Gérard (painter)	12,174
General Michel-Marie Pauthod	88,770
Senator Charles Lambrechts (ex-foreign minister)	5,110
Lord Cholmondeley	217
General Mathieu Dumas (war minister of Joseph Bonaparte at Naples)	600
Dominique Vivant Denon	1,833

Debtors in Prolonged Arrears (<i>Débiteurs arriérés douteux</i>)	
Name of Client	Sums owed to Perregaux & Cie. (francs)
Charles Rougemont of Paris	1,240
Ph. Morin of Philadelphia (possibly Philip Morin Freneau?)	8,542
Payne & Mackinley	5,616
J. & A. M. Cullow of Baltimore	693
C. A. de Hasselgreen	727
Bethmann <i>frères</i> of Frankfurt	967
Dubious state debtors	57,766
In. Vochez [?] of London	355,845
Lord Robert Fitzgerald (British diplomat in Switzerland – 6 th son of James FitzGerald, 1st Duke of Leinster)	7,045
Leroy de Petitval	296,295
Walter Smith	32,361
Fumagalli of Milan	22,443
Dauberval (ballet dancer)	8,420
Graff & Geary of London	1,156
Thomas Coutts & Cie. of London	£19,586 + £2,880 drawn on James Craufurd
Puget & Bainbridge of London	5,584
Ransom Morland & Cie. of London	15,737
Minet & Fector of London	£1,610
A. F. Rall of St. Petersburg	5,038
Lord Whitworth (British ambassador in St. Petersburg and later in Paris)	26,498
Nettement (Perregaux's intermediary with Lord Auckland)	1,675
J. A. Rose (Augustus Rose – English bailiff of the National Convention?)	421
Maréchal François Joseph Lefebvre	1,232
Senator (and Maréchal) Pierre Riel de Beurnonville	94
J. Edward Devereux (possibly a relation of Nicholas Devereux, Utica financier?)	3,253
The Duchess of Dorset (Arabella Diana Cope, wife of John Sackville)	9,030
Lord Kerry (Francis Thomas-Fitzmaurice, 3 rd Earl of Kerry)	180
Lord Oxford (Edward Harley, 5 th Earl of Oxford and Earl Mortimer)	59
Holcroft (Thomas Holcroft, playwright)	189
General merchandise	17,519
The manufacture of Creil	50,000
Nathaniel Parker-Forth (British spy)	25,575

Source: MC/ET/X/882, 25 février 1808 – Inventaire après-décès de Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.

APPENDIX VII

Summary of the National Treasury's Operations with Financiers in 1796-1797	
Marc-François Séguy (Rouen Trader)	
Description	Observations
<p>The following deal was proposed by Séguy and approved by the finance minister on 27 brumaire an V:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Séguy will pay the Treasury 1,525,000 francs in <i>ordonnances</i> issued by the war and naval ministers and approved by the finance minister; • Séguy will pay the Treasury 375,000 francs in <i>bons du Trésor</i> with validity dates of 30, 45 and 60 days; <p style="text-align: center;">Total: 1,900,000 francs</p> <p>In exchange, Séguy will be granted an equivalent amount in bills of exchange drawn on <i>Bauwens, Beths & Cie.</i> in the following instalments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 300,000 francs in the 2nd <i>décade</i> of frimaire V; • 375,000 francs in the 3rd <i>décade</i> of frimaire V; • 375,000 francs in the 1st <i>décade</i> of nivôse V; • 400,000 francs in the 2nd <i>décade</i> of nivôse V; • 450,000 francs in the 3rd <i>décade</i> of nivôse V. <p>The Directory further ceded the sum of 8 million francs to Séguy which the King of Naples promised to pay France within a year. The terms & conditions for this cession were as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Séguy will be paid 1,400,000 francs and will pay the following sums to contractors for their services: 2. 100,000 francs to M. Brocq for supplies; 3. 20,000 francs to the <i>administration munitionnaire</i> of the 15th division; 4. 120,000 francs to the company of Lavauverte; 5. 200,000 francs to the company in charge of supplying forage; 6. 100,000 francs to the treasurer of the Invalides; 7. 40,000 francs to the contractor supplying heating (<i>fournisseur des chauffages</i>); 8. 120,000 francs to the members of the <i>Corps diplomatique</i>. <p>Séguy will be awarded a discount of 500,000 francs.</p>	<p>On 5 nivôse, Séguy paid the Treasury the following sums:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 375,000 in <i>bons du Trésor</i> with Lavauverte as compensation to the war ministry; • 903,427 francs in <i>bons du Trésor</i> to the naval ministry. <p style="text-align: center;">Total : 1,278,427 francs</p> <p>In return, he was paid 555,555 francs 8 deniers 9 sols on 5 nivôse worth 1,050,000 francs.</p> <p>Operation to be started on 1 nivôse (an V?)</p>

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

Corsanger

Description	Observations
<p>Deal approved by a letter from the foreign minister dated 5 brumaire an V and by a letter of the finance minister dated 7 brumaire an V:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paid the Treasury 70,000 francs in bills of exchange drawn on New York; • Paid the Treasury 80,000 francs in bills of exchange drawn on Philadelphia. <p align="center">Total: 150,000 francs</p> <p>In exchange, Corsanger is granted an <i>ordonnance</i> of an equivalent sum drawn on the <i>Caisse générale</i> payable in 8 equal instalments issued every five days beginning in the 2nd <i>décade</i> of nivôse an V.</p>	<p>On 11 nivôse an V, the Treasury received:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 70,000 francs in bills of exchange drawn on New York; • 80,000 francs in bills of exchange drawn on Philadelphia. <p align="center">Total: 150,000 francs</p>

Compagnie Flachat, Laporte & Castelin

Description	Observations
<p><u>Contract for Italian Contributions</u></p> <p>A contract for the conversion and employment of Italian contributions was concluded with the company on 19 messidor an IV pursuant to the Directory's letters of 17 & 18 messidor stating its intentions according to which all Italian contributions were to be collected and deposited in a designated city where they would be placed at the company's disposal. One month after signing the contract, the company will pay the Treasury the following sums:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A quarter of the contract's total value to be deposited at Huningue (Alsace) in 6-franc <i>écu</i> coins (<i>écus de six</i>); • A second quarter to be paid in Paris, either in 6-franc <i>écu</i> coins or gold ingots; • The remaining half to be paid in bills of exchange with 60-day validities drawn on foreign markets and guaranteed by the company. <p>The company will be compensated for shipping and handling costs and will be allowed to keep any excess of the sums outlined in Article 7 of the contract and will be awarded a commission of 5% on contributions and 20% on the bills of exchange.</p>	

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

An additional clause approved by a decree dated 28 messidor an IV pawned jewels, diamonds and merchandise drawn from contributions or seized from the enemy with the company. Along with a bonus, the company will be granted a commission of 2% on the price of all objects it will sell and will be compensated for shipping and handling costs. It shall deliver all payments for these effects to the Treasury in the manner stipulated in the above contract.

Contract of 3 nivôse an V

On 3 nivôse an V, the *Compagnie Flachat, Laporte & Castelin* and the Treasury signed a deal according to which their previous agreement of 19 messidor an IV and its addended articles signed on 28 messidor an IV would be rescinded once the company had submitted its definitive accounts to the Treasury. The balance or surplus on expenses receipts (*recette sur la dépense*) will be awarded in entirety to the company which will employ these funds exclusively to purchase its military supplies.

The company will lift the seals and release all jewels and diamonds deposited with *Aimé Regny père fils & Cie.* in Genoa. The company undertakes to pay within three months as of this day all payment orders (*mandats*) which it has delivered and not yet acquitted totalling an estimated 998,424 francs.

The Treasury will pay 998,424 francs in hard currency drawn as priority payments on paymasters (*payeurs*) of *départements* to the company at its Parisian headquarters within three days. This sum will only be delivered once the company has acquitted all its aforementioned payment orders. The company will have the right of converting all remaining effects in its possession and of collecting the sums outstanding on them.

No further action will be taken pursuant to the finance minister's letter of 17 brumaire excepting what shall be agreed by the present deal.

Any seizure or placing under seal of goods, arrests or other actions taken against representatives or assets of the company are cancelled and will be revoked. The company and its properties shall be restored to the position they enjoyed prior to these actions.

All subsequent ordonnances delivered to the company shall be paid in the manner of its

On 13 nivôse, the company was awarded a special delegation to withdraw 20,000 francs in each of 49 *départements* (totalling 980,000 francs), plus an additional delegation on the *département* of the Vosges for 18,424 francs.

Total: 998,424 francs

On the same day, a memorandum was addressed to the paymasters of each of these 50 *départements* to facilitate the execution of these dispositions.

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

choosing – either by the *Armée d'Italie's* paymaster or by the Treasury via payment orders in hard currency, gold or silver (at market rates) drawn as priority payments on *départements*. The company shall continue to administer the mint in Milan and will report on its activities every month to the Treasury.

Grandecourt

Description

The finance minister accepted Grandecourt's proposal on 26 brumaire an V to pay the Treasury the following sums:

- 200,000 francs in hard currency;
- 200,000 francs in ordonnances.

Total: 400,000 francs

In exchange, Grandecourt will receive a payment order for 400,000 francs from the Treasury drawn on the *receveur* of the *département* of Eure payable either in hard currency or *mandats territoriaux* at a provisional exchange rate of 4 francs per *mandat*, unless he chooses to exchange the entire sum on the day he advances funds to the Treasury – in which case the *mandat's* exchange rate on that particular day will apply.

A second proposal approved by the finance minister on 17 nivôse an V requires Grandecourt to pay the Treasury the following sums:

- an *ordonnance* of 890,000 francs issued by the interior minister on which 690,000 francs are still due;
- 95,000 francs in hard currency;
- 53,875 in bills drawn on Paris with short-term validity dates;
- 541,125 francs in bills of exchange drawn on Genoa

Total: 1,380,000 francs

In exchange, the Treasury will issue Grandecourt with two payment orders of 690,000 francs each, one drawn on the *receveur* of the *département* of Eure and the other on the *département* of Seine-inférieure (total: 1,380,000 francs). This on condition that Grandecourt shall relinquish the carpets and tapestries deposited with him as down payment for the interior minister's aforementioned *ordonnance* of 690,000 francs.

Observations

On 19 nivôse an V, the Treasury received 553,612 francs in bills of exchange drawn on Genoa, plus 136,387 francs in bonds and short-term bills drawn on Paris.

Total: 690,000 francs.

All these effects were delivered on the appointed day as were the two payment orders.

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

Compagnie Dijon

Description	Observations
<p>The Treasury committee decided on 24 frimaire an V to fix the <i>mandat's</i> conversion rate at 2 <i>livres 10 sous</i> for the 40 million <i>mandats territoriaux</i> delegated to the <i>Compagnie Dijon</i>, namely 10 million taken from the <i>département</i> of the Rhone and 30 million on six other designated <i>départements</i> to be retrieved no later than 10 nivôse an V.</p> <p>On 5 nivôse an V, the Treasury committee approved the company's proposal in execution of the contract approved by the Directory's decree of 21 frimaire which authorised the company to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To retrieve in the 40 designated <i>départements</i> the <i>mandats territoriaux</i> in public coffers and those placed under seal within a period of forty days following the present decision on condition that if the company retrieves more <i>mandats</i> than it is entitled to, it pay the excess amount over to the National Treasury on the same day that receipts are issued; <p>The company further undertakes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not to withdraw any <i>mandats</i> already in the Treasury's coffers or which will be transferred to them in the interval between the conclusion of this agreement and the start of the contractual period; 2. To pay the outstanding million francs to the Treasury without waiting to receive the <i>mandats</i> it is entitled to. <p>A second decision approved on 14 nivôse an V prolonged the company's contractual period from 10 nivôse to 15 pluviôse an V for withdrawing <i>mandats</i> in the first six <i>départements</i> it had been assigned.</p> <p><u>Directorial decree of 18 frimaire an V & Letter of the finance minister dated 19 frimaire an V:</u> The company advanced the Treasury 2,500,000 <i>écus</i> in hard currency at no commission or interest and in return was given as a deposit an <i>ordonnance</i> of 60 million in <i>mandats territoriaux</i> drawn on the <i>Caisse des dépôts</i> plus a special delegation drawn on the <i>receveurs</i> and paymasters of <i>départements</i> for the remainder of the sum. To pay back the 2,500,000 <i>écus</i> the Treasury will furnish bills of exchange and</p>	<p>All these dispositions were executed as planned. On 25 frimaire, a memorandum was sent to the first six <i>départements</i> concerning the 40 million to be retrieved until the 10 nivôse. On 7 nivôse, another memorandum was sent to the 40 other <i>départements</i>. On 16 nivôse, another memorandum was sent to the first six <i>départements</i> concerning the prolonging of the company's contractual period until 15 pluviôse.</p> <p>Batavian rescriptions were deposited with the Treasury by the company in accordance with a Directorial decree dated 16 thermidor (an IV ?).</p>

Summary of the National Treasury's Operations with Financiers in 1796-1797	
payment orders (<i>mandats</i>) drawn on <i>receveurs</i> and paymasters, while the sums to acquit the <i>ordonnance</i> will be raised in tax instalments of 10, 20 and 30 million in <i>mandats territoriaux</i> .	
Gildemester, Folloppe, Vasse & Cie.	
Description	Observations
Exchange of bills from <i>Magon Labalue & Cie.</i> drawn on Cadix approved by Directorial decree of 1 nivôse an V.	
The Marquis d'Iranda at Madrid	
Description	Observations
Following the Directory's decree of 29 pluviôse an IV, diamonds were deposited in Spain as collateral for the cash advances the Marquis d'Iranda and his correspondents made for <i>Magon Labalue & Cie.</i> 's bills of exchange drawn on Cadix which were not covered by the sale of goods seized on enemy ships.	The operation has been concluded and the accounts balanced but the Marquis must be paid the sums owed to him for the diamonds to be retrieved.
André-Daniel Laffon-Ladébat	
Description	Observations
An operation on rescriptions and <i>mandats territoriaux</i> approved by Directorial decree of 11 pluviôse (an IV?).	Operation concluded.
Legouez, Legeo & Cie.	
Description	Observations
Purchase of merchandise from the government approved by Directorial decree of 4 Brumaire an V. The goods were paid a quarter in hard currency, a quarter in paper currency and obligations on military contractors, and half in promissory notes of payment with three month validities and bills of exchange drawn on foreign markets.	Operation started.
Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie.	
Description	Observations
A negotiation was concluded with <i>frères Bernard Nortnagel, Schwatz & Rocque</i> of Hamburg for the sale of a delegation worth 239,000 banco marks drawn on <i>Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie.</i> – without any guarantee from the latter trading house nor the government – consisting of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An obligation (reconnaissance de dette) on <i>Lang Hupais, Gelot, & Cie.</i> worth 88,000 banco marks; 	Operation concluded.

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

- 91,250 banco marks in bills of exchange with three and six month validities drawn on *Lang Hupais Gelot & Cie.*;
 - A bonus of 59,750 banco marks awarded to *Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie.* by the Directorial decree of 4 brumaire an V.
- Total:** 239,000 banco marks.

Another negotiation was concluded with *Coste, Caylus, Gevaudan & Cie.* in execution of the Directory's decrees dated 4 & 9 brumaire an V for the sale of a delegation for 1,500,000 banco marks drawn on *Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie.* for reclamations and recovery petitions to be made to the British government concerning captured ships from neutral powers. *Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie.* was awarded a commission of 20% (300,000 banco marks), establishing the total value of this delegations at 1,200,000 banco marks.

The City of Frankfurt am Main

Description	Observations
<p><u>Convention signed on 7 brumaire an V:</u> An exchange was made giving this city paper currency notes of 2 banco marks (<i>billets au porteur</i>) payable in two years against 600,000 banco marks in bills of exchange supplied by the city in the following quantities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 50,000 banco marks in bills with three-month validities; • 50,000 banco marks in bills with four-month validities; • 50,000 banco marks in bills with five-month validities; • 50,000 banco marks in bills with six-month validities; • 50,000 banco marks in bills with seven-month validities; • 50,000 banco marks in bills with eight-month validities; • 50,000 banco marks in bills with nine-month validities; • 50,000 banco marks in bills with ten-month validities; • 100,000 banco marks in bills with eleven-month validities; • 100,000 banco marks in bills with one-year validities; <p style="text-align: center;">Total: 600,000 banco marks.</p>	<p>Operation concluded.</p>

Summary of the National Treasury's Operations with Financiers in 1796-1797	
<p>Plus a payment delivered by the city of 1,400,000 banco marks ordered by Directorial decree of 15 frimaire an V. Total: 2,000,000 banco marks.</p>	
Magon Labalue & Cie.	
Description	Observations
<p>Background not included in this record: <i>On 13 ventôse IV/3 March 1796, the Directory approved by decree an offer from a Citizen Sadler – who held approximately 43 000 pistoles in bills of exchange from the Magon Labalue & Cie. trading house which were drawn on Sahiée, Guillet, et Cie. of Cadix – to recover these bills at a rate of 11 livres 9 sols per pistole and subject to additional conditions.</i></p> <p><i>These bills of exchange had originally been advanced to the Directory by Magon Labalue & Cie. for a total of 1,061,918 pistoles, which the French government had intended to repay with the product of the sale of an enemy convoy captured by Admiral Richéry's fleet which had been hauled to Cadix. But these sales had proved very disappointing and the sums raised had to be diverted towards "considerable expenses for repairs and supplies of [Admiral Richéry's] and the wages of his sailors."¹</i></p> <p><i>The Directory also pawned over a million francs worth of diamonds (approved by decree of 18 Feb. 1796) with Laffon who acted as an intermediary and deposited the jewels with the Marquis d'Iranda at Madrid.²</i></p> <p>Furnished military supplies and bills of exchange worth 20 million francs. The company will be given rescriptions drawn on the French consul at Cadix in whose hands plunder seized from enemy ships shall be delivered. The company will be awarded a commission of 2%. This agreement was approved by Directorial decrees dated 9 & 11 frimaire an IV – the first decree stipulating that sums from the sale of seized goods will be deposited with the Treasury progressively and in equivalent proportions to the amounts which come due.</p>	<p>Operation in process.</p>

¹ AN, AF/III/352, dossier 1628, *Decree of 13 ventôse IV/3 March 1796.*

² See Appendix IX and AN, AF/III/349, dossier 1594, *Decree of 29 pluviôse IV/18 Feb. 1796.*

Summary of the National Treasury's Operations with Financiers in 1796-1797

Letter of the finance minister dated 14 nivôse (an V?):

The company proposes to liquidate its account of bills of exchange with the Treasury and remove from circulation those of its bills on which payments remain outstanding. The latest balance of its account shows the company owes the Treasury approximately 1,084,060 pending various documents yet to be furnished, including 802,889 francs worth of bills of exchange the Treasury has already paid. It is however noted that the company has 1,339,000 francs of assets deposited with the Treasury which have been rendered useless by the bankruptcy of the Walckiers trading house at Hamburg. These assets consist of:

- 66,666 *pistoles* (golden double escudo) in bills of exchange drawn on Cadix and deposited at Cadix in the expectation of a trial which if converted at a rate of 15 francs per *pistole* makes a total of 1,000,000 francs;
- £33,000 British pounds in bills of exchange drawn on London which if converted at a rate of 30 *deniers* per pound makes a total of 792,000 francs – and on which they have already been paid 453,000 francs.

Total: 1,339,000 francs.

In addition, considering that *Magon Labalue & Cie.* has not been able to avail itself of the two assets listed above, they have only been recorded in its account at the Treasury using provisional conversion rates, namely:

- For the 66,000 *pistoles* – a rate of 15 francs per *pistole* which is the hard currency rate, and if one considers the current exchange rate stands at approximately 11 francs per *pistole* due to the habit of paying in Spanish royal paper currency, the difference to be subtracted from this sum would amount to 226,664 francs;
- For the £33,000 – also calculated using the provisional rate of 30 *deniers* to the pound which is the hard currency rate. The real current exchange rate stands at 28 *deniers* per pound, resulting in a difference to be subtracted of 84,857 francs.

Total difference to be subtracted from the company's Treasury account: 351,521 francs.

Once this sum is subtracted from the company's

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

debts, it will owe the approximate total sum of **732,539 francs**.

The government considered it was just to come to the aid of a trading house which sacrificed its credit and resources for the Treasury's service. Consequently, the Treasury committee has accepted the company's proposal which has been approved by the finance minister to deliver it the following sums:

- 1,200,000 Dutch florins in Batavian rescriptions at a rate of 60 *deniers* per florin on condition the company will not be able to contest this conversion rate, making a total of 2,400,000 francs;
- The 1,084,060 francs which the company still owes the Treasury in unpaid bills of exchange drawn on Cadix.

Total: 3,484,060 francs.

These sums will be awarded to the company on the following conditions:

1. The company will first supply a down payment sufficient to cover the sum of 3,484,060 francs;
2. The company will reimburse to the Treasury within four months all the bills of exchange on which payments are still outstanding, liquidate its accounts with the Treasury and thereafter repay all its remaining debts in *ordonnances* approved by the finance minister within a month – based on the audit of its accounts.

Michel frères

Description	Observations
<p><u>Report of the Treasury's committee dated 6 brumaire an V approved by the finance minister:</u> This company paid the Treasury 600,000 francs in hard currency plus 400,000 francs in obligations drawn on military contractors and in return was given 596,649 banco marks in bills of exchange from <i>Bauwens, Beths & Cie.</i> drawn on Hamburg plus deposits of diamonds as security for these bills.</p> <p><u>2nd Report of the Treasury's committee dated 6 brumaire an V approved by the finance minister:</u> The company paid the Treasury the following items:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 400,000 francs; • 600,000 francs in ministerial rescriptions issued to military contractors; 	<p>Operation concluded.</p>

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

- The 596,649 banco marks in bills of exchange from *Bauwens, Beths & Cie.* from the first operation.
- In return, the company was awarded 3,000,000 francs in letters of credit drawn on *receveurs* and paymasters of *départements*.

Paulée & Cie.

Description	Observations
<p>Directorial decree of 8 frimaire an V relating to the payment of bills of exchange contracted by Paulée on behalf of the Treasury in foreign markets and allowing his company to purchase – within the month – <i>domaines nationaux</i> in Belgium up to a maximum of 1,600,000 francs. These shall be paid for as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1/20 in rescriptions drawn on military contractors or bills of exchange with three-month validities accepted and approved by the ...[cuts off] 	<p>Operation to be started.</p>

Bauwens, Beths & Cie.

Description	Observations
<p><u>Directorial decree of 11 frimaire an IV & Letter of the finance minister dated 14 frimaire an IV:</u> The company purchased 3,397 marcs of silverware and of 51,326 marcs of silver from the Treasury on the following terms & conditions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 155 <i>louis</i> per 100 marks of Parisian silverware; • 135 <i>louis</i> per 100 marks of foreign silverware; • 128 <i>louis</i> per 100 marks of German silverware; • 128 <i>louis</i> for every bill of exchange worth 100 marks of silver, plus an extra 5 <i>louis</i> for every 100 additional marks. <p>Another proposal approved by the same decree and letter from the finance minister to supply the Treasury with bills of exchange drawn on foreign markets, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2,000,000 francs of bills with three-month validities drawn on Hamburg per <i>décade</i>; • 1,000,000 francs of bills with three-month validities drawn on Basel per <i>décade</i>; • 1,500,000 francs of bills with three-month validities drawn on Amsterdam per <i>décade</i>; <p>The company is granted a commission of 2% on these bills on condition the Treasury receive their sums 20 days before the expiry of those drawn on Amsterdam and 25 days before the expiry of those drawn on Hamburg and Basel.</p>	<p>Half the proceeds of the silverware were raised in <i>louis</i> and the other half in bills of exchange.</p> <p>This operation still has outstanding sums due before being definitively concluded.</p> <p>The operation was concluded except for 45 million in</p>

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

<p>Finance minister Faipoult noted that: “<i>The company offered to pay half in louis and half in bills of exchange drawn on Amsterdam, with 100 silver marks being traded at the Paris rate of 155 louis; and the same amount converted in foreign markets at 135 louis and in Germany at 128 louis. They also agreed to give an extra 5 louis per 100 marks for everything paid in bills of exchange drawn on Amsterdam with a 40 or 50-day validity.</i>”³</p> <p><u>Letters of the finance minister dated 13 & 24 nivôse an IV:</u> In a second operation, the company sold 800,000,000 <i>assignats</i> in Belgium and Holland.</p> <p><u>Directorial decree of 8 ventôse an IV & Letter of the finance minister dated 15 ventôse an IV:</u> Approval of another contract to supply 4-5 million <i>livres</i> in bills of exchange drawn on Amsterdam and Hamburg within two months in return for a deposit of diamonds, rescriptions on the forced loan of Year IV and a commission of 2%.</p> <p><u>Proposal approved by the Directory on 19 fructidor an IV:</u> The company will supply the Treasury with 10 million francs in bills of exchange drawn on foreign markets, namely one million every three days of which 1/5 with a validity of half a day [?] and the remainder with three-day validities in return for revenues drawn from <i>domaine nationaux</i> in Belgium for the current and preceding year. The company will receive a commission of 5% on all its costs.</p>	<p><i>assignats</i> which were submerged and lost in the crossing of the Scheldt River.</p> <p>Operation still in progress.</p> <p>Operation has started.</p>
Jacques de Chapeaurouge of Hamburg	
Description	Observations
<p><u>Contract signed on 18 floréal an IV and approved by a letter of the finance minister dated 19 floréal an IV:</u> Chapeaurouge deposited 7,000,000 in <i>mandats territoriaux</i> with the Treasury.</p>	<p>Deposit received.</p>

³ AN, AF/III/331, dossier 1442, *Proposal by Citizens Bauwens, Betts et Cie. to exchange silverware from church spoils against hard currency and paper money drawn on foreign markets*, 14 frimaire IV/5 Dec. 1795.

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

Emmanuel Balbi of Genoa

Description	Observations
<p><u>Letter of the finance minister dated 12 prairial an IV:</u> Operation involving bills of exchange drawn on Italian contributions.</p>	

Bey of Algiers

Description	Observations
<p>The Bey loaned the Treasury 200,000 piasters at no interest to be refunded after two years...</p>	

Jacques-Rose Récamier

Description	Observations
<p>Contract signed on 17 frimaire an V to help the Treasury reimburse the bills of exchange drawn on the French consul at Cadix and debts owed to Greeks as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Treasury will issue bills of exchange drawn on <i>Aimé Régny & Cie.</i> of Genoa amounting to 2 or 3 million francs; 2. Available funds from Italian contributions will be put at the disposal of <i>Aimé Régny & Cie.</i>; 3. The <i>Banque de Saint Georges</i> will pay the 2 million francs; 4. If <i>Aimé Régny & Cie.</i> are unable to raise sufficient funds one month prior to the expiration of the validity of the bills of exchange, Récamier will intervene on the following terms & conditions: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. He will immediately receive a deposit of diamonds as security; 2. He shall receive another deposit of Batavian rescriptions if the first deposit is judged insufficient; 3. Récamier will be authorised to contract loans using the deposits of diamonds and Batavian rescriptions, provided the Treasury approves them. And if he still doesn't dispose of sufficient funds to repay the bills of exchange 8 days prior to their expiration, he will be authorised to borrow funds at whatever conditions deemed appropriate; 4. Récamier will receive a commission of 2%. 	<p>Operation has started.</p> <p>On 16 pluviôse, rescriptions compensating for the 2 million francs and drawn on 25 <i>départements</i> were awarded to M. Récamier.</p>

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

Reimbursement of the bills of exchange drawn on Admiral Richery's fleet and of the debts owed to Greeks:

The 2 million francs sent to Genoa intended to cover the costs of the operation agreed on 17 frimaire last with Jacques-Rose Récamier and *Aimé Régny & Cie.* of Genoa having been spent on another matter of urgency, the Treasury's committee has adopted the measure it agreed with the *comité de surveillance* to deliver the equivalent sum to M. Récamier in rescriptions drawn on the *receveurs* of 25 départements payable as soon as funds become available.

Georg Heinrich Sieveking

Description	Observations
<p><u>Contract signed with the finance minister on 9 messidor an IV:</u> Sieveking will receive 10 million francs in Batavian rescriptions and will pay the Treasury:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 250,000 francs in hard currency; • 250,000 francs in bills of exchange with three-month validities; • Another 1,500,000 francs in bills of exchange with three-month validities; • 8 million francs in obligations on military contractors. 	<p>Operation in progress.</p>

Warnes, Perrotin & Klein

Description	Observations
<p><u>Contract signed with the finance minister and approved by the Directory on 16 vendémiaire V:</u> The company will provide the Treasury with 3,600,000 francs within 10 days in the following quantities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 600,000 francs in hard currency; • 600,000 francs in bills of exchange with four-month validities; • 600,000 francs in bills of exchange with five-month validities; • 600,000 francs in bills of exchange with six-month validities; • 600,000 francs in bills of exchange with seven-month validities; • 600,000 francs in bills of exchange with nine-month validities; <p>In exchange, the company is granted a delegation on the product and sale of logging concessions for Year V designated in the contract.</p>	<p>Operation started.</p>

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

Summary of the National Treasury's Operations with Financiers in 1796-1797	
Compagnie Rousseau	
Description	Observations
<p><u>By letter of the finance minister dated 4 pluviôse (an IV?):</u> The company applied for and was granted a deposit of 10,000,000 Dutch florins in Batavian rescriptions with no expiry date in exchange for a payment of 4,000,000 francs equivalent to one-fifth of their total value. The Treasury committee also ruled that the deposit of 3,000,000 Dutch florins in Batavian rescriptions previously granted to this company on 23 fructidor – and for which it advanced 1,500,000 francs (one-fifth of their value) – would be joined to the above deposit, making a total of 5,500,000 francs advanced to the Treasury by the company for both deposits. The company will provide provisional receipts for these sums and will be reimbursed the full 5,500,000 francs by the Treasury after one year providing it undertakes to return the rescriptions. The company will also receive an additional sum of 495,000 francs representing 9% interest, making a total of 5,995,000 francs from which must be deducted 1,400,000 francs equivalent to the 4% interest attached to the coupons adjoined to the Batavian rescriptions. Ultimately, the company will only be able to claim a refund of 4,945,000 francs.</p>	<p>The deposit was made on 16 pluviôse at the terms & conditions agreed.</p>
Compagnie Lanoy, Wouters & Wallemberg	
Description	Observations
<p>On 17 prairial an IV, the company deposited with the Treasury an <i>ordonnance</i> issued by the war minister worth 8,350,000 francs. In exchange, the company was given 3,000,000 florins in Batavian rescriptions, worth 6,000,000 francs at a conversion rate of 60 <i>deniers</i> per florin. On 12 frimaire an V, acting on the finance minister's letter of the same day, the company was awarded 5,000,000 florins in Batavian rescriptions to be repaid within two months in return for a deposit of 6,500,000 <i>écus</i>. This deposit will be reused for another loan of 2,000,000 florins in Batavian rescriptions approved by the finance minister on 7 pluviôse an V. These three aforementioned sums will together constitute a general deposit of 10,000,000 florins worth 20,000,000 francs at a conversion rate of 60</p>	<p>Operation concluded.</p>

**Summary of the National Treasury's Operations
with Financiers in 1796-1797**

deniers per florin. The company will issue receipts against this sum for its nominal value – a quarter (5,000,000 francs) of which will be guaranteed by the deposited war minister's *ordonnance* worth 8,350,000 francs.

At the end of the year, the company will repay the 10,000,000 florins of Batavian rescriptions to the Treasury and will be returned its 5,000,000 franc deposit plus a 9% commission equivalent to 450,000 francs (total 5,450,000 francs) – from which must deducted annual interest charged for the use of 10,000,000 florins in Batavian rescriptions amounting to 800,000 francs. In total, the company will receive a payment of 4,650,000 francs.

Compagnie Verninac

Description	Observations
--------------------	---------------------

The company submitted the following proposal approved by the finance minister's letter of 8 pluviôse (an IV?):

The company will pay the Treasury the following sums:

- 200,000 *écus*;
- 200,000 francs in bills of exchange with three-month validities;
- 200,000 francs in bills of exchange with four-month validities;
- 200,000 francs in bills of exchange with five-month validities;
- 300,000 francs in bills of exchange with six-month validities;

Total: 1,100,000 francs – on condition the company receive a discount of 60% for this loan over the course of a year, plus a deposit of 2,000,000 florins in Batavian rescriptions which will be pawned with Mr. J.H. André, a banker in Paris, who shall have the authority – should the Treasury be unable to repay the loan – to raise the money independently on the Treasury's behalf and seek payment from the Treasury's head clerk.

Operation concluded.

Source: AN, C//503, dossier 393/3 (*Négociations de la Trésorerie nationale*).

APPENDIX VIII

I. The National Treasury's Payment of Batavian Rescriptions down to 13 Pluviôse V (February 1, 1797)

Type of Supplies	Recipient	Date Issued	Expires 1796	Expires 1797	Expires 1798	Expires 1799	Expires 1800	Expires 1801	Expires 1802	Expires 1803	Expires 1804	No expiry date	Total (Florins)
Deposit	Vouters Lanoy & Cie.	July 4, 1796	50,000	50,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,000,000	3,100,000
War	Rousseau & Cie.	July 17, 1796	-	-	225,000	225,000	225,000	225,000	225,000	-	-	-	1,125,000
War	Delanoue & Rousseau	July 19, 1796	-	225,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,000	230,000	227,000	-	711,000
War	Compagnie Lamotz	July 31, 1796	-	50,000	25,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75,000
Navy	Jacques Chapeaurouge	Aug. 2, 1796	250,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250,000
Navy	Abbéma & Cie. (Amsterdam)	Aug. 8, 1796	72,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72,000
War	Egbert frères	Aug. 9, 1796	50,000	-	-	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	44,000	44,000	-	338,000
Refund	Feradini	Aug. 13, 1796	-	-	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	4,000	5,000	23,000	47,000
War	Vanberchem & Defer	Aug. 18, 1796	-	-	2,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	-	2,000	16,000	32,000
Hamburg operation	Michel Simons (Altona) Georg Sieveking (Hamburg)	Aug. 18, 1796	-	-	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	168,000	336,000
War	Ottevard	Aug. 18, 1796	200,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200,000
Refund	Erhard Stubers	Aug. 22, 1796	-	-	-	-	-	2,000	3,000	-	-	5,000	10,000
War	Bazin	Aug. 23, 1796	-	-	-	-	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	15,000	30,000
Hamburg operation	Jacques Chapeaurouge	Aug. 23, 1796	-	-	-	59,000	59,000	59,000	59,000	59,000	59,000	471,000	825,000
War	Rousseau & Cie. (2,019,000)	Aug. 23, 1796	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,119,000	2,119,000
War	Lanoue & Cie. (100,000)	Aug. 23, 1796	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
War	Rousseau & Cie.	Aug. 26, 1796	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	220,000	220,000
War	Stuydt & Bode	Sept. 2, 1796	-	-	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	8,000	10,000	8,000	58,000	116,000
Deposit	Rousseau & Cie.	Sept. 10, 1796	-	-	-	425,000	425,000	425,000	425,000	425,000	425,000	450,000	3,000,000
Transaction	Perreux & Cie. (deductible from Sieveking)	Sept. 11, 1796	-	-	-	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	110,000	110,000	140,000	750,000
Refund	Paulée & Cie.	Sept. 15, 1796	-	-	-	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	8,000	50,000
Refund	François Devinck	Sept. 17, 1796	-	-	-	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	5,000	25,000	50,000
War	Vouters Lanoy & Cie.	Sept. 20, 1796	300,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300,000
War	Robiquet & Fallois	Sept. 23, 1796	-	-	-	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	-	-	4,000	8,000
Transaction	Perreux & Cie. (via Sieveking in Hamburg)	Sept. 27, 1796	-	-	-	90,000	90,000	90,000	90,000	90,000	90,000	100,000	640,000

Type of Supplies	Recipient	Date Issued	Expires 1796	Expires 1797	Expires 1798	Expires 1799	Expires 1800	Expires 1801	Expires 1802	Expires 1803	Expires 1804	No expiry date	Total (Florins)
Deposit	Bolle Lasalle & Cie.	Sept. 29, 1796	-	-	-	143,000	143,000	143,000	143,000	145,000	140,000	143,000	1,000,000
War	Schwarz	Sept. 29, 1796	-	-	-	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	9,000	45,000
War	Holbeck	Sept. 30, 1796	-	-	-	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	7,000	49,000
Transaction	Perreiaux & Cie. (via Sieveking in Hamburg)	Oct. 13, 1796	-	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	4,000	44,000
Transaction	Perreiaux & Cie. (via Sieveking in Hamburg)	Oct. 13, 1796	-	85,000	85,000	85,000	85,000	85,000	85,000	85,000	85,000	116,000	796,000
War	Voutere Lanoy & Cie.	Oct. 22, 1796	250,000	250,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500,000
War	Calvi & Podesta	Oct. 26, 1796	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36,000	36,000
War	Voutere Lanoy & Cie.	Nov. 6, 1796	150,000	150,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300,000
Transaction	Perreiaux & Cie. (via Sieveking in Hamburg)	Nov. 12, 1796	-	-	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	6,000	27,000
War	Voutere Lanoy & Cie.	Nov. 18, 1796	141,000	177,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	318,000
War	Girard	Nov. 18, 1796	-	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	-	24,000
Refund	Mélique	Nov. 23, 1796	-	-	-	-	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000	57,000	-	297,000
Navy	Abbéna & Cie. (Amsterdam)	Dec. 5, 1796	-	-	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	40,000	250,000
Deposit	Voutere Lanoy & Cie.	Dec. 6, 1796	-	-	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	1,500,000	5,000,000
War	Holbeck	Dec. 15, 1796	-	-	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,000	-	2,000	-	10,000
War	Franz Haber	Dec. 19, 1796	-	-	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	4,000	3,000	-	1,000	12,000
Deposit	Compagnie Negre & Bonnevaux	Dec. 19, 1796	-	-	400,000	300,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	300,000	-	1,400,000	3,000,000
Transaction	Perreiaux & Cie. (via Sieveking in Hamburg)	Dec. 23, 1796	-	-	68,000	81,000	68,000	27,000	21,000	24,000	33,000	36,000	358,000
Refund	Marchal	Dec. 28, 1796	-	-	-	44,000	-	-	-	-	-	154,000	198,000
Deposit	Jacques-Rose Récamier	Dec. 29, 1796	-	215,000	27,000	160,000	40,000	-	32,000	39,000	120,000	1,867,000	2,500,000
Transaction	Pailieux (via Sieveking in Hamburg)	?	-	-	-	2,000	2,000	2,000	3,000	-	-	-	9,000
Refund	Marchal	Jan. 6, 1797	-	-	-	40,000	-	-	-	-	-	31,000	71,000
Refund	Finance Minister	Jan. 30, 1797	18,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18,000
Refund	Magon Labaue	Jan. 30, 1797	-	185,000	483,000	73,000	100,000	41,000	100,000	-	-	218,000	1,200,000
Deposit	Bey of Algiers	Jan. 30, 1797	-	605,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	605,000
Sums outstanding on Hamburg operation		Jan. 30, 1797	-	-	600,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	615,000	1,215,000
TOTAL (Dutch Florins):			1,481,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	2,490,000	2,263,000	2,124,000	2,213,000	2,210,000	2,000,000	13,005,000	32,286,000

Source: AN, C//503, dossier 393/3 (Négociations de la Trésorerie nationale).

II. Summary of the Influx & Expenditure of Batavian Rescriptions down to 13 Pluviôse an V (February 1, 1797)

Recipient	Expires 1796	Expires 1797	Expires 1798	Expires 1799	Expires 1800	Expires 1801	Expires 1802	Expires 1803	Expires 1804	No Expiry	Total (Florins)
<i>Ordonnances</i> – war ministry	1,091,000	855,000	272,000	312,000	315,000	314,000	316,000	306,000	302,000	2,449,000	6,532,000
<i>Ordonnances</i> – naval ministry	322,000	-	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	40,000	572,000
<i>Ordonnances</i> – finance ministry	68,000	50,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	118,000
Refunds	-	185,000	486,000	171,000	174,000	117,000	177,000	75,000	74,000	500,000	1,959,000
Hamburg operation	-	90,000	785,000	449,000	436,000	395,000	390,000	390,000	409,000	1,656,000	5,000,000
Deposits with Rousseau & Cie.	-	-	-	425,000	425,000	425,000	425,000	425,000	425,000	450,000	3,000,000
Deposits with Bolle Lasalle & Cie.	-	-	-	143,000	143,000	143,000	143,000	145,000	140,000	143,000	1,000,000
Deposits with Voutere Lanoy & Cie.	-	-	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	4,500,000	8,000,000
Deposits with Negre & Bonnevaux	-	-	400,000	300,000	200,000	200,000	200,000	300,000	-	1,400,000	3,000,000
Deposits with Récamier	-	215,000	27,000	160,000	40,000	-	32,000	39,000	120,000	1,867,000	2,500,000
Deposits with the Bey of Algiers	-	605,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	605,000
Total Payments (Dutch Florins)	1,481,000	2,000,000	2,500,000	2,490,000	2,263,000	2,124,000	2,213,000	2,210,000	2,000,000	13,005,000	32,286,000
Rescriptions received from the Batavian Republic (Dutch Florins)	1,481,000	2,400,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	2,400,000	22,809,000	47,081,000
Balance (Dutch Florins)	-	400,000	500,000	510,000	737,000	876,000	787,000	790,000	400,000	19,795,000	14,795,000

Note: An addended memorandum to these tables indicates that additional down payments received from Récamier, Abbéma and the Compagnie Lamotze meant the Treasury held an extra 5,424,402 florins in its accounts and in Batavian rescriptions at The Hague as of 11 germinal an V (March 31, 1797).

Source: AN, C/503, dossier 393/3 (*Négociations de la Trésorerie nationale*).

APPENDIX IX

Diamonds Received & Pawned by the National Treasury, 1794-1796

Diamonds Received by the National Treasury		
Date	Description	Minimum Estimate (Francs)
July 29, 1794	13 diamonds	7,158,500
Aug. 5, 1794	A box containing diamonds & jewels received from the National Mint	677,770
Oct. 13, 1794	A box containing diamonds & jewels received from the National Mint	2,010,032
Oct. 15, 1794	A box containing diamonds & jewels received from the National Mint	14,588 (Mint's appraisal)
Dec. 6, 1794	8 diamonds	580,000
Dec. 15, 1794	Two cases of diamonds & jewels sent by the <i>Compagnie Morel</i>	1,072,010
Nov. 9, 1795	An unspecified number of diamonds received from the <i>Compagnie Morel</i>	4,670,927
Total of minimum estimates (francs):		16,062,901

Diamonds Pawned by the National Treasury		
Date	Description	Estimated Value (Francs)
Dec. 31, 1794	Diamonds given by the Treasury's <i>Caisse générale</i> to the <i>Compagnie Berné</i> by order of the Treasury's commissioners (included in the tax returns of Oct. 15, 1794).	14,588
Feb. 1, 1795	Diamonds given to the <i>Compagnie Lacoudray & Poulet</i> (included in the tax returns of Dec. 15, 1794).	995,583
Nov. 9, 1795	Diamonds deposited with <i>Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie.</i> by a decree dated Oct. 11, 1795.	2,409,561
Nov. 9, 1795	Diamonds given to the <i>Tourton & Ravel</i> bank by a decree dated Oct. 19, 1795. Some of these are deposits.	2,547,980
Feb. 20, 1796	Diamonds deposited with the Marquis d'Iranda at Madrid by Laffon-Ladébat in accordance with the Directory's decree of Feb. 18, 1796. ¹	1,063,000
April 25, 1796	Diamonds given to M. Parceval in accordance with the Directory's decree of April 13, 1796.	6,319,386
Outstanding debts of the Treasury's <i>Caisse générale</i> :		2,712,801
Total (francs):		16,062,901

Source: AN, C//503, dossier 393/3 (*Négociations de la Trésorerie nationale*).

¹ AN, AF/III/349, dossier 1594, *Decree of 29 pluviôse IV/18 Feb. 1796*.

APPENDIX X¹

I. Summary of Promissory Notes (Promesses de Mandats) negotiated by agents other than the Agence de négociations de l'intérieur Undated (Probably Brumaire to Messidor Year IV)

Name of Agent	Total Amount of Promesses de Mandats Negotiated (livres) ²	Rate (cours moyen)	Sums Raised (Produit)		
			Bills of Exchange drawn on foreign markets (livres)	Ingots (livres)	Total Raised (livres)
Sévènes frères	81,015,231	89. 13/20	2,761,898	4,083,594	6,845,493
Descorbières frères	18,474,000	86. 19/20	-	1,553,965	1,553,965
Giro Caillat & Thibaudier	10,846,613	91. 13/40	542,556	167,590	710,147
André-Daniel Laffon-Ladébat	3,100,000	87. 7/8	372,031	818	372,849
Charles Roberger	1,725,000	87. 19/20	201,493	3,728	205,222
J. Carbonnet	1,148,021	94. 9/16	61,858	-	61,858
Rousset	720,000	95	-	36,000	36,000
Various (via Sévènes frères)	713,300	81. 75/132	-	133,060	133,060
Exchanged in Paris	21,101,979	6 livres, 15 sols, 3 deniers	-	1,427,147	1,427,147
Michel frères	115,710,219	1 livre, 13 sols, 7 deniers	-	2,018,022	2,018,022
Total	254,554,363	-	3,939,839	9,423,928	13,363,767

Source: AN, C//503, dossier 393/3 (*Négociations de la Trésorerie nationale*)

¹ The following charts are attached to a copy of the Directory's decree of 4 messidor IV/22 June 1796 which stipulates that given the impossibility to precisely track all negotiations of payment orders due to the fluctuation of rates, the Treasury's commissioners will manage and negotiate, at the best rates they can obtain, the transactions needed to maintain the Treasury's hard currency supplies.

² *Promesses de mandats* were negotiated at a rate of 3 livres, 8 sols, 10 deniers.

II. General Summary of Negotiations for Paper Currency since Brumaire Year IV (down to Messidor Year IV)

Name of Agent	Assignats negotiated ³ (livres)	Rate (cours moyen)	Sums Raised (Produit)		
			Paper Currency raised in foreign markets (livres)	Hard Currency or Ingots (livres)	Total Raised (livres)
André-Daniel Laffon-Ladébat	51,401,671	6981	-	168,000	168,000
Various exchange agents	2,129,468,989	4931	-	9,732,900	9,732,900
Treille	394,660,554	2347	-	4,035,446	4,035,446
Bauwens, Beths & Cie.	755,500,000	8127	-	2,231,006	2,231,006
Sévène frères	214,218,262	7095 10/12	-	720,000	720,000
Roettier	134,105,459	9853 ² / ₃	-	685,125	1,585,388
	101,134,607	2696	-	900,263	
Mottet Cordier from Lyon	250,000,000	-	-	964,656	964,656
Dubroc et cie. from Bayonne	100,000,000	-	-	362,380	362,380
Sévène frères	845,696,770	6561	-	3,173,601	3,173,601
Descorbières frères	8,000,000	5895	-	32,569	32,569
Assignats given as refunds for remittances drawn on foreign markets	591,167,000	5721	2,477,360	-	2,477,360
Total:	5,575,353,312	-	2,477,360	23,005,947	25,483,308

Source: AN, C//503, dossier 393/3 (Négociations de la Trésorerie nationale)

³ Assignats are negotiated at an average rate (cours moyen) of 4846.

APPENDIX XI – THE SCHÉRER SCANDAL

I. Denunciations against Schérer addressed to the Cinq-Cents in 1799

21 January 1799 – The citizens of Valenciennes to the Cinq-Cents:

We must not pass under silence the theft ordered by the minister Schérer of 60,000 bombs of German calibre intended for the supply of our garrison... The ex-minister, as treacherous as he is perfidious, took these bombs – worth six million – and gave them during the month of Brumaire Year VI to citizen Gossuin, a weapons manufacturer of Liège, as payment for military supplies without respecting the legal formalities, for 18 francs per thousand pounds when ordinance of this kind is worth 40 francs per thousand pounds. [New bombs] from forges cost the Republic 90 francs per thousand pounds, plus 22.5 francs to ship them to our département... The effective loss therefore amounts to 92%!... What condemns the ex-minister even further is his letter of 22 pluviôse last in which he refuses the poor of the general hospice fifty logs of wood to bake their bread...¹

25 June – Thirty-eight citizens of La Rochelle castigate Schérer's corruption:

Citizen legislators, we have seen sold here an immense quantity of tents, glass canopies, clothes, vests, breeches, pants, cartridge pouches, bags and an infinity of military effects by order of Schérer at such vile prices that even the malevolent have been surprised... liberty has for too long tolerated this monster.²

That same day, a Parisian belt-maker named Samuel Cerf protested that:

The minister Schérer has been granted two markets for the supply of military equipment worth 50 million in which articles worth two francs are being sold for five francs.³

Around the same time a Mr. Ovigneau, manager of the arsenal at Avignon, reported that:

The following items have been sold at vile prices by order of the minister Schérer: 110,293 francs of lead, 90,921 of new iron in the same decade, 128,000 francs of steel, 45,065 of old iron...⁴

12 July – An accusation sent by Adjutant-General Boisson-Quency reminds the government that:

...it would be impolitic to forget [Schérer's] two accomplices, his private secretary Darguesse who negotiated the fraudulent contracts... and Denervo, head of the

¹ AN, AF/III/158, dossier 747:8, *Letter from 71 citizens of Valenciennes to the Cinq-Cents: complaint against the minister Schérer*, 6 messidor VII/24 June 1799.

² *Ibid*, dossier 747:9, *Letter from 38 'republicans' of La Rochelle to the Cinq-Cents denouncing Schérer*, 7 messidor VII/25 June 1799.

³ *Ibid*, dossier 747:10, *Letter from Samuel Cerf, a Parisian beltmaker, to the president of the Cinq-Cents denouncing two contracts signed by Schérer*, 7 messidor VII/25 June 1799.

⁴ *Ibid*, dossier 747:12, *Déclaration de L.-J. Ovigneau, warehouse manager of the Arsenal, concerning sales made by Schérer*, undated – Schérer claims only 1,868 francs of wood and discarded gun carriages were sold from La Rochelle's arsenal (*Comptes rendus au Directoire exécutif par le citoyen Schérer...op cit.*, p.148).

*Bureau of funds of the war ministry's 6th Division, who paid these contracts and was specially tasked with adjusting the necessary figures to make the payment orders receivable by the National Treasury.*⁵

Morla, a former engineer of the *ponts-et-chausées*, warns the President of the *Cinq-Cents* of:

*...a man named Bouruisier who was certainly an accomplice of Schérer concerning military furloughs – you know the enormous quantity of these which the ex-minister granted...this matter concerns a furlough granted for 150 francs, what was the price of the others?...approximately 80,000 furloughs makes 12 million francs.*⁶

14 July – Sixty republicans from Rambervilliers (Vosges) condemn Schérer's corrupt sales:

*Under Schérer's ministry, a considerable quantity of bombs, shells and grenades...were sold for 2.5 centimes per pound to master blacksmiths in this canton.*⁷

18 July – Valentin Blanc, president of the municipality of St. Bonnot (Hautes-Alpes), complains that his town has long since served as a military staging post but that the companies Bayard, Bodin and Rapinat – which are contracted to supply troops – never appear with any equipment or food, leaving the town's authorities with the task of furnishing soldiers who arrive unannounced:

*How long will these dilapidators remain unpunished, citizen legislators? What are the war commissioners doing?...They never inform the municipality of anything, not even of the arrival of a thousand men! How long will new Catilines succeed one another to machinate before our eyes the inevitable ruin of the Republic?*⁸

22 July – Mr. Baron, a former captain of artillery, writes to the *Cinq-Cents* criticising the pillaging of military warehouses:

Since the new organisation of the artillery has come into effect pursuant to the law of 18 floréal Year III...arsenals have become nothing but civilian workshops confecting cabriolets and four-wheel coaches, desks, wardrobes, beds in polished iron à la polonaise, hunting rifles, pistols, knives, scissors and other kitchenware. The iron, copper, powder, saltpetre and other arsenal supplies are used for the exchange of

⁵ AN, AF/III/158, dossier 747:35, *Letter from Adjutant-general Boisson-Quency accusing two accomplices of Schérer, Darguesse, private secretary, and Denervo, manager of funds at the war ministry's 6th division*, 24 messidor VII/12 July 1799.

⁶ *Ibid*, dossier 747:39, *Letter from Morla to the president of the Cinq-Cents denouncing Merlin de Thionville's fortune and Schérer's trafficking of military furloughs*, 22 messidor VII/10 July 1799.

⁷ *Ibid*, dossier 747:57, *Letter from sixty republicans of Rambervilliers to the Cinq-Cents denouncing the sale by Schérer of a great quantity of bombs, mortars and grenades to the canton's blacksmiths*, 26 messidor VII/14 July 1799.

⁸ *Ibid*, dossier 747:48, *Letter of Valentin Blanc to the Cinq-Cents complaining about the Compagnies Bayard, Bodin and Rapinat and denouncing the war commissioners who sell furloughs to conscripts*, 30 messidor VII/18 July 1799.

these products...All these thefts and dilapidations have been denounced several times to the Directory and minister Schérer, and have been relayed to the Bureau of Artillery Personnel where they were discarded. The composition of this bureau whose employees are royalists is such that when a denunciation is registered it is immediately brought to the attention of the person against whom it is directed with the name of the plaintiff...⁹

3 August – The representative Dénonée decries:

...the removal of 18 cannons from Briançon by order of Schérer which were sold for 20 sous per pound to a company that transported them to the forges of Lyon where they sold them back to the Republic for 45 sous per pound.¹⁰

II. Schérer's Defence

Schérer on his administration of the war ministry for Year VI:

“Without denying that false supplies were for a time the mainstay of the cupidity of contractors, I believe I can assert that Year VI has seen them completely disappear.”¹¹

Schérer offered meek justifications to counter the accusations levelled against him, arguing that:

Service depots often being confused with siege reserves, it was difficult to positively identify what belonged to one service or the other, and thereby safeguard it...Since contractors could also draw on siege reserves to ensure the running service (which occurred daily despite orders to the contrary), it was impossible to rely on any permanent supply, and the fate of an important stronghold could be compromised at any moment. Finally, siege reserves require non-perishable goods and consequently a particular type of handling and care which contractors could not suitably guarantee. It was to be feared that their personal interest, always deft at escaping surveillance, might lead them to pillage on one side what they would furnish on the other.¹²

Schérer dissimulated his embezzlements by spreading confusion in his administration.

He awarded the contract to supply siege reserves to the *Compagnie Bailly*; but to

⁹ *Ibid*, dossier 747:75, Letter from Baron to the Cinq-Cents requesting the prosecution of the administrative heads of the war ministry's bureau of artillery personnel because of the protection they afford thieves, 4 thermidor VII/22 July 1799.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, dossier 747:46, Extract of the Cinq-Cents's report concerning fraudulent contracts for munitions made by Citizen Félix of Maubeuge and the ex-minister Schérer at Briançon, and supplies of poor quality stockings and shoes in the département of Jemmapes, 16 thermidor VII/3 Aug. 1799.

¹¹ CRDECS, p.34.

¹² CRDECS, p.41-42.

reception and verify the quality of the goods it provided, he enlisted the services of another firm named the *Compagnie Pluche!*¹³

Schérer states the war ministry owned considerable amounts of land which it leased to private citizens or companies so they could cultivate crops or graze herds to provide military supplies. These leases were unregulated prior to Schérer's tenure at the ministry.¹⁴

Schérer claimed he had reduced the war ministry's annual budget from 341 million francs in Year VI to 256 million in Year VII.¹⁵

Accused of inflating soldiers' wages in his accounts for Year VII, Schérer countered by arguing:

*“The inventories demanded from [army] corps, generals and war commissioners don't allow for any kind of abuse nor excess in payment [of wages] which – if they had occurred – would only have benefited the corps or the Treasury that pays them.”*¹⁶

Schérer argues feebly that *“if a minister distributed two million worth of ordonnances where only one million sufficed, the second million would remain in public coffers.”*¹⁷

In response to the accusations of selling equipment taken from military warehouses, Schérer presented a rather muddled defence:

*“The war minister, far from permitting such sales, opposed them with all his strength. These consisted in objects which had been declared useless for the war effort; and [these illegal transactions] were given the greatest publicity. Moreover, these objects...were sold with the assent and assistance of the competent authorities in accordance with the formalities outlined by the law.”*¹⁸

Furthermore, in order to furnish clothing for the 200,000 extra men called to arms following the resumption of hostilities in Year VII, Schérer signed contracts with

¹³ CRDECS, p.44-45.

¹⁴ CRDECS, p.73 – Schérer issued a memorandum on 22 Feb. 1798 to regulate these leasing agreements, which he says raised 267,913 francs for Year V and 500,000 francs in Year VI.

¹⁵ CRDECS, p.87.

¹⁶ CRDECS, p.93.

¹⁷ CRDECS, p.104.

¹⁸ CRDECS, p.117-118.

suppliers through which he granting them special delegations worth fifteen million francs drawn on the tax on doors and windows.¹⁹ He claimed that:

*“If no adjudication for military foodstuffs took place [for Year VII], it was because no successful bidder came forward over the course of repeated auctions. Acting on your orders, I therefore stepped in and awarded a contract to the Compagnie Rochefort.”*²⁰

*“...if some services of the war ministry received delegations for amounts exceeding those of delivered goods, I was irremediably obliged to do this, as much by the nature of the assets as by the fact delegations must be granted at least three months in advance.”*²¹

*“I only accepted the prices offered by contractors on the advice of the ministers of finance and the interior; and my rigour was such on these conventions that these same contractors have long been asking for the rescinding of their contract.”*²²

Schérer claims the sale of disused artillery ordnance was approved by a Directorial decree of 6 fructidor V/23 Aug. 1797 and raised a total of 34,061 francs. He does however admit to selling 103,823 cannons from arsenals in Paris and Versailles, most of which he claims were defective and cost too much to be repaired.²³

On 26 brumaire VII/16 Nov. 1798, the *Compagnie Lanchère* was ordered to supply 19,000 horses – of which 16,000 for the cavalry – plus another 3,000 for transports. This was later increased by 10,000 horses (total 32,000 horses).²⁴

¹⁹ CRDECS, p.119 & 124.

²⁰ CRDECS, p.120-121.

²¹ CRDECS, p.129.

²² CRDECS, p.130.

²³ CRDECS, p.138-142.

²⁴ CRDECS, p.108.

APPENDIX XII – THE COMPAGNIE BODIN

The *Compagnie Bodin frères* was founded by three brothers – Charles, Victor and Louis – the sons of a trader from Romans-sur-Isère. On 16 February 1797, the war minister Barthélémy Schérer awarded the *Compagnie Bodin frères* a contract for the general supply of the *Armée d’Italie*. It stipulated the *Armée d’Italie*’s accounting was to be assimilated with that of the *Armée de l’Intérieur*. In his memoir defending his administration’s financial operations, Schérer asserted that:

*“Although the expenses of this army at first appeared immense, they have gradually diminished to a considerable extent and can even be reduced further – cuts having already been made for Year VII.”*¹

He claimed to have saved 278,652 francs by lowering the cost of the army’s bread ration from 6 *sous* 3 *deniers* to 5 *sous* 3 *deniers*, plus another 189,326 francs by lowering the meat ration from 5 francs 6 *deniers* to 5 francs (on a total of 7,673,040 rations). In total, Schérer estimated the savings on the *Armée d’Italie*’s service for Year VI at 1,888,343 francs.²

Additional Supplies Furnished by Cisalpine Cities to Compensate Shortcomings in the <i>Compagnie Bodin</i>’s Service to the <i>Armée d’Italie</i> (15 floréal Year VI – end of Year VI)		
City	Nature of Supplies	Value in Milanese Currency
Monza	Forage	228.9
Lodi	Forage	20,798.18
Mantua	Forage	5,954.13
Bozzolo	Forage	15,445.11
Crema	Forage & Meat	49,741.1
<u>Total:</u>		92,168.12
Lodi	Forage	53,707.14
Crema	Forage	59,384.5
Bozzolo	Forage	14,356.8
Bozzolo	Meat	10,719.1
Bozzolo	Bread	677.6
Casalmaggiore	Forage	20,893.12 (Bread)
	Meat	2,656.13 (Meat)
	Wine	499 (Wine)
<u>Total:</u>		255,063.3
Viadana	Bread	62.12
Leftover from preceding liquidations of the <i>Compagnie Bodin</i> ’s forage		52,965
<u>Grand Total:</u>		307,850.15

¹ *CRDECS.*, p.80.

² *Ibid.*, p.84-85.

Source: AF/III/72, dossier 292, plaquette 1 – *Aperçu des reprises à exercer contre la Compagnie Bodin pour les fournitures faites par les communes de la République Cisalpine à l'armée française du 15 floréal an VI à la fin de l'an VI.*

Sums Awarded in Advance to the <i>Compagnie Bodin</i>	
Year VI	
In Paris.....	3,690,000 francs
In Italy.....	1,151,471 francs
Year VII	
In Paris.....	11,939,907 francs
In Italy.....	5,175,222 francs
Total:	21,956,600 francs

Source: AF/III/72, dossier 293, plaquette 1 – *Situation de la Compagnie Bodin, 6 pluviôse an VII.*

In Years VIII and IX, *Bodin frères* transferred most of its business from military contracting in Italy to speculations on French and Belgian *biens nationaux*. Between Brumaire and Prairial Year VIII, for example, it acquired 1,978,817 francs of *biens nationaux* in 475 lots in the Belgian *département* of the Dyle.³ Most purchases were made in devalued government bonds.⁴ Bodin sold nearly 400,000 francs of lands to Pierre Joseph Fleury Jubié, and another 350,000 francs to Hippolyte Charles – Joséphine's former lover. The following chart presents a geographical distribution of its real-estate sales:

Geographical Distribution of <i>Bodin frères's</i> Sales of <i>Biens Nationaux</i> (Years VIII & IX)			
Département	Sales (francs)	Département	Sales (francs)
Dyle	372, 770	Haute-Vienne	25,000
Jemappes	351,367	Seine-et-Marne	25,000
Ourthe	272,400	Nord	13,900
Meuse-inférieure	128,600	Indre-et-Loire	13,500
Côtes-du-Nord	67,311	Ain	12,500
Saône-et-Loire	56,200	Allier	10,050
Lys	55,000	Loire-inférieure	8,500
Escaut	27,400	Meuse	5,000
<i>Total for Belgian départements</i>	1,331,048	Dordogne	3,400
		Eure	1,200

Source: Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.165.

³ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.350, footnote 123.

⁴ For records of these sales, see MCN/ET/XVIII/975-979 & 984-986. Drawing a complete summary of these purchases presents a near-impossible task.

APPENDIX XIII

Two letters denouncing thefts by General Louis Liger-Bélaïr

I. Letter from Mangourit, Gaudin and Stamaty, commissioners at Ancona, denouncing the thefts committed by général de division Louis Liger-Bélaïr, 5 ventôse an VII (23 Feb. 1799)¹

The Directory has expressed through its decrees and successive orders the firmest resolution to expel from Italy all Frenchmen (of whatever authority or rank they may be invested with) who through their actions and intrigues would tend to debase the empire of freedom and make it reviled.

The commissioners believe they are conforming to the Directory's views and fulfilling a sacred duty by reporting General Bélaïr as being one of these men. He is known in the Armée d'Italie for his shameful scams, the last of which was to leave Milan without paying the bill at his inn and taking away sums he had borrowed from the innkeeper and another person whom he reimbursed with delegations which he had already cashed in (this has been confirmed by Commissioner Amelot).

Deprived of the government of Corfu by his failure to cross [the Adriatic], he intrigued at the Army of Milan where his son-in-law Villette has just been appointed second-in-command of the general staff and obtained the command of Ancona and its three annexed départements. Through this manoeuvre he planted a seed of discord between the Army of Milan and that of Naples. If his nomination is confirmed, he will threaten a country which is already so vexed and impoverished that internecine quarrels will flood it with blood and render it sterile.

The commissioners do not uphold personal views but only the public good in saying that General Cambay is qualified to pacify this region. He is esteemed by the population and is known for his selflessness. General Bélaïr is only known by his blatant machinations and avidity. The latter basely defers to the [Roman] commission while secretly believing he can divide its members. General Cambay is honest, loyal and trusts [the commission] on all measures of public safety and national honour.

The commissioners are no more attached to General Cambay than to any other general as honest as he, but they are certain that leaving General Bélaïr in Italy will prevent the carrying out of orders given by the Directory for the French name to cease being the dread of the inhabitants of Italy.

¹ AN, AF/III/78, dossier 323, plaquette 3.

II. Extract of a letter from Citizen Mangourit to Citizen Paganel regarding the abuses and embezzlements of General Liger-Bélair²

Michel-Ange-Bernard Mangourit was born in Rennes in 1752 and died in Paris in 1829. He served as *lieutenant-criminel* at the *présidial* of Rennes under the *Ancien Régime* and participated in the storming of the Bastille. He served as French Consul at Charleston from 1792 to 1794 and was briefly Minister of Exterior Relations in November 1794 before serving in various diplomatic posts in Spain and Switzerland. In 1798, he was appointed as commissioner for exterior relations at Ancona where he was tasked with assisting Bonaparte's *Armée d'Égypte* by stirring revolt in Greece.³ He was one of the commissioners who signed the rendition of Ancona to Austrian forces in 1799 after a 500-day siege.⁴

Pierre Paganel was born in 1745 at Villeneuve-sur-Lot and died at Liège in 1826. He was elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1791 and to the National Convention in 1792 as a deputy for the Lot-et-Garonne. He withdrew from politics after the dissolution of the Thermidorian Convention on 26 October 1795 and was serving as general secretary to the Minister of Exterior Relations when this letter was addressed to him.

Ancona, 13 germinal an VII (2 April 1799)

You cannot imagine the tyranny and brigandage afflicting this country. Calonne, Mandrin, Cartouche were all jokers in comparison.⁵ Pockets are picked publicly here.

General Bélair has just left us. He is going to command in the Roman Republic. Learn who is General Bélair, whom Amelot warned us was a crook.

Would you believe that the supply contractors in charge of the convoy to Corfu were forced to hand over – just to get paid – 25% of their earnings to Bélair, 4% to his staff, 11% to the employee of the paymaster of the Neapolitan army at Ancona. You see how contractors by ceding 40% are forced to make 50%. Thus, the Roman Republic – and ultimately our own republic – is forced to pay 100 écus to obtain 10 écus of effective goods. We hold this information from Citizen Hasden, a Swede or a Dane, one of the contractors.

Hasden told us he was forced to confiscate the key to the safe because members of the general staff would come in the morning asking for 50 piasters, 60, etc. for expenses or to pay gambling debts.

The day before Bélair departed he asked Asda – Hasden's associate – for his phaeton as a gift. It had to be handed over. An officer came to ask for 700 piasters. They had to be given. 500 were for Bélair and 200 for the general staff.

² La Revellière, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.355-357, pièce justificative n°56.

³ See Masson, *Le Département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787-1804*, p.323-325.

⁴ See his *Défense d'Ancône et des départements romains, le Tronto, le Musone et le Metauro, par le général Monnier, aux années VII et VIII*. 2 vols. Paris: C. Pougens, 1802.

⁵ Louis Mandrin (1725-1755) was an 18th century smuggler (tobacco, cotton, etc.) and brigand who operated in the Dauphiné and robbed *receveurs généraux*. Cartouche (Louis Dominique Garthausen, 1693-1721) was the most notorious brigand of the Parisian criminal underworld during the Orléans regency.

Bélaïr demanded 2,000 piasters to allow this company to be paid its arrears. The company refused, but [Bélaïr] still left for Rome with over 7,000 piasters.

*Under pretext of hospital needs or of refurbishing fortifications, the departmental administration was forced to take 20,000 piasters from 13 individuals within 24 hours. It observed that a law which had been made for the French ambassador and sanctioned by the Roman consul removed its authority to levy taxes. Bélaïr replied by threatening to place the central administration on the ship *le généreux* and send it to Corfu. [The administration] therefore designated 13 citizens who were also threatened with deportation and forced to hand over the money despite their protests.*

The preceding central administration had been tried by a criminal court for corruption and extortion. Bélaïr wrote to the praetor [the local magistrate] saying that he had examined the case and that the administration was innocent, and that consequently the magistrate should stop the judicial proceedings.

A Roman contractor had come to an agreement with the central administration to furnish Ancona with combustibles and grain. He had deposited a down payment guaranteeing the delivery of these goods. Last week, he went to Bélaïr to ask for permission to enter the city and deliver his merchandise. Bélaïr's office refused to let the contractor – named Baroni – speak with the general unless he paid 300 piasters. Baroni came to see us. Stamaty [commissioner of exterior relations] went to see Bélaïr, who feigned anger but gave the contractor permission to enter the city without charge and asked to interview him. Stamaty sent him to Bélaïr, but he was whipped and mocked with the words: Ah! Cittadino romano.

*The Roman Marco-Emmanuele Fermi owed a bill of exchange of 300 piasters in his capacity as a partner of the Cavagnari company. This firm, which was obliged to suspend its payments because the Roman government was unable to honour its engagements with it, had obtained a hearing from the Roman authorities and the Directory's civilian commission in Rome. The bearer of this bill of exchange named Raphaele Terni asked Bélaïr for help. Fermi was summoned and threatened with being deported aboard *le généreux*. He protested virulently but was forced to pay.*

The postmaster of Ancona was beaten with sticks by the general's staff over a carriage he had traded and which the general wanted him to buy back for 300 piasters. He ended up being imprisoned.

All these are facts which were brought to our attention despite the shroud of mystery in which Bélaïr envelops his operations. We probably only know a very small part of his affairs. You should also know that all the bureau chiefs were associated with his corruption in these clandestine operations, such as Roman and French war commissioners, inspectors and warehouse managers. This corruption exists in nearly all the army's divisions, but never had a général de division yet dared to pick the narrowest pockets so brazenly. Furthermore, a certain Compagnie Bodin is covering Italy with employees but furnishes nothing. But it keeps accounts – that is the jargon of this gang. For instance, coaches bought from peasants are normally paid 3 livres 10 sous but are reimbursed at between 12 and 15 francs.

APPENDIX XIV

Members of the *Vingt & Dix Négociants Réunis*

The *Vingt Négociants Réunis* (formed 20 December 1799)

Listed in order of appearance on the company contract (left column first, then right):

- Jean-Frédéric Perregaux
(*Perregaux & Cie.*)
- Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de
Canteleu (*Le Couteulx & Cie.*)
- Guillaume Mallet l'*ainé*
(*Mallet frères*)
- Jacques-Rose Récamier
- Alexandre Barrillon
- Fulchiron *frères*
(Jacques-Aimé-Gabriel & Joseph)
- Jean-Pierre Germain
- Jean-Auguste Sévène (*Sévène frères*)
- Charles-Martin Doyen
- Louis-Barthélémy Bastide
- Armand-Jean-François Séguin
- Jean-François Martigny
(for *Carié Bézard & Cie.*)
- Enfantin *frères*
- Pierre-Joseph-Fleury Jubié
- Pierre-Léon Basterrèche
- Alexandre-Antoine Limoges (from the
Limoge et Mazère bank)
- Marc-Antoine-Grégoire Michel (*jeune*)
- Roger *frères*
- *Solier fils et Delarue*
- Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard

Source: MC/ET/XV/1130, 29 frimaire VIII/20 Dec. 1799 & MC/ET/XV/1135, 29 fructidor VIII/16 Sep. 1800.

The *Dix Négociants Réunis* (formed 9 March 1800)

Regrouped the first ten financiers of the *Vingt Négociants* (all those in the left column). They were subsequently joined by Armand Seguin.¹

L'Association des Banquiers du Trésor public (formed 17 August 1801)

Succeeded the *Dix Négociants Réunis*. Served as a syndicate of financiers who could provide the Treasury with cash advances at short notice. Initially regrouped five top bankers: Perregaux, Mallet, Fulchiron, Récamier and Doyen. In early 1802, the membership was changed to: Barrillon, Bastide, Médard Desprez, Louis Naurissart, Récamier and Fulchiron.²

¹ MC/ET/XV/1132, 18 ventôse VIII/9 March 1800.

² See AN, AF/IV/1082.

APPENDIX XV

The Founding Regents & Censors of the *Banque de France*

Regents				
Seat #	Name	Date Appointed ¹	Date of Departure	Comments
1 st Seat	Jean-Frédéric Perregaux	13 February 1800	17 February 1808 (deceased)	Replaced by Jacques Laffitte on 18 January 1809.
2 nd Seat	Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu	13 February 1800	17 Oct. 1804 (resigned)	Replaced by the <i>receveur général des Droits Réunis</i> , Jean-Baptiste Jame, on 17 October 1804.
3 rd Seat	Guillaume Mallet l'ainé	13 February 1800	14 March 1826 (deceased)	Replaced by his eldest son James Mallet on 27 January 1827.
4 th Seat	Georges-Victor Demautort	13 February 1800	17 October 1800	Failed to be re-elected at the general assembly of shareholders of 17 October 1800. Replaced by Louis-Barthélémy Bastide. Legal counsel of the <i>Banque de France</i> .
5 th Seat	Claude Perier	13 February 1800	7 February 1801 (deceased)	Wrote the foundational statutes of the <i>Banque de France</i> . ² Replaced by Médard Desprez on 17 October 1801.
6 th Seat	Pierre-Nicolas Perrée-Duhamel	13 February 1800	17 October 1800	Replaced shortly after his appointment to the Tribunalate by Charles-Martin Doyen on 17 October 1800.
7 th Seat	Jacques-Florent Robillard	13 February 1800	17 October 1803	Replaced by Louis-François Cordier. Elected Second Censor in replacement of Journu-Aubert on 17 October 1806 and served in this post until 29 January 1824.
8 th Seat	Joseph Hugues-Lagarde	13 February 1800	17 October 1801	Replaced by Louis-Charles Thibon.
9 th Seat	Jacques-Rose Récamier	16 February 1800	15 November 1805? (resigned)	Probably resigned on 15 November 1805 after he went bankrupt. Replaced by Vital Roux on 17 October 1806.
10 th Seat	Jean-Pierre Germain	16 February 1800	24 March 1803 (deceased)	Replaced by Jean-Conrad Hottinguer on 17 October 1803.
11 th Seat	Henry-Liévain Carié	16 February 1800	17 October 1803	Replaced by Jean-Louis Ambroise Marmet.
12 th Seat	Pierre-Léon Basterrèche	16 February 1800	15 November 1801 (deceased)	Replaced by Benjamin Delessert on 12 October 1802. Basterrèche was a cousin by marriage of the Second Consul Cambacérés.
13 th Seat	Jean-Auguste Sévène	16 February 1800	9 September 1806 (resigned)	Replaced by Augustin-Charles-Alexandre Ollivier on 17 October 1806.
14 th Seat	Alexandre Barrillon	16 February 1800	17 October 1803	Replaced by Jean-Baptiste Roger Dibon.
15 th Seat	Georges-Antoine Ricard	16 February 1800	17 October 1801	Replaced by Jean-Charles Joachim Davillier (who held the seat until 1846!).

¹ The *Banque de France* was created by consular decree on 18 January 1800. Its first general assembly of shareholders was held on the following 13 February and its second on 16 February. All founding Regents and Censors were officially appointed during one of these two assemblies.

² See Stourm, *LFC*, p.240-243 & Ramon, *HBFC*, p.9-37.

Censors			
Seat #	Name	Date Appointed	Date of Departure
1 st Seat	Guillaume Sabatier	13 February 1800	1803 (resigned)
2 nd Seat	Bernard Journu-Aubert	16 February 1800	1806 (resigned)
3 rd Seat	Jean-Michel Soehnée	16 February 1800	28 December 1808 (resigned)
			Resigned due to health concerns and was replaced by Jean-Henry Martin-Puech on 17 October 1803.
			Resigned as he no longer met the criteria to be censor as stipulated in the <i>Banque de France</i> 's statutes. ³ Replaced by Jacques-Florent Robillard on 17 October 1806.
			Resigned due to infirmity and was replaced by Martin d'André, his daughter-in-law's uncle, on 17 January 1810.

Presidents of the Regency Council, 1800-1806			
Name	Date Appointed	Date of Departure	Comments
Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu	23 March 1800	1 October 1801	Resigned to concentrate on his personal banking activities.
Jean-Frédéric Perregaux	1 October 1801	March 1806	Forced to resign following the bankruptcy scandal of the <i>Négociants Réunis</i> .

Main Administrators	
Director-General of the Banque de France	Paymaster-General (caissier principal)
Martin Garat (held the post without interruption from 1800 to his death in 1830, aged 81).	François-Pierre Cornut de la Fontaine (in post 1803-1813). ⁴
Jean-Marie-Eusèbe Devaines, <i>fiils</i> .	Jean-Marie-Eusèbe Devaines, <i>fiils</i> .
Louis-Jacques Dangirard. ⁵	Louis-Jacques Dangirard. ⁵
Joseph-Marie Vial (appointed 1801). ⁶	Joseph-Marie Vial (appointed 1801). ⁶
Director of Rents & Pensions	General Auditor (contrôleur général)
Manager Overseeing Conversion of Bank Notes into Hard Currency (caissier des billets)	

The *Banque de France* was officially brought under government control and placed under the oversight of a state council headed by a governor after the 1805-1806 bankruptcy scandal of the *Négociants Réunis*. The first governor was Emmanuel Crétet (appointed 25 April 1806) who was succeeded by the *comte* Jaubert (appointed 9 August 1807). Jacques Laffitte took over as governor on 6 April 1814.

Source: Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*.

³ These statutes required censors to be selected from among shareholders who were artisans, manufacturers or merchants (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.205).

⁴ Former *premier commis des finances au Trésor royal* (1789), Treasury commissioner (5 May 1791-Sep. 1794) and Paymaster (*caissier*) of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* (Nov. 1798) (Bruguière, *GPR*, p.241).

⁵ Uncle of the Mallet brothers (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.228).

⁶ Former *caissier de la guerre et de la Marine* (1793-1795) and *caissier de la recette journalière* (1796-1801) at the Treasury (Bruguière, *GPR*, p.290).

APPENDIX XVI

List of the Treasury's Leading Creditors on 16 August 1801

Name	Amount (francs)
<i>Michel frères</i>	7,132,600
Mont-de-Piété	5,023,000
Jacques Récamier	1,600,000
Antoine Delamarre	1,200,000
<i>Banque de France</i>	834,000
Dewelle	640,000
<i>Fulchiron & Cie.</i>	630,000
Jean-Charles Davillier	600,000
Georges Combe	600,000
Guillaume Sabatier	599,600

Name	Amount (francs)
<i>Gros, Davillier & Cie.</i>	570,000
Antoine Revenaz	554,000
Gosset	500,000
Alexandre Barrillon	500,000
Jean-Baptiste Chauvet	485,000
Charles Joseph Baguenault	350,000
Vandermarcq	182,600
Parguez	140,000
Various creditors	49,800

Source: AF/IV/1082, dossier 1, pièces 42 & 43 (reproduced in Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.344).

BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX

The following index contains biographical information on financiers, banks and trading houses referenced by this thesis. The information presented was gathered by the author's own research and should not be viewed as a definitive or exhaustive catalogue of all the financial actors and institutions of the late French revolutionary and early Napoleonic periods. In certain cases, such as for middling Parisian and provincial banks and trading houses, available details in archival records were either extremely limited or non-existent.

Legend:

-  Tax official or commercial agent of the *ferme générale* or Ministry of Finance (e.g. *Commission des Revenus nationaux*).
-  Administrator or Commissioner of the *Trésor royal* (*Ancien Régime*) or of the National Treasury (*Trésorerie nationale*).
-  Administrator of *domaines* or forestry official (*Ancien Régime* or revolutionary Ministry of Finance).
-  *Premier commis* of Louis XVI.
-  Elected or appointed to a legislative seat.
-  *Direction générale de la Liquidation* (Ministry of Finance).
-  Regent, Censor or Administrator of the *Banque de France*.
-  Brumaire conspirator.
-  *Légion d'honneur*.
-  *Baron, Comte* or *Duc de l'Empire*.
-  *Pair de France*.
- AI** Administrator or Contractor of the *Armée d'Italie*.
- CCC** Administrator or Shareholder of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*.
- CEC** Administrator or Shareholder of the *Caisse d'escompte du Commerce*.
- BT** Administrator or Shareholder of the *Banque Territoriale*.
- MF** Minister of Finance.
- MI** Minister of the Interior.
- MT** *Ministre du Trésor public* (Minister of the Treasury).

Amelin Van Robais & Cie. CCC

The Van Robais family, originally from Zeeland, had established the *Manufacture Royale des Rames* at Abbeville in 1665 at the invitation of Colbert. *Amelin Van Robais & Cie.* was awarded the general contract for military clothing (*habillement*) on 2 Nov. 1796 – an agreement renewed in Year VI.¹ The company experienced financial difficulties due to the economic crisis of Year VII despite being awarded 2,597,140 francs worth of extraordinary discounts by the Caisse des Comptes Courants in a desperate attempt to keep it afloat. *Amelin Van Robais & Cie.* went into administration on 6 frimaire VIII/27 Nov. 1799 and the *caisse* began marketing obligations on its debts on 2 nivôse VIII/23 Dec. 1799.²

Amelot de Chaillou, Antoine-Léon-Anne (1760 – c.1824) ●

Born in Paris. Son of Antoine-Jean, intendant of Burgundy and minister of the *Maison du Roi* (1776-1783), and of Marie-Françoise-Jeanne Legendre. Amelot was from a distinguished family of parliamentarians and civil servants who had served the French crown since the time of King Francis I.

- Master of requests (*maître des requêtes*) (1779);
- Intendant of Burgundy (1783-1789);
- Director of registrations (*régisseur de l'enregistrement*) from Aug. to Oct. 1793;
- Imprisoned from Oct. 1793 to 14 Oct. 1794;
- Chief administrator of contributions, revenues and finances of the Republic in Italy (Oct. – Nov. 1798);
- Civil commissioner of the *Armée d'Italie* until Feb. 1799;
- Appointed the Directory's representative in Frankfurt but fails to take up the post;
- Administrator of the lottery (Dec. 1799 – March 1802);
- Retired to Blois and Rouen.³

André, Dominique (14 Sep. 1766 – 9 Feb. 1844)

The André family were protestants from Nîmes who had settled in Genoa in 1667 where David André (1629–1709) established *David André et Cie.* The André operated trading counters in both Nîmes and Genoa and maintained close links to Genevan finance.⁴ They were friends of Madame de Genlis and their business was protected by the comte de Sémonville during his posting as French ambassador to Genoa (1790-1792).⁵ Dominique's father – Jean André (1734–1794) – was elected president of Nîmes's tribunal de commerce in 1791 but was guillotined on 11 July 1794 following a rapidly expedited trial because he was suspected of financing federalist rebels. In 1793, Dominique André married Mira Rivet, the daughter of the trader David Rivet de Sabatier, who later founded the *pensionnat*

¹ CRDECS, p.51-52.

² ABF, 1069200402/22, PVRCA-2, 2 nivôse VIII/23 Dec. 1799.

³ For more on Amelot see François Bluche, *L'origine des magistrats du parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle (1715-1771)*, *Dictionnaire généalogique*, Paris: Fédération des sociétés historiques et archéologiques de Paris et de l'Île-de-France, 1956 and *Les Magistrats de la Cour des monnaies de Paris au XVIIIe siècle, 1715-1790*. Paris: Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon (vol. 81), 1966; Pierre Caron, *La Commission de subsistances de l'an II, procès-verbaux et actes*. Paris: E. Leroux, 1925; Jacques Godechot, *LCAD* and Bruguière, *GPR*, p.227-228.

⁴ See Virginie Lehideux-Vernimmen, *Du négoce à la banque : Les André, une famille nîmoise protestante 1600-1800*, Nîmes: Lacour-Ollé, 1992.

⁵ See Jean-Jacques Hémarquinier, 'Une correspondance de banquiers parisiens (1808-1815). Aspects socio-politiques', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 17(3), juillet-septembre 1970: 514-539.

de jeunes-filles de l'Église réformée de Paris in the Rue de Reuilly. In 1808, Dominique partnered with future *Banque de France* Regent Adolphe Pierre François Cottier to found the *André & Cottier* bank which participated in the creation of the *Caisse d'épargne et de prévoyance de Paris* (the modern *Caisse d'Épargne*) and subsisted until 1896.⁶ This bank was one of the ancestors of the Neuflyze OBC bank which is currently a subsidiary of the ABN-AMRO group. During the 1820s, Dominique made highly successful investments in the porcelain manufacture of Foecy (Cher). He was also a prominent member of the Protestant Consistory of France. His grandson, Édouard André, donated an important art collection to the *Institut de France* which formed the basis for the *Musée Jacquemart-André*.

Baldwyn, Samuel

Samuel Baldwyn was an Englishman who came to France in 1773 and served as an English tutor to the younger brothers of Louis XVI and the Duke of Orléans. He became a naturalised French citizen in May 1783. Baldwyn was a friend of Benjamin Franklin whose Parisian apartment he rented. During the Revolution, he probably operated as a British agent and corresponded with the editorial board of *The Morning Star*, a newspaper close to Pitt, sending news back to England via George Stratton, another British operative. On 6 June 1793, Baldwyn was arrested but released shortly thereafter and immediately escaped to London. He apparently returned to France on 17 Oct. that year and met the French foreign minister Deforgues and Hérault de Séchelles. Baldwyn was arrested again and incarcerated in the Prison de l'Abbaye, but friends in high places (possibly Barère) secured his release on 24 Aug. 1794.⁷

Baroud, Claude-Odile-Joseph (1755 – 1824)

Originally a notary from Lyon, Baroud was also involved in speculation and trading and appears to have made considerable profits in late 1782. He came to Paris in Oct. 1783 and became one of the most successful speculators of the late *Ancien Régime*. A small man with piercing eyes and a melodious voice, he could be seen daily at the Parisian stock market in the Rue Vivienne. His Parisian residence was located at 162 Rue Neuve-des-Petits-Champs in the *paroisse Saint-Roch*. Baroud developed close links to Genevan financial circles and was highly successful in popularising the sale of life annuities drawn on Necker's tontines loans on the 'Thirty Immortals of Geneva'.⁸ Following the outbreak of the Revolution, many of these bonds became worthless and Baroud was taken to court in Year V by one of the clients to whom he had sold many of these assets – the Tourton & Ravel bank. The jurist Berryer, who defended Baroud in this case, was unable to prevent the court from ruling against him.⁹

By late 1784 and early 1785, he was already moving over 1,200,000 *livres* a month in various ventures and had acquired several shares of the *Caisse d'Escompte* via his business associate Étienne Clavière and over a million *livres* of bonds of Calonne's 1785 national loan for 125 million *livres*. By August 1785, Baroud's assets had more than doubled to reach nearly eight million *livres* which enabled him to conduct large-scale speculations on

⁶ See Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.54 & 326.

⁷ See Blanc, *LERE*, p.69-71 & *LCST*, p.109-110.

⁸ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.513-515.

⁹ Berryer, *Souvenirs*, Tome II, p.346-347.

shares of the *Banco de San Carlos* and the *Compagnie de Indes*.¹⁰ He did business with many leading Parisian and provincial trading houses including, *Boyd, Ker & Cie.*, *Tourton & Ravel*, *Vandenyver frères*, *Récamier père & fils* (Lyon), *Delessert & Cie.*, *Rougemont & Hottinguer*, and even international bankers like *Hogguer* of Amsterdam.

On 17 Dec. 1786, Baroud signed a contract with *Seneffe, Pyron et Cie.*, the company of the Comte de Seneffe and Pyron de Chaboulon, which allowed him to sell – in partnership with the Abbé d’Espagnac – all shares of the *Compagnie des Indes* owned by both the company and d’Espagnac.¹¹ Baroud was further authorised to negotiate a loan of four million *livres* on behalf of *Seneffe, Pyron et Cie.* at ½% monthly interest for whatever duration of time he deemed appropriate which would be guaranteed by a down payment of 100,000 *livres* plus shares of the *Compagnie des Indes* valued at 1,450 *livres* each and other assets. Baroud contracted the loan with an exchange agent named Louis-Aspaïs Amiot de Franconville who was granted a further 2% commission on the deal. This loan was set to expire on 28 Feb. 1787. Baroud was then authorised to negotiate additional loans on 20 Dec. 1786 and 6 Jan. 1787. His main job was to sell *Compagnie des Indes* shares and keep a tally of all the individual share numbers he sold which he was supposed to report to *Seneffe, Pyron et Cie.*

Seneffe, Pyron et Cie. received 6,900,000 *livres* from Calonne to purchase shares of the *Compagnie des Indes* in order to maintain its value on the stock market. By Dec. 1786, the company had purchased 24,000 of these shares, while the Abbé d’Espagnac – who owned 25,000 *Compagnie des Indes* shares – sold 18,000 of them to the company which therefore owned a total of 42,000 shares – 2,000 more than had actually been issued!¹² This meant that Baroud and d’Espagnac – far from keeping a rigorous tally of the individual numbers of shares they were selling – had sold additional bogus shares to unsuspecting buyers and traders by recycling original share identification numbers. When this discrepancy became known on the stock market, speculators feared the value of the shares would crash and therefore engineered a pre-emptive rush to buy more of them which raised the share price to 1,700 *livres*. In this way, Baroud and d’Espagnac were able to extort vast sums from middling speculators who were forced to pay them inflated commissions to get bogus shares in their possession refunded. Moreover, some unscrupulous traders sought to make rapid profits from this situation by buying large amounts of shares from Baroud and d’Espagnac and rapidly reselling them for profit. On 12 Feb. 1787, for instance, the exchange agent Coindre purchased 16,000 *Compagnie des Indes* shares from d’Espagnac at a price of 1,650 *livres* per share which enabled d’Espagnac to make a profit of 2,400,000 *livres*.¹³ Shortly afterwards on 18 March 1787, Louis XVI exiled d’Espagnac from Paris after Mirabeau denounced his speculations.¹⁴ On 20 March, Baroud and d’Espagnac submitted a summary of their accounts to Calonne who appointed the bankers Le Couteulx and Haller to oversee the liquidation of *Seneffe, Pyron et Cie.*’s speculation on the *Compagnie des Indes*.¹⁵ On 29 March, d’Espagnac nominated Baroud to manage his affairs in the liquidation process.

¹⁰ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.169-170.

¹¹ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.18.

¹² *Ibid*, p.20.

¹³ *Ibid*, p.21.

¹⁴ Mirabeau, *Dénonciation de l’agiotage de Paris au Roi et à l’assemblée des notables*, Sans lieu ni nom, 18 March 1787.

¹⁵ AN, AD/XI/66.

Baroud continued to speculate on the *Caisse d'Escompte* and the Périer brothers' *Compagnie des Eaux de Paris* in 1788. The following year he was involved in a dubious scheme which defrauded the creditors of *Rougemont, Hottinguer & Cie.* – the Zürich consortium '*Usteri, Escher, Ott et Cie.*' – of several hundreds of thousands of *livres*, possibly with the connivance of Denis de Rougemont and Jean-Conrad Hottinguer (both of whom were Baroud's friends).¹⁶

In late 1789, Baroud appears to have been implicated in the conspiracy of the Marquis de Favras – probably acting as an intermediary.¹⁷ On 20 Sep. 1793, the *Comité de Sûreté générale* ordered the commissioners of the *section de la Montagne* to arrest Baroud.¹⁸ Baroud's house in the Rue Neuve des Petits-Champs was searched but he had already fled. He remained in hiding in Paris until 9 Thermidor. During the later part of his career, Baroud was principally involved with managing his cotton-weaving manufacture located at Neuville-sur-Saône which he had acquired in 1785. The Peace of Amiens deprived him of his last remaining funds and he was unable to secure any state-subsidised loans to revive his businesses.¹⁹

Barrillon, Jean-Joseph-François-Alexandre CCC ● **(1 Aug. 1762 – 19 May 1817)**

Alexandre Barrillon was born in Serres (Hautes-Alpes), the son of Paul Barrillon, a bourgeois notable from Serres, and of Elisabeth Pinchinat.

Marriage & Children:

On 2 Aug. 1787 at Cap-Français (Saint Domingue) he married Françoise-Marguerite Chassy-Poulet (a.k.a. Chassi-Poulet), the daughter of François Chassy-Poulet, a merchant trader of Lyon, and of Louise Michalet (resident of Saint Domingue).²⁰ They had one son after fourteen years of marriage: François-Sophie-Alexandre Barrillon (1801-1871), future mayor of Élincourt (Oise) and deputy of the Oise (1837-1839 & 1842-1846), who was involved in the Dercheu case (against the press) and opposed Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte's coup of 2 December 1851.

Alexandre Barrillon must not be confused with Claude-Georges Barrillon (a.k.a. 'Barrillon des îles'), another Parisian banker active under the *Premier Empire* related to the Barrillon de Morangis family and married to a Tascher de la Pagerie (Josephine's family).²¹

Career:

Barrillon began work aged 16 as a *commis* in the trading house of the Pinchinats (his mother's relatives) at Bayonne before settling in 1782 aged 20 in Saint Domingue where he was initially employed by a wealthy plantation owner, Mr. d'Anglade. Prior to his marriage, he was already in business with the brothers Pierre and Jacques Hugues from the Hugues-Lagarde family of Marseille, managing a trading house in Cap-Français. Barrillon then formed a business with Denis Castanet and purchased a plantation at Le Pilate in

¹⁶ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.724-725.

¹⁷ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.173.

¹⁸ AN, AF/II*/286 & F/7/4587, plaquette 7, dossier Barrou.

¹⁹ For a detailed account of Baroud's career, see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.167-180.

²⁰ A copy of their marriage contract was registered with the notary Mathieu (MC/ET/XLV/663, 13 prairial VI/1 June 1798).

²¹ He later also participated in the founding of the *Caisse d'Épargne* in 1818 with Benjamin Delessert.

Plaisance.²² Following the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution, Barrillon was put in charge of defending the plantations of white proprietors in his area and temporarily succeeded in dislodging rebels of the slave army after six months of fighting. The tide of war soon turned against him and he grew weary of the conflict, returning to France in late 1791/early 1792 where he settled in or near Lyon, doing business in wine and speculating on *biens nationaux*. He seems to have stored most of his merchandise at Marseille where he had many associates (e.g. Hugues-Lagarde).

Barrillon served with the federalist rebels during the Siege of Lyon (June-Nov. 1793). After the fall of the city, he spent several months hiding in his native Hautes-Alpes where he was aided and protected by his business connections, only re-emerging after 9 Thermidor. It was at this time he began resuming shipments of colonial goods.²³ In 1795, he settled in Paris and founded *Barrillon et Cie.* – headquartered at 161 Rue Neuve du Luxembourg – with Pierre-Antoine Chégaray of Bayonne.²⁴ Their firm first appeared in the republican almanac in Year VII (1798-1799), and served as the Parisian correspondent of the Croese bank in Amsterdam. Capefigue claims Barrillon was protected by Barras.²⁵

Barrillon was among the bankers who agreed to loan Napoleon's new consular government three million francs in the aftermath of Brumaire.²⁶ He was a member of the *Vingt Négociants Réunis*, the *Dix Négociants Réunis* and the *Association des Banquiers du Trésor public*. However, he opposed awarding the monopoly of paper currency emission to the *Banque de France* and wrote two virulent letters to Perregaux denouncing this.²⁷ In May 1803, rumors began circulating that he had – in secret concert with Greffulhe in London – speculated on the announcement of a British ultimatum to France or an offer of peace, with the intention of rapidly selling vast amounts of colonial goods and bonds of the national debt for a large profit.²⁸ Following the resumption of hostilities with Britain, he went bankrupt on 22 Aug. 1803 after Parisian *agents de change* refused to accept bills he had endorsed. On 23 Aug., Barrillon petitioned the *Banque de France* for an advance of two million francs guaranteed by colonial goods stored in Paris which was accepted.²⁹ He had recovered by 1804 but soon after retired from high finance, continuing his business on a far more modest scale. In March 1811, he petitioned the government for an advance of 200,000 francs to compensate the loss of several hundred cotton balls imported from Brazil (destroyed by “*insurrectional juntas*!”).³⁰

During the siege of Paris in 1814, Barrillon was a captain of the Parisian *garde nationale*. He received news of the armistice signed at the Buttes-Chaumont while defending a

²² They amicably dissolved this company in 1802 (MC/ET/V/885, 1 pluviôse X/21 Jan. 1802).

²³ See for example AN, AF/II/77, dossier 568:31, *Decree authorising Barrillon to load a neutral ship for the Mascarenes Islands (Iles de France) and La Réunion*, 17 ventôse III/7 March 1795.

²⁴ The Chégaray brothers (Thomas and Pierre Antoine) were from Bayonne and settled as *armateurs* in La Rochelle in 1795. They established the *Grammont-Chégaray et Cie.* trading house at Bordeaux with Jean-Barthélémy Grammont and Joachim Zuasnavar. It soon became a major trading outfit active in the colonial trade with Saint Domingue and the United States, and also equipped privateers. The *hôtel Chégaray* is currently the town hall of La Rochelle. See Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.6, footnote 20.

²⁵ Jean-Baptiste Honoré Raymond Capefigue, *Histoire des grandes opérations financières*, Tome II, Paris: Librairie d'Aymot, 1855, p.183.

²⁶ See Chapter 6 & AN, AF/IV/8, plaquette 35, 14 ventôse VIII/5 March 1800.

²⁷ AN, AF/IV/1070: 13-14, *Barrillon to Perregaux*, 18 & 20 March 1803.

²⁸ Aulard, *PSC*, Tome IV, 55 (7 May 1803).

²⁹ ABF, dossier 1069201116/1 – *Registre des Délibérations du Conseil General de Régence de la Banque de France*, Tome 2, p.239, 5 fructidor XI/23 August 1803.

³⁰ AN, AF/IV/1061, dossier 2: 40 – *Projet Barillon, négociant, pour favoriser la culture du coton et de la canne à sucre en Andalousie*. See also AF/IV/1062, dossier 2:35-36.

barricade against Russian attacks in the Place des Ternes (*barrière du Rouille*) on 30 March. At great personal risk, he picked up a drum, crossed the battlefield, and was nearly cut down by Cossack troops but succeeded in alerting the Russian general in charge who ordered the fighting to stop.³¹ Barrillon was elected a deputy of the Hautes-Alpes to the *Chambre des Cent-Jours* on 16 May 1815. He was closer to Lucien Bonaparte than to Napoleon and was a good friend of Constantin Permon and of his sister – the Duchesse d’Abrantès. In 1815, Barrillon attended Constantin’s marriage to Eugénie-Camille Journu, niece of the *Banque de France* Censor Journu-Aubert.³²

Barrillon allegedly conserved all his commercial archives from Year V to 1817, and these were likely transferred by his son to his château of Bellinglise at Elincourt-Sainte-Marguerite (Oise). Unfortunately, this château – which was sold to the Collart-Dutilleuls – was badly damaged in World War One.

Military Contracting

Barrillon invested in numerous military contracting firms (weapons, supplies, forage, bedding, etc.) under his own name or using borrowed ones, including the *Compagnie Massieu* (forage for the war ministry in Year IV), the *Compagnie Brocq*, the *Compagnie Freydier*, the *Compagnie Rousseau, Massieu, Freydier, Falloux et Brocq* and the *Compagnie Brocq et Terrier*.

Barrillon and his nephew Jean-Joseph Paul Itier were also partners in the *Compagnie Limoge et Mazères* which had been specifically established for military contracting in 1797.³³ The original investors in this firm were Alexandre-Antoine Limoge (*commissaire en chef des poudres et salpêtres*), Bertrand Mazères and Victor Charles Jean François La Broue. Itier joined as a full partner on 2 March 1799 with his uncle Barrillon being recognised as a preferential investor. But in fact, Barrillon’s links with *Limoge & Mazères* can be traced back to a financial procuration of Year V.³⁴

Some of its contracts and business partners included:

- A partnership with Citizens Gobert and Lanoue who held the general contract to supply forage to the *Armées du Nord et de l’Est* for which they held a state ordinance of two million francs. They also supplied grain to the 17th military district (Paris). In Year V, Barrillon, Gobert and Lanoue used these contracts to secure advances of 600,000 francs in hard currency drawn from public coffers and and gold ingots provided by Mr. Auguste, *Directeur de l’affinage*.³⁵
- Supplying wine and meat to the navy in various ports (Brest, Lorient, Nantes, Rochefort) (Years V to VIII);³⁶
- The ‘*Affaire des Chérubins*’ in Year X (*Administration des vivres de la Marine*);
- *Compagnie Gramagnacq et Cie*. (Itier, Barrillon’s nephew, in partnership with Gramagnacq as of 2 Aug. 1801), which went bankrupt in Year XIII (1803);

³¹ Robert, Bourloton & Cougny (eds.), *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français*, Tome I, p.178.

³² For more on Barrillon, see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.1-13.

³³ For Barrillon’s links with *Limoge & Mazères*, see the records of Joseph François Mathieu de Heudolsheim (notarial study XLV) at the *Minutier Central des Notaires*.

³⁴ MC/ET/XLV/660, 27 floréal V/16 May 1797 – *Procuration d’Alexandre Antoine Limoge à Alexandre Barrillon*.

³⁵ AN, AF/III/418, dossier 2333: 41, 11 frimaire V/1 Dec. 1796.

³⁶ AP, D31U3 7, dossier 66.

- *Affaire des Entrepreneurs généraux des équipages d'artillerie* – whose partners were Jean Astier (Barrillon's brother-in-law), Chégaray, Grammont, Itier, Ouvrard and Otard;
- The *Compagnie Lauchère fils et Julien succession*, for *équipages d'artillerie* in 1799-1800;
- The *Compagnie Noë* (a forage company headed by Robert Audras and Pierre Noë, with its main warehouse in Versailles).³⁷ On 9 Jan. 1800 – shortly after Brumaire – Barrillon and *Limoge & Mazères* formed a special partnership with Antoine Louis Girardot and the *Compagnie Noë* (headed by Pierre Noë) to administer a large contract to supply the *Armée d'Angleterre*'s 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 17th, 20th and 22nd divisions with forage.³⁸ The contract was guaranteed by two businessmen named Salvatore Poli and Ignace Augustin Reynaud who mortgaged 600,000 francs worth of real estate. Antoine Louis Girardot and Pierre Noë were guaranteed for another 400,000 francs and by a certain Jacques Abraham Pallard. The contract was witnessed by General Berthier. The notarial act of association between the *Compagnie Noë*, Girardot and *Limoge & Mazères* conserved in Parisian archives indicates their partnership was comprised of 24 *sols*: 6 for Noë, 9 for Girardot and 9 for Limoge.³⁹
- The *Compagnie de fournitures à l'Armée espagnole à Brest*, founded by the Spanish ambassador José Martínez de Hervás, Auguste Ouvrard and Dubœuf. Barrillon served as Dubœuf's financial guarantor. The company sold drafts (*traites*) to the Spanish government for four million piasters in 1798-1802.

In 1801, Barrillon advanced *Limoge & Mazères* a further 150,000 francs.⁴⁰

Banking & Commerce

Barrillon also maintained interests in banking, colonial trade, privateering and international commerce. His affairs were closely connected with those of Ouvrard, Vanlerberghe, Médard Desprez, Louis-Barthélémy Bastide, José Martínez de Hervás and Récamier. He regularly did business with the manufacture of Sèvres. The Duchesse d'Abrantès notes Barrillon was one of the most reputed financiers of the Directory.⁴¹ His personal fortune at its height has been estimated at 15 million francs.⁴² Among the assets listed in his inventory after decease we find:

- A stake in the trading vessels *l'Alexandre* (based in Marseille) and *Pondichéry* (from Bordeaux);
- Investments in privateering ships and corsairs, held jointly with the Chégaray family;

³⁷ See AP, D31U3 1, dossier 8, 19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800 & MC/ET/LXXXVI/921, 19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800.

³⁸ MC/ET/LXXXVI/921, 19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800 – The contract was guaranteed by two businessmen named Salvatore Poli and Ignace Augustin Reynaud who mortgaged 600,000 francs worth of real estate. Antoine Louis Girardot and Pierre Noë were guaranteed for another 400,000 francs and by a certain Jacques Abraham Pallard. The contract was witnessed by General Berthier. The notarial act of association between the *Compagnie Noë*, Girardot and *Limoge & Mazères* conserved in Parisian archives (AP, D31U3 1, dossier 8, 19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800) indicates their partnership was comprised of 24 *sols*: 6 for Noë, 9 for Girardot and 9 for Limoge.

³⁹ AP, D31U3 1, dossier 8, 19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800.

⁴⁰ MC/ET/XLV/673, 9 messidor IX/28 June 1801– *Obligation de 150,000 francs d'Alexandre Antoine Limoge à Alexandre Barrillon*. See also Itier's inventory after decease (MC/ET/XLV/680, 11 vendémiaire XIII/3 Oct. 1804).

⁴¹ AN, AF/IV/1062, dossier 5.

⁴² Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.11.

- Agreements with several banking firms (*Baudecourt et Chalamel, Fulchiron & Cie., Geyley, Jordan & Cie., Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie., Jacques Récamier and Vignes & Neveu* of Bordeaux) to facilitate transfers of funds;⁴³
- In Year IX, he partnered with Hervás, *Geyley et Jourdan* and Récamier to invest in the *Compagnie des Laines* (managed by Henri Grandin) for the business of trading wool with Spain;⁴⁴
- On 30 germinal X/20 April 1802, he was part of a contract signed with the government, along with Médard Desprez, Bastide and Naurissart, which made them members of the *association des banquiers du Trésor public*;
- When Bastide went bankrupt in Year XIV (1805-1806), he owed Barrillon 1,060,000 francs.

Tracking Barrillon's business dealings presents a near-impossible task for the researcher because he used a wide range of *prête-noms* (usually those of his relatives or business partners). These included his nephew Jean-Joseph Paul Itier (or Ithier), Jacques and Pierre Hugues, Louis and Emard Millot, Marc Claude Victor Dubeuf and the Duverger de Sermet (father and mother of his associate Pierre-Antoine Chégaray).

Basterrèche, Pierre-Léon (28 Feb. 1763 – 15 Nov. 1801) ● CCC ●

Basterrèche was from a merchant trading family of Bayonne and undertook his commercial training in Holland, northern France, England and Spain. On 17 May 1793 he was arrested with his brother Pierre and incarcerated at Tarbes. They were released in September 1794. In March 1795, Pierre-Léon was elected deputy of Bayonne at the Thermidorian Convention.

In 1798, Basterrèche established *Jubié, Basterrèche et Cie.* in partnership with Pierre-Joseph-Fleury Jubié, headquartered in the Rue Neuve-des-Mathurins. The bank dealt in all kinds of business and worked regularly with the *Régie nationale des Hôpitaux Militaires*. Under cover of the *Compagnie Durand*, of which it owned 60%, *Jubié, Basterrèche et Cie.* purchased several *biens nationaux*, in the *départements* of the Nord, Seine-et-Marne and the Belgian *département* of Jemmapes. It also acquired a building at the intersection of the Rue Neuve-des-Mathurins and the Rue de l'Arcade for 200,000 francs (1 June 1799) and another building at 688 Rue Neuve-des-Mathurins for 130,000 francs (25 Aug. 1800). *Jubié, Basterrèche et Cie.* was dissolved in Year IX and on 23 Sep. 1801 Basterrèche established a new company named *Léon Basterrèche et Cie.* (starting capital 600,000 francs) – still headquartered in the Rue Neuve-des-Mathurins – with Pierre Junca and Alexandre Durand as partners. By the terms of its statutes, Basterrèche received 86% of its profits.

On 18 April 1799 he married Jeanne-Catherine-Rose-Emilie Duvidal (de Montferrier), a relative of Cambacérès (whose paternal grandmother was a Duvidal de Montferrier). Cambacérès and Basterrèche shared a father-in-law – Jean-Jacques Duvidal – who was related to the Vassal family, one of the trading dynasties of the Languedoc.⁴⁵ Basterrèche

⁴³ AN, AF/III/598, plaquette 4137:16-17, 12 floréal VII/1 May 1799.

⁴⁴ AP, D31U3 1, dossier 84, 19 germinal IX/9 April 1801 & MC/ET/XLV/723, 29 May 1817 (Barrillon's inventory after decease).

⁴⁵ For more on the Vassals, see Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, *Les financiers du Languedoc au XVIII^e siècle*. Paris: SEVPEN, 1970, p.224-225. Other members of the Vassal family included the Prefect Jean André Louis Rolland de Villarceaux (1764-1849), who served as an ordnance officer on Bonaparte's staff, and the baron Antoine-Jean-Armand-Matthieu Séguier (1768-1848), *premier président de la Cour d'Appel de Paris*.

was also close to Martin Garat, another native of Bayonne. The Duchesse d’Abrantès devotes several paragraphs in her memoirs to Basterrèche’s wedding – one of the most celebrated unions of the Consulate.⁴⁶ She also dresses a scathing portrait of him:

“The first time I saw Mr. Basterrèche, he frightened me. Not only was his ugliness bitter, but he was monstrous in his deformity, and the expression of his face had something which was truly terrifying...”

D’Abrantès explains that when Basterrèche was an infant, his maid forgot him in his bath which was equipped with a heating stove. The poor child had been severely burnt:

“Mr. Basterrèche was cooked. All that was left to say was: serve it hot! Nevertheless, he survived, and apparently was not the worse for it, since he wanted to get married. He was terrifying. Not only was he outrageously deformed, but his mouth was twisted, and his nose had joined in the fun as well. Two inconveniences resulted from all this, one of which was dreadful for others: perfume. The other, a buffoon’s voice, entertained his auditors. This soft and agreeable voice was in the habit of spurting out profanities, for along with all the perfections of ugliness I have just outlined, the “little roaster” was as nasty as a stubborn mule. Finally, he probably had a talisman. For Mademoiselle Rose Duvidal married him without shedding too many tears; and in truth I was the one crying for her, as coming out of the Opera I saw her so young, so fresh and so beautiful, leaning on either the forward or backward lump of her husband, and thereby presenting to the world the image of the two extremes of beauty and ugliness.”⁴⁷

The young and attractive Madame Basterrèche, eighteen years her husband’s junior, was widowed after a year and a half of marriage and re-married Jean-Olivier Lavollée, the secretary of her uncle Cambacérès. Basterrèche’s brother, Pierre – an intimate of General Moreau – was an ardent opponent of Bonaparte and kept a low profile during the *Premier Empire*.

According to Basterrèche’s inventory after decease, he held 385,617 francs of assets in *Léon Basterrèche et Cie.* including:

- 93,754 francs of unrecovered bills and letters of exchange (on several creditors including Tanner of Hamburg, Passavant and Faesch of Bâle, Warocqué of Mons, J.B. Decrétot of Paris, Martinez of Madrid, and *Basterrèche frères et Cie.* from Bayonne);
- 128,051 francs worth of assets caught up in succession procedures (notably from the *Banque Hupais et Gelot*);
- 65 shares of the *Banque de France* worth 68,900 francs;
- 112,095 francs of payments received from M. Tolentin for supplies and forage during the months of brumaire to nivôse Year IX;
- 147,735 francs of payments received from Guigues, for the supplying of military convoys from ventôse to floréal Year IX.⁴⁸

Basterrèche also bequeathed a large real estate portfolio:

- His principal residence - an *hôtel particulier* at 688, rue Neuve-des-Mathurins – worth 130,000 francs, in which he invested an additional 100,000 francs for embellishments (the silverware alone was worth 34,000 francs);

⁴⁶ D’Abrantès, *Mémoires*, Tome IV, p.185-188.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, Tome IV, p.188.

⁴⁸ MC/ET/XXXV/998, 25 nivôse X/15 Jan. 1802 – *Inventory after decease of Pierre-Léon Basterrèche.*

- A house with garden located at the corner of Rue Neuve-des-Mathurins and Rue de l'Arcade worth at least 250,000 francs;
- Land formerly belonging to the *jacobins* in the Rue Neuve-des-Mathurins worth 150,000 francs;
- 3/10s of the *biens nationaux* acquired by the *Compagnie Durand* in the Belgian *département* of Jemmapes and in the Seine-Maritime (value uncertain);⁴⁹
- Two grazing fields (*herbages*) at Chauffour and La Cocherre, in the Orne, purchased as *biens nationaux* for 16,000 francs on 29 vendémiaire V/20 Oct. 1796;
- His stake in the Basterrèche bank, worth 600,000 francs.⁵⁰

This tally does not include the assets of the Basterrèche family at Bayonne, nor Pierre-Léon's participation in the affairs of his brother Pierre (*Basterrèche frères et Cie.*).

Bastide, Louis-Barthélémy (2 Aug. 1768 – 6 Feb. 1821) ● ●

Born in Montpellier. Died in Paris. Son of Claude, a merchant trader from Montpellier who ran the *Bastide père* trading house, and of his wife Rose Fargeon. On 1 Jan. 1793 he married Jeanne-Françoise Moyse, the daughter of a modest marble trader from Toulouse of Italian extraction. The marriage had no contract (*coutume de Droit écrit*). No children.

The son of a middling merchant family which had been established at Montpellier for several generations, Bastide settled as a trader in Narbonne, perhaps for personal reasons. Aside from his banking activities, he was involved in arming, equipping and insuring merchant marine vessels. He was also highly active in the colonial trade between Le Havre, Senegal and Martinique.⁵¹

Career

- Merchant trader in Narbonne (1793);
- Deputy-chief for northern France at the *Direction générale de Liquidation* (1794-1795);
- His trading house, *Bastide fils*, appears for the first time in the republican almanac (1800). It was first headquartered in the Rue Caumartin before moving to the Rue Cerutti in 1803;
- Joins the *Dix Négociants Réunis* (1800);
- In 1801, he was in business with the banker Hainguerlot and administered *biens nationaux* purchased by him in the Belgian departments of the Ourthe, Sambre-et-Meuse, Meuse-inférieure, Lys, Jemmapes, and the Dyle;⁵²
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (1800-1806);
- Went bankrupt after joining Médard Desprez in speculations on bill discounting at the *Banque de France* (21 Jan. 1806).

⁴⁹ The lands in Seine-Maritime were worth at least 160,000 francs. Those in Jemmapes were not appraised.

⁵⁰ MC/ET/XXXV/998, 25 nivôse X/15 Jan. 1802 – *Inventory after decease of Pierre-Léon Basterrèche*.

⁵¹ For more on Bastide see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.29-36; Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.48 &164 and Bruguière, *GPR*, p.230-231.

⁵² See Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.164 & Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.33. Bergeron says they were in business in 1801, Szramkiewicz gives the date as 1803 (Year XI).

Assets:

The inventory of Bastide's assets drawn up pursuant to his bankruptcy reveals the following:

- 1,299,865 francs invested in maritime trade and insurance;
- 373,741 francs invested in corsairs (privateering);
- 200,000 francs prize money from the corsair ship "*le Général Pérignon*";
- 1,047,044 francs invested in the grain trade with Spain in partnership with Vanlerberghe;
- 1,282,708 francs invested with Hainguerlot in *biens nationaux* in Belgium;
- 126 shares of the *Canal d'Aigues-Mortes*, worth 5,000 francs each, for a total of 630,000 francs;
- 300,000 francs invested in his brother's trading house (*D. Bastide et Cie.*) at Marseille;
- 950,000 francs – estimated worth of his two châteaux in Seine-et-Oise and the Hérault and their furniture (see below);

Bastide also owed creditors the following sums:

- 1,488,356 francs to Médard Desprez, plus 5,205,869 francs as security on the bills of exchange they had contracted;
- 1,669,111 francs to *Gramont-Chegaray et Cie.* at Bordeaux (a company of the Barrillon group);
- 1,060,420 francs to Alexandre Barrillon;
- 255,000 francs to Auguste Sévène;
- 109,000 francs to Pierlot;
- 60,850 francs to Hottinguer;
- 31,800 francs to Flory;
- 19,800 francs to L.F. Cordier.

In summary, Bastide's passive assets can be broken down as follows:

- Bills of exchange requiring payment – 3,752,064 francs;
- Debts owed to creditors on current accounts – 1,679,234 francs
- Interest and handling costs – 165,175 francs;

Bastide's creditors, through an act of the *Tribunal de Commerce de Paris* dated 9 Jan. 1808, waved 73% of his debt.

He also owned a number of buildings:

- His *hôtel particulier* in the Rue Cerutti with all its furniture, valued at 400,000 francs;
- The Château de Montferrier, near Montpellier (which had belonged to the father-in-law of Basterrèche), estimated at 350,000 francs with its furniture;
- The Château d'Ollainville, near Arpajon (Seine-et-Oise), which he had purchased for 121,000 francs in Year IX and considerably embellished, worth an estimated 200,000 francs in 1805;
- The *terre des Chapelles* in the cantons of Rossoy and Tournon (Seine-et-Marne), with 322 hectares of land and 22 hectares of forest, estimated at 200,000 francs, later sold in 1808.

Batz, Jean Pierre (Baron) de (26 Jan. 1754 – 10 Jan. 1822)

Born at Tartas (Landes). Son of Bertrand de Batz, Lord of Armanthieu and Dême (Landes), *conseiller du roi*, and of his wife Jeanne-Marie-Catherine de Laboge. Jean-Pierre de Batz was awarded the title of *baron de Sainte-Croix* by Louis XVI on 29 Dec. 1776. He was a disciple of Calonne and became the financial intendant of the Baron de Breteuil. Thanks to astute speculations on the Parisian bond market he purchased several buildings around the *Comédie Italienne*. He was an intermediary of the *Compagnie d'Assurance contre les Incendies*.⁵³ On 10 June 1788, he founded the *Compagnie royale d'assurances sur la vie* with Étienne Clavière. Following the Revolution's outbreak he was elected the National Assembly's deputy for Nérac (Lot-et-Garonne). He became the *Comité de liquidation*'s director following its creation on 22 Jan. 1790. Arnaud de Lestapis has shown how Batz used his former secretary, Devaux, to extort vast sums from the state by purchasing old public debts which he cashed in with interest at the *Caisse de l'Extraordinaire*. These funds were used to finance a plot to free Louis XVI.⁵⁴

Bayard, Antoine (Bayard & Cie.) CCC

Antoine Bayard was a veteran contractor of *vivres-viandes*. In Year VI, his company – *Bayard & Cie.* – was awarded a contract “to supply stageposts and military convoys throughout the whole extent of French territory and of the *départements réunis*.”⁵⁵ The contract was awarded by war minister Schérer on 28 Oct. 1797. The prices agreed were 4 francs per saddle horse, 4 francs per draft animal, 4 francs per pack horse, 5 francs per coach with one horse harness, 10 francs per coach with two harnesses, 14 francs per coach with three harnesses, 18 francs per coach with four harnesses. Schérer claimed these prices saved the government 2 *deniers* per food ration, 10 *deniers* per forage ration and 13 *sous* 11 *deniers* per horse collar. Bayard's partners included Louis Frainnau (see Sévène's entry), Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy, the Hausmanns of Colmar and the *juge de paix* Valentin Buob.⁵⁶

In 1806, *Bayard & Cie.* partnered with Auguste Monttessuy, a trader from Lyon, to supply meat to all French imperial troops for six years.⁵⁷ Auguste's relative – Nicolas Marie Monttessuy – was *munitonnaire général des Invalides*.⁵⁸

Bellamy, Pierre (1757 – 1832)

Bellamy began life as a humble protestant minister from Geneva. He was forced to flee his native city – possibly due to his implication in the events of the 1782 Genevan Revolution – and travelled to Turin in 1790 where the British ambassador, Mr. Trevor, employed him as a secret agent. It was probably in Turin that Bellamy learnt the banking trade. During the early Revolution, he corresponded frequently with Mallet du Pan, Francis d'Ivernois,

⁵³ See Jean Bouchary, *Les Compagnies financières à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle*, Tome III, Paris: Marcel Rivière & Cie., 1942, p.15 & 24.

⁵⁴ See ‘Batz et la liquidation de la créance Guichon’, *AHRF*, 128, 1952: 377-392; ‘Autour de l’attentat d’Admiral’ (Part I), *AHRF*, 146, 1957: 6-18 & (Part II) *AHRF*, 147, 1957: 106-120. See also René Batz, *Étude sur la contre-révolution : la vie et les conspirations de Jean, Baron de Batz*, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1808 & Arnaud de Lestapis, *La conspiration de Batz*, Paris: Société des études robespierristes, 1969.

⁵⁵ MCN/ET/XLV/661, 1 frimaire VI/21 Nov. 1797 & CRDECS, p.36-37.

⁵⁶ Buob started a ‘*club national*’ in Claude Périer's manufactures at Voiron in 1790 which was in fact a cover to spread pro-royalist propaganda (see Blanc, *LCST*, p.19-20).

⁵⁷ AP, D31 U3, 3/37.

⁵⁸ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.159.

and several other of his Genevan compatriots. He also befriended Beaumarchais and worked as a collaborator of Étienne Clavière, often travelling to Paris to export French grain with Bourdois and Omer Talon.

In 1794, Bellamy left Paris for Geneva to escape the guillotine and relocated to Hamburg. His friend, Madame de Staël recommended him to Gabriel-Marie, comte de Ricé, a prominent Hamburg trader, and Bellamy became his associate. Through Ricé, he developed close ties to Jacques Chapeaurouge's trading house which employed him as its representative in Paris. Bellamy often travelled between Hamburg and Paris to conduct business for Chapeaurouge during the directorial era. In 1796, he was appointed Jean-Conrad Hottinguer's secretary at Hamburg for the *Compagnie Cérès*, a real estate venture established to sell American lands to émigrés. Following Talleyrand's appointment as foreign minister, Bellamy became one of his unofficial financial agents. He played an important part in the XYZ affair, attempting to extract a bribe of £100,000 from the American envoys Pinckney, Marshall and Gerry (Bellamy was referred to as 'Y' in the affair's correspondence).⁵⁹

Bérard, Jean-Jacques (1753 – 1836) CCC

Jean-Jacques Bérard & Cie., the firm of the Bérard brothers (Thomas-Simon, Pierre and Jean-Jacques) was based in Lorient and given an exclusive five-year monopoly (1785-1790) by Louis XVI for equipping and arming the *Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes Orientales et de la Chine*'s India-bound trading vessels. Thomas-Simon was appointed president of the company's Parisian board, while Pierre operated as a trader at Pondicherry and Jean-Jacques headed the company's counter at Lorient. The Bérards, once based at Lyon and linked to Genevan financial circles, had forged a new alliance with *Pourtalès & Cie.* of Neuchâtel and relocated to Lorient in 1775, slipping away from Neckerian influence.⁶⁰ Their monopoly was contested by the traders of Marseille who enlisted the duc de Castries to lobby for their alternative model of trading with India via the Red Sea.⁶¹ The financial speculators and opportunists of the Orléans faction – led by Belgian financier Berthold Proly – also attempted to control the new company by offering to finance it through a loan to be floated on European markets in 1786. Reacting to these proposals, *Pourtalès & Cie.* proposed a loan in exchange for control of the company.⁶² Towards the end of the Revolution, Jean-Jacques Bérard moved to Paris and went into business with Louis-François Cordier, future *Banque de France* Regent. His daughter married the youngest son of Charles-François Lebrun, Bonaparte's Third Consul.⁶³

Bidermann, Jacques (30 Nov. 1751 – 16 July 1817) CCC

Bidermann was a relative of the Bidermann family of Hamburg who owned the second oldest bank in Europe. Based at Wintherthur in the canton of Zürich, his business

⁵⁹ See William Stinchcombe, 'The Diplomacy of the XYZ Affair', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 34 (4), Oct. 1977: 590-617. For more on Bellamy see also AN, F/7/642 (9 ventôse VI/27 Feb. 1798); Staël, *Correspondance générale*, Tome III, Geneva: Slatkine, 2009, p.127; Blanc, *LERE*, p.169-171; Capefigue, *Histoire des grandes opérations financières, op. cit.*, Tome II, p.165 & 248.

⁶⁰ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.439-441.

⁶¹ See François-Charles Roux, *Le Projet français de commerce avec l'Inde par Suez sous le règne de Louis XV*, Paris: Société de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, 1926.

⁶² See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.674-681.

⁶³ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.56, footnote 11.

integrated the trade of cotton cloths manufactured in Europe and *indiennes* imported from India which were refined in the workshops of Geneva and Alsace. These upgraded luxury products were then sold throughout Europe or exported overseas. During the last decades of the *Ancien Régime*, Bidermann's company attracted capital from all over Switzerland and maintained strong links with *armateurs* from Marseille. He was a friend of Mirabeau and Dupont de Nemours. After the Revolution's outbreak, he increasingly began to reconvert into military contracting while endeavouring to shield his personal assets (but not those of his companies) from the *assignat's* depreciation. We find him, for example, negotiating with the National Convention's *Comité de la Guerre* in Jan. 1793.⁶⁴ He was also the leading director of the Convention's *Directoire des achats* (set up on 4 Nov. 1792) which oversaw the awarding of military contracts and regulated foreign trade until the advent of the Directory.⁶⁵ In 1794, he was imprisoned for several months, but released after 9 Thermidor. He continued to do business with the Thermidorian Convention, notably acting as an intermediary to sell wine confiscated by the government.⁶⁶ The company at Wintherthur gradually lost assets and value until it was eventually liquidated in 1806 with a loss of 78% of its capital.⁶⁷

In 1781, Bidermann married Gabrielle Aimée Odier, the daughter of Jacques Antoine Odier of Geneva.⁶⁸ Bidermann, Odier, *Gros, Davillier, Roman et Cie.* (see Davillier's entry) and Jean-Joseph Johannot (deputy of the Haut-Rhin and successor of Cambon at the head of the Convention's *comité des finances* in 1795) were all investors in the textile manufacture of Wesserling (Alsace).⁶⁹ In 1805, Bidermann sold his share in the manufacture to his partners for 3 million francs while still guaranteeing the business for 400,000 francs.⁷⁰ With the assets he was able to salvage, Bidermann threw himself into extremely hazardous speculations on *eaux-de-vie* and varnished wood (*bois de teinture*) which led him to file a first time for bankruptcy in January 1811. Although rescued by a group of investors, he went bankrupt a second time in 1814.⁷¹ Bidermann resided at 18 Rue de Paradis (section Faubourg Poissonnière).

Bodin, Charles (Bodin frères) CCC

Charles was the son of a trader from Romans-sur-Isère. His brothers Victor and Louis were traders based in Lyon who acted as his financial guarantors. Their military supplying company – *Bodin frères* – was awarded the contract for the general supply of the *Armée d'Italie* in 1798, allegedly thanks to the help of Hippolyte Charles who was paid two million francs for his services. The Bodin brothers were involved in a dispute with the Directory's commission sent to administer the Roman Republic when it ruled the supply of

⁶⁴ AN, AF/II/14, dossier 93:26 & 48 (janvier 1793) & dossier 112:22.

⁶⁵ See Charles Poisson, *Les Fournisseurs aux armées sous la Révolution française. Le Directoire des achats 1792-1793, J. Bidermann, Cousin, Marx-Berr.* Paris: A. Margraff, 1932.

⁶⁶ AF/II/77, *Arrêté faisant payer à Jacques et André Bidermann de Winterthur pour les vins saisis par la Commission du Commerce*, 17 ventôse III/7 March 1795.

⁶⁷ See Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.78-79.

⁶⁸ Bidermann and the Odiers of Geneva had longstanding links. See for example Bidermann's procuration to James Odier (MC/ET/LXII/734, 5 germinal V/25 March 1797).

⁶⁹ MC/ET/XIX/922, 2 frimaire XI/23 Nov. 1802 & MC/ET/XIX/942, 2 Jan. 1813. See also Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.66-67 & 332, note 6.

⁷⁰ See Bidermann's second bankruptcy file (AP, D11U3 47, dossier 1030, 18 Jan. 1814).

⁷¹ *Ibid.* See also Bidermann's inventory after decease (MC/ET/IX/1022, 24 July 1817).

French troops in Rome should be awarded to a consortium of bankers from Rome. *Bodin frères* enlisted the help of General Brune and the case was ruled in their favour.⁷²

In Year IX, the Bodin Company transferred most of its business from military contracting in Italy to large-scale speculations on French and Belgian *biens nationaux*. On 28 brumaire VIII/19 Nov. 1799, for instance, *Bodin frères* purchased 1,779,709 francs worth of *biens nationaux* in 374 lots in the *département* of the Dyle. Most of these properties were ecclesiastical lands not worth more than 10,000 francs per lot. From Frimaire to Prairial Year VIII, Bodin made more acquisitions in the Dyle raising the total amount of its purchases in that *département* to 1,978,817 francs in 475 lots.⁷³ Most of these purchases were made in severely devalued government bonds.⁷⁴ *Bodins frères* sold a considerable amount of the *biens nationaux* it acquired. The following chart presents a geographical distribution of the company's real-estate sales:

Geographical Distribution of <i>Bodin frères</i>'s Sales of <i>Biens Nationaux</i>			
Département	Sales (francs)	Département	Sales (francs)
Dyle	372,770	Haute-Vienne	25,000
Jemmapes	351,367	Seine-et-Marne	25,000
Ourthe	272,400	Nord	13,900
Meuse-inférieure	128,600	Indre-et-Loire	13,500
Côtes-du-Nord	67,311	Ain	12,500
Saône-et-Loire	56,200	Allier	10,050
Lys	55,000	Loire-inférieure	8,500
Escaut	27,400	Meuse	5,000
Total for Belgian départements	1,331,048	Dordogne	3,400
		Eure	1,200

Source: Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.165.

Bodin sold nearly 400,000 francs worth of these lands to the banker Pierre Joseph Fleury Jubié, and another 350,000 francs to Hippolyte Charles – Joséphine's former lover. Charles Bodin was also the financial guarantor of Jean Ulrich Schlumberger, whose brothers were investors in *Dollfus, Mieg et Cie.*'s *indiennes* manufacture at Mulhouse.⁷⁵

Boscary, Jean-Marie (1 July 1746 – 1797) ●

Boscary was a Parisian merchant banker who established the *Chol Boscary & Cie.* bank with his partner Jean Chol. In January 1791, this bank was involved in a large-scale speculation on life annuities drawn on the French Treasury which formed part of the French national debt. The National Assembly had agreed to lift the hold on capital assets invested in public markets in order to begin repaying the country's national debt. The printing of *assignat* and the repatriation of French assets in foreign markets bolstered the

⁷² See Chapter 5.

⁷³ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.350, footnote 123.

⁷⁴ For records of these sales, see MC/ET/XVIII/975-979 & 984-986. Drawing a complete summary of these purchases presents a near-impossible task.

⁷⁵ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.52 & 193.

Parisian stock exchange as this raised the perspective of an influx of capital which could be used to reimburse these assets. On 15 Jan. 1791, Boscary submitted a proposal to the *Caisse d'Escompte* that it advance public funds to private bankers who held such life annuity contracts. One of his associates – Paul-Henri Mallet of the *Bontemps, Mallet frères & Cie.* bank – even succeeded in convincing the *Caisse d'Escompte* to spend 10 million *livres* to buy back these contracts and forward him 1,776,285 *livres* to refund two-thirds of all life annuity agreements held by his bank. Mallet also encouraged his creditors in Geneva to forward as much cash as possible to Paris. But when it transpired in November 1791 that those buying all these life annuities were in fact speculators backed by no tangible assets, the bubble burst and the market crashed.⁷⁶

Boscary was elected a deputy of Paris to the Legislative Assembly on 21 Sep. 1791. During the harsh winter of 1791-1792, rising prices – particularly for soap and sugar following the revolts in Saint Domingue – sparked a wave of demonstrations and social unrest across France. In January 1792, a riot broke out in Paris over the price of soap. Women seized boats carrying soap shipments and sold them to the public at deflated rates. Boscary, whom the rioters suspected of intentionally hoarding soap to raise prices, saw his Parisian trading depot ransacked. On 24 Jan., he addressed the following letter of recriminations to his peers in the Legislative Assembly:

“The people, misled by malevolent agitators, crowded before my house yesterday and prevented me from coming to the Assembly. Rumours have spread that my trading house, Chels-Boscary & Cie., has hoarded sugar. This is a slanderous assertion. They tried to forcibly break into my house. All the windows on the first floor were broken before the public authorities arrived to protect me. I am still being threatened. Stones are thrown at my windows. I had not expected to be the object of the people’s fury. I have never harmed anyone. I have done good things whenever I could. I have consistently been attached to the Revolution in both civilian and military capacities.”⁷⁷

But his demands received lukewarm support and he was eventually forced to resign his seat on 5 June when *Chol, Boscary & Cie.* went bankrupt.

Bouillierie, François-Marie-Pierre Roulet de la AI   
(27 April 1764 – 6 April 1833)

Born at La Flèche (Sarthe), the son of Gabriel-Joseph Roulet de la Grange, Lord of La Bouillierie (Basse Normandie) and *trésorier-général des finances* at Tours, and of his wife Louise-Françoise-Joseph-Charlotte Bélin de Langotière.

Trained by the *Ancien Régime* administration, De la Bouillierie was a paymaster at the *Armée d’Italie* in 1798 and became one of Napoleon’s key financial officials in charge of raising extraordinary contributions in occupied lands, working under Defermon as Treasurer of the *Domaine Extraordinaire*. He rallied the Bourbon Restoration in 1814 and was Louis-Emmanuel Corvetto’s right-hand man at the finance ministry in the duc de Richelieu’s government. His first marriage was to the daughter of Charles-Gilbert Lachapelle (1755-1794), *premier commis de la maison du roi*, who was guillotined in 1794. On 18 Oct. 1807, he was remarried to Anne-Mélie de Foucault (died 1859), sister of

⁷⁶ See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.582-583.

⁷⁷ Adolphe Robert & Gaston Cougny (eds.), *Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français*, Tome I, Paris: Bourloton, 1889, p.404.

François-Louis-Charles de Foucault, an army paymaster who was his protégé in the financial administration. De la Bouillierie's career ended following the July Revolution when he refused to swear allegiance to King Louis-Philippe. He owned the Château de la Barbée at Bazouges-sur-le-Loir (Sarthe).⁷⁸

Career:

- *Trésorier des dépenses de la guerre* (1785);
- Paymaster (*receveur*) at the *Armées d'Italie* (1798), *du Rhin et d'Angleterre*;
- *Receveur général pour la levée de contributions dans les pays conquis* (6 brumaire XIV/28 Oct. 1805);
- *Receveur général de la Prusse* (30 Oct. 1806) serving under General Clarke, the governor-general of Prussia;
- *Membre* (March 1807) and *Grand officier de la Légion d'honneur*;
- *Payeur général de la Marine* (March 1807);
- *Administrateur des fonds extraordinaires de la Caisse d'amortissement* (31 March 1809);
- *Administrateur des fonds extraordinaires provenant des pays conquis* (14 June 1809);
- *Maître des requêtes au Conseil d'État (section finances)* (22 Dec. 1809);
- *Trésorier général du Domaine Extraordinaire* (30 Jan. 1810);⁷⁹
- *Baron de l'Empire* (11 July 1810);
- *Trésorier général de la Couronne* (Dec. 1811);
- *Intendant de la liste civile du roi* (1814);
- *Député de la Sarthe* (22 Aug. 1815);
- *Président du comité des finances* (October 1815);
- *Sous-secrétaire d'État au département des Finances* (9 May 1816 – 29 Dec. 1818);
- *Président de la section des finances au Conseil d'État* (1824);
- *Ministre d'État, Membre du Conseil privé* and *Intendant général de la Maison du roi* (23 May 1827);
- *Pair de France* (5 Nov. 1827);
- *Comte* (15 April 1829).

Bourdieu, James (1714 – 1804)

James Bourdieu, who founded the trading house *Bourdieu, Chollet et Bourdieu* with his partner Samuel Chollet (later *James Bourdieu & Sons*), was descended from a Huguenot family. He was a business associate of Jacques Necker and *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* and had been the London representative of the second *Compagnie des Indes* (the *Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes* created by John Law) in the late 1760s, having been awarded exclusive rights to negotiate agreements on its behalf with the British government and East India Company to trade in Bengal. Necker owed a part of his success to his connection with *Bourdieu, Chollet et Bourdieu* which granted him access to Indian trade.

During negotiations to establish the third *Compagnie des Indes* (the *Compagnie des Indes orientales et de la Chine*) in 1784-1785, Bourdieu vied with his commercial rival Robert Herries to become its exclusive London representative, and he was ultimately chosen thanks to his influence with Calonne and the Maréchal de Castries – although this was

⁷⁸ See Révérend, *APE*, Tome IV, p.179-181.

⁷⁹ For more on de la Bouillierie's rôle in administering the Domaine Extraordinaire see Henri de Grimouard, 'Les origines du Domaine Extraordinaire', *Revue des questions historiques*, Tome XXXIX, 1908: 160-192.

largely a symbolic victory.⁸⁰ Bourdieu negotiated agreements directly with the East India Company's chairman, William Devaynes. In a memoir recapitulating the services his firm had rendered the second *Compagnie des Indes*, Bourdieu justified his demands for a commission of 1.5% on bills of exchange drawn on *Bourdieu, Chollet et Bourdieu* which would be provided to the new company to trade in Bengal, plus another 1% commission to cover rates of exchange and insurance costs:

“[Mssrs. de Gourelade, Bernier and Périer – his supporters on the new company's board] know that Mr. Bourdieu is not breaking with customary procedure in asking for his commission, since these gentleman have already paid him such a commission previously [during business conducted for the second company]. Moreover, the trading house of Mr. Bourdieu was the first to establish such a precedent in these types of negotiations which it spearheaded. It was the official agent of the former French East India Company. It procured it bills of exchange for India worth fourteen million...without there ever being question of the slightest reduction in commission.”⁸¹

Along with its business for the *Compagnie des Indes*, *Bourdieu, Chollet et Bourdieu* was a major player in the grain trade, importing large quantities of Baltic wheat. It participated in the West Indian slave trade, advancing bills of exchange for the purchase in 1788 by *Samuel Chollet & Co.* of 290 enslaved people on Dominica from the ship *Pearl* owned by *James Rogers & Co.* of Bristol.⁸² Bourdieu is known to have owned property in the West Indies (possibly the Kendal estate in Tobago). His firm was also involved in speculations surrounding the medals minted by the Monneron brothers in England in late 1791.⁸³

Boyd, Walter (18 Nov. 1753 – 16 Sep. 1837)

Practically nothing is known of Walter Boyd's family and early life. He was born on 18 November 1753, possibly in the north of Scotland, but the names of his parents are unknown. He had a brother – Archibald – and there may have been other siblings. He is said to have been educated in Amsterdam and Switzerland and to have served an apprenticeship with a mercantile house in France, but reliable information about his career dates only from 1774, when, at twenty years of age, he became an agent to manage farm properties at Cressy and Heckington (Lincolnshire) owned by Patrick Heron of Heron in Kirkcudbright. In the late 1770s, these properties fell on bad times and Boyd left to seek better prospects elsewhere, aged 28.⁸⁴

Boyd succeeded in gaining an introduction to Sir Robert Herries whom he had never met before, and within the space of a year he was in the Austrian Netherlands working with Sir Robert's youngest brother – William Herries – at *Herries, Keith & Co.* in Ostend (see Robert Herries's entry). Through William, Boyd became associated with the great Brussels trading house *Veuve Nettine et fils*, headed by Édouard Sébastien de Walckiers, which was

⁸⁰ For more details see Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.382, 661 & 674-682.

⁸¹ AN, T/38: 1-2, Papers of Barthélémy Huber, *liasse 54 – Memoir of James Bourdieu to the administrators of the new French East India Company to recommend his house and solicit its appointment as the company's exclusive agent*, undated (circa January 1786). Reproduced in Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.382.

⁸² See <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/person/view/2146636379> (UCL's Legacy of British slave-ownership database).

⁸³ See Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.206.

⁸⁴ S.R. Cope, *Walter Boyd: A Merchant Banker in the Age of Napoleon*. See *Boyd, Ker & Cie*. London: Alan Sutton Publishing/LSE, 1983, p.5.

the bank of the Austrian administration in the Netherlands. In February 1782, Walckiers and William Herries founded the Private Bank in the Austrian Netherlands (*Banque particulière dans les Pays-Bas Autrichiens*) with a capital of 500,000 florins (roughly £36,000). To help them run this bank, they turned to Walter Boyd and a certain John William Ker from Edinburgh, both of whom were made assistant-managers (*secrétaires de direction*).⁸⁵ The bank was so successful that by 1783 its capital had doubled to a million florins, and the following year it doubled again to two million, prompting it to open offices in Brussels, Ostend, Ghent and Bruges. It provided banking services for individuals and businesses, accepted current and deposit accounts, made payments for customers, discounted bills of exchange, held securities and managed client portfolios. Thanks to this experience, Boyd and Ker gained valuable knowledge and numerous business contacts which were to prove important in their subsequent careers.

Boyd and Ker – both of whom spoke fluent French – arrived in Paris and founded *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* in mid-1785 for a duration of six years which rapidly became one of the most prominent banks in all of Europe. The French capital had an active stock market but no banks with British partners, which gave Boyd and Ker an advantage in competing for the custom of well-to-do British clients in Paris. *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*'s principal activities were banking and dealing in foreign exchange and securities. By 1787, it had gained a leading position in Parisian banking. The bank was first located at 4 Rue d'Amboise before Boyd purchased an *hôtel particulier* at 9 Rue de Grammont next to the headquarters of the *Compagnie des Indes* for 200,000 *livres*.

Boyd, Ker et Cie. did business with merchants in Lyon, Nantes, Honfleur, Calais and Dunkerque, as well as with foreign correspondents such as *J. Vercour et Cie.* and *L'Arbalète et Eicke* (both from Liège), *Veuve Nettine et fils* (Brussels), *Parish & Co.* and *Martin Dorner* (both from Hamburg), and the London firms *John & George Ward, Smith & Atkinson* and *Richard Buller & Co.*⁸⁶ It also had an active relation with *Robert Herries & Co.* – one of the two firms owned by Robert Herries located in Jeffrey's Square, London – which supplied the *Régie des fermes générales* with American tobacco. Boyd, Ker & Cie. may have acted as *Robert Herries & Co.*'s Parisian agent to help it bid for tobacco contracts.⁸⁷ Walter Boyd also became Robert Herries's son-in-law.⁸⁸ In 1787, Herries considered business in Paris was good enough to open an office at the *Girardot, Haller et Cie.* bank under the name *John Forbes & Co.*

Another important correspondent was *Hope & Co.* of Amsterdam which *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* viewed as a kind of financial mentor. In August 1787, both houses, along with *John & Francis Baring & Co.* of London, took part in a disastrous venture to take control of the cochineal market by buying stocks in Cadiz, Amsterdam and London. Thankfully for Boyd, his firm was not a syndicated partner in this venture, and he escaped relatively unscathed.⁸⁹

Among *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*'s individual clients were Thomas Jefferson, the high-flying Belgian aristocrat and financier Joseph François Xavier de Pestre, Comte de Senefe et de

⁸⁵ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.657 & 660.

⁸⁶ Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.6-7 & 11-13.

⁸⁷ Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.12-13 – *Robert Herries & Co.* was taken over by Charles Herries (*Charles Herries & Cie.*) in 1784.

⁸⁸ Blanc, *LERE*, p.156-157.

⁸⁹ See Marten G. Buist, *At spes non fracta: Hope & Co. 1770-1815, op. cit.*, p.431-451 & 677.

Tournout, who was heavily involved in speculating on the *Compagnie des Indes*,⁹⁰ and the Count of Mercy-Argentaup, Austrian ambassador in Paris. Mercy-Argentaup owned extensive domains in France and the Austrian Netherlands and a plantation in Saint Domingue, plus 475,000 *livres* of annual income on his portfolio of annuities (*rentes*), most of which were managed by *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. He left Paris in October 1790 and became minister-plenipotentiary in Brussels in December, leaving Bumendorf as Austrian *chargé d'affaires* in Paris. Mercy-d'Argentaup's mail was sent on via *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. He suspected Boyd of intentionally making him lose money and had withdrawn most of his investments in *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. by November 1791.⁹¹

But the bank's biggest client was probably Louis-Philippe ('Philippe Égalité'), the Duke of Orléans. In March 1789, the duke created an obligation of two million florins at 4.5% interest secured on his hereditary estates at Avesnes (which was later purchased by Ouvrard), in favour of Christian van Osy en Zoon, merchant bankers at Rotterdam, with a view to their placing them with investors. When these remained unsold a year later, *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. decided to purchase all the annuities outright. In February 1791, Boyd purchased – in the name of Édouard Walckiers – 700,000 florins of these annuities from Le Couteulx and *Tourton & Ravel* and 500,000 florins already held as collateral by *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. Four months later in June 1791, *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. purchased the annuities from Walckiers at a rate of 2⅔ *livres* to a florin, crediting him with 3,200,000 *livres*. On the surface, this appeared as a bad deal for Boyd, but in reality he was protecting himself against the depreciation of the *livre* and *assignat* by converting his money into Dutch florins – one of the most stable currencies on the market. In October 1790, *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. also purchased half a stake in the dowry received by the Duke of Orléans upon his marriage to Louise Élisabeth d'Orléans (which the duke had inherited), worth 2,079,425 *livres*.⁹² This money was credited to the duke's accounts at *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. and used to pay his previous debts. Finally, *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. also purchased for one million *livres* an annuity of 200,000 *livres* paid by the French Treasury on the duke's life which had cost 2,500,000 *livres* in 1783.⁹³

When the *Caisse d'Escompte* experienced a run on its shares in August 1788, most of its directors solicited a decree suspending its cash payments and giving its notes legal tender. Only Walter Boyd and Jean-Frédéric Perregaux objected to this measure. Boyd wrote: "*On no occasion did I ever take so warm a part against any measure...I did so from the most intimate conviction that ruin must inevitably be the consequence.*"⁹⁴ *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. renewed its foundational agreement for six years on 30 June 1791. Walckiers, Walter Boyd Jr. (Boyd's nephew) and Laborde de Méréville became partners in the firm.⁹⁵

Early in 1791, *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. embarked upon a large scale 'bear' operation on the value of the *assignat* with Hope & Co., Parish & Co. and Harman Hoare & Co. These firms bought *assignats* with bills drawn on *Boyd, Ker et Cie*. and sold them in their respective markets abroad. They then used the money to buy bills in guilders, marks or sterling which

⁹⁰ For more on the comte de Seneffe, see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.9-68 & 'Un manieur d'argent à Paris à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, Joseph-François-Xavier de Pestre, Comte de Seneffe et de Turnhout', 25 (3/4), *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, 1939: 261-292.

⁹¹ See H.E.B. 'The Flight of Capital from Revolutionary France.' *The American Historical Review*, 41 (4), July 1936: 710-727.

⁹² Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.632.

⁹³ S.R. Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.15.

⁹⁴ Quoted in *Ibid*, p.13.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.17-18.

expired immediately before the bills in assignat drawn on *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* did. In this way, they made enough money to pay *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*'s expenses and to make a profit of 30% on the entire operation. These bear operations are confirmed by a letter of June 1791 from James Bourdieu – of Bourdieu, Chollet & Bourdieu – to Barthélémy Huber:

“...*The house of B[oyd], K[er] et Cie. is always working for a fall [of the French exchange], we understand that they have invited everybody to draw on them so as to profit by remittances at a higher rate (for sterling) of the large amounts falling due, and it is these goings-on which are so bad for your exchange.*”⁹⁶

James Bourdieu's letter also revealed that Boyd was selling gold and silver coins of foreign currencies on the French market (which was not illegal) at inflated prices:

“*We understand that H[erries] have recently bought here considerable quantities of [silver] dollars which they have shipped to France, they did not buy Louis d'ors, which convinces us that they have not bought for the government, as we do, for in that case they would not have refused your specie. What then is the purpose? Is it for some expedition to China or is it to exchange them at a high price for assignats, which perhaps could not be done with écus or Louis d'ors without exposing them to danger?...P.S. We know that H[erries] dollars were sent to Boyd by diligence, some by night.*”⁹⁷

Boyd, Ker et Cie. and Walckiers also speculated on sugar and coffee, knowing that the price of these commodities would rise following reports of slave unrest in Saint Domingue. They purchased these goods in French ports and sent them to *Parish & Co.* in Hamburg to sell for profit.⁹⁸ In a letter dated 6 August 1791, Jean-Joseph de Laborde wrote to Lacaze, former governor of Saint Domingue, describing the involvement of his son, Laborde de Méréville, with *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*:

“*My son has taken an interest as a financial guarantor in this trading house. Mr. Boyd is English. He has a great talent for business and what is more a great probity! When I have personal funds, or money belonging to my parents or friends, I place it with him at 4% interest because he finds money at that rate in Paris and in foreign markets...I think, Monsieur, that you could not find a more reliable placement for your money than the trading house of Mssrs. Boyd, Ker et Cie.*”⁹⁹

In 1792, *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* also embarked on more bear speculations with *Jean Louis Grenus et Cie.* Grenus drew 300,000 *livres* worth of bills of exchange on *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* and discounted them with the *Caisse d'Escompte*, using the money gained to purchase bills in foreign currency which came due shortly before the bills drawn on *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* matured.¹⁰⁰ Grenus could then convert the bills in foreign currency into *livres* and benefit from an advantageous exchange rate, thereby generating enough money to both cover *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*'s payments and make a substantial profit. Grenus repeated the operation in August 1792, drawing another 310,000 *livres* worth of bills on *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*, but the September Massacres interrupted this venture.¹⁰¹ Walter Boyd obtained a passport through Bérard, former administrator of the *Compagnie des Indes*, and left Paris for London on 30

⁹⁶ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.661.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ S.R. Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.20-21.

⁹⁹ AN, T//1087 – quoted in Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.141.

¹⁰⁰ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.166.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Tome II, p.172.

September 1792. John William Ker followed him a few months later on 24 March 1793.¹⁰² Walter Boyd Jr. was arrested towards the end of June 1793 and *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*'s headquarters at 9 Rue de Grammont were searched. Boyd Jr. bribed the investigating officials to confirm his republican credentials and was released. The *Moniteur* reported that “*the wildest rumours are circulating about this arrest.*”¹⁰³

Remarkably, between 1 July to 14 August 1793 – just a few weeks before the decree arresting all British citizens and confiscating all their assets was voted on 9 October 1793 by the National Convention – the Treasury purchased 503,591 *livres* (8,036£) worth of bills of exchange on the London market via *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*¹⁰⁴ On 24 August, a decree was issued ordering the suppression of all companies with a share capital, including the *Caisse d'Escompte*. Seeing the writing on the wall, Walter Boyd Jr. and Walckiers signed an agreement on 3 October with one of their clerks – the 27-year-old Antoine Grégoire Geneste – leaving him in charge of the bank's affairs in Paris on the following conditions:

- 1) As of 10 October 1793, Geneste would conduct all the bank's affairs in his name and under his responsibility;
- 2) All annuity contracts (*contrats de rente*) in *Boyd, Ker & Cie.*'s name or in Boyd's personal name would be put in Geneste's name so that he could receive payments in arrears and keep *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* and other beneficiaries informed of their status;
- 3) The commercial overheads, clerk salaries and rent for the bank's offices would be included in the its balance of payments (*profits et pertes*);
- 4) Geneste would furnish 100,000 *livres* and *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* 200,000;
- 5) *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* would henceforth only act as financial guarantors while Geneste would have sole legal responsibility. *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* would not accept losses totalling more than 200,000 *livres*;
- 6) The drafting of correspondence, accounting and bookkeeping, etc. would be carried out with the Consent of Boyd and Walckiers who would still have the right, along with all other partners, to audit and verify Geneste's books and accounts;
- 7) Boyd and Walckiers reserved the right to liquidate all Geneste's affairs, resume control of the bank at any time of their choosing, and transfer in their name or that of any new company they would establish all annuity contracts they had transferred or would transfer to Geneste;
- 8) In the event Article 7 were applied, Geneste would own an interest in any new company established by Boyd and Walckiers of 30,000 *livres* per year, for three years, as of the foundation date of this new company. This agreement could be altered if new arrangements were agreed which were more favourable to Geneste;
- 9) Given the state of existing revolutionary turmoil, Geneste would not seek new business but merely content himself with receiving the payments owed on pre-existing annuity contracts and other agreements which would not expose him to any risk. Geneste would be entitled to half the bank's profits and *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* to the other half. Should profits not exceed 15,000 *livres*, Geneste would not have to pay anything;
- 10) The new entity headed by Geneste was to last from 10 Oct. 1793 to 31 Dec. 1797 except in the case where Article 7 were applied;

¹⁰² AN, F/7/5651, dossier 10 and Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.127, footnote 1. S.R. Cope (*Walter Boyd*, p.26) claims Boyd left on 23 Sep. 1792 and that Ker left in April 1793.

¹⁰³ *Moniteur*, Tome XVI, p.745.

¹⁰⁴ AN, C//327 – Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.128.

- 11) Should *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* choose not to resume control of the bank on 31 Dec. 1797, Geneste would be authorised to liquidate the bank with a partner of *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* appointed by Boyd and Walckiers. All its business would then belong to Geneste who would be free to do with it as he pleases. If Geneste declined to continue the business, the liquidation would be carried out following the same procedure;
- 12) In the case of Geneste's death, *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* would appoint a representative to carry out the bank's liquidation and the appropriate payments would be made to his widow or heirs;
- 13) Geneste would be required to balance his books on 31 Dec. of each year and send them for verification to Boyd and Walckiers;
- 14) Should a conflict of interest arise between *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* and Geneste, the case would be submitted for arbitration to two referees named by each party: Jean-Joseph de Laborde and Grammont (of Bordeaux);
- 15) Both parties agree the present contract will be carried out in good faith.¹⁰⁵

The very day Geneste took possession of *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* (10 Oct. 1793), the bank's premises were searched by commissioners from the Le Peltier section and he was arrested. Although released a few weeks later, he was not allowed to retake possession of the bank's offices and had to relocate to the Rue des Moineaux.¹⁰⁶ Walter Boyd Jr., sensing the approaching danger, obtained a passport for 400,000 *livres* and fled to England via Basel.¹⁰⁷

On 22 ventôse II/12 March 1794, Geneste was arrested by the revolutionary committee of the Mont Blanc section after having been denounced for association with émigrés (Boyd and Ker), advancing 2,700 *livres* to Madame Billens (Ker's mistress who had been guillotined and whom Geneste had only met once), receiving money for priests and helping to transfer funds abroad. Geneste was interrogated and admitted he had advanced funds to Madame Billens after the decree of 9 October against British citizens. His residence was searched and the receipts for these advances were seized along with all his correspondence with foreign trading houses. Geneste was incarcerated at the *Conciergerie* and questioned by the Revolutionary Tribunal on 6 & 19 germinal II/26 March & 8 April 1794. Despite his denials of any wrongdoing, he was tried on 29 germinal/11 April and guillotined a week later.¹⁰⁸

In the meantime, Walter Boyd had founded *Boyd, Benfield, & Co.* with his new partner Paul Benfield in London. He became one of Pitt's leading financial advisors, playing an important role in supporting his government during the 1797 Bank of England monetary crisis, and sat as an MP for the pocket borough of Shaftesbury (1796-1802). Returning to France after the Peace of Amiens, he was arrested and detained until the fall of Napoleon in 1814. He subsequently sat as an MP for Lymington (1823-1830) and in 1837 died at his estate of Plaistow Lodge (Kent).¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ See Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.145-147.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, Tome II, p.147.

¹⁰⁷ S.R. Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.28-29.

¹⁰⁸ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.155-156.

¹⁰⁹ For more on *Boyd, Ker et Cie* see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.123-156; Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.657 & 660 and S.R. Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.11-31.

Boyd, Ker & Cie.

See Walter Boyd.

Bresson, Jean-Baptiste-Marie-François ● ☆ **(15 Aug. 1760 – 11 Feb. 1832)**

Born in Darney (Vosges). Died in Meudon. Son of Louis Bresson (1721-1771), *lieutenant général au bailliage royal de Darney and subdélégué de l'intendant de Lorraine à Darney*, and of his wife Anne Diez (c.1730-c.1800). The Bresson family, originally from Frisia, had served the house of Burgundy during the sixteenth century before settling in Lorraine where its members acquired high-ranking positions in the duchy's judicature and courts.

Bresson completed his secondary studies at the *Collège Mazarin* in Paris. At the outbreak of the Revolution, He was a lawyer in his native Darney and was elected the town's administrator on 17 June 1790. Bresson was then elected a substitute deputy for the Vosges on 3 Sep. 1791 before being returned as the seventh deputy for the Vosges to the National Convention on 4 Sep. 1792. A moderate *Girondin*, he frequented the literary *salon* of Sophie Cottin (née Marie Risteau, 1770-1807), the daughter of former *Compagnie des Indes* director Jacques François Risteau and wife of the prominent Parisian banker Jean Paul Marie Cottin.

During the trial of Louis XVI, Bresson delivered an impassioned speech against the king's execution on 19 Jan. 1793 – calling for the monarch's internment and banishment once peace with Austria was signed – which earned him the ire of the *Montagnards*. As a result, he was one of 72 deputies proscribed by the coup of 31 May-2 June 1793 but succeeded in escaping from prison and fled to his native Vosges where he was hidden by a friendly forestry official. Rehabilitated following 9 Thermidor, Bresson resumed his seat in the Convention and on 23 vendémiaire IV/15 Oct. 1795 was elected a deputy of the Vosges to the *Cinq-Cents*. He served in this capacity until 1 prairial VI/20 May 1798 when he left the legislature to work at the foreign ministry under Talleyrand. He spent a year working in the offices of the *comptabilité intermédiaire* (1 messidor VI-30 fructidor VII/19 June 1798-16 Aug. 1799) before becoming head of the *Division des fonds et de la comptabilité* on 25 brumaire VIII/16 November 1799 (in replacement of Antoine de Laforêt), remaining in this post until his retirement on 30 June 1825. Bresson was made a *chevalier de la Légion d'honneur* on 25 prairial XII/14 June 1804.¹¹⁰ In December 1815, Bresson and his wife hid the comte de Lavalette, who was proscribed as a bonapartist and condemned to death, in their apartment at the foreign ministry. They were never discovered. Lavalette records this episode in his memoirs.¹¹¹

Carié (Carié-Bézard), Henry-Liévain Nicolas CCC CEC ● **(c.1763 – 3 Oct. 1809)**

Carié was the son of Nicolas-François Carié (died 1766) and of Anne-Marie-Isabelle Braeckman of Ghent (died 22 Oct. 1796). After the death of her first husband, Carié's mother was remarried on 9 Aug. 1767 to Jean-Baptiste Accarias de La Buisnière, a lawyer at the *parlement de Paris*. The Cariés were linked through one of Henry-Liévain's uncles –

¹¹⁰ For more on Bresson see Masson, *LDAEPR*, p.488-489 and Robert & Cougny (eds.), *DPF*, Tome I, p.479-480.

¹¹¹ *Mémoires et souvenirs du comte de Lavalette*, Tome II, Paris: H. Fournier Jeune, 1841, p.300-309.

Clément Carié (a trader at Lyon – *Carié, Arpajon et Cie.*) – to Marshal Suchet.¹¹² Henry-Liévain’s brother, Clément-Hercule (a.k.a. Carié de Saint-Clément), was a partner in *La Ville, Le Roux et Carié fils* based in Lorient before going into business with Jean-Louis Johannot (*Johannot, Carié, Jacquet et Cie.*, later renamed *Johannot, Carié et Cie.*, headquartered at 2 Place Vendôme).¹¹³ In 1777, Henry-Liévain’s sister – Marie-Charlotte – married Augustin Périer, director of the *Compagnie des Indes* at Lorient and brother of the Grenoble banker Claude Perier.

On 23 May 1795, Henry-Liévain married Gabrielle-Jeanne-Eulalie Bézard (1768-1859), daughter of Jacques Bézard, a merchant trader from Montpellier and former administrator of the *Compagnie des Indes* who was guillotined on 16 May 1794.¹¹⁴

Career:

- His father dies and his mother takes over the family firm (renamed *Veuve Carié fils et Cie.*) (1766);
- Begins his career as a lawyer at the *parlement de Paris*;
- Becomes a partner in his father-in-law’s bank, renamed *Labuissière, Carié et Cie.*, headquartered in the Rue Poissonnière (1787). The bank was dissolved on 9 July 1795;¹¹⁵
- Comes of age and inherits his father’s business (Sep. 1789);¹¹⁶
- His brother-in-law, Augustin Périer, is imprisoned at Vannes and commits suicide in prison (1792);
- His sister (Marie-Charlotte) and niece (Elisabeth) are murdered by Chouans while traveling to Lorient to receive Augustin Périer’s succession (early 1793);
- Inherits half the fortune of his brother-in-law, Augustin Périer, possibly amounting to 6,000,000 francs (1794). This sparks a legal battle with the Périer family of Grenoble which is settled when Carié pays them 500,000 francs in *assignats* on 13 Feb. 1795. Stendhal, a family friend of the Périers, alludes to this case in his correspondence;¹¹⁷
- Finds *Carié, Bézard et Cie.* with Barthélémy Imbert and Y. Martin – one of the most prominent Parisian banks under the Directory (1795);¹¹⁸
- Acquires the Château of Ville d’Avray for 125,000 *livres* (27 Sep. 1796);¹¹⁹
- Inherits the Château of Juziers near Mantes and several other properties at Rungis and Ghent from his mother (who owned the Labuissières estate) (9 Nov. 1796);¹²⁰
- Awarded the contract to farm overdue taxes for 1797;¹²¹
- Sells an estate at Créteil to General Muret-Millau for 100,000 *livres* (2 June 1799);¹²²
- Founding Regent of the *Banque de France* (1800-1803);

¹¹² Révérend, *Titres, anoblissements et pairies de la Restauration, op. cit.*, Tome IV, p.49.

¹¹³ For *Johannot, Carié, Jacquet et Cie.* see MC/ET/XIX/922 2 frimaire XI/23 Nov. 1802. For *Johannot, Carié et Cie.* see AP, D31 U3, 31 Dec. 1808.

¹¹⁴ MC/ET/LXXIV/684, 4 prairial III/23 May 1795.

¹¹⁵ For more on the activities of *Labuissière, Carié et Cie.*, see Bouchary, *MAP*, Tome I, p.32 & 168. In Year IV (1796), Carié’s new bank, *Carié fils et Cie.*, still owned 124 shares of the *Compagnie des Indes*.

¹¹⁶ MC/ET/LXXXIV/635, 22 Sep. 1789.

¹¹⁷ In a letter dated 26 Jan. 1806 addressed to François-Périer Lagrange, Stendhal asks “*L’affaire Périer héritage dure-t-elle toujours?*” See Archives de l’Isère, II, E/384; Adolphe Rochas, *Biographie du Dauphiné*, Tome II, Paris: Charavay, 1816, p.239; Pierre Barral, *Les Périer dans l’Isère au XIX^e siècle*, Paris: PUF, 1964, p.38 & Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.51, footnote 25.

¹¹⁸ MC/ET/XIX/921, 28 prairial X/17 June 1802.

¹¹⁹ MC/ET/LXXXIV/697, 6 vendémiaire V/27 Sep. 1796.

¹²⁰ See her inventory after decease (MC/ET/LXXXIV/697, 19 brumaire V/9 Nov. 1796).

¹²¹ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.131.

¹²² MC/ET/XLV/669, 14 prairial VII/2 June 1799.

- *Munitionnaire général de la Marine* (Jan. 1803);¹²³
- Fails to repay two million francs following the expiry of his contracts with the Treasury (Year XI);
- Goes bankrupt in early January 1803 suffering an estimated eight million francs of losses. Jean-Pierre Collot, who had advanced him 1,200,000 francs, went bankrupt ten days later. Carié offered to surrender his domain of Ville d'Avray to Napoleon as compensation.¹²⁴ His bank was contracted at this time for the furnishing of military supplies for up to 10 million francs.¹²⁵

Unfortunately, Carié's inventory after decease has been lost, depriving us of valuable knowledge concerning his assets.¹²⁶

Cerf Berr (or 'Cerf Beer'), Baruch (1762-1824) & Théodore (1766-1832) AI

The sons of Naftali Hertz ben Dov Beer (1726-1793) – known as Cerf Beer de Medelsheim, a Jewish horse trader who settled in Bischheim (Alsace) around 1748 and became a prominent military contractor during the Seven Years War working for the duc de Choiseul. Cerf Beer was so successful that by 1783 he had become *entrepreneur général des fourrages* for all troops in the provinces of Trois-Évêchés, Lorraine, Alsace and Franch-Comté. This meant he supplied practically all the armies in north-eastern France, and his company based in Nancy employed over 70 people. He accumulated a considerable fortune and purchased the estate of Tomblaine for 400,000 *livres*. Cerf Beer played a leading role in obtaining full citizenship rights for Jews in France. In 1787-1788, he was elected as the *syndic général* for the Jewish nations of Metz, Lorraine and Alsace. At that time, there was no unified body representing all French Jews, and Cerf Beer worked with Malesherbes on a major reform to award them more rights and create a national institution representing the French Jewish community. On 28 Jan. 1790, he signed a petition addressed to Louis XVI requesting these reforms be enacted; and on 28 Sep. 1791, French Jews were finally given full citizenship rights. Cerf Beer was also the financial mentor of another Jewish banker from Lorraine named Beer Léon Fould who served as a clerk in his company. Fould founded his first bank in Paris in 1795 thanks to three advances of 30,000 francs Cerf Beer had given him.¹²⁷

Baruch and Théodore Cerf Berr were two of Naftali's eight children who inherited the family's military contracting business. During the Thermidorian and directorial periods, they formed a business partnership with Jean Lanchère to provide horses and pack animals to various armies (*Compagnie Lanchère et Cerf Berr*), notably to the *Armée d'Italie*.¹²⁸ Records show that Lanchère was already in business with Baruch Cerf Berr by Year III when he requested that Cerf Berr be given a passport to travel for business.¹²⁹ They also held contracts for postal mail deliveries.¹³⁰ Baruch Cerf Berr was later a representative of

¹²³ Carié signed several notarial acts as guarantees for his naval supply contract (see MC/ET/LXXXIV/723).

¹²⁴ AN, AF/IV/935, papier 37.

¹²⁵ Aulard, *Paris sous le Consulat*, Tome III, p.547 (6 Jan. 1803), 550, 574 & 690.

¹²⁶ For more on Carié see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.46-53.

¹²⁷ Alfred Cerfberr de Medelsheim, *Biographie alsacienne-lorraine*, Paris: Alphonse Lemerre, 1879, p.157-158.

¹²⁸ See Chapter 2.

¹²⁹ AN, AF/II/31, dossier 256:46, *Letter from Lanchère and Cerfberr requesting a passport for Barruch Cerfberr*, 8 ventôse III/26 Feb. 1795.

¹³⁰ AF/II/20, dossier 148:20, *Decree awarding the franchise of letter and parcel deliveries to the Compagnie Lanchère et Cerf Berr*, 10 floréal III/29 April 1795.

the Grand Sahedrin during its sessions hosted by Napoleon at Paris's city hall in February and March 20 1807.

Chapeaurouge, Jacques de (1744 – 1805)

Chapeaurouge came from a family which had resided in Geneva since the fifteenth century. In 1764, he moved to Hamburg where he became a partner in *Diodati & Poppe*. In 1769 he married Marie Elisabeth Hadorne (1752–1793), whose parents had also immigrated from Switzerland (Canton of Valais), and in the same year acquired Hamburg citizenship. Chapeaurouge turned to the shipping business and quickly acquired a considerable fortune. In 1773, he built a palatial residence on the eastern outskirts of Hamburg known as the "Hammer Hof" with an English landscape park. Chapeaurouge conducted several important deals with the *Comité des Subsistances* and the French Treasury. One of his closest friends and best clients in Hamburg was the Swiss trader Pierre-Louis Bouvier (1765-1836) who had also left Switzerland to settle on the Elbe. Chapeaurouge's eldest son, Jean Dauphin de Chapeaurouge, became mayor of Hamburg during the Napoleonic occupation, and his daughter Caroline Henriette later married the Karl Sieveking who further expanded the Hammer Hof.¹³¹

Chiappe, Ange-Marie (29 October 1760 – 18 July 1826) ●

Chiappe was elected a Corsican deputy to the National Convention in September 1792. He was elected the Convention's secretary on 20 April 1793 and was then dispatched to quell rebellion in the *Midi*. Chiappe was appointed civilian commissioner to the *Armée d'Italie* in replacement of André Réal in November 1795, but rapidly left his commission to take up his seat in the *Cinq-Cents* where he had been re-elected in October that year. Napoleon subsequently employed him as French consul to the United States, Sweden and Spain.

Cinto & Charlemagne CCC

Based in the Rue de la Verrerie.

Collart-Dutilleul, Étienne-Louis-Gabriel ● ● **(29 April 1747 – 28 July 1807)**

Born in Lille. Son of Louis-Antoine, *commis à la lieutenance générale de Police*, a police chief attached to Louis XV's personal protection. Married Madeleine-Françoise Rosalie Petit, daughter of Germain Petit, merchant banker at Lille. The marriage produced several children, including Adèle Rosalie Collart-Dutilleul (1784-1878), who married François-Nicolas Mollien on 9 fructidor X/27 August 1802 and later served as one of Queen Maria Amalia's *Dames d'Honneur* (see Mollien's entry); and Alexandre-Jules (1790-1865), future *procureur général de la cour des comptes* from 1846 to 1864. His grandson, François-Ernest, was president of the *Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas* (ancestor of the modern BNP Paribas) and became the French minister of finance in 1877.

Collart-Dutilleul was well-versed in the arts of secrecy and intrigue and became the right-hand man of Dufresne de Saint-Léon (see his entry) at the *Direction générale de la*

¹³¹ For more on Jacques de Chapeaurouge, see Aulard, *Paris sous l'Empire*, Tome II, Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1914, p.316; AN, F/7/3060, p.314; AF/IV/1706/B, p.16-19.

Liquidation. Dufresne de Saint-Léon entrusted him with the custody of all the *Liquidation*'s sensitive documents.

Career:

- Began working as a *commis* for his father before being appointed as a *chef de division* at the *lieutenance générale de Police* (1766-1789);
- *Premier commis au département des établissements publics de la Ville de Paris* (1789-1790);
- *Premier commis (liquidation définitive, examen des pièces)* at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* (1791-1792);
- One of the *liquidateurs principaux* at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* (1793);
- Head of the 7th section (*comptabilité, envois à la Trésorerie*) of the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* (1793-1795);
- Arrested and interrogated (Dec. 1793);
- Head of the 5th bureau of the *Direction générale de la Liquidation (reconnaisances définitives, envoi à la Trésorerie des états de créance à inscrire au grand livre)* (1795-1800).¹³²

Collot, Jean-Pierre (5 March 1774 – 9 Aug. 1852) AI ●

Born in Montpellier. Died in Paris. Son of Pierre Collot and Marie Carenet. Married Anne-Victorine-Claudine Lajard (1785-1844), younger sister of Anne-Marie-Rose Lajard, wife of Jean-Antoine Chaptal.¹³³ See Chapters 2 & 6 for Collot's biographical details.

Cordier, Louis-François, (c.1757 – 1 July 1817) CCC ●

One of the more obscure Regents of the *Banque de France* (appointed 17 Oct. 1803 in replacement of Robillard), the birthplace and origins of Louis-François Cordier are unknown. He appears to have begun his commercial career at Caen before working for the *Compagnie des Indes* under the supervision of Jean-Jacques Bérard at Lorient. In Year IV, Cordier appears as Bérard's business partner in the Lorient firm *Bérard & Cordier* which sold naval supplies. *Bérard & Cordier* subsequently moved to Paris where Cordier became the firm's representative and expanded its interests in the iron trade and selling of canons.¹³⁴

Craufurd, Charles Gregan (1763 – 1821)

Charles was the younger brother of James Craufurd, British *chargé d'affaires* in Hamburg and later Copenhagen, and the nephew of Quentin Craufurd – former East India Company official, owner of the *Hôtel de Matignon* and intimate friend of Talleyrand.

Craufurd, Quentin (22 Sep. 1743 – 23 Nov. 1819)

Born in Kilwininck (Ayreshire), Quentin Craufurd (or 'Crawford') was a litterateur, bibliophile, world traveller and passionate art collector. In 1761, he travelled to India in the

¹³² For more on Collart-Dutilleul see AN, F/7/4698 (dossier 3); Bruguière, *GPR*, p.63-64 & 252.

¹³³ For Anne-Victorine-Claudine Lajard's inventory after decease, see MC/ET/XCI/1959, 1 June 1844.

¹³⁴ See Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.54-59.

service of the British East India Company and amassed a considerable fortune. After ten years in Manilla he returned to Europe around 1775, was presented to the French court by Lord Strathavon (George Gordon, future 9th Marquess of Huntly) in 1780 and grew close to Marie-Antoinette. It was in Craufurd's *hôtel particulier* at Clichy that the carriage used for the royal family's flight to Varennes was built and concealed. He left Paris after the king's arrest and lived in Frankfurt, Vienna and London, returning to Paris in 1801. Craufurd was a regular guest of Talleyrand at his foreign ministry in the *Hôtel de Galliffet* of the Rue du Bac. He also frequented Lord Yarmouth and Casimir de Montrond.¹³⁵

Quentin's nephew, James Craufurd, was the British *chargé d'affaires* in Hamburg and Copenhagen, and his brother – George Craufurd – worked for British intelligence as a registered trader at Rotterdam.¹³⁶ They all corresponded via Quentin's mistress, Eleonora Sullivan (Anne Éléonore Franchi – former mistress of the comte de Fersen and good friend of Catherine Grand – Madame Talleyrand). When the French occupied Hamburg in 1804, the papers of the British ambassador George Rumbold were seized and confirmed their spying activities.¹³⁷ That same year Quentin purchased the *Hôtel de Matignon* from Honoré IV, Prince de Monaco, and sold it to Talleyrand in 1808 for over three million francs.¹³⁸ Craufurd continued to reside in Paris after the end of the Napoleonic Wars and died there in 1819.¹³⁹

Craufurd, James Gregan (11 Oct. 1761 – 9 July 1839), 2nd Baronet of Kilbirney

Eldest son of Sir Alexander Craufurd, 1st Baronet of Kilbirney (Ayreshire) and his wife Jane Crokatt. James was the elder brother of Charles Gregan Craufurd (lieutenant-governor of Tynemouth and Cliff Fort and deputy quartermaster-general at the Horse Guards) who was elected MP for Nottingham East Retford in October 1806 and married Lady Anna Maria (the Dowager Duchess of Newcastle) in 1800, and of General Robert Craufurd the famous commander of the light division in the Peninsula War who was killed at the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812. Their uncle was Quentin Craufurd (see above). James Craufurd served as the British *chargé d'affaires* in Copenhagen (1794-1796) and Hamburg (1798-1803) and was a key player in William Wickham's counter-intelligence operations in Switzerland and Hamburg.¹⁴⁰

Cretet (comte de Champhol), Emmanuel **MI** **(10 Feb. 1747 – 28 Nov. 1809)**

Emmanuel Cretet was from a wealthy Savoyard family of *indiennes* traders. In 1791, he purchased the *Chartreuse de la Sainte-Trinité de Champmol* monastery in Dijon. He was elected a deputy of the *département* of the Côte d'Or (Burgundy) to the *Conseil des Anciens* in 1795. He spoke frequently on matters of finance and political economy in successive revolutionary legislatures and spearheaded the introduction of the decimal

¹³⁵ Hauterive, *PSPE*, Tome II, n°1250, p.400 & n°1258, p.402.

¹³⁶ Hauterive, *PSPE*, Tome I, n° 494, p.157; n°1299, p.413 & Tome III, n°383, p.148

¹³⁷ See AN, F/7/6450.

¹³⁸ Hauterive, *PSPE*, Tome IV, n°28, p.13 & n°42, p.20-21.

¹³⁹ For more on Quentin Craufurd, see AN, F/7/5879; Hauterive, *PSPE* (Tome I – n°310, p.99; n°334, p.107; n°396, p.127; n°662, p.207-208; n°1299, p.413; n°1376, p.439-440; Tome II – n°1250, p.400; n°1258, p.402; Tome IV – n°28, p.13) and Blanc, *LERE*, p.135 & 155-156.

¹⁴⁰ See Blanc, *LERE*, p.95 & 319, footnote 15.

system in France. Cretet was a political ally of Talleyrand and supported the Brumaire coup for which he was rewarded by being appointed a *conseiller d'État* on 4 nivôse VIII/25 Dec. 1799. He was instrumental in the establishment of the *Banque de France*. A few days after the signing of the Peace of Amiens, Bonaparte received the Regents of the *Banque de France* in April 1802 who petitioned to be awarded the monopoly for the emission of paper currency. Napoleon referred their demands to Cretet with the following instructions:

*“I would like you to inform me of what needs to be done to finalise the establishment of our bank –the remit of which has as of yet only been sketched – by taking advantage of the current session of the Corps Législatif to constitute it into a national bank and enable it to render the same services as the Bank of England. To this end, you will find an exposé given to me by an agent of the bank. All this must be for yourself alone.”*¹⁴¹

In 1806, Cretet became head of the administration of the *Ponts et Chaussées* and oversaw numerous engineering projects in Paris (e.g. the building of the *Ponts d'Austerlitz* and *d'Iéna*, the opening of the *Canal de l'Ourcq* and the *Bassin de La Villette*, the early construction of the *Arc de Triomphe*, etc.). He took over the directorship of the *Banque de France* in the wake of the *Négociants Réunis* bankruptcy scandal which he governed from 26 April 1806 to 9 Aug. 1807. He subsequently served as interior minister (9 Aug. 1807 to 29 June 1809) but had to resign his brief due to gout attacks and was replaced by Joseph Fouché. Cretet died shortly afterwards and was buried in the Panthéon. He was made a *Commandeur de la Légion d'honneur* in 1805 and created *comte de Champhol* on 26 April 1808.

Dallarde (père), Pierre CCC

Resided in the Rue Neuve des Mathurins.

Davillier, Jean Antoine Joseph CCC **(11 Oct. 1754 – 16 Jan. 1831)**

Davillier l'*ainé* was the older brother of Jean-Charles-Joachim Davillier. He began his career working for the Bidermann bank in Hamburg managing Indian and Far Eastern colonial trade, and later partnered with Jacques Bidermann (based in Winthertur, Switzerland) in the *indiennes* manufacture at Wesserling (Alsace) until 1805. Davillier l'*ainé* then went into business with his brother Jean-Charles-Joachim and the investors François Gros and Jacques Roman, founding *Gros, Davillier, Roman et Cie.*, which became one of the largest manufacturers in France under the *Premier Empire*.¹⁴² Gros and Davillier had established a bank in Paris, Rue des Jeûneurs, as early as Year V. Davillier l'*ainé* served as *conseiller general de la Seine* (1800-1802 & 1803-1815) and was made a *chevalier de la Légion d'honneur*. He was also created *Pair de France* by Napoleon on 2

¹⁴¹ CN, Tome VII, n°6035, *Bonaparte to Crétet*, 23 germinal X/13 April 1802.

¹⁴² In 1802, we find Gros and Roman as investors (for 600,000 francs and 400,000 francs respectively) in the *Coulon & Cie.* trading house, headed by Paul Coulon with headquarters in Paris and Neuchâtel, which was linked to Jacques-Louis Pourtalès's *indiennes* trading empire. See Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.357, footnote 105 & *Ibid*, Chapter VII for more on *Coulon & Cie.*

June 1815. *Gros, Davillier & Cie.* was granted a license to export cotton and indigo in September 1795.¹⁴³

Marriage:

On 15 floréal III/4 May 1795, Davillier *l'ainé* married Pierrette-Julie Anthoine (died 1849), daughter of Edme-François Anthoine, who served as *premier commis* at the finance ministry for fifty years. Pierrette-Julie, known as '*la belle Madame Davillier*', hosted a glamorous literary and political salon with strong Bonapartist sympathies under the Bourbon Restoration. Her great aunt, Jeanne Sarah Madeleine Blondel (1723-1797), had married the Genevan bourgeois Michel Fillietaz de Morges and had two sons: Marc-Jacob Fillietaz (1760-1812), an influential banker who became Jean-Charles Davillier's business partner and married Pierrette-Julie's sister; and Gabriel Fillietaz (1762-1823), French consul at Antwerp who married Pauline Savoye, a relation of the Périers.

Davillier, Jean-Charles-Joachim CCC ● ★ 🇫🇷 🇨🇭 🇨🇮 **(3 Nov. 1758 – 18 Oct. 1846)**

Jean-Charles Davillier was the son of Jean Davillier (1712-1762), a merchant trader of Montpellier, and of Anne Auverny (1729-1806). The Davillier family were Protestants, originally from Rillé in Touraine, who settled in Montpellier.

Marriage:

On 21 Oct. 1791, Jean-Charles married Aimée-Françoise Breganty (a.k.a. Breganti) of Geneva (1771-1821), daughter of Joseph Breganti, a Genevan merchant of Florentine extraction, and of his third wife Jeanne-Henriette-Charlotte Blondel, whose father Jacob Blondel was a *commis* at the *douanes* of Geneva.¹⁴⁴ Through this marriage and through his brother's wife, Jean-Charles was connected to Genevan finance, in particular the Fillietaz family. His business partners were his brother-in-law Marc-Jacob Fillietaz and Henri Sautter of Geneva. Together they developed a conglomerate of companies whose activities covered not only banking but also commissions, the financing and establishment of textile manufactures and diverse industrial projects.

Davillier's career extended well into the 1840s. He bequeathed one of the largest fortunes of all the founding Regents of the *Banque de France* (over 6 million francs – second only to Benjamin Delessert). Unlike his brother Davillier *l'ainé*, Jean-Charles kept aloof from public office. The Davillier bank survived until the mid-20th century.

Career:

- Settles in Paris aged 20 and has modest beginnings. Little is known of his early career;
- The Davillier brothers form a company with David Senn in Geneva (Dec. 1781);¹⁴⁵
- The Davillier brothers form a company with Jean-Théodore Rivier of Geneva with capital assets worth 1,100,000 *livres* (1 Nov. 1788 – 11 nivôse III/31 Dec. 1794);

¹⁴³ AN, AF/II/77, dossier 571:19.

¹⁴⁴ Jean-Charles declared assets worth 300,000 *livres* in his marriage contract (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.63).

¹⁴⁵ The Senn family had partnered with the Bidermann, bankers of Hamburg, to establish *Senn, Bidermann & Cie.* in 1781, successively based at Geneva, Brussels and Paris. See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.667 & Louis Dermigny, *Cargaisons indiennes, Solier et Cie. (1781-1796)*, Paris: SEVPEN, 1960, Tome I, p.247.

- The Davilliers were among the largest shareholders of the *Compagnie des Indes*. According to an 1817 report presented by Jacques Laffitte, Jean-Charles held 100 shares while his brother's bank (*Gros-Davillier*) owned 252;
- Buys the Parisian trading house of the Fillietaz family in the Rue Meslée (1794);
- Forms a new company with Jean-Théodore Rivier and Marc-Jacob Fillietaz whose business is conducted “either in Paris or in Switzerland and consists of commissions of all types, on cotton clothes, mousselines and indiennes, as well as in all sorts of goods produced in India in general.” Starting capital is 100,000 livres (1795);¹⁴⁶
- The Gros-Davillier bank (the bank of Davillier *l'ainé*) first appears in the republican almanac (Year V);
- *Jean-Charles Davillier et Cie.* first appears in the republican almanac, headquartered in the Rue Basse-du-Rempart (Year VI);
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (17 Sep. 1801 to his death – 45 years in total!);
- One of the *Banque de France*'s 200 largest shareholders (Sep./Oct. 1803);
- *Baron de l'Empire* (23 Aug. 1810);
- *Pair de France* (19 Nov. 1831), appointed by Casimir Périer;
- *Commandeur de la Légion d'honneur* (5 Sep. 1836).

Notable Real Estate Purchases:

- On 27 pluviôse III/15 Feb. 1795, an *hôtel particulier* located at 16 Rue Basse-du-Rempart from Mme. Randon for 200,000 livres acquired jointly with his sister-in-law Jeanne-Jacqueline-Elisabeth Fillietaz (daughter of Gabriel Fillietaz?);¹⁴⁷
- On 9 Nov. 1804, the domain of Morainvilliers (Yvelines) for 280,000 francs (sold to his son Charles on 16 July 1824 for 362,000 francs);¹⁴⁸
- On 16 Sep. 1807, he jointly-purchased the domain of Guermange near Sarrebourg in the Meuse (225 hectares of land, 132 hectares of fields, 624 hectares of woods) with his sister-in-law Fillietaz for 500,000 francs;¹⁴⁹
- The old manufacture of Morris at Gisors (an entire complex of factories, workers' houses, land and windmills) for 348,150 francs on 21 Aug. 1816.¹⁵⁰

Declerck (père), Claude-Jean (30 May 1739 – ?) ● ●

Born in Dunkerque. Son of Jean-Jacques Declerck, a merchant tailor (*maître tailleur d'habits*) who was a member of Dunkerque's chamber of commerce and ran a commission business (1785-1794), and of Francine Parent. Married Pétronille-Jeanne Delva. Five children, including Jean-Baptiste Théodore Declerck (*fils*) (see below).

Career:

- Worked as a *commis* for his father's trading house before being appointed *commis-contrôleur de la comptabilité centrale en partie double* at the *Trésorerie nationale*. He played a part in Cambon's opaque financial dealings and speculations on foreign markets from 1793 to 1795;

¹⁴⁶ See Dermigny, *Cargaisons indiennes, Solier et Cie. (1781-1796)*, Tome I, p.272 – This company soon purchased important stakes in *Martin-Portalès* of Montpellier and *Fronton et Cie.* of Toulouse.

¹⁴⁷ MC/ET/IV/800, 27 pluviôse III/15 Feb. 1795.

¹⁴⁸ MC/ET/XCIII/442, 16 July 1824.

¹⁴⁹ MC/ET/XCIII/286, 16 Sep. 1807.

¹⁵⁰ For more on Jean-Charles Davillier, see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.60-75.

- Commissioner of the *Trésorerie nationale* (appointed temporarily on 28 Aug. 1795, confirmed on 7 Nov. – remained in post until 19 May 1797);
- Considered as a possible replacement for Ramel de Nogaret at the finance ministry following the Coup of 30 Prairial in 1799;
- *Chargé des payeurs au ministère du Trésor* (1802-1812).

Documents in file 61AQ of the *Archives nationales* (papers of the *Greffulhe-Montz* bank) provide detailed information on the activities of Jean-Jacques Declerck, Claude-Jean's father, from 1789 to 1794. He was at Dunkerque during this time and in constant liaison with the Greffulhe-Montz bank on the one hand, and the financiers Walter Boyd, William Ker (both British agents) and Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver (former banker of Madame du Barry) on the other. Along with the Simons brothers (see Chapter 5), Declerck was one of the financial barons of the Dunkerque trade who dominated commercial exchanges between northern France, England and the Low Countries.¹⁵¹

Declerck (fils), Jean-Baptiste Théodore ● ● ☆ **(20 April 1766 – 16 June 1844)**

Born in Dunkerque. Died in Paris. Son of Claude-Jean and of Pétronille-Jeanne Delva.

Career:

- Naval officer of the *Compagnie des Indes* (1783-1789);
- *Directeur de la comptabilité centrale en partie double* at the *Trésorerie nationale* (serving under his father) (1791-1800) and a leading intermediary in Cambon's financial speculations (1793-1795);
- *Chef du bureau particulier auprès du directeur général du Trésor* (Bertrand Dufresne) *pour la liquidation des anciens comptes de banque, l'examen des négociations, les affaires réservées* (1800-1801);
- *Contrôleur générale des recettes de l'enregistrement* (1801-1802);
- *Receveur général de la Gironde* (1802-1815);
- *Receveur général du Tarn-et-Garonne* (1815-1820);
- *Receveur général de l'Aisne* (1821-1843);
- *Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur*.¹⁵²

Defermon (des Chapelières), Jacques ● ● ● ● ● ☆ ● **(15 Nov. 1752 – 20 July 1831)**

Born in Maumusson (Loire-Atlantique). Died in Paris. Son of Jacques, a lawyer at the *parlement de Paris* who was the legal *alloué* and *procureur fiscal* of the barony of Châteaubriand, and of Marie Lambert. Married Jeanne Dubois des Sauzais in 1783, with whom he had four children. Two of their sons later became government deputies, while one of their daughters married Philibert Ginoux.¹⁵³ One of Jacques's brothers also served as a deputy and Prefect under the *Premier Empire*.

¹⁵¹ For more on Declerck *père*, see AN, F/7/4665 (dossier 2); AF/III/280 & Bruguière, *GPR*, p.243-244.

¹⁵² For more on Declerck *fils*, see AN, F/1/C/3/Gironde (dossier 3); LH/683/48; AF/IV/63 (plaque 363); AF/IV/859/16 (plaque 7024) and Bruguière, *GPR*, p.244.

¹⁵³ The Ginoux family owned the Château of Sucy-en-Brie in the Val-de-Marne, which they had purchased on 17 Nov. 1780 for 250 000 *livres* (see Michel & Françoise Balard, *Nouvelle histoire de Sucy-en-Brie. Tome 1 : Naissance et développement d'un village briard. Sucy des origines à la Révolution*, Société historique et

Career:

- Lawyer and procurator at the *parlement* of Rennes (1783);
- *Député-adjoint* to the Estates of Brittany, then deputy of Rennes at the 1789 Estates General;
- Elected Secretary of the National Assembly on 21 July 1791, shortly after the king's flight to Varennes;
- Deputy of *Ile-et-Vilaine* at the National Convention (elected Sep. 1792). Served as president of the Convention (13-27 Dec. 1792). Voted against the death of the king;
- Opposes the coup against the Girondins (31 May – 2 April 1793). Declared an outlaw from Oct. 1793 to Dec. 1794. Flees to Brittany and hides at the Château de Trécesson;
- Resumes his seat as deputy in the Thermidorian Convention (Dec. 1794);
- Elected to the *Comité de Salut public*. Placed in charge of naval and colonial affairs (May 1795);
- Deputy of *Ile-et-Vilaine* at the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents* (Nov. 1795);
- Puts forward a motion in the *Cinq-Cents* for the creation of the *mandat territorial* to replace the *assignat* (March 1796);
- Elected Treasury commissioner (3 July 1797);
- Supports the Coup of 18 Brumaire during which he allegedly transfers funds from the Treasury to the conspirators (9-10 Nov. 1799);
- Appointed a member of the *Tribunat* (25 Dec. 1799);
- President of the *section des finances* of the *conseil d'État* (1800);
- *Directeur général de la liquidation de la Dette publique* (1804);
- *Comte de l'Empire* (1808);
- *Intendant général du Domaine extraordinaire* (1810-1814);
- Rehabilitated following the *Cent-Jours* as deputy of *Ile-et-Vilaine*;
- Exiled to Brussels, then to Harlem in the Netherlands (1816);
- Returns to France (1818);
- *Grand officier de la Légion d'honneur* (1821).¹⁵⁴

Delessert (a.k.a. de Lessert), Jean-Paul-Benjamin



(14 Feb. 1773 – 1 March 1847)

Generally referred to as Benjamin Delessert. Born in Lyon. Died in Paris. Son of Étienne Delessert (1735-1816), banker and manufacturer at Lyon, and of his wife Madeleine-Catherine Boy de La Tour (died 1816), daughter of Pierre Boy de La Tour (1706-1759), a trader from Neuchâtel who settled in Lyon, was ennobled by Frederick II of Prussia in 1750 and served as Consul of Poland.

archéologique de Sucy-en-Brie, 2010 re-edition, p.182). The scion of the family, César Ginoux (1746-1838), served as an *écuyer*, *conseiller*, and *secrétaire du Roi*. During the Revolution, the Ginoux were able to save their château through a fictitious sale. César Ginoux was appointed mayor of Sucy-en-Brie in 1806 and held the post until his death in 1838. With no male issue, his estate passed to his niece, Marie Ginoux (1783-1863) and subsequently to her brother, Philibert Ginoux (1787-1871), following her death. The château was occupied and badly damaged by the Prussians during the Franco-Prussian War (see Bernard Méa (ed.), *Nouvelle histoire de Sucy-en-Brie. Tome 3 : La grande mutation. Du village à la banlieue. 1804-1914*. Société historique et archéologique de Sucy-en-Brie, 1996, p.81 & 110-111).

¹⁵⁴ Bruguère, *GPR*, p.244-245.

Marriage & Relatives:

On 22 Aug. 1807, Benjamin Delessert married his cousin, Laure-Renée-Livie-Jacqueline Delessert (de Lessert) (1772-1823), daughter of Jean-Jacques de Lessert, *seigneur d'Outard* (Pays de Vaud) and proprietor of the Château de Cossonay, *membre du Grand Conseil du Pays de Vaud*, and of his wife Madeleine-Françoise de Mestral. Laure Delessert's brother, Étienne-Henri de Lessert, headed the Lessert-Will bank in Lausanne, and was related to the Will family from Heidelberg. Benjamin and Laure had no children.

Benjamin Delessert's brothers and sisters were:

- Étienne Delessert (1771-1794), who was forced to leave France in August 1792 due to his royalist sympathies. He died in New York where he had established a bank;
- Alexandre Delessert (1776-1833), banker in Paris;
- François-Marie Delessert (1780-1868), banker in Paris, president of the *Chambre de Commerce de Paris* multiple times between 1821 and 1838; Regent of the *Banque de France*; deputy from 1831-1834 and 1838-1848; vice-president of the *Chambre des Députés* at the end of the reign of Louis-Philippe, president of the *Consistoire réformée de l'Église de France*. His daughter Caroline Delessert married Jean-Henri Hottinguer, son of Jean-Conrad Hottinguer, in 1832.
- Gabriel Delessert (1786-1858), Prefect of Eure-et-Loir (1834), *conseiller d'État* (1836-1848), who married Valentine de Laborde (1806-1894), daughter of François-Louis Jean-Joseph Laborde de Méréville and granddaughter of Jean-Joseph de Laborde, court banker of Louis XV;
- Marguerite-Madeleine Delessert (1767-1839), who married Jean-Antoine Gautier (1756-1800), a bourgeois of Geneva and Parisian banker;
- Jeanne-Emilie Delessert (1778-1830), who married her cousin Jean-Marie de Lessert de Cossonay (1781-1850), the brother of Benjamin Delessert's wife Laure.

Among the numerous relatives of Benjamin Delessert, we should note the head of the Lessert-Will bank in Lausanne (Étienne-Henri de Lessert), another banker in Naples, merchant traders and maritime insurers in Le Havre (the Delaroche family), scientists, military officers, an explorer and numerous Swiss landholders.

On his mother's side (the Boy de La Tour family), let us note Benjamin's uncle, François-Louis Boy de La Tour (1744-1819) who married the daughter of the Genevan banker Bontems (*Bontems père, fils et Mallet*); and his aunt Elisabeth-Emilie Boy de La Tour (died 1781), first wife of the Parisian banker and *Banque de France* Regent Guillaume Mallet *l'ainé*.

Career:

- From 1784 to 1789, undertakes a series of voyages to complete his commercial and industrial training, notably to Great Britain where he is Adam Smith's student in Edinburgh, and meets James Watt in Birmingham and Jean André Deluc in Windsor;
- Cadet at the artillery school of Meulan in 1793;

- Serves as secretary to the *représentant-en-mission* Jean-François Lacroix (*Dantonist* representative of Eure-et-Loir, guillotined in 1794 for corruption and embezzlement) in Belgium during Dumouriez's campaign;¹⁵⁵
- *Aide-de-camp* to General Kilmaine;
- Serves with General Pichegru during his Belgian campaign (Sieges of Maubeuge, Ypres, Anvers);
- In 1796, he returns to civilian life and becomes his father's business associate in the family bank. He then partners with his brothers Alexandre and François, and finally with François alone after Alexandre's death (*M.M. Delessert et Cie.*);
- Appointed mayor of Paris's 3rd *arrondissement* (18 ventôse VIII/9 March 1800);
- *Membre du Conseil général des Hospices de Paris* (1801 to his death);
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (12 Oct. 1802 to his death – 45 years in total!);
- Elected to the Protestant *Consistoire de Paris* (15 April 1808 – resigned in Oct. 1815);
- *Baron de l'Empire* (19 Sep. 1812);
- Placed at the head of the 3rd legion of the *Garde Nationale de Paris* (1813);
- *Représentant de l'industrie de la Seine à la Chambre des Cent-Jours* (1815);
- Deputy of the Seine (1817-1824);
- Finds the *Compagnie Royale d'Assurances et l'Union* with Jean-Conrad Hottinguer (1817);
- Finds the *Caisse d'Épargne et de Prévoyance de Paris* (the modern *Caisse d'Épargne*) with the Duc de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt and Jean-Conrad Hottinguer in 1818. Benjamin first serves as the vice-president of its *Conseil des Directeurs* before becoming its president in 1824;
- *Conseiller général de la Seine* (1819-1822);
- *Membre du Conseil supérieur du Commerce* (1819) ;
- Deputy of Maine-et-Loire (1827-1842, elected for Saumur);
- Finds two “*écoles d'enseignement mutuel*” and a public library at Passy (1829);
- *Membre du Conseil Municipal* (1830);
- The reign of Louis-Philippe marks the high-point of Delessert's career. His political salon is a focal point for supporters of the “*juste milieu*” (notably Mérimée). Delessert reputedly served as the inspiration for Stendhal's character of Monsieur Grandet in his second novel, *Lucien Leuwen* (published 1834);
- *Grand Officier de la Légion d'honneur* (1837);
- Serves twice as Vice-President of the *Assemblée nationale*.

The Delessert bank was headquartered in the Rue du Coq Héron from 1786 to 1824, then in the Rue du Faubourg Montmartre. Aside from his banking activities, Benjamin Delessert also owned several important industrial ventures:

- A cotton weaving manufacture;
- The sugar refinery at Passy, established in 1801 to refine sugar cane. It was here that Delessert and his head chemist, Jean-Baptiste Quérueu, perfected the industrial procedure of extracting sugar from beetroot.¹⁵⁶ Napoleon visited the refinery in 1812;
- Another sugar refinery at La Villette (in Paris's 19th *arrondissement*), purchased from his head chemist Jean-Baptiste Quérueu who continued to manage it;

¹⁵⁵ For more on Jean-François Lacroix (1753-1794), his links to the embezzlement of funds drawn from Louis XVI's civil list in coordination with Jérôme Pétion and Danton, his complicities with Dumouriez and the Abbé d'Espagnac and charges of corruption during his mission in Belgium, see Blanc, *LCST*, p.29-31.

¹⁵⁶ See Jean-Lambert Dansette. *Histoire de l'entreprise et des chefs d'entreprises en France, Tome II : le temps des pionniers (1830-1880). Naissance du patronat*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001, p.51.

- A factory known as the “*Fabrique de noir-animal*” at Montsouris near Montrouge.

Paternal Inheritance:

Benjamin’s father, Étienne, had already constituted an impressive real estate portfolio which was valued at 1,800,000 francs at his death in 1816. This included:

- A château of 176 hectares at Villeneuve-le-roi (Val de Marne);
- The 196-hectare Château of Ver in the canton of Plailly (Oise), purchased as a *bien national* in 1791, estimated at 310,000 francs in 1816;
- The 155-hectare farm of Pomponne at Ver (Oise – purchased as a *bien national*), worth 258,000 francs in 1816;
- The 178-hectare farm of Borest in the canton of Senlis (formerly belonging to the Chapter of Sainte-Geneviève de Paris) estimated 210,000 francs in 1816;
- Several buildings in America including: the 170-acre estate of Bonticoe, four miles from Rosendale in Ulster County, New York; the 135-acre Springstown Farm (also near Rosendale); 45 acres of fir and pine trees in the same area; 600 acres of uncultivated land near Rochester, New York – all of which were purchased in 1796 and 1797 from Messrs. de Hardenberg, de Schwartz and Crooke in dollars, estimated at 60,000 francs in 1817;
- The 157-hectare farm of Eve (Oise), a *bien national* formerly belonging to the Chapters of Dammartin, Senlis and the Abbaye de Chaalis, acquired on 23 April 1791 through a *prête-nom*, estimated at 293,000 francs in 1816.

Benjamin Delessert’s share of this inheritance was 310,000 francs. He later inherited one-fifth of his brother Alexandre’s estate in 1833.

Real Estate Portfolio at Death (1847):

- An *hôtel particulier* located at 176 Rue du Faubourg Montmartre (ex-hôtel d’Uzès), leased for an annual rent of 46,200 francs;
- A house at 178 Rue Montmartre, leased for an annual rent of 12,000 francs;¹⁵⁷
- A house at 12 Rue des Jeuneurs, leased for an annual rent of 10,000 francs;
- A house at 7 Rue Saint-Fiacre (which also included a building located at n°9), purchased jointly with his brother François-Marie from Mr. Saint-Hilaire for 93,687 francs on 18 May 1824, leased for an annual rent of 6,800 francs;
- The first four buildings listed above had an estimated value of 1,500,000 francs in 1847;
- Several buildings in Passy located within a quadrilateral formed by the Rue Le Nôtre, the Rue Raynouard, the Avenue de Lamballe and the Quai de Passy (including his manufacture, several rented houses and a Swiss chalet). The buildings alone without the manufacture were leased for an annual rent of 29,770 francs. The Passy refinery, which brought in 60,000 francs annually, was valued at 1,795,400 francs;
- Two small domains in Switzerland: one at Montlaville (Pays de Vaud) known as “La Montagne de Vervand” and the other at Cossonay (estimated values unavailable);
- Several plots of land in the commune of Ivry, notably the ‘*terrain de la Garre*’ purchased for 500,000 francs on 31 May 1824, and other lands bought in 1839 for the *Chemin de Fer d’Orléans*.

¹⁵⁷ The former *hôtel d’Uzès* and the house in the Rue Montmartre amounted to 6,150m².

Bonds & Deeds Bequeathed at Death (1847):

- 266 shares of the *Banque de France*, worth 33,000 francs each in 1847;
- 45 shares of the *Compagnie des Quatre Canaux*, worth 1,252 francs each in 1847;
- Over 30,000 francs of bonds of the national debt, yielding 5% interest (*rente à 5%*);
- Roughly 30,000 francs of bonds of the national debt yielding 3% interest (*rente à 3%*);
- Several other cash advances made to various investors worth 220,000 francs.

Merchandise Left at Death (1847):

- 429,000 francs of unrefined sugar stored at his warehouse in the Rue Saint-Fiacre;
- 131,460 francs of refined sugar stored at his warehouse in the Rue Saint-Fiacre;
- 1,778,100 francs of *valeurs mobilières* at Passy (including 1,584,460 francs of sugar).

Capital Assets Left at Death (1847):

- *Mobilier de Paris* worth an estimated 316,250 francs, including his well-known mineralogical, numismatic and botanical collections (his herbarium was housed in twelve galleries on the second floor of his residence in the former *hôtel d'Uzès*), and his collection of paintings;¹⁵⁸
- 540,970 francs in current accounts linked to his trading house *Delessert et Cie.*;
- 1,200,000 francs equivalent to his participation in *Delessert et Cie.*;
- 821,000 francs of cash advances made to various investors (*créances*).

Benjamin Delessert also gifted 451,400 francs to various charitable institutions (and to his workers), equivalent to 5% of his personal fortune. In total, he bequeathed a fortune in excess of 11,000,000 francs.¹⁵⁹

Denormandie (l'ainé), Louis-Valentin (20 Oct. 1754 – ?) ●

Son of Charles-François, a lawyer at the *parlement* of Paris and *huissier ordinaire du roi en tous ses conseils*. Married N. de Morambert.

Career:

- Procurator at the *Chambre des comptes* (1777);
- Commissioner at the Accounting bureau (*comptabilité*) (1791);
- *Directeur provisoire de la Liquidation* (1792-1801).¹⁶⁰

Denormandie (jeune), Claude-Ernest (20 July 1756 – 10 Oct. 1815) ● ●

Younger brother of Charles-François. Married Alexandrine de Sinçay in 1784. The marriage had issue, including Augustin Denormandie (1789-1852), future president of the *Compagnie des avoués*.

Career:

- *Procureur du roi* at the Châtelet courts (1784);

¹⁵⁸ The mineralogical and numismatic collections alone were worth 41,697 francs. The herbarium had been created by Jean-Jacques Rousseau for the grandchildren of his patroness, Madame Boy de La Tour of Mottiers-Travers.

¹⁵⁹ For more on Delessert see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.76-85.

¹⁶⁰ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.245.

- Head of the 8th Division (*Dette*) of the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* (1792), later acting as a deputy to his elder brother Louis-Valentin (1802-1810);
- *Sous-directeur à l'intendance du Domaine extraordinaire* & member of the *Comité du contentieux des douanes* (1810);
- *Secrétaire général de l'administration des forêts* (1811);
- *Maître des requêtes au Conseil de Monsieur* (1814).¹⁶¹

Delon, Antoine Louis & Louis Frédéric (Delon frères) CCC CEC

The Delon brothers were silk and wool merchants from Montpellier who managed the *Delon frères et Cie.* trading house located in the Rue du Faubourg Saint-Denis. They were partners in Henri Grandin's *Compagnie des Laines* which was at the forefront of speculative ventures on the Spanish wool market during the Consulate. The Delons were first cousins of Jean-Auguste Sévène, Regent of the *Banque de France*, and their sister – Suzanne Delon – married Jean-Édouard Sévène, younger brother of the Regent. Both the Delon brothers married sisters of the wine merchant and revolutionary firebrand Antoine Joseph Santerre. In 1839, Jules Delon – Antoine's son – married Cécile Davillier, the granddaughter of Jean-Charles Davillier (another Regent of the *Banque de France*).¹⁶² The Delons were also close to the banker Jean-Marie Boscary. Louis Delon resided at 11 Rue du Faubourg Saint Denis. *Delon frères et Cie.* folded in the wake of Récamier's bankruptcy in December 1805.¹⁶³

Desmarest (a.k.a. Desmaret), Pierre Marie **(11 March 1764 – 24 April 1832)**

Desmarests was born in Compiègne. He abandoned an ecclesiastical career in 1793 to enrol in the first battalion of the Charente and undertook several missions in the *départements* during Year II. Desmarests was subsequently appointed *Administrateur général des Hôpitaux civils et militaires*, served on the *commission du commerce et des approvisionnements* and at the *service des vivres* of the *Armée d'Italie*. In October 1799, he was recruited by Fouché as head of the police ministry's *bureau particulier (bureau secret)*. They had met through a common acquaintance, a military contractor named Morin whose firm was headquartered in the Rue Taranne and with whom they were both in business along with Pierre-François Réal. Under the Parisian police prefect Régnier, Desmarests became chief of the *Préfecture de Police de Paris*'s 5th division – the Parisian *Sûreté* – and reigned over this department unopposed for fifteen years. He was made a *chevalier de la Légion d'honneur* on 12 Aug. 1810 and created a *chevalier de l'Empire* on 10 April 1811. During the *Cents Jours*, he briefly served as a representative for Compiègne but retired to private life after Napoleon's downfall. He married Mlle Lhardy, a niece of Neuchâtel banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.245-246.

¹⁶² For all these links see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.379.

¹⁶³ Aulard (*Paris sous le Premier Empire*, Tome II, p.357-358, 17 Dec. 1805) mentions their bankruptcy: "On a annoncé la faillite aujourd'hui de MM. Delon frères, marchands de soie en bottes faubourg Saint-Denis ; cette maison qui a toujours joui de la meilleure réputation se trouve entraînée...dans l'affaire de M. Récamier."

¹⁶⁴ See Desmarest's memoirs –*Quinze Ans de Haute Police sous le Consulat et l'Empire*, Paris: Garnier frères, 1900.

Desprez, Médard (24 April 1764 – 24 March 1842) ● CCC ●

Desprez was the son of a school headmaster from Vauxaillon (Aisne).

Career:

- *Commis* at the *Cottin & Jauge* bank (1784);
- Unofficial agent (*agent officieux*) of Dufresne de Saint-Léon at the *Trésor royal* (1788);
- Administrator of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* (1799);
- Director of the 3rd Division of the *Trésorerie nationale (service extraordinaire, comptabilités vacantes ou antérieures à l'établissement de la Trésorerie)* (1800);
- *Banquier du Trésor public* (1802);¹⁶⁵
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (17 Oct. 17, 1801 – 17 Oct. 1806);
- One of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* in Year XII (1804);
- Joins the *Compagnie des Négociants Réunis* (1805);
- Goes bankrupt (1807).

The speculations of Médard and Ouvrard on Spanish piasters were the principal cause of the *Banque de France*'s disastrous bankruptcy during the winter of 1805-1806. Summoned to explain himself before Napoleon in January 1806, Desprez reportedly burst into tears. All his goods were confiscated by decree on 6 April 1806 and he was imprisoned with Ouvrard at the Sainte-Pélagie prison.¹⁶⁶ Médard declared bankruptcy on 26 Nov. 1807 with debts of 13,126,840 francs.¹⁶⁷ The inventory of his assets listed property worth two million francs including:

- Three buildings with an estimated value of 600,000 francs;
- The domain of Marchais (Aisne) with a revenue of 36,000 francs, estimated at 720,000 francs;
- A house at 27 Place Vendôme, estimated at 400,000 francs;
- A farm at Ecquevilly (Yvelines) with a revenue of 8,000 francs, estimated at 200,000 francs.¹⁶⁸

The liquidation of his estate was still ongoing at the time of his death.

Desrenaudes (or Des Renaudes), Jean-Dominique Borie ● ● ●
(March 24, 1746 – ?)

Born in Tulle. Son of Jean-Augustin, *conseiller du Roi à la sénéchaussée* and *siège présidial de Tulle*, and of Jeanne Dumirat. Brother of the *Abbé* Martial Desrenaudes – Talleyrand's secretary. Jean-Dominique was a lieutenant of Dufresne de Saint-Léon at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation*. Note that in 1828, all the archives of the *Liquidation* were still being overseen by a *conservateur* who was none other than Dominique des Renaudes, still in activity with the rank of *inspecteur des finances* at the age of 82!

¹⁶⁵ AN, AF/IV/1082. See also Bruguière, *GPR*, p.246

¹⁶⁶ Desprez's sister, Geneviève, married Alexandre-François Drouet (a.k.a. Druet), a high-ranking official at the *Trésor public* who was implicated in Desprez's bankruptcy and committed suicide on 14 Oct. 1810 (Bruguière, *GPR*, p.248).

¹⁶⁷ See AP, D11U3, carton 41, dossiers 2606 & 2607 ; MC/ET/XCVII/651, 29 Nov. 1807 (bankruptcy statement) & MC/ET/XVII/1241, 9 Aug. 1842 (Médard's inventory after decease).

¹⁶⁸ For a detailed list of Desprez's assets see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.94-100.

Career:

- *Commis aux exercices des fermes* at Amboise (1763);
- *Receveur des fermes* at Revel (1770);
- *Chef and premier commis à la dette du clergé* (1791), then at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* (1792);
- *Liquidateur principal* at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* (1792);
- Head of the 2nd section of the *Direction générale de la Liquidation (dette du clergé, des provinces et des communes)* (1793-1810);
- *Inspecteur des finances* (1821).¹⁶⁹

Desrenaudes (or Des Renaudes), Abbé Martial Borie (1755 – 1825)

The Abbé Martial Borie-Desrenaudes had studied theology with Talleyrand at the Sorbonne where they both received law degrees in 1778. Talleyrand had previously obtained a bachelor's in theology from the seminary of Saint-Sulpice in 1774 where his thesis was entitled: “*De quelle science les lèvres du prêtre sont-elles les gardiennes?*” He was ranked first due his ‘noble’ status while Desrenaudes was fifth.¹⁷⁰ Desrenaudes became Talleyrand's assistant when he was appointed Agent-General of the Clergy in 1780. Both were experts in Church real estate and *biens nationaux*. He also served as Talleyrand's *sous-diacre* in the ecclesiastical administration of the bishopric of Autun and officiated with him at the *Fête de la Fédération*.¹⁷¹

Devaines (or De Vaines) père, Jean **CCC** **(1733 – 15 March 1803)**

Jean Devaines was the son of a *receveur des gabelles* from Bellême (Orne). He met Turgot while serving as director of the royal domain in Limoges (1768) and became his disciple.¹⁷² Both shared an interest for intellectual pursuits and the physiocratic movement. Turgot eventually appointed him *premier commis des finances* (1774) – the first *premier commis* of Louis XVI's reign. Devaines hosted a well-known salon in Paris which welcomed some of the great writers of the Enlightenment (Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert, Condorcet, Turgot, Malesherbes), and he even provided several articles for the *Encyclopédie*.¹⁷³ He also served as a Treasury commissioner under the Legislative Assembly.¹⁷⁴ Devaines was a driving force in the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*'s creation.¹⁷⁵ His son (L.C. Devaines *fils*) also worked for the *caisse*.

Career:

- *Directeur des domaines* at Limoges (1768), and in Brittany (1771-1774);
- *Premier commis des Finances* (1774);
- *Lecteur de la Chambre du roi* (1775);
- Ennobled (1776);

¹⁶⁹ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.63-64.

¹⁷⁰ Georges Lacour-Gayet, *Talleyrand*. Tome I, Paris: Payot, 1928, p. 368.

¹⁷¹ For more on Desrenaudes see BN, f^o Lf/157/10 and Bruguière, *GPR*, p.247.

¹⁷² See Edgar Faure, *La disgrâce de Turgot*. Paris: Gallimard, 1961.

¹⁷³ See Pierre Grosclaude, *Malesherbes. Témoin et interprète de son temps*, Paris: Fischbacher, 1961, p.616.

¹⁷⁴ Most of these biographical details are drawn from John F. Bosher, ‘The Premier Commis des Finances in the Reign of Louis XVI’, *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 3 (4), 1964, p.477 & Bruguière, *GPR*, p.289.

¹⁷⁵ He became its third administrator (ABF, 1069200402-1, *RDAGA-I*, 11 messidor IV/29 June 1796, p.6).

- *Receveur des Finances* at Caen (1779-1790);
- Associate of the *Ferme générale* for the duchy of Penthièvre (1789);
- Commissioner of the *Trésorerie nationale* (1791-1794);
- Imprisoned on the charge of “*paying his dues to the nation*” (*rendre compte à la Nation*). Released after 9 Thermidor;
- Member of the *section de finances* of the *Conseil d’État* (1800);
- Member of the *Institut* (1803).

Antoine-Clair Thibaudeau, one of his close friends, gives the following description of Devaines:

*“Mr. Devaines, a student of Turgot and former receiver-general of finances, hosted a social circle numbering few friends, which made it all the more agreeable. Far from having the ridicule and pompous airs which were often associated with financiers of the Ancien Régime, he had simple and polite manners, a soft and amiable character, with bonhomie and finesse, an ornate spirit and delicate taste. Having lived in the circles of high society prior to the Revolution, he knew their characters and anecdotes. He lent interest to trifles through the grace with which he recounted them, and approached serious matters with the gravity befitting them. He was all in all an experienced old man with a shrewd sense for business and of very wise council indeed.”*¹⁷⁶

Another friend was Martin Gaudin, Napoleon’s finance minister, who had served as Treasury commissioner with Devaines during the early Revolution. Gaudin speaks approvingly of Devaines’s character in his memoirs: “*Mr. Devaines [was] remarkable by his private virtues, his administrative expertise and his literary talents.*”¹⁷⁷

Mollien, who crossed paths with Devaines when he was a member of the *conseil d’État*’s financial commission, also praises him:

*“The conseil d’État’s [financial] commission...was presided by a man who was distinguished by his graceful spirit, the moderation of his political principles and the reputation of his financial enlightenment. He had been one of the students and collaborators of Turgot and had honourably assembled a great fortune. He was an example of the kind of ‘equality’ which – long before the term was abused by the Revolution – had been imparted in all things by the instruction of good manners. His house was then the meeting point for those men who held the highest rank at Court and in the sciences. He had escaped the dangers of the Revolution without having recourse to reproachable sacrifices, and in its last stages he found himself back at the point where it had first taken him – excepting a few losses to his fortune – sought out by all those of his old friends from different classes who had survived.”*¹⁷⁸

Devinck, François CCC

A prominent Dunkerque trader who served as Consul-General of Flanders.¹⁷⁹ He imported salt into France via Dunkerque.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ Thibaudeau, *Mémoires sur la Convention et le Directoire*, Tome I, p.134-135.

¹⁷⁷ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.13.

¹⁷⁸ Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.242-243.

¹⁷⁹ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.528.

¹⁸⁰ AN, AF/II/77, dossier 567:20 – *Arrêté autorisant Devinck de Dunkerque, à exporter du sel pris à Marennnes* (6 pluviôse III/25 Jan. 1795).

Doyen, Charles Martin (21 Aug. 1756 – 19 July 1831) ● ● ● CCC

Charles Martin was the son of Charles-Philippe, “*intéressé aux affaires du roi*”, and of Anne-Élisabeth Abraham. The Doyen were well-established in the Parisian bourgeoisie and produced many lawyers and notaries who practiced at the Châtelet courts. Charles’s cousin – Nicolas-Amand Leclerc – was a secretary to Louis XVI, while another cousin, Nicolas-Marie Leclerc de Septchênes, had served as *secrétaire des Commandements de la reine*.¹⁸¹ On 19 Jan. 1794, Charles married Olive-Rose-Jacqueline Montaut, a descendant of Samuel Bernard (court banker to Louis XIV).¹⁸² Doyen was appointed general paymaster (*caissier général*) of the Treasury by Louis XVI in 1791. Yet this proximity to the monarchy did not prevent Doyen from continuing to serve in his post throughout the Terror.¹⁸³ He was also a friend of Perregaux.¹⁸⁴ In 1796, Doyen left the Treasury to establish his own bank – *Doyen, Durieux et Cie.* – and became an administrator of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*. One of his shareholders was Médard Desprez, former collaborator of Bertrand Dufresne at the Royal Treasury between 1788 and 1790.¹⁸⁵ Desprez’s brother-in-law, Drouet, worked at the Treasury as a director of correspondence.¹⁸⁶

Career:

- *Commis à la caisse du Trésor royal, assurant la liaison avec la banque de la cour*, acting as assistant to Martin Garat (1785);
- *Caissier du Trésor royal à Paris* (1789). It was through Doyen that all monthly allowances the National Assembly consented for the king’s civil list transited (between 500,000-700,000 *livres* each month). He also reimbursed the court banker’s expenses;
- *Caissier de la recette journalière* (1791-1792);
- *Caissier de la caisse générale de la Trésorerie nationale* (1793-1794);¹⁸⁷
- Founds *Doyen, Durieux et Cie.* (headquartered at 8, Rue de la Michodière) with his partner Jean-Baptiste-Fidel-Auguste-Marie Durieux (prior to Floréal Year V). This bank served as the financial guarantor (1,500,000 francs) for a supply contract signed on 25 March 1797 with the Brussels firm *Frédéric Romberg et fils* for the *Armées du Nord et de Sambre-et-Meuse*.¹⁸⁸ It also lent 600,000 francs to Rouen’s *banque d’escompte* on 30 May 1798.¹⁸⁹ The bank was dissolved prior to Venémiaire Year VIII. Alexandre-Edme Méchin, the future deputy of the Restoration who was appointed to replace Régnaud de Saint-Jean d’Angély as commissioner at Malta, records that he had

¹⁸¹ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.108 – In 1778, Nicolas-Marie Leclerc married Marie-Catherine de La Ponce, daughter of a director of the Invalides and *commissaire ordinaire des guerres*. The marriage contract indicates both spouses brought dowries worth 200,000 *livres* each and was signed by a litany of distinguished witnesses including Louis XVI, Necker, Voltaire, Choiseul and Vergennes amongst others!

¹⁸² See the Bernard de Coubert family in Albert Révérend, *Titres et confirmations de titres. Monarchie de Juillet à la 3^e République (1830-1908)*, Paris: Honoré Champion, 1909, p.10-11.

¹⁸³ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.96.

¹⁸⁴ Laffitte, *Mémoires*, p.55

¹⁸⁵ For more on Médard Desprez, see AN, F/7/6555 & BB/18/797 and Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.94-100.

¹⁸⁶ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.133.

¹⁸⁷ Two decrees issued by the *Cour des Comptes* on 4 May & 16 June 1808 exonerated Doyen of any irregularities in his management of the Treasury for the periods of 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1792 and 1 Jan. 1793-30 April 1794. The Treasury’s budget during the latter period amounted to 5,769,745,805 francs (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.110).

¹⁸⁸ MC/ET/XLV/660, 8 floréal V/27 April 1797.

¹⁸⁹ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.97.

purchased bills of exchange from *Doyen & Durieux* to cash in with their Italian correspondents during his travels in Italy in 1798 and 1799;¹⁹⁰

- Founds *Charles-Martin Doyen et Cie.* (headquartered at 26 Rue Notre-Dame-des-Victoires) with Charles-Henry-Pierre Tellier (a former clerk at *Doyen, Durieux et Cie.*) on 11 Oct. 1799. Its starting capital was 600,000 francs (Doyen – 400,000; Tellier – 100,000; Joseph-Marie Lasalle – 100,000).¹⁹¹ The bank's headquarters moved to 5 Rue Cerutti in 1802. It was dissolved in 1813;
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (1800-1806);
- Deputy of the *département* of the Seine (1800-1807);
- Mayor of Paris's 3rd arrondissement in replacement of Benjamin Delessert (30 March 1800);
- One of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* in Year XII (1802-1803);
- *Député de la Seine au Corps Législatif* (elected by the *Sénat conservateur* on 27 March 1802);
- Suffers losses due to Récamier's bankruptcy (1806) and the downturn of Rouen's trade (1811);¹⁹²
- *Conseiller général de la Seine* (1810-1811);
- Assets placed in administration (*liquidation*) (1811);
- Goes bankrupt (31 Dec. 1818).¹⁹³

Real Estate:

- Land in Indre-et-Loire purchased for 600,000 *livres* on 8 July 1793 in association with Jean-Claude Moynat.¹⁹⁴ They attempted to resell the land on 15 June 1795 for 900,000 *livres*;¹⁹⁵
- An *hôtel particulier* at 5 Rue Cerutti in Paris purchased for 200,000 francs on 17 Sep. 1801 from the widow of Jean-Joseph de Laborde. Doyen had been renting the property from Laborde's widow since 11 Aug. 11, 1798. He only paid 60,000 francs up front and acquitted the remainder in payments stretched over 7 years and charged at 5% interest.¹⁹⁶

Dufresne, Bertrand (24 Nov. 1736 – 22 Feb. 1801)

Born in Navarrenx (Pyrénées-Atlantiques). Died in Paris. Son of Nicolas Dufresne, a cobbler from Navarrenx, and of his wife the 'dame' de Compagnet. No relation to Dufresne de Saint-Léon (see below).

Bertrand Dufresne began his career as a *commis* of Jean-Joseph de Laborde. He also worked for the duc de Choiseul and the *Caisse d'Escompte* (where he met Le Couteulx) before serving as one of Necker's principal tax experts. In September 1790, he was

¹⁹⁰ Méchin, *Précis de mon voyage et ma mission en Italie dans les années 1798 et 1799*, Laon: Imprimerie de Melleville, 1808, p.13.

¹⁹¹ MC/ET/XLVIII/427, 19 vendémiaire VIII/11 Oct. 1799 & MC/ET/XLVIII/440, 5 pluviôse VIII/25 Jan. 1800. The company was renewed in 1808 (MC/ET/XLVIII/489, 24 Dec. 1808). See also Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.110-111 and Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.58.

¹⁹² See AN, F/12/502, *rapport du 19 avril 1811* & Odette Viennet, *Napoléon et l'industrie française*, Paris: Plon, 1947, p.122.

¹⁹³ For more on Doyen, see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.107-113; AN, D X 3; F/1a/565 & F/1b/II/Seine (dossier 2); Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.58, 88 & 96; Bruguière, *GPR*, p.249.

¹⁹⁴ MC/ET/CXII/827, 8 July 1793.

¹⁹⁵ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.112.

¹⁹⁶ MC/ET/XLVIII/437, 1 fructidor IX/19 Aug. 1801.

appointed director of the *Trésor royal* by Louis XVI with an annual salary of 200,000 *livres*.¹⁹⁷ Arrested in 1793, he was freed after 9 Thermidor and elected to the *Cinq-Cents* in April 1797 but was one of the pro-monarchist deputies removed on 18 Fructidor. Bonaparte found him excessively rigid but respected his exceptional financial talents, saying Dufresne was: “*like stupid on any other subject except finances, but on these he excelled: his nerves immediately seized the most intricate question.*”¹⁹⁸ Napoleon appointed him a counsellor of state on 25 Dec. 1799 and director of the Treasury on 17 Aug. 1800. Thus, Dufresne was one of the great financial officers of state who carried over from the *Ancien Régime* to the consular era. He died in 1801 and was replaced at the Treasury by Barbé-Marbois.

Career:

- Began his career as a *commis* in the trading houses of Bayonne and Bordeaux;
- Noticed by Jean-Joseph de Laborde who placed him in the Duc de Choiseul’s household, then at the court bank (1764);
- *Caissier de la Caisse d’Escompte de Laverdy* (1767 – dissolved in 1769);
- *Payeur-contrôleur à la Chambre des comptes de Paris* (his position regrouped the duties of three separate posts) (1775);
- Missioned by Jacques Necker to reorganise the *Recette générale; premier commis chargé du Trésor* (1777 – replaced by Gojard following Necker’s departure in 1781);
- *Receveur des finances* at Rouen (1782);
- *Intendant des fonds de la Marine et des Colonies* (1784);
- *Conseiller d’État* (1785);
- Appointed *intendant du Trésor royal* following Necker’s return in 1788;
- *Directeur général du Trésor public* (9 Sep. 1790 – Aug. 1791);
- Ran unsuccessfully as a candidate to the Legislative Assembly against Jacques-Pierre Brissot (Sep. 1791);
- Arrested for being a ‘*concessionnaire*’ (an embezzler of public funds) (14 Nov. 1793);
- Released from prison after 9 Thermidor;
- Elected a deputy to the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents* (April 1797);
- “*Fructidorisé*” - deprived of his legislative seat by the Coup of 18 Fructidor (he was removed on 4 Sep. 1797 – the first day of the coup);
- *Conseiller d’État* (25 Dec. 1799);
- *Directeur du Trésor public* (17 Aug. 1800 to his death).¹⁹⁹

Dufresne de Saint-Léon, Louis-César-Alexandre



(15 April 1751 – 11 Jan. 1836)

Born and died in Paris. In 1792 he married Madeleine-Sophie Van Robais, daughter and sole legal heir of Josse Van Robais, the divorced wife of Jean-Jacques Hogguer. No relation to Bertrand Dufresne.

¹⁹⁷ See Bertrand Dufresne’s entry in the Biographical Index.

¹⁹⁸ Charles Durand, *Étude sur le Conseil d’État napoléonien*, Paris: PUF, 1949, p.280.

¹⁹⁹ For more on Dufresne see AN, F/4/1954 (dossier personnel); AD/IX/432 (*offices à la Chambre des comptes*); AB/XIX/327 (Dufresne’s papers while he was *intendant* and *directeur général du Trésor public* (1788-1791)); C/224, dossiers 160, 165 and 166 (*lettres et mémoires au Roi en novembre-décembre 1791*); DX 2; John Francis Bosher, ‘The ‘*premier commis*’ in the reign of Louis XVI’, *French Historical Studies*, 3(4), 1964, p.478-481; Robert & Cougny (eds.), *DPF*, Tome II, p.463 and Bruguière, *GPR*, p.250.

Louis-César-Alexandre Dufresne de Saint-Léon was a colourful financial adventurer of the Revolution. He accumulated extensive financial experience working at the Royal Treasury prior to 1789, serving as *Liquidateur* (1777), *premier commis* (1785), *premier commis au Trésor royal* (1786) and *premier commis aux finances (bureau des dépêches)* (1788) – all under the training and supervision of the influential guardian of the Royal Treasury (*garde du Trésor royal*) Savalette de Langes, one of the wealthiest bankers in France (see his entry below). Dufresne de Saint-Léon became a close advisor of Necker and Valdec de Lessart and was the man sent by Louis XVI to recall Necker to the finance ministry following the Storming of the Bastille. After the nationalisation of church lands, he decided to specialise in the confiscation and sale of ecclesiastical real estate and developed close ties with the recognised authority in that field – Talleyrand.

After the National Assembly determined to honour France's national debt on 17 June 1789, it established the *comité de liquidation* in January 1790 to audit the claims of all state creditors and pensioners and to undertake debt recoveries. This committee, directed by the Baron Jean-Pierre de Batz, was unquestionably one of the most important administrations of the early Revolution.²⁰⁰ The *comité de liquidation* worked in tandem with the *Caisse de l'Extraordinaire*, headed by Amelot de Chaillot, which established payment orders (*mandats de paiement*) for state creditors. Any claim submitted by a state creditor would first be examined by the *comité de liquidation*, and if deemed receivable, was passed on to the National Assembly for approval. If the legislature confirmed it, a decree was issued which had to be signed by the king. Once all these requirements were fulfilled, the claim was finally passed to the *Caisse de l'Extraordinaire* which issued the payment order in *assignats* to the creditor.²⁰¹

Such was the popularity of these payment orders of the *Caisse de l'Extraordinaire* that they rapidly became the subject of intense trading and speculation on the market. Canny speculators purchased dubious claims at low prices and attempted to have them validated through their political connections. Applications for liquidations became so numerous that Batz decided to create a *Direction générale de la Liquidation* to act as the auditing authority for the *comité de Liquidation*. He appointed Dufresne de Saint-Léon as its director in December 1790.

The period between 16 Dec. 1790 and 30 Sep. 1791 (dissolution of the Legislative Assembly) – during which Batz and Dufresne de Saint-Léon exerted the greatest authority over the liquidation of the national debt – proved catastrophic for state finances. A report of April 1791 by a Captain Beaufort suggests the funds collected by Talon and his network of secret counsellors were being diverted from the National Treasury:

“Outdated claims, which had perhaps already been reimbursed, were paid on vague or false certificates from the director of the Public Treasury who is appointed by the court. Old debts were paid a second time as if they were legitimate based on a simple certificate from a commissioner, who is again appointed by the king...and all these suspicious claims have today been paid with the goods of the state without having

²⁰⁰ The *comité de liquidation* audited claims representing several billions of *livres*, and hundreds of millions of freshly printed *assignats* were assigned to it. Batz oversaw the committee's creation and implementation and succeeded in attributing it the tasks of liquidating the outstanding debts of the departments of the Army, Navy, *Maison du Roi* and of princely households, to which he soon added the recovery of all sums owed to the state by local communities, individuals and even the clergy. Batz enriched himself by demanding millions in the name of the state from the *Compagnie des Indes* and the *Compagnie des Eaux*, which these firms of course could not provide (Blanc, *LCST*, p.20-21).

²⁰¹ Blanc, *LCST*, p.21.

*been subjected to any kind of verification. Finally, what reveals the extent of this new pillage of the Public Treasury is that the king's agents hastened to use the first billion worth of biens nationaux to pay debts that were probably outdated, extinguished or suspect of the most prominent aristocrats and the court validated these fraudulent reimbursements without first verifying whether the biens nationaux could even cover the totality of legitimate debts.”*²⁰²

This corruption, Rivarol argued, had been a prime motivator in the outbreak of the Revolution itself:

*“...It was vile interest that made Paris rise in revolt...Sixty thousand capitalists and the anthill of speculators determined it by devoting themselves to the National Assembly the day it declared the government's debts under the safeguard of French honour and loyalty; for it was not a constitution that the capitalists expected from the Estates General, it was a guarantee.”*²⁰³

Among the experts Dufresne de Saint-Léon gathered around him at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* was Dominique des Renaudes, the elder brother of the Abbé Martial Borie des Renaudes – Talleyrand's personal secretary (see his entry). He was also very close to Mollien's wife, the Comtesse Mollien (Adèle Rosalie Collart-Dutilleul – see Mollien's entry), whom he “*considered as his own daughter.*”²⁰⁴ Her father, Étienne-Louis Gabriel Collart-Dutilleul, was one of his most important lieutenants and acted as a kind of general-secretary at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* (see his entry). Dufresne de Saint-Léon also took advantage of his position to forge alliances with the merchant aristocracy, marrying Madeleine-Sophie Van Robais around 1792 – the daughter and sole legal heir of Josse Van Robais who owned the great textile manufactures of Abbeville. Arrested in November or December 1792, he was released in February 1793 thanks to Barère and briefly emigrated before returning to France in August 1794.²⁰⁵

After Talleyrand was appointed finance minister in 1797, Dufresne de Saint-Léon became an influential member of his entourage. He served as Talleyrand's authorised agent (*fondé de pouvoir*) in Benevento in 1806 and accompanied him to the Congress of Vienna in 1815. During the Restoration, Louis XVIII appointed him *Conseiller d'État honoraire et secrétaire de la commission de liquidation des créances anglaises.*²⁰⁶

Career:

- *Liquidateur* (1777), then *premier commis* (1785) under Savalette de Langes (the *garde du Trésor royal*) at the Royal Treasury;
- Arrested by Calonne for having published a study on public credit. He was subsequently well-regarded by Calonne's successors;

²⁰² AN, F/7/4590, plaquette 3 – quoted in Arnaud de Lestapis, ‘Batz et la liquidation de la créance Guichon’, *AHRF*, 128, 1952: 377-359. See also ‘Le réseau de Batz’ in Blanc, *Les hommes de Londres*, p.171-201. This occult scheme intended to corrupt members of the Legislative Assembly's *comité de Liquidation* by making the revolutionary government pay pensions which should have been covered by the king's civil list was first mentioned by Buchez & Roux (*Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française*, Tome XIX, Paris: Paulin, 1836, p.212). There is little doubt a significant portion of this money was used to finance counter-revolutionary activities (Blanc, *LCST*, p.20).

²⁰³ Rivarol, *Mémoires*, p.235.

²⁰⁴ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.636.

²⁰⁵ Blanc, *LCST*, p.40-41 & Bruguière, *GPR*, p.250-251 – He was replaced at the *Direction de la Liquidation* by the Denormandie brothers (see their entries).

²⁰⁶ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.250-251.

- *Premier commis au Trésor royal* (1786);
- *Premier commis aux Finances (bureau des dépêches)* (1788);
- *Directeur général de la Liquidation* (Dec. 1790);
- Replaced by the Denormandie brothers and arrested (Nov./Dec. 1792);
- Emigrated abroad immediately following his release from prison (Feb. 1793);
- Returns to France (Aug. 1794);
- Organises the wedding of his goddaughter, Adèle Rosalie Collart-Dutilleul (daughter of his close collaborator, Étienne Louis Gabriel Collart-Dutilleul), to François-Nicolas Mollien (1 Aug. 1802);
- Served as Talleyrand's authorised agent (*fondé de pouvoir*) in Benevento (1806);
- Attended the Congress of Vienna with Talleyrand (1815);
- *Conseiller d'État honoraire et secrétaire de la commission de liquidation des créances anglaises* (1815-1818).²⁰⁷

Durieux, Jean-Baptiste-Fidel- Auguste-Marie CCC

See Charles Martin Doyen.

Enfantin, Marcel CCC CEC

Resided in the Rue Coq Héron.²⁰⁸

D'Espagnac, Marc René Marie de Sahuquet d'Amarzit (Abbé) (26 Sep. 1762 – 5 April 1794)

Born in Brive. The Abbé d'Espagnac was a disciple of Calonne, a counsellor of the *parlement de Paris* and canon of Notre Dame Cathedral during the late *Ancien Régime*. D'Espagnac acquired a reputation as a provocative troublemaker at Court but was shielded by his association with Philippe d'Orléans, Louis XVI's brother. As an associate of the *Orléanistes*, he was regularly involved in the speculations conducted at the Palais Royal. D'Espagnac wrote the *cahier de doléances* for the bailiwick of Montfort-l'Amaury in 1789 but failed to be elected a deputy to the Estates-General. He played a small part in the fall of the Bastille and became a vocal opponent of religion and ecclesiastical privileges at the *club des jacobins*. His proximity to many Jacobin leaders such as Danton, Chabot, Julien de Toulouse and Camille Desmoulins afforded him political protection and enabled him to secure lucrative business contracts for his military supply company – the *Compagnie Masson*. Joseph Servan, the war minister, awarded this company the general supply of Dumouriez's army, and d'Espagnac became Dumouriez's financial advisor and personal banker.²⁰⁹ He was also closely linked to the Belgian financier Édouard Walckiers. Denounced for embezzling public funds in November 1792, D'Espagnac had to go into hiding after Dumouriez defected to the Austrians. Soon afterwards, it was revealed he was

²⁰⁷ For more on Dufresne de Saint Léon see AN, F/7/4698 & 4386; T//1617; F/1/A/565; D/XI/2; Archives Départementales des Yvelines, IV/Q/97 and Bruguière, *GPR*, p.41-42, 144-146 & 250-251.

²⁰⁸ MCN/ET/XVIII/988, 11 brumaire XI/2 Nov. 1802.

²⁰⁹ See Mathiez, *LCPST*, Chapter V.

deeply implicated in the *Compagnie des Indes* liquidation scandal. He was arrested and tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal and guillotined with the *Dantonists* on 5 April 1794.²¹⁰

Estève, Martin-Roch-Xavier (1772 – 1853) AI

Estève began working as an official in the army treasury in 1792 and spent three years as *directeur général-comptable des revenus publics* before serving as paymaster general of the *Armée de l'Ouest*. He accompanied Bonaparte on his Italian Campaign in 1796-1797 where he was based at Treviso and served as general paymaster of the *Armée d'Orient* during the Egyptian expedition. Estève rose rapidly after Brumaire, being appointed government treasurer in 1801 and Treasurer of the Imperial Crown in 1804. Following the Battle of Iéna, he was placed in charge of Prussian finances as *Administrateur-général des finances et domaines des pays conquis au-delà de l'Elbe* (1806), working for General Clarke who was governor-general of Prussia. On 24 Feb. 1809 he was made a *comte de l'Empire*. Estève's career ended abruptly in 1811 when he was disgraced and forced to resign his office.²¹¹ On 5 Oct. 1802 he married Anne-Antoinette-Françoise Villemintot, daughter of the banker and *Caisse des Comptes Courants* shareholder César-Louis-Marie Villemintot (1749-1807).

Faber (Faber frères), Frédéric CCC

Frédéric Faber was a partner of the Hamburg banker Joachim Schlutter and the Parisian textile merchant Pierre Sagnier down to Year V.²¹² He then went into business with Louis Nicolas Razuret (*Razuret, Faber et Cie.*). Their partnership was dissolved in 1803 and Faber settled in Montpellier where he continued his business on a regional scale.²¹³

Faipoult (de Maisoncelles), Guillaume-Charles MF **(4 Dec. 1752 – 8 Oct. 1817)**

Born in Paris in the *paroisse* of *Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois*. Died in Augy (Yonne). Son of Charles Faipoult de Maisoncelles (c.1710-1761), *écuyer, seigneur* of Maisoncelles (Haute Marne) and investor in the *Fermes du roi*, and of Marie-Jeanne Aubert. His grandfather was Nicolas Faipoult (c.1688-1751), an *écuyer* ennobled through his purchase of a charge of *secrétaire notaire du roi* in the *chancellerie* of Toulouse on 8 April 1734 who also served as *receveur général des tailles de l'élection de Joinville* (Haute Marne) and was created *seigneur* of Fays and Trois-Fontaines-la-Ville (Marne). The Faipoults were a catholic family.

Guillaume-Charles had several distinguished relatives. On his father's side, his eldest uncle – Jacques Faipoult (died 30 Sep. 1787) – served as *président du grenier à sel* and mayor of Joinville, while another uncle – Claude-Nicolas Faipoult – had been an infantry commander and a *chevalier de Saint Louis*. Through his paternal aunt, Marie-Madeleine Faipoult (1716-1784), he was linked to the Widranges family who were his cousins and

²¹⁰ For more on d'Espagnac see Le Comte Victor de Seilhac, *L'abbé Marc-René d'Espagnac*, Tulle: Imprimerie Crauffon, 1881 and Mathiez, *LCPST*, p.135-185.

²¹¹ For his relations with Bonaparte see Paul Frémont, *Les Payeurs d'armée*, Paris: Plon, 1906, p.112-121.

²¹² AP, D3B6 96, nivôse an X.

²¹³ For more on Faber see AP, D31 U3, 2/214 & D11 U3, 22/1546; MC/ET/XVIII/1020, 23 Aug. 1806 and Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.48-49 & 326, footnote 26.

owned the lordships of La Rochère, Maisoncelles and Grignoncourt (in the Haute Marne and Franche Comté). His maternal grandfather, Guillaume Aubert, had been *receveur ancien des tailles de l'élection de Reims* and a *secrétaire notaire au roi*.

Faipoult's mother died in 1754 and he lost his father in 1761. He was placed in the care of a tutor – a Parisian bourgeois named Louis Pechinet – by a council of family relatives and friends. After completing secondary school, Faipoult studied at the *École militaire du Génie* at Mézières (Charleville-Mézières) where his classmates included Lazare Carnot who became his lifelong friend. Following his first marriage, Faipoult resided in the Rue Saint-Hyacinthe in Paris. After his return from Italy, he lived in Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1799) before spending several years as Napoleonic prefect of the Scheldt at Ghent (1800-1808). From 1809 to 1813 he was in Madrid before returning to Paris where he spent the last years of his life in a residence located at 63 Rue Sainte-Avoie (modern Rue du Temple).

Marriages:

Faipoult was married twice:

- In June 1777, he married Maris-Claude Bergeat (1731-1821), the daughter of Claude-François Bergeat who was a *bailli* and *lieutenant général de police* of Reims as well as a law professor at that city's university.²¹⁴ She was 21 years older than him. Since the 25-year-old Faipoult was still considered a minor, the wedding had to be approved by a family council. The couple had no children and divorced on 8 April 1793;
- On 11 ventôse III/1 March 1795, Faipoult married Anne-Germaine Duché (1762-1815), daughter of Jacques-François Duché who had been a Parisian wine merchant and postmaster.²¹⁵ The couple had no children. However, they oversaw the education of Anne-Germaine's niece and nieces. They also adopted a daughter whom they named Charlotte-Germaine-Julie Grandjean-Delisle (the Grandjean-Delisle were relatives of Anne-Germaine) by notarial act signed in Ghent on 6 thermidor IX/25 July 1801.²¹⁶ In 1807 she married Louis de Séganville who served as Marshal Bessières's *aide-de-camp* and was later created a *baron de l'Empire*.²¹⁷

Assets:

The extent of Faipoult's personal fortune is difficult to establish and appears to have varied considerably during his career. His father, Charles Faipoult de Maisoncelles, whose fortune amounted to some 135,000 *livres*, bequeathed a large number of bills of exchange and shares in military contracting ventures, naval armaments and participations in the bishopric of Cambrai's tax farming administration. He also owned 20% of the *société fermière du comté d'Autrey-lès-Gray* (Côte d'Or) which included ironworks and forges and yielded an annual revenue of 28,000 *livres*. Guillaume-Charles was his only heir. However, it is impossible to know how much of his father's wealth he inherited because the notarial study

²¹⁴ MC/ET/XXIII/752, 21 June 1777, *Marriage contract of Faipoult de Maisoncelles and Bergeat*.

²¹⁵ MC/ET/XCVIII/707, 8 ventôse III/26 Feb. 1795, *Marriage contract of Faipoult de Maisoncelles and Duthé*.

²¹⁶ MC/ET/CVII/689, 12 Oct. 1807, *Supporting documents relating to the adoption of Charlotte-Germaine-Julie Grandjean-Delisle*.

²¹⁷ AP, DQ7 1884, f^o 1v^o-2r^o, 19 Oct. 1807, *Marriage contract of Séganville and Grandjean-Delisle-Faipoult*.

which managed the succession (study CVI) has not conserved its archival records for this period.

In the contract of his first marriage, Faipoult claimed that “*his goods only consist of furniture, clothes, laundry and rags for his personal use estimated at 5,000 livres.*” Yet his first wife brought a dowry of 36,000 *livres* plus 76,000 *livres* in bonds (*effets de portefeuille*) and 4,150 *livres* in annual life annuity payments. In the contract of his second marriage in 1796, Faipoult declared his personal assets were worth 10,000 *livres* while his second wife brought a dowry of 8,000 *livres*.

Despite his reputation for being an upright and honest civil servant, it is possible Faipoult received several valuable gifts from the Italian states where he was posted during his career (i.e. Genoa, Rome, Milan and Naples). In an 1810 letter to interior minister Montalivet who had served as a war commissioner at the *Armée d’Italie* in 1796, Faipoult acknowledge that “*a gift the republican government [of Genoa] gave me paid the debts I had accumulated while honourably fulfilling my duties as minister plenipotentiary.*” He concluded the letter by asserting he had “*returned from Italy in Year VII in a carriage more modest than that of the lowliest employee of the army’s service des vivres.*” Nonetheless, he gave his adoptive daughter a dowry of 120,000 francs for her wedding to Séganville in 1807 plus an additional sum (*trousseau*) of 12,000 francs. Séganville himself pledged 80,000 francs plus another 12,000 worth of furniture.

Faipoult appears to have been broke following his dismissal from his prefectural post at Ghent in 1808. His prospects improved when he was granted a position to work in King Joseph Bonaparte’s administration in Spain the following year and he began purchasing several properties, but most of these were lost following the French debacle in 1813.

Career:

- Enters the *École militaire du Génie* at Mézières (1 Jan. 1771) ;
- Resigns from the army’s engineer corps with the rank of captain after unsuccessfully applying to enlist with American forces in the American Revolutionary War (1780);
- After joining the Parisian National Guard, he is put in charge of organising its artillery (21 Oct. 1789);
- Becomes a member of the *club des jacobins* (late 1789);
- Appointed secretary-general of the interior ministry by Jean-Marie Roland on Carnot’s recommendation (March 1792). He continues in this post after the monarchy’s downfall (10 Aug. 1792) and Roland’s resignation (Jan. 1793), serving under the new minister Dominique Joseph Garat;
- Forced to go into hiding following the decree of 26 germinal II/15 April 1794 banishing all former nobles from Paris. He returns to the French capital after 9 Thermidor;
- Appointed head of the *Bureau central des renseignements* and later secretary-general of the *Comité de Salut public* thanks to Carnot’s influence (1794-1795);
- Publishes a pamphlet entitled *Essai sur les finances* (24 vendémiaire IV/16 October 1795) which proposes the creation of a national bank and recommends withdrawing *assignats* from circulation and replacing them with mortgaged shares (*cédules hypothécaires*). These ideas are inspired by those of Johannot, Le Couteulx, Laffon, Monneron and others and establish Faipoult as a leading financial expert (Oct. 1795);
- Becomes the Directory’s first finance minister thanks to Carnot’s influence (9 Nov. 1795). Faipoult’s appointment is only considered as a temporary expedient to grant the

- Directory the necessary time to seek out a fully-fledged financial expert for the post. He is replaced by Dominique-Vincent Ramel on 25 pluviôse IV/14 Feb. 1796;
- Appointed French Consul in Genoa (3 pluviôse IV/23 Jan. 1796). Before leaving for Italy, he accounts for his ministerial expenses at the finance ministry in a report to the *Cinq-Cents* on 3 ventôse IV/22 Feb. 1796. His accounts are approved and he is authorised to depart for Italy on 11 ventôse IV/1 March 1796. Faipoult does not get along with Saliceti, who has just become the *Armée d'Italie*'s new civilian commissioner on 11 pluviôse IV/31 Jan. 1796. He grows close to Joseph Bonaparte who has been appointed a war commissioner in Genoa through Napoleon's influence;²¹⁸
 - Following Bonaparte's lightning victories against Piedmontese and Austrian troops in April/May 1796, Faipoult's rank is upgraded to 'extraordinary envoy' considering that "*the present affairs [in Italy] confer a high degree of importance to the duties of the minister plenipotentiary of the Republic at Genoa*" (19 floréal IV/8 May 1796);
 - Faipoult engineers the social disturbances which lead to the proclamation of the Ligurian Republic (May-June 1797) and the establishment of its Directory (Jan. 1798) presided by Luigi Corvetto (future finance minister of Louis XVIII);
 - Dispatched to Rome to assist in setting up the Roman Republic (April 1798);
 - Sent to Milan to reorganise the Cisalpine Republic's finances (June 1798). He clashes with General Brune whose recall he secures in Sep. 1798;
 - Sent back to Rome to help reorganise the Directory's civilian commission in that city (Dec. 1798). He clashes with General Championnet who is recalled in Feb. 1799;
 - Posted to Naples where he works with General MacDonald (Feb. 1799), but he is forced to leave when the city revolts against the French occupation in April;
 - Following Jacobin gains in the legislative elections of April 1799, Faipoult is denounced by Championnet's allies in the *Cinq-Cents* and recalled from Italy (May 1799). Proceedings are filed against him but he is eventually cleared of all charges;
 - Appointed Prefect of the Scheldt after 18 Brumaire (1800-1808);
 - *Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur* (25 Prairial XII/14 June 1804);
 - Abruptly dismissed by Napoleon on 18 Sep. 1808 on tenuous charges;
 - Appointed counsellor of state and director-general of the Spanish Treasury by Joseph Bonaparte with whom he is on intimate terms (April 1810);
 - Returns to France following Joseph's deposition (July 1813);
 - When Murat leaves for Naples following Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig, Faipoult is sent to intercept him and negotiate his return. They meet at Bologna but the mission is unsuccessful (late 1813);
 - Appointed Prefect of Saône-et-Loire by Carnot during the Cents Jours. Faipoult conducts a brave defence of Mâcon against the Austrians who imprison him. Following his release, he retires to Ghent;
 - Returns to France in 1816 where he dies at Augy near Auxerre.²¹⁹

²¹⁸ See AN, 381 AP 12, dossier 3, 26 and dossier 10/4, 27 & 33 – *Papiers de Joseph Bonaparte : correspondance avec Faipoult, états de mouvements des fonds.*

²¹⁹ For more on Faipoult, see Antonetti (ed.), *LMFRFSE*, p.179-200.

Féline (Féline fils aîné), Louis CCC

The Félines were from Alès. The father, Louis, was a banker in Paris under the Directory, and his three sons – Jean-Louis, Isaac and Étienne – established *Félines frères et Cie.*, a modest bank which went bankrupt as a result of the Monneron scandal.²²⁰

Fillietaz, Gabriel (died c.1822) CCC

An *indiennes* and textile trader from the influential Genevan Fillietaz family who settled in France in 1798. Consul-General of France at Antwerp where he owned a textile manufacture.²²¹ He was a cousin and business partner of Jean-Charles Joachim Davillier. , In 1803, he married his eldest daughter – Jeanne-Jacqueline Élisabeth – to Jean-Scipion-Anne Mourgue of the Mourgue family (powerful textile manufacturers based in northern France).²²² His second daughter, Jeanne-Jacqueline-Sarah, married the Montpellier cotton cloths trader Jean-Louis Médard in 1807.²²³ His third daughter, Jeanne-Jacqueline Aline, married the Dunkerque armateur Jacques-Benjamin Morel in 1811.²²⁴ Gabriel Fillietaz resided in the Rue de la Loi.

Foloppe or 'Folloppe' (de Caudebec), Charles Augustin CCC (1765 – 1809)

Very little is known about Follope. He was appointed *inspecteur des postes* at Strasbourg in Year II.²²⁵ He then served on the Convention's *commission des subsistances* and subsequently on the *Agence de négociations de la Trésorerie nationale*. He was also mayor of Caudebec in the region of Caux (Normandy) from 1808 to his death. Several documents in the French National Archives record business transactions between the Treasury and Foloppe's company – *Gildemester, Foloppe, Vasse* (or 'Wasse') & *Cie*. 'Foloppe' is often spelt in various ways in these documents (e.g. 'Folloppe' or 'Faloppe'). I have also found a François-Augustin Foloppe (possibly his father) and a Jacques Philippe Follope in notarial archives who resided at 742 Rue Saint Augustin (a relative?).

Fould, Beer Léon (1767 – 1855) CCC

On 15 Frimaire an III, he became the financial guarantor of a company specialised in commercial relations with Basel and Switzerland. Fould had five partners in this venture: Jean-Louis Toudouze, Armand Prospère Ducaurroy, Théophile Frédéric Chrétien Popp (all

²²⁰ For the Félines, see AP, D11 U3, 10/648; MC/ET/IX/856 ter, 1 frimaire VIII/22 Nov. 1799 and Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.49.

²²¹ See his inventory after decease (MC/ET/IX/878, 25 nivôse XII/16 Jan. 1804).

²²² For the marriage contract see MC/ET/XCIII, 255, 10 frimaire XII/2 Dec. 1803. Born in 1772, Jean-Scipion-Anne Mourgue was the son of Jacques Antoine Mourgue, a textile baron who headed the *Colombiez et Mourgue* firm and briefly served as French interior minister in 1792. His mother, Jeanne Vialars, was from the Fesquet family which originated from the Périgord (Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.324, footnote 9 & p.367, footnote 50) and had links to Jean-Antoine Chaptal, Cambacérès and the Rougemont bank in London. Jean-Scipion-Anne spent ten years in the French diplomatic service, at the London embassy as principal *premier commis aux Relations extérieures* under Chauvelin and Maret, and in Italy as a war commissioner and interior minister of the Roman Republic. He was *administrateur général des vivres* for the Marengo Campaign in 1800, and served as Jean-Antoine Chaptal's *secrétaire-général* at the Interior Ministry. See Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.47.

²²³ MCN/ET/XCIII/286, 16 Sep. 1807.

²²⁴ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.65.

²²⁵ AN, AF/II/20, dossier 145:65.

Parisian merchants) and Chrisoph Bolli (a Basel merchant). Each of these partners brought a starting investment of 10,000 *livres* on which they were promised 3% interest.²²⁶ This company – which succeeded an earlier firm named *Toudouze, Ducaurroy & Popp* founded on 1 Nov. 1793 – was established for four years. Fould guaranteed the new firm for up to 60,000 *livres*. Fould's Parisian residence was at 4 Rue Favart. He later purchased the Château of Rocquencourt (Yvelines) and was elected mayor of that town.

Fulchiron, Jacques-Aimé-Gabriel (c.1740 – 1817) CCC

Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron and his brother Joseph were bankers from Lyon whose trading house – *Fulchiron frères* – already operated counters in both Lyon and Paris during the *Ancien Régime*. During the early directorial period their firm was involved in a legal battle against *Carvalho & Cie.*²²⁷ Aimé-Gabriel was a leading administrator and shareholder of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*. When several of the *caisse*'s clients were negatively affected by the political crisis preceding the 18 Fructidor, it granted them extraordinary discounts to temporarily support them. The rate of these discounts is uncertain, but they seem to have hovered at around 1% interest rather than the *caisse*'s usual ½% interest commission. Fulchiron was placed in charge of overseeing all of the *caisse*'s extraordinary discounts to selected shareholders. In total, the *caisse* discounted 25,435,032 *livres* which yielded a profit of 210,573 *livres*.²²⁸

Fulchiron was involved in several large-scale military supply ventures during the late directorial era. In November 1798, he provided a financial guarantee of a million francs to back Jean Gosuin, the director of the arms manufactures of Charleville and Liège, to provide 150,000 weapons to the French government.²²⁹ In March, he partnered with Récamier et Roëttier de Montaleau (former director of the *Monnaie de Paris*) to provide the *Compagnie Laurensen et Nobelly* with a financial guarantee of 2,936,000 francs in its contract to operate the *ferme générale des droits de passe aux barrières de Paris* for three years. In April and May 1799, he signed two deals in partnership with Récamier and other bankers to advance money to the government.²³⁰ He was also an important investor in the *Compagnie Rochefort*.²³¹ Shortly before 18 Brumaire, Fulchiron was one of the Parisian bankers who negotiated with finance minister Robert Lindet to establish the *Syndicat du Commerce* which provided the Directory with additional cash advances.²³²

Around this time, Aimé-Gabriel appears to have established another company named *Fulchiron & Cie.* which was probably set up for military supply ventures and participations in public markets. When the *Banque de France* sent its initial offer for a merger to the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*, Fulchiron was one of five administrators designated by the

²²⁶ MCN/ET/XXI/616, 15 frimaire III/5 Dec. 1794.

²²⁷ AP, D6 U3 11, 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796 – *Jugement de l'affaire Fulchiron contre Carvalho & Cie.*

²²⁸ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.91.

²²⁹ MC/ET/XLV/665, 4 frimaire VII/24 Nov. 1798, *Traité pour le ministre de la guerre en faveur de Jean Gosuin & Cautionnement de Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron en faveur de Jean Gosuin.*

²³⁰ AF/III/594, plaquette 4097:24-27, *Approbation d'un traité de mouvement de fonds avec Fulchiron, Récamier et autres banquiers de Paris*, 27 germinal VII/16 April 1799 and AF/III/598, plaquette 4197:16-17, *Traité de mouvement de fonds avec Baudecourt et Chalamel, et avec Fulchiron & Cie. et autres banquiers à Paris (Alexandre Barrillon, Geyler, Jordan & Cie., Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie., Jacques Récamier et Hugues Vignes pour la maison Vignes & Neveu de Bordeaux)*, 12 floréal VII/1 May 1799.

²³¹ AF/III/608, plaquette 4249:23-24, *Transfert d'une délégation sur les contributions de l'an VII pour les banquiers Fulchiron & Cie. à la Compagnie Rochefort*, 25 prairial VII/13 June 1799.

²³² See Chapter 6.

caisse to examine the proposal.²³³ Thereafter, he regularly appeared as one of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France*. He was a member of the *Vingt and Dix Négociants Réunis* and of the *Association des Banquier du Trésor public* (formed in August 1801).²³⁴ That same year, he ranked seventh in the list of the Treasury's biggest creditors.²³⁵ In 1802, the Fulchiron brothers partnered with *Delessert & Cie.* to establish a company specialising in trade with the Mascarene Islands.²³⁶ They were also investors in Henri Grandin's *Compagnie des Laines* and appear in its 1805 act of liquidation.²³⁷ That same year, Aimé-Gabriel was one of the commissioners who oversaw the liquidation of Louis-Barthélémy Bastide's assets following his bankruptcy.²³⁸

Aimé-Gabriel was badly affected by the bankruptcy of Médard Desprez in the *Négociants Réunis* scandal, losing 500,000 francs.²³⁹ He retired from affairs in 1808 and the Fulchiron trading house was taken over by his nephew Jean-François Guérin de Foncin. During much of his trading career, Fulchiron's domiciled Parisian address was in the Rue Ménars.

Fulchiron, Joseph (11 June 1744 – 20 July 1831) CCC ●

Brother of Jacques-Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron. In December 1797, he formed part of a delegation of bankers led by Le Couteulx which presented the Directory with a loan project of 80 million francs "to prepare a descent in England."²⁴⁰ The loan was voted on 16 nivôse VI/5 Jan. 1798 and Joseph Fulchiron was appointed as one of the commissioners in charge of overseeing its marketisation and collection. In 1800, Joseph was sued by Edme-Bonaventure Courtois, a member of the Tribunal who had been one of his partners in a military contracting venture formed in Prairial Year III which was going into liquidation. Courtois accused Fulchiron of embezzlement, but when it was shown that Courtois himself had received 132,000 francs for his mere political influence the case was dismissed and Fulchiron was cleared of all charges.²⁴¹ On 10 August 1810, Joseph Fulchiron was appointed a representative of the *Corps législatif* for the *département* of the Rhône. He held this post until the end of the *Premier Empire*.²⁴²

Garat, Martin (12 Dec. 1748 – 11 May 1830) ● ● CCC ● 🏰

Born in Bayonne, the son of a doctor. Closely linked to the Basterrèche banking family of Bayonne. He was a cousin of the revolutionary deputy Dominique-Joseph Garat who replaced Danton as justice minister in October 1792 and informed Louis XVI of the decision to execute him. Dominique-Joseph was later elected to the *Conseil des Anciens* in 1799 and created *comte de l'Empire* in 1808.

²³³ ABF, RDAGA-2, 3 pluviôse VIII/23 Jan. 1800 – The others were Geyler, Cordier, Récamier and Davillier.

²³⁴ See Appendix XV.

²³⁵ See Appendix XVI.

²³⁶ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.71.

²³⁷ AP, D31 U3 2, dossier 361, *Liquidation de la Compagnie des Laines* (Hervas, Récamier, Fulchiron, Geyler, Jordan & Cie.), 1 ventôse XIII/20 Feb. 1805 – See also Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.289.

²³⁸ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.34, 53.

²³⁹ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.291.

²⁴⁰ Marion, *HFF*, Tome IV, p.78-81 – The bankers' delegation included Récamier, Barrillon, Desprez and Jubié. See also

²⁴¹ See Chapter 6.

²⁴² For more on Joseph Fulchiron see Robert & Cougny (eds.), *DPF*, Tome III, p.82.

Career:

- *Premier commis de la caisse générale du Trésor royal* under Jean-Joseph de Laborde and his son Laborde de Méréville (1780);
- *Caissier de la caisse générale de la Trésorerie* (July 1791);
- Resigns from the Treasury (Aug. 1792);
- Arrested and incarcerated (29 Sep. 1793);
- Released from prison (6 Aug. 1794);
- Director-General of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* following the departure of Augustin Monneron (1799);
- Director-General of the *Banque de France* (27 Feb. 1800 – his death);
- *Baron de l'Empire* (Sep. 1810).

Garrau, Pierre-Ansèlme (19 Feb. 1762 – 15 Oct. 1829) ● AI ☆

Born in Sainte-Foy-la-Grande (Gironde). Prior to the Revolution's outbreak, Garrau had been a lawyer at Libourne (Gironde). He was elected a deputy of the Gironde to the Legislative Assembly and National Convention where he sat with the *montagnards*, voted for the death of Louis XVI and approved the purge of the *Girondins*. He was dispatched as a *representant-en-mission* to Turreau's army in the Vendée and to the armies of the Pyrenees and Sambre-et-Meuse. Thanks to his friendship with Carnot, Garrau was appointed the *Armée d'Italie*'s second civilian commissioner on 28 Feb. 1796 but lingered in Bordeaux for several weeks before taking up his post in Milan. His clash with Bonaparte led to his recall on 10 December 1796. He was then elected as a deputy for Libourne to the *Cinq-Cents* on 14 April 1797. Despite his previous conflict with Napoleon, he was named *inspecteur aux revues* after 18 Brumaire and was made a *chevalier de la Légion d'honneur* on 14 January 1805 (promoted to *Grand Officier* on 5 Jan. 1814). He was also the intendant of Warsaw in 1806 and later served in Spain. Exiled to Brussels and Wiesbaden following the Bourbon Restoration, he was ultimately pardoned by Louis XVIII and returned to France where he died at Saint-André-et-Appelles in his native Gironde.

Gaudin, Martin-Charles-Michel ● ● ● MF ● ● ☆ 🇫🇷 🇪🇺

(16 Jan. 1756 – 5 Nov. 1841)

Born in Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis). Died in Paris. Son of Charles Gaudin (c.1712-?), a lawyer at the *parlement* of Paris, and of his wife Louise-Suzanne Ragot (c.1731-1758). Martin Gaudin's mother died when he was three years old and his father abandoned him before he was seven. He was initially raised by his maternal grandparents and then placed in the care of his maternal great-uncle (Michel Deschamps, a Parisian *mâitre teinturier* who lived in the Rue des Arcis) and great-aunt (Gabrielle-Marie Hochereau).

Gaudin's maternal great-grandfather, Claude Ragot, was *premier huissier audiencier au présidial de Chaumont-en-Bassigny* (Haute Marne). His maternal grandfather, Martin Ragot (c.1702-1773), was a lawyer at the parlement of Paris, *bailli général du bailliage pairie de Saint-Denis-en-France*, mayor of Saint-Denis and *subdélégué de l'intendant de la généralité de Paris*.

Marriage:

Gaudin led a complicated personal life. He remained officially single for many years while living with his longstanding partner, Anna Summaripa (1775-1855), who came from a Greek catholic family with Italian roots. Anna had been employed as a translator at the French consulate in Constantinople and had married Claude-Émile Gaudin on 6 Nov. 1793, the secretary of the French legation to the Sublime Porte, with whom she had a daughter named Athénaïs-Laure-Pauline Gaudin. Claude-Émile Gaudin was not related to Martin Gaudin. He later became an inspector of the land registry at the finance ministry, giving rise to a farcical situation whereby Martin Gaudin was living with the inspector Gaudin's wife! Eventually, Anna Summaripa's marriage to Claude-Émile Gaudin was annulled by a decree of the *Cour d'appel* of Orléans dated 7 March 1820, which however confirmed Anna's daughter – Athénaïs – as a legitimate child.²⁴³ On 2 April 1822, Anna finally married Martin Gaudin who adopted Athénaïs as his own daughter.²⁴⁴ Athénaïs later married Ernest Stanislas, marquis de Girardin (1802-1874), in 1826.

Character & Education:

Gaudin's primary schooling was in Saint Denis. In 1767, he was sent aged 11 to the Collège Louis-le-Grand where he completed his studies in 1772. Gaudin then registered as a student at University of Paris's law school which had just moved into new buildings at the Place Sainte-Geneviève (the modern Place du Panthéon). Unfortunately, Gaudin's maternal grandfather – who owned the charges of bailiff and mayor of Saint Denis – died when he was 17; and Gaudin was too young to inherit his offices. This forced Gaudin to abandon his legal studies and he only completed the *baccalauréat en droit* which he obtained after two years of study. He rapidly passes over this difficult episode in subtle passage at the very beginning of his memoirs.²⁴⁵ Gaudin remained fundamentally a man of the *Ancien Régime* all his life. He continued to wear a wig and powder his face even under the *Premier Empire*. Embarrassed by his weak voice, he regularly had his speeches read out by colleagues, notably his friend Antoine Roy.

Residences:

Gaudin lived in the residence of his maternal grandparents in the Rue des Arcis until 1780. He then moved to the Rue Sainte-Avoye and in 1793 settled in the Rue du Faubourg Saint-Martin. Between 1795 and 1799, he resided in the property he had acquired at Vic-sur-Aisne. During his tenure as finance minister (1799-1814), he lived in the ministerial *hôtel du Contrôle général des finances* in the Rue Neuve des Petits-Champs. While serving as governor-general of the Banque de France, he declined to settle at the bank's headquarters in the hôtel Massiac (located in the modern Place des Victoires) and lived instead in various successive residences: 40 Rue d'Artois (now Rue Laffitte) until 1820, 5 Rue de Clichy until 1825, 105 Rue de Bourbon until 1829 and 5 Rue Blanche until 1836. He then moved into an *hôtel particulier* he had acquired on 30 Jan. 1836 for 240,000 francs located at 98 (now 104) Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré where he lived for the rest of his life.

²⁴³ Archives départementales du Loiret, 2U 11257, Arrêt de la Cour d'appel d'Orléans, Nullité du mariage de Louis-Émile Gaudin et d'Anna Summaripa, 7 March 1820.

²⁴⁴ MC/ET/XLII/789, 2 April 1822, Marriage contract of Martin Michel Charles Gaudin and Anna Summaripa.

²⁴⁵ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.5.

Assets:

Gaudin accumulated a considerable fortune during his career in the civil service. As Treasury commissioner, he had an annual salary of 15,000 *livres*. In late 1792, he purchased an estate at Vic-sur-Aisne near Soissons. His salary as *commissaire général des postes* was only 8,000 *livres*. But it was after 18 Brumaire that he really began to build up his wealth, benefitting from sumptuous consular and imperial stipends. In Year XI, he earned 80,000 francs as finance minister. This figure rose to 160,000 francs in 1811 plus another 40,000 francs for living expenses. Gaudin also received several bonuses for completing various missions (reorganising the finances of Genoa in 1805, those of Holland in 1811, etc.). His appointment as *grand-aigle de la Légion d'honneur* came with an annual gratification of 125,000 francs drawn from rents in Westphalia and Hanover.

In 1807, Gaudin set his sights on acquiring the estate of La Loge Tristan at Chouy (Aisne) near Villers-Cotterets, comprised of a manorial residence with dependencies and 303 hectares of land. Since the owner insisted on full payment in cash, Gaudin wrote to Napoleon who was then in Poland requesting a loan at 5% interest payable over three years drawn on the *Grande Armée*'s cash reserves. Bonaparte, who wished to reward Gaudin for many past services, magnanimously forwarded him 300,000 francs.²⁴⁶

In 1814, Gaudin lost his ministerial revenues with the fall of the Napoleonic regime except for a 5,000-franc stipend which he still received from his French portfolio of assets. His situation improved in 1820 when he was appointed governor-general of the Banque de France which carried an annual salary of 60,000 francs. The position also entitled Gaudin to an additional indemnity of 40,000 francs which he waived. His wealth by then must have been considerable, for the *Banque de France*'s statutes stipulated its governor-general must have at least a hundred shares of the bank before taking office.

When Gaudin married in 1822, he gave his wife 240,000 francs in hard currency – in effect providing her with a dowry. The spouses also declared joint ownership of all their assets, which meant that all assets would automatically be inherited by the last surviving spouse. Their daughter Athénaïs received a dowry of 280,000 francs for her wedding – plus an additional 600,000 francs should Martin Gaudin predecease his wife – payable upon Madame Gaudin's death.

Madame Gaudin died in 1855 and bequeathed her daughter 291,138 francs of transferable assets (*valeurs mobilières*), the *hôtel particulier* in the Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré valued at 320,000 francs, a house at 21 Rue de la Victoire valued at 185,000 francs and the estate of La Loge Tristan valued at 360,000 francs.²⁴⁷ If we add Athénaïs's dowry to these sums, the fortune Gaudin bestowed totalled approximately one and a half million francs.

Career:

- Begins his career at the finance ministry as *Surnuméraire aux impositions* (1775) thanks to Marc-François Dailly (1724-1800), a family friend and associate of Turgot. Dailly is *premier commis* of François Lefèvre d'Ormesson, one of the seven *intendants des finances* at the *Contrôle général des finances*. One of Gaudin's colleagues is Louis-

²⁴⁶ See *Supplément aux Mémoires et souvenirs de M. Gaudin, duc de Gaëte*. Paris: Goestchy fils & Cie., 1834, p.162-163.

²⁴⁷ AP, DQ7 10520, n°389, Declaration of Succession of the duchesse de Gaëte, 17 April 1856 & DQ7 10521, n°526, Declaration of Succession of the duchesse de Gaëte, 27 May 1856. See also MC/ET/LVIII/826, 25 Nov. 1855, Inventory after decease of the duchesse de Gaëte.

Hardoin Tarbé – another protégé of Lefèvre d’Ormesson and future revolutionary finance minister – whom Gaudin befriends;

- Following Necker’s reform of the *Contrôle général*, Dailly appoints the 21-year-old Gaudin *Chef de division au Contrôle général des finances* (1777);
- *Premier commis aux impositions* (1788);
- *Premier commis aux contrôle des recettes* (1791);
- Commissioner of the *Trésorerie nationale* (Feb. 1792 – June 1795), appointed thanks to the influence of his former colleague – Louis Hardouin Tarbé. Gaudin is specially tasked with managing the Treasury’s revenues (*recettes*) and accounting (*comptabilité*) and oversees the implementation of a new tax collecting system;²⁴⁸
- When the *fermiers généraux* and *trésoriers généraux* are tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal in floréal II/May 1794, Gaudin saves the *trésoriers* from the guillotine by arguing they had not been tax collectors but financial administrators. His friendship with Cambon also comes into play;
- Declines the position of finance minister (12 brumaire IV/3 Nov. 1795);²⁴⁹
- Declines the post of Commissioner of the *Trésorerie nationale* (May 1797) and of Commissioner General of the *Trésorerie nationale* (July 1798);
- *Commissaire du Directoire exécutif près l’administration des Postes* (6 floréal VI – 20 brumaire VIII/25 April 1798 – 11 Nov. 1799);
- Declines the finance ministry a second time prior to 30 Prairial coup (May 1799);²⁵⁰
- Declines the finance ministry a third time after the 30 Prairial coup (June 1799);
- Minister of Finance (10 November 1799 – 1 April 1814);
- *Membre* (9 vendémiaire XII/2 Oct. 1803), *grand-officier* (25 prairial XII/14 June 1804) and *grand-aigle* (13 pluviôse XIII/2 Feb. 1805) *de la Légion d’honneur*;
- *Comte de l’Empire* (26 April 1808);
- Created *Duc de Gaëte* (15 Aug. 1809);
- Reinstated as finance minister during the *Cent Jours* (20 March – 22 June 1815);
- Created *Pair de France* during the *Cents Jours* (3 June 1815);
- Elected deputy for the *département* of the *Aisne* (22 Aug. 1815). He fails to gain re-election in Sep. 1819;
- Governor-General of the *Banque de France* (March 1820 – April 1834).

Relations with the Abbé Sieyès:

Gaudin had known Sieyès since at least 1787. The ex-Abbé was then serving on the provincial assembly of the Orléanais’s tax committee for *vingtièmes* and had drawn up tables of progressive tax capitation rates which he sent the government.²⁵¹ The state official in charge of such matters was the *premier commis des impositions*, a certain Martin Gaudin. Ironically, Gaudin claims that Sieyès was “*entirely unknown*” to him when he was offered the finance ministry in May 1799.²⁵² This was because Gaudin’s memoirs were published in 1826 during the reign of Charles X – when Sieyès was living as an exiled regicide in Brussels while the prudent Gaudin was still governor of the *Banque de France*!

There are numerous sources on Gaudin, all of which cannot possibly be listed here. His file at the *Archives nationales* (188 AP) contains very limited information on his activities. His

²⁴⁸ See Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.12.

²⁴⁹ Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.37.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid*, Tome I, p.43.

²⁵¹ See AN, 284 AP & Paul Bastid, *Sieyès et sa pensée*, Paris: Hachette, 1970, p.44-47.

²⁵² Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.49.

memoirs, which do not reveal much in the realm of private finances, are nonetheless regularly referenced by economic historians.²⁵³

Gélot, Jean-François (1763 – 1808) CCC

Gélot was a banker from Year VII to his death, and the business partner of Hupais and Jean-Ernest Lang (*Lang, Hupais, Gélot & Cie.*). He served as *Conseiller général de la Seine* from 1806 to 1808.²⁵⁴

Germain, Jean-Pierre (8 Aug. 1745 – 24 March 1803) CCC ●

Born in Villeneuve-lès-Avignon (Gard), the son of a baker. His uncle, Pierre Germain (1721-1783), known as '*le Romain*' (because he had visited Rome), was a Parisian goldsmith associated with Louis XVI's court.²⁵⁵ Jean-Pierre began his career working for Étienne Delessert at Lyon before breaking off and establishing his own bank. On 16 January 1792 he married Reine-Marthe Rousseau (1756-1817), daughter of the Parisian bourgeois Pierre Rousseau.²⁵⁶ Their only son – Auguste-Jean (1786-1821) – was created *comte de Montforton* by Napoleon and married Constance-Jeanne-Stéphanie de Houdetot, daughter of the *comte de Houdetot*, commander of the Martinique garrison.

Career:

- Partner in the Parisian branch of Étienne Delessert's bank ('*Delessert et Cie.*'), located in the Rue du Coq Héron (1783);²⁵⁷
- Establishes his own bank – '*au Cabas d'Or*' – in the Rue Saint-Denis;
- Administrator of the *Royal-Incendies* (a company established by Delessert on 24 Jan. 1791);²⁵⁸
- Shareholder and administrator (with Delessert) of the *Caisse Patriotique* (founded 31 Jan. 1791);²⁵⁹
- Received by Bonaparte at his residence in the Rue de la Victoire shortly before 18 Brumaire;²⁶⁰
- Founding Regent of the *Banque de France* (1800);
- Member of the *Dix Négociants Réunis* (1800).

Assets:

Germain amassed a large real estate portfolio, particularly in the *Pays de la Loire*:

- On 2 April 1789, Germain purchased from Madame de Montmorency-Robecq the estate of Benais (Indre-et-Loire) comprised of several farms and 280 hectares of woods

²⁵³ For more on Gaudin, see Antonetti, *LMFRFSE*, p.251-276; François Latour, *Le grand argentier de Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions du Scorpion, 1962 and Auguste Portalis, *Essai sur la vie et l'administration du duc de Gaëte*. Paris: E. Duverger, 1842.

²⁵⁴ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.20.

²⁵⁵ Pierre Germain's inventory after decease names Jean-Pierre as sole heir (MC/ET/XLVII/329, 19 Feb. 1783).

²⁵⁶ See their marriage contract (MC/ET/XV/1068, 16 Jan. 1792).

²⁵⁷ See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.526, footnote 78 & p. 547, footnote 130.

²⁵⁸ See Bouchary, *Les Compagnies Financières à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle*, Tome II p.53-73 & Tome III p.35.

²⁵⁹ MC/ET/XLVII/435/B, 31 Jan. 1791.

²⁶⁰ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.246.

(a total of 560 *arpents*) for 330,000 *livres*.²⁶¹ He subsequently adjoined several *biens nationaux* to this estate (including the Presbyterian church of Benais) worth 125,000 *livres*;

- On 12 Oct. 1793, by adjudication of the *Tribunal de la Seine*, the estate of Branges (Saône-et-Loire) acquired with his associate Coindre for 1,063,000 *livres* (Germain's share – 531,000 *livres*);²⁶²
- On 23 Sep. 1794, the *biens nationaux* Germain had purchased during the early Revolution with his partners Isaac-Louis Grivel and Étienne Delessert were divided;²⁶³
- On 18 Jan. 1797, a quarter of the estate of Boubilly and Sauvigné (near Semur in the Côte d'Or) for 1,000,000 francs (the other three-quarters were purchased by a Madame Pomme);²⁶⁴
- On 8 April 1797, a house located at 17 Rue de Provence in Paris for 80,000 francs, purchased from Madame Lafontaine-Gradcourt (*née* Lemaistre);²⁶⁵
- On 16 Sep. 1802, the château and estate of Cheverny (former residence of Diane de Poitiers) and Courcheverny for 433,543 francs from Madame Dufort (*née* Legendre);²⁶⁶

Germain bequeathed a succession worth 2,500,000 francs – a fortune almost entirely accumulated as a result of his own speculations.²⁶⁷

Geyler, Charles (Geyler, Jordan & Cie.) (1764 – ?) CCC

Geyler was born in 1764 at Ribeauvillé (Haut-Rhin). He settled in Paris in 1786 where he became a banker and military contractor. Geyler was an associate of Henri Grandin's *Compagnie des Laines*. In 1800, he formed *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* with Louis André Jordan, a commission house specialising in the wool trade. On 26 Vendémiaire VIII/18 Oct. 1799, the firm advanced *écus* to the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* in return for notes.²⁶⁸ It went bankrupt due to the resumption of hostilities with England and privateering against French ships in 1803. In the last days of September 1802, *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* lent *Coulon frères* 800,000 francs in hard currency at 5% interest for three years, of which only 756,000 were furnished.²⁶⁹ The obligation was subscribed to by Bourrienne and guaranteed on the assets of *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* Rodolphe-Emmanuel Haller also acted as guarantor for 180,000 francs. In late December, *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* was forced to borrow 900,000 francs from Jean-Henry Louis Greffulhe in Paris and Jean-Louis Greffulhe in London.²⁷⁰ Moreover, the Consular government owed *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* 619,000 francs on a foreign exchange transaction guaranteed by contributions to be levied in the Papal States;²⁷¹ and the company had also lost considerable sums due to its

²⁶¹ MC/ET/XV/1037, 2 April 1789.

²⁶² Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.134.

²⁶³ MC/ET/XLVIII/?, 2 vendémiaire an III (no online records for this notary – I need to check at the MCN) – These included the farm of Lambolt at Montreuil-sur-Mer worth 88,000 francs, 48 measures of land in the same district taken from the Chapellerie de Saint Jean and the farm of Saint Josse at Montreuil-sur-Mer also worth 88,000 francs.

²⁶⁴ MC/ET/XV/1110, 29 nivôse V/14 Jan. 1797 – The estate was sold for a total of four million francs.

²⁶⁵ MC/ET/LXII/734, 19 germinal V/8 April 1797.

²⁶⁶ Sale recorded by Bergevin, notary at Blois, 29 fructidor X/16 Sep. 1802 (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.134).

²⁶⁷ See Germain's inventory after decease (MC/ET/XV/1156, 10 germinal XI/31 March 1803). For a detailed list of his assets see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.129-136.

²⁶⁸ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.94.

²⁶⁹ MC/ET/XV/1051, 5^e jour complémentaire X/22 Sep. 1802.

²⁷⁰ MC/ET/XV/1054, 6 nivôse X/27 Dec. 1801.

²⁷¹ AP, D11 U3, 21/1492.

participation in the *Compagnie Rousseau. Geyley, Jordan & Cie.* was forced to suspend its payments in September 1803 and was eventually dissolved in 1809.²⁷² Geyley resided in the Rue de Province.

Gibert Desmolières (a.k.a. 'Gibert des Molières), Jean-Pierre ●
(26 July 1746 – 2 Jan. 1799)

Born in Paris. Gibert-Desmolières was an administrator of *domaines* prior to 1789 and served as *conservateur des forêts* from 1791 to 1793. Elected to the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents* as deputy of the Seine on 20 Oct. 1795, he specialized in economic matters and became a leader of the royalist Clichy faction (he resided in the Rue de Clichy). Arrested during the Coup of 18 Fructidor, he was deported to Cayenne where he died after bathing in an ice-cold river between recurrent bouts of fever. Gibert-Desmolières's works (mostly brochures) are available in the *Catalogue* of the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, Tome 59, col.1222-6.²⁷³

Girardot de Marigny, Jean (1733 – 1796)

See Louis Greffulhe and Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller.

Grandin, Henri Jacques Nicolas CCC CEC

Grandin, who came from one of the premier manufacturing families of Elbeuf, was a merchant banker specialising in the wool and cotton trades. Settling in Paris around Year IV, he was based in the Place Vendôme and became a leading speculator, supplying textiles to the manufactures of Louviers, Sedan and Elbeuf. In the winter of 1796-1797, Grandin and his associate Antoine Delon planned a large-scale speculation on Spanish wool using Henry's connections with the Sevilla trading house *Lanux père, Dubernard et Cie.*, which had supplied wool to Rouen and Orléans under the *Ancien Régime*. On behalf of this trading house, they purchased 35,426 *arobes* of Estremadura wool (1,348 bales) worth 666,072 *livres* and spent an additional 405,098 *livres* transporting them back to France via Bayonne. The wool was sold gradually to manufactures in Sedan and wool traders in Rouen (*Chaumont et Cie.*, *Quesnel frères et Cie.*) and Orléans (*Tassin père et fils*, *Michel frères*). In July 1798, Grandin demanded *Lanux père, Dubernard et Cie.* repay their share of the venture to him, but arguments over pricing and the degradation suffered by certain shipments led to Grandin filing charges against the Sevilla house at the Commercial Court of Paris.²⁷⁴ The case was settled out of court in Prairial Year XI when Grandin was compensated for his losses.²⁷⁵

An anonymous letter dated 24 May 1798 recommended Grandin for the position of finance minister.²⁷⁶ He built up a considerable fortune in real estate, including his *hôtel particulier* in the Place Vendôme and a country château at the barrière des Amandiers (Père-Lachaise). Thanks to a partnership with Auguste Charles Carcenac, a trader from the Midi,

²⁷² See Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.56, 85, 94 & 279.

²⁷³ See also his police file at AN, F/7/4724.

²⁷⁴ AP, 6U3 11, 4 fructidor VIII/22 Aug. 1800. See also Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.196-197.

²⁷⁵ MC/ET/XXVI/875, 24 & 26 prairial XI/13 & 15 June 1803.

²⁷⁶ AN, AF/III/273, dossiers 1105-1107, pièce 261– *Lettre anonyme recommandant le citoyen Henry Grandin, négociant et banquier place Vendôme, pour les fonctions de ministre des Finances*, 5 prairial VI/24 May 1798.

Grandin and his company – *Henri Grandin et Cie.* – became leading players on the international wool market.²⁷⁷

On 14 Aug. 1801 Grandin became the chairman of the *Compagnie des Laines*, a company founded on 9 April 1801 by José Martínez de Hervás (Spanish *chargé d'affaires* in Paris), Jacques and Laurent Récamier, Alexandre Barrillon, Charles Geyler and Louis Jourdan (*Geyler, Jourdan & Cie.*) – all shareholders of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* except Hervás.²⁷⁸ This company dominated the Spanish wool trade until its dissolution on 20 Feb. 1805.²⁷⁹ Grandin also served as an administrator for the *Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce*. *Henri Grandin et Cie.* went bankrupt in 1806.²⁸⁰ Grandin resided in the Rue de la Place Vendôme.²⁸¹

Greffulhe, Louis (1 Jan. 1741 – 8 April 1810)

Born in Geneva. Died in Paris. Son of Simon Greffulhe (1690-1763), a protestant refugee from Sauve in the Languedoc who fled France following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes to settle in Geneva where he established a small grocery store, and of his wife Marguerite Pourtalès. Louis was far from belonging to the aristocratic bourgeois merchant class of Geneva. His paternal inheritance amounted to a mere 3,000 *livres*, and he had already left Geneva for Amsterdam prior to his father's death. In 1764, his mother was remarried to François-Louis Trembley, the son of a *procureur général*. Louis's maternal grandfather, Louis Pourtalès (1692-1751), a protestant refugee from La Salle in the Dauphiné, was the founder of the Pourtalès family branch in Geneva which achieved an honourable affluence in business but was nowhere near as wealthy as its cousin branch – the Pourtalès of Neuchâtel. Louis's maternal great-uncle, Jérémie Pourtalès (1701-1784), brother of Louis Pourtalès, was later a business partner of Jacques-Louis Pourtalès, the great trader of *indiennes* based at Neuchâtel. It was through these maternal links that Greffulhe maintained contact with Geneva and Neuchâtel.

One of Louis's maternal aunts, Anne Pourtalès, had married Jean-François d'Escherney in 1733, a trader and bourgeois of Neuchâtel who became the Polish king's consul at Lyon and was ennobled in 1767. It was with this uncle-by-alliance that Greffulhe undertook his commercial apprenticeship in 1761. He maintained close links to his Escherney cousins, all of whom achieved social prominence:

- François-Louis d'Escherney was an honorary state counsellor of Neuchâtel and chamberlain of the Duke Regent of Wurttemberg;
- Marguerite d'Escherney married Abraham Peschier in 1758, a Marseille trader who later became the associate of Louis Necker (Jacques Necker's brother);
- Anne d'Escherney married Jean Fries in 1764, official banker to the imperial court at Vienna.

²⁷⁷ For this partnership, see AP, D31 U3, 2/361.

²⁷⁸ AP, D31U3 1, dossier 84, 19 germinal IX/9 April 1801.

²⁷⁹ AP, D31U3 2, dossier 361, 1 ventôse XIII/20 Feb. 1805.

²⁸⁰ AP, D31U3 32, dossier 2116, 4 Jan. 1806 & MC/ET/XXVII/886, 11-14 Feb. 1806.

²⁸¹ The most authoritative study of Grandin's activities is Jeffrey Kaplow's *Elbeuf during the Revolutionary Period*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963. See also Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.196-197.

Marriages:

- Around 1773, Greffulhe married Judith Dumoulin (née Michel, died 9 Oct. 1782), daughter of a pastor from the *Pays de Vaud*. They had two sons: Jean-Henri-Louis Greffulhe (1774-1820), mayor of Fontenailles and created *Pair de France* by Louis XVIII in 1818; and Jean Greffulhe (c.1776-1867);
- On 14 Oct. 1793, Greffulhe was remarried to Jeanne-Pauline-Louise Randon de Pully, daughter of Charles-Joseph Randon, comte Randon de Pully, future Napoleonic *général de division* and *comte d'Empire*. They had a daughter: Louise-Cordilia-Eucharis (c.1796-1847).²⁸²

Career:

Louis Greffulhe experienced a difficult start in the business world. He had to care for a younger brother and four or five sisters (all of whom had to be provided with marriage dowries). Louis was a self-made man who was proud of having “*honourably lifted himself up in the world.*”

Greffulhe began his career in 1763 at Amsterdam as a commis with *Veuve Juran & fils*, the trading house of Étienne-Jean Juran. When Juran died in 1771, he passed over his heirs and willed his trading house to Greffulhe. For many years, Greffulhe had to defend himself from accusations of having stolen *Veuve Juran & fils* levelled by Juran’s business partner, Daniel Hogguer, former director of the Amsterdam-based Horneca-Hogguer bank and Dutch minister plenipotentiary at Hamburg. After paying an indemnity of 60,000 florins to Hogguer, Greffulhe finally became the sole legal owner of *Veuve Juran & fils* via a notarial act dated 20 Dec. 1775.

In the late 1770s and early 1780s, Greffulhe developed a close business relationship with Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller. Both were then at the start of their careers. Greffulhe practically abandoned trading in goods to become a full-time speculator, working exclusively with investments from foreign clients which he placed on British funds on the Amsterdam market – a service for which he charged commissions. He also speculated on the likelihood of war breaking out in various theatres – between France and England in the American Revolutionary conflict, in the Bavarian succession crisis and between Catherine II and the Sublime Porte in the Crimea. Greffulhe counted on Haller as his contact in Paris to forward him all the latest news from his correspondence with Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams. Greffulhe and Haller also played on the price of colonial goods, buying large quantities of tea, coffee, sugar, indigo, etc. and hoarding them in warehouses in the hope the fear of war and supply shortages would make their prices rise.²⁸³

Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.:

In April 1789 Haller, probably concerned by the political unrest developing in Paris, relinquished his interest in the *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* bank.²⁸⁴ He was succeeded as a partner by Greffulhe, who injected a million *livres* in the company. The 28-year-old Jacques-Marc Montz, who was the nephew of Girardot de Marigny and George-Tobie de Thelluson and had undertaken his banking apprenticeship as a commis in Greffulhe’s trading house in Amsterdam, was brought in as Greffulhe’s new partner in the venture.

²⁸² Révérend, *Titres, Anoblissements et Pairies de la Restauration*, Tome III, p.236-237.

²⁸³ For the American speculations of Greffulhe and Haller, see Lüthy, *LPBF*, Tome III, p.599-612.

²⁸⁴ MC/ET/L/738, 30 April 1789, *Procuration of Haller to Girardot de Marigny* – Haller handed over all responsibility to Girardot de Marigny for the liquidation of his assets in *Girardot, Haller & Cie.*

Montz was catapulted as co-director and injected a starting investment of 600,000 *livres* in the bank, while Haller and Girardot de Marigny stayed on as the company's financial guarantors.²⁸⁵ The new bank was renamed *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* and established for a duration of twelve years, beginning on 1 May 1789.²⁸⁶ It was initially headquartered in the Rue Vivienne but moved on 28 Dec. 1789 to 16 Rue Bergère into an *hôtel particulier* rented from the *intendant* Sénac de Meilhan.²⁸⁷

During the early Revolution, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* was closely connected to *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* which was itself linked to Jean-Joseph de Laborde, Édouard de Walckiers and Sir Robert Herries – all of whom were big investors in Calonne's *Compagnie des Indes*. Between 1789 and 1791, both *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* and *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* conducted large amounts of business with the Duke of Orléans and his *intendant des finances*, Louis-René-Madeleine Levasseur de La Touche, comte de Tréville – the deputy of Montargis at the National Assembly. The duke had been forced into momentary exile in London following his suspicious behaviour during the events of 5-6 October 1789 and relied on both banks to forward him money. The following list provides a sample of their transactions:

- On 9 October 1789, La Touche was instructed by the duke to borrow 1,600,000 *livres* from *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* and *Boyd, Ker & Cie.*;
- On 21 January 1790, La Touche borrowed another 300,000 *livres* from *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* and opened a supplementary line of credit with the bank for 600,000 *livres* in exchange for 250,000 *livres* in bills of exchange drawn on Delaunay, the duke's *receveur général des finances*, plus a down payment guarantee of 200,000 *livres* staked on rents of the duke's estate at Avesnes, payable at Amsterdam in Dutch florins;
- Additional loans totalling 426,250 *livres* were made to La Touche in March and April 1790 in return for further bills of exchange staked on rents and obligations;
- In December 1790, the duke contracted another loan for 880,000 *livres* to be repaid in a year's time in hard currency;
- On 17 December, the duke ceded an 'historic' obligation (*créance*) for 4,158,850 *livres* to be drawn on his account at the Royal Treasury, equivalent to his share of the inheritance from Louise-Élisabeth d'Orléans (dowager queen of Spain), half in favour of *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* and the other half in favour of *Boyd, Ker & Cie.*²⁸⁸ In exchange, both banks agreed to provide the equivalent sum to the duke upfront. There were probably additional rents and obligations included as guarantees or payments for

²⁸⁵ *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* deposited 600,000 *livres* in a new account with *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* yielding 4% annual interest (AN, T//1170, dossier 2, Séquestre Montz). But Haller only paid ¼ of the guarantee he promised to *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* (AN, 61 AQ, dossier 10, 1789-1791).

²⁸⁶ AN, T//1170, dossier 2, Séquestre Montz, *Foundational contract of Greffulhe, Montz & Cie. (contrat sous seing privé)*, 18 March 1789.

²⁸⁷ Lüthy, *LPBF*, Tome III, p.630-631.

²⁸⁸ Louise-Élisabeth d'Orléans (Mlle de Montpensier) received a dowry of 500,000 *écus d'or* from her nephew Louis XV for her marriage to Don Luis, Prince of Asturias, on 16 Nov. 1721. She was widowed three years later and returned to Paris. In 1742, she ceded her dowry to her brother Louis, duke of Orléans, and it was passed on to his heirs who contented themselves with receiving interest payments on it. On 11 Jan. 1791, Louis-Philippe d'Orléans asked the National Assembly, via the *rapporteur* of its *comité de liquidation* Armand-Gaston Camus, to refund the dowry. The committee returned a favourable report which caused an uproar and the refund was waived. The dowry was only liquidated by Cambon under the National Convention who authorised an annuity for 200,000 *livres* (Lüthy, *LPBF*, Tome III, p.632, footnote 66).

this enormous loan. The duke's obligation was communicated to both banks by Henri Clarke, future Napoleonic marshal, who was then a captain of dragoons;²⁸⁹

- By early 1791, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* owned 399,000 *livres* worth of obligations on the duke's Avesnes estate. Walter Boyd, who had advanced the duke 1,800,000 *livres* by 31 Dec. 1790 in exchange for a similar amount of obligations, loaned him another 1,200,000 *livres* staked on his Avesnes estate on 21 Feb. 1791.²⁹⁰ Boyd and Greffulhe ensured all the duke's obligations were payable in hard currency.
- In 1793, the duke's other creditors led by Le Couteulx de la Noraye (Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx's cousin) filed a class action lawsuit against Boyd and Greffulhe, claiming all the obligations they had received from the duke should be converted into *assignats*. The case was cut short by the dispersal and execution of most of the parties involved and was not yet resolved when the Bourbons were restored to power. Prior to Greffulhe's departure for London (see below), he and Montz shared out the 399 obligations they had received from Orléans – with two-thirds going to Greffulhe and a third to Montz.²⁹¹

Jean-Marc Montz took a far greater interest in business opportunities provided by the Revolution's economic context than Greffulhe and was prepared to interact with revolutionary authorities to secure them. He was notably involved in several industrial acquisitions and ventures:

- In October 1791 and May 1792, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* loaned 300,000 *livres* to La Touche for the establishment of a sugar refinery and textile manufacture at Montargis;²⁹²
- In March 1792, Montz purchased the glass manufacture of Sèvres for 560,000 *livres* which was put up for auction at the court of Paris's fifth *arrondissement* by the heirs of Isaac Panchaud;²⁹³
- In early 1795, Montz acquired an interest of a million francs in the weapons manufacture of Moulins using a *prête-nom*.²⁹⁴

Moreover, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.*'s partners invested large sums in *biens nationaux*. In 1791 Girardot de Marigny, one of the bank's guarantors, acquired the château and estate of Tremblay-lès-Gonesse which had formerly belonged to the Benedictine monks of Saint Denis for 360,000 *livres*, along with several other former religious buildings in the same

²⁸⁹ MC/ET/L/748, 17 March 1790, *Transport. The Duke of Orléans to Mssrs. Greffulhe and Montz*; MC/ET/L/749, 20 April 1790, *Transport. M. le duc d'Orléans à MM. Greffulhe et Contremontz*; MC/ET/L/756, 17 Dec. 1790, *Obligation of Louis-Philippe-Joseph d'Orléans to Mssrs. Greffulhe and Montz* and on the same day *Transport, Henri-Jacques-Guillaume Clarke to Mssrs. Greffulhe and Montz*.

²⁹⁰ See AN ; T//1710, dossier 22, papiers Montz, dossier Orléans.

²⁹¹ AN, T//1710, dossier 2, *note et décharge* and dossier 1, *conventions de liquidation signées par Greffulhe à Londres le 21 déc. 1793 et par Montz à Paris le 31 déc. 1793*.

²⁹² MC/ET/L/763, 18 Oct. 1791, *Deposit of a procuration given to Mssrs. Greffulhe and Montz and other documents* and MC/ET/L/769, 5 May 1792, *Obligation of Levassor de la Touche to Greffulhe and Montz*.

²⁹³ MC/ET/L/773, 4 Sep. 1792, *Obligation of Montz to Beaudouin*; 6 Sep. 1792, *Receipt of Panchaud's widow to Montz* and 7 Sep. 1792, *Obligation of Montz to Viat*. Numerous documents on the glass manufacture of Sèvres can also be found in AN, T//1170, dossier 2, Séquestre Montz.

²⁹⁴ AN, T//1170, dossier 2, Séquestre Montz – The manufacture is in the name of *Herries Herrissé & Cie.*

town.²⁹⁵ In March 1792, Greffulhe himself purchased – from the marquis de Ségur via a straw man – the estate of Romainvilliers for 357,000 *livres*.²⁹⁶

As of 1791, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* adopted a contradictory approach to business. On the one hand, it aimed to make rapid profits from price rises caused by revolutionary events. In October 1791, it was among the first trading houses to be informed of the slave revolts of Saint Domingue and the burning of Port-au-Prince via its correspondents at Nantes. Anticipating these events would trigger a rush to hoard American colonial goods, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* sent dispatches to Haller in Marseille, Henry Simons in Dunkerque and other correspondents in Antwerp, Amsterdam and Hamburg instructing them to immediately buy as many American goods as possible so that they could resell them at a higher price later.²⁹⁷ When France declared war on Austria in April 1792, the bank hurried to take advantage of new opportunities in military contracting. Less than two weeks after hostilities were declared, war minister Pierre Marie de Grave advanced *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* 850,000 *livres* to purchase 2,000 horses in Holland.²⁹⁸ On 31 Jan. 1793, war minister Servan advanced the bank another 300,000 *livres* to furnish 75,000 German florins in bills of exchange drawn on Vienna, Leipzig and Berlin for the *administration de l'habillement*.²⁹⁹

On the other hand, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* knew business in France was ultimately condemned and that it would soon have to liquidate affairs in Paris and move its assets to London. This increasingly became a point of contention between Louis Greffulhe – who wanted to leave – and Montz who believed affairs could still be conducted. The first partner to leave the bank was Haller who on 10 May 1791 ceded his sixth of interest in the company to Montz.³⁰⁰ Six days later he left for Marseille where he went into business with Jacques Bouillon at the head of *Peschier, Necker & Cie.* (later *Peschier, Bouillon & Cie.*). Montz split Haller's share and sold half to Michel Simons of Dunkerque and the other half to a certain Benoît Delafosse. *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* continued to be involved in military contracting, particularly through the supply contract which Michel and Henry Simons had signed with Tort de la Sonde and Dumouriez on 4 Nov. 1792 for the *Armée du Nord*.³⁰¹

However, the fall of the monarchy on 10 August 1792 and the French declaration of war against Britain (27 pluviôse I/15 Feb. 1793) made the bank's situation even more perilous. Greffulhe, who did not like the bank's new associates, obtained a passport in October 1792

²⁹⁵ MC/ET/L/757, 15 Jan. 1791, *Procuration of Jean Girardot de Marigny to Mr. Coutanceau (mayor of Gonesse)*; MC/ET/L/768, 5 April 1792, *Procuration of Jean Girardot de Marigny to Maheu* and AN, F/7/4726, *Memoir of Jean Girardot de Marigny written following his arrest (arguing his purchase of biens nationaux proves his adherence to the Revolution)*.

²⁹⁶ MC/ET/L/767, 11 March 1792, *Sale by Mr. & Mrs. Fleuriau de Tonehelonge to Mr. Louis Greffulhe*.

²⁹⁷ See the *cahiers-registre des copies lettres* of *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* in AN, T/*/1170, dossier 2.

²⁹⁸ AN, T/*/1170, dossier 6, *Fournitures à l'armée. Premier traité du 3 mai 1792* (in the name of Delamotte and Duchesnoie).

²⁹⁹ AN, T/*/1170, dossier 2, p.148-154 (furniture de chevaux). In the same record (p.160-166), we find a purchase by *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* at Ostend in Oct.-Nov. 1792 of 176 bags of saltpetre from India (bought for 100-110 *livres* per quintal) which the bank resold to the *Régie des poudres et salpêtres* for 32 *sols* per pound. Many other military contracting sales are recorded in the bank's files, extending to the Consulate.

³⁰⁰ MC/ET/L/761, 18-19 May 1791, *Procurations of Rodolphe Emmanuel de Haller to Louis Greffulhe and Jean-Jacques Hogguer*.

³⁰¹ See Chapter 5 – Two acts added to *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.*'s foundational statutes dated 17 & 22 Oct. 1791 stipulated that its new partners were entitled to 1/20 of all profits made since 1 May 1791, but that they were not entitled to any payments on any of the Duke of Orléans's obligations (AN, T//1170, dossier 2, *actes additifs des 17 et 22 oct. 1791 au traité de société du 18 mars 1789*).

and left for London where he arrived via Calais on 11 ventôse I/1 March 1793.³⁰² By then, he had already transferred over three million *livres* (£120,000) of his assets to various partners in London.³⁰³ Two weeks later, he wrote a prophetic letter to Montz in Paris:

*“The more I see what is happening, how tempers are becoming exasperated, how prejudices and the desire for vengeance smother the voice of reason and justice, the more I am persuaded of the validity of the arrangements I detailed in my last missive relating to the measures which urgently need to be taken to keep us on our guard...I fear the moment when exactions against individual properties will be permitted...Let us surround ourselves with precautions. These times do not resemble any we have previously seen, and it can be said that one should be afraid of his own shadow and fear drowning in his own spit.”*³⁰⁴

On 29 ventôse I/19 March 1793, Greffulhe acquired \$30,000 of American government securities, plus 24 shares of the American national bank for a total of £7,000 at a later date.³⁰⁵ On 7 thermidor I/25 July 1793, each partner of *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* received the equivalent of their participation in the company in bills of exchange drawn on Greffulhe in London.³⁰⁶ The bank continued to exfiltrate its funds via Liège, the Hanseatic ports, Spain and especially Basel. In mid-September, the bank informed its clients it would no longer ensure regular payments for annuity contracts. On 7 vendémiaire II/28 September 1793, those partners remaining in Paris signed an agreement temporarily entrusting the management of the bank’s affairs to one of their former clerks, Armand-Pierre-Marie-Bévière, in a deal similar to that concluded by *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* with its clerk Geneste (see Walter Boyd’s entry).³⁰⁷ The bank had already been closed on 11 fructidor I/28 August 1793 by the revolutionary committee of the Guillaume Tell section; and although Montz managed to have it briefly re-opened, he himself was arrested on 8 brumaire II/29 October 1793 along with many of the bank’s other partners (including Girardot de Marigny).

Initially incarcerated at the La Force prison, Montz was transferred to the Pension Belhomme where he managed to contact Greffulhe and sign a notarial procuration on 11 nivôse II/31 December 1793 declaring the bank temporarily liquidated since 10 vendémiaire/1 October. He was released on 22 thermidor II/10 Aug. 1794 and eventually managed to have Greffulhe removed from the list of émigrés on 8 brumaire III/29 October 1794.³⁰⁸ Girardot de Marigny, also incarcerated at the Pension Belhomme, was released on 8 vendémiaire III/29 Sep. 1794 but died soon after on 30 Jan. 1796.³⁰⁹

³⁰² AN, F/7/5634, dossier Greffulhe, passeport.

³⁰³ Greffulhe had placed funds in London with Loubier, Teissier & Cie and Cazenove, neuveu & Cie. under the name “Louis Greffulhe de Genève”. He had also placed funds in Amsterdam with Pye Rich & Cie. in the name of his sons who were Dutch citizens (see AN, T*/1170, *copies de lettres de Louis Greffulhe* – in a small notebook separate from the rest of the file with falsified dates and locations!).

³⁰⁴ AN, T*/1170, copies de lettres de Louis Greffulhe (in separate notebook), *Greffule to Montz*, 15 March 1793.

³⁰⁵ AN, T*/1170, dossier 5, *note sur l’achat d’effets anglais*, avril 1791-oct. 1793.

³⁰⁶ AN, T//1170, dossier 2, *copie de circulaire du 25 juillet 1793* – The total pay-out amounted to £80,000. Greffulhe’s share was £33,333 (5/12 of the total capital).

³⁰⁷ AN, T//1170, dossier 6, papiers Bevière, 1 Oct. 1793 – This was not a contract but a legal obligation requiring Bevière to forward 9/10 of his annual profits to Greffulhe and Montz, who conserved their right to resume control of the bank at any time.

³⁰⁸ AN, T*/1170, dossier 8, *Radiation de Greffulhe de la liste des émigrés*.

³⁰⁹ For the arrests of Girardot de Marigny and Montz, see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.131-135.

During most of 1795, Montz tried unsuccessfully to establish a meeting with Greffulhe in Hamburg to retrieve some of the bank's assets which had been sent to London for safekeeping. Greffulhe held some £200,000 expedited by various associates in 1793 but refused to travel to meet Montz. After several acrimonious exchanges, Montz travelled twice to London and signed two agreements with Greffulhe on 29 Oct. 1795 and 11 Nov. 1796 whereby they liquidated *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* and shared its profits between them after deducting starting capital investments – equating to a derisory sum of £68,000.³¹⁰ Greffulhe was exonerated of any responsibility for paying the bank's debts and kept most of the assets transferred by its partners to London (not considered as 'profits'). Montz, who had deposited several payments in *assignants* with Parisian notaries to cover the bank's debts, found himself locked in interminable legal battles to recover them.

Nonetheless, Montz returned to prominence under the Directory, investing in several military contracting ventures where his name never appeared (*Bevière, Cartier & Cie.*;³¹¹ *Herries Herrissé & Cie.*;³¹² *Gin d'Osseray & Cie.*;³¹³ etc.), and he continued to maintain contact with his former associates (Michel Simons, Tort de la Sonde, Édouard Walckiers, William Herries, etc.). He owned the *hôtel d'Évreux* in the Place Vendôme, the Château d'Issy (the former estate of the Conti family at Issy-les-Moulineaux), the glass manufacture at Sèvres, the estate of Plaisance and co-owned the weapons manufacture of Moulins (via a straw man). But in 1804-1805, he was targeted by a succession of court cases which deprived him of most of his fortune (notably related to Claude Baroud's solidary notes drawn on the *Tourton & Ravel* bank) and in 1810 he disappeared without a trace just as Louis Greffulhe was returning to settle in Paris. Greffulhe, who had developed many contacts in the circles of *Ancien Régime* nobility, spent his last few years as an affluent *notable* in Paris under the Bourbon Restoration.³¹⁴

Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.

See Louis Greffulhe.

³¹⁰ AN, T*/1710, dossier 1, *Arrangements pour la liquidation faits à Londres le 29 oct. 1795 et le 11 nov. 1796, renvoyant à un acte sous seing privé signé par Greffulhe à Londres le 21 déc. 1793 et par Montz à Paris le 31 déc. 1793.*

³¹¹ AN, T//1170, dossier 6, *foundational contract of Bevière Cartier & Cie.* dated 11 ventôse IV/1 March 1796 with Armand-Pierre-Marie Bevière and Joseph Cartier as managers (each investing 50,000 *livres*) and Jacques-Marc Montz (200,000 *livres*) and Jean-Joseph de Walckiers (brother of Édouard de Walckiers – 100,000 *livres*) as guarantors. The company went bankrupt on 2 Oct. 1797 (Archives de la Seine, 5 B. 6 1351, bilan du 25 oct. 1797).

³¹² For *Herries Herrissé & Cie.* see the entry of William Herries.

³¹³ AN, T//1170, dossier 7, *Traité de fournitures à la marine*, 19 thermidor IV/6 Aug. 1796, in the name of *Gin d'Ossery & Cie.* The partners included Jacques-Marc Montz (9/20s), Balsa, Fockeday, Charles-Claude Taillepied de Bondy and others.

³¹⁴ This summary of *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.*'s activities is based on Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.630-643. For a detailed study of the bank, see Guy Antonetti, *Une maison de banque à Paris au XVIII^e siècle, Greffulhe, Montz & Cie : 1789-1793*, Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1963.

Godard, Jean & Étienne CCC

Jean Godard and his brother Étienne owned a colonial trading house based in Lorient (*Godard frères*) which did business with the Mascarene Islands.³¹⁵ They also furnished military supplies.³¹⁶

Hainguerlot, Pierre Laurent (1767 – 1841) CCC

The son of a *receveur de l'Enregistrement* of the Calvados, Hainguerlot's activities date back to the early Revolution. In 1792-1793 we find him supplying the navy with '*draps d'Angleterre*'.³¹⁷ Under the Directory he became a major speculator of *biens nationaux*, best known for his involvement in the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal and his association with the banker Louis Barthélémy Bastide. In Year VI, he acquired 254 hectares in the Belgian *département* of Mons and spending 79,000 francs in that of Namur.³¹⁸ He purchased more land in the Ourthe in Year VII.³¹⁹ Hainguerlot guaranteed *d'Hautmesnil & Cie.* – a company owned by Pierre d'Hautmesnil and linked to Joseph Fouché – for 250,000 francs.³²⁰ His brother, François-Jacques Hainguerlot, was the company's manager. Hainguerlot also formed a banking partnership with d'Hautmesnil and the bankers William Herries and Jacques-Marc Montz.³²¹

A notarial document dated 5 March 1802 shows the banker Louis Barthélémy Bastide had lent Hainguerlot 1,047,000 francs to purchase *biens nationaux*.³²² Hainguerlot repaid 846,369 francs of this sum by ceding the following lands to Bastide:

Biens Nationaux Ceded by Pierre-Laurent Hainguerlot to Louis Bastide (1803)			
Département	Amount (francs)	Département	Amount (francs)
Deux-Nèthes	258,368	Meuse-inférieure	23,321
Dyle	125,319	Jemmapes	9,975
Sambre-et-Meuse	93,376	Seine-et-Marne	150,000
Ourthe	41,586	Calvados	120,000
Lys	24,424	Total:	846,369 francs.

Source: MC/ET/LIII/724, 28 nivôse XI/18 Jan. 1803 (reproduced in Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.164).

An inventory of Bastide's assets established after his bankruptcy (20 Dec. 1805) reveals Hainguerlot still owed him 1,282,708 francs.³²³

³¹⁵ See e.g. AN, AF/II/75, plaquette 557:50

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, plaquette 555:2-3.

³¹⁷ AN, AF/II/9, dossier 59:5-7.

³¹⁸ See Ivan Delatte, 'La vente des biens nationaux dans le département de Namur', *Annales de la Société archéologique de Namur*, Tome XL, 1932-1933, p.215, 279 & 301.

³¹⁹ He used these lands as guarantees to build six brigs equipped with sixteen cannons each at Le Havre (MC/ET/CXV/1047, 6 brumaire IX/28 Oct. 1800).

³²⁰ AN, T//1710/1 (Papiers de Jean Tilly).

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² MC/ET/LIII/717, 14 ventôse X/5 March 1802.

³²³ MC/ET/LIII/743, 31 Jan. 1806.

Hainguerlot owned the Château of Stains (Seine-Saint-Denis) and founded the *Compagnie du Canal de l'Ourcq*. In 1817, he purchased the Château de Villandry following the liquidation of Jérôme Bonaparte's assets.

Haller, Rodolphe-Emmanuel de (1748 – 1833) AI

Born in Berne the son of Albrecht von Haller, a famous doctor and naturalist, Rodolphe-Emmanuel spent his youth in Holland where he learnt the banking trade.³²⁴

Marriage:

On 16 March 1776, he married Gérardine, daughter of Hendrik Van der Dussen, a counsellor and *dykgraft* of Delft who had managed the Dutch East India Company's trading counter in that city.³²⁵ It was probably thanks to this auspicious alliance that Haller was able to raise the funds to settle in Paris.

Career:

In August 1776, Haller was appointed as joint manager of the *Germany, Girardot et Cie.* bank. This establishment had been founded on 14 April 1772 by its main shareholders Jacques Necker and his business partner, George-Tobie de Thelluson, as a subsidiary outfit of their main banking house – *Thelluson, Necker & Cie.* Its official managers (*gérants associés*) were Necker's brother – Louis Necker de Germany – and Jean Girardot de Marigny, Thelluson's brother-in-law who was also a cousin of the powerful banker Jean Cottin and later served as an administrator of the *Caisse d'Escompte* in 1782-1783. When Thelluson died on 5 Sep. 1776, Jacques Necker decided the business interests of *Thelluson, Necker & Cie.* would be taken over by *Germany, Girardot et Cie.* The following year, Necker was appointed Louis XVI's finance minister. Court etiquette required he downplay his direct links to the banking community, and *Germany, Girardot et Cie.* was therefore renamed *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* in August 1777 with Jean Girardot de Marigny and Haller as directing managers and headquarters in the Rue Vivienne.³²⁶ Jacques and Louis Necker allowed Girardot de Marigny and Haller to take over their shares in the business, and *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* soon became one of the premier Parisian trading houses of the late *Ancien régime*.³²⁷

During Necker's ministry, many of the French government's financial operations transited through *Girardot, Haller & Cie.*³²⁸ The outbreak of the American Revolutionary War saw

³²⁴ Little is known of Haller's youth. The first letters we have of him date from 1768 when he was aged 20 and already in Amsterdam. His elder brother Karl Ludwig became a member of Berne's *Conseil des Deux Cents* in 1775, and a younger brother – Jean-Charles – served the King of France. His sister married Louis Zeerlander, official banker of Berne's *Conseil des Deux Cents* (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.620).

³²⁵ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.621 – For Haller's marriage certificate, see MC/ET/L/634, 17 Sep. 1777. A *dykgraft* or *dykgraaf* ('Keeper of the Dykes') was an important Dutch official.

³²⁶ For the formation of Girardot, Haller & Cie., see Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.402-407. Girardot, Cottin and Haller were also close to Jean-Théodore Jauge, a wealthy *armateur* of Bordeaux who served as one of Lafayette's aide-de-camps (Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.116). All of them were Protestants.

³²⁷ *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* had previously been called *Necker, Girardot et Cie.* before changing names in August 1777. Jean Girardot de Marigny and Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller mainly did business with Louis Necker, who was a member of the *Vrai Concorde* freemason lodge of Geneva and had links with the lodges of Berne and Paris (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.406-407).

³²⁸ Mathurin-François Adolphe de Lescure (ed.), *Correspondance secrète inédite sur Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, La Cour et la ville*, Tome I, Paris: Plon, 1866, p.314-315 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.621.

the bank compete with Beaumarchais to win lucrative American wholesale contracts.³²⁹ Haller used his international connections to make strategic investments and procure favours. Among his American relations were Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane and John Adams.³³⁰ We also find Haller involved in shady operations at this time, such as helping one of his British business acquaintances – Thomas Walpole – to receive a clandestine transfer of £50,000 in August 1778 from the American double-agent Edward Bancroft as an advance commission payment on a future sale of merchandise.³³¹

During this period, Haller conducted large amounts of business with his correspondent Louis Greffulhe who directed the *Veuve Juran & fils* trading house in Amsterdam (see Greffulhe’s entry). Both were specialists in speculating on the likelihood of war and developed elaborate communication networks which enabled them to be the first informed about any outbreak of hostilities that would drive up the prices of colonial goods on global markets. They would then rush to buy merchandise and hoard it before the news spread, waiting for prices to rise so they could resell at inflated prices. The war between France and England, the war for the succession of Bavaria, the war between Russia and the Sublime Porte: all were fair game.³³² Greffulhe and Haller also sought participations in military supply contracts. Herbert Lüthy notes that:

*“It was with the establishment of Haller in Paris as a partner of Girardot in Necker’s former bank – in August 1777 – that [Louis] Greffulhe’s interest for business in France began to emerge. The approaches leading up to the Franco-American alliance, the preparations of the French war navy which sent enormous orders to Amsterdam and the Baltic states (via Dutch intermediaries), the appropriation of colonial goods in expectation of the outbreak of hostilities and the supply needs of the Americans raised the prospect of magnificent profits, and the “dear friend” Haller was the man to get in touch with to partake in the imminent stampede.”*³³³

Records show Haller continued to be at the forefront of aggressive speculation on bond markets during the 1780s. In 1781, we find *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* purchasing life annuities on behalf of Etienne Clavière.³³⁴ The bank was involved in a minor scandal when it was blamed for ruining a state loan floated by the Spanish court because it had not been entrusted with its commercialisation.³³⁵ Anonymous correspondence dating from June 1785 revealed Haller had speculated on shares of the *Banco de San Carlos* and sought advice from Mirabeau.³³⁶ But Haller’s reputation escaped unscathed. In April 1785, *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* was called upon by Calonne to market the shares of the *Nouvelle*

³²⁹ Lescure (ed.), *Correspondance secrète...*, Tome I, p.293 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.622.

³³⁰ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.604-605.

³³¹ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.605-606 – The sale took place in November 1778 and proved a disaster. Bancroft lost 100,000 *livres* in this speculative venture. Bancroft arrived in France in July 1776 and served as secretary to the American commission in Paris. He was in fact a British double-agent and kept London informed of all the Franco-American secret negotiations of 1777-1778.

³³² *Ibid*, Tome III, p.606-607.

³³³ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.603 – The Greffulhe family, originally from Sauve in the Languedoc, were Huguenots who fled to Amsterdam after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. In May 1789, Louis Greffulhe relocated from Amsterdam to Paris and established a bank with Jacques-Marc Montz (*Greffulhe, Montz et Cie.*) headquartered at 16, Rue Bergère. The new *Greffulhe & Montz* bank took over the business of *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* (Haller signed over his power of attorney on 30 April 1789) and played a major part in exfiltrating émigré funds out of France during the early Revolution. Documents relating to *Greffulhe & Montz* are conserved at the French National Archives (61 AQ).

³³⁴ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.113.

³³⁵ *Ibid*, Tome III, p.113-114 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.623.

³³⁶ AN, F/12/798C & Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.114.

Compagnie des Indes Orientales et de la Chine in partnership with Jean-Jacques Bérard & Cie. of Lorient and its Scottish associate, Charles Herries (*Herries & Co.* – see the entry for Robert Herries). When the company was nearly ruined two years later by the speculations of the Abbé d’Espagnac, it was Haller whom Calonne called upon again to liquidate its shares on the market.³³⁷ Haller was also involved in speculating on Claude Baroud’s life annuity bonds drawn on Jacques Necker’s tontines loans on the ‘Thirty Immortals of Geneva’ (see Baroud’s entry).³³⁸

One of *Girardot, Haller & Cie.*’s most successful ventures was the raising of a loan of thirty million *livres* from the city of Paris in 1786 which was issued on the market in 30,000 shares of 1,000 *livres* yielding 4% interest. The proceeds were used for the “*salubrity and embellishment of Paris.*”³³⁹ The bank also represented the interests of the Dutch East India Company in France.³⁴⁰

In April 1789 Haller – probably concerned at the rising political tension in Paris – decided to take a back seat and relinquished his partner’s status in *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* to Louis Greffulhe and Jacques-Marc Montz (Girardot de Marigny’s nephew). Nonetheless, he stayed on as a financial guarantor of the bank which was renamed *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* (see Greffulhe’s entry).³⁴¹ He also remained in close contact with all the bank’s partners and with Antoine-Louis Girardot – another nephew of Girardot de Marigny – who would later become a prominent financier under the Directory and administrator of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*.³⁴² Haller was even briefly considered as a possible replacement for Necker as finance minister after the latter’s temporary dismissal in July 1789.³⁴³ He was also a member of the *société de 1789*.³⁴⁴

But on 16 May 1791, Haller ceded his share in *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* to Montz and left for Marseille where in August he became a partner in Jacques Bouillon’s trading house – *Peschier, Bouillon & Cie.* (formerly *Peschier, Necker & Cie.*) – which had been *Girardot, Haller & Cie.*’s correspondent in Marseille for 25 years – and now became *Bouillon, Haller & Cie.*³⁴⁵ To guard against his assets being seized, he organised the fictitious sale of

³³⁷ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.626-628 – Calonne had forwarded 12 million *livres* of royal funds to speculators to help sell shares of the *Nouvelle Compagnie de Indes* upon its creation and gave another 12 million to facilitate its liquidation prior to his dismissal! The company’s demise benefited Etienne Clavière and Jean de Batz who speculated against it and founded the *Compagnie royale d’assurance sur la vie* with their earnings. According to Bouchary (*LMAF*, Tome I, p.85), Haller also received 10 million from Calonne’s final loan of 80 million made in 1786. Note that in August 1787, Charles Herries (younger brother of the Scottish financier Sir Robert Herries) opened a branch of his bank in *Girardot, Haller & Cie.*’s Parisian offices where customers could purchase British banknotes, bills of exchange and travellers’ cheques. This agency would “*make it even more practical for travellers and others*” to use “*notes in circulation payable to the bearer, bills of exchange, correspondence and any other papers relating to the Bank of England.*” (see MC/ET/L/724, 30 Aug. 1787 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.659-660)

³³⁸ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.542.

³³⁹ The loan was authorised by royal decree of the *Conseil d’État* dated 31 Aug. 1786 (AN, E/1444B), thanks to the Baron de Breteuil’s intercession with Louis XVI (Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.114-115).

³⁴⁰ Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.116 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.628.

³⁴¹ AN, T//1170, dossier 2, Séquestre Montz, *Foundational contract of Greffulhe, Montz & Cie. (contrat sous seing privé)*, 18 March 1789. See also MC/ET/L/738, 30 April 1789, *Procuration of Haller to Girardot de Marigny* and AN, F/7/3434 (Greffulhe’s entry – In January 1789, the *caissier* of *Girardot, Haller & Cie.* – Jean-Marie Gaillard – fled Paris with 300,000 *livres*. He was arrested and incarcerated at the Châtelet (Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.115-116 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.630).

³⁴² Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.112-113 – The Girardots were originally bourgeois merchants from Sedan.

³⁴³ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.629.

³⁴⁴ Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.122.

³⁴⁵ MC/ET/L/761, 18-19 May 1791, *Procurations of Haller to Louis Greffulhe and Jean-Jacques Hogguer.*

his estate at Villiers-la-Garenne to Sophie Madeleine Van Robais, the wife of his business associate Jean-Jacques Hogguer.³⁴⁶ While in Marseille, Haller continued to act as *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.*'s agent and assisted them in speculating on colonial goods – such as during the slave revolts in Saint Domingue in October 1791 when he purchased large quantities of merchandise which he resold for profit (e.g. sugar), notably at Genoa (where goods were paid in hard currency).

Bouillon, Haller & Cie. also appears to have been involved in some dubious speculations on piasters – possibly for state business or the *Compagnie des Indes* (whose correspondent it was in Marseille) – whereby it purchased piasters in Cadix and sold them in Paris for a profit. In the last four months of 1791, a Cadix trader named Pierre Fouan made piaster purchases for *Bouillon, Haller & Cie.* and drew bills of exchange on the trading house for 307,368 *livres*, plus an additional 48,260 *livres* for and the first four months of 1792. All these bills were accepted and paid at *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.*'s Parisian headquarters.³⁴⁷ It should also be noted that correspondence sent by *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* to Patricio Joyes (director of the *Banco de San Carlos* in Madrid) and to Haller himself indicates Haller was travelling to Spain on business at this time.³⁴⁸ Moreover, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.* was the *Banco de San Carlos*'s official correspondent in France.³⁴⁹

It is not clear what Haller did between the summers of 1792 and 1793. His last big venture was his participation in the Abbé d'Espagnac's notorious contract for the *entreprise des charrois* (military transports) of the *Armée du Nord*. The contract had been awarded to d'Espagnac by his friend and protector, war minister Servan, in September 1792. D'Espagnac received 3,660,000 *livres* of advances for his service in return for depositing a down payment of 640,000 *livres* comprised of 400 shares of the Étienne Clavière's *Compagnie d'Assurances sur la vie* obtained from Clavière in September 1791.³⁵⁰ Haller served as one of the contract's guarantors in association with the Genevan financier Paul-Henri Mallet, Jean-Jacques Hogguer and a friend of Hogguer named Dumas. His participation appears to have mainly been motivated by his desire to rapidly liquidate the large number of 'royal' *assignats* (i.e. *assignats* with Louis XVI's effigy) in his possession.³⁵¹ Unfortunately for d'Espagnac, when the time came for him to forward his down payments, Servan had been replaced as war minister by Pache and his effects were declined.³⁵² The situation became perilous for the financiers involved in the deal when Dumouriez defected to the Austrians in April 1793 (d'Espagnac was guillotined the following year). Haller may possibly have been protected by Jacobins deputies like Danton and Julien de Toulouse who were connected to d'Espagnac, Michel Simons and *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie.*

Haller only re-emerges following the outbreak of the federalist revolt triggered by the Coup of 31 May-2 June 1793 when we find him employed as *directeur des transports*

³⁴⁶ MC/ET/L/761, 20 May 1791, *Sale by Haller to Madeleine Sophie Van Robais, wife of Jean-Jacques Hogguer.*

³⁴⁷ AN, T//1170, dossier 1, *Bills contracted by Fouan (mostly with Cadix trading houses) and drawn on Bouillon, Haller & Cie.* – These include 84,454 *livres* with *Lecouteulx, Desportes & Cie.*, 45,000 *livres* with *Malibrand frères* and 43,000 *livres* with *Splingk, Uhthoff, Kaehler & Cie.* All these bills are stamped "Extraordinaire" or "Dept. du Rhône".

³⁴⁸ AN, T*/1170, p.16-17, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie. to Patricio Joyes*, 2 Aug. 1791 and *Ibid.*, p.20, *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie. to Haller*, 29 Nov. 1791.

³⁴⁹ For more details, see Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.635-636.

³⁵⁰ See Mathiez, *LCPST*, Chapter 5.

³⁵¹ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.636.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, Tome III, p.587.

militaires at the *Armée d'Italie* and subsequently *directeur des subsistances* at the *Armée des Alpes*. The fact that Haller did not choose to flee France after the monarchy's downfall and Dumouriez's treason indicates he made a conscious decision to stay on and conduct business under the Jacobin regime. He was one of the few financiers who remained at the *Armée d'Italie* in September 1793 following the arrival of the *représentants-en-mission* Paul Barras, Jean-François Ricord, Augustin Robespierre and Pierre David Beauvais. Thanks to their patronage he was appointed *directeur des charrois* of the *Armée d'Italie* in October and *munitionnaire général* in February 1794.³⁵³ That same month he was attached to the *Commission de Marseille* to purchase grain in foreign markets.³⁵⁴ According to Ludovic Sciout:

*“Haller, a friend of Danton, had helped pillage Belgium. Later, he became a Robespierriste and was appointed a contractor to the Armée des Alpes and the Armée d'Italie. He did some very good business thanks to the help of Barras and the younger Robespierre. After Thermidor, Barras saved Haller's head, and he became his agent in Italy. Together, they churned out immense profits.”*³⁵⁵

Haller's proximity to Augustin Robespierre made him an easy target for the enemies of the Robespierre brothers, and he was denounced as an 'army speculator' and Robespierre's henchman Thermidor by Marc-Guillaume-Alexis Vadier, Pierre-Joseph Cambon and André Dumont on 8-9 Thermidor. The *comité de sûreté générale* issued an arrest warrant for Haller on 2 Aug. 1794 which was endorsed by the commissioners Antoine-Louis Albitte and Antoine-Christophe Saliceti.³⁵⁶ But Haller was able to flee to Genoa and then Switzerland, from where he succeeded in obtaining his rehabilitation by addressing several petitions to the French government (2 Aug. and 8 & 20 Sep. 1794). Although the Thermidorian Convention seized his property at Villiers-la-Garenne, Haller was not placed on the list of émigrés. He eventually returned to France in May 1796, was cleared of all charges and the hold on his assets lifted. Soon after, he was reinstated as the *Armée d'Italie's administrateur des Finances* and even promoted to *administrateur des Contributions et Finances*, no doubt thanks to the influence of his old friend Barras.³⁵⁷

Louis-Sébastien Mercier is extremely critical of Haller in his *Tableau de Paris*:

“The assassin dies, and the man who made an entire army endure the horrors of famine, which was more terrible for the soldiers of the nation than the fire and iron of the enemy, which made wagons of flour disappear and populated hospitals – this man has just built a palace before the effigy of the monarch whom he deceived and robbed! He should hear the state murmur, the plaintive cries of the soldiers he starved to death. He should wake in fright and see menacing spectres hover around him. Nevertheless, he sleeps soundly, registers signed by lawyers sold to his rapines having legitimised his thefts. Forged accounts make him appear innocent. His vile

³⁵³ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.135 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.643 – Ricord was the *Armée d'Italie's* principal commissioner at this time.

³⁵⁴ AN, AF/II/75, plaquette 554:68, *Arrêté adjoignant le citoyen Haller aux agents de la Commission de Marseille pour l'acquisition de grains à l'étranger*, 27 pluviôse II/15 Feb. 1794..

³⁵⁵ Sciout, 'Le Directoire et la République Romaine', *Revue des questions historiques*, Tome XXXIX, janvier 1886, p.11, footnote 1.

³⁵⁶ See AN, F/7/4738, dossier Haller; Aulard, *RACSP*, Tome XVI, p.43 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.644-645.

³⁵⁷ Hamelin, 'Douze ans de ma vie', p.304, footnote 1 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.645.

*and infamous work accredits him and confers him rank among that race which thirsts for gold.*³⁵⁸

For Haller's subsequent career see Chapter 2.

Hamelin, Antoine Romain (9 Oct. 1770 – 26 Sep. 1855) AI

Antoine-Romain Hamelin married the daughter of a wealthy creole family, Fortunée Lormier-Lagarve (a.k.a 'Madame Hamelin'), in 1792. His wife became one of the most famous *merveilleuses* of the Directory's salons. Hamelin met Josephine at the salon of Madame Brunville and soon became her confidante. She suggested he accompany her to Milan where she would introduce him to her husband.³⁵⁹

D'Hauterive, Alexandre Maurice Blanc de Lanautte (Comte) ☆ (14 April 1754 – 28 July 1830)

Hailing from a noble but impoverished family of the Dauphiné which had served the *connétable* of Lesdiguières under Louis XIII, Hauterive was the second of thirteen children. He was educated by the *Oratoriens* and sent to Tours in 1779 to become a teacher in one of their schools. The following year, the duc de Choiseul attended a ceremony of prize distributions at d'Hauterive's school and he was selected to deliver a welcoming address in the duke's honour. D'Hauterive was noticed by Choiseul who invited him to his seat at Chanteloup. It was at Choiseul's court that he met the future diplomats Talleyrand, Mathias-Joseph Gérard de Rayneval and François Barthélémy. In 1784 Choiseul's nephew, Choiseul-Gouffier, had just been appointed French ambassador in Constantinople, and d'Hauterive was invited to assist him and embarked for Turkey from Toulon. Thus began a long and illustrious diplomatic career.

The outbreak of the Revolution nearly bankrupted d'Hauterive. After repeatedly petitioning Valdec de Lessart and Lebrun for a diplomatic post, he was finally appointed French consul in New York in early 1793 where he welcomed Talleyrand during the latter's American exile. Following Talleyrand's appointment as foreign minister in July 1797, d'Hauterive left New York and returned to France, arriving at Le Havre in September. In 1798, Talleyrand appointed Hauterive head of the foreign ministry's second division – known as the '*division du Midi*' – which encompassed Spain, Turkey, Italy, the Levant, etc. D'Hauterive frequently acted as caretaker foreign minister during Talleyrand's leaves of absence. The former Bishop of Autun valued his exceptional administrative talents, describing him as "*one of those men who must be made to work for the benefit of affairs, for the glory of his superiors and for his own advantage.*"³⁶⁰

D'Hauterive gained Bonaparte's favour by authoring several reports, such as *L'État de la France à la fin de l'an VIII*, which appeared shortly after 18 Brumaire in 1800. In 1805, he was awarded the *Légion d'honneur* and appointed a *conseiller d'État* (24 messidor XIII/13 July 1805). On 18 May 1807, following a disagreement with Talleyrand over the Austrian alliance, d'Hauterive was transferred to the foreign ministry's archival division where he remained right through to the Bourbon Restoration. The Duc de Richelieu even petitioned

³⁵⁸ Mercier, *Tableau de Paris*, Tome III, chapter 278 – Note this is about Haller during the *Ancien Régime*.

³⁵⁹ Hamelin, 'Douze ans de ma vie', p.6.

³⁶⁰ Frédéric Masson, *Le département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution*, Paris: Plon, 1877, p.411.

to keep him at his post. D'Hauterive was created a *chevalier* (26 April 1808) and *comte de l'Empire* (19 Dec. 1809). In 1809, he organised a successful reconciliatory meeting between Fouché and Talleyrand at his country house in Bayeux. In 1820, he became a member of the *Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*.³⁶¹

Herries, Sir Robert (1730 – 25 Feb. 1815)

Eldest son of William Herries of Halldykes (Dumfries) and of his first wife Katherine, daughter of John Henderson of Broadholme (Dumfries). The Herries were a Scottish clan who appear to have had strong Jacobite links.³⁶² Unfortunately, very little is known of their origins.

Robert Herries began his career in 1747 as an apprentice to his uncle – also named Robert – a successful merchant based in Rotterdam who saved the Herries family from ruin by purchasing the Halldykes estate in 1751. Robert stayed in Holland until 1753 when he established himself as a wine merchant at Barcelona thanks to the assistance of Henry Hope of Amsterdam (*Hope & Co.*). His trading house – *Herries, Keith & Co.* – subsequently expanded its business activities to Valencia, Montpellier and the Mediterranean. A few years later in 1762, he accepted the invitation of *John Coutts & Co.* of Edinburgh and London to join them as a principal partner and relocated to the City of London.

Along with *Herries, Keith & Co.*, Robert held interests in two London trading firms. Firstly, his personal London-based firm – *Robert Herries & Co.* – located in Jeffrey's Square in the City, in which he and his two brothers Charles and William and brother-in-law George Henderson each owned a quarter share.³⁶³ Secondly, the *London Exchange Banking Company*, which was founded in 1772 to provide travellers with 'circular exchange notes' – prototypes of travellers' cheques invented by Herries which could be endorsed in various European markets. These travellers' cheques transformed European commerce, and Herries – with help from *Hope & Co.* – soon developed a network of accredited exchange counters extending from Lisbon to Moscow. Partners in the *London Exchange Banking Company* included the four who were partners in the City house together with two partners of *John Coutts & Co.* (Sir William Forbes and James Hunter Blair) and Sir William Maxwell and William Johnson Pulteney.³⁶⁴ The network of Herries trading houses soon developed into a veritable empire with trading interests in the Americas, West Indies, European and Indian theatres. One of his principal clients in France was Isaac Panchaud.

During the 1770s, Herries built a strong position in the tobacco trade, obtaining the monopoly with the *Régie des tabacs* of the *ferme générale*. He also secured the tobacco monopoly for Scotland in 1771 and for London in 1774.³⁶⁵ Success enabled Robert to further expand his ventures in Spain where he was particularly active at Barcelona and Villanueva. He was mandated to represent Danish commercial interests in the Iberian

³⁶¹ For more on D'Hauterive, see Le Chevalier Artaud de Montor, *Histoire de la vie et des travaux politiques du comte d'Hauterive*, Paris: Adrien Leclerc et Cie., 1839 and Masson, *LDAEPF*, p.409-411 & 464-472.

³⁶² Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.659.

³⁶³ William Herries was also a partner in *Herries, Keith & Co.* of Barcelona since 1768 (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.659).

³⁶⁴ S.R. Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.5-6.

³⁶⁵ See Robert Herries's biography at: <https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1754-1790/member/herries-sir-robert-1730-1815>.

Peninsula and in 1777 established, in partnership with Don Juan de Larrad, the *Compañia de Banco en Cambios* which “revolutionised the medieval banking system of Barcelona.”³⁶⁶ Moreover, Herries’s dominant position in Spain made him an important intermediary for the British East India Company and for traders doing business with America and the Spanish New World.

Robert Herries was a supporter of Lord North and counselled his administration on economic and political issues during the American Revolutionary crisis. He was elected an MP for Dumfries Burghs in 1780 and voted for Fox’s East India bill on 27 Nov. 1783. Having refused to abandon the Fox-North Coalition for Pitt, he failed to be re-elected in 1784 and relinquished his political career to concentrate on his business affairs instead.

When war broke out between Britain and Holland in 1780, the neutral Austrian Netherlands became a convenient base for international mercantile activities and Robert Herries decided to set up a trading house in Ostend called *Herries, Keith & Co.* (not to be confused with the Barcelona house) – managed by his youngest brother William (who relinquished his interests in the two London firms) – in partnership with George Keith and Édouard Walckiers.³⁶⁷ This Ostend firm specialised in maritime insurance for colonial traders, equipping privateers and financing sperm whale hunting fleets. It was also involved in the Angolan slave trade.³⁶⁸ Two other Scottish financiers associated with the Herries empire who later played determining roles in French revolutionary finance were Walter Boyd and John William Ker (see Walter Boyd’s entry). Robert Herries subsequently set up another company for William named *Herries, Keith & Bodan* with John Keith – George Keith’s brother – as co-partner. It was a subsidiary of *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* (see Walter Body’s entry) and folded with its parent bank in 1793.³⁶⁹

In 1784, Robert Herries’s put his younger brother, Charles, in charge of *Robert Herries & Co.* in London which became ‘*Herries & Co.*’ Charles was heavily involved in the creation of the *Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes Orientales et de la Chine* (the third *Compagnie des Indes*) in 1785, and when Vergennes ruled in favour of *Herries & Co.* instead of *Bourdieu, Chollet & Bourdieu* to serve as the company’s official London agent, Charles became the French company’s principal London intermediary.³⁷⁰ Until 1790, *Herries & Co.* negotiated nearly all insurances of the *Compagnie des Indes*’s vessels sailing down the western coast of Africa, and approximately half of those travelling on past the Cape of Good Hope to the Indian Ocean, charging a commission of 3% which yielded annual profits approaching 600,000 *livres*.³⁷¹ *Herries & Co.* also maintained close links to *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* in Paris which probably acted as its Parisian agent to help it bid for tobacco contracts from the *Régie des fermes générales*.³⁷² Their business relationship must have been strong since Walter Boyd became Robert Herries’s son-in-law (see Walter Boyd’s entry).³⁷³

Robert Herries retired from business in 1798 and settled in Cheltenham where he died on 25 Feb. 1815. His brother Charles went bankrupt in 1798.

³⁶⁶ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.660.

³⁶⁷ Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.6.

³⁶⁸ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.205-206 and Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.657, 659 & 679-680.

³⁶⁹ Blanc, *LERE*, p.151.

³⁷⁰ See the section on Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx.

³⁷¹ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.679-680.

³⁷² Cope, *Walter Boyd*, p.12-13 – *Robert Herries & Co.* was taken over by Charles Herries (*Charles Herries & Cie.*) in 1784.

³⁷³ Blanc, *LERE*, p.156-157.

Herries, William

William Herries was the third son of William Herries of Halldykes (Dumfries) and the youngest brother of the Scottish Jacobite financier Sir Robert Herries (the inventor of travellers' cheques). He began his career in Belgium in the early 1780s under the patronage of his elder brother Sir Robert and of Édouard Walckiers – heir of the powerful Nettine banking family and business ally of Robert Herries in the Low Countries (see Robert Herries's entry).

William and his associate Édouard Walckiers were heavily involved in the events of the Brabantine Revolution. But in 1792, William was forced to flee Belgium with Walckiers and relocated to France (see Walckiers's entry) where he attempted to gain controlling stakes in the weapons manufactures of Nevers and Moulins. It was here that he befriended Joseph Fouché, then a relatively unknown *représentant-en-mission*, who stood witness at the civic baptism of his son – '*Brutus hérissé*' – in October 1793.³⁷⁴ Fouché recommended William as an investor to government administrations in Paris,³⁷⁵ and mentions him in several letters to his sister Louise at Nantes.³⁷⁶

On 29 brumaire IV/20 Nov. 1795, William Herries founded *Herries Hérissé & Cie*. The company's partners were 'Guillaume Herries Herrissé' (William Herries – 200,000 *livres*), Pierre Laurent Hainguerlot (250,000 *livres*), Antoine-Marie-Pierre d'Hautmesnil (50,000 *livres*) and Dominique Lenoir (100,000 *livres*).³⁷⁷ Jacques-Marc Montz was appointed the company's manager on 1 germinal V/21 March 1797; and on the same day Charles-Claude Taillepied de Bondy was appointed a new partner in the company (investing 100,000 *livres*) with an option given to Benoît Delafosse, then absent at Hamburg, to become a partner as well (also for 100,000 *livres*). The company's principal vocation was to exploit the weapons manufacture at Moulins. Montz withdrew from the venture and renounced his share of the profits on 17 March 1798; and the company was liquidated for bankruptcy on 31 Dec. 1798.³⁷⁸

William Herries and his former associate George Keith (from *Herries, Keith & Cie.*) appear to have been involved in funding Admiral Sidney Smith's escape from the *Prison du Temple* on 23 April 1798. Richard Cadman Etches (a.k.a. Andrew Smith or 'R. Ellis') – a Danish operative and former agent of Catherine the Great whom the British had employed to prepare Smith's escape and bribe French officials – wrote an undated letter to Sir Evan Nepean – head of Admiralty intelligence – claiming he had advanced 13,000 *livres* to finance the operation and deposited another 82,000 at *Herries Hérissé & Co.*'s Parisian agency via the intermediary of his henchman – John Keith (brother of George and another former associate of William Herries in *Herries, Keith & Bodan*).³⁷⁹ George Keith participated in Sidney Smith's escape and was arrested and interrogated about his role but

³⁷⁴ See 'Fouché à Nevers', *Bulletin de la Société nivernaise des sciences, lettres et arts, seconde série*, Tome I, Nevers, 1863, p.249-250.

³⁷⁵ See AN, AA//49, dossier 1407.

³⁷⁶ See Dominique Caillé, *Le duc d'Otrante d'après une correspondance privée inédite*, lettre de Fouché à Louise Broband, 15 nivôse IV/5 Jan. 1796: "I have asked your husband to credit the 96 piasters he holds for me to the person whom William Herries Herrissé shall indicate."

³⁷⁷ AN, T//1170, dossier 7, *Foundational contract of Herries Herrissé & Cie.*, 25 brumaire IV/20 Nov. 1795 – Lenoir withdrew from the company after a few months. For Hainguerlot and d'Hautmesnil, see Chapter 3.

³⁷⁸ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.643, footnote.

³⁷⁹ UK National Maritime Museum, NEP 2, folio 28, *Etches to Nepean*, undated.

not indicted.³⁸⁰ These details indicate William Herries was probably one of the principal paymasters of British agents operating in France during the revolutionary period.³⁸¹

I have not been able to uncover the details of William Herries's later career, but he clearly continued to be protected by his friend Fouché until the advent of the Consulate.³⁸²

Hottinguer (or Hottinger), Jean-Conrad CCC ● 🇪🇵 ☆ **(15 Feb. 1764 – 12 Sep. 1841)**

Jean-Conrad Hottinguer – originally called Hans-Conrad – was born in Zürich, the son of Jehan-Rudolf Hottinger, a merchant trader who was elected a representative of Zürich's Grand Council of Corporation of Tailors in 1788, and of his wife Barbara Stockar. The Hottinguer family first appears in the bailiwick of Zürich in 1401, when three of its members were appointed bourgeois of the city. On 24 Aug. 1793 Jean-Conrad married Martha-Elisa Redwood in London. Her father, Abraham Redwood, owned an extensive estate in Newport (Rhode Island) renowned for its botanical garden and founded a public library in that city in 1747.³⁸³ Martha brought a dowry of 100,000 pounds sterling. The Hottinger group remains a prosperous conglomerate with offices in London, Dublin and Geneva. It recently merged with the Archimedes group in July 2016. The French magnate Vincent Bolloré owns a 17% stake in its subsidiary *Banque Hottinger*.

Career:

- Studies at the Kuntschule in Zürich;
- Four-year apprenticeship at the *indiennes* manufacture of Jean Wolff (nephew of *Banque de France* Regent Jean-Michel Soehnée) in Mulhouse (1779 – 1782);³⁸⁴
- Placed by his uncle as a clerk with *Passavant, de Candolle et Cie.* of Geneva (1783);³⁸⁵
- Becomes a clerk at *Le Couteulx et Cie.* thanks to Augustin de Candolle.³⁸⁶ Develops a pioneering technique of double accounting and serves as Le Couteulx's secretary (1784 to June 1786);³⁸⁷

³⁸⁰ AN, F/7/6187, dossier 2302.

³⁸¹ For a detailed examination of Sidney Smith's escape, see Michael Durey, 'The British Secret Service and the escape of Sir Sidney from Paris 1798', *History*, Vol. 84 (275), July 1999: 437–457. See also Pierre-François Réal, *Indiscrétions, 1798-1830. Souvenirs anecdotiques et politiques d'un fonctionnaire de l'Empire*, Paris: Dufey, 1835, p.8-18.

³⁸² Blanc, LERE, p.296.

³⁸³ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.169-170; Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer, banquiers à Paris*, Tome I, Paris: Draeger frères, 1968, p.155-157 – The Redwood family traced its roots back to 17th century Boston. It settled in Antigua in 1687 where it acquired – via marriage – a large sugar plantation with many slaves which Martha's father and brother still owned. In the early 1700s, the Redwoods moved their base to Salem and finally to Newport around 1732. Martha's grandfather – also named Abraham Redwood – married Martha Coggeshall, a descendant of John Coggeshall who came to New England aboard the 'Lyon' in 1632 and became the first president of Rhode Island. See Charles Pierce & Thellwell Russell Coggeshall, *The Coggeshalls in America*. Boston: C.E. Goodspeed & Co., 1930 and 'Genealogy of the Redwood family', *Newport Historical Magazine*, July 1880. Abraham Redwood and Martha Coggeshall were Quakers.

³⁸⁴ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.171 & Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.81-83.

³⁸⁵ His uncle, Johann Heinrich, was Zürich's representative to the *Conseil* of Geneva and an associate of *Passavant, de Candolle et Cie.* Georges-François Passavant and Augustin de Candolle were Huguenots whose families fled France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes to settle in Switzerland. Passavant came from a noble family with roots in eastern France while Candolle's ancestors were from Provence. Candolle was a member of the *Grand Conseil des Syndics* (Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.88-89).

³⁸⁶ Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.93.

³⁸⁷ Lüthy, *LBPf*, Tome III, p.723 & Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.98-101.

- Aged 22, he is selected to become co-director of *Rougement, Hottinger et Cie.* with Denis de Rougement de Chatellois (royal agent and representative of the Prussian king in Paris).³⁸⁸ This bank was founded on 1 Aug. 1786 for six years and backed by the ‘*Usteri, Escher, Ott et Cie.*’ group – a consortium regrouping five of Zürich’s most important trading houses.³⁸⁹ Its main activity was “*that of bills of exchange (traites) and promissory notes (acceptations) for trading houses of Zürich and Switzerland doing business in France, along with the opening of lines of credit.*”³⁹⁰ The bank was headquartered at the *hôtel de Beaupréau* in the Rue Croix-des-Petits-Champs with a starting capital of 1,350,000 *livres*.³⁹¹ It was dissolved on 31 Dec. 1790;
- Becomes the banker of the foreign ministry after purchasing Paul Sellouf’s trading house for 40,000 *livres* (paid as a bribe). It is renamed ‘*Hottinguer et Cie.*’ and headquartered in the Rue Croix-des-Petits-Champs. ‘*Usteri, Ott, Escher et Cie.*’ invests 500,000 *livres* (August 1790);³⁹²
- Imports 5,717,000 *livres* of hard currency with Jacques Bidermann to purchase *assignats*, which are then used to buy merchandise in foreign markets that is sold at higher prices in France (late 1791). This speculation is cut short when *Agassiz, Rougemont et Cie.* of London, which stores most of the profits, goes bankrupt (29 Feb. 1792);³⁹³
- Denounced as a royalist sympathizer. Flees France for Zürich (April 1793) and then London;
- Borrows 25,000 *livres* from his parents and sails for America with his wife and associate Heinrich (Henri) Escher on 13 Nov. 1794. Works as an agent of *Couderc, Cuni & Wandersee* which operates concessions in Georgia to recruit and settle German farmers as colonists.³⁹⁴

³⁸⁸ Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.102-106 & 133 – The Rougemont were a banking dynasty with roots in Franche-Comté whose members did business in Neuchâtel, London and Paris. Jean-Jacques Rougemont was the first of the family to become a banker in Paris. His sons (François-Antoine, Abraham, François-Abraham, Louis and Denis), headed *Rougemont frères* and were known as traders of diamond (especially via Lisbon with *Veuve Juran & fils* – an Amsterdam firm headed by Louis Greffulhe), colonial goods and *indiennes*. Denis inherited his brothers’ shares in their bank (See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.326-329). Jean-Conrad Escher met with Denis de Rougemont to convince him to become joint-director with Hottinguer of the new bank. Rougemont’s credit was weak as he had suffered from the bankruptcy of the foundries of Besançon and had just separated from his associate, the *Vaudois* banker François de Grandson Jeanneret (Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.104).

³⁸⁹ These included Jean Martin Usteri (*Martin, Usteri fils*) and Jean-Conrad Ott (*Jean-Conrad Ott et fils*) – both of whom were Zurich counsellors of state – Jean-Conrad Escher (*Escher “Au Paon”*), Salomon Escher and his business partner Jean-Rodolphe Pestalozzi (*Escher et Pestalozzi*), Jean-Conrad Heidegger, Jean-Jacques Scheuchzern and Gaspard Schulthess (these last three representing *Orell et fils?*).

³⁹⁰ Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.106 & 109; Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.172 – Lines of credit opened by the bank were generally for sums ranging between 20,000-60,000 *livres* (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.723).

³⁹¹ 1,000,000 *livres* were furnished by the ‘*Usteri, Ott, Escher et Cie.*’ group (500,000 in cash and 500,000 in ten monthly instalments running to June 1, 1787). Rougement invested 300,000 and Hottinguer 50,000. The company distributed 5% interest yield on its investments with profits and losses allocated as follows: 5/13 to Rougement, 6/13 for *Usteri, Escher, Ott et Cie.* and 2/13 for Hottinger (Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.106).

³⁹² Sellouf was burgomaster of Saint-Gall and a director of the *Compagnie Impériale Asiatique* before becoming the unofficial banker of the French foreign ministry. He was also the Parisian banker of Stanislas Poniatowski, the last King of Poland. See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.724; Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.124 & 126-127; Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.172.

³⁹³ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.725-726 & Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.139-140.

³⁹⁴ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.726 & Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.159 – Henri Escher’s son, Alfred, founded *Crédit Suisse* in 1856 and Swiss Life Insurances in 1857.

- Moves to Newport to live with his in-laws. Meets Talleyrand through Théophile Cazenove, a Holland Land Company agent and shareholder of the Pennsylvania Population Company (1795);³⁹⁵
- Involved in several speculative deals with Robert Morris.³⁹⁶ Also acquires 300,000 acres of land (4 francs per acre) in northern Pennsylvania via the *Compagnie Cérès* (1795);³⁹⁷
- Returns to Paris (20 Sep. 1796);
- In 1797, American envoys missioned to Paris (Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry) to end the Franco-American naval ‘Quasi-War’ via negotiations with the director Paul Barras were approached by Talleyrand and Hottinguer who offered their services in exchange for bribes (\$250,000 for Talleyrand and 25,000 *livres* for Hottinguer). This episode is known as the ‘XYZ Affair’.³⁹⁸ Hottinguer was identified as ‘X’ in the affair’s published papers;³⁹⁹
- Forms *Hottinguer et Cie.* with Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe (20 May 1798) initially based in the Rue de Provence, later moved to Rue des Petits-Champs in Year VIII (1799-1800);
- Becomes the banker of General Thadeus Kosciuszko (leader of the 1794 Polish Uprising and Washington’s former *aide-de-camp*).⁴⁰⁰
- Opens branches of his trading house at Le Havre and Marseille (1802);
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (elected 17 Oct. 1803 in replacement of Germain);
- One of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* (1803-1804);
- *Juge au Tribunal de Commerce* (1806-1807 & 1812);
- *Membre du Conseil général de Commerce* (1808);
- Created *baron de l’Empire* by letters patent (16 Sep. 1810);
- *Trésorier* (1810) then *Président* (May 1811 – April 1813) *de la Chambre de Commerce de Paris*;
- *Député de la Seine aux Cent Jours* (May 1815);
- *Chevalier de la Légion d’honneur* (awarded by Louis XVIII – date uncertain);

Hottinguer’s succession amounted to 4,000,000 francs, including an *hôtel particulier* at 11 Rue Bergère estimated at 400,000 francs; the Château de Piple at Boissy-Saint-Léger estimated at 1,400,000 francs;⁴⁰¹ 500,000 francs of Royal bonds and 40 shares of the *Compagnie des quatre canaux*.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁵ Talleyrand always began his letters to Hottinguer with ‘*Dear Hottinguer*’ in memory of their American exile (Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.194).

³⁹⁶ Letters in Morris’s *Private Letterbook* from October 1795 and March, April and June 1796 attest to these ventures. Most involved the purchase of over 100,000 acres of land which were sold in lots. Buyers were promised the construction of roads, windmills, public buildings, schools or even an entire new city. A quarter acre of ‘improvements’ was promised for every 400 acres sold (Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...* Tome I, p.169).

³⁹⁷ This included 156,000 acres of forest, pasture, rivers and valleys adjacent to the New York State border. The company issued 10 shares, 3 to be sold in America and 7 in Europe, but only 60,000 acres had been sold in 1828 (Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.169-171). Omer Talon was also linked to the *Compagnie Cérès* (*Ibid*, p.174).

³⁹⁸ For more on the XYZ affair, see William Stinchcombe, *The XYZ Affair*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980 & ‘The Diplomacy of the WXYZ Affair’, *The William & Mary Quarterly*, Vol. 34 (4), October 1977: 590-617. See also Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.726, footnote 46.

³⁹⁹ William Stinchcombe ‘The Diplomacy of the WXYZ Affair’, p.598.

⁴⁰⁰ Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.188.

⁴⁰¹ Former property of Marshal Auguste de Saxe comprising 72 hectares of parkland and vineyards and 69 hectares of land. Acquired in 1819 from C.F. Schulmeister.

⁴⁰² See the notarial act of liquidation of his succession (AP, DQ/7/5616, dossier 66). For a detailed list of his assets, see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.168-176;

Huber, Barthélémy (11 Jan. 1748 – ?)

Huber, a banker whose family originated in the Swiss canton of Schaffouse but who had settled in Lyon, was linked to the *Rilliet & Cie.* bank in that city. He left for London in 1769 where he worked as an associate of the *James Baillie & Cie.* trading house. Huber became a leading intermediary in Franco-British commercial relations and returned to France in 1787 in an unsuccessful attempt to be appointed as the official French commercial agent in London (his candidacy was backed by Lord Auckland, Necker and Le Couteulx). Huber was subsequently involved in discussions surrounding the third *Compagnie des Indes* and employed by Necker at the outset of the Revolution to negotiate contracts for Baltic wheat and other supplies via British companies, notably with the London-based firm *Bourdieu, Chollet et Bourdieu*. On 22 Feb. 1791, the finance minister Valdec de Lessart appointed Huber as a commissioner to the National Treasury. But Étienne Clavière, a sworn enemy of Necker, denounced him in the National Assembly as did Brissot in his *Patriot français*. Huber was forced to tender his resignation on 4 May without even having assumed office. He left France for England on 5 Aug. 1792 travelling on a passport delivered to him by Thomas-Simon Bérard, acting director of the *Compagnie des Indes*. According to a dossier at the British Museum, it was a Mr. Nettement who transferred Perregaux's letters to Auckland.⁴⁰³ Huber disappeared during the later Revolution but re-emerged in a police report of Year XI.⁴⁰⁴

Hupais, Charles-Frédéric (Hupais frères) CCC

Hupais was a banking partner of Gélot (*Hupais frères*) from at least Year VII to 1808. His son, Hupais de Saliègne, later became a *général de brigade*.⁴⁰⁵ Hupais resided in the Rue de la Place Vendôme.

Jauge, Jean-Laurent-Théodore (13 Oct. 1747 – 17 June 1794)

Son of Simon Jauge, a Bordeaux trader and *armateur*, and of his wife Judith Rocaute. The Jauge family hailed from the Sainte-Foy area of Bordeaux.

Johannot, Jean-Joseph (30 June 1748 – 15 Jan. 1829) ● MF

Son of Jean-Daniel-Mathieu Johannot (c.1715-1775), a bourgeois member of the *Conseil des Deux-Cents* of Geneva and of his wife Louise-Germaine de la Combe. The Johannots were a Calvinist family from Ambert (Puy-de-Dôme) who had settled in Annonay (Ardèche) in the early seventeenth century and established the first paper manufacture in that town. Jean-Joseph's great-grandfather, Jean-Prudent Johannot, had sought refuge in Morges in the Swiss Pays de Vaud following the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. His grandfather, also Jean-Prudent Johannot (1689-1755), was accepted into the bourgeoisie of the town of Échandens (near Lausanne) on 8 Feb. 1734.

Jean-Joseph had two brothers and a sister:

- Jean-David Johannot (born 8 Jan. 1752 in Geneva), was an officer in the service of the King of Prussia;

⁴⁰³ Add Mss n°34.454, f°37, *Letter of Lord Auckland to William Pitt the Younger about Perregaux*.

⁴⁰⁴ For more on Huber, see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.73-89 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.682-685.

⁴⁰⁵ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.19.

- Suzanne Johannot (born 30 Dec. 1752 in Geneva – 12 June 1781), was married to Pierre-Henri Malvesin, a Genevan citizen, on 31 Jan. 1779. They had no children;
- Jean-Louis Johannot (born 25 Sep. 1757 in Geneva – 2 July 1833) settled as a trader in Paris and became a partner of Clément Carié (a relative of the *Banque de France* Regent Henry-Liévain Carié) in *Johannot Carié Jacquet et Cie.* On 2 frimaire XI/23 Nov. 1802, he signed a procuration on behalf of this firm in favour of Jacques-Antoine Odier of Geneva who is described as “*predisposed to the affairs of the said house Johannot Carié Jacquet et Cie.*”⁴⁰⁶ The company was dissolved on 31 Dec. 1808 and replaced by *Johannot Carié et Cie.* on 1 Jan. 1809.⁴⁰⁷ This new firm was established for a duration of three years with Jean-Louis Johannot, Clément Carié and Jean-François Vieusseux (Étienne Clavière’s son-in-law) as partners. Its starting capital was 800,000 francs (550,000 francs invested by the three partners and 250,000 by their financial guarantors).

The Johannots were not related to René Jouenneault, a commissioner with the *Commission des subsistances*.

Marriages:

Jean-Joseph Johannot was married three times:

- On 27 Sep. 1772 he married Jeanne-Étiennette Mayor (1740-1775), daughter of Jacques-Guérard Mayor, a Genevan clockmaker. She brought a dowry of 3,000 Genevan *livres*. They had two children. Suzanne-Jacqueline Johannot (born 30 Jan. 1773) and Jean-Daniel Johannot (born 18 March 1775 in Geneva – 7 Jan. 1851) who was *directeur des comptes courants à la direction générale des fonds* at the French finance ministry and received the *Légion d'honneur*;
- Having been widowed, Jean-Joseph was remarried on 12 Aug. 1776 to Marie-Charlotte Aguiton (born c.1756-1757), the daughter of a Genevan bourgeois named Guillaume Aguiton. She brought a dowry of 3,000 Genevan *livres*. Benjamin Constant, then 18 years old, was reportedly passionately enamoured by Marie-Charlotte. He claims her husband was “*a very contemptable man with a very corrupt character and morals*” who abandoned her in Alsace when he was called to Paris in 1792 to take up his seat in the National Convention and that he later brought her to Paris to serve his mistress.⁴⁰⁸ All this allegedly drove Marie-Charlotte into deep despair and led her to commit suicide by ingesting poison;
- On 10 floréal VII/29 April 1799, Jean-Johannot married Eugénie-Antoinette-Louise Delarode (born c.1772-1773 in Aubenas, Ardèche). They had two children who died in infancy. The marriage ended in divorce in Year X.

Jean-Johannot’s education probably did not extend further than finishing secondary school – which was considered an adequate level for future traders in the eighteenth century. Unlike Benjamin Constant, Sir Francis d’Ivernois lauded Johannot’s character, asserting that: “*Johannot, whom I envisage as the most trustworthy – and perhaps the only honest person – to have managed revolutionary finances.*” Johannot resided in various locations in Paris during his career including Rue de la Pépinière (Year II), 5 Rue de Provence

⁴⁰⁶ MC/ET/XIX/922, 2 frimaire XI/23 Nov. 1802 – *Procuration given by Jean-Louis Johannot to Jacques Antoine Odier of Geneva.*

⁴⁰⁷ AP, D31 U3 (4), dossier 205 – Act of dissolution of *Johannot Carié Jacquet et Cie.*, 31 Dec. 1808 & dossier 206 – Founding contract of *Johannot Carié et Cie.*, 1 Jan. 1809.

⁴⁰⁸ Paul Bastid, *Benjamin Constant et sa doctrine*, Tome I, Paris: Armand Colin, 1966, p.41-42.

(1802) and 35 Rue de la Victoire (1810). From 1816 onwards, he resided at his château in Échandens where he lived out the rest of his life. Johannot appears to have lost his mental faculties during his last years, for he was declared of unsound mind on 11 July 1827 and his nephew, Colonel Folz, was appointed his legal guardian.

Business Activities & Property Portfolio:

Johannot was already in business with a trader named Pierre Caussade prior to his first marriage; and by the time of his second marriage he had another partner named J.-P. Fritz.

- In 1790, Johannot purchased the château and estate of Échandens in the Swiss Pays de Vaud with his brother Jean-Louis (they each owned half the property). The estate was valued at 137,800 Genevan *livres*;
- In 1797, Johannot went into business with the contractor Michel Simons, whom he probably met through Talleyrand, and began investing in Simons's military contracting ventures and speculations on *biens nationaux*. Both Johannot and Talleyrand were guests at Simons's wedding with Mademoiselle Lange (23 Dec. 1797), along with François de Neufchâteau. In early 1798, Simons and Johannot acquired four of twenty shares in a company established by the contractor Jean-Baptiste Paulée to manage *biens nationaux* he had purchased in Belgium. When Michel Simons and his brother Henry subsequently founded the *Simons frères* trading house to exploit Antwerp as a colonial port, Johannot was one of its associates, investing 100,000 francs in the firm. Another associate who invested 300,000 francs was José Martínez de Hervás, the Spanish representative of the *Banco de San Carlos* in Paris. Following the alliance treaty between France and Spain concluded on 19 Oct. 1803, Hervás was mandated by the Spanish government to deliver an agreed monthly stipend of four million francs to Paris. These were paid in bills of exchange (*traites*) drawn on Parisian banks, of which two million on *Johannot Martin*;
- On 12 pluviôse VI/31 Jan. 1798, Jean-Joseph acquired the estate of Jardy at Vaucresson (Yvelines) comprising a manorial house and 13 hectares of arable land for 20,000 *livres*. The purchase was made in his son's name. On 12 messidor XI/1 July 1803, Johannot's son sold him back the property, and Jean-Joseph enlarged it buy purchasing 2 additional hectares of arable land on 22 vendémiaire XIV/14 Oct. 1805;
- On 10 brumaire XI/1 Nov. 1802, Johannot acquired by adjudication 72 hectares in the forest of Brenne (Villiers-en-Brenne, Indre) which he enlarged by purchasing 4½ additional hectares in 1808 plus another 4½ hectares at a later date. The forest was valued at 20,000 *livres* in 1816. On 18 July 1814, Johannot borrowed 15,000 *livres* by mortgaging his lands in this forest;
- On 25 fructidor XIII/12 Sep. 1805, Johannot successfully bid for the 13-hectare estate of Bercy located between the Seine River and the Rue de Bercy. He sold this property five years later to the Baron Louis for 156,000 francs. The act of sale reveals that Johannot had borrowed 36,000 francs from the Abbé Sieyès on 17 June 1806 plus another 40,000 francs from Dominique de Demandolx on 25 July 1806, using the Bercy estate as collateral for these loans. The sums were deducted from the product of the sale to the Baron Louis.

Johannot was proscribed as a regicide in 1816. But before leaving France, he took the precaution of donating his lands in the forest of Brenne to his son Daniel on 22 Jan. 1815 and selling him the estate of Jardy for 40,000 francs. They then drafted a private agreement

on 20 Feb. 1816 stipulating that the father remained the veritable owner of these properties and that his son would continue to pay him the revenues they generated.

After Johannot was declared of unsound mind in 1827, his legal guardian dressed an inventory of his assets which were comprised of 12,275 *livres* of Berne (in various paper currency notes, debt obligations, etc.) and 5,092 *livres* of Berne in an account with *Delessert Will et Cie.* at Ouchy. Johannot's assets placed with François Warnery at Morges, Aguiton in Geneva and his brother Jean-Louis Johannot in Paris were not appraised, nor was his share in the estate of Échandens. Considering he also owned lands in the forest of Brenne and the estate of Jardey, Johannot must have disposed of a comfortable fortune. Johannot's testament, which he filed in the Swiss canton of Vaud, stipulated that each of his two children had already well been provided for by various agreements he had concluded with them, and that any excess assets he bequeathed at his death would be equally divided between grandchildren.⁴⁰⁹

Career:

- Begins his career as a Genevan trader of *indiennes* in *Johannot Lacaussade et Fritz*;
- Elected to the Genevan Council of 200, but his election is initially invalidated because he refuses to swear allegiance to the council during the Genevan Revolution (1782). He is rehabilitated in 1783;
- *Johannot Lacaussade et Fritz* is dissolved (1783) and Johannot leaves Geneva along with many of his business associates such as Clavière and Bidermann. He is in Brussels in 1785 where his second wife maintains a liaison with Benjamin Constant;
- Johannot, who is an associate of *Senn Bidermann et Cie.* of Brussels – is sent by this firm to manage its textile manufactory at Wesserling in the Val Saint-Amand near Mulhouse (1789);
- Elected to the directory of the *département* of the Haut-Rhin which he then presides (1792);
- Elected a deputy of the Haut-Rhin to the National Convention (5 Sep. 1792) and becomes a member of the Convention's *comité des finances* for which he produces several reports on various issues;
- Presents an important report to the Convention on the emission of 1,200,000,000 francs in *assignats* which secures his reputation as one of the legislature's foremost financial experts (7 May 1793). Henceforth and until 1795, French finances are essentially managed by the triumvirate Cambon-Ramel-Johannot at the expense of successive finance ministers, notably Clavière;
- Following Cambon's downfall in the spring of 1795, Johannot became the most influential member of the Convention's *comité des finances*. He presents three important reports on the French Republic's finances on 12 nivôse III/1 Jan. 1795 (calling for a reduction in public spending and return to economic liberalisation), 25 germinal III/14 April 1795 (calling for reforms to re-establish normal exchange rates and currency exchange, diminish the number of *assignats* in circulation, and cut public spending) and 16 floréal III/5 May 1795 (presenting a new plan to replace *assignats* with *cédules hypothécaires* – interrupted by the insurrection of 1 Prairial);
- Elected a deputy of the Haut-Rhin to the *Conseil des Anciens* (22 vendémiaire IV/14 Oct. 1795) thanks to the decree of two-thirds;

⁴⁰⁹ Archives cantonales vaudoises, État de Vaud (Suisse), DK 65/24, 1 July 1827 – *Testament of Jean-Joseph Johannot.*

- Fails to be re-elected in the March-April 1797 elections and leaves the *Anciens* (1 Prairial V/20 May 1797). Retires from politics and settles in his estate of Jardy at Vaucresson;
- Mayor of Vaucresson (Oct. 1799-Nov. 1810);
- Forced to leave France for his estate of Échaldens following the decree of 12 Jan. 1816 excluding regicidal deputies who had rallied Napoleon during the *Cent Jours* from receiving amnesties;

Although authorised to return to France in June 1818 with others like Cambacères, Johannot chooses to remain in Switzerland.⁴¹⁰

Jollivet, Jean-Baptiste Moïse (1753 – 1818) **CCC**

Jollivet, a former notary from Nemours and deputy of the Seine-et-Marne at the Legislative Assembly, served as *conservateur général des hypothèques* (1795-1799). After Brumaire he was appointed a *conseiller d'État* and Prefect of the Mont-Tonnerre before becoming Treasury minister of the Kingdom of Westphalia and being made a *comte de l'Empire*.⁴¹¹

Jordan, Louis André (Geyler, Jordan & Cie.) **CCC**

Louis André Jordan was a descendant of Charles Jordan – the son of a protestant pastor – who settled in Berlin in 1689. Charles's sons became jewellers to the Prussian court in Berlin. Louis André, Charles's grandson, began his career as an associate of *Haussmann frères* at Colmar. He married a daughter of the Haussmann family.⁴¹² The Haussmanns had established a bank in Paris during the *Ancien Régime* – *Sartorius et Cie.* – which in 1791 became *Sartorius, Schuchardt et Cie.* The partners were Lous Balthazar Schuchardt, Jean Conrad de Kock and a baron Niebecker of Eisenach.⁴¹³ Jordan married his daughter to Holterman, a Swedish trader from Gothenburg. In 1800, he partnered with Charles Geyler to establish *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.*, which went bust in 1803 (see Geyler's entry). Jordan lived in the Rue du Mont Blanc.⁴¹⁴

Journu-Auber(t), Bernard **(15 May 1745 – 28 Jan. 1815)**

Born in Bordeaux. Died in Paris. Son of Bonaventure Journu and of his wife Claire Fonfrède. Catholic. The Journu family was originally from Lyon but settled in Bordeaux during the last years of Louis XIV's reign. Bernard's grandfather had 22 children of whom 14 reached adulthood. The Journus established a trading house in Bordeaux ('*Bre Journu et Cie.*') in the early 18th century which specialised in naval armaments, particularly for ships navigating the Indian and Antilles trade routes. During the middle of the century, the partners in this trading house were Bonaventure Journu and his brothers Louis Journu (known as Montagny) and Olivier Journu. The family had extensive connections in the Bordeaux trading community, and also in Marseille, Saint-Domingue and even Holland.

⁴¹⁰ For more on Johannot, see Antonetti (ed.), *LMFRFSE*, p.163-178 and René Burnand, 'Les Johannots d'Echaldens.' *Revue historique vaudoise*, Tome LXVI, 1958: 177-189.

⁴¹¹ See Bruguière, *GPR*, p.117-118 & 263.

⁴¹² MCN/ET/XV/1166, 9 ventôse XII/29 Feb. 1804.

⁴¹³ AP, 3B6 92, 28 Jan. 1791.

⁴¹⁴ See also Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.85 & 329, footnote 77.

Bernard Journu became a partner in the family firm prior even to his marriage and held major commercial interests in the slave trade. This did not prevent him from maintaining links with several politicians of the *girondin* party (many of whom were members of the *société des amis des noirs*), such as his cousins Jean-Baptiste Boyer-Fonfrède (1760-1793) and Jean-François Ducos (1765-1793). He also corresponded with leading scientific figures of the Enlightenment. Journu-Auber's brother Antoine-Auguste (1753-1794, a.k.a. 'Journu d'Artiguevieille') and his cousins Boyer-Fonfrède and Ducos were guillotined during the Terror. The Haitian Revolution saw Journu-Auber lose most of his fortune, including the sugar plantations of his wife, a wealthy creole from Port-de-Paix. Elected the second Censor of the *Banque de France* upon its foundation, he served as a senator under the Consulate and was created *comte de Tustal* in 1808 before his elevation as *pair de France* in 1814. Journu-Auber died a month before Napoleon's return from Elba and bequeathed a fine collection of paintings to his only daughter which can be seen today in the museums of Bordeaux (*Muséum d'histoire naturelle* and *Musée des Beaux-Arts de Bordeaux*).

Bernard Journu-Auber was also the author of numerous works, including *Mémoire sur l'infertilité des Landes et les moyens de les mettre en valeur* (Bordeaux, 1789) and *Mémoire sur l'amélioration des bêtes à laine dans le département de la Gironde* (an XII). He created an experimental farm of merino sheep at his estate of Tustal in an attempt to supply wool for the production of French army uniforms (and thereby eliminate Spanish suppliers). He even had the merino sheep integrated in his imperial coat of arms. Nevertheless, the venture proved unsuccessful.⁴¹⁵

Marriage, Children & Relatives

On 26 May 1775 Bernard Journu married Geneviève-Monique Auber (1757-1783), the only daughter of Charles Auber, proprietor of sugar plantations at Port-à-Piment (Saint-Domingue) and of his wife Geneviève Deschamps.

Journu's marriage contract stipulates that he already had 40,000 *livres* invested in the family firm, and that his parents consented to give him another 100,000 *livres* as long as this sum also remained in the business. His wife brought a dowry of 150,000 *livres* (of which 50,000 in cash, the remainder to be paid over two years).

Bernard Journu and Geneviève-Monique Auber had two children:

- Geneviève Journu (c.1768-1840), who married Jean-Jacques Legrix (1766-1840) in January 1793, son of Jacques Legrix (de La Salle) (1735-1820), *trésorier de France* in 1789, administrator of the district of Bordeaux in 1793 and *membre du Conseil général de la Gironde* from 1802 to 1816. The Legrix were a family of naval *armateurs* from Bordeaux. Bernard Journu-Auber provided his daughter with a dowry of 250,000 *livres*. The marriage contract was witnessed and signed by several members of the Cabarrus family and by Dominique Garat, brother of Martin Garat (director of the *Banque de France*) and prominent lawyer of Bordeaux. This wedding may thus also have sealed an alliance between the Garats of Bayonne and the Journu-Aubers of Bordeaux;
- Hippolyte (c.1779-1797).

⁴¹⁵ For Journu-Auber's biographical details, see Révérend, *APE*, Tome II, p.354; Robert & Cougny (eds.), *DPF*, Tome III, p.438.

Note that two weeks after Bernard Journu-Auber's death, one of his nieces – Camille Journu – married Constantin Saint-Martin de Permon (on 15 February 1815), former *commissaire général de police* at Marseille, brother of the duchesse d'Abrantès, and former collaborator of Lucien Bonaparte. One of the signatories to their marriage contract was the banker Alexandre Barrillon.

Paternal Inheritance

Bernard's father, Bonaventure Journu, died in the last years of the *Ancien Régime*. Aside from his stake in the family trading house (probably the premier firm of *armateurs* in Bordeaux), he bequeathed to his son the *hôtel particulier* he had built in the heart of Bordeaux at 35 cours du Chapeau-Rouge (along with its magnificent furniture), his *maison du Quadrille* (named for its vineyards or for the 'Quadrille' dance?) in Bordeaux's suburbs, and several other unidentified properties.⁴¹⁶ He had also purchased in 1781 the ennobling charge of *conseiller secrétaire du roi à la Chancellerie près le parlement de Dijon* for 72,000 *livres*.

Antoine-Auguste (Journu d'Artiguevieille) (his brother)

Bernard's brother, Antoine-Auguste (Journu d'Artiguevieille), purchased the barony of Saint-Magne near Saint-Émilion for 200,000 *livres* from Carrié de Montreu on 20 Dec. 1785. He sold it to Martin du Colombier on 10 June 1791. When Journu d'Artiguevieille was arrested and tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal of Bordeaux, his former peasants testified against him.⁴¹⁷ He was guillotined on 5 March 1794. According to his statement before the tribunal, his fortune and that of his brother Bernard amounted to about 1,400,000 *livres* (700,000 each) in 1789. But this estimate seems rather low, if one takes into account the fortune of Bernard's wife (which would place his total at well over a million *livres*).

Career

- Becomes a partner in his family's trading house at Bordeaux ('*Bre Journu et Cie.*') at some point before his marriage;
- *Consul à la Bourse de Bordeaux* (1778-1780);
- Takes over the family trading house with his brother, Antoine-Auguste. It is renamed "*Journu frères*" (1 Jan. 1782). At this time, the firm owned six trading vessels anchored in the port of Bordeaux which were employed in the colonial and slave trades. These were:
 - *L'Auguste*, 450 *tonneaux*;
 - *La Garonne*, 600 *tonneaux*;
 - *Le Bordeaux*, 600 *tonneaux*;
 - *Le Port de Paix*, 500 *tonneaux*;
 - *L'Heureux*, 600 *tonneaux*;
 - *L'Asie*, 750 *tonneaux*.⁴¹⁸
- Attended the assembly of nobles in Bordeaux in 1789;

⁴¹⁶ Bernard sold his father's house in the cours du Chapeau-Rouge towards the end of his life.

⁴¹⁷ See l'Abbé Albert Gaillard, *La baronnie de Saint-Magne*. 2 vols. Bordeaux : Michel et Forgeot, 1911, p.214-235.

⁴¹⁸ See Arnaud Communay, *Esquisses biographiques, les grands négociants bordelais au XVIII^e siècle*. Bordeaux: Veuve A. Moquet, 1888, p.26.

- Starting in 1789, both Bernard Journu-Auber and his brother Journu d'Artiguevieille made several 'voluntary patriotic contributions' in hard currency and in silver, amounting to a total of 105,000 *livres*;⁴¹⁹
- Elected deputy of the Legislative Assembly for the *département* of Gironde (1 Sep. 1791). He was a member of the *Club des Feuillants* and voted with the royalist minority in the Assembly. He delivered several speeches condemning the abolition of slavery;⁴²⁰
- Administrator of the *département* of Gironde and president of Bordeaux's *Tribunal de Commerce* (1792-1793);
- President of the *Chambre de Commerce de Bordeaux*;
- The losses incurred by Haitian Revolution, the execution of his brother Antoine-Auguste in 1794, and the requisitioning of many of his firm's trading ships by the French navy forced Journu-Auber to dissolve his trading house at some point during the Revolution (probably in Year II);
- As of 25 June 1794, Journu-Auber began to hold an individual record of his business transactions, indicating that he had separated his affairs from those of his relatives. He continued to record transactions in this book until 31 Oct. 1804 when he abandoned his commercial vocation to devote himself exclusively to his senatorial duties. The French National Almanach for Year XII lists him as an '*ancien négociant*';
- In Year IV (1795-1796), Journu-Auber still held 60 shares of the defunct *Compagnie des Indes*;
- 2nd Censor of the *Banque de France* (1800). He resigned his seat in 1806, "no longer meeting the requirements described by article 9 of the law of 27 April 1806 stipulating that the bank's censors should be drawn from amongst the artisans, manufacturers or traders who are shareholders of the *Banque de France*."⁴²¹ He was replaced as Censor on 17 Oct. 1806 by Jacques-Florent Robillard, the Parisian tobacco merchant and manufacturer;
- President of the Electoral College of Guyenne (1803);
- Senator of the *sénat conservateur* for Bordeaux (elected 25 Dec. 1799);
- One of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* in Year XII (1803-1804);
- *Commandeur de la légion d'Honneur* (14 June 1804);
- Created *comte de Tustal et de l'Empire* by letters patent (May 1808);
- *Pair de France* (4 June 1814).

Business Connections in Saint-Domingue

Bernard Journu greatly expanded his business interests in Saint-Domingue following his marriage in 1775, thanks to the considerable investments in sugar plantations held by his wife's family there. When his father-in-law died, Bernard Journu decided to reinvest his share of the Auber inheritance in improving the plantations in Saint-Domingue. His mother-in-law, the *Veuve Auber*, resided there and kept an eye over them. Moreover, Bernard Journu's uncle – Jean-Claude Journu (died in Year VII), was also established in

⁴¹⁹ See l'Abbé Albert Gaillard, *La baronnie de Saint-Magne*, p.228.

⁴²⁰ For more on these speeches, see Yves Benot, *La démence coloniale sous Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions de la Découverte (collection « série histoire contemporaine »), 1992.

⁴²¹ Archives de la Banque de France – Journu-Auber's letter of resignation is acknowledged by the *procès-verbal* of the *Banque de France*'s general assembly of shareholders held on 17 Oct. 1806 but is not included in his file in the bank's archives.

Saint-Domingue where he had built up a sizeable business from modest beginnings. All these assets were lost following the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution.

The inventory of Journu-Auber's assets drawn up after his death in 1815 reveals the names of the planters he did business with in Saint-Domingue. These included:

- Brun-Larcherie;
- Roberjot-Lartigue (Port-aux-Princes);
- Boissière des Cayes (Port-aux-Princes), who was a joint investor with Journu in the slave trading vessel *l'Hippolyte* and its voyages in 1793 and 1796;
- Huguet (Port-aux-Princes) in Year IV;
- Régnier *Veuve Sel ainé* and Régnier *Veuve Letang* (of Port de Paix);
- Ramadan;
- Cougnacq (of Port de Paix);
- *Veuve Auber* (his mother-in-law), of Port de Paix;
- Guillaume Garrigue, a planter based in Martinique.

The Estate of Tustal

On 29 Jan. 1791 Journu-Auber purchased the estate of Tustal near Bordeaux from François-Joseph Chaperon de Terrefort for 250,000 *livres*. From Year III to Year XII, he added several other properties to this estate, including one *bien national*. In Year VIII, for instance, he bought the domain of Marrocq (which was adjacent to his Tustal estate) from André Daniel in exchange for 3,600 francs of life-annuities plus 4,500 francs to be paid following the cessation of hostilities with Britain. Since André Daniel died in 1808, the domain of Marrocq ended up costing Journu-Auber a mere 30,000 francs or thereabouts. Other properties incorporated into the estate of Tustal were located in Sadirac, Créon, Madirac and Lignan, and included a château with gardens, three embroidery workshops, a windmill and a herd of 200 merino sheep (estimated value 6,000 francs). In 1810, the estate of Tustal was valued at 300,000 francs in total. That same year, Journu-Auber gave the estate to his daughter to pay her share of her mother's and brother's succession.

Assets Bequeathed at Death (1815)

- Furniture in his Parisian residence (6 Rue de l'Université) valued at 25,610 francs;
- Various cash advances (*créances*), plus his senatorial salary and some outstanding *rentes* payments – 4,000 francs;
- Significant cash advances made to businesses in Saint-Domingue and to the Amsterdam trading house '*Seweryn et Haezebrouk*' which remained unpaid (unspecified);
- A share of one-third in two houses in Bordeaux (located at 27 Rue des Aires and 8 Rue du Pas Saint-Georges), along with a stable in the Rue Saint-Martin, estimated at 12,500 francs.⁴²²

Jubié, Joseph Fleury Jubié (1 Sep. 1759 – ?) ● CCC

Jubié hailed from La Sône in the Isère. He was a former government inspector of commerce and manufactures who later purchased the silk manufacture of La Sône during the Revolution.⁴²³ Jubié was elected a deputy of the *Cinq-Cents* for the Isère on 16 Oct.

⁴²² For more on Journu-Auber's family and business connections, see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.197-206.

⁴²³ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.299.

1795. In 1798, he partnered with Pierre-Léon Basterrèche to found *Jubié, Basterrèche & Cie.*, headquartered in the Rue Neuve des Mathurins (see Basterrèche's entry for more details). Jubié also appears to have done considerable business with the *Compagnie Bodin frères*, purchasing over 400,000 francs worth of *biens nationaux* from this firm which were nearly all located in Belgium.⁴²⁴ During the Napoleonic era, Jubié served as the *sous-préfet* for Saint-Marcellin and deputy for the Isère (1803-1814). Having rallied the Restoration, he continued to hold important posts, such as *directeur des manufactures* (1817) and *secrétaire général de la préfecture de Seine-Maritime* (1820-1835).

Ker, John William

See William Boyd.

Laforêt, Antoine-René-Charles Mathurin (comte) de **(7 Aug. 1756 – 2 Aug. 1846)**

Born in Aire (modern Aire-sur-la-Lys, Pas-de-Calais). Died in Freschines (modern Villefrancœur, Loir-et-Cher). Son of Jacques de la Forêt (c.1705-1786), *chevalier de Saint Louis* and *capitaine aide-major* at Aire, and of his wife Catherine Hecquet. Antoine's godfather was Antoine-René de Voyer d'Argenson (1694-1757), marquis de Paulmy, *secrétaire d'État au département de la guerre* and a close friend of Voltaire.

Laforêt began his career in the army but rapidly switched his vocation to the diplomatic service. He spent several years as French consul in the United States where he was introduced to Talleyrand in 1794. The two met several times in New York and became close friends. Three years later, on the very day Talleyrand was appointed foreign minister, he immediately nominated Laforêt as head of the ministry's *Division des fonds et comptabilité*. Through Talleyrand's influence, Laforêt became director of the postal service shortly before 18 Brumaire.⁴²⁵ This enabled him to oversee the *cabinet noir* which opened and copied sensitive mail. He reputedly communicated several of Bonaparte's letters to Talleyrand via the intermediary of his secretary Desrenaudes. Laforêt may well have also provided advance warning about police investigations to certain of his friends who were crypto royalists, such as Jean-Guillaume Hyde de Neuville with whom he corresponded.⁴²⁶ Laforêt was eventually replaced as postal director by Lavalette.

Under the Consulate and *Premier Empire*, Laforêt was entrusted by Talleyrand with several delicate missions, such as spying on the negotiations with Austria at Lunéville while officially accompanying Joseph Bonaparte;⁴²⁷ and extorting large bribes from German princes during the Diet of Ratisbonne.⁴²⁸ Laforêt was about to depart for Russia when he was suddenly dispatched to Madrid as French ambassador to deal with the Spanish revolt in 1808. After five arduous years in Iberia, he returned to France and emulated his master Talleyrand in operating a timely defection to the Bourbons in 1814. Although Laforêt re-joined Bonaparte during the *Cent Jours*, he had no difficulty in reintegrating Louis XVIII's service following Waterloo and served the Bourbon

⁴²⁴ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.165.

⁴²⁵ See Talleyrand's instructions to Laforêt during the Lunéville conference published in Michel Poniatowski, *Talleyrand et le Consulat*, Paris: Perrin, 1986.

⁴²⁶ Blanc, *LERE*, p.163.

⁴²⁷ Waresquiel, *Talleyrand, le prince immobile*, p.292.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.316.

Restoration for many years until the 1830 Revolution brought his political career to a close.

Career:

- *Sous-lieutenant* at the Regiment of Hainaut (1772);
- Student at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (14 Dec. 1774);
- Secretary of the French Legation in the United States (1779);
- Vice-Consul of France to the United States at Savannah (20 Aug. 1783), then at Philadelphia and New York;
- Consul-General of France to the United States (2 March 1792);
- Recalled to France on 17 Nov. 1792, he only receives his letter of recall on 29 floréal I/18 May 1793. Initially, he refuses to return to Paris but finally accepts at Washington's insistence to avert a diplomatic crisis between France and the US. He is well-received in Paris and is confirmed as Consul-General to the United States and redeployed on 26 brumaire II/16 Nov. 1793;
- Revoked as Consul-General by the *Comité de Salut public* (3 vendémiaire III/24 Sep. 1794);
- Appointed Head of the *Division des fonds et de la comptabilité* at the foreign ministry (30 messidor V/18 July 1797);
- Director of the postal service (1799);
- Accompanies Joseph Bonaparte to the peace talks with Austria at Lunéville as First Secretary of the French Legation (1801);
- *Chargé d'affaires extraordinaires* at Munich and later at the Diet of Ratisbonne (Aug. 1802 – Feb. 1803);
- *Grand-Croix* (19 vendémiaire XII/12 Oct. 1803) and *Grand-Cordon de la Légion d'honneur* (1814);
- Minister plenipotentiary in Berlin (11 floréal XIII/1 May 1805);
- French ambassador in Madrid (1808-1813);
- *Comte de l'Empire* (25 Jan. 1809);
- Minister of Foreign Affairs (3 April – 12 May 1814), tasked with negotiating the Treaty of Paris by Louis XVIII;
- Elected deputy of the Loir-et-Cher during the *Cent Jours* (11 May 1815);
- Minister plenipotentiary to the Allied Powers;
- *Pair de France* (5 March 1819);
- *Ministre d'État* and *membre du conseil privé* (1825);
- Deprived of his offices of state following the 1830 Revolution.⁴²⁹

Lanchère, Jean (1727 – 1805) AI

Lanchère began life as a modest and practically illiterate coachman from Metz. He developed a military contracting business which supplied military wagons and horse artillery to fourteen different republican armies and was subdivided in 'brigades'. His wife oversaw the firm's accounting. Lanchère's services were partially paid by awarding him furniture from Versailles. In 1797, he purchased the château of Maisons-Laffitte as a *bien national* for 853,853 francs. Lanchère tried to make a profit by stripping the château of its materials and furniture which he put up for auction, but eventually sold the estate to

⁴²⁹ For more on Laforêt see Masson, *LDAEPR*, p.407-408 and Robert & Cougny (eds.), *DPF*, Tome III, p.526.

Marshal Lannes in 1804 for 450,000 francs. In 1818, Lannes's widow – the Duchesse de Montebello – sold it to Jacques Laffitte for 1,050,000 francs.⁴³⁰

Lang, Jean Ernest CCC

Jean-Ernest Lang was a clerk at *Mallet frères* for eight years before becoming an associate of their bank from 1788 to 1792. He formed a banking partnership with Hupais and Gélot.⁴³¹

Laffon de Ladebat, André-Daniel ● CEC BT (30 Nov. 1746 – 14 Oct. 1829)

Born in Bordeaux. Died in Paris. André-Daniel Laffon de Ladébat was the son of Jacques-Alexandre Laffon de Ladebat, a naval *armateur* and protestant financier from Bordeaux ennobled by Louis XV for services to the crown. André-Daniel was elected to the Legislative Assembly as a deputy for the department of Gironde in 1791. He presided the assembly's financial committee and was elected President of the Legislative Assembly on 23 July 1792. In December of that year, he was appointed director of the *Caisse d'Escompte* and charged with overseeing its liquidation. Voters in the department of Gironde returned him to the *Conseil des Anciens* in October 1795, and he was elected that body's president on 18 Aug. 1797. Deported to French Guyana following the Coup of 18 Fructidor, he only returned to France after 18 Brumaire.

- Completes his education at the University of Franeker in Holland in the early 1760s;
- On 26 Aug. 1788, he delivers a famous speech to the Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences of Bordeaux (*Académie Royale des Sciences, Belles-Lettres et Arts de Bordeaux*) entitled *Discours sur la nécessité et les moyens de détruire l'esclavage dans les colonies*;
- Elected a delegate of the Third Estate to the 1789 Estates-General for the Gironde.
- Returns to Bordeaux following the womens' march on Versailles (5-6 Oct. 1789) which forced the royal family to return to Paris;
- Member of the *directoire exécutif de la Gironde* in 1790;
- Elected a deputy of the Legislative Assembly for the Gironde (31 Aug. 1791). Serves as president of the Legislative Assembly in June 1792. He is close to the *Feuillants* at this time;
- Opposes the overthrow of the monarchy in August 1792. He is arrested and imprisoned at the *Prison des Carmes* in December 1792. He was soon released, only to be thrown into prison again during the Terror. Narrowly escapes a trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal and is freed after 9 Thermidor;
- Elected a deputy of the *Conseil des Anciens* on 17 Oct. 1795;
- Administrator of the *Caisse d'escompte du Commerce* (1797);
- Elected president of the *Conseil des Anciens* on 18 Aug. 1797. He presided the council during the Coup of 18 Fructidor, following which he was deported to Sinnamary in French Guyana. Laffon de Ladebat had been an outspoken critic of the Directory's financial mismanagement;

⁴³⁰ For more on Lanchère, see AN, 19 AQ papiers Dailly (Lanchère's son-in-law); Madeleine Fouché, *La poste aux chevaux de Paris et ses maîtres de postes*, Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 1975 and Berryer, *Souvenirs*, Tome II, p.340-341.

⁴³¹ Lüthy, *LBPf*, Tome II, p.272.

- Returns to France shortly after 18 Brumaire;
- Founder and co-director of the *Banque Territoriale* with Pierre-Samuel du Pont de Nemours (1799).

Laporte (a.k.a ‘La Porte’ or ‘Delaporte’), François Sébastien Christophe (15 Sep. 1760 – 25 March 1825)  AI

Born in Belfort. Elected a deputy of the Haut-Rhin to the Legislative Assembly in 1791 and National Convention in 1792. He was dispatched to the *Armée des Ardennes* as a representant-en-mission in April 1793, then sent to Lyon with Jacques Reverchon to suppress the federalist insurrection. La Porte limited himself to expediting judgments of Lyon’s revolutionary tribunal back to Paris and let his colleagues Jean-Marie Collot d’Herbois and Joseph Fouché carry out most of the repression. After the fall of Lyon he was sent on mission to the *Armée des Alpes* at Nice. Following 9 Thermidor he was sent back to Lyon where he was tasked with arresting the terrorist leaders with whom he had repressed the federalists the previous year. La Porte was elected to the *Comité de Sûreté générale* and the *Comité de Salut public*. During the Insurrections of Prairial and 13 Vendémiaire he was one of the deputies who was put in charge of troops.

Under the Directory, he was elected to the *Cinq-Cents* as a deputy for the Haut-Rhin but resigned to go into business as a contractor. Together with Victor Flachet, he founded the *Compagnie Flachet, La Porte et Castelin* which on 7 July 1796 secured – thanks to Laporte’s friendship with the director Reubell – the general contract for the supply of the *Armée d’Italie* in exchange for managing all seized merchandise and levied taxes in Italy. The *Compagnie Flachet* rapidly became notorious for the corruption and royalist sympathies of its agents (see Chapter 2 for more details). Flachet and Laporte were eventually arrested for embezzlement in February 1797 but cleared of all charges by a military court in December that year – again probably thanks to the protection of Reubell. Reubell himself was suspected of having stolen large quantities of silverware following the rendition of Mainz in 1793.⁴³² His Parisian residence was later searched by order of the *Comité de Sûreté générale* and the silverware confiscated and transferred to the Parisian mint.⁴³³

Laporte reappeared in Milan in 1798 when his friend Joseph Fouché – with whom he had served as a *representant-en-mission* at Lyon in 1793 – was appointed French ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic.

Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Jean-Barthélémy       
(4 March 1746 – 18 Sep. 1818)

Jean-Barthélémy was born in Canteleu near Rouen, the son of Barthélémy-Thomas Le Couteulx de La Noraye – Lord of Canteleu, Croisset, Bapaume, Youville, Souspraitures Farceaux, Suzey, and of several other villages in Normandy who served as *conseiller au Parlement de Rouen* and *premier président de la cour des comptes, aides et finances de Normandie* until 1789 – and of his wife Marie-Catherine Garnier. The Le Couteulx were a Catholic family who came from Yvetot (Seine-Maritime) and were involved in foreign

⁴³² See Mathiez, ‘Les malles de Reubell’, *Annales Révolutionnaires*, Tome IX (4), juillet-septembre 1917: 541-543 & Tome X (2), mars-avril 1918 : 246-247.

⁴³³ Tuetey, *Répertoire*, Tome X, n°1450, 23 nivôse II/12 Jan. 1794, p.294.

trade, privateering and naval supplies as early as the fifteenth century. The family was split into several branches, including the Le Couteulx de Noraye (with strong links in Cadix), the Le Couteulx de Canteleu (based in Rouen), the Le Couteulx du Molay, the Le Couteulx de Verclives and the Le Couteulx de Caumont. These branches frequently intermarried to keep the family's patrimony consolidated.⁴³⁴

Among Jean-Barthélémy's cousins, let us note Jacques-Jean Le Couteulx du Molay (1740-1823) who served as *caissier général de l'Extraordinaire* from 1790 to 1792;⁴³⁵ and later sold the Château de Malmaison to Josephine on 21 April 1799 for 325,000 francs (plus an additional 37,516 francs for the furniture). Josephine borrowed 200,000 francs from Jean-Barthélémy to pay the bill!⁴³⁶ Jacques-Jean's wife, Genviève-Sophie, was very close to Jean-Barthélémy. Another cousin – Barthélémy-Jean-Louis Le Couteulx de La Noraye – married his daughter Pélagie to Camille Perier, son of Claude Perier and brother of Casimir, in 1809.⁴³⁷

Marriages & Children:

Jean-Barthélémy was twice married. Firstly, on 13 June 1775 to his cousin, Anne Le Couteulx de Verclives (died 1784). Secondly, on 27 Sep. 1784 to Catherine-Charlotte-Alexandrine Formont (de Cleronde) de Sermentot (1763-1803) with whom he had a son, Barthélémy-Alphonse Le Couteulx de Canteleu (1786-1840), who married Mathilde Talhouët, daughter of Louis-Céleste, marquis de Talhouët-Bonamour.

Le Couteulx also had numerous affairs with actresses, even in old age.⁴³⁸

Assets:

Like many other financiers, Le Couteulx amassed a large portfolio of *biens nationaux* during the early Revolution, including many deconsecrated churches, abbeys and monasteries but also manors and farms – mostly located in Belgian *départements*.⁴³⁹ He did not own all of these properties outright, for he contracted a mortgage loan with the

⁴³⁴ For more on the Le Couteulx family see Michel Zylberberg, *Capitalisme et catholicisme dans la France moderne : la dynastie Le Couteulx*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2001; Geneviève Daridan, *MM. Le Couteulx et Cie, banquiers à Paris : un clan familial dans la crise du XVIII^e siècle*, Paris: Éditions Loysel, 1993 & Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.213-224.

⁴³⁵ Jacques-Jean Le Couteulx du Molay (1740-1823) was a resident of Meung-sur-Loire and the highest taxpayer of the Loiret under the *Premier Empire* with 24,211 francs in property taxes (Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.330, footnote 96). The baron de Frénilly described him as a “*roi de la banque française...gros grand homme mal bâti...grossier, brutal, débauché...*” (Frénilly, *Souvenirs*, Paris: Plon, 1909, p.201-202).

Hottinguer was of the same opinion (Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.96). Jean-Jacques's daughter married the marquis Jules de Noailles and his son was Prefect of Dijon and created *baron de l'Empire* by Napoleon in 1810 (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.213).

⁴³⁶ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.239 (who quotes the notarial act of sale but misquotes the sale price as 225,000 francs). For full details of the sale see Bernard Chevalier, *Malmaison, château et domaine des origines à 1904*, Paris: Éditions de la Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1989. Josephine had been recommended to Le Couteulx by Fouché, and he became her personal banker. Note that she had no income of her own. Lentz says Bonaparte reimbursed approximately 2 million francs to his wife's creditors shortly after Brumaire.

⁴³⁷ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.213.

⁴³⁸ Ida Saint-Elme (“*la Veuve de la Grande Armée*”), *Mémoires d'une contemporaine*, Tome II, Paris: Ladvocat, 1828, p.314 & 328.

⁴³⁹ For a list of these properties, see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.220-221. Most of the information on his real estate ventures must be gleaned from the inventory of his goods drawn up for his widow following his death (MC/ET/XCVIII/878, 30 Dec. 1818, *Inventaire après-décès de Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu*), and from the loan contract he made with Jacques-Louis Pourtalès & associates in 1809 for which he used a number of properties as mortgaged security.

Banco de San Carlos for 6,941,500 francs to guarantee payments on them.⁴⁴⁰ By the time of his death in 1818, Le Couteulx had lost most of these assets, conserving only a house in Auteuil, four farms in Osterloo (Belgium) and a plot of land in Antwerp.

Career:

The *Le Couteulx & Cie.* bank, established in Paris in 1670, was the largest of the great international trading houses in France prior to 1789 and the oldest still in activity on the eve of 18 Brumaire (Mallet was the second). Its principal activity was the import and sale of silver piasters from the Spanish Empire. A branch of the Le Couteulx family – the Le Couteulx de la Noraye – had established themselves at Cadix to act as intermediaries in this trade. The following list illustrates the scope of *Le Couteulx & Cie.*'s business:

- Trade with the Far East and the United States (tobacco concessions in Virginia);⁴⁴¹
- Participation in the *Caisse d'Escompte* (where the Le Couteulx reigned supreme).⁴⁴² Le Couteulx was linked to Jacques Necker and his international financial network which included the Scottish banker Robert Herries, the Belgian financier Édouard de Walckiers, Jean-Joseph de Laborde and the Périer brothers (*Compagnie des Eaux de Paris*). Opposing them was the faction of Isaac Panchaud and Calonne which included speculators like Étienne Clavière, Étienne Delessert and politicians such as Jacques-Pierre Brissot. Throughout the 1780s these two factions jostled for control of the *Caisse d'Escompte*, the *Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes Orientales et de la Chine* and the *Compagnie des Eaux de Paris*;⁴⁴³
- Selling Spanish state loans on the international money market in 1780;⁴⁴⁴
- Involvement in one of Necker's seven life annuity loan schemes contracted on the lives of the 'Thirty Immortals of Geneva'. Le Couteulx de La Noraye of Cadix purchased 420,000 *livres* of these annuities and *Le Couteulx & Cie.* acquired another 880,000 *livres* (1780-1781);⁴⁴⁵
- In 1782, *Le Couteulx & Cie.* formed a business partnership to import silver piasters from the *Banco de San Carlos* in Madrid (founded by Francois Cabarrús – father of

⁴⁴⁰ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.222.

⁴⁴¹ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.217 & Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.97-98.

⁴⁴² Founded in 1776 by Turgot and the Anglo-Swiss financier Isaac Panchaud, the *Caisse d'Escompte* fell under the influence of 'Neckerian' financiers in 1778. Several trading houses heavily involved in the Spanish piaster trade held permanent seats on its board until the Revolution like *Pache frères et Cie.* (Genevans who relocated to Paris), *Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver & fils* (Dutch banking house favoured by Madame du Barry), *Jean Cottin & fils* (Protestant bankers closely linked to the *Compagnie des Indes* and textile industry of northern France) and *Rilliet & Cie.* (Lyon bankers subsequently replaced on the board by *Girardot, Haller et Cie.*). Other directors of note included Simon-Emmanuel-Julien Le Normand – Le Couteulx's former associate in Cadix and later *receveur général des finances* of La Rochelle and Tours – Joseph Duruey, Claude Baudard de Saint-James and Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier. See Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.698-701.

⁴⁴³ See Jean Bouchary, *L'eau à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle. La Compagnie des Eaux et l'Entreprise de l'Yvette*. Paris: M. Rivière, 1946 & Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.673-685 for the struggle surrounding control of the *Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes Orientales et de la Chine*.

⁴⁴⁴ The sale of Spanish state loans was launched on the Parisian market in September 1780 by a group of bankers – Le Couteulx, Jean-Baptiste Vandenyver, Jean Cottin and Jean-François Batdebat – all of whom were linked to the *Caisse d'Escompte*. Since poor Spanish credit rendered these loans unattractive to foreign investors, Madrid advanced a million piasters drawn on the Havana Treasury to François Cabarrús and the banker Pierre Lalanne who entrusted them to Vandenyver so he could discount them with the *Caisse d'Escompte*. The resulting funds were used to purchase subscription bonds from Calonne's loan of December 1783. Thus, the French Royal Treasury not only reimbursed the original Spanish loan, but also enabled the banking middlemen to reap handsome profits at its expense. This scam was latter denounced by Marat and Fouquier-Tinville during the trials of Madame du Barry and Vandenyver (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.702).

⁴⁴⁵ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.511-512 – Lüthy provides a detailed analysis of these loans (*Ibid*, Tome II, p.464-591) which were vital in helping France finance its participation in the American Revolutionary War.

Thérèse Cabarrús a.k.a. Madame Tallien), which held the exclusive monopoly to export piasters from Spain.⁴⁴⁶ Jean-Barthélémy secured an agreement with the *Caisse d'Escompte* to advance him funds to purchase piasters at a very low rate of interest. For the first quarter of 1785, he borrowed twenty million *livres* for his purchases, paying 0.65% interest per 1,000 *livres*.⁴⁴⁷ Profits were so considerable that Le Couteulx founded a banking syndicate to sell *Banco de San Carlos* shares in Paris. Mirabeau was hired by Calonne's faction to denounce Le Couteulx's speculations in a pamphlet entitled "*Lettre à M. Le Couteulx de La Noraye sur la Banque de Saint-Charles et sur la Caisse d'Escompte*";⁴⁴⁸

- Participation in the establishment of the *Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes Orientales et de la Chine* (1785). In its first year of activity (1785-1786), this company sent over fifteen million *livres* in hard currency to India almost exclusively supplied by *Le Couteulx & Cie.* and *Magon Lefer frères* in Cadix.⁴⁴⁹ These investments made Le Couteulx one of the *Compagnie des Indes*'s principal shareholders (he still owned 200 shares in 1796). He also financed the activities of several textile manufactures linked to the company with his associates, the Féray (the in-laws of Oberkampf);⁴⁵⁰
- In 1788, Le Couteulx speculated on shares of the *Compagnie des Eaux* along with his partners, the bankers Louis Pourrat and Guillaume-Louis d'Arthenay.⁴⁵¹ All three became administrators of the *Administration Royale des Eaux de Paris*, as did Laurent-Vincent Le Couteulx.⁴⁵²

Le Couteulx was therefore at the heart of what was referred to as '*les affaires d'Espagne*' – a triangular trading system initially set up to finance Franco-Spanish operations during the American Revolutionary War comprising three main sectors: the sale of Spanish state loans on the Parisian market, the establishment of the *Banco de San Carlos* in Madrid to consolidate these loans and the supply of hard currency to the French Royal Treasury.⁴⁵³ It should be noted that France was the European market where the price for piasters was highest.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁴⁶ *Le Couteulx & Cie.* was the *Banco de San Carlos*'s official correspondent in Paris while the Le Couteulx de La Noraye in Cadix acted as intermediaries between Paris and Madrid. Bruguière, *GPR*, p.61-62.

⁴⁴⁷ See AN, F/12/798C, *extrait de la délibération du 8 juillet 1785* – The *Caisse d'Escompte* gave Le Couteulx free access to its credit for 25 days – the requisite delay to remit piasters into French currency – and charged him ½% every month for purchases of piasters made after this deadline for the Royal mint. The deliberation of 8 July 1785 indicates Le Couteulx borrowed 19,971,000 *livres* for the first semester of 1785 for which he paid 13,529 *livres* interest (equivalent to 0,65% per 1,000 *livres*).

⁴⁴⁸ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.217 – Speculation on shares of the *Banco de San Carlos* reached a high point in 1785, with shares in Paris worth 20% more than in Madrid (800 *livres* vs. 625 *livres*) on June 14. Le Couteulx and his partners made considerable profits, while buyers of these shares lost a great deal when their value fell dramatically in July. See Earl J. Hamilton's series of articles on the Bank of Spain – 'The Foundation of the Bank of Spain', *The Journal of Political Economy*, 53 (2), 1953: 97-114; 'The First Twenty Years of the Bank of Spain I', *Ibid*, 54 (1), 1946: 17-37; 'The First Twenty Years of the Bank of Spain II', *Ibid*, 54 (2), 1946: 116-140. See also Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.46-52.

⁴⁴⁹ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.679

⁴⁵⁰ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.59.

⁴⁵¹ The D'Arthenay family of Normandy were cousins of Le Couteulx's second wife (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.215).

⁴⁵² Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.710-711.

⁴⁵³ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.701 – The structure of this dubious system explains why the *Banco de San Carlos*'s main activity initially consisted in speculating on its own shares. This produced mediocre results and resulted in the Spanish government conferring the monopoly of piaster exports to the bank in order to save its finances.

⁴⁵⁴ In 1783-1784, the rate of exchange for the piaster between Cadix and Paris stood at 3 *livres* 14 *sols* for commercial transactions but fluctuated between 5 *livres* 7 *sols* and 5 *livres* 8/11 *sols* for 'effective' rates. The

At the close of the 18th century, *Le Couteulx et Cie.* was headquartered in the Place Vendôme with important subsidiary counters in Rouen and other provincial towns, and also in cities abroad – especially Cadix where all Le Couteulx sons spent a few years completing their commercial training.⁴⁵⁵ According to Pierre-Nicolas Berryer, a close family friend:

*“Every year, the two families of Paris and Rouen – women, children, and grandchildren – met on an appointed day on the Paris-Rouen road in a large house which they jointly owned, located midway along the road near Vernon. Here they brought all the registrars of both their establishments. The annual inventory was carried out and signed by the heads of each family. After this they parted ways and each returned to their respective homes.”*⁴⁵⁶

Le Couteulx played an important role in the Revolution from the start. He was extremely well-connected in government financial administrations, maintaining close links to the Denormandie brothers (Louis Valentin and Claude-Ernest) of Rouen who succeeded Dufresne de Saint-Léon at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation* in December 1792,⁴⁵⁷ and with the veteran *garde du Trésor* Bertrand Dufresne whom he welcomed at Rouen for special training in the Spanish piaster market.⁴⁵⁸ Under the Directory he was a close ally of Sièyes, Talleyrand and Bonaparte. Jean-Conrad Hottinguer, who clerked at *Le Couteulx & Cie.*, described Jean-Barthélémy as “*quite a superficial man.*”⁴⁵⁹

In 1805, Le Couteulx secured a controlling stake in the *société des fonderies de Romilly* (Romilly-sur-Andelle in the Eure) – a company listed among the *Banque de France*’s 200 biggest shareholders in Year XIV.⁴⁶⁰ He was also showered with honours by successive Bonapartist regimes, being appointed a member of the *sénat conservateur*, first president of the *Banque de France*’s Regency Council and a *Grand officier de la Légion d’honneur*. He was later created *comte de Fresnelles* and a *comte de l’Empire* and awarded the *senatorerie* of Lyon. In 1814, Le Couteulx was one of Napoleon’s *commissaires extraordinaires* dispatched to oversee the 22nd *division militaire* at Tours. Despite his close association with Napoleon, Louis XVIII welcomed Le Couteulx’s defection to the Bourbon side, making him a *Pair de France* (June 1814) and appointing him to the *Chambre des Pairs*. Jean-Barthélémy declined to rally Napoleon during the *Cent Jours* and voted the death of Marshal Ney.

Career Overview:

- Spends a few years at Cadix during his youth to complete his commercial training;
- Partner in the family bank at Rouen (17 Jan. 1784),⁴⁶¹
- Opposes the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1786 which ruins Norman commerce;
- *Premier échevin de Rouen* (1789);

import of gold and silver remained one of the most lucrative trades of this era and was subsequently denounced by revolutionaries as a vital constituent of foreign plots (Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.704).

⁴⁵⁵ Berryer, *Souvenirs*, p.320-321.

⁴⁵⁶ Berryer, *Souvenirs*, p.322-324.

⁴⁵⁷ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.64-65 & 245-246.

⁴⁵⁸ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.42.

⁴⁵⁹ Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.96.

⁴⁶⁰ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.217.

⁴⁶¹ Jean-Barthélémy’s inventory after decease (MC/ET/XCVIII/878, 30 Dec. 1818) indicates he was already a director of *Le Couteulx & Cie.* at this date. Other cousins who served as his co-directors were Jacques-Jean Le Couteulx du Molay (his principal assistant), Barthélémy Jean-Louis Le Couteulx de La Noraye, Laurent-Vincent Le Couteulx and Antoine Le Couteulx de Verclives.

- Elected deputy of the Third Estate of Rouen to the Estates-General (21 April 1789);
- Imports wheat into France with Gouverneur Morris, the American *chargé d'affaires* in Paris, particularly for the city of Lyon (Nov. 1789);⁴⁶²
- Supports Necker's plan for a national bank based on the *Caisse d'Escompte* (Dec. 1789);⁴⁶³
- Declines the post of *caissier général de l'Extraordinaire* (which eventually goes to his cousin, Jean-Jacques Le Couteux du Molay) (early 1790);
- Backs Necker's proposal for a loan of 40 million *livres* to the National Assembly (17 April 1790);
- Submits a project for a *Banque territoriale* and speaks against the dissolution of the *Compagnie des Indes* (May 1790);⁴⁶⁴
- Publishes a report in favour of exchanging *Caisse d'Escompte* notes for *assignats* (July 1790);⁴⁶⁵
- Joins the *club des Feuillants* (July 1791);
- The 'Affair of the Bank of Saint-Charles'. In 1791, Le Couteux established a bankers' syndicate to buy up about 5,000,000 francs of public markets owned by the *Banco de San Carlos* in France. But in October 1792, he diverted over two million *livres* from this venture to the Spanish *chargé d'affaires* in Paris who planned to bribe the National Convention's deputies to vote against Louis XVI's execution.⁴⁶⁶ Jean-Barthélémy and his cousin (Laurent-Vincent) even published a brochure entitled "*Le Cri de la Conscience*" petitioning all deputies;⁴⁶⁷
- After being denounced by a certain 'Héron', a bankrupt merchant of Marseille, Le Couteux was arrested and imprisoned for eleven months (Nov. 1793 – Aug. 1794) at the *Conciergerie* with his cousin Laurent-Vincent. Berryer claims "*the judgment of their case was eluded a hundred times until 9 Thermidor by a purely mechanical stratagem which consisted in always placing their dossier at the bottom of the bundles of accusations. It cost Mssrs. Le Couteux et Cie. enormous sums to escape execution.*"⁴⁶⁸ They were released after 9 Thermidor thanks to the intercession of

⁴⁶² "Spend the morning [Nov. 6th] with Le Coulteux adjusting the form of a contract for flour with M. Necker, which is to be copied and sent with a note from me. Return home after three to dress, then go to M. de Montmorin's." (*The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris*, Vol. 1, New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1888, p.217)

⁴⁶³ Several plans for a national bank were put forward at the outset of the Revolution, notably by Necker, Jacques-Annibal Ferrières and Laborde de Méréville. See Marion, *HFF*, Tome II, chapter II; Bruguière, *GPR*, p.60-63 ; Jacoud, *LBBF*, p.73-82 & Le Couteux's speech to the National Assembly in support of Necker's plan: *Discours et motion sur le plan de banque nationale du premier ministre des finances prononcé à l'Assemblée nationale le 6 décembre 1789 par M. Le Couteux de Canteleu*, Versailles: Baudouin.

⁴⁶⁴ See *Opinion de M. Le Couteux de Canteleu, député de Rouen, sur le commerce de France aux Indes Orientales*, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1790.

⁴⁶⁵ *Rapport du Comité des finances, sur l'échange des assignats, contre les billets de la Caisse d'escompte*, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 29 juillet 1790.

⁴⁶⁶ See L. Janrot, 'L'Affaire de la Banque Royale de Saint-Charles.' *Banque*, n^{os} 7 & 11, 1936 – When the *Banco de San Carlos* attempted to balance its books in 1805, it established the debt owed by Le Couteux's banking syndicate at 17,652,940 francs and marketed mortgaged securities on his goods worth 6,800,000 francs. In 1809, with Joseph Bonaparte now King of Spain, Napoleon ordered Le Couteux to reimburse 2,250,000 francs to the bank. He was forced to borrow money from Jacques-Louis Pourtalès of Neuchâtel and four other Parisian financiers (Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.218, 220, 222 [for the list of his creditors on the loan] & 224).

⁴⁶⁷ *Le cri de la conscience, ou réflexions d'un français ami de la justice, adressées à la Convention Nationale et à ses concitoyens, sur le procès de Louis XVI*, 1792 (BN, 8^o Lb41 115).

⁴⁶⁸ Berryer, *Souvenirs*, Tome I, p.168-171 – Berryer believed the Le Couteux were spared because he had helped Fouquier-Tinville obtain a job in his Parisian section in July 1789. Antoine Sérieys (*Le Règne de Louis XVII*, Paris: Plancher, 1817, p.74-76) affirms the notary Maupas – whose son had married one of

Cambacérés;⁴⁶⁹ Laurent-Vincent's condition had deteriorated so badly in prison that he died shortly after on 6 Nov. 1794.⁴⁷⁰

- Purchases a share (2 sols 3 deniers ½) of the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin*, sold as *biens d'émigrés* (10 July 1795);⁴⁷¹
- Participates in negotiating the exchange of Madame Royale (Sep.-Nov. 1795);
- Elected *député de la Seine* at the *Conseil des Anciens* (20 Oct. 1795);
- Supports the forced loan of Year IV (Nov. 1795);⁴⁷²
- Meets Bonaparte at a dinner reception hosted by Barras (Jan. 1796);
- Supports the project to set up a national bank (Feb. 1796);
- Elected President of the *Conseil des Anciens* (20 April – 20 May 1796);
- Supports renewing the 9 Oct. 1793 ban on British merchandise in French ports. This leads the *Conseil des Anciens* to ratify the law of 10 brumaire Year V (31 Oct. 1796);
- Submits a report on the removal of *mandats territoriaux* from circulation (4 Feb. 1797);⁴⁷³
- Opposes 18 Fructidor coup and purging of royalists from legislative councils (Sep. 1797);
- Proposes a system employing *bonds des deux-tiers* to liquidate the national debt (Dec. 1797);⁴⁷⁴
- Delivers a report condemning the Treasury's role in the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal (26 Aug. 1798);⁴⁷⁵
- Publishes an essay on proposed tax contributions for Year VII based on Britain's model (1798);⁴⁷⁶

Fouquier's daughters – served as an intermediary in these bribery transactions. Barère claims rather unconvincingly he obtained Le Couteulx's liberation after meeting Fouquier in the Tuileries (*Mémoires de Barère*, Tome II, p.204-205). See also Bigo, *La Caisse d'escompte (1776-1793) et les origines de la Banque de France*, p.219.

⁴⁶⁹ Arnaud Manas, 'Le Mythe des Trente Deniers de Brumaire' in Pierre Branda (ed.), *L'Économie selon Napoléon*, p.82 – There is no doubt Jean-Barthélémy narrowly avoided death, for a letter from the concierge of the *Prison de la Bourbe* to Fouquier-Tinville, found in the papers of the latter, indicates his execution had been decided as early as 11 April 1794: "He has been taken out of la Bourbe to be tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal. Nothing has yet been determined in this case. Le Couteulx has requested certain effects left in this prison, etc." (AN, W//163, pièces 18 & 35 & BB/3/68, dossier 180)

⁴⁷⁰ MC/ET/XCVIII/705, 28 brumaire III/18 Nov. 1794 – *Inventaire après-décès de Vincent Le Couteulx*.

⁴⁷¹ For full details of this sale see the inventory after decease of the Montpellier banker Guillaume Sabatier (MC/ET/XLVIII/550, 12 Sep. 1808). The *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin* was comprised of 24 sols of which 11 sols 1 denier were sold (11/24^e et 1/288^e) for 2,261,700 livres – equivalent to roughly half the company's total shares. The banker Claude Perier advanced 2,200,000 livres of this sum to the *receveur général* of Valenciennes on 19 June 1795 in the name of Dessandrouin, the company's caretaker manager. The seller on the deed of sale was listed as one Jacques Renard, a representative (*mandataire*) of Dessandrouin. The share distribution was as follows: Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx – 2 sols 3 deniers ½; Claude Perier – 2 sols 3 deniers ½; Guillaume Sabatier – 1 sol 10 deniers; Veuve Pierre Bernier (former administrator of the *Compagnie des Indes*) née Devilliers – 1 sol 10 deniers; Veuve Vincent Le Couteulx née Pourrat – 11 deniers; Pierre Desprez (father of Médard Desprez) – 11 deniers; Hermenegilde Laurent Oger – 6 deniers and Pierre-Nicolas Berryer – 6 deniers. These details are reproduced in Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.371-372.

⁴⁷² *Opinion de Lecouteulx-Canteleu, représentant du peuple, sur la résolution du Conseil des Cinq-cents, qui propose un emprunt forcé de six cents millions en numéraire*, frimaire IV.

⁴⁷³ *Rapport sur l'entier retirement des mandats, fait par Lecouteulx-Canteleu, séance du 16 pluviôse an V.*

⁴⁷⁴ *Rapport fait par Lecouteulx-Canteleu, sur la résolution relative à la liquidation de l'arriéré de la dette publique et au mode de remboursement des deux tiers...* Séance du 14 frimaire VI/4 Dec. 1797, Paris: Imprimerie nationale.

⁴⁷⁵ *Rapport fait par Lecouteulx, au nom de la commission de surveillance de la Trésorerie nationale.* Séance du 9 fructidor VI/26 Aug. 1798, Paris: Imprimerie nationale.

⁴⁷⁶ *Essai sur les contributions proposées en France, pour l'an sept, sur celles qui existent actuellement en Angleterre, et sur le crédit public*, Paris: Imprimerie Dupont, 1798.

- Resigns his seat in the *Conseil des Anciens* and is appointed *Président de l'administration départementale de la Seine* (Floréal VII/April-May 1799);
- Supports the 18 Brumaire and accompanies Bonaparte to Saint Cloud on the second day of the coup (10 Nov. 1799). He is promised the post of finance minister, but the position eventually goes to Martin Gaudin (thanks to lobbying from Sièyes);⁴⁷⁷
- Joins the *Vingt Négociants Réunis* (20 Dec. 1799) & *Dix Négociants Réunis* (9 March 1800);
- Appointed a member of the *Sénat conservateur* (24 Dec. 1799);
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (1800-1804) and *premier président du Comité Central de Direction de la Banque de France* (1800-1 Oct. 1801). Resigned and succeeded by Perregaux;
- Major shareholder in the *société des fonderies de Romilly*, which was itself among the *Banque de France*'s 200 largest shareholders in Year XIV (1805-1806);
- Created *comte de Fresnelles* and *comte de l'Empire* (1808);
- *Commandeur* (1804) and *Grand officier de la Légion d'honneur* (3 June 1811);
- Dispatched by Napoleon as *commissaire extraordinaire* to the 22nd *division militaire* at Tours (early 1814);
- *Pair de France* (June 1814). Appointed to the *Chambre des Pairs* (1814);
- Declines to rally Napoleon during the *Cent Jours*. Votes the death of Marshal Ney (1815).⁴⁷⁸

Lemercier, Louis Charles CCC

Lemercier was a trader from Saint Malo.⁴⁷⁹ Under the Directory he secured a major shipbuilding contract with the government, farming out his concession in the port of Antwerp to the military contractor Michel-Jean Simons.⁴⁸⁰ Lemercier resided in the Rue de la Loi.

Lenormand, Pierre (1734 – ?)

Born in 1734. Pierre hailed from the Lenormand family, many of whom had made their careers as *receveurs généraux* or associates of the Le Couteulx family based at Cadix.

Career:

- Works as a trader in Cadix (1755-1793);
- Arrested and imprisoned (July 1794-August 1795);
- Head of the 2nd section of the finance ministry's general secretariat (*opérations de commerce et de changes où la République est intéressée*) – renamed the 3rd section in 1798 (1797-1801).⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁷ Bonaparte told Le Couteulx: “*Il faut un homme à présenter au commerce, aux honnêtes gens, à l'Europe financière et commerçante, et cet homme-là, c'est vous*” (Lescure (ed.), *MJR*, Tome II, p.225). For Le Couteulx's role in 18 Brumaire, see also Paul Bastide, *Sièyes et sa pensée*, Paris: Hachette, 1970, p.242.

⁴⁷⁸ For more on Le Couteulx see Geneviève Daridan, *MM. Le Couteulx et Cie, banquiers à Paris : un clan familial dans la crise du XVIII^e siècle*, Paris: Éditions Loysel, 1993; Michel Zylberberg, *Capitalisme et catholicisme dans la France moderne. La dynastie Le Couteulx*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2001 and Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.213-224.

⁴⁷⁹ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.352.

⁴⁸⁰ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.82.

⁴⁸¹ See his file at AN, AF/III/29 & Bruguière, *GPR*, p.270-271.

Liévain-Bauwens, François (14 June 1769 – 17 March 1822) ☆

Born in Ghent, the eldest of twelve children. Liévain-Bauwens was the son of a prosperous wine merchant and tanner. Aged 13, his father took him out of school and put him to work in the family tannery. Liévain-Bauwens regularly travelled to Britain and was the first continental manufacturer to clandestinely smuggle a spinning jenny out of England along with qualified personnel to operate the machinery. He established textile manufactures at Paris in 1799 and at Ghent in 1800. In 1810, he received Bonaparte during his official visit at Ghent and was awarded the *Légion d'honneur*.

Lonnoy, Joseph Alphonse CCC

Lonnoy began his career as a trader in Givet (Ardennes). Successful ventures in military supplying enabled him to purchase an estate at Bièvres worth 80,000 *livres* and a house in the Place Royale in Brussels worth 100,000 *livres*. In Year VI, he established a real estate company with entirely borrowed funds to speculate on *biens nationaux* in both 'domestic and foreign' lands (i.e. France and the Belgian *départements réunis*).⁴⁸²

Lonnoy then secured a contract to supply the *Armée du Rhin* for which he put forward a guarantee of 300,000 francs worth of mortgaged buildings in the *département* of the *Éscaut*.⁴⁸³ He was also an investor in the *régie et ferme des canaux d'Orléans*.⁴⁸⁴ In Year VII, we find him as a partner in the *Compagnie Musset* which furnished military clothing and equipment;⁴⁸⁵ and that same year he also participated in Jacques Antoine Rochefort's *Compagnie Rochefort* for the supply of troops on campaign and of stageposts and military convoys, in partnership with Jean-Baptiste Ouin (*Compagnie Ouin*), Nicolas Haussmann of Colmar and Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe of Douai.⁴⁸⁶ In Year XIV, he was involved in the supply of Bonaparte's *Armée d'Angleterre*.⁴⁸⁷ The Duchesse d'Abrantès, who knew Lonnoy, describes him as "a good and friendly man."⁴⁸⁸

Magon de La Balue (Marquis de La Gervaisais), Nicolas Louis Marie CCC (1765 – 1838)

Known as 'Magon Gervaisais', Nicolas came from the elder branch of the influential Magon family, powerful *armateurs* based in Saint Malo who operated the *Magon, Labalue & Cie.* trading house and had been the official bankers to Louis XV. Magon Gervaisais was known for his love of writing political pamphlets and for his enduring platonic friendship with Louise-Adélaïde de Bourbon, daughter of the Prince de Condé (Louis V Joseph de Bourbon-Condé). Despite his noble origins, Magon Gervaisais embraced the Revolution, and after a brief exile in Britain achieved the remarkable feat of returning to France to salvage the family fortune in the midst of the Terror while avoiding imprisonment.

⁴⁸² MCN/ET/XLV/661, 19 vendémiaire & 27 brumaire VI/10 Oct. & 16-17 Nov. 1797.

⁴⁸³ MCN/ET/XLV/662, 14 nivôse VI/3 Jan. 1798 & MC/ET/XLV/663, 18 floréal VI/7 May 1798.

⁴⁸⁴ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.58.

⁴⁸⁵ MC/ET/XLV/665, 9 frimaire VII/29 Nov. 1798. The company had a financial guarantee of 2,358,556 francs.

⁴⁸⁶ MC/ET/XLV/668, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799.

⁴⁸⁷ MC/ET/LIII/734, 6 vendémiaire XIII/28 Sep. 1804.

⁴⁸⁸ D'Abrantès, *Histoire des salons de Paris*, Tome III, p.367, footnote 1.

Nonetheless, the Terror took a heavy toll on the Magons. In 1794, *Magon, Labalue & Cie.*'s director – Jean-Baptiste Magon de La Balue (1713-1794) – a former treasurer of the Comte d'Artois, was guillotined; but the trading house survived and was taken over by his son, Adrien, who was awarded a subsidy of 60,000 *livres* by the Thermidorian Convention on 3 March 1795.⁴⁸⁹ Adrien partnered with Joseph Servatius, a former *caissier* of his father, and on 1 Sep. 1795 they offered to advance three million Dutch florins in bills of exchange drawn on Pontoys of Amsterdam to the *Comité de Salut public* in exchange for deposits of diamonds and gold ingots. The diamonds were deposited with the Marquis of Iranda, their associate in Madrid, while the gold ingots were sent to Amsterdam as security.

Shortly after the advent of the Directory, the government signed an agreement whereby *Magon, Labalue & Cie.* would advance it 1,061,918 pistoles in bills of exchange drawn on *Sahiée Guillet et Cie.* of Cadix which could be cashed in with *Fould & Cie.* in Paris or *Rey & Brandenburg* of Cadix. The Directory intended to repay them with rescriptions pledged on the sale of a British convoy captured by Admiral Richery's fleet and held at Cadix. As extra security on the deal, the government pawned over a million francs worth of diamonds (approved by decree of 29 pluviôse IV/18 Feb. 1796) with Laffon who acted as an intermediary and deposited the jewels with the Marquis d'Iranda at Madrid.⁴⁹⁰

Unfortunately, the whole operation proved a disaster as the refunds raised had to be diverted towards “*considerable expenses for repairs and supplies of [Admiral Richery's] fleet and the wages of his sailors.*”⁴⁹¹ On 13 ventôse IV/3 March 1796, the Directory was forced to accept an offer by decree from a Citizen Sadler – who held approximately 43 000 pistoles in bills of exchange from the *Magon Labalue & Cie.* trading house which were drawn on *Sahiée, Guillet, et Cie.* of Cadix – to recover these bills at a rate of 11 *livres 9 sols* per pistole.⁴⁹² *Magon Labalue & Cie.* folded later that year and dragged other financiers, such as Édouard de Walckiers, into bankruptcy.⁴⁹³

Under the Restauration, Magon Gervaisais resumed his pamphlet writing and was a staunch critic of Joseph de Villèle, the *président du Conseil*.

Maisse Marius-Félix (17 March 1756 – 18 Feb. 1806) ● AI

Maisse was elected a deputy of the *Basses-Alpes* to the National Convention in Sep. 1792 and supported the *Girondins*. He was excluded from the Convention in June 1793 but reinstated on 18 Frimaire Year III (8 Dec. 1794) and dispatched with his colleague Louis-François Peyre as civilian commissioner to the *Armée d'Italie* on 28 June 1795 with limited powers.⁴⁹⁴ The commissioner Charles-Alexis Alexandre was struck by their greed, writing that:

“*Both complemented each other to such a point that they were veritable piglets of Epicurus: true gluttons. Eating and drinking was their great occupation, and*

⁴⁸⁹ See R. Baron de Saint Pern, *Preuves pour servir à l'histoire généalogique de la maison de Saint Pern*, Tome III, 1908-1920, Bergerac: Imprimerie du Sud Ouest, p.461.

⁴⁹⁰ See Appendix IX and AN, AF/III/349, dossier 1594, *Decree of 29 pluviôse IV/18 Feb. 1796*.

⁴⁹¹ AN, AF/III/352, dossier 1628, *Decree of 13 ventôse IV/3 March 1796*.





⁴⁹² *Ibid.* See also AP, D5 B6 1710, *J. Servatius à Magon Le Fer & Cie. de Cadix*, 24 frimaire V/14 Dec. 1796 and Lefebvre, *LFSD*, p.117.

⁴⁹³ AN, AF/III/63, Dossier 254, plaquette 1, *Dispatch from Hermand, French Consul in Madrid*, 5 ventôse V/23 Feb. 1797). See also Michel Zylberberg, *USDD*, p.509-510.

⁴⁹⁴ AN, AF/III/146, dossier 690, *Maisse to the Directory*, 28 frimaire IV/19 Dec. 1795.

perhaps the only one. The work was done as best as possible by secretaries who followed the tradition of exploiting their functions. The table was set from morning to evening, and perhaps at night as well. They were reputed in the army for having consumed in their house what would have sufficed for an entire battalion, which was all the more scandalous given the army was experiencing acute shortages. Finally...greedy businessmen, they wanted to turn the army's affairs to their advantage. One day they suppressed the supply agencies for bread and forage and immediately re-established them in another form with their front man at its head. But since this poor devil didn't understand how anything worked, he soon mixed up, disorganised and annihilated these two services which had to be restored to their former organisations, and the front man who became their victim found himself so ruined within the space of a month that he was obliged to flee Paris..."⁴⁹⁵

Another of Alexandre's notes relates the expenses of Maïsse and Peyre for three months alone (thermidor & fructidor III and vendémiaire IV) amounted to 1,500,000 *livres*, "excluding bread, wine, lard, meat, oil, soap, which they have taken in prodigious quantities." The army's paymaster-general refused to reimburse such a sum, but they obtained compensation in kind from a warehouse of the commercial agency of Nice which provided both commissioners with hemp and wool from its depots.⁴⁹⁶ There is no proof of these dilapidations in state archives and the letters of Maïsse and Peyre to the government are insignificant.⁴⁹⁷ After the republicans defeated the royalists in the Insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire, many soldiers of the *Armée d'Italie* rejoiced and sang the *Marseillaise*. Maïsse and Peyre found nothing better than to stop several of them from singing the revolutionary anthem, and they were denounced for it.⁴⁹⁸ One month later, they were recalled to Paris.⁴⁹⁹ Maïsse left the *Cinq-Cents* in 1798 and ended his career as a procurator in his native Fourcalquier.

Mallet 'l'ainé' (baron Mallet de Chalmassy), Guillaume    
(29 July 1747 – 14 March 1826)

Born in Noisy (Noisy-le-Sec, Seine-Saint-Denis). Died in Paris. Son of Jacques Mallet (1724-1815), *citoyen et membre du Grand Conseil de Genève*, banker in Paris under the successive names 'Dufour, Mallet et Le Royer', 'Mallet, Le Royer et Mallet fils', and finally 'Mallet père et fils'; and of his wife Madeleine-Louise Bresson (died c.1786).

The Mallets belonged to the bourgeoisie of Rouen since the middle of the 16th century. The family converted to Protestantism during the Reformation. One of its members fled to Geneva where he was granted bourgeois status in 1598. At the start of Louis XV's reign, Isaac Mallet (1684-1779), Guillaume's grandfather, returned to France from Switzerland and established a bank in Paris (1713). He participated in the speculation craze surrounding Law's bank in 1719-1720. The Mallet bank first appeared in the royal almanac in 1723. It

⁴⁹⁵ Alexandre, *Mémoires manuscrits*, Bibliothèque Thiers, 132^e cahier, p.9.

⁴⁹⁶ *Notes d'Alexandre, Revue de la Révolution*, 1886, Tome VIII, p.182.

⁴⁹⁷ AN, AF/III/185, dossier 853:35, *Maïsse to the Directory*, 6 frimaire IV/27 Nov. 1795 & AF/III/331, dossier 1398, *Maïsse to the Directory*, 3 frimaire IV/24 Nov. 1795.

⁴⁹⁸ AF/III/185, dossier 853:33 – *Lettre adressée au comité de Salut public et au comité de Sûreté générale par Dabray (Joseph-Séraphin), membre du Conseil des Cinq-Cents, pour demander le rappel du Peyre et la destitution de Baumont, président de l'administration municipale de Nice, et pour dénoncer la nomination d'Anglas au tribunal de cassation des Alpes-Maritimes*, 12 brumaire IV/3 Nov. 1795.

⁴⁹⁹ AF/III/331, dossier 1398, *The Directory to Peyre and Maïsse*, 13 frimaire IV/4 Dec. 1795; see also Debidour, *RADE*, Tome I, p.176. For more on Maïsse and Peyre see Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.162-163.

was the second oldest surviving banking house of the *Ancien Régime* behind that of Le Couteulx (founded 1670).⁵⁰⁰

Marriage & Children:

Guillaume Mallet was twice married. Firstly, on 24 Aug. 1799 to Elisabeth-Emilie Boy de La Tour (died 1781). They had no children. Secondly, on 11 January 1786 to Anne-Julie Houel (1761-1849).⁵⁰¹ They had two sons: 1.) Adolphe-Jacques (1787-1868, known as 'James'), who inherited his father's barony and Regent's seat at the *Banque de France*, served Louis XVIII and Charles X as *gentilhomme de la chambre du roi* and married Laure Oberkampf, daughter of Christophe-Philippe Oberkampf (1738-1815), the well-known Franco-Bavarian industrialist who established the first manufacture of *toiles peintes* in France at Jouy-en-Josas (Yvelines) in 1759; and 2.) Louis-Jules Mallet (1789-1866), who married Emilie Oberkampf (1794-1856), another daughter of the famous Oberkampf. Both sons were later administrators of the *Compagnie des Docks et entrepôts du Havre*.

Relatives:

Guillaume had one brother: Isaac-Jean-Jacques Mallet (1763-1815), who was also a partner in the family bank and was imprisoned under the Terror. He married Marthe-Henriette Houel (1769-1829), the sister of Guillaume's second wife.

It is important to distinguish the bank of Guillaume, Isaac-Jean-Jacques and their father (*Mallet père et fils*, later renamed *Mallet frères et Cie.*) from that of their distant cousins, Paul-Henri and Francois-Louis Mallet, who had been the business partners of Bontems since 1782 (*Bontems, Mallet frères et Cie.*). Among Guillaume's numerous other relatives were his uncle, Jean-Jacques Mallet (1733-1817), another Parisian banker, and his cousin Paul Torras (1787-1879), secretary to the Empress Josephine following her divorce.

Another relative was Madame Williams, born Arabella Mallet, who was recruited as a British agent into John Talbot's Swabian Agency. She was famous for her cross-Channel journeys in sailor costume as le Petit Matelot.⁵⁰²

Career:

- Works as an associate of his father in the Mallet bank (renamed *Mallet, Le Royer et Mallet fils*). The bank is located at the corner of the rue Montmartre and the rue du Jour (1772-1777); he is made a partner in 1775;
- Sole partner with his father in the family bank which is renamed *Mallet père et fils* (1782);
- Recovers French citizenship (28 Sep. 1791);
- Guillaume and his brother Isaac-Jean-Jacques become the main partners in the family bank, with their father Jacques acting as their financial guarantor (*commandite*). The bank is renamed *Mallet frères et Cie* and headquartered at 13 Rue Mirabeau⁵⁰³ (1792);
- After helping Henri Bertin (former *contrôleur général des Finances* under Louis XV) exfiltrate funds abroad, he is twice arrested and imprisoned during the Terror, held at the former *College du Plessis* with his brother Isaac-Jean-Jacques (26 June – 10 Aug.

⁵⁰⁰ For the Mallet bank's history see Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.270-273 & Tome III, p.580-589 & 728-729.

⁵⁰¹ The Houel family were manufacturers from Caen.

⁵⁰² Sparrow, Elizabeth. 'Secret Service under Pitt's Administrations, 1792-1806', *History*, 82 (270), 1998, p.290-291.

⁵⁰³ Renamed rue du Montblanc in 1793.

1794). They are released after 9 Thermidor. During their captivity, the affairs of their bank are overseen by their wives, their uncle Dangirard and their servant Charpentier who had been in their employ for fifteen years;

- In 1796 (Year IV), Guillaume Mallet still owned 713 shares of the *Compagnie des Indes* (perhaps the biggest shareholder). He still held them in 1825;
- Meets Bonaparte at his residence in the Rue de la Victoire a few days before the Brumaire coup;
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (1800 to his death);
- *Conseiller général de la Seine* (10 March 1800 – 1825);
- *Banquier du Trésor public* (until 20 April 1802);⁵⁰⁴
- Appointed *agent de change* at the bourse (20 July 1801);
- Suffers considerable financial losses due to a string of bankruptcies (1802);
- Elected a member of the protestant consistory of the Seine (1803-1826);
- One of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* (Year XII/1804);
- Created *baron de Chalmassy* (9 Sep. 1810); confirmed by Louis XVIII (17 Feb. 1815);
- In 1812, Mallet was approached by the interior minister, Savary, who had been missioned to evaluate the loyalty of financial elites following the debacle in Russia;⁵⁰⁵
- *Chevalier de la légion d'Honneur* (18 Aug. 1814);
- Takes his son Adolphe-Jacques ('James') and his cousin Aimé-Léonard Torres as new partners in the family bank (30 Dec. 1816); Guillaume's second son, Jules, becomes a partner at an unspecified later date;
- Participates in the founding of the *Compagnie Commerciale d'Assurance* and of the *Caisse d'Épargne* bank (with Benjamin Delessert) (1818).

Like most of the Revolution's great financiers, Guillaume Mallet acquired a significant number of *biens nationaux*, including:

- Half of an *hôtel particulier* in the rue de la Chaussée d'Antin, purchased jointly with his brother Isaac-Jean-Jacques for 250,000 francs from Henri Bertin in 1791;
- The farm of Chalmassy at Tremblay (now Tremblay-en-France) for 180,000 francs on 25 May 1791;
- The farm of the *Archevêché* at Tremblay for 90,000 *livres* on 30 May 1791;

In addition, Guillaume inherited a large real-estate portfolio from his father Jacques in 1818 which included a house in the Rue Taitbout in Paris (estimated 154,500 francs) and the farm of Chambre-Fontaine near Meaux, purchased as a *bien national* by Jacques for 313,500 francs on 3 Feb. 1792.⁵⁰⁶

Mareuil, Joseph Alexandre Jacques Durant de



(6 Nov. 1769 – 13 Jan. 1855)

Born in Paris. Died at the Château of Aï (Marne). The son of André-Anne Durant, a wine merchant from Epernay who purchased the charge of *receveur général des entrées* in Paris, and of his wife Marie-Julie Challaye. Mareuil inherited his father's charge but it was annulled in 1791. As a young man he studied commerce in Le Havre where he indulged in injudicious speculations. Having returned to Paris, he was employed as an *inspecteur*

⁵⁰⁴ AN, AF/IV/1082.

⁵⁰⁵ D'Abrantès, *Mémoires*, Tome IX (Garnier edition, 1893), p.559-567.

⁵⁰⁶ For more on Mallet see AN, 57 AQ, dossiers 1-108 and Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.225-234.

général de la fabrication des assignats. On 17 May 1793, Mareuil was presented to Lebrun who appointed him secretary to the French Legation at Stuttgart. But judging the times inauspicious to launch a diplomatic career, Mareuil did not take up his post but travelled instead to Metz where he passed the officer's exam and served thirteen months at the *Armée du Rhin*'s engineer corps until 1 vendémiaire IV/23 Sep. 1795. The *Comité de Salut public* then appointed him first secretary to the French Legation at Copenhagen. In prairial IV/May 1795, he became *sous-chef de division* at the foreign ministry and was rapidly promoted to head of the ministry's first division on 1 thermidor IV/19 July 1796. He retained this post until 1805, except for a brief stint during which he managed the ministry's political agency at Altona.

As one of Talleyrand's principal deputies, Mareuil oversaw relations with England, Austria, Berlin and Russia and worked in close coordination with d'Hauterive's second division. Compelled to leave the foreign ministry's first division because of his links with Radix de Sainte-Foix, he was subsequently dispatched as minister plenipotentiary to Dresden, Stuttgart and Naples.⁵⁰⁷ Napoléon created him a *baron de l'Empire* on 24 Feb. 1809. Mareuil had a highly publicised duel early in 1812 with the Russian ambassador to Naples, Prince Dmitri Dolgorukov, who had attempted to step in front of him during an official court reception. Dolgorukov was injured in the ear and recalled from his brief. After Murat's defection, Mareuil was recalled from Naples to Paris in January 1814 and was attacked by brigands in imperial territory who stole several precious objects from him.

During the *Cent Jours* he was elected as deputy of Épernay (Marne) on 15 May 1815. Mareuil rallied the second Bourbon Restoration and was appointed a *conseiller d'État* before serving as French ambassador in the Netherlands (1820) and Washington (1824-1830) and Portugal (1830). He was about to take up the post of ambassador in Brasil when the 1830 Revolution broke out. He was then sent to Holland and England where he managed the French embassy in London during Talleyrand's absence. Mareuil was created *pair de France* on 11 Oct. 1832 and elevated to *grand cordon de la Légion d'honneur* on 30 March 1834. Sent as ambassador to Naples in 1834, he was abruptly recalled and retired from the diplomatic service without any public explanation being given. He lived out the remainder of his life on his estates in Champagne.⁵⁰⁸

Marmet, Jean-Louis-Ambroise (c.1767 – 1828) CCC

A future Regent of the *Banque de France* (appointed 17 Oct. 1803 in replacement of Henry-Liévain Carié), Jean-Louis-Ambroise Marmet – known as Marmet l'*ainé* – was the son of a *premier commis des Hypothèques* and of a mother who sold candles. Having received no formal education, he founded his own commission house in 1790 aged twenty-three in the greengrocery business located in the Rue Sainte-Appoline. The next year he moved his business to the Rue de la Verrerie.⁵⁰⁹ One of his younger brothers was probably a *commis* at the Greffulhe bank.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁷ Waresquiel, *Talleyrand, le prince immobile*, p.216.

⁵⁰⁸ For more on Mareuil see Masson, *LDAEPR*, p.369-370 and Robert & Cougny (eds.), *DPF*, Tome IV, p.266-267.

⁵⁰⁹ See Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.235-241.

⁵¹⁰ Guy Antonetti, *Une maison de banque à Paris au XVIII^e siècle, Greffulhe, Montz & Cie : 1789-1793*, Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1963.

Martigny, Jean-François CCC

Martigny was an associate of Carié and one of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* in Year IX. He resided in the Rue Saint Marc.

Meret & Cie. CCC

Wood merchants based at 51 Rue des Tournelles and shareholders of the *Comptoir Commercial*.⁵¹¹

Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel 'jeune' (12 May 1771 – 16 Jan. 1852) CCC

See Chapter 5. Resided in the Rue d'Antin.

Miles, William Augustus (c.1753 – 1817)

William Augustus Miles was a political propagandist whose newspaper, *The Morning Post*, was entirely devoted to Pitt's policies. Miles had served in the Royal Navy before being sent on mission to Liège and Brussels as a spy during the Brabantine Revolution. It was here that he met Lebrun, future French foreign minister, to whom he appears to have lent considerable sums of money. Miles addressed the following letter to Lord Grenville about Lebrun:

“...knowing the influence of the public prints on the minds of the people abroad, I sent him twenty louis by a bill of exchange on Ratisbon, to enable him to pursue his journey, and with the view, I confess, of attaching him by gratitude to defend the interests of my country...being admitted into the Jacobin club at Paris where I saw him [in 1791], he proposed setting up a paper in France, and actually published a prospectus, when he saw that by cabal and intrigue he might get into office.”⁵¹²

In 1790, Miles relocated to Paris where his mission was to break the Franco-Spanish pact of mutual defence which had been concluded in 1761. Pétion de Villeneuve introduced him to the *Club des Jacobins* where he was well-received.⁵¹³

Milloz, Étienne CCC

Resided in the Rue Neuve du Luxembourg.

Miranda y Rodríguez de Espinoza, Sebastián Francisco de (28 March 1750 – 14 July 1816)

Born in Caracas in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. Son of Sebastian de Miranda Ravelo, a wealthy merchant who had immigrated to New Granada from the Canary Islands, and of his wife Francisca Antonia Rodríguez de Espinoza. Miranda studied Humanities at the Royal and Pontifical University of Caracas and was awarded a baccalaureate degree in June 1767, aged 17. In March 1771, he left to continue his studies in Madrid. His father Sebastian purchased a commission for him as a captain in the Princess's regiment in

⁵¹¹ ABF, 1069200401/284, *Liste des actionnaires du Comptoir Commercial, an XII*.

⁵¹² *Grenville Papers*, Vol. III, p.462-463.

⁵¹³ Blanc, *LCST*, p.70-72. See also Evans, Howard V. 'William Pitt, William Miles and the French Revolution.' *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 43 (108), 1970: 190-213.

January 1773. Miranda served on several campaigns, taking part in the defence of Mellila against Morocco (1774-1775) and Spain's campaign against the British during the American Revolutionary War (Siege of Fort Pensacola, invasion of The Bahamas, abortive expedition against Jamaica). While conducting operations in Jamaica, Miranda entered into a commercial agreement with the British merchant Philip Allwood and was accused of being a British spy. This eventually forced him to seek refuge in the United States in July 1783 where he became acquainted with many leading American politicians (Washington, Jefferson, Paine, Samuel Adams, Henry Knox, etc.). In December 1784, Miranda sailed for Britain and spent the next six years travelling through various European courts (Berlin, Stockholm, St. Petersburg, Vienna, etc.) earning his living as a diplomatic fixer and selling his services to politicians and merchants.

In 1791, Miranda arrived in Paris where he befriended Brissot, Pétion and other leaders of the Girondin faction. He was appointed to the *Armée du Nord* (24 Aug. 1792) by war minister Servan on the recommendation of Pétion and Brissot. Miranda was accused of intentional negligence and dereliction of duty bearing decisive responsibility in the French defeat at the Battle of Neerwinden and the Siege of Maastricht. He was arrested and tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal in April 1793 but inexplicably acquitted (16 May 1793)! A police administrator named Charles-Thomas Baillemont reported that "... 60,000 livres were brought to corrupt the judges of Miranda and this affair cost more than 50,000 écus to [Miranda's] friends."⁵¹⁴ An unpublished document in Barère's secret archives entitled "*Les hommes de mon temps*" describes Miranda as follows:

*"This British agent was sent to France in 1792 to appear as more patriotic than the French republicans and steal the command of some of their divisions. He was part of the commanding headquarters of General Dumouriez who was also a secret British agent aiming to become the Monck of the Revolution, overthrow the Republic and restore the Bourbons to the throne of France."*⁵¹⁵

Another letter from Pitt to Lord Grenville dated 7 Sep. 1792 clearly establishes Miranda was in English pay: "*The 800£ about which you enquire was for Miranda, and Smith [Pitt's secretary] has his receipt, which I have mentioned this morning to [James Bland] Burges.*"⁵¹⁶ The archives found in Miranda's possession following his arrest by the Spanish in 1808 prove beyond any doubt he was a British spy. They were published at Caracas in 1930 under the title *Archivo Miranda*. Several papers seized at Miranda's Parisian residence are also conserved at the French National Archives.⁵¹⁷

Mollien, Francois-Nicolas **(28 Feb. 1758 – 20 April 1850)**



Born in Rouen. Died in Paris. Son of Jacques-Robert Mollien (1712-1794), a leading lace maker and cotton velvet manufacturer (*maître-passementier et fabricant de velours de coton*) of Rouen, and of his second wife Anne-Madeleine-Rose Cotelle (1726-1773). Mollien's father was an educated man who spoke English and kept informed of the latest

⁵¹⁴ See AN, AF/II/45:351; Tuetey, *Répertoire général des sources manuscrites de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution française*, Tome IX, p.601-602 and Buchez & Roux (eds.), *Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution française*, Tome XXVII, p.26 & 70.

⁵¹⁵ Personal papers of Bertrand Barère conserved at the Château de Presle. See Blanc, *LCST*, p.86.

⁵¹⁶ *Grenville Papers*, Vol. 2, p.310.

⁵¹⁷ AN, F/7/6285, dossier 5819. See also Blanc, *LCST*, p.86-90.

economic debates. Along with two business associates named André Fesquet and François Pinot, he established one of the first cotton velvet manufactures in Rouen which employed hundreds of rural workers who weaved cotton in their homesteads and transported the finished product to the manufacture. Mollien therefore developed an extensive knowledge of manufacturing in his youth and notes in his memoirs that his father encouraged him to read Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*.⁵¹⁸ His mother died when he was 15.

Mollien had a brother and four sisters. One of his sisters, Hortense-Chantal Mollien (born 1768), married Jacques-François-Adrien Boieldieu in 1795 who already had a son – the well-known composer François-Adrien Boieldieu (1775-1834).

Mollien's paternal grandfather, Jacques Mollien (c.1664/5-c.1757), also a lace maker (*maître-passementier*) hailed from Mesnil-sur-Blagny (Calvados) near Pont-l'Évêque and was the first family member to settle in Rouen. His maternal grandfather, Nicolas Cotelie, was a draper from Rouen.

Marriage:

Mollien was married twice:

- On 21 Oct. 1786, he married Charlotte-Rosalie Mignotte (1769-?), daughter of Jean-Baptiste Mignotte (died 1771), a *bourgeois de Paris* and *boulangier au roi*, and of his wife Marie-Anne-Suzanne Autran, at the parish of Saint-Eustache in Paris. The marriage contract was signed by Calonne and Colonia, *maître des requêtes au Conseil du roi* (Mollien's boss).⁵¹⁹ One of Mollien's witnesses was his friend Adam-François Parcel de Saint-Cristau, the *fermier général* and *trésorier* of Nantes who was guillotined in 1794. Through this union, Mollien became the brother-in-law of Jacques-Constantin Périer (the designer of the *fontaine de Chaillot* and director of the *Compagnie des Eaux*), who was married to Thérèse-Amélie Mignotte, Charlotte-Rosalie's elder sister.⁵²⁰ Jacques-Constantin's brother, Augustin-Charles Périer, stood witness for Charlotte-Rosalie at the wedding. Mollien's father was absent and represented at the ceremony by Bernard Delaitre, *secrétaire au roi* and *directeur général des entrées de Paris*, who was murdered at Charonne on 10 Aug. 1792. Two of Charlotte-Rosalie's maternal uncles were also in attendance: Charles-Barthélémy Autran, exchange agent and *maître d'hôtel de Monsieur frère du roi*, and Claude-Bernard Autran, also an exchange agent. Through his links to the Autrans, Mollien became a first cousin of the printer Firmin-Didot who had married Marie-Félicité Autran. Mollien and Charlotte-Rosalie divorced some time between 1792 and 1800, probably shortly after the law of 20 Sep. 1792 which legalised divorce. Mollien does not mention his first wife in his memoirs;
- On 27 Aug. 1802, Mollien was remarried to Adèle-Rosalie Collart-Dutilleul (1784-1878), daughter of Étienne-Louis-Gabriel Collart-Dutilleul (see his entry) and of Madeleine-Françoise-Rosalie Petit.⁵²¹ Mollien's new father-in-law, Étienne, was the

⁵¹⁸ Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.11-12.

⁵¹⁹ MC/ET/LI/1187, 21 Sep. 1786, *Marriage contract of François-Nicolas Mollien and Charlotte-Rosalie Mignotte*.

⁵²⁰ He was also a cousin of Claude Perier, the financial magnate from Grenoble (proprietor of the Château de Vizille) who had played an important role in the Day of Tiles, purchased a share of the Anzin coal mines in 1795 and later became a Regent of the *Banque de France* upon its creation.

⁵²¹ MC/ET/LXVII/876, 1 fructidor X/19 Aug. 1802, *Marriage contract of François-Nicolas Mollien and Adèle-Rosalie Collart-Dutilleul* and AP, V10 E9, *Marriage of François-Nicolas Mollien and Adèle-Rosalie Collart-Dutilleul*, 9 fructidor X/27 Aug. 1802.

son-in-law of the Lille banker Germain Petit and the right-hand man of Dufresne de Saint-Léon at the *Direction générale de la Liquidation*. Dufresne de Saint-Léon was the godfather of Adèle-Rosalie, and it was him who arranged her marriage to Mollien. She served as Hortense de Beauharnais's *dame de compagnie* and in 1810 was appointed by Napoleon as Empress Marie-Louise's *dame d'honneur*. During the Bourbon Restoration, she held a salon frequented by Talleyrand and his niece the duchesse de Dino, the *comtesse* de Boigne and François Guizot. She became an intimate friend of the Orléans family and was later appointed one of Queen Maria Amalia's *Dames d'Honneur* by King Louis Philippe. Following the 1848 Revolution, she travelled every year to England to visit the exiled Queen Maria Amalia in Claremont. Mollien had no children with his second wife. He speaks very highly of her in his memoirs.⁵²²

Education & Character:

Mollien's father personally took charge of his primary education and hired the services of a private home teacher to instruct complementary lessons. For his secondary schooling, Mollien was sent aged 12 to "a college of the University of Paris" where he was an excellent student. This school was probably not the College Louis-le-Grand or Mollien would have mentioned it in his memoirs. During his stay in Paris, Mollien had been placed in the care of a family friend, a lawyer at the *parlement* of Paris and *échevin* named Angelesme de Saint-Sabin, which indicates the reach of his father's relations.

Mollien identified as catholic but was non-practising, being more interested in the social dimension of religious ideas than in the practice of faith. He joined the *Société de la moral chrétienne* which was founded by his close friend, the duc de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, in 1821. This society supported various philanthropic causes such as the abolition of slavery, the dissolution of gambling houses and the lottery, relief for the poor and indigent in mental asylums, the abolition of the death penalty, etc. It numbered many illustrious members such as the Duke of Orléans, the comtes de Lameth, the Duke of Choiseul, bankers like Davillier, Mallet, Delessert, Hottinguer, Ternaux, Odier, writers like Rémusat, Guizot, Benjamin Constant and high-ranking administrators like Duchâtel, Humann, d'Argout, etc.

Residences:

In 1786, Mollien was living in the Rue Neuve des Mathurins. From 1800 to 1806, he lodged in the buildings of the Caisse d'amortissement in the Rue de l'Oratoire du Louvre. During his tenure as Treasury minister, he stayed at the hôtel Tubeuf located at the corner of the Rue Neuve des Petits-Champs and the Rue Vivienne. Between 1820 and 1823, he resided at 51 Rue de la Chaussée d'Antin. In 1823, he had an *hôtel particulier* constructed in the Quai d'Orsay (now the Rue de Solférino) where he resided for the rest of his life. Mollien's country residence was the Château de Jeurre in Morigny (now Morigny-Champigny in the Essonne) near Étampes which had been bequeathed by Dufresne de Saint-Léon to his second wife.

Assets:

In the contract of his first marriage in 1786, Mollien declared the following assets:

⁵²² Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.237, footnote.

- An annual pension of 2,000 *livres par bon du roi* to be drawn on the tax farming administration's coffers (*Caisse des fermes*);
- An annual salary of 10,000 *livres* from his position as *premier commis*;
- A share of one sixtieth in the pontons de Bordeaux;
- 10,000 *livres* of furniture, clothes, linen, jewels and cash;

His first wife brought a dowry of 80,000 *livres* comprised of 47,000 *livres* from her parental inheritance (father & mother) and 33,000 *livres* of personal assets.

The inventory after decease of Mollien's father (Dec. 1794) indicates his fortune amounted to between 200,000 and 300,000 *livres*.⁵²³ However, over 100,000 *livres* of this was in promissory notes of payment, and there were also several thousand *livres* more in loans and life annuities. These effects depreciated by up to 80% following the introduction of the *assignat*.

Thus, Mollien lost most of his family fortune due to the Revolution, and it is unclear what source of income he used to live on during the period between his release from prison in 1794 and his appointment as administrator of the *Caisse d'amortissement* in 1800 (possibly a loan or some type of revenue from the textile manufacture of Saint-Rémy-sur-Avre? – see below). A consular decree of 23 messidor IX/12 July 1801 fixed Mollien's annual salary as director-general of the *Caisse d'amortissement* at 20,000 *livres* plus free accommodation at its premises in the Rue de l'Oratoire du Louvre.

In the contract of his second marriage, Mollien declared a summary inventory of his goods which included several pieces of precious mahogany furniture and sets of silverware. His second wife declared 52,000 francs of assets, including the bare ownership of the Château of Jeurre which her parents had sold her on 1 fructidor X/19 Aug. 1802 for 30,000 francs to be deducted from her tutelary account (*compte de tutelle*).⁵²⁴ Dufresne de Saint-Léon still enjoyed usufruct rights on the property (which he had acquired from her parents in Aug. 1802 for 25,000 francs) but sold them to the Molliens on 21 Dec. 1809 in exchange for an annual life pension of 2,000 francs.⁵²⁵ Mollien also pledged to pay his wife an annual life pension of 2,400 francs.

Between 1806 and 1814, Mollien was paid an annual salary of 120,000 francs as Treasury minister plus an indemnity of 25,000 francs. As a comte de l'Empire, he received numerous gratifications in the form of rents drawn on various properties in Westphalia, Hanover, Illyria, Florence, Genoa and shares of the *Canal du Midi*. But he lost nearly all of these in 1814 except for 20 *Canal du Midi* shares. He did continue to draw an annual stipend of 5,000 francs as *grand-officier de la Légion d'honneur* which he had enjoyed since 1809, but his bonuses as *grand-aigle* were revoked.

Mollien also purchased three farms during the *Premier Empire*:

⁵²³ Archives départementales de la Seine-Maritime, 2E 12/151, *Inventory after decease of Jacques-Robert Mollien*, 17 frimaire-4 nivôse III/7-24 Dec. 1799 and 3Q 38/36, *Declaration of succession of Jacques-Robert Mollien*, 9 nivôse III/29 Dec. 1794.

⁵²⁴ The estate of Jeurre was worth much more than this and was valued at about 250,000 francs following Madame Mollien's death in 1878.

⁵²⁵ However, Madame Mollien did not acquire full ownership of the Château de Jeurre until Dufresne de Saint-Léon's death in 1836.

- The 69-hectare farm of La Monnerie and the 63-hectare farm of Mesnil, both located at Brétigny-sur-Orge (Seine-et-Oise) near Arpajon, acquired on 14 Jan. 1808 for 80,000 francs in cash;
- The 137-hectare farm of Banthelu near Magny-en-Vexin (Seine-et-Oise) acquired on 18 May 1811 for 170,000 francs cash, plus a bribe of 2,400 francs;

In 1822, Mollien bought a 683m² plot of land in the Quai d'Orsay for 41,400 francs which he enlarged in 1824 through the purchase of an adjacent plot of 184m² for 14,400 francs. It was here that he built an *hôtel particulier* where he settled in 1824.

Mollien bequeathed a fortune of about a million francs: 500,000 francs for the *hôtel particulier* in the Quai d'Orsay, 360,000 francs for the three farms he acquired in the Seine-et-Osie, 75,900 francs as a security bond for the receveur général Ducommun du Locle (his second wife's nephew) and an additional 20,000 francs of uncertain provenance – possibly for his 20 shares in the *Canal du Midi*. His second wife was his sole heir.⁵²⁶

Career:

- *Postulant au bureau des Finances* (1774);
- Intern with the *Frémont et Gerbier* law firm (1775);
- *Commis à l'administration de la Ferme générale* (1778), promoted to *premier commis* (1784);
- *Directeur des domaines et de l'enregistrement* for the *département* of the Eure based at Évreux (1791-1793);
- Co-director of the textile manufacture of Saint-Rémy-sur-Avre (Eure-et-Loir), with the Périers from Grenoble and Henry Sykes from Yorkshire (1792);⁵²⁷
- Arrested and imprisoned (15 Feb. 1794), released on 2 Aug. 1794 thanks to the intercession of Topino-Lebrun;
- Second administrator of the *Caisse d'amortissement* (appointed thanks to the influence of Gaudin, his former colleague at the *Contrôle général*) (Dec. 1799);
- Director-General of the *Caisse d'amortissement* (July 1801);
- *Conseiller d'État* (section des finances) (1805);
- Treasury minister (27 Jan. 1806 – 3 April 1814), and again briefly during the *Cent Jours*;
- Royal Order of Holland (1807);
- *Commandeur* (28 April 1808), *grand-officier* (3 Dec. 1809) and *grand-aigle* (6 April 1813) *de la Légion d'honneur*;
- *Comte de l'Empire* (10 March 1808);
- Order of the Elephant of Denmark (1811);
- *Pair de France* (5 March 1819). Revoked in 1848;
- *Président de la commission de surveillance de la Caisse des dépôts et consignations* (1819-1825, and again from 1830-1835).
- Resigns from the presidency of the *Commission de surveillance de la Caisse des dépôts et consignations* due to failing eyesight (1836).

⁵²⁶ All these assets are listed in her declarations of succession (AP DQ7 11799, 21 Oct. 1878 & DQ7 11800, 16 Nov. 1878 and Archives départementales de l'Essonne, 3Q 15/13, 18 Nov. 1878). See also DQ7 3905, *Declaration of Succession of François-Nicolas Mollien* (less detailed on his assets), 21 Sep. 1850.

⁵²⁷ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.301 – The Waddington family was also involved in the venture. One of their descendants, William Waddington (1826-1894), was later caretaker Prime Minister of France (1879) and French ambassador in London during the Third Republic.

After finishing his secondary schooling in 1774, Mollien was recommended by his Parisian guardian Saint-Sabin to the administration of the *Contrôle général des finances*. But his father wanted him to become a lawyer and apprenticed him to Maître de Frémon, one of the leading barristers of Rouen. While working in Frémon's study, Mollien met the maréchal de Richelieu and Maître Gerbier, one of the leading lawyers in Paris. Thanks to Richelieu's influence, Mollien obtained a position at the *Ferme générale* in 1775. Two years later, Necker became finance minister and Mollien made the acquaintance of the banker Isaac Panchaud along with a number of financial experts gravitating in his entourage (Dupont de Nemours, Clavière, the Abbé Louis, etc.).

Following the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War, Mollien presented a report in 1781 to Necker's successor – Joly de Fleury – detailing a plan to transform Bayonne – the leading marketplace for the import and export of Spanish piasters – into a free port, thereby luring American trading ships away from Britain towards France. Joly de Fleury liked the project and he hired Mollien as a commis in the *Contrôle général des finances*, delegating him to Louis-Guillaume de Villevault (1716-1786) who was responsible for overseeing the *Ferme générale*'s tax collection. When Joly de Fleury was replaced by Lefèvre d'Ormesson as finance minister in 1783, Villevault resigned but presented Mollien to his successor, Colonia, who became Mollien's close friend. It was through Colonia that Mollien met the duc de Liancourt, the well-known philanthropist.

During his time at the *Contrôle général des finances*, Mollien was involved with two major operations linked to the *Ferme générale*. The first was the reform of the fiscal regulations governing the *octrois de Paris* – the ring of toll gates surrounding Paris – in 1784. Several institutions like the Invalides, the *École militaire*, the Bastille and religious communities benefited from old privileges which exonerated them from paying taxes on importing merchandise into Paris – and they often abused this preferential status to import goods into the capital and sell them at inflated prices. Mollien resolved this problem by imposing a compensatory annual subscription (*rente annuelle compensatoire*) on all these institutions and recommending the construction of a wall to link toll gates with each other and prevent the importing of fraudulent merchandise. This caused widespread criticism from those who lost their privileges and was denounced as 'the wall walling in a whispering Paris' (*le mur murant Paris murmurant*).

The second major dossier managed by Mollien involved the renewal of the contractual lease of the *Fermes générales*, the association of private contractors who collected indirect taxes for the king, in 1786. Mollien was tasked with drafting the new contractual lease and increased the annual franchise owed by the *fermiers généraux* by 14 million *livres*. He conducted these negotiations very successfully while maintaining cordial relations with the various contractors involved. The new finance minister, Calonne, rewarded him with the rank of *premier commis* and an annual pension of 2,000 *livres* for his "extraordinary services" in this affair. Mollien was also a devoted follower of Adam Smith and an early supporter of free market economics. He believed the progress of French industry enabled it to compete with those of neighbouring countries, and to this end he successfully argued for the removal of several import restrictions in negotiations surrounding the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1786.

Observing the advent of the Revolution with suspicion, Mollien distanced himself from Paris and was appointed *directeur de l'administration générale des domaines nationaux et de l'enregistrement* for the department of Eure (based at Évreux) by Louis-Hardouin

Tarbé, his former colleague at the *Contrôle général* who became finance minister in 1791. He drafted a letter of remonstrance when the Parisian mob broke into the Tuileries on 20 June 1792 and lost his post with the fall of the monarchy (10 Aug. 1792). Mollien then returned to private life and accepted a proposal from his brother-in-law, Jacques-Constantin Périer, to become a partner and manager of a cotton manufacture he was establishing at Saint-Rémy-sur-Avre (Eure-et-Loire). In May 1793, finance minister Clavière offered Mollien to resume working in the public financial administration, but he declined the offer.

Arrested on 15 Feb. 1794 by order of the revolutionary committee of Évreux, he was briefly freed but incarcerated again in March by the *Comité de Sûreté générale* on a charge of complicity with the *fermiers généraux* of the *Ancien Régime* (among whom was Lavoisier). He was imprisoned in Paris with the 32 *fermiers* and narrowly escaped the guillotine, probably thanks to the judicious financial advice he gave the *Comité de Salut public* for which he was occasionally summoned from his cell.

Released on 2 Aug. 1794 thanks to the intercession of Topino-Lebrun, Mollien then decided to travel to England. Since Britain was an enemy country and all direct travel there was barred, he initially secured a position in the customs offices at Mainz and obtained a passport from an acquaintance in the customs administration. He travelled to Mainz in late 1798, and from there went to Holland and eventually England where he remained for nearly a year. Mollien studied the British financial system and witnessed first-hand the financial crisis during which the Bank of England was forced to suspend the conversion of its bank notes into hard currency. His sojourn in England has given rise to numerous speculations by historians that he had been dispatched on a secret mission, especially since such a journey was well-nigh impossible without assistance from accomplices in high places.

Mollien returned to France via Holland and Strasbourg in October 1799, about the same time Napoleon disembarked at Fréjus. One of the first measures taken by the new finance minister Gaudin after the Coup of 18 Brumaire was the re-establishment of the *receveurs généraux* and the creation of a *Caisse de garantie et d'amortissement* to manage payments of the national debt which was established by a consular decree on 6 frimaire VIII/27 Dec. 1799. Gaudin had known Mollien since their days together at the *Contrôle général*, and he secured Mollien's appointment as the *Caisse d'amortissement's* second administrator (the other two were Chanorier and Decrétot). As Mollien notes in his memoir:

*This minister [Gaudin] and I followed the same career prior to the Revolution. He had for a long time been in charge of the administration of direct contributions, as I had been in charge of indirect contributions. The Revolution suspended our relations without weakening our mutual esteem.*⁵²⁸

In early 1801, Napoleon was deeply irritated by a speculative run on shares of the *Caisse d'amortissement* triggered by a false rumour it would soon receive additional funds to buy back more *tiers consolidé*. He summoned Mollien to a meeting and was so favourably impressed that he made him his chief financial advisor for all matters relating to the stock market, speculation and banking and monetary reform. The *Caisse d'amortissement* was re-organised by a consular decree of 23 messidor IX/12 July 1801 and Mollien became its director-general, instituting double accounting in its bookkeeping. He subsequently played

⁵²⁸ Mollien, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.215.

an active role in advising Bonaparte on discount banks and counselling him in preparing the law of 24 germinal XI/14 April 1803 which granted the *Banque de France* a monopoly of paper currency emission. Nonetheless, Mollien remained highly critical of the *Banque de France*'s Regency Council and the privileges enjoyed by the bank and its Regents, pressing Napoleon to place it under state control.

Following the bankruptcy of the *Négociants réunis* in early 1806, Mollien was appointed Treasury minister on 27 Jan. 1806 in replacement of Barbé-Marbois who had failed to check the reckless speculations of the *Banque de France*'s Regents. Mollien's tenure at the Treasury lasted until 1814 and was underscored by reforms in four major fields and institutions: reorganising the *Banque de France* and placing it under state control (law of 22 April 1806), introducing double accounts (imperial decree of 4 Jan. 1808) and instituting budgets in public accounting, reorganising the Treasury to end its dependency on private contractors by creating a *Caisse de service* to facilitate its movement of funds (imperial decree of 16 July 1806), and creating the *Cour des comptes* (16 Sep. 1807) to act as the state's financial auditing agency.

Mollien remained loyal to Napoleon throughout. He accompanied Empress Marie-Louise to Blois in 1814, leaving the Treasury under the guardianship of the Abbé Louis. He rallied the first Bourbon Restoration but nonetheless returned to serve Bonaparte as Treasury minister during the *Cent Jours*. Following the second Bourbon Restoration his management of the Treasury was criticised by ultra-royalist deputies but he was eventually cleared of all charges. Mollien was offered the post of finance minister in Dec. 1818 by the duc de Richelieu, in Nov. 1819 by Decazes and in 1821 by Talleyrand, but declined all three times. However, he did accept his nomination as *Pair de France* and the presidency of the *Caisse des dépôts et consignations* in 1819. Failing eyesight forced him to resign from the latter in 1836 aged 78. After Napoleon III was elected president, he came to visit "the last surviving minister of the imperial era" a few days before his death.

The memoirs of Mollien represent one of the principal sources for the economic history of the Napoleonic period. His personal file in the *Archives nationales* is 132 AP.⁵²⁹

Monneron, Jean-Louis (12 Sep. 1742 – 30 Nov. 1805) ● ●

Sometimes referred to as 'Monneron des Mortiers'. Born in Annonay (Ardèche). Died in Senegal. Son of Antoine (1693-1791), *contrôleur des fermes* at Antibes, then *receveur du grenier à sel* of Annonay, and of his wife Barbe-Catherine Arnaud. Barbe-Catherine's mother was the sister of Anne-Louise Massac, who had married Claude Dupleix (*trésorier de l'extraordinaire des guerres* in Hainault) and had two sons: Charles Dupleix de Bacquencourt (*Directeur de la Compagnie des Indes and fermier général*), and Joseph, marquis de Dupleix, *gouverneur général des établissements français des Indes*.

In 1795, Louis was sent by the Directory to oversee French prisoners in London, but he was not well-received by Pitt who preferred to use the Scottish banker Robert Herries as a

⁵²⁹ There are also numerous secondary sources on Mollien including Bernard Vaudour, 'Notes sur N.F. Mollien', *Revue des sociétés savantes de Haute-Normandie*, vol. 15, 1959, and by the same author *Le Comte Mollien, un Rouennais ministre du Trésor impérial*. Fécamp: L. Durand et fils, 1965; Serge Grandjean, 'Le ministre Mollien et sa femme', *Revue de l'Institut Napoléon*, n^{os}64 & 65, 1957: 107-112 & 121-131; Antonetti (ed.), *LMFRFSE*, p.311-349 (on which this summary is based); Bruguière, *GPR*, p.147-148 & 274-275 and several passages in Jacoud, *LBBF* and Zylberberg, *USSD*.

liaison with the French. Herries was in contact with the banker Hainguerlot and Fouché.⁵³⁰ In 1798, Louis was an administrator of the *ferme des postes* in charge of inspecting its *Bureau de l'arrivée*. He tendered his resignation to accept a new posting as the Directory's particular agent in the Mascareignes Islands where he was tasked with secretly making contact with Tipu Sultan, dispatching French privateers in the Red Sea to raid British merchantmen and supporting Bonaparte's communications in Egypt.⁵³¹ Louis's mission was abruptly cancelled after he was arrested following his brother Augustin's flight from Paris.

Career:

- Agent of the *Compagnie des Indes* at Pondicherry (aged 14), where his cousin Dupleix is governor (1753);
- Stays in Pondicherry for 25 years before being expelled by the British in 1778;
- Elected deputy to the 1789 Estates-General for the colonial counter of Pondicherry. He only takes up his seat in the National Assembly in Sep. 1790;
- Administrator of the *Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes orientales et de la Chine* (1792);
- Arrested and interrogated (June 1794);
- Serves as one of the commissioners for *Commerce et Approvisionnements* (Oct. 1794);
- Sent by the Directory on a secret mission to London (Aug. – Sep. 1795);⁵³²
- Banker associated with the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* (1796 – 1798);
- Applies unsuccessfully for the ministerial portfolio of the navy in April 1798;
- Louis was on the point of embarking for the Mascarene Islands (*Ile de France* and *Ile Bourbon*) on a secret mission to set up a coordinated plan of action targeting British interests between his friend Tipu Sultan in the Indian Deccan and Bonaparte in Egypt when his brother Augustin Monneron fled Paris with two and a half million francs from the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*. Louis was arrested in Bordeaux on 23 Nov. 1798. He was released from prison in Feb. 1799;
- Shareholder in the *Compagnie du Bouvillard (fonte et fer)* at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne (Savoie) (1801).⁵³³

⁵³⁰ Blanc, *LERE*, p.349, footnote 17.

⁵³¹ AN, AF/III/551, plaquette 3792:1-2 & 8-9, 5 brumaire VII/26 Oct. 1798. See also Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.228-229 – Louis Monneron was then an administrator of the *ferme des postes* in charge of inspecting its *Bureau de l'arrivée*. He tendered his resignation to accept his new posting. Louis had already been sent by the Directory in 1795 to oversee French prisoners in London, but he was not well-received by Pitt who preferred to use the Scottish banker Robert Herries as a liaison with the French. Herries was in contact with the banker Hainguerlot and Fouché (Blanc, *LERE*, p.349, footnote 17). See also Arthur Birembaut, 'La Mission de Louis Monneron en Angleterre en 1795', *AHRF*, 1963: 103-104.

⁵³² See AN, AF/IV/1671, plaquette 1, pièce 82 – *Mémoire de Louis Monneron, chargé de mission en Angleterre, sur l'état de ce pays, les dispositions des esprits, ses ressources économiques et militaires, les projets de son Gouvernement*, 17 Nov. 1795 & Arthur Birembaut, 'La Mission de Louis Monneron en Angleterre en 1795', *AHRF*, 1963: 103-104.

⁵³³ For more on Jean-Louis Monneron see AN, 8 AQ (dossier 384); AF/*/II/254 (folio 395); F/7/6166; AF/III/585; *Archives des Colonies*, C/2/243 & 246-251; Archives Municipales de Bordeaux; Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, ms149 (for his membership of the freemason lodge of Pondicherry); Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.181-248 and Bruguière, *GPR*, p.275.

Monneron, Joseph-François-Augustin ● ● CCC
(24 Dec. 1756 – 13 Aug. 1824)

Born in Annonay (Ardèche). Died in Barataria, near modern New Orleans. Son of Antoine (1693-1791), *contrôleur des fermes* at Antibes, then *receveur du grenier à sel* of Annonay, and of his wife Barbe-Catherine Arnaud.

Career:

- Director of the tobacco manufacture of Asnières in partnership with his brother Pierre-Antoine under the legal entity ‘*maison Monneron frères*’ (1791);
- In 1791, Augustin and his brothers founded the *Caisse Monneron* and were awarded the right to mint and circulate their own currency which they called *monnerons*;⁵³⁴
- Deputy of the Legislative Assembly for Paris (Sep. 1791 – 31 March 1792). Resigns his legislative seat following the scandal surrounding the bankruptcy of the mint set up by his brothers in England and suspends his payments on 1 April 1792. Augustin is subsequently granted permission to repay his debts over a period of three years with the assets of his brother Janvier in the *Ile de France* (Mauritius) guaranteeing his payments;
- Arrested and held from 24-27 Aug. 1792, and again from 17 May to 10 Aug. 1794. He was also imprisoned for a few days in Dec. 1794;
- Agent for commercial relations at the National Convention’s *Agence du commerce extérieur* (1794 – 1795);
- Administrator and Director-General of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* (29 June 1796);
- Flees Paris with two and a half million francs from the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*’s cash reserves on 17 November 1798. Escapes to Guadeloupe;
- Charged and acquitted *in absentia* on 10 April 1799;
- Briefly arrested following his return from Guadeloupe in February 1802. Leaves definitively for America following his release.⁵³⁵

Montrond, François-Casimir Mouret de (1768 – 1843)

Casimir de Montrond came from a noble family of Franche-Comté. His father was a military officer and Casimir himself served as a cavalry officer in his youth. During the late *Ancien Régime*, he became a protégé of the Princesse d’Hénin – an old friend of Talleyrand’s – and was associated with the circle of young ‘*fashionables*’ who copied British customs and nurtured a passion for prize horses and luxurious carriages. He soon developed a reputation for being an inveterate gambler and womanizer. According to an English lady who met Montrond in Madame de Laval’s *salon*, he was “*blonde, gentle and pink*” and endowed with an extremely handsome figure.⁵³⁶

Following the Revolution’s outbreak, Montrond became a regular at the duc d’Orléans’s *salon* in the Palais Royal where he rubbed shoulders with Lafayette and Théodore de Lameth whose *aide-de-camp* he became. It was probably here that he first met Talleyrand and not in England as is commonly believed where Montrond sought refuge with his mistress – the duchesse de Fleury (Aimée de Coigny) – in 1793. After returning to France,

⁵³⁴ See Bouchary, *Les compagnies financières à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle*, Tome II, p.152-156.

⁵³⁵ For more on Augustin Monneron, see AN, F/7/4774/49; F/7/6166; C//146; AJ/1/393; T//38/1-2; T/*/609/26; AP, 5U 1, dossiers 26-27; Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.181-248; Bruguière, *GPR*, p.86-87 & 275-276.

⁵³⁶ Henri Malo, *Le beau Montrond*, Paris: Émile-Paul, 1926, p.7.

they were married in January 1795 after having spent several months in various prisons. Montrond spent all his mistress's fortune and divorced her a few months later.

Montrond rapidly reintegrated the *salons* of the Parisian social elite following the establishment of the Directory. He wore a glove to mask a slight deformation of his right hand which he passed off as a stylistic fad and was an incurable duellist – notorious for accepting challenges at the drop of a hat. Louis-Marie d'Estournel, who met Montrond at the duchesse de Luyne's gambling table, noted that:

*“He was elegantly calm and composed amidst the wealthy players and twists and turns of the game. Sometimes loaded with money – which had not always been gained innocently – and sometimes coming up short but always insouciant and witty, whether fortune or shunned him.”*⁵³⁷

This passion for gaming soon drew Montrond into Talleyrand's circle where he soon took on the role of the former bishop's leading financial agent and trusted counsellor and confidante. After Talleyrand's nomination at the foreign ministry, Montrond became a director in his occult 'confidential agency', where letters were forged to spread misinformation using a huge archive regrouping the seals and facsimiles of the signatures of all European monarchs, state ministers, ambassadors, and leading socialites. Montrond's services were regularly solicited to fulfil Talleyrand's most covert and secretive missions. He transformed his Parisian residence in the Rue Cérutti into a veritable bureau of espionage where he sold intelligence and marketed his influence over Talleyrand to all kinds of shady operatives. This occasionally led Montrond into trouble and he was imprisoned for a few years under the *Premier Empire*. In 1809 he was forced to flee to Spa via Antwerp after criticising Napoleon's imperial government, and after a brief imprisonment in the Château du Ham he was held under house arrest at Châtillon from where he conducted a spectacular escape to England in 1812. Montrond also served as a mentor to several important future officials who began their careers in Talleyrand's administrations, such as Ange-François-Charles Bourjot, Antoine Rœderer, Charles-Maxime de Villemarest and especially Gabriel-Antoine Perrey.

Montrond's proximity with Talleyrand earned him several colourful nicknames such as 'Talleyrand's evil soulmate' (*l'âme damnée de Talleyrand*) and 'Talleyrand on horseback' (*un Talleyrand à cheval*). Talleyrand himself referred to Montrond as 'the infant Jesus from hell' (*l'Enfant Jésus de l'enfer*) and did not hide his admiration for him, once telling Adolphe Thiers:

*“He is certainly the man of the world who has the most intellect. He doesn't own a penny in assets, does not benefit from any type of pension, spends 60,000 francs per year but does not have any debts.”*⁵³⁸

Montrond returned to France following the first Bourbon Restoration and was even sent to Vienna by Napoleon to convince Talleyrand to return to the fold and secure the return of Marie-Louis and her young son. He continued to gravitate in Talleyrand's entourage and accompanied him on his ambassadorial mission to London in 1832, returning to Paris shortly before his death.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁷ Comte d'Estournel, *Derniers souvenirs*, Paris: Crapelet, 1848, p.319.

⁵³⁸ Thiebault, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.167-168, footnote.

⁵³⁹ For more on Montrond see Waresquiel, *Talleyrand, le prince immobile*, p.226-228.

Montz, Jacques-Marc (1770 – 1810)

See Louis Greffulhe.

Moynat, Jean-Claude CCC

A financial guarantor of *Doyen, Durieux et Cie.*⁵⁴⁰ He resided in the Rue de la Michodière.

Ouvrard, Gabriel-Julien (6 Nov. 1770 – Oct. 1846) ● ● ☆

Born at Moulins d'Antières, a hamlet in the commune of Cugand (Vendée). Died in London. Ouvrard's career – the most successful of any financier under the Revolution and early Napoleonic era – is far too extensive to encapsulate in a cursory summary. See Chapters 3 & 6 for his role in the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* and his imprisonment after 18 Brumaire. For detailed studies of his life see the works listed in the biographical section of the bibliography.

Paulée, Jean-Baptiste (1754 – 1832)

One of the Revolution's most spectacular cases of a rags-to-riches fortune was that of Jean-Baptiste Paulée, a contractor from Douai who came to dominate commercial interactions between northern France, Belgium, the Low Countries and the Baltic during the directorial period. Scant information survives on this financier. Paulée's name is missing from many tax lists and surveys, and unfortunately there is no detailed monography of his life and activities to date. Most of the evidence tracing his business dealings is conserved in the *Saisie Michel-Jean et Henry Simons* at the Belgian Royal Archives. However, the French *Archives nationales* also contain a large dossier detailing Paulée's contract with the *Comité de Salut public* to supply wheat to Paris and the French military.⁵⁴¹

The first records we have of Paulée indicate he began working as a waiter and sommelier in a hotel at Douai.⁵⁴² This city's strategic location along the commercial thoroughfares of northern France brought him into contact with many officers and commissioners of the *Armée du Nord*, as well as with local farmers and regional grain merchants. Sensing the commercial opportunities afforded by the Revolution's outbreak, a practically illiterate Paulée decided to become a broker and married the cook of the hotel!⁵⁴³ Thanks to a good managerial team of clerks and notaries, his business soon thrived. Paulée states in his correspondence that by 1789, he was already supplying wheat to Paris and the *départements* of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais for which he was still owed two million *livres* in December 1795.⁵⁴⁴ His efforts must have been appreciated, for a decree of 21 August 1794 appointed him an official supplier of oats (*avoine*), heating and luminaries (*chauffage et lumières*) to the *Armées du Nord et de Sambre-et-Meuse*.⁵⁴⁵ When the Directory dismissed many private contractors from its service on 23 October 1795, Paulée

⁵⁴⁰ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.329, footnote 84.

⁵⁴¹ AN, F/11, dossier 1229, *Comptes de Jean-Baptiste Paulée et Cie., soumissionnaire de grains*, an III-1808.

⁵⁴² Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.211, footnote 1.

⁵⁴³ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.58.

⁵⁴⁴ AN, F/11/1229 dossier 3:28 & 54, *Paulée to the Interior Minister*, 16 frimaire IV/7 Dec. 1795 & *Summary of all the business Citizens J.B. Paulée Vanlerberghe & Cie. have concluded for the government*, undated.

⁵⁴⁵ AN, AF/II/76, plaquette 561:15, *Decree approving J.B. Paulée as an employee of the Commission de Commerce attached to the Armées du Nord et de Sambre-et-Meuse*, 4 fructidor II/21 Aug. 1794 & AF/III/21/A, dossier 70(i), *Memoir of Jean-Baptiste Paulée on bids to purchase biens nationaux in Belgium (25 frimaire V/15 Dec. 1796) addressed to Merlin de Douai*, 15 vendémiaire VI/6 Oct. 1797 – In this memoir, Paulée claims the Directory still owed him and his associates over five million *livres* in hard currency for military supplies.

successfully petitioned the *Cinq-Cents* to remain an official supplier to the military and city of Paris. By this time, his company – *Jean Baptiste Paulée & Cie.* – already operated 200 wagon-coaches (*voitures*).⁵⁴⁶

Paulée became a leading contractor in 1795 when he emerged victorious from a bitter struggle pitting him against the trading house of Édouard Dominique Sébastien de Walckiers (*Compagnie Walckiers*) for the contract to supply Paris and the *Armées du Nord et de Sambre-et-Meuse* with wheat and rye from the Baltic and Low Countries. The contract was awarded by the *Comité de Salut public's section des approvisionnements* on 12 August 1795 for the supply of 2,700,000 quintals of wheat and 1,800,000 quintals of rye (total 4,500,000 quintals – 100,000 lasts) imported exclusively from foreign markets over a period of 25 *décades*.⁵⁴⁷ The agreed price was 18 Dutch florins (38 *livres 8 sols*) per quintal of wheat and 14 florins (29 *livres 17 sols 4 deniers*) per quintal of rye amounting to a staggering total of 157,440,000 *livres* (4,723,000,000 *assignats*!).⁵⁴⁸ The *section*, which wrote an advisory report on Paulée's deal, anticipated there would be rumblings on the high price agreed per quintal of wheat and explained that poor harvests had forced the government to secure emergency supplies:

“...the price demanded by these contractors is high and considerably more than obtained by the government or its agents for supplies of a similar nature. But first of all, exchange rates have incontestably dropped since these contracts were carried out. Secondly, some of these agreements were made over two months ago but still have produced no results for the service... Finally, the price requested by Paulée & Cie. is inferior to that of a great deal of previous important contracts agreed by the government or its agents for the supply of Paris or its armies... The advance of over 20 million in hard currency or bills drawn on foreign markets requested by Paulée & Cie. appears exorbitant... These contractors in reality are not running any personal risks in their operations and all the unfavourable chances are for the government... but you have deemed the six thousand lasts he must furnish over three *décades* will secure your supplies and alleviate all concerns until the product of the French harvest [becomes available].”⁵⁴⁹

The contract stipulated 270,000 quintals were to be delivered between 12 August and 11 September 1795; another 630,000 quintals between 11 September and 26 November 1795; and 3,600,000 more between 26 November 1795 and 24 April 1796. Three quarters of all shipments were to be delivered in the cities of northern France (Lille, Douai, Arras) and the remaining quarter in Channel or Atlantic ports (Ostend, Dunkerque, Bordeaux, Rochefort). Paulée partnered with two companies from Antwerp – *Pierre Deheyder fils* and *Veuve Charles Joseph Lombaert* – which were tasked with purchasing Belgian and Dutch grain.⁵⁵⁰

The *section des approvisionnements*, informed the *Comité de Salut public* that “this contract is one of the most substantial ever to have been accepted by our government –

⁵⁴⁶ AN, AF/II/286/B:61-63, *Letter from Paulée to the war ministry requesting his firm be maintained for the supply of Paris & Decree confirming Paulée as a supplier of military transports*, 6 & 13 Brumaire IV/28 Oct. & 4 Nov. 1796.

⁵⁴⁷ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 2 – *Contract for the supply of a hundred thousand lasts or four million five hundred thousand quintals of grain*, 25 thermidor III/12 Aug. 1795.

⁵⁴⁸ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 2, *Rapport by the section des approvisionnements to the Comité de Salut public*, 25 thermidor III/12 Aug. 1795 – The exchange rate applied for the Dutch florin was 2 *livres 2 sols 8 deniers*.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁰ These associates relinquished their participation in the contract in Year V (AN, F/11/1229, dossier 2, *acte de renonciation*, 28 ventôse V/18 March 1797, Jean Martin Schepens notaire).

*perhaps even by any European government.*⁵⁵¹ Paulée was immediately paid an advance of 8 million Dutch florins in Batavian rescriptions plus 100 million in *assignats* (20,399,999 *livres* in hard currency) or bills of exchange drawn on Cadix or other markets upon the signing of the contract – 40 million up front plus three instalments of 20 million at the end of each of the first three *décades* of the contractual term. The agreement also shows that Paulée was already in business with the man who would become his principal associate – Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe (1758-1819) – another native of Douai, who was sent to Amsterdam to coordinate grain purchases and organise shipments. Vanlerberghe’s father-in-law, a certain Mr. Lefebvre, was *inspecteur général de l’approvisionnement* at the state warehouse of Lille which greatly facilitated the reception of grain shipments in that city’s river port.⁵⁵²

In a memoir addressed to three French commissioners (Ramel de Nogaret, Lefebvre de Nantes, Giroust and Meynard) dispatched by the Directory to buy wheat in Belgium, Tort de la Sonde suggests that Paulée’s compatriot from Douai – the future director Merlin de Douai – had a hand in approving Paulée’s contract,⁵⁵³ and it is true the government’s signatories to Paulée’s deal included Merlin and several other heavyweights of the *Comité de Salut public*’s financial committee hailing mostly from northern *départements* such as Étienne-François Letourneur (*Manche* – also a future director), Jean Debry (*Aisne*), François Antoine Boissy d’Anglas (*Ardèche*), Pierre-Florent Louvet (*Somme*) and Jacques Defermon (*Ile-et-Vilaine*). The endorsement of these deputies raises the suspicion they were somehow connected to Paulée and hoped their constituencies and personal pockets would benefit from his deal. However, since Tort was working for Walckiers, his memoir does not constitute an impartial source and probably deliberately casts Merlin de Douai and Paulée in an unfavourable light.⁵⁵⁴

On 25 August 1795 – two weeks after the contract was signed – Paulée and Vanlerberghe presented themselves with the document at the headquarters of General Jacques-Polycarpe Morgan, the officer in charge of supplies for the *Armée du Nord*. General Morgan was wary of Paulée and wrote to Le Febvre that Paulée’s associate – Lombaërt – was an émigré with royalist sympathies who was spreading news that only he and his partners had the right to supply Paris, having received 14 million *livres* in Batavian rescriptions and a larger sum in *assignats* to execute their contract.⁵⁵⁵ When Morgan’s warnings were dismissed by the *Comité de Salut public*, he resigned on September 23.⁵⁵⁶

Since the *Comité de Salut public* did not dispose of sufficient funds to pay Paulée, a clever scheme was devised whereby Paulée was authorised to act as the government’s fundraiser abroad, marketing bills of exchange drawn on the National Treasury but backed by the reputation of his trading house to make them more appealing to investors. A decree of the *Comité de Salut public* dated October 10, 1795 allowed the Treasury to accept up to 20 million francs in remittances with three month validities drawn on *Paulée & Cie.* or on the

⁵⁵¹ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 2, *Rapport fait au Comité de Salut public par la section des approvisionnements*, 25 thermidor III/12 Aug. 1795.

⁵⁵² AN, T//1157 (Papiers de Jean Tilly) – *Memoir of Tort de La Sonde concerning the supply of Paris and French armies*.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁴ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.213, footnote 1.

⁵⁵⁵ AN, T//1157 (Papiers de Jean Tilly).

⁵⁵⁶ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.212.

markets of Hamburg, Amsterdam, Basel and Italy.⁵⁵⁷ Acting on this decree, Paulée informed the interior minister on November 17 that:

“Seeing that the government cannot obtain credit outside its borders I have established trading houses under its authority at Amsterdam, Hamburg, Basel, Genoa and Livorno on which I have furnished in advance approximately 21 million in hard currency. If the government sends me funds, I hope to offer it more extensive resources through a circulation from which it could benefit greatly...foreigners are informed that these trading houses are dependent on my firm and they demand indirect effects (valeurs indirectes) for our grain operations.”⁵⁵⁸

Paulée used the money raised to purchase grain and sent the bills back to the Treasury to obtain refunds. In a memoir of Year VI addressed to Merlin de Douai in which he detailed these operations, Paulée explained that:

“I was authorised to send the National Treasury remittances drawn on my house or other bills of exchange in foreign monies for up to 20 million in hard currency with three months validity payable on the markets of Hamburg, Amsterdam, Basel and Italy; and to employ them – depending on the circumstances – either to pay contractors or sell them on the market...The Treasury...promised to furnish the necessary funds to cover my remittances in assignat or foreign paper currency...I was awarded 2% commission on the sums of the remittances I sent to the National Treasury...Fifteen days before the signature of the contract, I had already forwarded 15 million in remittances...As soon as this operation got underway, I established five banking houses at Hamburg [J.M. Langerin & Cie.], Amsterdam [Moigny & Cie.], Basel [Paulée & Cie.], Genoa [Henri Mertin & Cie.] and Paris [Auguste Le Roy & Cie.]...all these remittances were accepted as payment by military suppliers or discounted at 5% or 6%...When the Directory took the reins of government... the agreement was renewed for a further six million...and I sent the Treasury for another two or three million...”⁵⁵⁹

In this memoir, Paulée reveals the decree was aimed at averting a collapse of the *assignat*:

“The government needed 20 million in écus or foreign paper currency which could only be obtained with nearly two billion assignats and since there was a scarcity of assignat in the public Treasury, a new emission – whose cost would have been excessive – would have depreciated its value even further...such a massive emission in these circumstances would have accelerated the final downfall of paper money...The government instead procured these 20 million in paper currency abroad and used them to pay contractors without incurring any losses, or it traded these foreign notes for assignats which were then converted into hard currency. Thus, for instance, a bill of exchange of 100 marks of Hamburg yielded 180 francs in hard currency (argent de France), or 1500 francs assignats yielded 168 francs in hard currency thereby reducing losses to 1/15, the exchange rate being 1500 francs assignats for 180 francs in hard currency (excluding commission). I would add that the influx of foreign paper currency reduced its price while raising that of the

⁵⁵⁷ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 3:7 – *Arrêté des Comités de Salut public et des finances et la Convention nationale réunis*, 18 vendémiaire IV/10 Oct. 1795.

⁵⁵⁸ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 3:6 – *Paulée au Ministre de l’Intérieur*, 26 brumaire IV/17 Nov. 1795.

⁵⁵⁹ AN, AF/III/21/A, dossier 70(i), *Memoir of Paulée on bids to purchase biens nationaux in Belgium* (25 frimaire V/15 Dec. 1796) addressed to Merlin de Douai, 15 vendémiaire VI/6 Oct. 1797.

*assignat, thus preventing its further depreciation. This was the object of the decree of 18 vendémiaire an IV.*⁵⁶⁰

Several letters of Paulée's correspondence show he relied on an extensive network of correspondents, importing wheat from the Baltic (Altona) and Poland (Danzig, Elbag) which transited via Amsterdam and Cadsand (Sluis) before being shipped on to Dunkerque and Lille.⁵⁶¹ Paulée also had a representative at Ghent (Citizen Puis) who purchased grain in the Low Countries;⁵⁶² and he regularly did business with American traders. However, he rapidly ran into logistical difficulties which were exacerbated by the tense political situation in the Baltic and Low Countries. Dissatisfied by the unsatisfactorily low quantities of his shipments, interior minister Benezech rescinded his contract on 23 pluviôse IV/12 February 1796 – although Paulée's deliveries continued to be accepted until 5 floréal IV/24 April 1796.⁵⁶³ At this latter date, the government's own calculations showed Paulée had only supplied 234,437.65 quintals of wheat and 30,557.9 quintals of rye (total 264,994.74 quintals), with 4,235,005.26 quintals still outstanding on his contract.⁵⁶⁴ Paulée claimed he had delivered 369,900.77 quintals.⁵⁶⁵

By all accounts, Paulée had completely failed to live up to his engagements. Yet he had already been paid 8,590,570 florins plus an advance of 2,810,000 francs in *assignats* (including 700,000 francs from the city of Lille) when he should only have received 1,456,132 florins.⁵⁶⁶ His company continued to deliver grain shipments until Fructidor Year IV, probably because the government paid it to furnish additional extraordinary supplies. Several letters from Paulée to Deveze (head of the interior ministry's sixth bureau) indicate *Jean Baptiste Paulée & Cie.* shipped wheat from Amsterdam and Ostend to Dunkerque and Ghent for the French Navy.⁵⁶⁷

Even though Paulée had not even supplied 10% of the grain he had been contracted to deliver, he argued he was still owed important sums on the bills of exchanges and remittances he had raised for the Treasury in foreign markets. He was handsomely rewarded by the Directory when it issued a decree on 28 Nov. 1796 awarding him exclusive bidding rights on newly released batches of Belgian *biens nationaux* that were to be sold at auction to the public.⁵⁶⁸ In association with another contractor named Victor Bodin (*Bodin frères*), he bought about a quarter of all lands for sale in the *département* of Jemappes (around 2,000 acres);⁵⁶⁹ while in the neighbouring *département* of Namur he acquired 364,000 of the 936,000 *livres* worth of auctioned properties. Instead of paying in cash, Paulée used state 'obligations' which had depreciated by 50% of their value, thereby disbursing far less than what his lands were really worth.⁵⁷⁰ In his memoir addressed to

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶¹ AN, F/11/1229 dossier 3:23, 25 & 40 – *Paulée to the interior minister*, 10, 13 & 30 frimaire IV/1, 4 & 21 Dec. 1795.

⁵⁶² AN, F/11/1229, dossier 2, *Paulée to the Interior Minister*, 17 thermidor IV/4 Aug. 1796.

⁵⁶³ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 1, *The Interior Minister to Paulée*, 23 pluviôse IV/12 Feb. 1796.

⁵⁶⁴ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 1, *Report presented to the Interior Minister*, floréal IV.

⁵⁶⁵ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 1, undated document.

⁵⁶⁶ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 1, *Report presented to the Interior Minister*, 9 pluviôse IV/29 Jan. 1796 & *Account of the advances made by order and for Jean Baptiste Paulée & Cie.*, 14 pluviôse IV/3 Feb. 1796.

⁵⁶⁷ AN, F/11/1229, dossier 1, e.g. *Paulée au Citoyen Deveze*, 13 fructidor IV/30 Aug. 1796, in which Paulée informs Deveze he will henceforth list the names and captains of every company boat delivering grain to French ports.

⁵⁶⁸ AN, AF/III/418, dossier 2331:24, *decree of 8 frimaire V/28 Nov. 1796.*

⁵⁶⁹ See Ivan Delatte, *La vente de biens nationaux dans le département de Jemmapes*, Bruxelles: Académie Royale de Belgique, 1938.

⁵⁷⁰ Ivan Delatte, 'La vente de biens nationaux dans l'arrondissement de Namur', *Annales de la Société Archéologique de Namur*, Tome XL (deuxième livraison), 1932-1933: 189-339 – produces detailed canton-by-canton lists of these sales (p.243-317). Less than ¼ of all payments for *biens nationaux* in the

Merlin de Douai three months after the November 1796 decree, Paulée defended his right to acquire these lands:

“However you look at the agreement of 8 frimaire by which the Directory authorised me to acquire 16 million of domaines nationaux in Belgium, it can only be considered as a means by which the government freed itself of a sacred and privileged debt towards me – namely the remaining bills of exchange of the National Treasury. It would therefore be a great error to look upon me as a mere speculator when I am in fact the man entrusted by the government with liquidating the state’s debt...The greatest part of my capital was expended in the service of the state. Until now I have remained unable to obtain the liquidation and reimbursement of these sums.”⁵⁷¹

Paulée mortgaged 2,380,000 francs of his *biens nationaux* as security for a new military supply company – the *Compagnie Saint Victor* – which he founded on 28 fructidor V/14 September 1797.⁵⁷² His partners in this venture were an associate from Douai, Mr. Claro, and *Levrat et Veuve Panckoucke & fils*, which mortgaged 587,000 francs worth of real estate for its guarantee.⁵⁷³ Unfortunately, very limited information on the *Compagnie Saint Victor* survives in the French National Archives. On 11 fructidor V/28 August 1797, it secured a major contract by winning the tender to supply horse artillery and equipment to the *Armée de Sambre-et-Meuse*. But on 5 vendémiaire VI/26 September, it subcontracted this service – with the war ministry’s approval – for a period of twelve months to the companies of Jean Lanchère (*Compagnie Lanchère père*) and his son François (*Lanchère fils*) who were to supply up to 6,000 horses at an agreed price of 220 *livres* per horse. The Lanchères were each given 33 bills of exchange drawn on the *Compagnie Saint Victor* (660,000 francs for Jean & 655,200 francs for François), payable with Pankcoucke at Lille, to reimburse their monthly expenses.⁵⁷⁴ The agreement was renewed on 18 December 1798 for the supply of at least 5,000 horses at a price of 210 francs per horse (total: 1,050,000 francs) plus an unspecified number of artillery wagons at 100 francs per wagon over a nine-month period beginning in Nivôse Year VII.⁵⁷⁵ This time, however, the *Compagnie Saint Victor* supplied the horses and wagons paying the costs up front – while the Lanchères delivered and reimbursed them on a monthly basis.⁵⁷⁶

Paulée was the only financier who kept most of his Belgian lands after the Revolution.⁵⁷⁷ He did sell 157,000 francs of real estate in the *département* of Jemappes in Year VII to the banker and *caisse des comptes courants* shareholder Pierre-François Tiberghien – including the Abbaye de Saint-Denis near Mons – where Tiberghien established a cotton

département of Namur were made in hard currency (*Ibid*, p.239). See also AN, C//505; Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.161-162 and Marion, *HFF*, Tome III, p.512-514, p.217.

⁵⁷¹ AN, AF/III/21/A, dossier 70(i), *Memoir of Paulée on bids to purchase biens nationaux in Belgium (25 frimaire V/15 Dec. 1796) addressed to Merlin de Douai*, 15 vendémiaire VI/6 Oct. 1797.

⁵⁷² MC/ET/XLV/660, 28 fructidor V/14 Sep. 1797.

⁵⁷³ For *Veuve Panckoucke & fils* see Ramel’s entry.

⁵⁷⁴ MC/ET/XLV/661, 5 vendémiaire VI/26 Sep. 1797.

⁵⁷⁵ MC/ET/XLV/665, 28 frimaire VII/18 Dec. 1798 – the *Compagnie Schunck* joined the Lanchères as an associate. The *Compagnie Saint Victor* advanced a guarantee of 540,000 francs, and the *Compagnie Lanchère* 406,000 francs. If the Lanchères defaulted, the *Compagnie Saint Victor* reserved the right to requisition their payment orders from the war ministry and National Treasury.

⁵⁷⁶ The timetable for the *Compagnie Lanchère*’s reimbursements to the *Compagnie Saint Victor* was as follows – a first instalment of 131,250 francs on 30 Dec. 1798; a second instalment for the same amount on 4 Jan. 1799; plus nine instalments of 87,500 francs each to be paid on the 29th of each month beginning in Germinal Year VII. These payments would consist in 109 bills of exchange drawn on the *Compagnie Lanchère* which the *Compagnie Saint Victor* used to repay its suppliers.

⁵⁷⁷ Delatte, ‘La vente de biens nationaux dans l’arrondissement de Namur’, p.217 & 234-235 – In 1830, Paulée’s descendants still owned many of the *biens nationaux* he had acquired in Belgium.

weaving factory managed by his brother Charles;⁵⁷⁸ and he also sold 600,000 francs of property during the early Consulate, notably the Abbaye Saint-Michel in Antwerp to the contractor Michel Simons for 322,000 francs in Year VIII.⁵⁷⁹

We do not know whether Paulée was involved in the Brumaire putsch, but Napoleonic scholar Thierry Lentz notes that “*he succeeded after the coup d’État in placing some of his protégés in the Consulate’s high administration, which could indicate that he supported the operation.*”⁵⁸⁰ Among these was Charles Jacques Nicolas Duchâtel who was appointed director-general of the *administrations des domaines* and whose son – Tanneguy Duchâtel (future finance and interior minister of the July Monarchy) – married Paulée’s daughter Églé Rosalie. Shortly after Brumaire on 9 January 1800, Paulée renounced all manner of commercial and trading activity to focus on managing his property portfolio.⁵⁸¹ It appears he was progressively channelling his fortune into real estate and abandoning commerce, as several other magnates (such as Jacques-Louis Pourtalès) were doing at this time. Thereafter he fades into obscurity, the only certainty being that he lived in a house located at 60 Faubourg Saint-Honoré and was one of the wealthiest men in Paris with an estimated fortune of ten million francs at the end of the Napoleonic era.⁵⁸² Not much more can be gleaned from Paulée’s inventory after decease.⁵⁸³

Pillot, Jean-François CCC

Pillot was a partner in the *Factorerie du Commerce*. This Parisian bank specialised in *monnaie de billon*, emitted 25, 50 and 100-franc bills, advanced money against deposits of merchandise and discounted bills of exchange.⁵⁸⁴

Perier (or Périer), Claude (28 May 1742 – 6 Feb. 1801) ● ● ●

Born in Grenoble. Died in Paris. Son of Jacques Perier (died 1782), manufacturer and trader of *indiennes*, *consul de Grenoble* (1767-1775) and director of that city’s hospital, and of his wife Marie-Elisabeth Dupuy (died c.1783), daughter of Claude Dupuy, *consul de Grenoble* (1734-1736).

According to Romuald Szramkiewicz, Perier’s avarice was proverbial.⁵⁸⁵ He was nicknamed ‘*milord*’ due to his fabulous wealth.

Marriage & Children:

On 28 April 1767 Claude Périer married Marie-Charlotte Pascal (1749-1821), daughter of Charles Pascal, *syndic-général des marchands de Grenoble*, *colonel de la milice bourgeoise* and *référendaire en la Chancellerie*, and of his wife Hélène Coquet. Marie-

⁵⁷⁸ MC/ET/XCIII/221, 25 vendémiaire VII/16 Oct. 1798 & Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.81.

⁵⁷⁹ AGRB, *SMJHS*, n^{os}1586, 1597, 1598, 1636, 1643 & 1655. See also in the *SMJHS*, Acte du 21 fructidor VIII/8 Sep. 1800, Étude de M^e Wauters, notaire du département des Deux-Nèthes and Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.82. The Abbaye de Saint Michel had been bought by Paulée as a *bien national* on 18 April 1797.

⁵⁸⁰ Lentz, *Le 18 Brumaire*, p.247.

⁵⁸¹ MC/ET/LXXXII/698, 19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800.

⁵⁸² Bergeron (*BNMPDE*, p.26) notes Paulée does not appear in the 1809 tax *statistique* for the *département* of the Seine.

⁵⁸³ MC/ET/LV/340, 13 June 1831.

⁵⁸⁴ AP, D31 U3, 1/23 – The *Factorerie* had a starting capital of 100,000 francs. See also Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.118-119, footnote 3.

⁵⁸⁵ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.304.

Charlotte's brother, Alexandre-Charles Pascal (1751-1818), served as *conseiller général de l'Isère* and was elected deputy of *Isère* to the *Corps Législatif* in 1802 (Year X).

Claude and Marie-Charlotte Périer had eleven children, ten of whom reached adulthood. Three sons went on to become Regents of the *Banque de France*, seven became deputies, two were named *pair de France*, and the most famous – Casimir – was appointed *président du Conseil* under Louis-Philippe:

- Elisabeth-Joséphine Perier (1770-1850), who married Jacques-Fortuné Savoye de Rollin (1754-1823), a member of the *Bureau consultatif des Arts et Manufactures du Directoire*, *baron de l'Empire* (1813) and deputy of *Isère* (1815 to his death);
- Augustin Perier (born 1773, eldest son), deputy of *Isère* (1827-1831) and *pair de France* (1832);
- Alexandre Perier (1774-1846), manufacturer at Montargis and mayor of that city;
- Scipion Perier (1776-1821), chemist, associated with the Périer brothers of the manufacture of Chaillot, *maître des forges* under the Consulate, Regent of the *Banque de France*, administrator of the *Compagnie d'Anzin*, who married Louise-Charlotte-Sophie de Dietrich, grandniece of Philippe-Frédéric de Dietrich of Strasbourg (the 'baron de Dietrich', patron of Rouget de Lisle);
- Casimir Perier (1777-1832), Regent of the *Banque de France*, *président de la Chambre des députés*, *président du Conseil* and interior minister under Louis-Philippe (1831-1832), who married Pauline Loyer (1788-1861), daughter of Laurent-Ponthus Loyer, *conseiller en la Sénéchaussée*, *Siege présidial de Lyon*, guillotined under the Terror;
- Marine Perier (died 1851), who married Hyacinthe-Camille Teisseire (1764-1842), manufacturer of flavoured syrups and liqueurs at Grenoble and deputy of the *Isère* (1820-1824). Hyacinthe-Camille saved Claude Perier's life during the Terror when he was imprisoned at Lyon in 1793. He was the son of Mathieu Teisseire and Gabrielle Cretet (sister of Emmanuel Cretet, deputy of the *Côte d'Or* at the *Conseil des Anciens* and prominent Brumaire conspirator);
- Camille Perier (1781-1844), Napoleonic prefect of Salzburg, deputy (1828-1835) and *pair de France* (1837), who married Pélagie-Honorine Le Couteulx de La Noraye (died 1829), daughter of the banker Barthélémy-Jean-Louis Le Couteulx de La Noraye and cousin of Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Regent of the *Banque de France*;
- Alphonse Perier (died 1866), industrialist at Grenoble and deputy of the *Isère*;
- Amédée-Auguste-Joseph Perier (1785-1851);
- Joseph Perier (1786-1868), Regent of the *Banque de France* (from 1833 to his death, 35 years in total!), deputy of the *Marne* (1832-1848).

Relatives:

Claude's younger brother, Augustin Perier (1746-1793), had worked for Jean-Joseph de Laborde in India and been an administrator of the *Compagnie des Indes* at Lorient. He was imprisoned at Vannes during the Terror and committed suicide in prison. Augustin's wife, Marie-Charlotte Carié (sister of Henry-Liévain Carié, Regent of the *Banque de France*), was murdered by the Chouans in 1794 as she travelled to Vannes to enquire about him.

Stendhal was a personal friend of Claude Perier (see notably his *Correspondance* and *Vie d'Henri Brulard*). In 1808, his sister married Claude's cousin, François Périer-Lagrange. Stendhal says Claude was a diligent father who taught his children about the importance of saving money. Another intimate of the family was Charles de Rémusat, one of Casimir Perier's close friends.

Career:

- Becomes an associate in his father's *indiennes* manufacture and trading house at Voiron (1764);
- Purchases the charge of *conseiller-secrétaire du roi à la Chambre des Comptes du Dauphiné*, which ennobled the bearer after thirty years of ownership (1778);
- Buys the Château of Vizille (Isère) for 1,024,000 *livres* (of which 224,000 were paid up front) from the duc de Villeroy in 1780.⁵⁸⁶ He sets up a manufacture of wallpaper and *indiennes* in the château, which he initially rents to the Fazy brothers of Geneva, whom he considers to be more technically proficient in the installation and use of machinery (1780);
- Resumes control of his manufacture at Vizille (1784). In 1787 alone, it produced 12,000 *toiles* which sold for a total of 700,000 francs;
- Invests 50,000 *livres* in *P. Chazel et Cie.*, a Marseille trading house specialised in the sugar cane business on Saint Domingue (1787);
- Director of the general hospital of Grenoble (1788);
- Invites the Estates-General of *Dauphiné* to assemble in the *salle du jeu de paume* at his Château of Vizille following the Day of Tiles in Grenoble (the Assembly of Vizille). Establishes political alliances with Antoine Barnave and Jean-Joseph Mounier (1788);
- Buys one-sixth of *Seren et Cie.*, a Marseille sugar refining company (1791);
- Suffers significant financial losses due to the slave revolts on Saint Domingue, but is able to alleviate these losses by repaying his debts in *assignats* (1791-1793);
- As of 1791, Périer began to purchase a considerable amount of *biens nationaux*:
 - Three domains amounting to 107 hectares of land (1791);
 - Two buildings in the Rue Saint-Honoré in Paris (n^{os} 391-393 and 61, where he would later reside) for 336,000 francs (1794);
 - A manor at Saint-Gilles-du-Gard which had formerly belonged to the chapter of Arles;
 - 2 *sols* 3 *deniers* et un *demi* in the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin* (see below) (1795);
 - The Château of Laval (a domain of 60 hectares) (1797); - located in Bellegarde (Gard)?
 - Half of an *hôtel particulier* (the *hôtel de la première Présidence*) in Grenoble (Rue Neuve).
- *Officier municipal de Grenoble* (Oct. 1792);
- Participates in the founding of the *Société des Sans-Culottes républicains* (20 Dec. 1793), established at Grenoble as a weapons manufactory to sell arms to the government. Périer was a member of its board of administration. On 21 germinal II/10 April 1794, the company signed a contract with the *Commission des armes* in Paris;
- Moves to Paris after 9 Thermidor, leaving his business at Vizille in the hands of his eldest son, Augustin.
- For the 1795 forced loan, his fortune was estimated at 800,000 francs (a gross undervaluation);
- Author of the foundational statutes of the *Banque de France*⁵⁸⁷ (1800);
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (1800 to his death);

⁵⁸⁶ Périer still owed 430,000 *livres* on the sale in 1793. See Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.302.

⁵⁸⁷ See Stourm, *LFC*, p.240-243 & Ramon, *HBF*, p.9-37.


- Deputy of the Isère at the *Corps Législatif* (elected by the *Sénat conservateur*). Died in office;
- Perier supposedly died of cold at his residence in Paris (61 Rue Saint-Honoré) after refusing to buy firewood because he found the price of logs too expensive.⁵⁸⁸

Purchase of the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin*:

Périer purchased, in partnership with the bankers Guillaume Sabatier, Pierre Desprez (father of Médard Desprez) and Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu, the share of the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin* which was still owned by émigrés (11 *sols* 1 *denier* [11/24^e et 1/288^e] of the 24 *sols* which made up the company's capital assets – equivalent to 46% of its total shares) for 2,261,700 *livres*. Perier advanced 2,200,000 *livres* of this sum to the *receveur général* of Valenciennes on 1 messidor IV/19 June 1795 in the name of Dessandrouin, the company's administrative caretaker and official seller. This operation brought together three future Regents of the *Banque de France*. The sale, dated 22 messidor III/10 July 1795, was overseen by Pierre-Nicolas Berryer, one of the top lawyers at the Châtelet courts (with Cambacérès probably pulling the strings in the background). In total, Périer received a stake of 2 *sols* 3 *deniers et un demi*, equivalent to about 10% of the Anzin company's total assets. The seller on the deed of sale was listed as one Jacques Renard, a representative (*mandataire*) of Dessandrouin. The sale's breakdown was as follows:

- Guillaume Sabatier – 1 *sol*, 10 *deniers*
- Pierre Desprez – 11 *deniers*
- Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu – 2 *sols* 3 *deniers* ½
- Veuve Laurent-Vincent Le Couteulx née Pourrat – 11 *deniers*
- Claude Périer – 2 *sols* 3 *deniers* ½
- Veuve Pierre Bernier (former administrator of the *Compagnie des Indes*) née Devilliers – 1 *sol* 10 *deniers*
- Hermenegilde Laurent Oger, from Paris – 6 *deniers*
- Pierre-Nicolas Berryer, legal advisor (*jurisconsulte*) – 6 *deniers*;
- Officially, the seller was listed as one Jacques Renard, representative (*mandataire*) of Dessandrouin – the administrative caretaker of the Anzin mines.⁵⁸⁹

The Perier family managed the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin* during much of the first half of the nineteenth century. Adolphe Thiers was also one of its administrative board members.

Perregaux, Jean-Frédéric (4 Sep. 1744 – 17 Feb. 1808)  CCC  

See his case study in Chapter 4 and the list of his clients in Appendices IV & V. Born in Neuchâtel. Died in Vitry-Châtillon. The Perregaux family had been part of the bourgeoisie of Neuchâtel since the first half of the sixteenth century.

Marriage & Children:

⁵⁸⁸ For more on Perier, see Pierre Barral, *Les Périer dans l'Isère au XIX^e siècle*, Paris: PUF, 1964 (devotes a long introduction to Claude Perier); Robert Chagny, *Une dynastie bourgeoise dans la Révolution: Les Perier*, Grenoble: Conseil Général de L'Isère, 1984 and Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.295-304.

⁵⁸⁹ For full details of this sale see the inventory after decease of the Montpellier banker Guillaume Sabatier (MC/ET/XLVIII/550, 12 Sep. 1808). See also Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.301, footnote 11 & p.371-372.

On 4 Dec. 1778, he married Adelaïde de Praël (Adélaïde Harenc de Presle de Surville), daughter of Bernardin, *comte de Praël, chevalier de Saint Louis* and *capitaine attaché au service de l'infanterie*, and of his wife Louise Dallie Geffriée (a.k.a. Dalis Geffriée). Bernardin de Praël was descended from the line of the *comtes de Surville*, a Norman family ennobled in 1432. Adelaïde was also one of the legal heirs of Nicolas Beaujon, court banker of Louis XV, protégé of Madame du Barry and former owner of the Élysée Palace (then known as the *Hôtel d'Evreux*).

Perregaux's marriage produced two children: Anne-Marie-Hortense (1779-1857), who married Marshal Auguste Marmont on 12 April 1798; and Alphonse-Claude-Charles-Bernardin (1785-1841), who married Anne-Elisabeth MacDonald (daughter of Marshal MacDonald) on 14 April 1813.

In 1814, five years after Perregaux's death, his son the *comte Perregaux* and his associate Jacques Laffitte held a mysterious meeting with Talleyrand at which the capitulation of Paris and the defection of Marshal Marmont's army to the allies of the Sixth Coalition were decided.⁵⁹⁰

Career:

- Begins his education in Mulhouse (where he learns German), before completing his commercial training in Amsterdam and London;
- Settles in Paris (1765);
- Finds his own banking house in partnership with his brother, François-Louis (1778);
- Acts as the delegate and commercial representative of the influential Anglo-Swiss banker Isaac Panchoard during the latter's business trips away from Paris. This brings him into contact with many leading financial institutions and foreign residents: the *Compagnie des Indes*, the *Caisse d'escompte*, John Sackville the 3rd Duke of Dorset (future British ambassador in Paris), etc. (1780-1781);
- The Perregaux bank appears for the first time in the royal almanac, headquartered in the Rue Saint-Sauveur in Paris (1781);
- Makes his initial fortune in military contracting during the American Revolutionary War;
- Implicated in the *affaire du collier* which led to Cardinal de Rohan's disgrace (1785);
- Helps to negotiate the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty (the Eden Agreement) of 1786;
- Frequents the *Club de Valois* at the *Palais Royal* and is close to the Orléans faction;
- Restructures his bank around a new partnership with Jean-Albert Gumpelzhaimer, former clerk at the *Gebrüder Bethmann* bank, imperial bankers in Frankfurt (30 Dec. 1786);⁵⁹¹
- Enlists in the *Garde Nationale* as a captain of the 1st Fusiliers regiment shortly after the Storming of the Bastille. He also offers to raise and equip an entire regiment of *gardes nationaux* at his own expense (1789);
- Buys an *hôtel particulier* in the Rue de la Chaussée d'Antin for 100,000 francs from Madame de Desquelbeck (31 March 1791);

⁵⁹⁰ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.311.

⁵⁹¹ According to Jean Lhomer (*PFDR*, p.29, footnote 2), Gumpelzhaimer was born in Ratisbonne in 1742 and had served as the Parisian correspondent for the Bethmann bank of Frankfurt and its affiliate, the Bethmann trading house in Bordeaux. See also Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.720, footnote 34. Jacques Laffitte (*Mémoires*, p.20) offers a brief portrait of Gumpelzhaimer in his autobiography.

- Perregaux drew close to Danton during the early revolutionary period and was sent on several missions to Switzerland by the French government. He was also in contact with several British agents or supposed agents at this time (e.g. Walter Boyd and John William Ker who managed the *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* trading house in the rue de Grammont, Robert Herries, William Augustus Miles, Stanislas Maillard, etc.), but these relations remain obscure;
- Perregaux maneuvered skillfully during the Terror (i.e. he survived). He developed ties with the *enragés* faction (Bouchotte, Pâche) which dominated the Paris commune, while placing himself under the protection of Cambon (Languedoc textile manufacturing lobby). Several historians (e.g. Olivier Blanc) believe he deliberately funded the *enragés* as part of a surreptitious British operation to radicalize and discredit the Revolution. Perregaux eventually became the official banker of the *comité de Salut public*. He was charged with hunting down counterfeiters of *assignats* and interrogating imprisoned financiers to recover their exfiltrated assets;
- The *comité de Salut public* issues a warrant for his arrest. It is not taken up (Nov. 1793);
- Temporarily flees to Switzerland on Cambon's advice (1794); returns soon after 9 Thermidor;
- Jacques Laffitte is hired as a clerk in the Perregaux bank (1795);
- It is unclear when Perregaux first met Bonaparte. Most historians believe they were probably introduced shortly after the Corsican general's return from Italy (Dec. 1797), probably at Talleyrand's residence in the Rue Taitbout. But they may have met earlier, such as following the royalist insurrection of 13 Vendémiaire (Oct. 1795);
- Pays 600,000 francs for the 1795 forced loan;
- Shareholder of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* (1796-1800);
- Regent of the *Banque de France* (1st seat) (1800 to his death);
- *Président du Conseil de Régence de la Banque de France* (1800-1806);
- Acquires the Château of Vitry-Châtillon for 220,000 francs (9 brumaire VIII/31 Oct. 1799), in the name of his nephew, Charles-Frédéric de Meuron (then still a minor),⁵⁹² which he purchases at auction at the *Tribunal de la Seine*. The château had formerly belonged to the Bérard family;
- Elected one of the twelve *notables* of the Protestant Consistory of France (1803);
- Jacques Laffitte becomes a partner in Perregaux's bank. He is given a quarter of the bank's capital assets, while Perregaux keeps the other three-quarters (23 Feb. 1806);
- Buried in the *Panthéon* following his death.⁵⁹³

Perreaux's social circle of friends included some of the greatest Parisian artists of the age like the ballet masters Jean-Georges Noverre, Gaétan Vestris (Gaetano Apolline Baldassare Vestris) and Jean Bercher 'Dauberval'; the acclaimed ballerinas Marie-Madeleine Guimard ('La Guimard'), Rosalie Duthé, Madame Dugazon (Louise-Rosalie Lefebvre),⁵⁹⁴ and celebrated actresses such as Carline and Sarah Lescot of the *Comédie*

⁵⁹² Son of Charles de Meuron, a bourgeois from Neuchâtel who had married Perregaux's sister, Suzanne.

⁵⁹³ For more on Perregaux's career and business dealings see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.311-318; Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.718-720 and Mathiez, 'Le banquier Perregaux', *AR*, XI (2), Mars-Avril 1919: 242-252 & 'Encore le banquier Perregaux', *AR*, XII (3), Mai-Juin 1920: 237-243.

⁵⁹⁴ Rosalie Duthé, in letter dated 23 Oct. 1796 calls Perregaux "her dear tutor" (Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.42). Raymond Guyot (*LDPE*, p.272, footnote 2) notes that "during the entire Revolution, [Perregaux] served as an intermediary for relations of all sorts. It was thus that he ensured for 'La Duthé' – the former mistress of the Comte d'Artois who had emigrated in 1789 and who called him "my dear tutor" – the payment of all her

Italienne, Marguerite Brunet ('La Montansier'), Louise Contat, Mademoiselle Françoise Raucourt and Mademoiselle Clairon (Claire-Josèphe Lèris).⁵⁹⁵ As the Goncourt brothers rightly observe, Perregaux could have guided us through all the confidences and secrets of Parisian high society.⁵⁹⁶ It was also at the *hôtel Guimard* that Perregaux first received Jacques Laffitte who came to apply for a clerking position at his bank.⁵⁹⁷

Business relationship with Théroigne de Méricourt:

Among his notable clients during the early Revolution was Anne-Josèphe Théroigne de Méricourt – '*la belle Liégeoise*' – who entrusted him with the management of an annuity paid her by the Chevalier Anne-Nicolas Doublet de Persan. She asked Perregaux for several advances to help her family and safeguard her affairs. In early 1789, Théroigne asked Perregaux to loan her money to fund her travels in Italy and help her family:

"I have travelled to Italy to sing and to study. I have brought my three brothers with me. One of them is studying painting while the other two are studying commerce. Since I am always obliged to travel, I would like to establish my eldest brother at Liège where we have relatives in business. I would need three or three and a half thousand livres to purchase a position as controller for my eldest brother, so that the income of this small posting could provide for his needs while he is apprenticed to a trading house."

In another letter dated 22 March 1789, she asked Perregaux to give ten *louis* to her brother to cover his traveling expenses and to place him as an apprentice with his correspondent in Liège. After the womens' march to Versailles on 5-6 October 1789 the Châtelet courts filed a case against Théroigne. She was declared an outlaw and fled to Liège from where she wrote to Perregaux on 26 Aug. 1790: "*I did not take flight out of fear, but rather because of the mediocrity of my fortune which has forced me – after engulfing all my diamonds – to return to my homeland to live there with modesty.*" It was to Perregaux that she turned for help to prevent her pension from being seized and to retrieve jewels pawned at the Parisian *Mont-de-Piété* which were costing her a fortune in interest payments.⁵⁹⁸ It is possible that Perregaux helped secure Théroigne's release from the Tyrolian castle of Kufstein after the Austrians kidnapped her at Liège during the night of February 15-16, 1791.⁵⁹⁹

Perregaux burned all his personal papers prior to his death and we therefore know very little about the details of his assets and investments. His correspondence with Napoleon in his capacity as President of the *Banque de France*'s Regency Council is conserved at the

revenues." According to legend, Perregaux died contemplating Mlle Duthé's portrait by Henri-Pierre Danloux (Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.6-9).

⁵⁹⁵ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.12-13 & 15; Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.9. Of all Perregaux's correspondents, the most assiduous was Louise Contat who benefited greatly from his business contacts (Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.43). We may also note that Perregaux managed Mlle. Clairon's pension from the Vicomte de Pieverscourt and that he lent Mademoiselle Raucourt 200,000 francs to purchase a farm at Compiègne in Year IV (Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.42).

⁵⁹⁶ Edmond & Jules Goncourt, *Histoire de la société française pendant le Directoire*, Paris: Gallimard, 1992, p.330-331.

⁵⁹⁷ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.14-15 – Legend has it that Perregaux initially refused Laffitte's request, but as Laffitte was leaving the building he noticed a needle lying on the floor and picked it up. Observing this, Perregaux realised that Laffitte paid great attention to detail and offered him a position in his establishment.

⁵⁹⁸ Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.19-20.

⁵⁹⁹ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome III, p.16 & Lhomer, *PFDR*, p.20-21 – Théroigne's brother appealed to Perregaux to help obtain her release.

French National Archives. For Perregaux's role in the merger of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* with the *Banque de France*, see the documents from the *Banque de France's* archives referenced in Chapter 6.

Peyre, Louis-François (14 March 1760 – 2 Sep. 1828) ● AI

Peyre was elected a deputy of the *Basses-Alpes* to the National Convention in September 1792 and supported the *Girondins*. He was expelled from the Convention in June 1793 but reinstated on 18 Frimaire III/8 Dec. 1794 and dispatched with his colleague Marius-Félix Maïsse as civilian commissioner to the *Armée d'Italie* on 28 June 1795 (see Maïsse's entry for more details). He was subsequently elected to the *Cinq-Cents* in October 1795 where he sat until Year VII.

Pinsot AI

Practically nothing is known about Pinsot. He was appointed the *Armée d'Italie's* third civilian commissioner on 24 May 1796;⁶⁰⁰ having previously represented France at The Hague where local observers described him as “*a known player without talent, intriguing to excess...*”⁶⁰¹ His nomination only occurred because the *Armée d'Italie's* second commissioner – Garrau (appointed 28 Feb. 1796) – had lingered in Bordeaux for months.⁶⁰² Pinsot was recalled on 30 June 1796 after attempting to impose his authority on the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie* and its collection of Lombard taxes.⁶⁰³ He has left us an account of his mission in Italy.⁶⁰⁴

Proly, Berthold (a.k.a Pierre-Jean Berthold de Proli) **(18 Dec. 1750 – 25 March 1794)**

Berthold Proly was the son of Brussels banker, Balthazar Proly, whom Empress Maria Theresa had appointed *receveur générale des domaines et finances de Belgique*, and of Marie-Anne Cloots, daughter of a bourgeois family of Aix-la-Chapelle. It was widely rumoured Proly was the natural son of Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Chancellor. Educated in Paris and Nantes, he made his fortune in the Indian colonial trade and founded the *Compagnie de commerce de la mer Rouge* based at Nice. Settling in Paris in 1783, Proly participated in the speculation crazes of the late *Ancien régime* and frequented Calonne and Mercy-Argenteau. During the early Revolution he befriended Camille Desmoulins, Richer de Sérizy and especially Hérault de Séchelles, while also cultivating relations with *montagnards* like Bentabole, Saint-André, Jay de Sainte-Foy, Chabot and Fabre d'Églantine. He was also close François Desfieux, the wine merchant from Bordeaux who dominated the *jacobins's comité de correspondance*, and had links to financiers like Michel Simons, Greffulhe & Montz, De Busscher and Perregaux. In late 1789 and early 1790, Proly was in Belgium serving as an intermediary between Vienna and the Vonckist Party. His Parisian newspaper, *Le Cosmopolite*, opposed war with Austria. Proly and Desfieux frequented the Café Corazza near the Palais Royal where many *jacobins* congregated. After war with Austria was declared, Proly lobbied his friend – foreign

⁶⁰⁰ AN, AF/III/373, dossier 1843 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome II, p.455.

⁶⁰¹ H.T. Colenbrander, *Gedenkstukken*, Vol.2, Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1906, p.635.

⁶⁰² AN, AF/III/*/2:142-143.

⁶⁰³ AN, AF/III/383, dossier 1958:86 – *Directory's decree*, 13 messidor IV/1 July 1796.

⁶⁰⁴ AN, AF/III/410, dossier 2262:47– *Pinsot's account of his mission in Italy*, 4 brumaire V/25 Oct. 1796.

minister Lebrun – to negotiate peace and prevent the French annexation of Belgium. Proly had advance knowledge of Dumouriez's treason and was used by Danton in negotiations with Austria. After the coup of 31 May 1793, he joined the *Hébertists* and was guillotined with their leaders in March 1794.⁶⁰⁵

Radix de Sainte-Foix (or Sainte-Foy), Charles-Pierre-Maximilien
(13 June 1736 – 23 June 1810)

Born in Paris. Died in Bourbonne-les-Bains (Haute Marne). Son of Claude Mathieu Radix and Marie-Élisabeth Denis.

Radix de Sainte-Foix was Talleyrand's principal financial agent. He began his career in 1759 when he was attached to the French embassy in Vienna before serving as *trésorier de la Marine* from 1764 to 1771 – a lucrative position which enabled him to accumulate a vast fortune. He was a protégé of Vergennes who engineered his appointment in 1774 as Louis XVI's minister plenipotentiary at the court of Palatinate-Zweibrücken. In 1776, he returned to Versailles to take up the post of *surintendant des Finances* in the Comte d'Artois's household – a charge which he paid 300,000 *livres* to acquire.⁶⁰⁶

Radix was an inveterate womanizer who reportedly had affairs with the future Madame du Barry and the duchesse de Mazarin. His longstanding mistress was a charming intriguer from St. Malo named the 'Comtesse' de Sainte-Albin (Mlle. Marie-Françoise Henriette Laché, aka Mary Frances Henrietta Lachs) who served as his secret courier with England during the early Revolution.⁶⁰⁷ By holding open receptions for his guests at the Château de Neuilly and gifting the use of rented loges in Parisian operas and theatres to selected friends, Radix developed an extensive network of elite contacts in high society.

In 1782, he was accused by Necker of embezzling five million *livres* from the Comte d'Artois and forced into momentary exile at London, but returned to France two years later thanks to the Duke of Orléans's intercession.⁶⁰⁸ Radix manoeuvred skilfully at court, developing contacts with various factions. He was a daily companion of Talleyrand, frequented prominent *Orléanistes* such as the duc de Biron and Dumouriez and gravitated around Lafayette. Thanks to Orléans's influence, his mistress – the Comtesse de Sainte-Albin – was put in charge of a gambling house at the Palais-Royal. With links to the most prominent bankers of Paris, Brussels and London, Radix was ideally placed to draw advantage from the political upheavals which shook France in 1789.

In 1790, Radix and his nephew Antoine Omer Talon (see his entry) were recruited on Mirabeau's recommendation by foreign minister Montmorin to serve as intermediaries in the royalist faction's secret operation to corrupt the Revolution from within and prevent the monarchy's prosecution and deposition. This covert initiative had taken shape following the creation by the National Assembly of a 'civil list' for the monarchy – a register of royal servants remunerated by the state based on the British model – voted on 9 June 1790.

⁶⁰⁵ See Mathiez, *LRE*, p.101-106.

⁶⁰⁶ For more on Radix de Sainte-Foix, see Blanc, *LERE*, p.154 & *LCST*, p.16-17.

⁶⁰⁷ Born on 15 Aug. 1767 in Saint Malo, Marie-Françoise Henriette Laché lived in England for several years and was the mistress of Lord Cholmondeley, with whom she had a daughter in 1790. See Mathurin de Lescure (ed.), *Correspondance secrète de Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, la cour et la ville*, Tome I, Paris: Plon, 1866, p. 521.

⁶⁰⁸ Lescure (ed.), *Correspondance secrète de Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, la cour et la ville*, Tome I, p.420-421.

Another decree passed on 26 May 1791 stipulated the Treasury would devote 25 million francs annually to the king's expenses (roughly 685,000 francs every ten days) and another four million to those of the queen.⁶⁰⁹ Talon was appointed the list's director. All these payments were managed by the National Treasury and theoretically intended to help the royals meet their expenses.

But almost from the very beginning, considerable sums were diverted from the 'civil list' and from the secret funds (*caisses noires*) of various ministries to purchase the votes and leverage of several deputies in the National and Legislative assemblies (Barère, Brissot, Vergniaud, Dumouriez, Adrien Duquesnoy, etc.) and influence the works of parliamentary committees (notably the *comité de Liquidation* and Foreign Affairs committee). Bribes were also paid to impact speeches delivered in political clubs – especially those made by Antoine Joseph Santerre, François Desfieux and Georges Danton at the *Club des Jacobins* – as well as newspaper articles and representatives of Parisian sections.⁶¹⁰ Talon himself later confirmed the objective was to “*arrest the changes and dispositions of the Estates General during their birth.*”⁶¹¹ While Mirabeau corrupted deputies and civil servants in Paris, Radix did the same in the provinces and sent the king regular reports on the advancement of the royalist cause.⁶¹² In one letter to Louis XVI, for instance, Radix wrote:

*“The means employed on the public are wasted. That system is worthless today. It is in the assembly itself, and nowhere else, that work must be done if we wish to be safe and cut short many bad projects which are circulating in the minds of deputies.”*⁶¹³

According to Bertrand de Molleville (former naval minister of Louis XVI), Radix offered bribes to several legislative representatives in December 1791 including Brissot, Isnard, Vergniaud, Guadet, the abbé Fauchet and others. Each of these deputies reputedly agreed to sell their votes and influence for 6,000 *livres* per month.⁶¹⁴ A note from Radix to the king dated 2 January 1792 acknowledges two million *livres* were spent to purchase the support of various *Brissotins* leaders.⁶¹⁵ Another letter dated May 1792 from Radix to Louis XVI confirms Dumouriez had rallied the king's cause:

⁶⁰⁹ See Bruguière, *GPR*, p.69 – Twice a month, Louis XVI was called upon to sign ordinances which regularised mass transfers of funds from the National Treasury to the Royal Treasury.

⁶¹⁰ Blanc, *LERE*, p.154 & *LCST*, p.16-17.

⁶¹¹ AN, F/7/6374, dossier 7634, *Interrogation of Antoine-Omer Talon*, 28 Sep. 1803 – Talon is quite forthcoming in his interrogation and makes no effort to deny his links with Mirabeau, Montmorin, Danton and others. Another dossier of considerable importance in the French National Archives for those wishing to trace the influence of occult finance in the first two legislatures of the Revolution is that which regroups the private papers of Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély (AN, F/7/6683 – *papiers privés de Regnaud saisis en 1815*) – These contain many original documents on the events of 1792.

⁶¹² Blanc, *LCST*, p.15-17.

⁶¹³ TRPTAF, Tome I, n°X, p.25. See also Tuety, *Répertoire général des sources manuscrites de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution française*, Tome VIII, 901.

⁶¹⁴ Molleville, *Histoire de la Révolution*, Tome VIII, Paris: Giguet, 1802, p.322.

⁶¹⁵ TRPTAF, Tome I, n°XV, p.34 – These sums were expended to ensure the Brissotins would not vote in favour of the decree to depose the monarchy. The negotiations were apparently led by Thierry de Ville d'Avray and the Comte Joseph Volcy de Boze. Camille Desmoulins – who had frequented the Orléans circle until the king's flight to Varennes – was convinced the Brissotins had been bribed for just such a purpose (see Desmoulins's *Histoire des Brissotins*, Paris: Imprimerie patriotique et républicaine, 1793 & Blanc, *LCST*, p.27-29). But Desmoulins does not mention his friend Danton also received bribes to sell his influence. The works of Mathiez have shown that Danton scandalously enriched himself during his mission in Belgium from December 1792 to January 1793 (See Albert Mathiez, 'Danton, Delacroix et le pillage de la Belgique', *AHRF*, 10, Juillet-Août 1925: 384-390).

*“Those persons whose intentions are suitable for service would be Clavière for finance, Kersaint for the Navy, Leflos for one of the departments of the Interior, Dietrich for another, and Dumouriez for Foreign Affairs. The latter holds a truly magical influence over them. He has intellect and a sufficient dose of knowledge. Besides which he is far less exaggerated than is believed – we are certain of this since we ourselves convinced him of the usefulness of our views.”*⁶¹⁶

But the efforts of Radix and Talon were expensive and did not always yield satisfactory results. Some in the king’s entourage began to doubt their loyalty and grew increasingly convinced their real objective was to swindle the king out of his money. Arnault de La Porte, intendant of the *Maison du Roi*, warned the king to be wary of Radix:

*“All that I would risk saying to Your Majesty at this moment is that it cannot dissimulate the millions it has distributed have produced no result: our affairs go as badly as ever.”*⁶¹⁷

In another missive to the king dated 26 May 1792, La Porte expressed further reservations:

*“M. Talon is owed a sum of over 600,000 livres which he desires to be repaid. Two or three hundred soldiers of the National Guard must be paid daily. All this costs more than 100,000 livres every month...He insists on the necessity of 1,500,000 livres. His Majesty must resign himself to make this sacrifice. But it should be the last vis-à-vis these people whom I would like to believe have served him as best they could, but whose efforts have so far been impotent yet extremely costly.”*⁶¹⁸

In his *Histoire de la Révolution*, Bertrand de Molleville writes that under the Legislative Assembly:

*“...in the space of eight to nine months at the most, [Talon] made the king spend over 2,500,000 livres for press articles alone and this money was always directed to the Jacobins.”*⁶¹⁹

The entire operation was only revealed after the Storming of the Tuileries on 10 August 1792 when commissioners of the Paris Commune discovered confidential papers in a sealed safe hidden in a wall of the Tuileries Palace (the notorious *armoire de fer*).⁶²⁰

Shortly afterwards, Radix fled his Parisian apartment in the Passage Valois to seek refuge at the Convent of Prémontré (Aisne) which he had purchased the preceding year. He was apprehended just as he was about to flee to Brussels with the Simons brothers and Tort de La Sonde. His arrest warrant stipulated he was:

⁶¹⁶ TRPTAF, Tome I, n°X, p.25.

⁶¹⁷ *Quatrième recueil des pièces trouvées dans l’armoire de fer*, Tome III, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1793, n°CCCIV, p.18-19. See also Albert Mathiez, ‘Les mouchards des tribunes de la Constituante’, *Annales révolutionnaires*, vol. 2 (4), 1909: 568-576.

⁶¹⁸ *Quatrième recueil des pièces trouvées...*, Tome III, n°CCCIV, p.18-19.

⁶¹⁹ Molleville, *Histoire de la Révolution*, Tome VIII, p.77.

⁶²⁰ Michel Gaudin, Napoleon’s future finance minister, was a commissioner at the National Treasury during the early Revolution. According to him, the Treasury narrowly avoided compromising itself prior to the Storming of the Tuileries: “...the second monthly payment for August 1792 should have been made on the morning of the 11th. It so happened – through the course of events – that the Treasury hadn’t advanced an obole [to the king]. If the throne had been toppled two days later, it would have been discovered that nearly 700,000 francs had been advanced the previous day, and God knows how such an advance of cash would have been interpreted in these...moments...where betrayal appeared to be everywhere!” (Gaudin, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.32).

*“...accused of having seduced members of the Legislative Assembly with money, gifts and promises of funds, of having submitted them through corruption, provoked them to traffic their opinions – either on the role of the liquidation of offices and pensions of the king’s household or to burden the Nation with the payment of these aforementioned charges which should have been imputed to the [king’s] civil list – and of having through different manoeuvres which facts have rendered apparent, conspired against the state by seeking to excite citizens to remove themselves from the power of the law and turn its representatives against the legislative authority.”*⁶²¹

Radix and his nephew Talon (who had been more fortunate than his uncle and succeeded in escaping to England) were accused of bribery with the intent of securing the votes of 16 deputies of the National Assembly. Radix was deferred to the Paris Criminal Court where he was interrogated by Ruhl, Danton’s friend. He was notably questioned about two compromising letters discovered in the armoire de fer. The first was a letter addressed to Louis XVI dated 14 June 1792 in which Radix appeared to encourage the king to use Dumouriez’s army against those deputies who did not support the monarchy:

“Sire,

When I took the liberty of expressing to Your Majesty, two months ago, my opinion on Mr. Dumouriez, I knew him sufficiently well to foresee what he would become, and I had personal proof that he was a loyal servant of Your Majesty.

I am aggrieved today to see that he has not followed any of my detailed advice.

- 1. I was absolutely opposed to the declaration of war [against Austria] and I had given him a very different plan for negotiations. But the time to discuss this matter has passed.*
- 2. The interest of Your Majesty and that of the Monarchy requires the dismissal of the ministers. He [Dumouriez] had confided his views to me about this, but I thought they should have been dealt with one at a time in order not to cause an explosion which could have returned them to office as those [ministers] who had been dismissed in July 1789.*
- 3. I did not believe the mustering of this intermediary army should have been opposed but, on the contrary, that it should have been influenced and employed in the destruction of conspirators [factieux]. And this would have been easier than it seemed. But it would have been of prime importance that all this be preceded by a lobbying of the Parisian opinion – so that the Garde Nationale, the sections and the people could be directed – and the support of a particular party in the National Assembly assured. I am still certain I could fulfil such a project which is imperatively commanded by the circumstances. And if Your Majesty had been kind enough to meet the person who took the liberty of writing Him to communicate important information eight days ago, everything which happened yesterday, everything which threatens us at this moment, could have been prevented and can still be so in great measure, confident – as I am – of reaching an understanding with Mr. Dumouriez concerning everything that is of essential interest to the service of Your Majesty.*

If you would deign, Sire, to look attentively at the service which has been made during the first six months of last year and compare the stealth in which it remains

⁶²¹ AN, W//473.

with the multiple mishaps that have accompanied subsequent operations, Your Majesty will be able to judge the value of the different agents who have served Him.

I am, with the most profound respect, Sire, of Your Majesty, the very humble, very obedient and very loyal servant and subject.

Sainte-Foy."⁶²²

The second was a letter from Radix to Arnaud de La Porte, intendant of the *maison du roi*, suspected to have been written on 20 June 1792 in which Radix appeared to advise the king against placing himself in the care of the Legislative Assembly. Radix claimed the letter was written on 9 August (the day before the Storming of the Tuileries):

“You know, Monsieur, that the Faubourg Saint Antoine is marching against us and will arrive at the Tuileries with cannons. But I have also been informed that the King and Queen’s intention is to seek refuge with their family at the Legislative Assembly.

This measure is entirely wrong and ill-judged. It could have detestable consequences in that it displays lack of courage on the one hand and could disgust the Garde Nationale on the other which is in open conflict with the legislature – and which shall perform far better when the time comes to defend their majesties in their real and royal residence.

I would prefer, by contrast, that a delegation of 200 members of the Legislative Assembly come to the château [of the Tuileries], and that is what I have just advised should be done to all the ministers and some influential deputies. I pray you transmit this note if you approve of my way of thinking.

A thousand homages,

Sainte-Foix. Wednesday, 9 o'clock."⁶²³

Radix was interrogated about these letters by a commission of the National Convention led by Danton’s friend, Philippe Jacques Rühl, on 25 Nov. 1792 and 2-4 Jan. 1793.⁶²⁴ He was tried on 27 Feb. 1793 but cleared of all charges thanks to the intervention of his friend Barère who claimed Dumouriez had asked him to intercede.⁶²⁵ Radix was then arrested a second time following denunciations by the departmental administration of the *Aisne* where he had purchased several properties. He was incarcerated at the *Conciergerie* and interrogated again on 4 frimaire II/24 Nov. 1793 about his role in the king’s civil list and the two letters he had written to the king and La Porte. Against all odds, he was again saved by Barère who secured his transfer to the *Pension Belhomme* on 7 pluviôse II/26 Jan. 1794!⁶²⁶ Although briefly incarcerated at the Prison de l’Abbaye, Radix was eventually given permission on 11 floréal II/30 April 1794 to return to his Parisian residence and remain there under house arrest. He kept a low profile until 9 Thermidor and the *chambre du Conseil* acquitted him on 3 brumaire III/24 Oct. 1794.⁶²⁷

⁶²² TRPTAF, Tome I, n°LXXXII, p.152-153.

⁶²³ TRPTAF, Tome I, n°XIV, p.32.

⁶²⁴ See TRPTAF, Tome I, n°XVII, p.41-48 and Tome II, n°CCLXXXV, p.233-236.

⁶²⁵ See AN, W//473.

⁶²⁶ Blanc, *LERE*, p.306, footnote 18.

⁶²⁷ Blanc, *LCST*, p.40-41.

A few attentive observers have questioned why Barère twice saved Radix from the guillotine and protected him during the seventeen months he was in power at the *Comité de Salut public*. In fact, Radix knew a great deal about Barère's past (both had frequented the Orléans circle) and Barère's name had emerged in several documents found in the *armoire de fer* at the Tuileries Palace.⁶²⁸ Olivier Blanc suggests it is quite possible Radix and others like Dufresne de Saint-Léon held compromising documents on Barère.⁶²⁹

When Talleyrand returned to France from his American exile in September 1796, Radix resumed his close association with him and rapidly became his financial *éminence grise* in charge of coordinating and overseeing all his business ventures. He was Talleyrand's principal intermediary in negotiating a deal with the contractors Michel Simons and Jean Werbrouck to import British guineas into France and melt them to restrike French currency (see Chapter 5). According to Barras, Radix and Talleyrand used a gambling house located at 58 Rue Honoré near the Place Vendôme as their unofficial business office. This establishment, which welcomed influential deputies and doubled as a luxury brothel, was reportedly protected by François de Neufchâteau's police – the gambling being merely a cover for the contracts and attendant government decrees which Radix, Talleyrand and their business associates discussed and agreed on the building's second floor.⁶³⁰ Radix was also in Talleyrand's entourage during the Brumaire coup, attending the dinner at Michel Simons' country estate of Montalais in Meudon on the evening of 19 Brumaire with Talleyrand, Montrond, Arnault, and Rœderer (see Chapter 6).

In 1807, Radix was elected mayor of Ourscamps (now Chiry-Ourscamps in the Oise) where he had purchased the former Cistercian abbey as a *bien national* in 1798 and remained there until his death.⁶³¹

Ramel, Dominique-Vincent (3 Nov. 1760 – 31 March 1829) ● ● MF

Born in Montolieu (Aude). Died in Brussels. Son of Jean-Baptiste Ramel (1718-1800) and his wife Marie-Rose Ducup de Saint-Ferriol (died 1791). Dominique-Vincent's parents had to obtain a special dispensation to get married due to their filial proximity. His paternal great-grandfather, Antoine Ramel (1643-1715), had been an *avocat du roi*, and one of his paternal uncles – Jean-Baptiste-Joseph-Dominique Ramel – married Marie-Anne-Philippe-Delphine Bochet in 1808, the daughter of Edme Bochet who headed the land registry administration (*administrateur de l'Enregistrement et des Domaines*).⁶³² Delphine Bochet's three sisters also married administrators in the land registry, including Cécile Bochet who wed Henri-Philippe-Joseph Panckoucke (1780-1812) – a *sous-vérificateur de la comptabilité de l'administration de domaines* and the brother of Dominique-Vincent's wife (Ange-Pauline-Charlotte-Josèphe Panckoucke – see below).

Dominique-Vincent's maternal family, the Ducup de Saint-Ferriol, had been ennobled prior to the Revolution (unlike the Ramels). One of his first cousins on his mother's side was Jean-Baptiste-Théodore Marragon (1741-1829) who was *contrôleur général du canal du Midi* at the Revolution's outbreak and was elected a deputy of the *département* of the

⁶²⁸ *Moniteur*, Tome XIV, p.639-645 & 678.

⁶²⁹ Blanc, *LCST*, p.198, footnote 34.

⁶³⁰ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome III, p.295 – Rapport politique du 24 nivôse VII/13 Jan. 1799.

⁶³¹ The only biography on Radix is André Doyon, *Maximilien Radix de Sainte-Foix (1736-1810)*, Paris: A. Pedone, 1966.

⁶³² MC/ET/XLII/739, 23 Feb. 1808, *Marriage contract of Jean-Baptiste-Joseph-Dominique Ramel and Marie-Anne-Philippe-Delphine Bochet*.

Aude to the National Convention in 1792. Marragon was co-opted as a deputy in the *Anciens* on 26 Oct. 1795 thanks to the decree of two-thirds. Through his cousin's influence, he was appointed French consul at Hamburg on 30 May 1798 and *directeur général des canaux* in May 1799. Ramel also engineered Marragon's subsequent appointment as *receveur général des finances* in the Haute Marne in July 1799 and facilitated his transfers to the *départements* of the Hérault (late 1799) and Haute-Garonne (1800-1810). Being a regicide, Marragon was forced to leave France following the Bourbon Restoration and joined Ramel in Brussels where he spent the rest of his life.

Ramel's sister, Claire-Marie-Jeanne Ramel (1757-1791) married Jean-Antoine Bories, a lawyer at the *parlement de Toulouse*, on 25 Sep. 1786.

Marriage:

On 29 vendémiaire VIII/21 October 1799, Ramel married Ange-Pauline-Charlotte-Josèphe Panckoucke (1779-1840), daughter of the influential Lille banker Placide-Joseph Panckoucke (1740-c.1793) who headed the *Veuve Panckoucke et fils* bank (which was notably connected to Paulée, Vanlerberghe, Jean Lanchère and *Bontems Mallet Frères et Cie.*) and was a leading freemason.⁶³³ Placide-Joseph's cousin, Charles-Joseph Panckoucke (1736-1798), was the editor of the *Mercure de France* and of the *Encyclopédie* by Diderot and d'Alembert and founded the *Moniteur Universel* in 1789.

The ceremony was held in the church of Saint-Denis-de La Chapelle in La Chapelle-Française (now located in Paris's 19th *arrondissement*).

Children:

Ramel and his wife had two daughters. The eldest, Pauline-Angélique-Rose Ramel (1800-1878), married Édouard-Louis Lorois (1792-1863) in 1818.⁶³⁴ Lorois served as deputy-prefect of Chateaubriant during the *Cents Jours*.

Their second daughter, Mélanie Ramel (1804-1881), married Frédéric-Guillaume Ronstorff (1805-1876) in 1828, son of Jean-Engilbert Ronstorff who was the founder of evangelical church of Brussels (*Église évangélique de Bruxelles*).⁶³⁵

Character & Education:

Ramel began his education at the *monastère des Montolieu*. He was sent to Carcassonne for his secondary schooling and attended the law school at the University of Toulouse where he obtained his law degree (*licence de droit*). His family wanted him to become a magistrate so that he could be ennobled by the 'administrative route' (known in France as the '*noblesse de robe*' as opposed to those ennobled in exchange for military service who were the '*noblesse d'épée*'). He was an active freemason and member of the *Les Amis philanthropes* lodge in Brussels, being twice elected Worshipful Master (*vénérable*) of the lodge in 1819 and 1823.

⁶³³ MC/ET/LXXXIV/709, 29 vendémiaire VIII/21 Oct. 1799, *Marriage contract of Dominique-Vincent Ramel and Ange-Pauline-Charlotte-Josèphe Panckoucke*.

⁶³⁴ AGRB, Notariat du Brabant, n°17150/3, acte n°164, *Marriage contract of Édouard-Louis Lorois and Pauline-Angélique-Rose Ramel*, 11 Aug. 1818.

⁶³⁵ AGRB, Notariat du Brabant, n°17213, acte n°82, *Marriage contract of Frédéric-Guillaume Ronstorff and Henriette-Mélanie Ramel*, 2 May 1828.

Residences:

Ramel resided in several Parisian locations during his career. In 1791, he was domiciled at 4 Rue de Richelieu before living at 377 Rue Saint Honoré between 1793 and 1796. After becoming finance minister, he moved into the *hôtel du Contrôle général des finances* in the Rue Neuves des Petits-Champs. In 1804, he settled in a new residence at 738 Rue Saint-Augustin, and during the last years of the *Premier Empire* he lived at his family seat – the Château du Petit-Versailles in Montolieu (Aude) – which he had inherited in 1789. In 1816, his status as a regicide forced him to leave France for Brussels and he sold the Petit-Versailles to his brother-in-law, Jean-Antoine Bories. In Brussels, Ramel initially resided at the *hôtel d'Angleterre* before moving in with his cousin Marragon at 1147 Rue d'Isabelle. When Marragon eventually purchased a house at 73 Rue Dame-des-Neiges, Ramel moved there with him. On 19 Feb. 1817, he bought a house located at 8 Rue de l'Étuve. Around 1822, he rented an *hôtel particulier* at 775 Rue des Minimes where he stayed until his death.

Assets:

The Ramel family were wealthy textile merchants who owned the manufacture of Montolieu (Aude) which had been granted the privileged status of a royal manufacture in 1734. Unfortunately, we know very little about the family's fortune. Neither his parents' marriage contract nor their acts of succession have been conserved. His sister's wedding contract is also missing. Ramel inherited the Château du Petit-Versailles in 1789 from his maternal great uncle, Louis-Joseph de Bénazet, but we do not know the value of this sumptuous residence nor the precise value of the inheritance he received.

During his time as finance minister, Ramel earned an annual salary equivalent to half that of the executive directors in Year IV, 60,000 francs in Year V and 67,000 francs in Year VI. In his marriage contract of 1799, he declared the value of his goods to be 60,000 francs which appears to be a gross undervaluation. His wife brought a dowry of 50,000 francs staked on part of the property deed of the *bois nationaux* de Beaulieu (Juvanzé, Aube) which her mother – the Veuve Angélique-Josèphe Panckoucke (née Petit) – had acquired at auction on 1 pluviôse V/20 Jan. 1797 for 90,570 francs. She also received an annual pension of 10,000 francs paid in *tiers consolidé* which the marriage contract actually valued at 20,000 francs “*considering the variation of these types of effects.*”

Ramel was very closely connected to the affairs of his mother-in-law who had succeeded her husband at the helm of the *Veuve Panckoucke et fils* bank. Her inventory after decease reveals several interesting operations in which they were associated.⁶³⁶ On 16 Prairial IX/5 June 1801, for instance, a Citizen Havet from Montreuil-sur-Mer subscribed to an obligation of 110,000 francs in favour of the Veuve Panckoucke. Ramel purchased 50,000 francs of this obligation from his mother-in-law a few weeks prior to her decease via two notarial acts dated 11 prairial X/31 May 1802 and 12 thermidor X/31 July 1802. The Veuve Panckoucke had also rented on 18 germinal X/8 April 1802 an apartment on the first floor of a house located at 31 Rue Taitbout in Paris whose lease Ramel took up after her death.

But the most revealing operation concerns the old convent of the Récollets in Brussels which the Veuve Panckoucke had purchased on 21 thermidor VI/8 Aug. 1798. The convent

⁶³⁶ MC/ET/CXV/1056, 28 vendémiaire XI/20 Oct. 1802, *Inventory after decease of Angélique-Charlotte-Josèphe Panckoucke (née Petit)*.

had previously belonged to a Parisian trader named Balbot who had acquired it at auction on 25 nivôse V/14 Jan. 1797, but it appears Balbot was merely a strawman for *Veuve Panckoucke et fils* all along. Balbot destroyed the convent's church so rapidly that he endangered the structure of the adjacent buildings which aroused a string of complaints from neighbouring landowners that he ignored. When he was threatened with having the convent's title deed revoked for failing to meet his payments on time, Ramel intervened and wrote to the administrators of the *département* of the Dyle on 13 messidor VI/1 July 1798, requesting they "*revoke any decree or other measure*" they might already have taken and which could impede "*the exclusive use of the estate in this citizen's case.*"

Five weeks later, Balbot sold the convent of the Récollets to the *Veuve Panckoucke* but continued to act as its manager, overseeing the construction of a butter market (*halle au beurre*) on the property. His objective was to force all butter merchants in Brussels to use this market and pay emplacement rights. Despite the objections of local councils, interior minister Quinotte supported Balbot's project. Shortly before 18 Brumaire, Quinette wrote to the administrators of the Dyle on 4 brumaire VIII/26 Oct. 1799 enjoining them to "*prescribe the municipal administration to take all necessary dispositions to transfer the butter market to the new emplacement in the convent of the Récollets and force buyers and sellers [to use it].*" The butter market was approved and put in service. Following the *Veuve Panckoucke's* death, it was inherited by her daughter – Ramel's wife. According to the Brabantine land register, it comprised 71 stalls generating an annual income of 2,400 florins (approximately 5,000 francs).

Another intriguing side to Ramel's wealth concerns his position as sole beneficiary in the inheritance of Armand-Frédéric-Ernest Nogaret (1734-1806) to whom he was not related.⁶³⁷ Nogaret, the son of the king's goblet steward, had purchased the charge of treasurer of the comte d'Artois for 150,000 *livres* and placed his brother – Félix Nogaret – as the comtesse d'Artois's librarian. This duty enabled Félix Nogaret to meet the editor Charles-Joseph Panckoucke, and it was probably through the Panckouckes that Armand Nogaret met Ramel. How then did Ramel become Armand Nogaret's sole heir? It is likely Ramel saved Nogaret during the Terror and that Nogaret rewarded him by naming him sole beneficiary in his will. Nogaret bequeathed Ramel an extensive collection of paintings, a house at Chateauneuf-sur-Loire and another at Vitry-sur-Seine where Ramel's second daughter was born.

Ramel was also closely linked to several leading financiers such as Ouvrard, Paulée, Vanlerberghe, Hainguerlot and Michel Simons whose affairs he facilitated thanks to his ministerial prerogative. But these links remain highly opaque and will probably never be fully revealed. Even the marriage contracts of Ramel's two daughters, conserved at the Belgian National Archives, provide almost no indication on the endowments their father gave them.

When he was appointed *conseiller général* for the *département* of the Aude in 1812, Ramel's annual revenues amounted to 20,000 francs; but this probably only reflected the rents he collected from the 2,364 hectares he owned in Montolieu. We do not know the price at which Ramel sold his Château du Petit-Versailles to his brother-in-law Bories in November 1816, nor whether the sale was fictitious or not (as Johannot had done, for

⁶³⁷ MC/ET/CXV/1075, 21 July 1806, *Inventory after decease of Armand-Frédéric-Ernest Nogaret.*

example, with his estate at Jardy). He also practised law in a private capacity, but we are ignorant of his revenues.

Ramel invested considerable sums in the cotton manufacture established by François Liévain-Bauwens at Ghent in 1800. He was also the proprietor of a nail factory and a linen weaving factory in Belgium. A notarial act reveals his two daughters shared 24 certificates of the Dutch national debt worth 1,000 florins each after his death, equating to roughly 50,000 florins. Ramel's wife bequeathed her daughters three houses located at 2,4 and 6 Rue du Cerfeuil in Brussels, the butter market in the Place des Récollets and four smaller houses in the Rue du Fer.⁶³⁸ Assuredly, these assets represented only a small portion of Ramel's wealth and the full list of assets comprising his fortune remains a mystery.

Career:

- Acquires the charge of *capitaine viguier et juge royal de Montolieu* (1784);
- Acquires the charge of *avocat du roi au présidial de Carcassonne* ceded by his maternal great uncle, Louis-Joseph de Bénazet (1787);
- Elected deputy of the Third Estate for the *sénéchaussée* of Carcassonne to the 1789 Estates-General (23 March 1789);
- Displays great activity in the National Assembly's committees, particularly in the *Comité d'aliénation des biens nationaux* which is created following the confiscation of the clergy's goods on 2 November 1789;
- Opposes the division of France into *départements*, arguing this would hinder tax collection (1790);
- Dispatched by the National Assembly to Brest to restore order following the mutiny of the Atlantic fleet (June 1791). His mission succeeds and the assembly appoints him one of its secretaries following his return to Paris;
- Elected president du tribunal civil de district de Carcassonne following the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly (Oct. 1791);
- Elected deputy for the *département* of the Aude to the National Convention (4 Sep. 1792). He immediately joins the Convention's *comité des finances* where he wields considerable influence with his friend Cambon. Together, they secure the dismissal of Clavière from the finance ministry;
- Delivers a report to the Convention blaming the increase in the amount of *assignats* on the growing number of defaults in the payment of taxes (23 April 1793);
- Proposes a forced loan of a million *livres* (20 May 1793);
- Delivers a report to the Convention on property and income tax contributions for 1793 (29 July 1793);
- Presents a report to the Convention on the proposed forced loan for 1793 (19 Aug. 1793) which is voted on 3 Sep.;
- Lobbies with Cambon to lift the hold placed on goods owned by foreigners voted by the Convention on 7 Sep. 1793;
- Opposes the creation of the *maximum* on 29 Sep. 1793;
- Although compromised in the *Compagnie des Indes* scandal, he succeeds in escaping prosecution and even accuses Fabre d'Églantine of embezzlement (April 1794). In Sep. 1794, he plays an important role in passing the decree which definitely liquidated the company;

⁶³⁸ AGRB, Enregistrement et Domaines, 1^{er} trimestre 1841, n°791, *Act of succession of Ange-Pauline-Charlotte-Josèphe Panckoucke, widow of Dominique-Vincent Ramel*, 12 Jan. 1841.

- Ramel, Cambon and the Treasury are denounced by Robespierre on 8 thermidor II/26 Aug. 1794. This triggers an immediate reaction and the following day Robespierre falls;
- Dispatched to Holland following General Pichegru's conquest of the Low Countries in Jan. 1795. Ramel advises against annexing Holland and suggests instead the creation of an allied sister republic – the Batavian Republic – which is established in May 1795;
- Co-opted as a deputy for the *département* of the Aude to the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents* thanks to the decree of two-thirds (26 Oct. 1795);
- Appointed finance minister in replacement of Faipoult (14 Feb. 1796). The separation of powers enshrined in the 1795 Constitution forces Ramel to resign his deputy's seat in the *Cinq-Cents*. He reforms the finance ministry and creates its general secretariat (*secretariat général*) which survives until 1933. Its first director is François Rolland who hails from a textile manufacturing family from Carcassonne. In 1798, Rolland leaves to become the director of Liévain-Bauwens's textile manufacture at Poissy and is replaced by Alexandre Dupré whom Ramel had met in the Legislative Assembly;
- Submits a report to the executive directors forecasting state budgetary expenses for Year IV which he evaluates at 600 million francs. To meet these costs, he suggests raising indirect taxes on salt extraction and tobacco, increasing land registry dues and levying a 20% tax on all payments made on government bonds and obligations.⁶³⁹ His proposed reforms are not applied, the government preferring instead to resume the sale of *biens nationaux* to raise funds;
- Approves the *Compagnie Dijon*'s contract to remove *mandats territoriaux* from the Treasury and regional tax offices (11 Dec. 1796);
- Orders an audit of all public coffers in tax bureaus and places them under seal (21 Dec. 1796);
- The *Cinq-Cents*, spurned on by accusations formulated by the Treasury's commissioners, demands Ramel be prosecuted for his role in the *Compagnie Dijon* scandal (13 Aug. 1797). But this is cut short by the Coup of 18 Fructidor (4 Sep. 1797) and Ramel emerges victorious from the struggle. However, he becomes highly unpopular with the public following the 'bankruptcy of two-thirds' (9 vendémiaire IV/30 Sep. 1797) when the Directory foregoes payments on two-thirds of the national debt. The bankruptcy is widely referred to as the 'Ramel liquidation';
- Submits a report to the executive directors forecasting state budgetary expenses for Year VI which he evaluates at 616 million francs;⁶⁴⁰
- Institutes the system of 'special delegations' (*délégations spéciales*) allowing contractors to levy their reimbursements directly from public coffers in tax offices (1797). Ramel is soon accused by Jacobin deputies of conniving with contractors to embezzle public funds. He refutes these accusations and defends the delegation system in the *Cinq-Cents* on 9 prairial VII/28 May 1799;
- On 23 messidor VII/11 July 1799, Pierre-Joseph Briot, the deputy of the Doubs, accused Ramel of having "legalised speculation, transformed the offices of the finance ministry and Treasury into Augean stables which even the most regenerative events failed to clear." Nine days later, Ramel resigned from the finance ministry;

⁶³⁹ AN, AF/III/115, dossier 536, *Report of Ramel to the Directory following his entrance to the finance ministry*, Pluviôse IV.

⁶⁴⁰ AN, AF/III/115, dossier 538:1, *Summary of Ramel to the Directory concerning the expenses of Year VI*.

- Ramel presented a general account of his expenses at the finance ministry soon after the establishment of the Consulate and was granted a full discharge on 29 frimaire VIII/20 Dec. 1799;
- Publishes *Des finances de la République en l'an IX* (1801);
- Moves to Brussels a first time (around 1802);
- Moves back to Paris (1804);
- Publishes *Du change, du cours des effets publics et de l'intérêt de l'argent, considérés sous le rapport du bien général de l'État* (1807) following the 1805-1806 bankruptcy of the *Négociants réunis*. By demonstrating his financial expertise in this book, Ramel was probably subtly offering his services in the hope of being appointed Treasury minister or director of the *Banque de France*;
- Publishes *Les deux Khans de la presque île de l'Inde, Recueil des opinions des Anciens et des Modernes et des différents peuples sur le gouvernement*, in which he argues in favour of a republican parliamentary democracy.
- Ramel appears to have gone into the textile/drapery business with his cousin Henry Panckoucke at Lille. He undertook several business trips to Anvers, Lille and the Languedoc, sending draperies to Lille for Panckoucke to sell;
- Moves back to his Château du Petit-Versailles at Montolieu;
- Appointed *conseiller général de l'Aude* by imperial decree (20 Sep. 1812);
- Appointed prefect of the Calvados during the *Cents Jours* by Carnot;
- Forced to leave France due to his status as a regicide after the second Bourbon Restoration and settles in Brussels (1816).⁶⁴¹

Réal, André (10 Nov. 1755 – 18 Oct. 1832) ● AI

Réal was elected deputy of Grenoble to the National Convention in September 1792 and also served in the *Cinq-Cents*. He was appointed civilian commissioner to the *Armée d'Italie* after the voting of the law of 14 fructidor III/31 Aug. 1795 which divided Belgium into nine *départements*. Réal confined himself to sending reports to the Committee of Public Safety and the Directory emphasising the dilapidated state of the army's supply and equipment.⁶⁴² He was recalled on 1 frimaire IV/22 Nov. 1795 and recommended Hilaire as his replacement, but Ange-Marie Chiappe was selected instead.

Réal, Pierre-François (Comte) (28 March 1757 – 6 May 1834) ●

Pierre-François Réal was the son of a gamekeeper. He was elected a deputy to the 1789 Estates-General where he supported his friend the Abbé Sieyès. He became a member of the new Parisian municipal administration upon its creation on 5 Aug. 1789, specialising in logistical and supply issues. Gravitating towards the Girondins, Réal spoke in favour of deposing the monarchy at the *Club des Jacobins* but opposed Robespierre. Following the fall of the monarchy, he was delegated to the Parisian Commune's police section and was appointed a prosecutor on the Commune's *Tribunal extraordinaire* on 17 August 1792 and subsequently second substitut du Procureur (Dec. 1792 – March 1794). Réal's dislike of

⁶⁴¹ For more on Ramel, see Antonetti (ed.), *LMFRFSE*, 2007, p.201-233; F. Charles, 'Une ancienne famille de Montolieu, Les Ramel', *Bulletin de la Société d'études scientifiques de l'Aude*, LXXV, 1975: 241-246 and 'Dominique-Vincent Ramel,, conventionnel et ministre des finances', *Mémoires de la Société des arts et des sciences de Carcassonne*, Série 4, Tome 9, 1976-1978 (published 1980): 81-85.

⁶⁴² AG, B3/18. Grenoble, 18 brumaire IV/9 Nov. 1795. *Réal to the Directory*; AN, AF/III/144/A, dossier 679 – *Kellermann to the Directory*, Chambéry, 22 nivôse IV/12 January 1796.

Robespierre led him to befriend Joseph Fouché. In March 1794, he was arrested at the Luxembourg during the purges against the Hébertistes and Dantonists but was released following 9 Thermidor. During the Thermidorian and early directorial periods he worked as a journalist, publishing articles in the *Journal des Patriotes de 89* and the *Journal de l'Opposition*. He also continued to work as a lawyer and defended Gracchus Babeuf in his show trial at Vendôme and later Tort de la Sonde in his case to recoup funds from the supply contract for Dumouriez's army. Thanks to their friendship with the director Paul Barras, Réal and Fouché participated in a number of speculative ventures and military contracting deals. When General Moreau captured important counter-revolutionary correspondence in the carriage of the Austrian General Klinglin revealing the treason of General Pichegru (president of the *Cinq-Cents*) and the Prince de Condé, Réal was tasked by police minister Sotin to examine it. Shortly afterwards, Réal was appointed as head of the administration of the Seine through Barras's influence. This administration superseded the police ministry which Fouché took over in mid-1799. Réal was a key Brumaire conspirator and was responsible for introducing Napoleon to Fouché. He was also instrumental in relaying messages between Bonaparte and Sieyès and keeping an eye on Barras while the conspiracy unfolded. His memoirs, published after the advent of the July Monarchy and presented in the form of succeeding anecdotes, are of varying interest.⁶⁴³

Récamier, Jacques-Rose (10 March 1751 – 29 March 1830) CCC ●

Born in the *paroisse de Saint-Nizier*, perhaps at Belley (Ain) near Lyon, the son of François Récamier (1709-1782), a banker and luxury hat manufacturer from Lyon and of his wife Emeraude Delaroche (died 1777), daughter of Léonard Delaroche, *imprimeur-libraire* at Lyon.⁶⁴⁴ The Récamier family originated from the region of Bugey in the Ain (between Lyon and Geneva), with the first documented relative being Aimé Récamier (1490-1540). In the early 18th century, the family split into two branches, one of which produced the well-known Parisian physician Joseph Récamier (1774-1852), and the other the famous banker (Jacques-Rose). Jacques had six brothers and sisters including Laurent Récamier (1747-1830), his partner in *Jacques Récamier et Cie.* and one of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* in 1804.

Marriage:

On 24 April 1793 Jacques married Jeanne-Françoise-Julie-Adélaïde Bernard (1777-1849), better known as Juliette Récamier.⁶⁴⁵ Her father, a Lyon notary named Jean Bernard (died 1828), was appointed *receveur particulier des Finances* by Calonne (1786-1800) and *administrateur des Postes* by Bonaparte (1800). In 1807, he was arrested for suspected royalist sympathies, deposed and imprisoned at the *Prison du Temple* (but released on Bernadotte's intercession). Several of Juliette Récamier's biographers have suggested she was in fact Jacques's daughter because he had been the lover of her mother – Marie-Julie

⁶⁴³ *Indiscrétions, 1798-1830. Souvenirs anecdotiques et politiques d'un fonctionnaire de l'Empire*, Paris: Dufey.

⁶⁴⁴ His brother, Aymé de La Roche, *imprimeur du roi en la principauté de Dombes*, bequeathed his printing workshop to Pierre-Simon Ballanche (1776-1847), faithful friend of Madame Récamier.

⁶⁴⁵ MC/ET/LXII/698, 11 April 1793, *Marriage of Jacques Rose Récamier and Jeanne-Françoise-Julie-Adélaïde Bernard*.

Matton (died 1807).⁶⁴⁶ Moreover, their marriage was never consummated and they had no children, although their relationship was affectionate and platonic. They never divorced even though Jacques offered to do so for her convenience. A relative of Juliette – Marie-Elisabeth-Antoinette Bernard de Civrieux – was married to the contractor Marc-Antoine-Grégoire Michel *jeune*, who maintained close links with Récamier. His elder brother – Michel *l'ainé* – was an associate of Médard Desprez in the *Négociants réunis*.⁶⁴⁷

Career:

- Works in his father's manufacture of hats and banking house at Lyon (*Récamier père et fils*);
- Travels to Spain for his father's business where he establishes commercial links that will endure for the rest of his life;
- Already settled in Paris by 1793, headquartered at 9 Rue du Mail;
- The *Récamier et Cie.* bank first appears in the republican almanac in Year V;
- Under the Directory, Récamier re-organises his business (renamed *Jacques Récamier et Cie.*) with himself and his brother Laurent as sole partners. At this time, he was one of the most prominent Parisian bankers, carrying out business on an international scale. Benjamin Constant speaks of “*affaires immenses*”.⁶⁴⁸
- Participates in the military contracting craze under the Directory, in particular supplying military hospitals;⁶⁴⁹
- Following the signing of the Second Treaty of San Ildefonso (Aug. 1796), Récamier was very active in the triangular trade set up by Ramel at the finance ministry which involved transferring forced contributions out of Italy to purchase Spanish silver piasters for the National Treasury on European markets. He served as an intermediary between the *Banque Saint-Georges* and Aimé Régný in Genoa on the one hand, and the National Treasury and French consulate in Cadix on the other;⁶⁵⁰
- In March 1799, Récamier, Fulchiron and Roëttier de Montaleau (ex-director of the *Monnaie de Paris*) guaranteed the *Compagnie Laurens et Nobelly* for 2,936,000 francs. This firm held the *ferme générale des droits de passe aux barrières de Paris* for three years. The bankers also advanced the firm 675,000 francs to cover its first quarter;⁶⁵¹
- Founding Regent of the *Banque de France* (resigns his seat on 17 Oct. 1806);
- Joins the *Vingt Négociants Réunis* (20 Dec. 1799) & *Dix Négociants Réunis* (9 March 1800). In Year X, his shares yielded a profit of 218,013 francs;⁶⁵²
- Forms a new *Compagnie des Laines* in partnership with José Martínez de Hervás, Barrillon, *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* and Henri Grandin (9 April 1801). Henri Grandin is entrusted with the company's general procuration on 4 Aug. 1801.⁶⁵³ This company was dissolved on 20 Feb. 1805;⁶⁵⁴
- *Banquier du Trésor public* (17 Aug. 1801 – 21 April 1802);

⁶⁴⁶ See for example *Souvenirs et Correspondances de Mme. Récamier, publiés par sa nièce, Mme. Lenormand*, Tome I, Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1859, p.13 & 141 and Édouard Herriot, *Madame Récamier et ses amis*, Tome I, Paris: Payot, 1946, p.16-24.

⁶⁴⁷ For more on Récamier's family, see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.325-329.

⁶⁴⁸ See Châteaubriand, *Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe*, livre XXIX, Chapter III.

⁶⁴⁹ AN, AF/IV/983 & Édouard Herriot, *Madame Récamier et ses amis*, p.129.

⁶⁵⁰ Bruguière, *GPR*, p.120.

⁶⁵¹ MC/ET/XLV/669, 9 germinal VII/29 March 1799.

⁶⁵² Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.329.

⁶⁵³ AP, D31U3 1, dossier 84, 19 germinal IX/9 April 1801.

⁶⁵⁴ AP, D31U3 2, dossier 361, 1 ventôse XIII/20 Feb. 1805.

- As early as 1802, rumours began circulating concerning Récamier's possible bankruptcy. His wife's trip to London that year was said to result from the necessity of selling her diamonds. In December, it was whispered Récamier had lost his credit in Madrid, Cadix and London. These claims were entirely unfounded, and Récamier was forced to petition the *Banque de France* and the *Grand Juge* to put an end to them;
- In 1803, despite losing 700,000 francs in the bankruptcy of Thomas Melleville, an American merchant based in Marseille, he still made an annual profit of 400,000 francs and was listed among the ten highest taxpayers in the *département* of the Seine;
- Financial guarantor of Nicolas Marie Montessus, the *munitionnaire général des Invalides*, for 300,000 francs in his supply of the *service des hospices de la Marine* (1805);⁶⁵⁵
- Went bankrupt in the fall of 1805 due to the speculations of Ouvrard, Vanlerberghe and Médard Desprez on bill discounting at the *Banque de France*. Récamier's bankruptcy report indicates he held about 21 million francs in passive funds and only 4 million in active funds.⁶⁵⁶ Henri Grandin owed him 1,118,000 francs. According to the banker Fulchiron, "*Monsieur Récamier was forced to stop his activities because the bankruptcy of [Grandin] compelled him to pay important reimbursements which he was unable to confront.*"⁶⁵⁷ Napoleon refused to allow the national bank to save Récamier out of personal enmity. Adolphe Thiers notes that "*the bankruptcy of Mr. Récamier, a banker renowned for his probity, the extent of his business dealings and the glamour of his lifestyle, who fell a victim far more to circumstance than to his own financial misconduct, produced the most gruelling sensation.*"⁶⁵⁸ Récamier's creditors waived 65% of his debts at a meeting held on 4 Feb. 1806. Three years later on 26 Jan. 1809, they acknowledged he had paid them the remaining 35%;
- Récamier went back into business, albeit on a more modest scale, relying mostly on his Spanish connections. He was then headquartered at 48 Rue Basse-du-Rempart. In 1819 he went bankrupt a second time, recovering only in 1828.⁶⁵⁹

Revenaz, Antoine CCC

Shareholder of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*. Resided in the Rue du Mail.

Ricard, Georges-Antoine (c.1740 – ?) CCC ●

Resided in the Rue de la Loi.

Ritter, François-Joseph (19 April 1758 – 6 Oct. 1809) ● AI

Ritter was from Huningue (Alsace) and served as a lawyer with the *Conseil souverain d'Alsace* and later as a judge at the court of Altkirch (1790). He was elected deputy of the Haut-Rhin to the Legislative Assembly and the National Convention. The commissioner Charles-Alexis Alexandre says he "*sacrificed nothing to grace and was a stranger to politeness.*"⁶⁶⁰ A military commission established at Huningue to monitor Ritter's conduct

⁶⁵⁵ MC/ET/XV/1180, 19 vendémiaire XIV/11 Oct. 1805.

⁶⁵⁶ AP, D11U3 33, dossier 2164, 1 février 1806.

⁶⁵⁷ Archives départementales du Rhône, fonds Guérin, 2 F 339, 14 Nov. 1805 (quoted in Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.289).

⁶⁵⁸ Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, Tome VI, p.199.

⁶⁵⁹ For more on Récamier, see AN, F/7/4774, 6454, 6539, 6571 & Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.325-335.

⁶⁶⁰ Alexandre, *Mémoires manuscrits*, Bibliothèque Thiers, 132^e cahier, p.9.

recommended he be kept under close surveillance and described him as a speculator and “*exporter of hard currency*”. He was rumoured to have channelled gold out of France to Switzerland and his father-in-law, Matter, was arrested for hiding a deserting officer at his residence and for not having abided by the maximum.⁶⁶¹ After 9 Thermidor, suspicions against Ritter dissipated and he was sent as commissioner to the *Armée d’Italie* where he was in charge of overseeing supplies with Schérer. He passed as a revolutionary in the Alpes-Maritimes given the significant number of moderates and émigrés in that *département*. Ritter soon proved he was not the man for the job as he was unable to exploit the opportunities offered by the victory of Loano.⁶⁶²

Roche, Joseph CCC

Resided in the Rue de l’Échiquier.

Roger CCC

Possibly Germier Roger, former secretary to the duc de Guines during his residency as ambassador in London.⁶⁶³ Resided in the Rue de la Place Vendôme.

Rose, Augustus

Augustus Rose arrived in Paris during the early Revolution and secured employment as a bailiff at the National Assembly, continuing in this post until the coup of 18 Fructidor (when he was serving with the *Conseil des Anciens*). He resided at 3 Rue Caumartin at the angle of the Rue Basse-des-Remparts. Rose was one of William Windham’s key agents in France and informed London of all the laws passed and debates held at the French legislature. Rose had an account with unlimited credit at *Perregaux et Cie.* and was also in contact with *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* (via Marie-Nicole Vigner de Montréal – Walter Boyd’s future wife), the Simons brothers, Berthold Proly and Gouverneur Morris (US ambassador in Paris). He also recruited several notaries to the National Assembly who were all arrested on 21 brumaire II/11 Nov. 1793. In Pluviôse Year II, Rose himself was arrested and his house at 3 Rue Caumartin was searched by the corrupt policeman Dossonville, also an agent of Windham, who had been assigned to the case by Barère. Nothing was found at Rose’s residence and he was cleared of all charges on 15 April 1794.⁶⁶⁴

Rosset, Louis CCC

Rosset was one of the eleven original administrators of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants*. I have not been able to precisely identify his family origins. He may possibly have hailed from Montpellier or the Bordeaux area. He does not appear to have been related to André Hercule Marie Louis de Rosset de Rocozels (1767-1810), the duc de Fleury and former governor of Lorraine, who served under the Marquis de Bouillé in the *Armée des Émigrés* during the directorial period and only returned to France in 1806. Rosset left his

⁶⁶¹ AN, AF/II/49, dossier 378 – *Dénonciations contre Ritter*.

⁶⁶² Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.163-164.

⁶⁶³ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.415-416.

⁶⁶⁴ Blanc, *LCST*, p.107-108.

administrative duties at the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* soon after its foundation and was no longer a shareholder when the bank was re-founded after the Monneron scandal.

Rougemont, Charles Abraham & Denis CCC

The Rougemonts were a banking dynasty with roots in Franche-Comté whose members did business in Neuchâtel, London and Paris. Jean-Jacques Rougemont was the first of the family to become a banker in Paris. His sons (François-Antoine, Charles Abraham, François-Abraham, Louis and Denis), headed *Rougemont frères* and were known as traders of diamonds (especially via Lisbon with *Veuve Juran & fils* – an Amsterdam firm headed by Louis Greffulhe), colonial goods and *indiennes*. Denis inherited his brothers' shares in their bank;⁶⁶⁵ and was the royal agent and representative of the Prussian king in Paris. In 1786, Denis was selected by a conglomerate of Zürich bankers ('*Usteri, Escher, Ott et Cie.*') to co-direct *Rougement, Hottinger et Cie.* with Jean-Conrad Hottinguer (see Hottinguer's entry). Jean-Conrad Escher met with Denis de Rougemont in Paris to convince him to become joint-director of the new bank. Denis's credit was then weak as he had suffered from the bankruptcy of the foundries of Besançon and had just separated from his associate, the *Vaudois* banker François de Grandson Jeanneret.⁶⁶⁶ *Rougement, Hottinger et Cie.* was dissolved in 1790. Charles Rougemont resided in the Rue de la Place Vendôme.

Sabatier, Guillaume (7 Sep. 1730 – 21 Aug. 1808) ● ●

Born in Montpellier. Died in Châteaufort (Yvelines). Son of Jean, merchant trader of Montpellier and head of the '*Maison Jean Sabatier et Cie.*', *grand munitonnaire du Languedoc*, and of his wife Jeanne Pomier. The Sabatier family had long been established in Montpellier and could trace its lineage back to Guillaume Sabatier, *syndic de l'Hôpital général de Montpellier* in 1678, and André Sabatier, *procureur en la Cour des comptes de Montpellier* in 1714. The family was probably related to a Guillaume Sabatier, *fermier* of a district equivalent to the Vivarais in 1584.

Such was the financial influence wielded by the Sabatiers and their associates that the Revolution was forced to negotiate with them and renewed the contracts which Louis XV and Louis XVI had signed with their trading house. These were extended again by Napoleon after Sabatier's death. Among the family's numerous business partners, the most prominent was Jean-Henry Martin (known as Martin-Puech) from Marseille, who eventually replaced Guillaume Sabatier as Censor of the *Banque de France* when he resigned due to ill health in 1803.

One of Guillaume Sabatier's closest collaborators was Jean-Jacques Régis de Cambacérès, his compatriot from Montpellier, with whom he shared a lifelong friendship. In Paris, he was domiciled at 5 Place Vendôme.

Children & Relatives:

Guillaume Sabatier never married. However, he did have an illegitimate son, Augustin Baudin (1785-1813), with his mistress Jeanne Baudin d'Alogny (died c.1813), whom he recognised in his will. Although one of Guillaume's sisters, Marie-Fortunée, was a nun

⁶⁶⁵ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.326-329.

⁶⁶⁶ Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer...*, Tome I, p.104.

(*religieuse*), his testament does not indicate any adherence to or sentiments for a religious faith. One of Guillaume's main business partners was his cousin, Jean-Étienne Sabatier (c.1733-1809), who served as his *caissier* in all matters relating to the sale of military beds (the 'bail Desmazures' and 'bail Laurent' – see below). Among his other cousins were Jacques-Guillaume Sabatier (died 1809), *Entrepreneur général des lits militaires* and partner in the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin*, and Jean-Gaspard-Pascal René, *général de brigade*, captured by Spanish guerillas near La Carolina (Jaén) in 1808 and burned alive in boiling oil.

Career:

- Jean Sabatier, Guillaume's father, established the *maison Jean Sabatier*, which was already supplying the Navy and French Caribbean islands by 1740. The Sabatier trading house dealt in all kinds of goods and services on an international scale: banking, textile manufacturing and trade, bed linen and military supplies, colonial trade, farming taxes at the *Ferme générale*, and conducting business with the *Compagnie des Indes* (where Guillaume Sabatier would later serve as a director);⁶⁶⁷
- Jean Sabatier carried out a significant amount of business with Saint Domingue and was also involved in the silver piaster trade with Spain. In 1763, he divided his business into two separate trading houses: *Jean Sabatier et fils* in Montpellier and *Sabatier fils* which was established and overseen by his son Guillaume in Paris;
- In 1780, *Jean Sabatier et fils* was awarded the contract to supply military beds in France's southern provinces (*provinces méridionales*) and Corsica;
- The American Revolutionary War enabled the Sabatiers to transform their business into a vast commercial enterprise yielding colossal profits. The financial opportunities presented by this conflict led Guillaume to take significant risks in his investments which often set him at odds with his father. In February 1779, for instance, Guillaume was advancing funds worth 2,400,000 *livres* to various creditors;⁶⁶⁸
- A short glance at Sabatier's contracts with the *Ferme générale* reveals the scope and variety of his dealings under the *Ancien Régime*:
 - *Fournitures pour les provinces du Languedoc*
 - *Ferme des octrois de Toulouse*
 - *Ferme générale*
 - *Lits militaires*
 - *Ferme de la province du Languedoc*.
- From 28 Nov. 1786 to 30 Thermidor IV/17 Aug. 1796, Guillaume Sabatier, his cousin Jean-Étienne, and their Martin-Puech associates were partners in a company which had been granted an exclusive government contract for the manufacture of military beds, known as the '*Bail Desmazures*' (the 'Desmazures lease'). Desmazures was a standard alias frequently employed by the Sabatiers and the Martin-Puech families in their official business dealings. On 20 Nov. 1807, they formed 'The Company of Military Beds for the Entire Expanse of the Empire' (*l'Entreprise des Lits militaires pour toute l'étendue de l'Empire*) – known as the '*Bail Laurent*' (Laurent lease) – which was backed up by another partnership with the *Receveur général de l'Aube* and Regent of the *Banque de France*, Louis Pierlot (1765-1826);

⁶⁶⁷ Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret (*Les Financiers du Languedoc au XVIII^e siècle*, Paris: SEVPEN, 1970) presents a detailed study of the activities of Jean Sabatier along with a map of his commercial connections between 1720 and 1740 (see especially p.223-225 and p.227 for the map).

⁶⁶⁸ MC/ET/XLVIII/550, 12 Sep. 1808, *Inventory after decease of Guillaume Sabatier*.

- Buys the Château d’Ors (Châteaufort, Yvelines) along with all its furniture from the Héricourt family for 250,000 *livres* (15 May 1788);
- Appointed *administrateur des hôpitaux* (9 Oct. 1789);
- During the last years of the *Ancien Régime*, Guillaume Sabatier formed a business partnership with Pierre Desprez (father of Médard Desprez) in Paris, *Sabatier et Desprez*, which lasted until 9 July 1793 when the partnership was dissolved;
- Sabatier formed many companies and partnerships during the late *Ancien Régime* and Revolutionary-Napoleonic era which are difficult to date with precision. These include:
 - Speculations on shares of the *Banco de San Carlos* (Madrid) with Pierre Desprez;
 - Speculations on commercial real estate (*bâtiments marchands*) with Henry-Liévain Carié-Bézard (future Regent of the *Banque de France*);
 - Partnerships with Perregaux, Doyen, Récamier, Fulchiron and Gabriel Filletaz (linked to Davillier);
 - Acting with Pierre Desprez as ‘*commandite*’ (guarantor/bankroller) *de la Recette générale de Seine-et-Oise*, which was held by Auguste Gille (brother-in-law of Cambacérès?);
 - A partnership with Médard Desprez, the Périer brothers (sons of Claude Périer) and *Flory et Cie.* (owned by Guillaume-Henry Flory, Parisian associate of the Périers and future Regent of the *Banque de France*) for the purchase of 50,000 *livres* of national debt bonds (*rentes sur l’état*);
 - The arming and equipping of privateers, including one vessel equipped in collaboration with Claude Périer and *Flory et Cie.*, and another armed by *Balguerie & Junca* from Bordeaux in partnership with the Basterréche trading family from Bayonne;
 - A partnership with Puech père, *Granier et fils*, *Pomier et fils* and his cousin Jean-Étienne (which he backed by mortgaging *biens nationaux* he owned in the *arrondissement* of Cleves worth 120,000 francs);
 - Acting as the financial guarantor for a number of trading houses (*Flory et Cie.*, *Henry l’Huillier et Cie.*, *Schroeder*);
 - He was in contact with several London-based trading houses, including *James Cazenove et Cie.*, *Loubiès*, *Teissier et Cie.* and *Motteux et Cie.* He also had links to *Chapeaurouge et Siaveking*, based in Hamburg;
- Both Guillaume Sabatier and Pierre Desprez were arrested on 28 ventôse II/18 March 1794 and put on trial for corruption linked to their embezzlement of funds destined for military convoys and their participation in the founding of the last *Compagnie des Indes* (the scandal of the *Compagnie des Indes*). Sabatier and Desprez, along with Augustin Périer (cousin of Claude Périer), had been sent to London in 1784 to study the East India Company in preparation for the founding of the *Compagnie des Indes*. In 1793, Sabatier still owned 793 of the *compagnie*’s shares.⁶⁶⁹
- Thanks to their connections and liberal distribution of bribes, Sabatier and Desprez were able to obtain their transfer to the Pension Belhomme in the *quartier Saint Antoine* (a mental asylum for the wealthy in the heart of a *sans-culottes* bastion!), from which they were released on 6 vendémiaire III/27 Sep. 1794;⁶⁷⁰
- Purchases a stake in the *Compagnie des Mines d’Anzin*, along with Claude Périer, Pierre Desprez and Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu (see Claude Périer’s entry for the details of this sale) (22 messidor III/10 July 1795);

⁶⁶⁹ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.371.

⁶⁷⁰ See Berryer, *Souvenirs*, Tome I, p.168-169 & Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome III, p.31-32.

- 1st Censor of the *Banque de France* (27 pluviôse VIII/16 Feb. 1800). Resigns from his seat for health reasons in 1803 and is replaced by Jean-Henry Martin-Puech (17 Oct. 1803);
- *Conseiller de la Seine* (10 March 1800);
- One of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* in 1804;
- Sabatier lent important sums to several bankers towards the end of his life, including Doyen (90,000 francs on 16 Aug. 1806) and the Périer brothers (150,000 francs on 19 April 1808).
- Hosts Cambacérès at his residence during his trip to Montpellier (Oct./Nov. 1807);
- Dies at his Château of Ors (at Châteaufort, Yvelines). Sabatier bequeathed a vast fortune of nearly five million francs to his two surviving sisters and illegitimate son, including 330 shares of the *Banque de France* (worth 396,000 francs), 138 shares of the Caisse Lafarge, bonds of the national debt worth 721,760 francs, his stake in the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin* (worth 660,000 francs), nearly 100,000 francs in hard currency, his Montpellier trading house (yearly income about 600,000 francs), 109,000 francs worth of bills of exchange, and roughly a million francs worth of real estate.⁶⁷¹

Purchases of Biens Nationaux:

- Using a *prête-nom*, he acquires the domain of Maurin (district of Montpellier) for 151,500 *livres* on 30 Jan. 1791.
- A 113-hectare farm at Etrepilly near Meaux for 201,000 *livres* on 22 June 1791 (rented for 2,600 francs plus 27 kilolitres of wheat);
- Another farm of 112 hectares in the same location for 183,100 *livres* on 27 July 1791 (rented for 3,000 francs plus 27 kilolitres of wheat);
- In association with Jean Allut from Montpellier (uncle-by-marriage of Martin d'André, future Censor of the *Banque de France*) and his cousin Jean-Étienne, he purchases the domains of Espeyran and Blanquet, former dependencies of the Abbaye de Saint-Gilles-du-Gard, for 673,000 *livres* on 18 Dec. 1791 (using the name 'Jalaguiet' on the deed of sale). Both these properties were later sold to Martin d'André on 26 vendémiaire IV/18 Oct. 1795;
- The farm of the *maison de Saint-Louis* at Gomberville (near Versailles) for 120,000 *livres* (26 April 1795);
- Acquires 1 *sol* 10 *deniers* in the capital of the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin* for 250,000 francs (10 July 1795 – see the entry of Claude Périer for details of this sale). By the time of his death, his share in the company was yielding an annual dividend of 82,500 francs;
- The farm of Cressely at Magny-Lessart in the Vallée de la Chevreuse for 43,000 francs (1 March 1804);
- The farm of Rhodon at Saint-Rémy-les-Chevreuses for 70,000 francs (10 Aug. 1804);
- Several buildings in the Rue de Vaugirard formerly belonging to the *Couvent des Carmes* for 136,500 francs (22 Aug. 1807);
- The usufruct of a house in Auteuil, Rue Boileau, with ownership (*nue-propriété*) devolving to his mistress upon his death (8 April 1807).⁶⁷²

⁶⁷¹ MC/ET/XLVIII/551, 7 March 1809, *Transaction settlement between the heirs of Guillaume Sabatier* – Pierre-Nicolas Berryer was the notary who oversaw the succession.

⁶⁷² For more on Sabatier's business activities see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.366-377.

Saint-André, Louis Alexandre CCC

Resided in the Rue Ménars.

Saliceti, Antoine Christophe (26 Aug. 1757 – 23 Dec. 1809) ● AI

Born at Saliceto near Bastia. Saliceti came from a Ghibelline family with roots in Piacenza which had fled to Corsica in the sixteenth century. Like the Bonapartes, he had studied in Pisa where he trained to become a lawyer. Designated a Corsican deputy to the Estates-General on 3 June 1789, he served as *procureur général syndic* of Corsica in 1791 before being elected a deputy to the National Convention on 17 Sep. 1792. Saliceti was the only Corsican representative to become a *montagnard* and vote for the death of Louis XVI. Adjutant-general Landrieux described him as “*one of the most astute men Corsica ever produced.*”⁶⁷³

Saliceti first met Bonaparte in March 1792 at Ajaccio.⁶⁷⁴ He supported the 1793 French expedition to Sardinia in which Napoleon participated.⁶⁷⁵ Their paths crossed again a few months later at the Siege of Toulon. Saliceti was due to embark with a contingent of 4,000 soldiers for Corsica to help coastal towns loyal to France; but the expedition was abandoned when the Royalist uprising in Toulon broke out. Both Napoleon and Saliceti formed links with Paul Barras who became their political protector. Saliceti probably sought Barras’s protection because a few months earlier on 15 May 1793 he had been indicted on corruption charges by his enemies in the Corsican assembly who accused him of purchasing the estate of Aleria at three-quarters less than its market price after imprisoning all other prospective buyers.⁶⁷⁶ It was Saliceti who recommended François Cacault to Barras.⁶⁷⁷ It was also on Saliceti’s order that Bonaparte’s *Souper de Beaucaire* was published;⁶⁷⁸ and through his influence that Bonaparte was appointed artillery general after General Dommartin was injured in the attack at Ollioules.⁶⁷⁹ Relations between the two were momentarily breached when Saliceti signed Bonaparte’s arrest warrant on 6 Aug. 1794 following Robespierre’s downfall, but they soon reconciled thanks notably to the intercession of Madame Permon – mother of the future Duchesse d’Abrantès – who was a mutual friend.⁶⁸⁰ Their association developed into a veritable political alliance during the

⁶⁷³ Jean Landrieux, *Mémoires de l’Adjudant-Général Jean Landrieux*, Tome I, Paris: Albert Savine, 1893, p.37.

⁶⁷⁴ For a detailed review of their relations see Émile Francheschini, ‘Saliceti et Napoléon’, *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, Tome XXXI, juillet-décembre 1930: 131-155.

⁶⁷⁵ See Arthur Chuquet, *La jeunesse de Napoléon*, Tome III, Paris: Armand Colin, 1899, p.23.

⁶⁷⁶ AN, AD/XVIII, A 62 – *Response of Saliceti to accusations contained in the letter of 15 May published by members of the Conseil général du département de Corse*. Saliceti had bought Aleria for 70,000 livres but offered to sell it at a personal loss of 1,000 écus to the first buyer who presented himself. He was also reproached with having declared Corsica to be a counter-revolutionary bastion. All charges against him were eventually dismissed.

⁶⁷⁷ AAE, Rome, 919, *Cacault to the Minister of Foreign Relations*, 27 floréal IV/16 May 1796.

⁶⁷⁸ Frédéric Mason, *Napoléon et sa famille*, Tome I, Paris: Société d’Éditions Littéraires et Artistiques, 1906, p.76.

⁶⁷⁹ “*The injured Dommartin had left us without an artillery chief. We called upon General Bonaparte, a trained captain who was on his way to the Armée d’Italie, and ordered him to replace Dammartin*” (AN, AF/II/281, dossier 2346:26-27). See also Chuquet, *La jeunesse de Napoléon*, Tome III, p.171-172.

⁶⁸⁰ Theories abound as to why Saliceti suddenly turned against Bonaparte. No doubt Saliceti needed to protect himself against accusations of complicity with the *jacobins* after 9 Thermidor. There were also rumours of a rivalry involving a woman. Moreover, Corsican politics may well have been in play, given that Bonaparte was in contact with Buonarotti and Saliceti had written a letter to Barras in which he reproached Bonaparte for his friendship with the Robespierriest Ricord (this letter written in Italian and dated 19 thermidor II/6 Aug. 1794 is in the Brouwet Collection and was published in Jean Bouguignon, *Napoléon*

months leading up to the 1795 Insurrection of Prairial. Bonaparte was then living in the Rue du Mail near the Place des Victoires and regularly “*had deeply animated conversations with (Saliceti)*” who “*once gave Bonaparte three thousand francs to make up for the carriage he had been forced to sell to meet his needs.*”⁶⁸¹ Their shadowy meetings continued until 24 May 1795 when Saliceti was proscribed by the Thermidorian Convention and forced to flee with the Permons – first to Bordeaux and then to Sète and Genoa – only returning to Toulon after the 13 Vendémiaire and the amnesty exonerating the *montagnards*.⁶⁸²

By early 1796, Saliceti was eager to return to politics and had set his sights on the position of civilian commissioner at the *Armée d’Italie*. The man initially touted for the job – Louis-Marie Stanislas Fréron – had fallen out of favour with the Directory. Thanks to an astute political intrigue, Saliceti outmanoeuvred him and was named civilian commissioner on 30 January.⁶⁸³ General Masséna asserts that Napoleon had a hand in securing Saliceti’s nomination.⁶⁸⁴ This certainly appeared obvious after Bonaparte’s own appointment, even though Saliceti took office a month before the general’s arrival. Since both Corsicans were reputed *jacobins*, the Directory delegated Pierre-Ansèlme Garrau – a friend of Carnot – as Saliceti’s colleague to counter any objections.⁶⁸⁵

Following the French seizure of Livorno in June 1796, Saliceti and Garrau wrote to the Directory encouraging it to send a force to reconquer Corsica from the British.⁶⁸⁶ Over 3,000 Corsican refugees had flocked to Livorno and the French planned to recruit them to form the main body of their troops. Bonaparte was instructed to encourage them to

Bonaparte, Tome I, Paris: Les Éditions Nationales, 1936, p.75). The most likely explanation is that Saliceti didn’t want to appear as the only one opposed to Bonaparte’s incarceration and decided to sign his arrest warrant and fight against it later. Indeed, Bonaparte was freed on 28 fructidor II/14 Sep. 1794 and tasked by Saliceti with preparing an expedition against the British in Corsica. The mission was called off and Bonaparte was dispatched instead as an artillery general to the *Armée de l’Ouest* (Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.240-241). Madame Permon had a son who served as Saliceti’s secretary at this time. Through his intermediary, she helped reconcile the two Corsicans, although it seems they never really were at daggers drawn (D’Abrantès, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.263). See Georges Manguin, ‘Salicetti et l’arrestation de Bonaparte à Nice’, *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, Tome XXXIX, juillet-décembre 1934: 261-264.

⁶⁸¹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.47 – Bourrienne adds that Bonaparte must have been linked to political factions through Saliceti because he eagerly awaited his arrival each day.

⁶⁸² Arnault, *Mémoires d’un sexagénaire*, Tome II, p.228 – Madame Permon hid Saliceti in Paris after the Prairial insurrection (D’Abrantès, *Mémoires*, Tome I, p.303). Bonaparte knew the location of his hideout but kept it secret (*Ibid*, Tome I, p.320 & 350). He wrote to Madame Permon: “*I have never wanted to be taken for a dupe; but I would be in your eyes if I did not tell you that I know, since more than twenty days, that you are hiding Saliceti...Saliceti, you see, I could have paid you back the injustice you did me and – in so doing – taken my vengeance, whereas you hurt me when I hadn’t even offended you. Who comes out the better in all this – you or I? Yes, I could have avenged myself, but I didn’t do it*” (NBCG-1, n°303, *Bonaparte to Madame Permon*, 30 prairial III/18 June 1795). The Duchesse d’Abrantès also recalls (*Mémoires*, Tome I, p.361) that Saliceti briefly courted her in Bordeaux during their flight.

⁶⁸³ AN, AF/III/343, dossier 1542 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome I, p.509. See also Maréchal Victor, *Mémoires*, Tome I, Paris: Dumaine, 1847, p.371 & Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.47-48 – Saliceti had met Fréron in Toulon who had been missioned as the Directory’s commissioner to purge royalists from the municipal administrations of Marseille. Fréron told Saliceti of his desire to become civilian commissioner at the *Armée d’Italie*, and Saliceti decided to apply for the job himself (Arnault, *Souvenirs d’un sexagénaire*, Tome I, p.231). On 24 Jan. 1796 the French finance minister, Guillaume-Charles Faipoult, issued a report complaining that civilian commissioners were withdrawing *mandats territoriaux* from public coffers using irregular procedures (AN, AF/III/343, dossier 1533 – *Report of Faipoult to the Directory*, 4 pluviôse IV/24 Jan. 1796). This was clearly directed against Fréron as an opening move to justify his recall (Sciout, *Le Directoire*, Tome I, p.458 & Mathiez, *Le Directoire*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1934, p.79-80).

⁶⁸⁴ Masséna, *Mémoires*, Tome II, Paris: Paulin et Lechevalier, 1848, p.11.

⁶⁸⁵ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.244.

⁶⁸⁶ AG, B3/25, Livourne, *Saliceti and Garrau to the Directory*, 12 messidor IV/30 June 1796.

enlist.⁶⁸⁷ Saliceti was appointed to lead the expedition on 17 July, and on 29 July he designated the three generals who were to lead it (Gentili, Cervoni and Casalta – all Corsicans). The advance troops landed on 11 September. Saliceti was poised to join them but upon learning the British fleet threatened Genoese territory he decided to delay his departure. In November 1796, he finally left for Corsica; but only three days after his arrival, the Directory replaced him with Miot de Mérito at the suggestion of Barras.⁶⁸⁸ According to Miot, Saliceti had begun acting in an extremely partisan manner immediately following his arrival and had indulged in a number of personal vendettas which undermined the Directory's wish to restore order (it had wanted to proclaim an amnesty for all Corsicans who had revolted against France).⁶⁸⁹

In January 1797, the Directory informed Saliceti of its decision to suppress the office of civilian commissioner.⁶⁹⁰ He did not return to France but stayed in Italy where he played an active role in the Genoese Revolution of April-May 1797. He was elected a deputy of the Corsican *département* of Golo to the *Cinq-Cents* in the elections of Year V, along with Aréna, and actively supported the coup of 18 Fructidor against the royalist deputies. He was a close friend of La Revellière and may even have participated in the planning of the coup. However, he refused to be a member of the commission which examined the terms of the Treaty of Campo-Formio because he objected to the manner in which Venice had been treated. Saliceti continued to keep close relations with Italian patriots and with French generals in Italy. When the Directory re-established civilian commissioners, there was talk of nominating him to the *Armée d'Italie*, but he was side-stepped. Nonetheless in January 1798, he left Genoa for Tuscany where he was in contact with General Joubert. The Directory began to suspect him of working for the generals' faction. In February 1798, he was in Rome but took no part in the confrontation between Championnet and Faipoult. Having returned to Paris in May 1799, Saliceti was one of the leaders of the *Club du Manège* and was hostile to Bonaparte's coup of 18 Brumaire. Collot recalled that when Saliceti received erroneous news the *jacobins* had been victorious, he hastened to Saint-Cloud only to discover Bonaparte's party had been successful. Attempting to ingratiate himself with the general's supporters, he was only admitted in their ranks thanks to the intercession of Joseph Bonaparte.⁶⁹¹

Under the Consulate, Saliceti's enemies attempted to implicate him in Aréna's plot to stab Bonaparte, but the First Consul remembered his past services in Italy and sent him on several missions to Corsica and Italy. In Year X, he served as ambassador to Lucca and then was posted to Genoa. In 1806, he followed Joseph Bonaparte to Naples and became his minister of police and later of war. He was well received by the Neapolitan nobility and married a daughter of the Duke of Lovello. Under Murat, Saliceti quit his functions and was replaced by the Genoese Maghella, whom he had introduced into the Neapolitan administration. After a brief stay in Paris, he returned to Italy where he continued his work with Italian patriots. He died suddenly on 23 December 1809. Murat's absence from Paris at this time, along with the tensions of the Anglo-Sicilian expedition and discontent linked to requisitions, made his death appear suspect, and Maghella was accused by many of

⁶⁸⁷ AN, AF/III/388, dossier 2014, *The Directory to Bonaparte*, 29 messidor IV/17 July 1796 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome III, p.123.

⁶⁸⁸ Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.241.

⁶⁸⁹ Miot, *Souvenirs*, Tome I, p.132 & 139.

⁶⁹⁰ AN, AF/III/426, dossier 2409, *The Directory to Saliceti*, 18 nivôse V/7 Jan. 1797 & Debidour, *RADE*, Tome IV, p.630.

⁶⁹¹ Bourrienne, *Mémoires*, Tome II, p.331.

having poisoned him. But the autopsy of Saliceti's body revealed nothing unusual and the doctors concluded to a natural death.⁶⁹²

Savalette de Langes, Charles-Pierre-Paul ● **(21 Sep. 1745 – 11 Dec. 1797)**

Died in Paris. Son of Charles-Pierre Savalette de Magnanville (1713-1797), intendant at Tours, director of the *Caisse d'escompte* and *garde du Trésor royal* (1756-1789), and of his wife Marie-Émilie Joly de Choin.

The Savalette de Langes family had been closely associated with royal finances since the time of Louis XIV. Charles-Pierre-Paul's paternal grandfather, Charles (1683-1756), had been a director of the *Compagnie des Indes* and was appointed a *fermier général* in 1718. His maternal grandfather, the marquis de Choin, was the nephew of the mistress of the Grand Dauphin; while his maternal grandmother was the daughter of Poullétier, the intendant of Lyon.

Savalette de Langes married Geneviève-Louise Hatry (1767-1832) with whom he had several children including Augustin (1790-1865), future *conseiller maître à la Cour des comptes* (1818-1865). In 1756, he inherited the paternal charge of *garde du Trésor royal*. He served both Louis XV and Louis XVI, and in 1788 became an administrator of the Royal Treasury in charge of the national debt, working closely with the powerful financier Jean-Joseph de Laborde de Méréville (who oversaw the Royal Treasury's expenses and accounting).

Savalette also grew close to the faction of the duc d'Orléans and the *Club de Valois*. He was a mentor to a generation of civil servants who later staffed the Napoleonic regime's financial administrations. Having embraced the ideas of the Revolution at its outset, Savalette was appointed commissioner to the National Treasury in 1791 by Louis XVI. He was briefly arrested and imprisoned for a few days in September 1793, but immediately released on the express request of Ramel de Nogaret.⁶⁹³

Savalette died only eleven months after his father, in December 1797, just as the legal battle between the National Treasury and the finance ministry (sparked by the *Compagnie de Dijon* scandal and 18 Fructidor coup) was unravelling. A few historians have suggested his death may have been politically motivated, but there is no evidence to substantiate this. He was a leading freemason who established the *loge des Amis réunis* (which numbered many barons of high finance among its members). His interest in martinism led him to initiate the *Philalèthe* rite in the *Amis réunis* lodge. Savalette also served as an officer of the *Grand Orient de France* for many years. Most works examining freemasonry in 18th century France reference him.

Career:

- *Conseiller au parlement de Paris* (1766-1771);
- Finds the 'Amis indissolubles' freemason lodge at Lille (15 May 1766);
- Travels to England and Holland after the dissolution of the *parlements* by Maupeou in 1771;
- Finds the 'Amis réunis' freemason lodge (1773);

⁶⁹² For more on Saliceti's later career see Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.569-571.

⁶⁹³ See Bruguière, *GPR*, p.36-38, 69 & 98.

- Seconds his father in his charge as *garde du Trésor royal* (1774-1785);
- Promoted *garde du Trésor royal*, his father now serving as his assistant (1785-1788);
- *Administrateur du Trésor* (1788-1791);
- Commissioner of the *Trésorerie nationale* (from the creation of the *Trésorerie* in 1791 to his death in 1797, without interruption).⁶⁹⁴

Sévène, Jean-Auguste (1760 – c.1840) CCC ●

Born in Marvejols (Lozère). Son of Raymond Sévène (1748-1807), lawyer and consul-mayor of Marvejols, lord of Limouze, Mazet and other localities near Marvejols, deputy of the Lozère at the Legislative Assembly and *receveur particulier* under the Directory, and of his wife Marie Delon (1735-1783).

The presence of the Sévène family in the Languedoc can be traced back to the fifteenth century. One of its members, Raymond Sévène, converted to Protestantism and was mayor of Marvejols when the town was besieged by the forces of the Catholic League led by Admiral Anne de Joyeuse in 1586. Raymond distinguished himself in the siege and received various rewards from Henry IV, which were confirmed by Louis XIII. Other branches of the family were based in the area of Toulouse and Brittany.

Jean-Auguste Sévène was already settled in Paris as a merchant trader by 1790. In Year V (1796-1797), he established the trading house ‘*Sévène frères*’ with his three brothers (Louis, Pierre and Jacques-Édouard). This bank specialized in the business of commissions and financed the production of velvet in their manufacture of Rouen. Bonaparte visited this factory in 1802: an event commemorated in a well-known painting by Jean-Baptiste Isabey (now in the *Musée du Château de Versailles*). Jean-Auguste was a founding Regent of the *Banque de France* (13th seat), but because his bank was closely connected to the affairs of Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe, it suffered significant losses due to the bankruptcy of the *Négociants Réunis* in 1805-1806. The Sévène bank placed itself in liquidation, and Jean-Auguste resigned from the *Banque de France*’s Regency Council, “*having renounced his affairs to enjoy the liberty one finds in the countryside.*”⁶⁹⁵ In fact, it appears that the speculations of Sévène had somehow incurred Napoleon’s displeasure. He remained in his country exile for the following thirty-four years.

Marriage:

On 9 March 1790, Jean-Auguste Sévène married Angélique-Françoise Bénard (c.1774-c.1830), daughter of Pierre-Joseph-Marie Bénard, a merchant trader of Paris, and of his first wife Françoise Arthaud. They had no children.

The Riants & Poupart de Neuflyzes (his cousins):

The paternal and maternal branches of the family of Sévène’s wife numbered several important merchants based in Paris (paternal side) and Lyon (maternal side), especially the Riant family. Joséphine-Claudine Bénard, the paternal aunt of Mrs. Sévène, had married Jean-Marie Riant, a trader from Lyon, at the outset of the Revolution. Their sons were therefore the cousins and business partners of Sévène and included:

⁶⁹⁴ For more on Savalette de Langes see AN, 177 AP (dossier 1); P/2505; C/516; F/7/4386/3; F/4*/70; AF/II/21A (dossier 155) and Bruguière, *GPR*, p.286-287.

⁶⁹⁵ See his letter of resignation in the Archives of the Banque de France, dated 9 Sep. 1806.

- Louis-Thomas Riant;
- Didier-Nicolas Riant, notary in Paris from 1816 to 1833;
- Joseph-Ferdinand Riant and Jean-Louis Riant, both iron merchants and associates of Louis-Victor Moreau (1757-1816), appointed Regent of the *Banque de France* in 1804. They purchased Moreau's real-estate assets and trading house following his death. These two nephews were also Parisian real-estate speculators and *cessionnaires des mines de Fins*.

Sévène owned the Château of Juvisy (Essonne) where, according to the historian Théodule Pinard, “*Mr. Riant his cousin spent his first youth.*”⁶⁹⁶

One of Jean-Auguste's nieces, Marie-Louise-Henriette-Zélie Sévène (daughter of Pierre Sévène), married Jean-Abraham-André, 2nd baron Poupart de Neuflize (1784-1836), in 1809. Neuflize was a linen manufacturer based in Sedan (of which he was also mayor) whose factory employed 500 workers in 1810 and generated an annual revenue of a million and a half francs. He was a member of the *Conseil général des Fabriques et Manufactures* and was created a *Baron de l'Empire* (1810). He also founded a bank with his uncle Jean-Auguste in 1813.

Career:

- At the time of his marriage in 1790, Sévène was a partner in a business (probably commissions) located in the Rue de la Croix near the church of St-Nicolas-des-Champs in Paris. His associates were François Corgioli and Guillaume Borgnis. Sévène's share amounted to 30,000 *livres*. In 1793, their company was renewed under the legal name ‘*Corgioli, Borgnis et Sévène frères*’ with Corgioli, Borgnis, Jean-Auguste Sévène and his brother Louis as partners. The firm split its activities between France – where it operated using the name ‘*Sévène frères et Cie.*’ – and Italy, where it was called ‘*Corgioli et Borgnis*’. In May 1796, the partners dissolved the company. Jean-Auguste and Louis Sévène agreed to pay Corgioli and Borgnis 77,500 florins at the residence of Pierre and Jean-Balthazard Bourcard in Bâle, in three payments extending to March 1797;
- On 21 Sep. 1796, Jean-Auguste formed a new company with his three brothers called ‘*Sévène frères*’ whose object was to take part in “*all mercantile and banking ventures.*” The new bank's starting capital was 150,000 *livres* in hard currency, with each partner receiving an annual salary of 10,000 *livres*. The company split its activities between two fields. The first was its banking business initially located at 7 Rue d'Amboise in Paris and later in the rue Le Pelletier (moved in 1803), which was overseen by Louis, Pierre and Jean-Auguste. The second was its velvet manufacture at Rouen (the former royal manufacture of Saint-Sever originally established by John Holker) – comprised of a velvet manufacture located in the Faubourg Saint-Sever and a spinning mill (*filature*) at Saint-Martin-d'Oisel (modern Oissel, 8kms south of Rouen), both managed by the youngest brother Jacques-Édouard;⁶⁹⁷
- Jean-Auguste Sévène was the financial guarantor of the *Compagnie Mannier* which held the contract for the general supply of French military hospitals.⁶⁹⁸ The *Compagnie Mannier*'s partners were Pierre Colombel (former deputy of the Legislative Assembly and wealthy landowner of Pont-à-Mousson, Meurthe-et-Moselle), Jean-François Paré

⁶⁹⁶ Quoted in Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p. 381, footnote 17.

⁶⁹⁷ See Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.300.

⁶⁹⁸ MCN/ET/XLV/660, 13 prairial V/1 June 1797.

(ex-interior minister and landowner in the Ain *département*), Mayer Lazare of Strasbourg (who owned 500,000 francs of land in the Bas-Rhin and Moselle), Lombard (possibly a Marseille trader), Dagnese Giro (Parisian merchant) and Claude François Lejoyand (a former military hospital doctor). Sévène purchased 3,200,000 francs of supply orders from the company which he paid at three-quarters of their value in hard currency;⁶⁹⁹

- In Year VII, Sévène acted as the financial guarantor of *Podesta et Cie.* of Genoa on its contract to supply the fortresses of Corsica in siege equipment, mortgaging three Parisian houses and two farms in the Eure acquired from the American speculator Daniel Parker for 642,000 francs;⁷⁰⁰
- The Sévène brothers were partners with Louis Frainnau, a former contractor of the *Armée des Pyrénées occidentales et orientales*, in a venture for the general supply of the *Garde des Consuls*, *Maisons des Consuls* and the *Ière division militaire*.⁷⁰¹ Sévène resided in the Rue d'Amboise;
- 'Sévène frères' survived the death of Pierre Sévène in Year XI, but was eventually dissolved in Year XIII when Jacques-Édouard requested his independence.⁷⁰² The company continued to be administered by Louis and Jean-Auguste who managed the banking business in Paris and sold their shares in the manufactures of Rouen to Jacques-Édouard;
- Founding Regent of the *Banque de France* (13th seat) (1800);
- Member of the *Dix Négociants Réunis* (1800). Sévène's participation in Year X was fixed at 217,854 francs. He was closely linked to Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe in this venture;
- One of the 200 largest shareholders of the *Banque de France* in Year XII (1803-1804);
- 'Sévène frères' was badly affected by the bankruptcy of the *Négociants Réunis* in 1805-1806. Jean-Auguste was the financial guarantor of the banker Bastide for 255,000 francs, as well as for the trading house of his cousins, the Delons. He was also appointed an auditing commissioner in the bankruptcy of Médard Desprez. An audit of 'Sévène frères' in January 1806 revealed that the bank only had 696,245 francs left in its coffers, and it was forced to sell many of its assets. On 9 Sep. 1806, Jean-Auguste resigned from the Regency Council of the *Banque de France* and was replaced by Augustin-Charles-Alexandre Ollivier (1772-1831);
- On 1 April 1807 'Sévène frères' published a circulary announcing that its liquidation would be managed solely by Jean-Auguste. The former Regent declared he would henceforth restrict his affairs to operations linked to public funds (placements, acquisition of state *rentes*, etc.);
- Sold his Château of Juvisy in 1811;
- Established a bank with his nephew Pourpart de Neuflyze in 1813 which was still operating in 1822;⁷⁰³
- In 1815, Jean-Auguste met with renewed financial difficulties and was forced to relinquish the management of the liquidation of the remaining assets of 'Sévène frères' to his two surviving brothers. His affairs during the last twenty years of his life remain obscure.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁰ MC/ET/XLV/665, 7 vendémiaire VII/28 Sep. 1798.

⁷⁰¹ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.159.

⁷⁰² For Pierre Sévène's inventory after decease, see MC/ET/XVIII/988, 14 brumaire XI/5 Nov. 1802.

⁷⁰³ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.49, who bases himself on AP, D/31/U/3, 9/261.

Notarial Audit of 'Sévène frères' dated 25 February 1803:

According to this document, the audit of *Sévène frères*'s accounts revealed they contained 6,421,122 francs and that the bank was generating a profit of 407,103 francs.⁷⁰⁴ Among the assets it owned were:

Buildings (total of 361,000 francs):

- A house in Paris in the Rue Plumet known as the 'hôtel Montmorin' estimated at 250,000 francs;
- Another house in the Rue Neuve des Petits-Champs, known as the 'grand hôtel Nantouillet', along with an adjacent house in the Rue d'Antin, estimated at 200,000 francs;
- Two farms near Chartres estimated at 65,000 francs;
- All the buildings the Sévènes had jointly purchased with Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe, estimated at 265,609 francs (no further details available);
- A building at St-Bénézet (Gard) estimated at 63,000 francs;
- A house at Sète with warehouses estimated at 32,500 francs.

Businesses and Shares held in common:

- The velvet manufacture in Rouen, estimated at 754,037 francs;
- A hat manufacture ('*Établissement Florel et Cie.*') estimated at 72,800 francs;
- Metallic frame manufacture (*carcasses*) estimated at 13,200 francs;
- 35 shares of the *Banque de France* estimated at 38,500 francs;
- Shares of the *Caisse des Comptes Courants* estimated at 9,837 francs;
- Shares of the *Caisse d'escompte du Commerce* (10 regular shares [*actions mobilières*] and 10 mortgaged shares [*actions hypothécaires*]) estimated at 54,590 francs;
- Investment in the *Dix Négociants Réunis* estimated at 108,600 francs;
- 10,240 francs invested in the French navy in partnership with Gramont and Richard;
- 7,500 francs invested in the *Compagnie des Trois Ponts* in Paris;
- Investments in commercial ships estimated at 38,250 franc.

Other Assets:

- Public effects worth 1,659,450 francs, of which 1,599,000 francs worth of *rachat de rentes* yielding 3% interest;
- 162,300 francs in its *Caisse générale*, of which 35,500 francs in the *Banque de France*;
- Obligations and discounts (*traïtes et remises*) worth 754,890 francs;
- 2,088,800 francs of cash advances made to various clients (*débiteurs pour comptes courants*), including:
 - 122,800 francs to Delafontaine from Paris;
 - 320,000 francs to the five bankers of the *Trésor public*;
 - 1,200,000 francs to Fraineau of Paris.

Passive Funds:

- 592,592 francs in fund accounts (*comptes de fonds*) belonging to Louis and Jean-Auguste Sévène (of which 148,148 francs for Jean-Auguste);
- 988,190 francs in current accounts belonging to the four Sévène brothers (of which 150,000 francs for Jean-Auguste);

⁷⁰⁴ Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.383.

- 407,103 francs of profit (*bénéfices annuels*) – 102,000 francs for Jean-Auguste;
- Unpaid letters and bills of exchange worth 1,937,000 francs;
- Credit advances made on various current accounts (*créanciers par compte courant*) totaling 2,485,600 francs.⁷⁰⁵

Simons, Michel-Jean (1762 – 1833)

See Chapter 5.

Stratton, George

George Stratton was an intimate friend of George Leveson-Gower (1st Duke of Sutherland), former British ambassador in Paris, and the father of Alexander Stratton, British *chargé d'affaires* in Vienna and later ambassador in Turkey and Sweden. Both were probably British agents during the Revolution. In early 1793, George Stratton was denounced as a spy and relocated to Calais.⁷⁰⁶

Sullivan, Eleanore (a.k.a. Anna Eleanore Franchi) (12 June 1750 – 14 Sep. 1833)

The daughter of a tailor from Lucca. See Quentin Craufurd.

Talhouët, Louis-Céleste Frédéric (marquis de) (1761 – 1812) CCC

Known as the marquis de Talhouët-Bonhamour, he came from a prominent noble family of Brittany. Prior to the Revolution he served with the *régiment du Roi-Infanterie* and was promoted lieutenant in 1788. During the Napoleonic era, Talhouët was created a *comte de l'Empire* in 1809 and appointed *président du Collège électoral de la Sarthe*. On 12 June 1783 he married Elisabeth Baude de La Vieuville, future maid of honour to Empress Marie Louise, Napoleon's second wife. Their son, Auguste-Frédéric, a *maréchal de camp* in the *grenadiers à cheval* and a *pair de France*, married Augustine Roy – daughter of Antoine Roy – one of Ouvrard's main business associates who succeeded the Baron Louis as finance minister. Their daughter, Mathilde, married Le Couteulx's son (Barthélémy-Alphonse).

Talon, Antoine Omer (20 Jan. 1760 – 18 Aug. 1811)

Born in Paris, Antoine-Omer Talon was the son of Jean-Baptiste Talon, *payeur des rentes* at the *Hôtel de Ville*, and of Charlotte Radix. Talon's brother-in-law was Joseph-François-Xavier de Pestre, comte de Séneffe, an influential Belgian financier.⁷⁰⁷ When aged only 29, Talon was appointed *lieutenant civil* at the Châtelet courts before being elected suppliant deputy for the bailiwick of Chartres at the 1789 Estates-General. He successively served Breteuil, Necker, La Fayette and Mirabeau, manoeuvring between various factions with incredible skill in tandem with his inseparable friend, Charles-Louis Huguet de

⁷⁰⁵ For more on Sévène see Szramkiewicz, *RCBF*, p.378-387 and Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.49 & 300.

⁷⁰⁶ For more on Stratton see Blanc, *LERE*, p.68-69; *LCST*, p.109-110 and *Les hommes de Londres*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1989, p.30-36.

⁷⁰⁷ For more on the comte de Séneffe see Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.9-68.

Sémonville. Talon resigned his position as *lieutenant civil* when he was appointed director of the king's civil list and was floated as a future *garde des Sceaux*. Along with his uncle Radix de Sainte-Foix, he was at the heart of the royalist conspiracy to prevent the trial and deposition of the king (see Radix de Sainte-Foix's entry).

Compromised after the fall of the monarchy by documents discovered at the Tuileries, he obtained a passport signed by Danton, Clavière and Lebrun which enabled him to flee to London.⁷⁰⁸ Talon took 18,000 *louis d'or* with him from the coffers of Tourteau de Septeuil, the treasurer of the king's civil list, arranging for these funds to be conveyed to London six days after his arrival by Benoît d'Angers, his factotum.⁷⁰⁹ Talon was forced to leave Britain due to the Alien Bill in 1793 and travelled to Philadelphia. However, he was employed by the British government in St Domingo as an officious agent. His wife continued to receive his correspondence in London.⁷¹⁰ He eventually returned to France in November 1799 where Fouché decided he could be useful and gave him a post in the police. But he was arrested and questioned by police in 1803;⁷¹¹ and sent to the Ile Sainte Marguerite near Cannes. He was released in 1807 after being declared in a state of dementia.

Tellier, Charles Henri Pierre CCC

Tellier, the son of an employee at the National Treasury, was from Dunkerque. From 1799 to 1813 he was the associate of Charles Martin Doyen (*Doyen & Cie.*).⁷¹² See Doyen's entry for more details.

Ternaux, Guillaume-Louis (Ternaux frères) (1763 – 1833) CCC ☆

Guillaume-Louis Ternaux – known as *Ternaux l'ainé* – was a trader and manufacturer from Sedan who became one of Europe's leading textile merchants during the Napoleonic era. He perfected new manufacturing techniques which contributed to the introduction of European cachemire on the French market, in particular his famous "Ternaux shawls". His younger brother, Étienne Nicolas Louis (1765-1830) – known as '*Ternaux Rousseau*' (because he married Charlotte-Blanche Rousseau of the Rousseau military contracting family) – was a banker who served as a member of the *comité d'escompte* of the *Banque de France* under the *Premier Empire*. The Ternaux brothers inherited their father's modest textile manufacture in Sedan in 1782 aged only 18 and 16 respectively. At the outbreak of the Revolution, the Ternaux were close to La Fayette who had established his military headquarters at Sedan. Guillaume-Louis was even appointed to Sedan's *conseil municipal*. But after the *conseil* had two delegations of the National Convention arrested following the Storming of the Tuileries, Guillaume-Louis was forced to flee to Germany and then to Britain.

When Guillaume-Louis returned to France in 1798, he and his brother Étienne set up their new business headquarters at 3 Place des Victoires in Paris. They became pioneers in the mechanisation of French industry and leading actors of the Spanish wool trade. The

⁷⁰⁸ AN, W//77, plaquette 3:166.

⁷⁰⁹ See Blanc, *LCST*, p.16.

⁷¹⁰ See Elizabeth Sparrow, 'Secret Service under Pitt's Administrations, 1792-1806', *History*, 82 (270), 1998, p.291.

⁷¹¹ AN, F/7/6374, dossier 7634, *Interrogation of Antoine-Omer Talon*, 28 Sep. 1803.

⁷¹² Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.58.

Ternaux's Parisian headquarters presided over a commercial empire encompassing sixteen different trading counters including a pivotal one in Bayonne which oversaw the sale of all their draperies in Spain, their acquisitions of Spanish wool and even purchases of wool for other companies (notably *Chéreau frères*). The brothers also operated three textile manufactories in France at Sedan, Reims and Louviers (Eure). Napoleon visited the manufactory of Sedan on 7 August 1803 accompanied by his *aide-de-camp* Savary (whose family originated from that city), and paid a visit to the Louviers manufacture in June 1810 where he awarded Guillaume-Louis the *Légion d'honneur*.

Ternaux l'*ainé* purchased the Château of Saint-Ouen from Jacques Necker on October 4, 1802. His brother Étienne bought an *hôtel particulier* at Auteuil which is known today as the Chateaux-Ternaux. In 1814, the brothers rallied the Restoration and Guillaume-Louis joined Louis XVIII at Ghent. He was later elected a deputy of the Seine. The Ternaux were Protestants and members of the *Famille Unie* masonic lodge of Sedan.⁷¹³

Tiberghien, Pierre-François (1762 – 1826) CCC

The four Tiberghien brothers (Pierre-François, Charles, Pierre-Joseph and Emmanuel) were sons of a wool trader from Tourcoing. Pierre-François founded the *Banque Tiberghien* around 1794 which was initially based in Brussels before moving to the Rue Vivienne in Paris in 1804.⁷¹⁴ Pierre-François was married to an English woman named Margaret Whettnall.⁷¹⁵ He purchased numerous contractual obligations for military supplies from Jean-Pierre Collot's company – *Collot, Caillard et Cie.* – and Marie Charles Monglas, both of whom furnished the *Armée d'Italie*.⁷¹⁶ In Year VII, he acquired 157,000 francs of *biens nationaux* from the military contractor Jean-Baptiste Paulée, notably the Abbaye de Saint-Denis near Mons, where he established a cotton weaving factory managed by his brother Charles.⁷¹⁷ Pierre-Joseph and Emmanuel were in charge of another manufacture of *basins et piqués* at Heylissem (Hélécine in Belgium). In 1810, the brothers opened two more cotton weaving manufactures at Saint Quentin and Vilvorde (where they employed a thousand convicts as workers).

The Tiberghien also held important interests in industry. Pierre-François was one of the administrators of the *Fonderies de Romilly* (Romilly-sur-Andelle in the Eure) and had established an iron and copper forge next to his cotton manufacture at Saint-Denis. He also owned 13/34 of the capital of the coal mines of Mariemont whose shares were valued at 40,000 francs each, and which he acquired from the Warocqué family.⁷¹⁸ In 1811, economic difficulties forced the Tiberghien to petition their creditors for 400,000 francs.⁷¹⁹

⁷¹³ For more on the Ternaux, see Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, 'Un grand capitaine d'industrie au début du XIX^e siècle : Guillaume Ternaux (1763-1833)', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, Tome 28, 1981: 335-343 & Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.58 & 201-202.

⁷¹⁴ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.300.

⁷¹⁵ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.81.

⁷¹⁶ MC/ET/XLVIII/434, 5 & 12 pluviôse IX/25 Jan. & 2 Feb. 1801.

⁷¹⁷ MC/ET/XCIII/221, 25 vendémiaire VII/16 Oct. 1798 & Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.81.

⁷¹⁸ AN, F/12/2305 & 2405. See also Roger Darquenne, 'La foundation d'une dynastie de maîtres-charbonniers : les Warocqué', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, juillet-septembre 1970: 596-609.

⁷¹⁹ The summary of their assets which they had to furnish their creditors reveals their cotton manufactures alone were still worth over a million and a half francs (Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.300-301).

Tort de la Sonde, Barthélémy (2 Feb. 1738 – 18 July 1818)

Born in Peyriac-Minervois (Aude). Died in Brussels. The son of a tailor from Montauban, Tort was a student at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand where he befriended Valdec de Lessart and Dumouriez. In 1756, he inherited his father-in-law's liqueur and lemonade business.

In 1767, he travelled to Paris where he was employed by the duc de Guisne as his second secretary. Three years later (1770), he accompanied Guisne as his personal secretary during his residency as ambassador in London. But the following year, Guisne accused him of using his name to speculate recklessly on French public markets and Tort was narrowly disculpated by a special commission of royal counsellors (seven votes to six).⁷²⁰ Later in 1783, when the Marquis de Castries was elaborating plans to establish the *Nouvelle Compagnie des Indes Orientales et de la Chine* – which he originally envisaged as an extension of the British East India Company – Tort was dispatched to England by Castries and Calonne to negotiate with the banker James Bourdieu (a longstanding associate of Necker) so he could represent the company in London.⁷²¹ But Louis XVI's foreign minister – Vergennes – objected to the idea of depending on British commerce for diplomatic reasons and chose instead to turn to Charles Herries (younger brother of Scottish Jacobite banker Sir Robert Herries) whose trading house had strong links with Spanish financial circles and Édouard de Walckiers in Belgium.⁷²²

In 1790, Tort was employed as an agent in Belgium by Dumouriez and Huguet de Montaran (Marquis de Sémonville – Lafayette's agent) to support Jan Frans Vonck's democratic Vonckist party and coordinate agitation among émigrés and refugees from Liège who had crossed into France following Belgium's occupation by Austrian troops. Then in June 1791, he was sent back to Brussels to meet Metternich and orchestrate a reversal of policy by attempting a *rapprochement* between Paris and Vienna!

Tort was then recommended to General Dumouriez by Collot d'Herbois and became one of his agents. He was also probably the lover of Madame de Beauvert – Antoine de Rivarol's sister – who became Dumouriez's mistress.⁷²³ When Danton and Delacroix were sent on mission to Belgium, they gave Tort the authority to negotiate the supply contract for Dumouriez's *Armée du Nord*, and on 4 Nov. 1792 he signed a lucrative agreement with Michel and Henry Simons (see Chapter 5).




During the Terror, Tort was imprisoned at the *Conciergerie* but eventually released after 9 Thermidor. He then based himself in Brussels where he again attempted to become an intermediary in contracting for the *Armée du Nord* and the Parisian wheat supply. In 1795 and 1796, he worked for the *Compagnie Walckiers* and submitted a memoir against *Paulée & Cie.* (see Paulée's entry), but this was unsuccessful. Returning to Paris in 1799, he filed charges against Michel and Henry Simons in an attempt to recoup some of the proceeds from their 1792 and managed to extract some payments after a prolonged legal battle.

⁷²⁰ Both Guisne and Tort published memoirs in their defence (see BN, 4° Fm 14802 & AAE, Angleterre, vol. 535, 1781).

⁷²¹ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.415-417 & Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.187 & 209. See Bourdieu's entry.

⁷²² Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome III, p.626.

⁷²³ Stern, *LMML*, p.12-14.

Turreau (de Linières), Louis-Marie AI   
(4 July 1756 – 10 Dec. 1816)

Also known as ‘Turreau de Garambouville’. Turreau was the son of Charles-Louis Turreau de Linières, lord of Garambouville and mayor of Evreux. He is well-known as the general who led the infamous ‘*colonnes infernales*’ in the *Vendée*. Turreau was appointed civilian commissioner to the *Armée d’Italie* on 21 Sep. 1794. He had just recently married Marie-Angèle Lequesne on 1 Feb. 1796 when Napoleon was appointed commander-in-chief. Bonaparte courted Madame Turreau’s favour following his arrival at army headquarters but described her husband as “*quite an insignificant representative of the army of Nice.*”⁷²⁴ Turreau left to oversee a military warehouse shortly afterwards.⁷²⁵ Under the Consulate, he had a brief spell serving under Masséna at the *Armée d’Italie* and commanding the *Armée du Danube*, but spent most of his Napoleonic career as French ambassador to the United States.⁷²⁶ He rallied the Bourbon Restoration in 1814.

- *Chef de bataillon de la garde nationale* (16 Sep. 1792);
- *Général de brigade* (30 July 1793);
- *Général de division* (18 Sep. 1793);
- *Ministre plénipotentiaire aux États-Unis* (1803-1811);
- *Grand officier de la Légion d’honneur* (18 June 1804);
- *Baron de l’Empire* (13 March 1812);
- *Croix de Saint-Louis* (1816, awarded posthumously).⁷²⁷

Vanlerberghe, Ignace-Joseph (1758 – 27 Sep. 1819)

Son of Ignace Vanlerberghe (1733-1759), a surgeon and trader from Lille who had settled in Douai, and of Rosalie Joseph Deparis. The roots of the Vanlerberghe family are uncertain, although the name suggests Dutch origins.

Marriage & Children:

On 5 Feb. 1789, Vanlerberghe married Barbe-Rosalie Lemaire (c.1765-1822) at Douai.⁷²⁸

They had three daughters and a son:

- Barbe-Rosalie-Joséphine (1790-1879), married General Jean Rapp on 7 germinal XIII/28 March 1805. Her dowry consisted of two manors near Cambrai worth 450,000 francs which had been acquired as *biens nationaux*.⁷²⁹ The couple divorced on 1 July 1811;
- Sophie-Angélique (c.1792-1864), married Paulée’s eldest son (also Jean-Baptiste Paulée) in 1815, bringing a dowry of 450,000 francs. In 1834, she was remarried to General Jean-François Jacqueminot – Marshal Oudinot’s former *aide-de-camp* – famed for his bravery on the battlefield;⁷³⁰
- Églé-Eugénie (c.1795-1875), married Étienne-Émile Cornudet des Chaumettes in 1821;

⁷²⁴ Las Cases, *MSH*, Tome I, p.140.

⁷²⁵ Godechot, *LCAD*, Tome I, p.163.

⁷²⁶ Tulard (ed.), *Dictionnaire Napoléon*, p.883.

⁷²⁷ Révérend, *APE*, Tome IV, p.335.

⁷²⁸ MC/ET/LV/189, 25 frimaire VIII/16 Dec. 1799, *Renunciation of Barbe-Rosalie Lemaire, divorced wife of Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe, to the joint ownership of assets established between them.*

⁷²⁹ MC/ET/XVIII/1050, 7 Aug. 1811, *Transaction between General Rapp and Vanlerberghe.*

⁷³⁰ Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.58.

- Aimé-Eugénie (?-1866), resided for many years at the Château Lafite in the Médoc (later purchased by James de Rothschild in 1868).⁷³¹

Residences:

After leaving Douai, Vanlerberghe was domiciled at 185 Rue du Faubourg du Roule in Paris. On 12 vendémiaire V/3 Oct. 1796, he purchased the *Folie Beaujon*, former estate of the banker Nicolas Beaujon, for 110,000 *livres* in hard currency at 1790 rates from two traders named Pierre-Vincent Piau and Antoine Conseil.⁷³² The sale was made in his wife's name. The Vanlerberghes gave many splendid receptions and dancing balls at the *Folie Beaujon* during the directorial era. Madame Vanlerberghe enlarged the estate by acquiring six adjacent properties and hired the architect Coffinet to build extensions and the designers Jean-Charles Krafft and Charles Nicolas Ransonnette to decorate them.⁷³³ Ignace-Joseph resided there until his death in 1819.

Career:

Vanlerberghe had been involved in supplying wheat to Paris since the time of Louis XVI. Following the poor harvest of 1788, he imported 250,000 quintals of wheat in 125 ships from Holland and Britain which were stored in warehouses at Dunkerque and Lille. This grain was used to supply Paris and feed French armies in 1789 and 1790.⁷³⁴ His trading house was located in the Rue Mirabeau at Douai.⁷³⁵

On the morning of 27 July 1789, a crowd of people gathered in Douai and accused Vanlerberghe of hoarding all the rye and wheat supply in the city. He was apprehended by the National Guard and detained in the town hall. A letter from Mr. Bruneau de Beaumetz, general procurator at the *Parlement de Flandre*, recommended the city aldermen “*not to release Mr. Vanlerberghe until the odious appropriations he stands accused of have been carefully examined and judged, by both the city authorities and the parlement. Consequently, this individual should remain in your prisons or that of the court until further notice.*” The following day, Vanlerberghe wrote to Mr. d’Haubersart, the subdelegate magistrate at Douai, imploring him to hear witnesses testify in his favour, asserting that: “*I am as innocent as you of the crimes imputed me.*” Following a court hearing on 1 August in which evidence from 21 witnesses was heard, the aldermen “*cleared Vanlerberghe of the charge laid against him and ordered his release from prison.*”⁷³⁶

The early Revolution was a prosperous period for Vanlerberghe. When the banker Doucet de Surigny went bust in September 1790, his bankruptcy statement revealed Vanlerberghe owned 85% of his 900,000 *livres* debt.⁷³⁷ He was also employed as a military supplier and made certain payments in Holland on behalf of the *Armée d’Allemagne* (see below). In

⁷³¹ See also Michel Bruguière, ‘L’aristocratie descendante des affaires de la Révolution’ in *Les noblesses européennes au XIX^e siècle. Actes du colloque de Rome, 21-23 novembre 1985*. Rome: École Française de Rome, 1988, p.111.

⁷³² MC/ET/LV/167, 12 vendémiaire V/3 Oct. 1796, *Real estate sale by Citizens Piau and Conseil to Barbe-Rosalie Lemaire, wife of Vanlerberghe*.

⁷³³ See René Dupuis, ‘La chartreuse et le quartier Beaujon’, *Bulletin de la société de l’histoire de Paris et de l’Île-de-France*, Vol. 62, 1935, p.108-109.

⁷³⁴ AN, F/7/5440/8 (dossier Vanlerberghe), *Letter of Citizen Lefebvre (factotum of Vanlerberghe – his father-in-law) to the comité de législation*, undated.

⁷³⁵ Dupuis, ‘La chartreuse et le quartier Beaujon’, p.106.

⁷³⁶ Louis Dechristé, *Préludes de la Révolution à Douai*, Douai: Imprimerie de Louis Dechristé, 1884, p.53.

⁷³⁷ AP, 4 B6, 110/7883, 27 Sep. 1790.

1792, Vanlerberghe was put in charge of Douai's grain supply by the *administration des subsistances* and reportedly accumulated more grain in the city's granaries than in any other locality within the space of six weeks. He advanced 400,000 *livres* to the government to cover the supplies of an entire army division during the retreat of French forces on the northern front at the end of the year; and imported large quantities of *eau-de-vie* into Douai during the spring and summer of 1793. Having then been designated to take charge of Douai's meat supply, he did not even receive a quarter of the necessary funds for this service from the *administration des vivres-viandes* and was forced to withdraw his personal funds from Amsterdam and London to purchase a herd of 410 cattle. He also supplied meat to the *Armée du Nord*.⁷³⁸

While in the process of assembling another herd of 1,500-2,000 cattle, Vanlerberghe was denounced for hoarding supplies and forced to flee Douai precipitously on 30 Sep. 1793 after the deputy Joseph Le Bon, the *Comité de Sûreté générale*'s representative tasked with hunting down corrupt contractors, dispatched agents to arrest him. He sought refuge in a farm owned by a friend near the imperial border where a detachment of Austrian soldiers apprehended him and sent him to Valenciennes and from there on to Belgium.⁷³⁹

Vanlerberghe was eventually released and returned to France on 27 ventôse II/17 March 1794 after convincing the Austrians he was a labourer in an oil manufacture.⁷⁴⁰ However, due to his having left the country, he had already been placed on the émigré register by French authorities and his dossier communicated to the Revolutionary Tribunal in pluviôse Year II. Thankfully for Vanlerberghe, his case had not yet been examined on 9 Thermidor.⁷⁴¹ Whether this was due to pure luck or thanks to connections which he brought to bear is unclear. What is all the more striking is that this did not prevent him from purchasing the Château of Neuilly with another trader named Marc-Antoine Delannoy on 19 floréal II/8 May 1794 from Madame de Montesson who was herself in prison. The château was sold to Murat in 1804.⁷⁴² Vanlerberghe petitioned to have his name removed from the émigré list but was only initially issued with a *certificat de notoriété* by the district authorities in Douai on 29 ventôse III/19 March 1795.⁷⁴³

Vanlerberghe returned to prominence during the Thermidorian Convention and early directorial period. He formed a lucrative business partnership with Jean-Baptiste Paulée, another contractor from Douai, whose trading house – *Paulée et Cie.* – was awarded a major contract to supply Paris with grain on 12 August 1795 (see Paulée's entry). Vanlerberghe was sent to Amsterdam as the company's agent to coordinate grain purchases from the Baltic and Low Countries and organise shipments. His father-in-law, a certain Mr. Lefebvre, was *inspecteur général de l'approvisionnement* at the state warehouse of Lille, which greatly facilitated the reception of grain shipments in that city's river port.

A police note dated 19 messidor V/7 July 1797 states that Vanlerberghe had been arrested that morning – presumably due to his name being on the émigré register – and that he produced a letter of recommendation signed by the former police minister Sottin. The note

⁷³⁸ AN, F/7/5440/8 (dossier Vanlerberghe), *Letter of Citizen Lefebvre (factotum of Vanlerberghe – his father-in-law) to the comité de législation*, undated.

⁷³⁹ AN, F/7/5440/8 (dossier Vanlerberghe), *Police report n°4520 by Lambert of the 3rd Division*, undated.

⁷⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴¹ Dupuis, 'La chartreuse et le quartier Beaujon', p.107.

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*

⁷⁴³ AN, F/7/5440/8 (dossier Vanlerberghe), *Police report n°4520 by Lambert of the 3rd Division*, undated.

states Vanlerberghe never attended the meetings of his Parisian section.⁷⁴⁴ The syndicate of contractors of the *Armées du Nord et de l'Est* petitioned the Directory to have him struck off from the émigré register, claiming that:

*“Citizen Vanlerberghe is indispensable to the accounting of our service whose financial operations he has always followed. He also oversaw payments in Holland for supplies of the Armée d’Allemagne...and contracted the loans we took out on Batavian payment orders. His presence in Paris is indispensable to forward this money to the government.”*⁷⁴⁵

On 4 fructidor V/21 Aug. 1797, he was issued with a safe conduit by the war ministry valid for three months to travel both in France and the ‘occupied territories’ to fulfil his duties as military contractor. This was renewed on 30 ventôse VI/20 March 1798.⁷⁴⁶ He was only definitively removed from the émigré register on 18 vendémiaire VII/9 Oct. 1798.⁷⁴⁷

In Year VI, Vanlerberghe and his associate Marc-Antoine Delannoy secured supply contracts to furnish the cities of Strasbourg, Landau, Huningue, Neuf-Brisach, Maastricht and Düsseldorf with grain and meat.⁷⁴⁸ Vanlerberghe also became a partner in Jacques Antoine Rochefort’s *Compagnie Rochefort* in Year VII;⁷⁴⁹ and was an associate of Jean-Conrad Hottinguer’s bank (*Hottinguer & Cie.*) from early 1798 to 1804. In October 1799, he divorced his wife who consented to legally renounce the joint ownership of their goods which had been established by their marriage contract.⁷⁵⁰ This was probably an ingenuous manoeuvre by Vanlerberghe who had already placed many of his assets in his wife’s name and thereby shielded them from repossession should he be arrested or go bankrupt.⁷⁵¹

In January 1800, Napoleon’s agent Joseph Fiévée registered the following report:

*“We have seen with pleasure how Vanlerberghe was instructed by the minister of commerce to supply the needs of some départements which have suffered more than others, and have observed with even greater satisfaction that the operations which were entrusted to him have produced the results he promised.”*⁷⁵²

When a new *Compagnie des Négociants Réunis* was formed in 1804 to make cash advances to the Treasury, Vanlerberghe and Ouvrard became the driving forces behind the venture which also included Michel jeune, Armand Seguin and Médard Desprez. Vanlerberghe was one of the main culprits responsible for the *Négociants Réunis* scandal – triggered by reckless speculation on the *Banco de San Carlos* obligations which resulted in

⁷⁴⁴ AN, F/7/5440/8 (dossier Vanlerberghe), *The Directory’s Executive Commission to the Municipal Administration of Paris’s First Arrondissement*, 19 messidor VI/7 July 1797.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid*, *Petition by the general suppliers of the Armées du Nord et de l’Est soliciting the removal of Vanlerberghe from the émigré register*, undated.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibid*, *Safe Conduits Issued to Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe*, 4 fructidor V/21 Aug. 1797 & 30 ventôse VI/20 March 1798.

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid*, *Decree of the Executive Directory*, 18 vendémiaire VII/9 Oct. 1798.

⁷⁴⁸ Dupuis, ‘La chartreuse et le quartier Beaujon’, p.107.




⁷⁴⁹ MCN/ET/XLV/668, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799.

⁷⁵⁰ MC/ET/LV/189, 25 frimaire VIII/16 Dec. 1799, *Renunciation of Barbe-Rosalie Lemaire, divorced wife of Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe, to the joint ownership of assets established between them.*

⁷⁵¹ Dupuis, ‘La chartreuse et le quartier Beaujon’, p.107.

⁷⁵² Quoted in Maurice Payard, *LFO*, p. 89.

the *Banque de France*'s bankruptcy of 1805-1806 (see the section on Michel *jeune* in Chapter 5). He went bankrupt in 1811.⁷⁵³

Villemanzu, Jacques-Pierre Orillard de AI   
(5 Jan. 1751 – 3 Sep. 1830)

Villemanzu enlisted in the French army aged 16 and served in the American Revolutionary War under the command of Rochambeau (1780-1783). Following the outbreak of the French Revolution he was appointed as chief ordnance officer of the *Armée du Rhin* and subsequently of the *Armée d'Italie*. In 1802 he married Élisabeth-Françoise-Marguerite Baudon de Mony (1774 – 1830). They had three children. Villemanzu's name is inscribed on the *Arc de Triomphe* in Paris. The *Archives départementales d'Indre-et-Loire* conserve a large stack of Villemanzu's archives (*Fonds Villemanzu* – sous-série 111 J).⁷⁵⁴

Career:

- *Commissaire général de l'Armée du Rhin* (1792-1793);
- *Ordonnateur en chef de l'Armée d'Italie* (1797-1798);
- Head of accounting at the War Ministry after 18 Brumaire;
- *Inspecteur général aux revues*;
- *Inspecteur général de l'armée du Rhin* (1799-1801);
- *Inspecteur général et intendant général à la Grande Armée* – participates in the campaigns of 1804-1805 against the Third Coalition and the campaigns of 1806-1809 in Germany.
- *Membre* (5 Feb. 1804); *Officier* (17 Jan. 1805); *Commandeur* (11 July 1807); *Grand Officier* (1816) and *grand-croix* (22 May 1825) de la *Légion d'honneur*;
- *Membre du Sénat conservateur* (11 Dec. 1809) ;
- *Baron* (9 March 1810) and *comte de l'Empire* (1813);
- *Pair de France* (4 June 1814);
- Votes in favour of Marshal Ney's execution (Dec. 1815);
- *Membre du grand conseil d'administration des Invalides* (10 Jan. 1816);
- *Président de la commission de surveillance de la Caisse des dépôts et consignations* (8 May 1816).

Viscovitch (or 'Wiskovitch'), Antoine (Comte)

Viscovitch was a shady Dalmatian or Polish diplomatic broker. He was associated with Jean-Jacques de Beaune's *Compagnie Winter* which allegedly raised artillery units that defected to rebels in the *Vendée*.⁷⁵⁵ During the Directory, Viscovitch was employed as a fixer by Barras to convey bribes from the Venetian Republic.⁷⁵⁶ He also served as Talleyrand's intermediary to demand payments from British representatives at the Lille

⁷⁵³ For more on Vanlerberghe, see his police file at AN, F/7/6554. For his links with Hottinguer, see Max Gérard, *MM. Hottinguer, banquiers à Paris*, p.180-181 & 201.

⁷⁵⁴ See also Pierre-Arnel de Beaumont, *L'Intendant général des armées de Napoléon : Le Comte de Villemanzu (1751-1830)*, Paris: Éditions SPM, 2000.

⁷⁵⁵ See Albert Goodwin, 'War transport and counter-revolution in France in 1793: the case of the Winter company and Jean-Jacques de Beaune' in *Historical Essays in Memory of J.R. Western*, London: Paul Elek, 1973: 212-224 and Arnaud de Lestapis, 'Gentilshommes charretiers', *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, septembre 1953: 151-166.

⁷⁵⁶ See Chapter 2.

conference and during negotiations in August 1797 with the Portuguese *chargé d'affaires* in Paris – the Chevalier Araujo de Azevedo – who advanced Talleyrand a ‘gratification’ of 500,000 francs to secure a treaty with France.⁷⁵⁷ Both Viscovitch and Azevedo were imprisoned at the *Temple* in December when the affair became public knowledge. Shortly afterwards, Viscovitch was recruited by the British secret service as part of a rescue team tasked which helped Admiral Sidney Smith escape the *Temple* on 23 April 1798.⁷⁵⁸ Viscovitch appears to have been recruited while still in jail! Although Viscovitch was imprisoned by French authorities after Smith’s escape, he was inexplicably released without being prosecuted – further accrediting the suspicion that bribes were disbursed to secure the complicity of high-ranking Directory officials.⁷⁵⁹ Viscovitch then joined Admiral Sidney Smith on his mission to the eastern Mediterranean to assist the Ottoman Empire against Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition.

Walckiers (de Tronchiennes), Joseph Édouard Sébastien (Vicomte) de (7 Nov. 1758 – 17 April 1837)

Édouard Sébastien de Walckiers was the son of Vicomte Adrien Ange de Walckiers de Tronchiennes (1721-1799), *conseiller d’État* and *Grand bailli du Pays de Termonde*, a leading *notable* in the Austrian Netherlands, and of his wife Dieudonnée Louise Josephine de Nettine (1736-1789).

Édouard was a descendant of the Nettine banking dynasty through his mother’s line. His maternal grandfather, Matthias de Nettine (died c.1749), had founded the *Banque Nettine* in 1733 which was inherited by his wife – Barbe Louise Josèphe Stoupy (1706-1775) – the famous Madame Nettine – by a notarial act dated 19 July 1749.⁷⁶⁰ Under Madame Nettine’s leadership, the *Banque Nettine* – renamed *Veuve Nettine et fils* – became Empress Maria Theresa’s official bank in the Austrian Netherlands, supplying the imperial administration with piasters and precious metals for its mints and managing all its payments. Madame Nettine maintained a close entente with the Austrian minister plenipotentiary in Brussels, Carl von Cobenzl, and with the Austrian governor-general. Édouard’s mother took over stewardship of the bank in 1775.

Following the reversal of alliances in 1756 and the *rapprochement* between Austria and France, the Nettine family developed close ties to French and Spanish financial circles under the auspices of the duc de Choiseul through a succession of marriage alliances. In 1760, one of Édouard’s aunts – Rosalie-Claire-Josèphe de Nettine (1737-1820) – married Jean-Joseph de Laborde, the financier from Bayonne who became Louis XV’s court

⁷⁵⁷ For the ‘Azevedo Affair’, see Barras, *Mémoires*, Tome IV, p.257; Poniatowski, *Talleyrand et le Directoire*, p.596-598 and Blanc, *LERE*, p.158-160.

⁷⁵⁸ See Michael Durey, ‘The British Secret Service and the Escape of Sir Sidney from Paris in 1798’, *History*, 84 (275), July 1999: 437–457 – Note that political prisoners like Smith and Viscovitch were frequently allowed to leave their jails for a day provided they gave their word of honour not to escape (often supplemented by a bribe), which enabled them to meet people outside (*Ibid*, p.456). Pierre-François Réal, a key Brumaire conspirator who headed the administration of the Seine, presents a detailed account of Smith’s escape in his *Indiscrétions, 1798-1830. Souvenirs anecdotiques et politiques d’un fonctionnaire de l’Empire*, Paris: Dufey, 1835, p.8-18. Jean Hyde de Neuville also recounts Smith’s break-out in his memoirs (*Mémoires et souvenirs*, Tome I, Paris: Plon, 1888, p.166-169).

⁷⁵⁹ Durey, *op. cit.*, p.455 – Viscovitch was released and expelled from France on 20 May 1798 (Blanc, *LERE*, p.160).

⁷⁶⁰ Carlo Bronne, ‘Madame de Nettine banquière des Pays-Bas’ in *Financiers et comédiens au XVIIIe siècle*, Bruxelles: Goemaere, 1969, p. 43.

banker.⁷⁶¹ Another aunt – Anne-Rose-Josèphe de Nettine (1739-1812) – married Joseph Micault d’Harvelay (1723-1786 – *garde du Trésor* of Louis XV) in 1761 and was remarried to Charles-Alexandre de Calonne on 2 June 1788. A third aunt, Marie-Louis-Josèphe Nettine (1742-1808), married Ange-Laurent Lalive de Jully (1725-1779), son of the *fermier général* Lalive de Bellegarde.⁷⁶² Thus, Édouard was the nephew of Jean-Joseph de Laborde, Calonne and Lalive de Jully.

In 1773, one of Édouard’s sisters, Louise Jeanne Josèphe Walckiers, married Jean-Baptiste Boullongne de Préninville (1749-1794), the French monarchy’s representative with the *Compagnie des Indes*.⁷⁶³ Their daughter (Édouard’s cousin), Herminie-Félicienne-Joséphine, married François Bernard, Marquis de Chauvelin (1766-1832), French ambassador in London in 1792.⁷⁶⁴

Marriages:

Walckiers was twice married. In 1783, he married Barbe-Thérèse de Reul (1767-1791) whose father, the baron Augustin de Reul, was the administrator of the lottery at Brussels established in 1760.⁷⁶⁵ They had one daughter, Louise Jeanne (1784-1825) who married the comte Alexandre Batowski (1758-1824) in 1821. Walckiers was remarried in 1799 to Rose-Françoise Renaut (1773-1837), with whom he had two sons: Charles-Louis (1793-1849) and Alphonse (1814-1879).

Residence:

Walckiers was nicknamed ‘*Édouard le Magnifique*’ for his grand style of living. He and his first wife maintained a splendid house in Brussels. In 1788, they built the Château du Belvédère in the Italian style at Laeken.⁷⁶⁶ It was acquired by King Leopold II for 500,000 francs in gold on 29 October 1867. Several hectares of the estate’s lands were used to form the Parc de Laeken.

Career:

Édouard de Walckiers’s was one of the great barons of European finance in the 1780s. On 16 Jan. 1784, he was awarded the charge of *conseiller-receveur général des Finances des Pays-Bas autrichiens*.⁷⁶⁷ During his early career, he formed several business partnerships with the commercial empire of the Scottish Jacobite banker Sir Robert Herries – the

⁷⁶¹ MC/ET/XLVIII/110, 12 Aug. 1760, *Marriage of Jean-Joseph de Laborde and Rosalie-Claire-Josèphe de Nettine*.

⁷⁶² MC/ET/XLVIII/119, 19 July 1762, *Marriage of Ange-Laurent Lalive de Jully and Marie-Louise-Josèphe Nettine*.

⁷⁶³ Jean-Baptiste Boullongne de Préninville, also referred to as ‘Boullongne-Magnanville’ (after his château of Magnanville in the Yvelines), was the godson of Madame de Pompadour, served as *trésorier général de l’extraordinaire des guerres* from 1772 to 1779 and succeeded his father as *fermier général de la généralité de Poitiers* in 1787. He was among the 28 *fermiers généraux* guillotined on 16 floréal II/8 May 1794.

⁷⁶⁴ François Bernard de Chauvelin was the son of François-Claude-Bernard-Louis de Chauvelin, Marquis de Grosbois, *maître de la Garde-robe* of Louis XV, *grand-croix de Saint-Louis* and French ambassador at Genoa and Turin. François Bernard was appointed French ambassador in London in 1792, working under Talleyrand’s instruction. After the execution of Louis XVI, he was sent as ambassador to Florence before being imprisoned. He was released only after 18 Brumaire when Napoleon appointed him a member of the Tribunal on 26 Dec. 1799. He was awarded the *Légion d’honneur* in 1804 and made a *baron de l’Empire* in 1811. Under the Restauration, he served as deputy of the Côte d’Or.

⁷⁶⁵ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.205, footnote 2.

⁷⁶⁶ Bronne, *Financiers et comédiens au XVIIIe siècle*, p.159.

⁷⁶⁷ Claude Bruneel, *Les grands commis du gouvernement des Pays-Bas autrichiens*, Bruxelles: Archives générales du Royaume, 2001, p. 646.

inventor of travellers' cheques – who had developed a network of trading counters stretching from Lisbon to Moscow (see his entry). These included:

- Founding the *Banque particulière dans les Pays-Bas Autrichiens* in February 1782 with Robert's youngest brother, William, with whom he was particularly close.⁷⁶⁸ The Scottish bankers Walter Boyd and John William Ker, who established *Boyd, Ker & Cie.* in Paris in 1785, began their careers as assistant-managers (*secrétaires de direction*) at this bank.⁷⁶⁹ Through his relations with William Herries, Walckiers was later linked to Joseph Fouché who met and befriended William in 1793.⁷⁷⁰
- Walckiers also took a stake in the *Compagnie d'assurances de la Flandre autrichienne* (also founded in 1782), whose first director was William Herries, and marketed a loan worth 250,000 *livres* on behalf of Alexandre and Jacques Baillie who mortgaged the island of Grenada as security for this sum;⁷⁷¹
- A stake in *Herries, Keith et Cie.* of Ostend, a venture established in 1799 with William Herries and George Keith to arm whaling ships and hunt sperm whales.

Walckiers also had many other investments in his business portfolio:

- In 1782, *Veuve Nettine et fils* built a ship named 'La Belle Pauline' which undertook several trips to Angola to trade for slaves;
- From 1784 to 1787, he undertook a number of speculative ventures with *Girardot, Haller et Cie.*;
- In 1785, Walckiers signed a contract with *Veuve Van Schoor et fils* in which both parties agreed to purchase 4,000-6,000 pounds worth of life annuities yielding 3% interest via the intermediary of *Gunel, Hoare, Harmann et Cie.* of London and to sell them on for a profit, sharing out the benefits equally;
- Walckiers most profitable transactions were concluded with *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*, the Paris-based bank founded in 1785 by William Boyd, John William Ker and William Boyd the younger (cousin of William Boyd). Both Walckiers and Laborde de Méréville were associates in this bank. When *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* was ceded to Antoine-Grégoire Geneste – one of its clerks – in 1793, Walckiers was granted a right of inspection on the bank's affairs;⁷⁷²

⁷⁶⁸ Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.657 & 660 – It had a starting capital of 500,000 florins (roughly £36,000).

⁷⁶⁹ See Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome II, p.123-156; Lüthy, *LBPF*, Tome II, p.657 & 660; Blanc, *LERE*, p.151 and S.R. Cope, *Walter Boyd: A Merchant Banker in the Age of Napoleon*, London: Alan Sutton Publishing/LSE, 1983, p.11-31

⁷⁷⁰ William Herries fled Belgium for France in 1792 where he attempted to gain controlling stakes in the arms manufactures of Nevers and Moulins. It was here that he befriended Joseph Fouché, then a relatively unknown *représentant-en-mission*, who stood witness at the civic baptism of his son, 'Brutus hérissé', in October 1793 (see 'Fouché à Nevers', *Bulletin de la Société nivernaise des sciences, lettres et arts, seconde série*, Tome I, Nevers, 1863, p.249-250). Fouché also recommended William as an investor to government administrations in Paris. He mentions William in several letters to his sister Louise at Nantes (see Dominique Caillé, *Le duc d'Otrante d'après une correspondance privée inédite*, lettre de Fouché à Louise Broband, 15 nivôse IV/5 Jan. 1796: "I have asked your husband to credit the 96 piasters he holds for me to the person whom William Herries Herrissé shall indicate").

⁷⁷¹ Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.205.

⁷⁷² Two articles in the contract signed between *Boyd, Ker et Cie.* and Antoine-Grégoire Geneste detailed Walckiers's rights to inspection as a surviving partner:

Article 6 – "The writing of contracts, bookkeeping, etc. will be established in accordance with the claims of Édouard Walckiers and Walter Boyd, who will always retain the right, along with the other associates of *Boyd, Ker et Cie.*, to examine the account books, etc., of Antoine-Grégoire Geneste."

Article 13 – "The aforementioned Geneste will take it upon himself to effect the balances of his accounts on 31 December of each year and regularly send the result to Édouard Walckiers and Walter Boyd." (AN, F/7/5651, dossier 10).

- In 1785, he was in business with Perregaux and the Parisian bank *Tourton et Ravel*;
- From 1784 to 1786, he was involved with Marcus Ézéchiels of Rotterdam;
- In 1787 we find him with *Senn Bidermann & Cie.* of Brussels and in 1790 with the Dunkerque traders *Caffin fils*;
- In 1791, he took part in speculations on sugar with Michel Simons of Dunkerque;
- Walckiers also marketed a loan worth 250,000 *livres* on behalf of Alexandre and Jacques Baillie who mortgaged the island of Grenada as security for this sum.

Veuve Nettine et fils's principal associate in Bordeaux from 1785 to 1793 was *Féger, Grammont et Cie.* Other business partners included *Hope & Co.*, *Smiths et Atkinson*, *Harmon Hoare & Cie.*, *Charles Herries & Cie.* and *Pasley et Mac Culloch* (all five from London); *Jean Ozy et fils* of Rotterdam; the great Viennese trading house *Freis et Cie.*; *Parish & Cie.* of Hamburg; *David et Jacob de Neufville* of Frankfurt; *Willaert, de Bare et Cie.* of Bruges; *Van Erthborn et fils* of Antwerp; *Vandoorne* of Ghent; Jacques Leyniers of Brussels, Berthold Proly and *Abbema & Cie.* of Paris.

Role in the Brabantine Revolution:

Walckiers played a prominent role in the Brabantine Revolution where he initially supported the Vonckist Party and was a member of the *Pro Aris et Focis* secret society founded by Jan Frans Vonck in May 1789. He and his business associate William Herries, along with their clerks De Lannoy and Greuse and the banker Sironval, formed the *Société patriotique* of which Vonck became president. The historian Suzanne Tassier notes that:

“Money was abundantly distributed to encourage desertion [of Austrian troops]. Viscount Édouard de Walckiers, whom Trauttmansdorff [the Austrian minister in Brussels] called ‘the most zealous patriot’, appears to have played a decisive role at this moment and spent considerable sums to seduce Austrian soldiers. Although banker of the Viennese court, Walckiers appears to have been informed of the plans of *Pro Aris et Focis*, and perhaps even collaborated with them... Beginning in December 1789, this thirty-year-old financier with a tall build and distinguished features, sporting abundant locks of black hair, elegant and generous, improvised himself as the *La Fayette* of the Low Countries. He was one of those who as early as December 10 distributed Brabantine cockades at the *Jardin Saint-Georges* and then at [Place] *Sainte-Gudule*...”⁷⁷³

Walckiers was accused by the Brabantine Statists of being the French Mirabeau and of receiving funds from the Viennese court to help raise battalions of democratic volunteers. Others claimed he was a false friend of the people who had only embraced the Brabantine Revolution to shield his trading house from suffering financial losses. After a popular revolt broke out in Brussels against the Democrats on 17 March 1790, he fled to France with his associate William Herries. According to the *Courrier de France et de Brabant* (n°XLVII, 22 mars 1790), Walckiers had signed a petition with Vonck, the Count of La Marck and the banker Chapelle and several other *notables* to convene a National Assembly which was poorly received by the common people.⁷⁷⁴ Walckier's spent some time at the Château of Hem near Lille before moving to Paris. Mathiez aptly resumes his activities during this time:

⁷⁷³ Suzanne Tassier, *Les démocrates belges de 1789*, Bruxelles: Lamertin, 1930, p.130-131.

⁷⁷⁴ Suzanne Tassier, *Les démocrates belges de 1789*, p.342.

“[Walckiers] marketed the loans of the Viennese government in Brussels and London. Generous and ambitious, Walckiers was the financier of the Vonckist Party. He played an important role at the beginning of the Belgian Revolution. He notably organised a company of volunteers which bore his name. When his party was crushed by the Statists following the riot of 16 March 1790 at Brussels, he sought refuge in Paris where he had illustrious relations. He was the nephew of the banker Laborde – the businessman of Mercy-Argentauf and of Marie-Antoinette. His sister, Madame de Boullongne, had married her daughter to the Marquis de Chauvelin who represented France in London in early 1792. Through the Boullongnes and the Chauvelins he was linked to the house of Orléans. In Paris, he entered into relations with Barnave and the Lameth, then with the Girondins through the intermediary of the journalist Lebrun, who later became Minister of Foreign Affairs. His hatred of the Statists brought him closer to Austria. As early as April 1790, he offered his services to Marie-Christine, governess of the Low Countries and sister of Joseph II. He proposed to travel to London where he had many friends, notably the banker Walter Boyd, a confidant of Pitt the Younger, to dissuade the British government from continuing its assistance to the Statists. Marie-Christine accepted his offer which she communicated to her brother while recommending he observe the greatest secrecy: “The letter is from Viscount Édouard Walckiers, whose name I can confide to you alone, dear brother, and not even to the court chancellery, given the risk of complete ruin which his commercial house would be exposed to both in the Low Countries and in France if this were known.”⁷⁷⁵ She added that she believed Walckiers was “well-intentioned and zealous at the moment”, but that she knew him to be weak and easily influenced. She would therefore have him accompanied in his mission to London by the secretary Pistricht. “Pistricht is his intimate friend and holds a singular ascendancy over him and he is a man on whom we may entirely depend and who will monitor him with the greatest attention and zeal in your service.”⁷⁷⁶

In December 1790, the Austrian General Bender recaptured Belgium from the Statists. This caused a considerable number of Vonckists to return to the Low Countries. Walckiers travelled to Brussels where he founded the *Club des Amis du bien public* in February 1791 which regrouped Vonckists who had rallied to Austria. Walckiers attempted to reconcile the Statists and the Vonckists, but his efforts failed. He therefore denounced the Statists and their leader, Béthune-Charost, to the Legislative Assembly’s diplomatic committee which issued a decree on 21 December ordering Béthune-Charost to disband his organisations. Mathiez writes:

“If one considers that the Statists were by far the most numerous party in Belgium and the one that inspired the most legitimate fears to Austria, one is entitled to ask whether Walckiers, in persecuting the Statists, was not operating in favour of the government in Vienna.”⁷⁷⁷

But Vienna was wary of the influence of French revolutionary ideas and Walckiers’ club was rapidly closed. He returned to Paris after an apparent row with Marie-Christine. Olivier Blanc provides the following assessment of Walckiers’s role in the Brabantine Revolution:

⁷⁷⁵ Lettre du 29 avril 1790, dans la correspondance publiée par H. Schlitter à Vienne, 1896.

⁷⁷⁶ Mathiez, *LRE*, p.106-107.

⁷⁷⁷ Mathiez, *LRE*, p.108.

“Walckiers, known as ‘Le magnifique’, a great fanciful lord who played the ‘Lafayette of the Low Countries’ in 1787-1790 and headed the Vonckist Party, became the chief of ‘a modernist faction, democratic, liberal and particularistic’, opposed to the reforms of Joseph II of Austria. In liaison with his associate William Herries, Walckiers had been involved in all the agitations and campaigns of the ‘Revolutions of France and Brabant’ which believed they were sisters and whose aspirations were diametrically opposed: a shred of misunderstandings and betrayals which resulted in the French conquest [of Belgium] and of which only the conquerors have kept an enthusiastic memory. It was the support of Walckiers and Descroches de Sainte-Croix⁷⁷⁸ to Lebrun which caused certain journalists – particularly Marat – to react noisily. They warned their readers and brought their attention to the underground links between Lebrun, the ‘foreign party’ and [Omer] Talon.

The Walckiers financial nebula not only had innumerable ramifications in international banking circles – London, Vienna, Madrid– but also in the French political class, and particularly with the jacobins.”⁷⁷⁹

Association with the Girondins:

Shortly after France declared war on Austria in April 1792, Walckiers settled in a property at Carlepont (Oise) which he had purchased for 230,000 *livres*. Through his proximity to foreign minister Lebrun, whose prior journalistic activities he had funded, he grew close to the Girondins and became the principal financier attached to their faction. In December 1792, rumours began to circulate the Girondins were preparing to negotiate peace with Austria and return Belgium to Austrian control. Marat suspected Walckiers was influencing Lebrun towards this policy and denounced Dumouriez’s appointment of Walckiers as the new mayor of Brussels after the capture of that city. He declared Walckiers was “*of all the Flemish the one who, after Van der Marsch, has contributed the most to reverting the Brabantines under the Austrian yoke.*”⁷⁸⁰

After the decree of 1 August 1793 ordering the arrest of suspect foreigners was passed, Walckiers began to make patriotic gifts to cover himself and establish his credentials as a good citizen. He gave two horses to the district of Noyons, plus his entire harvest of fodder (4000-5000 bales) and the iron railings of his château to make 500-600 pikes. These gifts may have been motivated by a denunciation brought against him by a Belgian officer named Charles Jaubert.⁷⁸¹ Thanks to these gifts, the district of Noyon congratulated Walckiers for his civic virtue on 24 August 1793 and the charges against him were not investigated. It is quite possible, as Mathiez suggests, that Walckiers had several business associates at the *Comité de Sûreté générale* who protected him.⁷⁸²

Relocation to Hamburg & Bankruptcy:

On 28 ventôse II/18 March 1794, the *Comité de Sûreté générale* issued an arrest warrant for Walckiers who was declared an émigré, but he had already fled to Hamburg on 15

⁷⁷⁸ Marie-Louis Henri d’Escorches, known as ‘Descorches’, Marquis de Sainte-Croix, was French ambassador at Liège, in Poland (March 1791) and at Constantinople (January 1793).

⁷⁷⁹ Blanc, *LERE*, p.25-26.

⁷⁸⁰ *Journal de la République française*, n°64.

⁷⁸¹ See AN, AF/II/*/63 & Suzanne Tassier, *Les démocrates belges de 1789*, p.93, footnote 1.

⁷⁸² Mathiez, *LRE*, p.110 – The *Comité de Sûreté générale* at this time included Basire, Chabot, Osselin and other members whose loyalty was not always impervious to the allure of money.

March where he immediately set about attempting to salvage his commercial position.⁷⁸³ He began shipping large quantities of wheat and rice to France, notably via the intermediary of his Belgian compatriot and associate Michel Simons.⁷⁸⁴ In mid-1795, a golden opportunity presented itself when poor harvests in France forced the Directory to dispatch emissaries (Ramel de Nogaret, Lefebvre de Nantes, Giroust and Meynard) to Belgium to purchase wheat.⁷⁸⁵ Walckiers joined forces with two Brussels trading houses related to his family – *Walckiers de Vliringhe* and *Walckiers de Gammarage* – and with the *Werbrouck* house from Antwerp to convince these officials to do business with him. He turned for help to an old acquaintance of the early Revolution – Barthélémy Tort de la Sonde – who had been Dumouriez’s supply agent in Belgium and was now an associate of *Walckiers de Vliringhe*. Tort submitted a memoir to the French emissaries explaining that Belgian wheat was being shipped by speculators (notably *Jacques Chapeaurouge* of Hamburg and *Bourdieu, Cholet & Bourdieu* of London) to Holland via the Scheldt River and then passed off as Baltic or American wheat to be resold to France for a profit.⁷⁸⁶ To remedy this problem, he suggested “*closing the two estuaries of the Scheldt through which foreign trading houses take away our grain to deliver it to Pitt and to our enemies in Germany,*” and assured the French agents that Walckiers could immediately provide them with 100,000 quintals of wheat stored at Ghent.⁷⁸⁷ In addition, Walckiers offered to supply Paris and all French armies and garrisons south of the Wal River for the period running from 23 Sep. 1795 to 20 May 1796.⁷⁸⁸ Then on 2 June 1795, Walckiers and Werbrouck put forward another bid to supply clothing to all northern French armies for 17,527,500 *livres*.⁷⁸⁹

Walckiers delivered 100,000 quintals of wheat at Ghent for the French. Lefebvre then wrote to Merlin de Douai for further instructions.⁷⁹⁰ The amount of wheat Walckiers was contracted to deliver to France is unknown, but according to Tort de La Sonde the Walckiers Company had offered to furnish the following quantities for the period running from 1 vendémiaire-1 prairial IV/23 Sep. 1795-20 May 1796:

1. Wheat from Belgium, Holland or other foreign markets for Paris:
 - 60,000 quintals of wheat at 28 *livres* per quintal;
 - 30,000 quintals of rye at 14 *livres* per quintal;

⁷⁸³ AN, F/7/5446.

⁷⁸⁴ See Stern, *LMML*, p.37-39 & 177.

⁷⁸⁵ Lefebvre de Nantes was the main French emissary in Belgium coordinating these purchases with Merlin de Douai back in Paris (for their correspondence see Aulard, *ACSP*, Tome XXIII, p.18-22).

⁷⁸⁶ AN, T//1157 (Papiers de Jean Tilly) – *Mémoire de Tort de La Sonde concernant les approvisionnements de Paris et des armées françaises*.

⁷⁸⁷ See Lefebvre de Nantes’s letter to Merlin de Douai (Aulard, *ACSP*, Tome XXIII, p.436-437).

⁷⁸⁸ Walckiers offered to supply the following quantities – For Paris: 60,000 quintals of wheat at 28 *livres* per quintal and 30,000 quintals of rye at 14 *livres* per quintal. For French armies and garrisons in Belgium: 40,000 quintals of wheat at 28 *livres* per quintal; 10,000 quintals of rye at 14 *livres* per quintal; 80,000 quintals of oats at 10 *livres* per quintal; 180,000 quintals of hay at 4 *livres* 15 *sols* per quintal and 50,000 quintals of straw at 3 *livres* per quintal (AN, T//1157, Papiers de Jean Tilly – reproduced in Bouchary, *LMAP*, Tome I, p.210). Walckiers demanded exclusive supply rights in Belgium and the closing of the Scheldt River to navigation to force Belgian farmers to sell him wheat at depreciated prices.

⁷⁸⁹ The details for this contract were as follows: 200,000 uniforms, vests and leggings at 53 *livres* 10 *sols* per unit – 10,700,000 *livres*; 400,000 shirts at 5 *livres* 2 *sols* per unit – 2,040,000 *livres*; 200,000 pants at 20 *livres* per unit – 4,000,000 *livres*; 200,000 pairs of gaiters at 2 *livres* 10 *sols* per unit – 500,000 *livres*; 25,000 coat racks (*porte-manteaux*) at 11 *livres* 10 *sols* – 287,500 *livres*. Grand total: 17,527,500 *livres*, payable in hard currency or *assignats au cours* (AN, T//1157, Papiers de Jean Tilly). See Lefebvre de Nantes’s letter to Merlin de Douai about this offer (Aulard, *ACSP*, Tome XXIII, p.811-813).

⁷⁹⁰ Aulard, *ACSP*, Tome XXIII, p.436-437.

2. For French armies in Belgium and cities and districts below the line of the Waal River:
 - 40,000 quintals of wheat at 28 *livres* per quintal;
 - 10,000 quintals of rye at 14 *livres* per quintal;
 - 80,000 quintals of oats at 10 *livres* per quintal;
 - 180,000 quintals of hay at 4 *livres* 15 *sols* per quintal;
 - 50,000 quintals of straw at 3 *livres* per quintal.⁷⁹¹

The price of wheat was well above 28 *livres* per quintal in Belgium, but Walckiers hoped to make a profit by closing the estuaries of the Scheldt and requiring that his company have no competition after 1 thermidor III/19 July 1795. This would hopefully cause the price of wheat in Belgium to stagnate and force Belgian farmers to sell.

Unfortunately for Walckiers, Jean-Baptiste Paulée's company (Paulée & Cie.) had also bid for the contract to deliver grain to Paris on on August 12, 1795 the *Comité de Salut public* effected a remarkable volte-face and approved Paulée's offer.⁷⁹² Although Walckiers succeeded in passing a motion 29 vendémiaire IV/21 Oct. 1795 in the *Comité de Salut public* which validated his agreement, Lefebvre and Giroust were rapidly recalled from Belgium and replaced, and a smear campaign began against the Walckiers Company.

Following the establishment of the Directory, Walckiers was permitted to petition on 14 frimaire IV/5 Dec. 1795 for payment of the wheat he had been contracted to deliver (250,000 quintals); and the Directory accepted to pay him 38 *livres* per quintal in two instalments on 21 & 25 December. But the interior minister, Pierre Bénézech, then asserted he did not have the money to pay Walckiers and enjoined him to wait until he obtained the necessary funds from the *Cinq-Cents*. When these were eventually voted, Bénézech claimed they were insufficient and that he needed further ministerial approval to release them. As a result, the Walckiers trading house found itself in dire financial straits and went bankrupt in May 1796. The *Moniteur* reported that: "*The bankruptcy of the Walckiers trading house at Hamburg has spread consternation in trading circles.*"⁷⁹³ Further details were published on 15 floréal IV/4 May 4, 1796 in the *Annales patriotiques et littéraires*:

"Among the important events which are beginning to unravel in Europe, an enormous bankruptcy affecting the Walckiers trading house is reported at Hamburg, amounting to 80 million in écus. A bankruptcy of this magnitude is certain to disrupt all of European commerce.

It is said that the English market has sustained the most violent commotion. All those who have placed capital with merchants or banks hasten to retrieve it, and public effects in London have lost up to 25%.

Those who know how to turn the consequence of such events to their advantage claim that the bankruptcy of the Walckiers house will contribute greatly toward a general pacification..."

The Revolution had ruined Walckiers. He was only removed from the list of émigrés by consular decree on 9 Prairial VIII /29 May 1800 and ended up working as a modest clerk in the *administration des droits réunis*, a job which François de Nantes helped secure him. Two police reports indicate Walckiers turned royalist and continued to intrigue after

⁷⁹¹ AN, T//1157.

⁷⁹² AN, F/11/1229, dossier 2 – *Traité pour une fourniture de cent mille last ou quatre millions cinq cent mille quintaux de grains*, 25 thermidor III/12 Aug. 1795.

⁷⁹³ *Moniteur*, Tome XXVIII, p.273.

Brumaire;⁷⁹⁴ keeping Barras, who lived in exile at Aix-la-Chapelle, informed of political developments in Paris.⁷⁹⁵ Walckiers died in Paris in 1837.⁷⁹⁶

Woodford, Sir Ralph (Robert) (1735 – 1810), 1st Baronet of Carleby (Lincoln)

Ralph Woodford served as the British *chargé d'affaires* in Copenhagen from 1772-1773. He was also involved in negotiating compensations for traders in the Nookta Sound Affair. During the French Revolution, he was appointed Inspector-General of the French Emigrant Corps under William Windham at the War Office and was charged with planning and coordinating royalist landings and uprisings in the Vendée. He was created 1st Baron Carleby (Lincolnshire) on 28 July 1791. He married Gertrude Reessen, a lady of Dutch extraction. His brother-in-law was Walter Boyd, the Scottish financier who founded *Boyd, Ker et Cie*.⁷⁹⁷ His son, Ralph James Woodford (2nd Baronet of Carleby), served as governor of Trinidad.

Worms (de Romilly), Olry Hayem (9 Sep. 1759 – 7 May 1849) CCC ☆

Worms came from a Jewish family of the Rhineland which had settled in Sarrelouis in 1682. His father had been a military contractor during the Seven Years War, furnishing bread, meat, horses, forage and equipment to the *Armée d'Allemagne*. Olry began his career as a merchant trader in Lorraine. His first wife was the daughter of a Jewish merchant from Metz named Jonas Garçon Lévy who bequeathed Olry 86,000 *livres*. This sum helped him settle as a banker in Paris around 1790. That year, Olry was remarried to Flore Zacharie, the daughter of a goldsmith in the Rue Saint-Martin. Little is known of Worms's activities, but they must have been very profitable since he was able to purchase a large amount of pearls deposited at the *Monnaie de Paris* in early 1796.⁷⁹⁸ He also purchased the Château of Romilly-sur-Aube from Louis César Baulny in Year V. In 1804, he established a luxury hat manufacture in the château, investing 150,000 francs in the business; but poor management by his partner Paÿn resulted in a loss of 300,000 francs three years later.⁷⁹⁹ Olry's Parisian residence was located at 18, Rue de Bondy. In Year VIII, he was appointed joint mayor of Paris's fifth *arrondissement*, and was later awarded the *Légion d'honneur* on 27 July 1814. Worms also served as president of the *Consistoire central israélite de France* from 1826 to 1843. He was an ancestor of the well-known French classical scholar Jacqueline de Romilly.⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹⁴ AN, F/7/3829, rapport du 15 floréal IX/5 May 1801.

⁷⁹⁵ AN, F/7/3831, rapport du 19 vendémiaire XI/11 Oct. 1802.

⁷⁹⁶ For more on Walckiers see Suzanne Tassier, *Les démocrates belges de 1789*, Bruxelles: Lamertin, 1930 and 'Édouard de Walckiers promoteur de l'union des Belges et des Liégeois, 1792', *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles*, décembre 1938-janvier 1939, n°2, p.139-165; Claude Bruneel, *Les grands commis du gouvernement des Pays-Bas autrichiens*, Bruxelles: Archives générales du Royaume, 2001; Bouchary, *LMAF*, Tome I, p.189-216 and Mathiez, *LRE*, p.106-110.

⁷⁹⁷ See Blanc, *LERE*, p.320, footnote 25; *The Grenville Papers*, Tome II, p.107, 109, 287 & 297 and *The Windham Papers*, Tome I, p.227-228 & Tome II, p.3, 33, 56-57, 96, 198 & 222.

⁷⁹⁸ AN, AF/III/114, dossier 532:108-109 – *Lettre du ministre des Finances au Directoire sur l'achat par Worms d'une partie des perles déposées à la Monnaie de Paris*, 4 pluviôse IV/24 Jan. 1796.

⁷⁹⁹ AP, D11U3 2, dossier 254 & D11U3 3, dossier 516 and MC/ET/XCIII/264.

⁸⁰⁰ For more details on Worms, see Bergeron, *BNMPDE*, p.55-56.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources – Archival Documents

French National Archives (Archives Nationales)

Série AA (Collections de lettres et pièces diverses)

- **AA//49**
 - **Dossier 1407**
 - *Recommandation de Joseph Fouché pour la reprise de l'usine d'armements de Moulins par le banquier Herries, 1794.*

Série AB XIX (Documents isolés et fonds d'érudits)

- **AB/XIX/3490**
- **Dossier 3 (ravitaillement militaire durant la Révolution et le Premier Empire. 1795-1817)**
 - *Lettres des commissaires liquidateurs de la compagnie Ferdinand à Michel frères, banquiers à Paris, sans date/undated.*

Série AD XI (Commerce et industrie, 1789-1857)

- **AD/XI/58**
 - Report by Michel Mathieu Lecointe-Puyraveau on various projects presented by financiers to establish a national bank in France, 12 germinal VII/1 April 1799.
- **AD/XI/66**
 - *Rapport sur les arts qui ont servi à la défense de la République & sur le nouveau procédé de tannage découvert par le citoyen Armand Seguin, 14 nivôse III/3 Jan. 1795.*

Série AF II (Conseil exécutif provisoire et comités de la Convention, 1792-1796)

- **AF/II/9**
 - **Dossier 59**
 - *Pièces 5-7 – Copie des certificats déposés au ministère des Affaires étrangères relatifs aux marchés de draps d'Angleterre faits avec Hainguerlot, Vaillant, Charron et Caillot, 1792-1793.*
- **AF/II/12**
 - **Dossier 78**
 - *Pièce 8 – Arrêté chargeant les citoyens Pflieger et Venard d'une mission relative aux étalons et juments des dépôts qui ne doivent pas tomber entre les mains de la Cie Lanchère, 17 ventôse III/7 March 1795.*

- Pièce 40 – *Lettre du cit. Lanchère qui désire installer un dépôt à Porchefontaine et arrêté joint*, 25 ventôse III/15 March 1795.
- **AF/II/20**
 - **Dossier 147**
 - Pièce 28 – *Arrêté ordonnant à la Commission des Transports d'avancer 40.000 l. au cit. Lanchère*, 15 vendémiaire III/6 Oct. 1794.
 - **Dossier 148**
 - Pièce 17 – *Arrêté accordant à bail au Cit. Lanchère, entrepreneur des transports militaires une maison rue de Choiseul*, 24 germinal III/13 April 1795;
 - Pièce 24 – *Arrêté accordant la franchise des ports de lettres et paquets relatifs à leur service aux entrepreneurs Lanchère et [illisible]Cerf Berr*, 10 floréal III/29 April 1795.
 - **Dossier 150**
 - Pièce 7 – *Arrêté obligeant les courriers à se servir des voitures de Lanchère*, 9 vendémiaire IV/1 Oct. 1795.
- **AF/II/21/B (Comité de Salut public, finances)**
 - Plaquette 163 – *états d'employés du ministère des Contributions publiques : Eaux et Forêts, passeports de la Ferme générale, liste civile, Imprimerie, dépêches, poudres et salpêtres, contributions, loterie, fermes et régies, douanes, timbre, hypothèques et biens de parents d'émigrés, régie nationale de l'Enregistrement et des Domaines*, 15 germinal II/4 April 1794.
- **AF/II/22**
 - **Dossier 170**
 - Pièce 15 – *Arrêté mettant Duplain en état d'arrestation et nommant Billaud-Varennnes et Niou commissaires pour la recherche des suspects dans le Nord*, 29 July 1793;
 - Pièce 17 – *Arrêté nommant Billaud-Varennnes, Garnier (de Saintes) et Lebon commissaires pour enquêter sur un complot contre la République et ordonnant l'arrestation du cit. Duplain*, 29 July 1793.
- **AF/II/24**
 - **Dossier 194**
 - Pièce 3 – *Arrêté requérant plusieurs citoyens de se rendre à Paris pour former un conseil auprès de la Commission du Commerce*, 14 vendémiaire III/5 Oct. 1794. (Nomination of Perregaux as an advisor to the Commission du Commerce)
 - **Dossier 195**
 - Pièce 40 – *Arrêté ordonnant une enquête sur les achats effectués par l'Agence des subsistances générales et en chargeant les cit. Perregaux, Monneron et Mabile*, 14 messidor III/2 July 1795.
- **AF/II/31**
 - **Dossier 256**
 - Pièce 46 – *Lettre des entrepreneurs des équipages d'artillerie Lanchère et Cerfberr demandant un passeport pour Barruch Cerfberr*, 8 ventôse III/26 Feb. 1795.

- **AF/II/32**
 - **Dossier 264**
 - Pièces 9-10 – *Arrêté accordant à Armand Seguin un acompte de 36.000 livres sur les 750.000 livres qu'on doit lui payer (minute de mandat jointe), 25 pluviôse III/13 Feb. 1795.*
 - **Dossier 265**
 - Pièce 32 – *Minute d'un mandat de 120.000 livres pour le citoyen Armand Seguin, 19 germinal III/8 April 1795.*

- **AF/II/42**
 - **Dossier 338**
 - Pièce 24 – *Lettre de l'inspecteur de la 17e division Dupérier relative à la convocation des entrepreneurs de transports Lanchère par le commissaire ordonnateur Chauvet, 13 vendémiaire IV/5 Oct. 1795.*

- **AF/II/49**
 - **Dossier 378**
 - Pièces 7-9 – *Dénonciations contre Ritter, an II/Year II.*
 - **Dossier 380**
 - Pièce 6 – *Lettre d'un informateur de Londres à Perregaux le banquier, sans date (s.d.)/undated.*

- **AF/II/60**
 - **Plaquette 441**
 - Pièce 84 – *Arrêté ordonnant à Lanchère de mettre une voiture et des chevaux à la disposition du conseil militaire de la section Lepelletier, 11 brumaire IV/2 Nov. 1795.*

- **AF/II/68**
 - **Plaquette 507**
 - Pièce 22 – *Arrêté interdisant à la Cie Lanchère et Cerf-Berr et à toute autre administration de s'emparer des chevaux de l'Agence de navigation et surtout de ceux employés au transport des produits du Creuzot et de Blanzzy, 9 fructidor III/26 Aug. 1795.*

- **AF/II/75**
 - **Plaquette 554**
 - Pièce 25 – *Arrêté accordant 300 000 marcs d'argent à M. de Chapeau-Rouge, 27 frimaire II/17 Dec. 1793;*
 - Pièce 68 – *Arrêté adjoignant le citoyen Haller aux agents de la Commission de Marseille pour l'acquisition de grains à l'étranger, 27 pluviôse II/15 Feb. 1794;*
 - Pièce 83 – *Arrêté relatif aux traites ou remises sur l'étranger, 30 pluviôse II/18 Feb. 1794.*
 - **Plaquette 555**
 - Pièces 2-3 – *Arrêté autorisant Godard à faire acheter des salpêtres, des poudres et du cuivre (pièce jointe), 3 ventôse II/21 Feb. 1794;*
 - Pièce 21 – *Arrêté relatif aux achats de grains et fusils faits par Pourtalès, de Neuchâtel, pour la République, 8 ventôse II/26 Feb. 1794;*
 - Pièce 30 – *Approbation d'un marché passé avec Dolfus et Cie pour l'achat de 30 000 aunes de drap, 9 ventôse II/27 Feb. 1794;*
 - Pièce 42 – *Arrêté autorisant la Commission des subsistances à faire payer 25 000 livres aux citoyens Flachet, Figuet et Menessier (Am.), 14 ventôse II/4 March 1794;*

- Pièce 62 – *Arrêté relatif à l'exportation des denrées surabondantes*, 23 ventôse II/13 March 1794.
- **Plaquette 556**
- Pièce 41 – *Arrêté autorisant la commission des subsistances à conclure des marchés avec les drapiers et tanneurs de Mulhouse, en particulier avec la maison Godard et Cie*, 25 germinal II/14 April 1794;
- Pièce 45 – *Arrêté libérant du droit d'enregistrement les citoyens qui demanderont par la Trésorerie nationale le paiement de leurs traites sur l'étranger*, 26 germinal II/15 April 1794.
- **Plaquette 557**
- Pièces 6, 8-9 & 11 – *Quatre arrêtés autorisant divers paiements aux négociants Patry, Keller, Lecoutaulx et Fauvelet*, 4 floréal II/23 April 1794;
- Pièce 43 – *Arrêté autorisant la remise à Laffon-Ladebat de 277 500 livres pour achats de boeuf salé*, 18 floréal II/7 May 1794;
- Pièce 50 – *Arrêté autorisant Godard à exporter du vin aux îles de France et de la Réunion*, 26 floréal II/15 May 1794.
- **Plaquette 558**
- Pièce 14 – *Arrêté autorisant un paiement à M. de Chapeaurouge à Hambourg*, 7 prairial II/26 May 1794.
- Pièce 16 – *Arrêté autorisant Biderman à retirer des magasins de Lorient des toiles de coton qui lui appartiennent*, 8 prairial II/27 May 1794.
- Pièce 63 – *Arrêté autorisant Ouvrard frères à exporter des soieries et batistes aux Etats-Unis*, 25 prairial II/13 June 1794.

- **AF/II/76 (Fonds du Conseil exécutif provisoire, Comité de Salut public, représentants en mission dans les départements, 1792-an IV, vol. 3)**
- **Plaquette 559**
- Pièce 50 – *Arrêté autorisant la Trésorerie à remettre à [Antoine] Delamarre du papier sur Hambourg à concurrence de 5 020 000 livres pour le paiement de grains*, 25 messidor II/13 July 1794.
- **Plaquette 561**
- Pièce 15 – *Arrêté approuvant le choix de J.-B. Paulée comme principal employé adjoint à l'Agence de la Commission de commerce près l'armée du Nord et de Sambre-et-Meuse*, 4 fructidor II/21 Aug. 1794.
- *Pièce 16 – Arrêté autorisant la maison de commerce Jean-Baptiste Cervella & fils à acheter à Marseille douze bâtiments de cabotage et à les faire sortir de ce port sous pavillon génois*, 4 fructidor II/21 Aug. 1794.

- **AF/II/77 (Fonds du Conseil exécutif provisoire, Comité de Salut public, représentants en mission dans les départements, 1792-an IV, vol. 3)**
- **Dossier 566**
- Pièce 3 – *Arrêté permettant de fournir des marchandises à Perregaux pour payer une somme en numéraire à l'étranger*, 2 nivôse III/22 Dec. 1794;
- Pièce 40 – *Arrêté faisant remettre à Chapeaurouge 1,500,000 livres de métal ou de traites*, 18 nivôse III/7 Jan. 1795;
- Pièce 49 – *Arrêté annulant celui du 22 ventôse relatif aux traites sur l'étranger pour les vins, eaux-de-vie, sucres, cafés et produits de luxe*, 23 nivôse III/12 Jan. 1795;
- Pièce 82 – *Arrêté approuvant le plan de transport des diamants à Gênes*, 28 nivôse III/17 Jan. 1795.

- **Dossier 567**
 - Pièce 20 – Arrêté autorisant *Devinck de Dunkerque*, à exporter du sel pris à *Marennnes*, 6 pluviôse III/25 Jan. 1795;
 - Pièce 30 – Arrêté exemptant du visa du Comité de salut public les arrêtés pris par la Commission des approvisionnements pour l'exportation de produits autres que les denrées et n'excédant pas 3000 livres, 10 pluviôse III/29 Jan. 1795;
 - Pièces 37-38 – Arrêté concernant la libre sortie des marchandises achetées en France par des Suisses (projet joint), 12 pluviôse III/31 Jan. 1795.
- **Dossier 568**
 - Pièce 29 – Arrêté faisant payer à *Jacques et André Bidermann de Winterthur* pour les vins saisis par la Commission du Commerce, 17 ventôse III/7 March 1795;
 - Pièce 31 – Minute de l'arrêté autorisant *Barillon* à charger un navire sous pavillon neutre pour les îles de France et de la Réunion, 17 ventôse III/7 March 1795;
 - Pièce 35 – Arrêté chargeant le Bureau du commerce d'examiner l'acte passé le 22 février 1793 entre [Antoine] *Delamarre* et le ministre *Garat*, 23 ventôse III/13 March 1795;
 - Pièce 74 – Arrêté autorisant d'exporter des balles de coton en Suisse, 27 germinal III/16 April 1795.
- **Dossier 569**
 - Pièce 5 – Minute de l'arrêté autorisant *Paulée* à se faire expédier du riz par *Deheyder fils, d'Anvers*, 6 floréal III/25 April 1795;
 - Pièce 22 – Arrêté chargeant l'inspecteur *Lefebvre* de se rendre en Hollande pour s'occuper des grains offerts au Gouvernement, 29 floréal III/18 May 1795;
 - Pièce 28 – Arrêté envoyant *Barras* en Belgique pour s'y renseigner sur les acquisitions de grains et leur envoi à Paris (minute), 10 prairial III/29 May 1795;
 - Pièce 40 – Arrêté autorisant le citoyen *Casteleyn* à exporter, 29 prairial III/17 June 1795.
- **Dossier 570**
 - Pièce 15 – Arrêté nommant *M. [Daniel] Itzig*, correspondant du Gouvernement français à Berlin, pour toutes les négociations d'achats et les opérations de banque, 16 thermidor III/3 Aug. 1795;
 - Pièce 22 – Arrêté ordonnant aux douanes de laisser passer librement *Daniel Itzig*, porteur de diamants et de louis d'or, et ses deux compagnons, 19 thermidor III/6 Aug. 1795.
- **Dossier 571**
 - Pièce 19 – Arrêté autorisant les citoyens *Gros, Davillier et Cie* à exporter du coton fin et de l'indigo, 24 fructidor III/10 Sep. 1795;
 - Pièce 31 – Arrêté autorisant le citoyen *Casteleyn* à importer du seigle, 3^{ème} jour complémentaire III/19 Sep. 1795.
- **Dossier 572**
 - Pièce 1 – Minute de l'arrêté autorisant *Chégarray* à exporter en Espagne, 1 vendémiaire IV/23 Sep. 1795);
 - Pièce 22 – Arrêté autorisant *Casteleyn* à faire naviguer sous pavillon neutre les trois bâtiments achetés par lui, 26 vendémiaire IV/18 Oct. 1795;
 - Pièce 29 – Arrêté autorisant *De Witt*, ministre de Hollande en Suisse, à emporter son argenterie, sans être fouillé aux frontières, 4 brumaire IV/26 Oct. 1795;
 - Pièces 36-37 – Arrêté autorisant *Chégarray* à une seconde expédition de goudrons (pièces jointes), 12 brumaire IV/3 Nov. 1795.

- **AF/II/78**
 - **Dossier 573**
 - Pièce 8 – *Arrêté autorisant la Commission du commerce à nommer des commissaires pour connaître la valeur des marchandises dont la fabrication n'existait pas en 1789*, 15 prairial II/3 June 1794;
 - Pièce 9 – *Arrêté appliquant le décret du 26 pluviôse aux entrepreneurs, fournisseurs et soumissionnaires de la République*, 16 prairial II/4 June 1794;
 - Pièce 14 – *Arrêté approuvant les trois articles de celui de la Commission du commerce*, 28 brumaire III/18 Nov. 1794.
 - **Dossier 575**
 - Pièce 21 – *Arrêté autorisant Mallet à expédier de Bordeaux par navire neutre des eaux-de-vie et vins à Dunkerque et autres ports de la Manche*, 28 frimaire III/18 Dec. 1794;
 - Pièce 25 – *Arrêté permettant à Falloppe, Vasse et Cie d'expédier des vins au Havre*, 16 nivôse III/5 Jan. 1795;
 - Pièce 26 – *Arrêté autorisant Mallet à frêter un navire neutre pour le transport de vins d'eaux-de-vie et autres marchandises*, 18 nivôse III/7 Jan. 1795;
 - Pièce 27 – *Arrêté autorisant Guerlin et Ouvrard à expédier diverses marchandises par navires neutres*, 25 nivôse III/14 Jan. 1795.

- **AF/II/98**
 - **Dossier 722**
 - Pièces 21-22 – *Copies d'arrêtés d'Albitte, Laporte, Fouché concernant la fonderie de Valence*, 7 nivôse II/27 Dec. 1793;
 - Pièce 23 – *Copies d'arrêtés d'Albitte, Laporte, Fouché abolissant l'exercice du culte, ordonnant de détruire tous les signes religieux et de fondre les cloches*, 17 nivôse II/6 Jan. 1794.

- **AF/II/219**
 - **Dossier 1890**
 - Pièce 7 – *Affaire Beaumarchais (1793 – messidor an III)*.
 - **Dossier 1891**
 - Pièces 1-5, 7-9 & 11-36 – *Correspondance relative à l'affaire Beaumarchais (marché de fusils)*, May 1793–messidor III.
 - **Dossier 1892**
 - *Mémoire justificatif de Caron-Beaumarchais (marché d'armes)*, 104 pages, 1793.

- **AF/II/281 (Arrêtés et lettres sur des particuliers, floréal an II – brumaire an IV)**
 - **Dossier 2346**
 - Pièces 26-27 – *Siège de Toulon. Lettre de Saliceti au comité de Salut public, datée d'Ollioules*, 26 Sep. 1793.

- **AF/II*/286 (Registre des arrestations et arrêtés généraux du Comité de Sûreté Générale n°2 : Du 8 août 1793 au 7 germinal an II)**
 - *Dénonciation de l'abbé de Chalautre-la-Petite (Seine-et-Marne) contre le banquier Perregaux*, 8 Aug. 1793.

- **AF/II/286/B (Guerre. Administration : Transports et Remonte)**
 - **Dossier 2390 (5 vendémiaire an III – 13 brumaire an IV)**
 - Pièce 30 – *Arrêté relatif à la compagnie Lanchère, 24 germinal III/13 April 1795;*
 - Pièce 31 – *Arrêté autorisant un marché avec Michel frères, maîtres de forges à l'Est, 6 floréal III/25 April 1795;*
 - Pièce 42 – *Arrêté donnant à l'agence des Transports militaires toute l'organisation des chevaux et voitures pour l'armée, y compris ceux des soumissionnaires, 8 messidor III/26 June 1795;*
 - Pièce 45 – *Arrêté résiliant le marché passé avec Fondreton pour le transport des subsistances à l'armée de l'Ouest et confiant tous les transports dépendant de la 4^e commission à un seul régisseur, 20 messidor III/8 July 1795;*
 - Pièce 47 – *Arrêté réglant les conditions du traité à forfait à passer avec la compagnie Michel et Roux pour procurer les voitures dont l'armée des Alpes et d'Italie a besoin, 3 thermidor III/21 July 1795;*
 - Pièces 61-62 – *Arrêté conservant J.-B. Paulée dans son service de transports militaires, 13 brumaire IV/4 Nov. 1795;*
 - Pièce 63 – *Lettre de J.-Baptiste Paulée, entrepreneur de transports, demandant le maintien de son entreprise au service des approvisionnements de Paris (copie), 6 brumaire IV/28 Oct. 1795.*

- **AF/II/*/289 (Archives du Comité de sûreté générale)**
 - **Dossier 113**
 - *Mandat d'arrêt contre Jean-Frédéric Perregaux, 24 frimaire II/14 Dec. 1793.*
 - **Dossier 116**
 - *Mandat d'arrêt contre Jean-Frédéric Perregaux et Jean-Albert Gumpelzhaimer, 26 frimaire II/16 Dec. 1793.*
 - **Dossier 128**
 - *Ordre du Comité de sûreté générale aux commissaires de la section du Mont-Blanc de lever les scellés sur les papiers de la Banque Perregaux et Cie. et de remettre ses directeurs en liberté, 3 nivôse II/23 Dec. 1793.*

- **AF/II/*/290 (Mandats d'arrêt, d'amener, de mise en liberté, invitations de venir conférer avec le Comité et appositions de scellés et levées de scellés relatifs aux citoyens domiciliés dans l'arrondissement de la 1^{ère} division des sections de Paris.... 5 du 2^e mois de l'an II-9 pluviôse an II)**
 - Dossier de Jean-Marc Montz.
 - **Dossier 95**
 - *Arrêté du Comité de sûreté générale pour reconduire le banquier Joseph Duruey de sa maison d'arrêt à son domicile pour recueillir sa déclaration de ses avoirs à l'étranger.*

- **AF^X/II/292**
 - f^o12 – *Mandat d'arrêt contre Michel-Jean et Henry Simons, 18 pluviôse II/ 6 Feb. 1794.*

- **AF/II/*/294**
 - **Dossier 48**
 - *Arrêté mandant les commissaires Servoisier, Duranville, Perregaux et Hupais de se rendre dans les maisons d'arrêt pour recevoir de leurs détenus les déclarations de toutes les lettres de changes qu'ils peuvent avoir sur l'étranger, 28 nivôse II/17 Jan. 1794.*

- **Dossier 59**
- *Arrêté du Comité de sûreté générale pour reconduire les banquiers Sabatier, Desprez, Lambert et Laborde de leurs maisons d'arrêt à leurs domiciles pour recueillir la déclaration de leurs avoirs à l'étranger, 4 pluviôse II/23 Jan. 1794.*

Série AF III (Directoire exécutif, An IV – An VIII)

- **AF/III/15 (Minutes des procès-verbaux des séances du Directoire et feuilles de travail, messidor à fin an VII)**
- **Dossier 46 (thermidor an VII)**
- *Pièce 7 – minute de procès-verbal : démissions de Talleyrand, ministre des Relations extérieures, remplacé par Charles-Frédéric Reinhard, ministre plénipotentiaire en Helvétie ; - de Ramel [de Nogaret], ministre des Finances, remplacé par Robert Lindet ; - et de Bourguignon [-Dumolard], ministre de la Police générale, remplacé par Fouché ; - révocation de Lambrechts, ministre de la Justice, remplacé par Cambacérès ; - nomination de Florent-Guiot ministre plénipotentiaire près la République batave en remplacement de Fouché, 2 thermidor VII/20 July 1799.*
- **Dossier 47 (fructidor an VII)**
- *Pièce 112 – feuille de travail des Finances : mention de la réclamation du diamant Le Régent déposé chez Van Lemberg à Amsterdam, 21 fructidor VII/7 Sep. 1799.*
- *Faipoult au Directoire. Gênes, 4 thermidor IV/22 July 1796 – Letter indicating that the jewels confiscated from various Italian monte-di-pièta and deposited in Genoa are estimated at 5,594,710 livres.*
- **AF/III/21/A (Correspondance de Merlin de Douai) – lettres de l'an V, initiales G à T**
- **Dossier 70(i)**
- *Pièces 49-50 – Mémoire de Jean-Baptiste Paulée sur des soumissions de biens nationaux (non-localisés) en Belgique, 25 frimaire V/15 Dec. 1796. Copie adressée à Merlin de Douai le 15 vendémiaire an VI (6 Oct. 1797).*
- **AF/III/28**
- *Secrétariat général. Listes d'employés des ministères pour leur épuration après le coup d'État du Dix-Huit Fructidor an V, certaines avec notes sur la conduite des employés lors des journées de Vendémiaire an IV et dossiers de la commission des Dix-Sept sur l'épuration des employés des comités et commissions de la Convention après les journées de Vendémiaire an IV (an IV–an VI).*
- **AF/III/29**
- *Traitements des employés des ministères de la Justice et des Finances et comptes de dépenses présentés au Directoire par la Trésorerie nationale et les ministres des Finances, de la Guerre, de l'Intérieur et de la Police générale (an IV–an VI).*
- **AF/III/58 (Groupe des Relations extérieurs – Angleterre, 1792–an VII)**
- **Dossier 228, plaquette 1**
- *Lettre de Louis Monneron à Larevellière-Lépaux avec un mémoire dans lequel il rend compte à Boissy de son voyage en Angleterre, 16 brumaire IV/7 Nov. 1795.*
- **Dossier 228, plaquette 2**
- *Lettre Grand (p.27).*

- **AF/III/63**
 - **Dossier 254, plaquette 1**
 - *Dépêche d'Hermand, consul de France à Madrid, 5 ventôse V/23 Feb. 1797.*
 - **Dossier 256, plaquette 1**
 - *Résumé d'une conversation à Paris entre Cabarrus et un espagnol, 29 ventôse VI/19 March 1798.*

- **AF/III/65 (Gênes)**
 - **Dossier 267, plaquette 2**
 - *Faipoult au Directoire. Gênes, 19 thermidor IV/6 Aug. 1796 – Letter concerning Saliceti's attempts at getting a loan of a million from Genoa.*

- **AF/III/66 (Gênes)**
 - **Dossier 270, plaquette 1**
 - *Faipoult au Directoire. Gênes, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796 – Letter from the Directory ordering Faipoult to audit the accounts of the *Compagnie Flachet*;*
 - *Lettre de Vincent Spinola, envoyé extraordinaire de la République de Gênes, notifiant au Directoire son étonnement pour les 5 000 000 réclamés par la France à Gênes avant toute négociation, 17 vendémiaire V/8 Oct. 1796.*

- **AF/III/68 (Genève)**
 - **Dossier 278, plaquette 1 (an VI-an VIII)**
 - *Copies de deux lettres de Gazan, général commandant la 4e division et du général Soult demandant un emprunt aux habitants de Rorschach et de Saint-Gall ; avec lettre du Directoire helvétique protestant contre les emprunts demandés en Suisse par le général Masséna, 23 vendémiaire VIII/15 Oct. 1799;*
 - *Lettre du Directoire helvétique déplorant la situation politique de la Suisse, protestant contre les contributions exigées d'elle ; copies jointes de lettres de Masséna au conseil de Zurich, de Mathieu Favières (commissaire ordonnateur en chef) à Lariboissière (directeur général de l'artillerie) et de Morizot (agent de la commission civile) et du représentant Hass (inspecteur général de l'artillerie de l'armée helvétique) au sujet de réquisitions faites par l'armée française, 11-14 vendémiaire VIII/3-6 Oct. 1799;*
 - *Copie de lettre de Masséna demandant à la ville de Bâle un emprunt de 100 000 livres, avec défense faite par le Directoire helvétique (Savary étant président) à la ville de payer cet emprunt, 19 vendémiaire VIII/11 Oct. 1799.*

- **AF/III/69 (Hollande, an III-an V)**
 - **Dossier 280, plaquette 1 (Vendémiaire-Floréal an IV)**
 - *Requête de nombreux commerçants et armateurs d'Anvers au Directoire pour assurer la liberté de la navigation sur l'Escaut qu'entravent les Hollandais, 14 floréal IV/3 May 1796;*
 - *Pièce 218 – Demande par ordre du Directoire de six millions de florins pour couvrir deux maisons d'Amsterdam qui ont prêté leur crédit à la France, 20 nivôse IV/10 Jan. 1796.*
 - **Dossier 282, plaquette 1 (Germinal-Fructidor an V)**
 - *Pièce 42 – Note sur divers emprunts faits par la cour de Vienne (Marie-Thérèse, Joseph II et François II) en Belgique, 28 floréal V/17 May 1797;*
 - *Pièce 41 – Note sur la liquidation des emprunts contractés en Belgique par l'intermédiaire de la banque Nettine par les empereurs d'Autriche, 21 floréal V/10 May 1797.*

- **AF/III/70 (Hollande, an VI)**
 - **Dossier 284, plaquette 1 (Germinal-Fructidor an VI)**
 - *Mémoire rédigé par un orangiste contre le "18 fructidor batave" avec observations de Charles Delacroix critiquant les allégations qu'il renferme et des notes sur Bicker d'Amsterdam, Hahn de Leyde, Beveren de Zélande, H. Gevers de Dort, Jordens d'Overyssel et Queysen, 22 germinal VI/11 April 1798.*

- **AF/III/71 (Mémoires et correspondance des agents français en Italie et du gouvernement italien : première série)**
 - **Dossier 289, plaquette 1 (Messidor an III-Thermidor an IV)**
 - *Pièce 97 – Extrait de plusieurs lettres du Général Clarke datées de Milan, 16 frimaire V/6 Dec. 1796;*
 - *Demande par les députés de Bologne de restitution par le gouvernement français des dépôts des monts-de-piété et des objets d'art enlevés, 12 thermidor IV/30 July 1796.*
 - **Dossier 289, plaquette 2 (Pluviôse an V-Brumaire an VI)**
 - *Mémoire du ministère des Relations extérieures sur la nécessité de décider du sort de la Lombardie, 4 pluviôse V/23 Jan. 1797;*
 - *Lettres de Vincent Massari, député de Ferrare, au ministre des Relations extérieures, protestant contre la réunion par Bonaparte de Ferrare à Bologne, 27 prairial & 8 messidor V/15 & 26 June 1797;*
 - *Lettre des députés de Bologne demandant une constitution républicaine et protestant contre le démembrement de leur territoire, 3 July 1796;*
 - *Lettre de Pierre Cavagnari, banquier chargé de la liquidation des comptes du duc de Parme, à Joseph Bonaparte, 3 June 1797.*
 - **Dossier 290, plaquette 1 (Vendémiaire-Ventôse an VI)**
 - *Envoi de médailles d'or au Directoire français, 21 brumaire VI/11 Nov. 1797;*
 - *Dépêche du Directoire exécutif au sujet de l'emprunt levé par le Général Berthier, 30 ventôse VI/20 March 1798;*
 - *Lettre du commissaire Faipoult au Directoire exécutif demandant l'envoi de 30,000 hommes supplémentaires à l'armée d'Italie et de prompts secours d'argent, 23 thermidor VI/10 Aug. 1798;*
 - *Le Directoire à Garrau (renvoie des plaintes des Ferrarais). Paris, 11 frimaire V/1 Dec. 1796.*
 - **Dossier 290, plaquette 2 (Vendémiaire an VI)**
 - *Extrait de dépêche de Fouché, ambassadeur à Milan, arrivé dans cette ville, 21 vendémiaire VII/12 Oct. 1798.*
 - **Dossier 290, plaquette 3 (Dépêches d'Amelot au Directoire exécutif – Brumaire an VII)**
 - *Plaintes sur la conduite du général Brune, 16 brumaire VII/6 Nov. 1798;*
 - *Mémoire sur l'aliénation des biens nationaux dans les pays conquis, sans date/undated;*
 - *Plainte contre l'ambassadeur Fouché, 27 brumaire VII/17 Nov. 1798;*
 - *Plainte contre le chef d'état-major Suchet, 27 brumaire VII/17 Nov. 1798;*
 - *Plainte contre le commissaire ordonnateur Aubernon, 27 brumaire VII/17 Nov. 1798;*
 - *Demande de fonds pour l'armée d'Italie, 29 brumaire VII/19 Nov. 1798.*
 - **Dossier 290, plaquette 4 (Dépêches de Fouché – Brumaire an VII)**
 - *Procès-verbal de la réception de Fouché par le Directoire Cisalpin avec texte du discours qu'il a prononcé, Milan, 4 brumaire VII/25 Oct. 1798;*
 - *Lettre de Fouché informant le Directoire cisalpin qu'il est le seul agent français qualifié, 8 brumaire VII/29 Oct. 1798;*

- *Lettre de Fouché annonçant sa réconciliation avec Amelot en présence du général Joubert, 19 brumaire VII/9 Nov. 1798, avec copie d'une lettre de Fouché à Amelot du 13 brumaire an VII;*
- *Note sur les intentions de Manfredini, ministre de Toscane, contre la France, 9 brumaire VII/30 Oct. 1798;*
- *Lettre du général Joubert, commandant de l'armée d'Italie, à Fouché sur l'ouverture de la campagne militaire en Italie, 17 brumaire VII/7 Nov. 1798;*
- *Critique de Fouché sur la conduite de son prédécesseur Trouvé, 21 brumaire VII/11 Nov. 1798.*
- **Dossier 290, plaquette 5 (Dépêches d'Amelot et de Faipoult – Frimaire an VII)**
- *Dénonciation des agissements de faux agents français en Italie (lettre jointe d'Amelot au roi de Sardaigne sur les secours qu'il doit fournir à l'armée d'Italie, novembre 1798);*
- *Lettre d'Amelot à Treilhard sur les dilapidations commises par l'armée d'Italie, 4 frimaire VII/24 Nov. 1798;*
- *Lettre d'Amelot à Treilhard sur les abus dans les finances de l'armée d'Italie, 5 frimaire VII/25 Nov. 1798;*
- *Lettre d'Amelot au Directoire exécutif sur le dénuement de l'armée d'Italie, 7 frimaire VII/27 Nov. 1798;*
- *Lettre d'Amelot au Directoire exécutif annonçant le début des hostilités de l'armée de Championnet contre Naples, et la corruption qui y règne, 8 frimaire VII/28 Nov. 1798;*
- *Lettre d'Amelot au Directoire exécutif affirmant que Fouché a touché 24,000 écus le jour de son départ de Milan ; dénonciation de Suchet, 23 frimaire VII/13 Dec. 1798.*
- **AF/III/72 (Mémoires et correspondance des agents français en Italie et du gouvernement italien : deuxième série)**
- **Dossier 291, plaquette 1 (Frimaire-Germinal an V)**
- *Arrêté de Garrau. Modène, 16 vendémiaire V/7 Oct. 1796 – Decree of Garrau putting all the Duke of Modena's goods under seal;*
- *Arrêté de Saliceti et Garrau. Modène, 24 vendémiaire V/15 Oct. 1796 – Decree transferring all funds in Modena's public coffers to the central French treasury in Milan.*
- *Mémoire du général Clarke sur la situation politique de l'Italie, 16 frimaire V/6 Dec. 1796;*
- *Lettre de Garrau au général Clarke lui transmettant trois arrêtés qu'il a pris pour se justifier de l'accusation portée contre lui au sujet des caisses d'argent envoyées de Modène. Milan, 16 frimaire V/6 Dec. 1796;*
- *Lettre de Clarke au Directoire accompagnant la transmission des noms des officiers généraux et aides de camp de l'armée d'Italie. Milan, 30 frimaire V/20 Dec. 1796;*
- *Lettre de Clarke au Directoire. Milan, 30 frimaire V/20 Dec. 1796;*
- *État des commissaires ordonnateurs et des commissaires des guerres employés à l'armée d'Italie, nivôse an V);*
- *Transmission des noms des officiers généraux et aides de camp de l'armée d'Italie, avec notes rédigées par Bonaparte, Berthier et Clarke, nivôse an V.*
- **Dossier 292, plaquette 1 (Nivôse an VII)**
- *Lettre de Rivaud au Directoire exécutif sur la concussion de fournisseurs de l'armée d'Italie et exactions des généraux Lemoine et Victor, 3 nivôse VII/23 Dec. 1798;*
- *Lettre de Rivaud à Reubell sur l'existence d'un complot à Milan fomenté par Bassal, Fouché et Suchet, 5 nivôse VII/25 Dec. 1798;*
- *Plainte contre le commissaire des guerres Allard, 8 nivôse VII/28 Dec. 1798;*
- *Plainte contre les généraux Suchet et Brune, 9 nivôse VII/29 Dec. 1798;*

- *État d'emploi des deux millions provenant de la contribution imposée sur le Piedmont par le général en chef*, undated;
- *Lettre du Directoire exécutif Cisalpin au citoyen Rivaud dénonçant la Compagnie Bodin*, 11 nivôse VII/31 Dec. 1798;
- *Copie de la lettre du commissaire ordonnateur Lambert au commissaire ordonnateur en chef de l'armée d'Italie (Auberon) au sujet des plaintes contre la Compagnie Bodin*, 12 nivôse VII/1 Jan. 1799;
- *Lettre d'Auberon, commissaire ordonnateur en chef de l'armée d'Italie, à Rivaud au sujet des plaintes contre la Compagnie Bodin*, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799;
- *Lettre de la Compagnie Bodin au citoyen Rivaud*, 14 nivôse VII/3 Jan. 1799;
- *Lettre de Lambert, commissaire ordonnateur de l'armée d'Italie, à Rivaud au sujet des réquisitions opérées par la Compagnie Bodin en Cisalpine*, 14 nivôse VII/3 Jan. 1799;
- *Plainte du Directoire exécutif Cisalpin contre la Compagnie Bodin et les réquisitions qu'on exerce dans la Cisalpine*, 18 nivôse VII/7 Jan. 1799;
- *Aperçu des reprises à exercer contre la Compagnie Bodin pour les fournitures faites par les communes de la République Cisalpine à l'armée française du 15 floréal an VI à la fin de l'an VI*;
- *Lettre de Lambert, commissaire ordonnateur de l'armée d'Italie, à Rivaud au sujet des plaintes contre la Compagnie Bodin en Cisalpine*, 19 nivôse VII/8 Jan. 1799;
- *Lettre de Rivaud au Directoire exécutif donnant des renseignements sur les réquisitions auxquelles on est obligé de recourir dans la Cisalpine pour suppléer à la négligence de la Compagnie Bodin*, 26 nivôse VII/15 Jan. 1799;
- *Lettre écrite par le général Joubert du quartier général de Reggio à Amelot*, 28 nivôse VII/17 Jan. 1799.
- **Dossier 292, plaquette 2 (Dépêches d'Amelot)**
 - *Demande que les biens nationaux de la République cisalpine soient mis à la disposition de la France*, 1 nivôse VII/21 Dec. 1798;
 - *Lettre du Directoire exécutif Cisalpin dénonçant les réquisitions des fournisseurs de l'armée d'Italie*, 10 nivôse VII/30 Dec. 1798;
 - *Lettre au Directoire exécutif concernant l'emploi de l'argenterie et du mobilier du roi de Sardaigne*, 10 nivôse VII/30 Dec. 1798;
 - *Lettre du Directoire exécutif Cisalpin concernant la dilapidation des fournisseurs à Mantoue*, 11 nivôse VII/31 Dec. 1798;
 - *Lettre de la Compagnie Bodin concernant les plaintes du Directoire exécutif Cisalpin*, 12 nivôse VII/1 Jan. 1799;
 - *Plainte au Directoire exécutif contre la Compagnie Bodin*, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799;
 - *Lettre du général Joubert au sujet des dilapidations des fournisseurs*, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799;
 - *Plainte du Directoire exécutif contre la Compagnie Bodin et contre les réquisitions vexatoires de ses employés*, 13 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799;
 - *Réponse à la lettre du général Joubert et état des sommes mises à la disposition de la Compagnie Bodin*, 15 nivôse VII/4 Jan. 1799;
 - *Plainte contre les dilapidations qui se commettent à l'armée d'Italie*, 15 nivôse VII/4 Jan. 1799;
 - *Lettre au général Joubert concernant leur mésintelligence*, 22 nivôse VII/11 Jan. 1799;
 - *Levée de contributions à Lucques et en Toscane par la seule autorité militaire*, 23 nivôse VII/12 Jan. 1799;

- *Plainte de Sivry, payeur-général de l'armée d'Italie, contre le gouvernement provisoire de Piémont*, 24 nivôse VII/13 Jan. 1799;
- *Réponse à la plainte de Sivry*, 24 nivôse VII/13 Jan. 1799;
- *Lettre de Sivry annonçant qu'il suspend tout paiement sauf celui de la solde*, 26 nivôse VII/15 Jan. 1799;
- *Nouvelles plaintes contre le général Joubert et contre l'adjudant général Hector Legros au sujet du mode de paiement des dépenses de l'armée*, 26 nivôse VII/15 Jan. 1799;
- *Plainte contre le gouvernement provisoire du Piedmont*, 26 nivôse VII/15 Jan. 1799;
- *Réclamation contre les mesures prises par le général Joubert*, 30 nivôse VII/19 Jan. 1799;
- *Lettre au Directoire exécutif demandant la véritable situation de la Compagnie Bodin*, 30 nivôse VII/19 Jan. 1799.
- **Dossier 293, plaquette 1 (Pluviôse an VII)**
 - 1. *Dépêches d'Amelot*
 - *Lettre au Directoire exécutif concernant la réponse datée du 29 nivôse an VII (18 Jan. 1799) qu'Amelot a reçue de la Compagnie Bodin*, 6 pluviôse VII/25 Jan. 1799;
 - *Situation de la Compagnie Bodin*, 6 pluviôse VII/25 Jan. 1799;
 - *Lettre au Directoire exécutif sur la nécessité de régler le sort du Piedmont*, 17 pluviôse VII/5 Feb. 1799;
 - *Lettre au Directoire exécutif dénonçant les généraux français en Italie qui se sont permis d'accorder des autorisations d'exporter des denrées vers l'étranger*, 20 pluviôse VII/8 Feb. 1799;
 - *Lettre au Directoire exécutif signalant un déficit de 8 millions dans les finances du Piedmont et la dépréciation du papier monnaie et des biens nationaux piémontais suite aux abus dans le mode de vente*, 28 pluviôse VII/16 Feb. 1799.
 - 2. *Dépêches de Rivaud*
 - *Plaintes du commissaire Blanchon contre la Compagnie Bodin*, 6 & 11 pluviôse VII/25 & 30 Jan. 1799.
- **Dossier 293, plaquette 2 (Ventôse an VII)**
 - 1. *Dépêches d'Amelot*
 - *Cession de 6 à 8 millions de domaines nationaux au Directoire cisalpin pour financer l'armée française*, 24 ventôse VII/14 March 1799.
- **Dossier 294 (Germinal an VII)**
 - 2. *Dépêches de Rivaud*
 - *Adoption des mesures nécessaires au service des subsistances de l'armée d'Italie par les conseils de la République Cisalpine*, 9 germinal VII/29 March 1799;
 - *Vente des domaines nationaux à la République Cisalpine*, 18 germinal VII/7 April 1799 – Haller cancelled some of these sales in favour of the Compagnie l'Huillier et Fabras;
 - *Lettre de Belleville confirmant l'ordre du Directoire de faire arrêter toutes les malles, caisses et ballots à Gênes envoyés de Naples ou de Ligurie vers la France*, 19 germinal VII/8 April 1799;
 - *Obligation pour le général Schérer de demander son rappel*, 4 floréal VII/23 April 1799;
 - *Protestation contre une lettre attribuée à Schérer et publiée dans l'Ami des Lois (n°1325 du journal, joint)*, 4 floréal VII/23 April 1799;
- **AF/III/77 (Rome)**
 - **Dossier 319, plaquette 1 (An IV)**
 - *Lettre de Cacault sur la contribution de 5 millions du pape et les conditions à exiger avant la signature de la paix*, 12 thermidor IV/30 July 1796;

- *Le fief de Piombino les mines de fer de l'île d'Elbe*, 1 fructidor IV/18 Aug. 1796;
- *Situation économique des États de l'Église*, 15 fructidor IV/1 Sep. 1796;
- *Note sur les ports des États du Pape*, 16 fructidor IV/2 Sep. 1796;
- *Lettres, pièces, notes et analyses relatives à la négociation du traité de paix avec le pape.*
- **Dossier 320, plaquette 1 (Vendémiaire-Pluviôse An V)**
- *Négociations de Laurent Galeppi, ministre plénipotentiaire du pape pour le traité de paix (vendémiaire an V)*;
- *Donato Orsi et Pozzolini, agents en Italie du ministre anglais Windham*, 17 Sep. 1796;
- *Paiement en alun du reste de la contribution due par le pape*, 26 brumaire V/16 Nov. 1796;
- *Intention de Bonaparte de ménager Rome et le gouvernement pontifical*, 18 nivôse V/7 Jan. 1797.
- **Dossier 320, plaquette 2 (Ventôse-Fractidor an V)**
- *Modalité du versement de la somme imposée au pape en argent et en bijoux*, 14 ventôse V/3 Jan. 1797;
- *Extrait d'une dépêche de Cacault, Ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française en Toscane*, 10 floréal V/29 April 1797 – recorded in the inventory as 'Agissements à Rome de Haller (10 floréal an V)';
- *Maladie de Pie VI : proposition du Directoire d'élire plusieurs papes pour lui succéder ! (17-23 floréal V/6-12 May 1797).*
- **Dossier 321, plaquette 1 (Vendémiaire-Ventôse an VI)**
- *Lettre de Joseph Bonaparte donnant les raisons de son départ de Rome ; mort du général Duphot ; émeute au palais Corsini*, 11 nivôse VI/31 Dec. 1797;
- *Lettre de Faipoult : mécontentement des troupes contre le général Masséna ; arrivée du pape à Sienne*, 12 ventôse VI/1 Jan. 1798;
- *Organisation et commencements de la République romaine (30 ventôse VI/20 March 1798) ; lettre signée de Faipoult, Daunou, Monge et Florent.*
- **Dossier 321, plaquette 1 (Germinal an VI)**
- *Convention secrète déterminant les contributions que la République romaine devra payer à la France*, 8 germinal VI/28 March 1798;
- *Loi ordonnant la levée d'une contribution extraordinaire pour la caisse de l'armée d'Italie*, 22 germinal VI/11 April 1798;
- *Transmission d'une lettre de Trouvé (chargé d'affaires à Naples) montrant l'hostilité croissante de la cour de Naples à l'égard de la France*, 27 germinal VI/16 April 1798.
- **Dossier 321, plaquette 2 (Floréal-Prairial an VI)**
- *Envoi à Paris d'une émeraude provenant de la couronne de Jules II et d'une plume d'opale*, 8 floréal VI/27 April 1798;
- *Attribution d'une somme de 150 000 livres à la famille du général Duphot*, 13 floréal VI/2 May 1798;
- *Besoins de l'armée d'Italie : demande du général Brune*, 15 floréal VI/4 May 1798;
- *Difficultés financières de la République romaine*, 11 prairial VI/30 May 1798.

- **AF/III/78 (Rome & Naples)**
- **Dossier 322, plaquette 1 (Messidor an VI)**
- *Prétentions de la compagnie Bodin au monopole d'entretien et de fourniture de l'armée d'Italie*, 8 messidor VI/26 June 1798;
- *Les commissaires français à Rome au Directoire exécutif*, 8 messidor VI/26 June 1798;
- *Lettre de Florent au Directoire exécutif*, 27 messidor VI/15 July 1798.
- **Dossier 322, plaquette 1 (Thermidor an VI)**

- *État des ventes des biens-fonds faites sous l'approbation des commissaires du Directoire, dressé par Périllier, agent en chef des finances jusqu'au 23 prairial an VI;*
- *Accord entre les compagnies Bodin et Lehardi, 21 thermidor VI/8 Aug. 1798.*
- **Dossier 322, plaquette 1 (Fructidor-Jours Complémentaires an VI)**
- *Éclaircissements sur la législation des cédules et la moralité des fonctionnaires romains, 10 fructidor VI/27 Aug. 1798.*
- **Dossier 323, plaquette 1 (Vendémiaire an VII)**
- *Mémoire sur les finances françaises dans la République romaine, 11 vendémiaire VII/2 Oct. 1798.*
- **Dossier 323, plaquette 1 (Brumaire an VII)**
- *Note sur Périllier, ex-agent des finances à Rome, 15 brumaire VII/5 Nov. 1798.*
- **Dossier 323, plaquette 1 (Frimaire an VII)**
- *Note sur le commissaire ordonnateur en chef Arcambal et le commissaire spécial Amelot.*
- **Dossier 323, plaquette 2 (Pluviôse an VII)**
- *Rivalité entre Faipoult et le général Championnet qui ne veut pas reconnaître l'autorité de Faipoult, ce dernier se plaignant de ne pas pouvoir arrêter les dilapidations entraînées par le pillage de Caserte et de Carditello, 3 pluviôse VII/22 Jan. 1799;*
- *Arrêté ordonnant la mise sous scellés des palais royaux, des ministères, des archives et des musées de Naples, 4 pluviôse VII/23 Jan. 1799;*
- *Création par le général Championnet d'un gouvernement à Naples et protestation de Faipoult (copie des lettres de Faipoult à Championnet), 5 pluviôse VII/24 Jan. 1799;*
- *Tentative de rapprochement de Faipoult ; mesures prises par lui pour assurer la subsistance de l'armée de Naples ; demande sa démission, 8 pluviôse VII/27 Jan. 1799;*
- *Contribution de 60 millions exigée par le général Championnet du gouvernement napolitain ; difficultés de la compagnie Bodin, 15 pluviôse VII/3 Feb. 1799;*
- *Contribution prélevée par le général Rey : note de Faipoult sur Béranger, chef de bataillon, Bassal et Fion, auxiliaires du général Championnet, 16 pluviôse VII/4 Feb. 1799;*
- *Arrêté du général Championnet ordonnant au commissaire civil Faipoult de quitter Naples, 20 pluviôse VII/8 Feb. 1799;*
- *Offre par le consulat romain de 5 millions à l'armée française ; protestation des commissaires français à Rome contre la levée des scellés sur les objets d'art de Naples par le général Championnet, 21 pluviôse VII/9 Feb. 1799;*
- *Retour de Faipoult à Rome, 27 pluviôse VII/15 Feb. 1799.*
- **Dossier 323, plaquette 3 (Ventôse an VII)**
- *Lettre de Mangourit, Gaudin et Stamaty [Stamati], commissaires à Ancône, sur les vols commis par le général de division Liger-Belair, 5 ventôse VII/23 Feb. 1799;*
- *Mise au pillage du dépôt de porcelaines de Naples ; exactions de Championnet, Dubreton, Bassal et Bonami, 20 ventôse VII/10 March 1799;*
- *Dénuement de l'armée française à Naples ; convention entre le général Championnet et le gouvernement napolitain déterminant les biens meubles et immeubles échus à la République française (biens appartenant à l'ordre de Malte et à l'ordre de Constantin), 29 ventôse VII/19 March 1799.*
- **Dossier 323, plaquette 3 (Germinal an VII)**
- *Exactions commises par le général Championnet, le général Dufresse et Romieu à Naples, 2 germinal VII/22 March 1799.*

- **AF/III/81 (Espionnage français en Suisse)**
 - **Dossier 335, plaquette 3 (18 janvier-22 octobre 1795)**
 - *Bénéfices réalisés par les maisons de Hambourg, commerçant avec la France* (18 Jan. 1795);
 - *Spéculation sur la vente des biens des émigrés* (12 Feb. 1795);
 - *Note sur Wickam, nouveau ministre anglais à Berne* (23 April 1795);
 - *Traitement offert par Crawford au prince de Condé* (30 July 1795);
 - *Vente des domaines nationaux dans le département du Mont-Blanc* (22 Oct. 1795).
 - **Dossier 336, plaquette 1 (an VI)**
 - *Mission de Pierre Ochs à Paris*, 12 frimaire VI/2 Dec. 1797.
 - **Dossier 337, plaquette 1 (Lettres et mémoires, an III-an VI)**
 - *Lettres de Pierre Ochs sur la situation politique de la Suisse*, 10 germinal VI/30 March 1798;
 - *Justification de Jean-Jacques Rapinat, commissaire près l'armée en Suisse, sur l'emploi des sommes trouvées à Berne lors de l'entrée des Français*, 14 prairial VI/2 June 1798.
 - **Dossier 337, plaquette 2 (Réclamations des Bernois et du Directoire helvétique au Directoire exécutif [prairial an VI])**
 - *Imposition des abbayes de Suisse pour l'entretien de l'armée française;*
 - *Protestations contre les agissements d'agents français et contre les impositions qu'ils exigent des habitants;*
 - *Abus d'autorité de Rapinat* (5 June 1798).
 - **Dossier 337, plaquette 3 (Projet de constitution de la Suisse [an VI])**
 - *Réflexions du colonel La Harpe sur la conduite à tenir à l'égard des patriciens de Suisse*, 25 fructidor V/11 Sep. 1797.
 - **Dossier 337, plaquette 4**
 - *Deux rapports sur la conduite des commissaires civils envoyés aux armées du Rhin, d'Helvétie et d'Italie* (messidor an VII).
- **AF/III/88 (Toscane)**
 - **Dossier 377**
 - *Pièce 9 – Plainte de Néri Corsini (ambassadeur du Grand Duc de Toscane) concernant l'occupation française de Livourne*, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796.
 - **Dossier 378**
 - *Pièce 98 – Belleville au Directoire. Livourne*, 23 fructidor IV/9 Sep. 1796 – Letter indicating that the sale of British goods seized at Livorno raised 700,000 livres.
 - **Dossier 379**
 - *Pièce 6 – Miot au ministre des Relations extérieures. Florence*, 6 vendémiaire V/27 Sep. 1796 – Letter in which Miot warns of imminent riots against the French occupation of Livorno;
 - *Pièce 10 – Belleville au Directoire. Livourne*, 9 vendémiaire V/30 Sep. 1796 – Letter denouncing the behaviour of the *Compagnie Flachet* at Livorno;
 - *Pièce 21 – Belleville au Directoire. Livourne*, 30 vendémiaire V/21 Oct. 1796 – Letter indicating that Redon de Belleville was only able to raise 1.5 million Tuscan *lira* from Livorno as contribution;
 - *Pièce 26 – Belleville au Directoire. Livourne*, 21 brumaire V/11 Nov. 1796 – Letter indicating that merchandise from neutral countries has been seized by mistake at Livorno;
 - *Pièce 29 – Belleville au Directoire, Livourne*, 28 brumaire V/18 Nov. 1796 – Letter in which Belleville complains of Bonaparte's threats against him.

- **AF/III/114**
 - **Dossier 532**
 - Pièce 1 – *Lettre de Faipoult au Président du Directoire sur la situation de la Trésorerie nationale*, 20 brumaire IV/11 Nov. 1796.
 - **Dossier 533**
 - Pièces 8-9 – *lettre du ministre des Finances au Directoire sur les mesures prises pour empêcher l'importation de marchandises coloniales anglaises dans les ports de Belgique*, sans date/undated;
 - Pièces 17-18 – *lettre du ministre des Finances au Directoire sur une réclamation de Lanchère, entrepreneur des équipages d'artillerie*, 9 pluviôse V/28 Jan. 1797.

- **AF/III/115**
 - **Dossier 536 (Rapport du ministre des Finances au Directoire, an IV)**
 - Pièce 40 – *Rapport sur la situation de l'administration des Finances au 1 Pluviôse IV/21 Jan. 1796*;
 - **Dossier 538**
 - Pièce 1 – *Compte rendu de Ramel au Directoire sur les dépenses de l'an VI*.

- **AF/III/126**
 - Pièce jointe aux Pièces 33-49. *Discours d'Armand Séguin sur son procédé de tannage appliqué dans l'île du pont de Sèvres*, 8 messidor VI/26 June 1798.

- **AF/III/127**
 - **Dossier 583**
 - Pièces 70-71 – *Pétition adressée au Corps législatif par Marc-Antoine Michel, négociant à Paris, gagnant des écuries de Montmorency au tirage de la Loterie nationale (prairial an V)*.

- **AF/III/130 (Trésorerie nationale – supply problems of the Armée d'Italie)**
 - Pièces 8-13. *Copie d'un arrêté de Maisse, commissaire du Gouvernement près l'armée d'Italie, autorisant le payeur général de cette armée, Delcros, à fournir au directeur des vivres, Faureau, des traites en numéraire sur la Trésorerie nationale pour le paiement du blé fourni par des capitaines grecs : les commissaires de la Trésorerie se plaignent de cet abus de pouvoir*, 26 frimaire – 16 nivôse IV/17 Dec. 1795 – 6 Jan. 1796;
 - Pièces 28-29 – *Protestation adressée par les commissaires de la Trésorerie au Directoire exécutif contre les abus d'autorité du général en chef de l'armée d'Italie, Bonaparte, qui avait arrêté entre les mains du payeur général Delcros une somme destinée au traitement des agents politiques, en prétextant les besoins de son armée ; copies jointes de la lettre de Delcros et de celles de Bonaparte à ce payeur (germinal/floréal an IV)*;
 - *Lettre du Directoire à Saliceti. Albinga*, 15 & 16 germinal IV/4 & 5 avril 1796.

- **AF/III/131 (Directoire : comptes-rendus par la Trésorerie nationale)**
 - Feuilles journalières – *états quotidiens de la situation des finances* (nivôse IV-brumaire V).

- **AF/III/146**
 - **Dossier 689 (Correspondance des ministres avec le Directoire sur le fait des armées, ans IV-V)**
 - Pièces 18-20 – *Tableau de l'organisation du département de la Guerre envoyé par le ministre de la Guerre Aubert-Dubayet (lettre et analyse jointes)*, 29 frimaire IV/20 Dec. 1795.

- **Dossier 690 (Correspondance des commissaires du Gouvernement près des armées, dans les Pays conquis et dans les départements avec le Directoire)**
 - Pièces 172-173 – *Arrêté de Ritter concernant la vente des olives des biens nationaux des pays conquis sur le Piémont (analyse jointe)*, 18 frimaire IV/9 Dec. 1795;
 - Pièces 176-177 – *Arrêté de Ritter concernant l'approvisionnement en bois de l'armée (analyse jointe)*, 30 frimaire IV/21 Dec. 1795);
 - Pièces 181-182 – *Lettre de Garrau concernant deux trompettes d'argent trouvées dans le palais du duc de Modène*, 16 frimaire V/6 Dec. 1796.
- **Dossier 691 (Correspondance des autorités civiles avec le Directoire sur le fait des armées)**
 - Pièces 135-137 – *Lettre du commissaire du Directoire près le département de la Seine-Inférieure [auj.Seine-Maritime] pour donner des renseignements sur l'entrepreneur Lanchere, prévenu d'avoir soustrait des équipages des charrois d'artillerie au dépôt de Rouen (avec un état général des mouvements des chevaux dans le dépôt de Rouen de messidor an III à ventôse an IV)*, 6 germinal-24 floréal IV/26 March-13 May 1796.
- **AF/III/147**
- **Dossier 692**
 - Pièces 5-6 – *Rapport du ministre de la Guerre concernant le manque de finances qui entrave les approvisionnements des armées (analyse jointe)*, 27 brumaire IV/18 Nov. 1795;
 - Pièces 10-13 – *Réponses aux questions envoyées par le Directoire au ministre de la Guerre sur l'arsenal de Paris et sur le comité central de l'Artillerie*, sans date/undated;
 - Pièces 149-150 – *Rapport du ministre de la Guerre concernant les subsistances et effets militaires (analyse jointe)*, 5 ventôse IV/24 Feb. 1796;
 - Pièces 192-199 – *Circulaires du ministre de la Guerre concernant l'armement, l'administration des Hôpitaux militaires, la conservation des grains destinés à l'armée, la réduction des bureaux du ministère de la Guerre, le service des Étapes (impr.)*, 1-26 ventôse IV/20 Feb.-16 March 1796.
- **Dossier 693 (Rapports et lettres du ministre de la Guerre (Pétiet) de germinal à prairial an IV)**
 - Pièces 16-20 – *Rapport du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire sur les difficultés qui s'élèvent dans l'exécution de son arrêté du 18 nivôse concernant la réorganisation de l'armée (avec tableaux et projets d'arrêtés)*, 3 germinal IV/23 March 1796.
- **AF/III/148A**
- **Dossier 695 (Rapports du ministre de la Guerre (Pétiet) au Directoire de frimaire à ventôse an V)**
 - Pièce 8 – *Lettre de Dennié, commissaire ordonnateur en chef de l'armée d'Italie, à la Compagnie Flachet, quartier général de Milan*, le 6 brumaire V/27 Oct. 1796;
 - Pièce 9 – *Traité entre la Trésorerie nationale et la Compagnie Christophe Flachet, Laporte et Castelin, 19 messidor an V (7 July 1797). Copie en annexe de la loi du 13 brumaire an IV qui règle la manière de procéder au jugement des délits militaires;*
 - Pièces 18-30 – *Pièces concernant l'affaire des citoyens Laporte, Christophe Flachet et Castelin, entrepreneurs des fournitures de l'armée d'Italie, prévenus de prévarications*, 6 brumaire – 24 pluviôse V/27 Oct. 1796 – 12 Feb. 1797;
 - Pièce 18 – *Le ministre de la Guerre au Directoire exécutif*, 22 pluviôse V/10 Feb. 1797;
 - Pièce 19 – *Lettre de Laporte au ministre de la Guerre*, 22 pluviôse V/10 Feb. 1797;

- Pièce 20 – *Lettre de la Compagnie Flachat au Directoire au sujet de la traduction de la compagnie devant un conseil de guerre à l'armée d'Italie comme prévenue de prévarications dans la levée et la répartition des contributions d'Italie*, 19 pluviôse V/7 Feb. 1797;
- Pièce 21 – *Lettre de Laporte au Directoire exécutif*, 22 pluviôse V/10 Feb. 1797;
- Pièce 22 – *Lettre de Laporte au Directoire exécutif du 22 pluviôse an V (10 Feb. 1797) lui adressant la copie d'un extrait du procès-verbal de la séance du Conseil des Cinq-Cents du 21 pluviôse contenant une pétition adressée par sa femme*;
- Pièce 23 – *Extrait du procès-verbal de la séance du Conseil des Cinq-Cents*, 21 pluviôse V/9 Feb. 1797;
- Pièce 24 – *Lettre du ministre de la Guerre à Reubell, président du Directoire*, 22 pluviôse V/10 Feb. 1797;
- Pièce 25 – *Lettre de Laporte au Directoire*, 19 pluviôse V/7 Feb. 1797;
- Pièce 26 – *Lettre des citoyens Christophe Flachat, Laporte et Castelin au ministre de la Justice*, 17 pluviôse V/5 Feb. 1797;
- Pièce 27 – *Lettre de Dennié, commissaire ordonnateur en chef de l'armée d'Italie, au citoyen Christophe Flachat, quartier général de Milan*, 6 brumaire V/27 Oct. 1796;
- Pièce 29 – *Lettre du ministre de la Guerre au président du Directoire exécutif*, 24 pluviôse V/12 Feb. 1797;
- Pièce 30 – *Lettre du brigadier Louis Joseph Dumaletat et du gendarme Megloire Grenet au chef d'escadron de la gendarmerie de Paris décrivant la fuite du citoyen Laporte de sa résidence surveillée*.
- **Dossier 696 (Rapports du ministre de la Guerre (Pétiet puis Schérer) au Directoire pendant le second semestre de l'an V)**
 - Pièce 140 – *Rapport du ministre de la Guerre sur le non-acquittement des ordonnances expédiées aux fournisseurs, entre autres aux frères Cerf-Berr et à la compagnie Lanchère*, 26 fructidor V/12 Sep. 1797.
- **AF/III/150A**
 - **Dossier 703 (Rapports du ministre de la Guerre (Schérer) au Directoire pendant le mois de frimaire an VII)**
 - Pièces 14-15 – *La compagnie Bodin est chargée des subsistances et approvisionnements des possessions françaises du Levant*, 5 frimaire VII/25 Nov. 1798.
 - **Dossier 704 (Rapports du ministre de la Guerre (Schérer) au Directoire pendant le mois de nivôse an VII)**
 - Pièces 82-83 – *Rapport du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire proposant de faire fournir par la République cisalpine les grains en nature afin d'assurer le service des armées d'Italie et de Rome et d'éviter les plaintes portées contre la compagnie Bodin (analyse jointe)*, 27 nivôse VII/16 Jan. 1799.
- **AF/III/150B**
 - **Dossier 706 (Rapports du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire pendant les mois de germinal, floréal et prairial an VII)**
 - Pièces 63-64 – *Rapport du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire sur les mesures prises pour assurer le service des subsistances des armées du Danube et d'Helvétie par l'intermédiaire de la compagnie Rochefort qui demeure chargée de ce service, la compagnie Lecrocq ne l'ayant pas accepté (analyse jointe)*, 9 floréal VII/28 April 1799;

- Pièces 93-94 – *Lettre adressée à Treilhard par Lanchère fils déclarant qu'il ne pourra continuer son service si le ministre de la Guerre ne lui accorde des secours (analyse jointe), 25 floréal VII/14 May 1799;*
 - Pièce 95 – *Copie jointe de la lettre écrite par les entrepreneurs généraux des équipages d'artillerie, Schunck, Lanchère fils et Barneoud, au ministre de la Guerre, sans date/undated.*
- **AF/III/152A**
- **Dossier 713 (Bureau militaire)**
 - Pièces 117-118 – *Examen par le bureau Militaire du rapport du ministre de la Guerre du 27 nivôse an VII tendant à résilier le marché de la compagnie Bodin, chargée du service des Vivres et fourrages des armées d'Italie et de Rome (minute jointe), 1er pluviôse VII/20 Jan. 1799;*
 - **Dossier 714 (Solde des troupes et rétablissement des masses)**
 - Pièce 32 – *Lettre jointe du général Cambray, commandant la 1re brigade de l'armée d'Italie, à Merlin de Douai sur la conduite des agents des vins Bodin, du général Macdonald et de Bertolio [Antoine-René-Constance], ambassadeur de France à Rome, 24 prairial VII/12 June 1799.*
- **AF/III/153**
- **Dossier 724 (Manufacture nationale des fusils de Paris)**
 - Pièce 8 – *Lettre de Petiet au Directoire sur les dispositions prises pour faire transporter au magasin général des Feuillants les armes déposées au collège d'Harcourt, 19 floréal IV/8 May 1796.*
- **AF/III/154B**
- **Dossier 731 (Mémoires soumis au bureau Militaire : inventions, marchés et fournitures.)**
 - Pièce 9 – *Soumission des citoyens Lanchère Jean (père) et Lanchère François (fils), pour la levée et l'entretien des chevaux destinés au service de l'artillerie des armées du Nord, de Sambre-et Meuse, de l'Intérieur et de la place de Metz, 4 pluviôse IV/24 Jan. 1796.*
- **AF/III/156**
- **Dossier 735 (Circulaires du ministre de la Guerre Schérer)**
 - Pièces 1 à 1i – *Conditions de l'adjudication au rabais du service des Équipages d'artillerie au citoyen Lanchère fils, Frimaire an VII.*
 - **Dossier 736 (Circulaires des ministres de la Guerre Milet-Mureau et Bernadotte)**
 - Pièce 18 – *Circulaire adressée aux commissaires ordonnateurs et ordinaires des guerres leur demandant de contrôler le moyen qu'emploiera la compagnie Rochefort, chargée du service des Étapes et convois militaires, pour assurer la marche des conscrits qui doivent former le complément de la levée, 5 floréal VII/24 April 1799;*
 - Pièce 19 – *Circulaire adressée aux administrations centrales de département et aux commissaires du Directoire près celles-ci relative au moyen qu'emploiera la compagnie Rochefort, chargée du service des Étapes et convois militaires, pour assurer la marche des conscrits qui doivent former le complément de la levée, 5 floréal VII/24 April 1799;*
 - Pièce 63 – *Rapport du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire sur les mesures prises pour assurer le service des subsistances des armées du Danube et d'Helvétie par l'intermédiaire de la compagnie Rochefort qui demeure chargée de ce service, la compagnie Lecrocq ne l'ayant pas accepté (analyse jointe), 9 floréal VII/28 April 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/158 (Commission militaire du Conseil des Cinq-Cents)**

▪ **Dossier 747 (Dilapidations des fournisseurs de l'Armée)**

- Pièces 2-3 – *Lettre de Pirson, ex-président de l'administration centrale du département de Sambre-et-Meuse, au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour lui communiquer le compte de gestion de l'administration centrale du département de Sambre-et-Meuse, destituée par arrêté du Directoire du 12 fructidor an VI pour avoir dénoncé le vol par Paulée, protégé du ministre des Finances, de 20 millions de biens nationaux des départements réunis ; Pirson dénonce, en outre, Ramel et Scherer pour leurs dilapidations, Duval pour ses détentions arbitraires et François de Neufchâteau pour ses circulaires "empoisonnées" (analyse jointe), 6 messidor VII/24 June 1799;*
- Pièces 7-8 – *Lettre de 71 citoyens de la commune de Valenciennes (Nord) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour dénoncer des dilapidations : affectation de 13 officiers de santé à l'hospice militaire de Valenciennes, plainte contre deux commissaires des guerres, dont Tamboise, et contre l'ex-ministre Scherer, accusé d'avoir vendu 60 000 livres de bombes au citoyen Gossuin, de Liège (analyse jointe), 6 messidor VII/24 June 1799. Copie à la suite d'une lettre de Scherer du 2 pluviôse an VII refusant du bois pour le chauffage de l'hospice général;*
- Pièce 9 – *Lettre de 38 "républicains" de la commune de La Rochelle (Charente-Maritime) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour dénoncer les nombreuses dilapidations faites par ordre de Scherer, 7 messidor VII/25 June 1799;*
- Pièces 10-11 – *Lettre de [Samuel] Cerf, [ceinturier à Paris], au président du Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour dénoncer deux marchés passés par l'ex-ministre Scherer pour fournitures d'équipement (analyse jointe), 7 messidor VII/25 June 1799;*
- Pièce 12 – *Déclaration de L.-J. Ovigneau, garde-magasin de l'Arsenal, relative aux ventes de plomb, fer, acier, bombes et obus faites par ordre de Scherer, ministre de la Guerre, sans date/undated;*
- Pièce 29 – *Lettre jointe d'un abonné du Bulletin universel, écrivant de Nantes pour dénoncer les profits scandaleux des Demangeat, cousins de l'ex-directeur Reubell, entrepreneurs de la fonderie d'Indret et des forges nationales de Moisdon-la-Rivière et Gravotel [commune de Moisdon-la-Rivière] (Loire-Atlantique), 17 messidor VII/5 July 1799;*
- Pièce 34 – *Lettre de Dubois-Dubais, membre du Conseil des Anciens, à la commission des Cinq-Cents pour lui transmettre une lettre dénonçant des dilapidateurs, 26 messidor VII/14 July 1799;*
- Pièce 35 – *Lettre jointe de l'adjudant général Boisson-Quency, ancien chef d'état-major, chargé par le Gouvernement de la comptabilité générale de l'expédition des Indes occidentales, mettant en cause deux complices de l'ex-ministre Scherer, Darguesse, secrétaire privé, et Denervo, chef du bureau des Fonds à la 6^e division du ministère de la Guerre, 24 messidor VII/12 July 1799;*
- Pièce 36 – *Notes sur les marchés scandaleux relatifs au service de la Marine, sans date/undated;*
- Pièce 37 – *Lettre (copie) de l'administration municipale du canton de Bar-sur-Aube (Aube) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents sur les dilapidations des entreprises des subsistances, étapes et convois militaires, 19 messidor VII/7 July 1799;*
- Pièce 39 – *Lettre (copie) de Morla, ancien ingénieur géographe des Ponts-et-chaussées, au président du Conseil des Cinq-Cents dénonçant la fortune de Merlin de Thionville et le trafic des congés militaires mené par Scherer, 22 messidor VII/10 July 1799;*
- Pièce 42 – *Lettre (copie) du général Debelle, commandant en chef l'artillerie à l'armée d'Italie, au président du Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour se justifier des inculpations dirigées*

- contre lui par l'ex-ministre Scherer au sujet de ventes de bouches à feu à Juliers, Luxembourg, Maestricht, Mayence, Metz et Venloo, 27 messidor VII/15 July 1799;*
- *Pièce 43 – Lettre et pièces jointes (copies) adressées à Ponterie-Escaut, député de la Dordogne, au Conseil des Cinq-Cents, par l'administration municipale de la commune de Bergerac au sujet de ventes publiques d'effets d'habillement et de fusils pratiquées au magasin national de Bordeaux, 2 thermidor VII/20 July 1799;*
 - *Pièce 44 – Déclarations (copie) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents d'Alexis Barthélémy, ancien chef d'atelier à l'arsenal de Belfort, au sujet de ventes frauduleuses de munitions à l'arsenal de Belfort et à l'arsenal de Porrentruy, 3 thermidor VII/21 July 1799;*
 - *Pièce 45 – Lettre et pièces jointes (copie) adressées au Corps législatif par Xiuxet Tauquin, commissaire du Directoire par l'administration municipale du canton de Collioure (Pyrénées-Orientales), pour dénoncer des dilapidateurs : ventes de pièces de canons et de boulets par Mainville, directeur d'artillerie à Perpignan, Nogués, garde magasin d'artillerie de Collioure, Bertin, capitaine d'artillerie faisant fonction de sous-directeur, enlèvement des balustrades en fer de l'église des jacobins de Collioure transformée en entrepôt, vente de poudre et de boulets au bey de Tunis, envoi à Narbonne de 12 000 livres de fer à Dubosc, propriétaire de forges, 12 thermidor VII/30 July 1799;*
 - *Pièce 46 – Extrait du procès-verbal du Conseil des Cinq-Cents relatif à des marchés frauduleux de munitions faits par le citoyen Félix, de Maubeuge (Nord), et par l'ex-ministre Scherer à Briançon (Hautes-Alpes) et à des fournitures de bas et de souliers de mauvaise qualité dans le département de Jemmapes, 16 thermidor VII/3 Aug. 1799;*
 - *Pièces 48-49 – Lettre de Valentin Blanc, président de l'administration municipale du canton de Saint-Bonnot (Hautes-Alpes), au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour se plaindre des compagnies Bayard, Bodin et Rapinat, chargées du service des Étapes et pour dénoncer les commissaires des guerres qui vendent des permissions aux conscrits (analyse jointe), 30 messidor VII/18 July 1799;*
 - *Pièces 50-51 – Lettre de l'administration municipale du canton d'Aubagne (Bouches-du-Rhône) au président du Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour dénoncer les dilapidations des entrepreneurs des étapes militaires et pour réclamer contre un arrêté de l'administration centrale du département qui oblige la commune d'Aubagne à fournir le pain, le vin et la soupe aux militaires de passage (analyse jointe), 30 prairial VII/18 June 1799;*
 - *Pièces 53-54 – Lettre de l'administration municipale du canton de Habsheim (Haut-Rhin), au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour exposer le despotisme que les fournisseurs aux armées ont fait subir aux citoyens du canton (analyse jointe), 18 messidor VII/6 July 1799;*
 - *Pièce 55 – Adresse de 276 citoyens du département du Léman au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour la punition des dilapidateurs, nommément Faipoult, Rapinat, Rivaud, Scherer et Trouvé, 8 messidor VII/26 June 1799;*
 - *Pièces 56-57 – Lettre d'une soixantaine de républicains de Rambervillers (Vosges) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour dénoncer la vente par Scherer d'une grande quantité de bombes, obus et grenades à des maîtres de forges du canton (analyse jointe), 26 messidor VII/14 July 1799;*
 - *Pièces 58-59 – Lettre d'une centaine de républicains de Strasbourg (Bas-Rhin) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour le féliciter du coup d'État du 30 prairial et demander le châtimement de l'agent qui, en l'an VI, a vendu à Strasbourg les fournitures des lits des hôpitaux militaires et les pallissades du fort Vauban (analyse jointe), 30 messidor VII/18 July 1799;*
 - *Pièce 60 – Lettre de la société politique de Caen (Calvados, 320 signataires) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents dénonçant les ventes frauduleuses faites dans les magasins nationaux de Caen, et les dilapidations commises par Dubois, directeur de l'arsenal, et Hion, commissaire ordonnateur, 1 thermidor VII/19 July 1799;*

- Pièces 61-62 – *Lettre d'une quarantaine de citoyens du canton de Bourg-Saint-Maurice (Mont-Blanc) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour se plaindre de ce que les défenseurs de la République gravissent pieds nus les glaciers du Grand-Saint-Bernard et des épithètes injurieuses distribuées aux républicains par les contre-révolutionnaires et les dilapidateurs (analyse jointe)*, 6 thermidor VII/24 July 1799;
 - Pièces 63-64 – *Lettre de 110 républicains de la commune de Barjols (Var) au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour demander la confiscation des biens de tous les entrepreneurs et fournisseurs de l'armée et se plaindre de ce que la subsistance des troupes dans les départements du Midi soit assurée par la population (analyse jointe)*, sans date/undated [thermidor an VII];
 - Pièce 66 – *Lettre de Miquel, ancien médecin du dépôt de mendicité de Nancy (Meurthe-et-Moselle) au président du Conseil des Cinq-Cents dénonçant le marché passé par l'ex-ministre de l'Intérieur François de Neufchâteau pour la fourniture des dépôts de mendicité*, 8 messidor VII/26 June 1799;
 - Pièces 67-68 – *Lettre de Miquel donnant au Conseil des Cinq-Cents de nouveaux détails sur l'affaire (analyse jointe)*, 10 thermidor VII/28 July 1799;
 - Pièces 71-72 – *Lettre de Depottre, chef de brigade d'artillerie à l'armée d'Italie, au président du Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour lui communiquer la lettre qu'il vient d'écrire au ministre de la Guerre au sujet des inculpations dirigées contre le général Debelle par l'ex-ministre Scherer (analyse jointe)*, 2 thermidor VII/20 July 1799;
 - Pièces 73-74 – *Copies jointes de la lettre au ministre de la Guerre*, 2 thermidor VII/20 July 1799;
 - Pièce 75 – *Lettre de Baron, ex-capitaine d'artillerie, au Conseil des Cinq-Cents pour demander la traduction devant les tribunaux des chefs et sous-chefs du bureau du Personnel de l'artillerie au ministère de la Guerre en raison des protections accordées à des dilapidateurs*, 4 thermidor VII/22 July 1799;
 - Pièce 78 – *Copie par Pignère La Boulloye, pensionnaire des Invalides, ancien chef de la 5^e division, de pièces relatives aux dilapidations commises par la compagnie Philippe, entrepreneur des fournitures générales des Invalides : mémoire de Deverlange, membre du conseil d'administration, exposant les abus des munitionnaires Voyart, Pelletier-Chambure, Thorel et Detail ; extraits de procès-verbal de visite des magasins par des experts*, 30 thermidor VII/17 Aug. 1799;
 - Pièce 79 – *Note de Dabray, membre du Conseil des Cinq-Cents, relative à l'achat et à l'exportation d'armes par les administrateurs du département des Alpes-Maritimes et aux compagnies Rochefort et Bodin, protégées par Troussel, commissaire ordonnateur à Marseille, et Renaud, commissaire des guerres à Nice*, sans date [an VII].
 - **Dossier 748 (Projets d'organisation militaire)**
 - *Pièce 19-20 – Lettre de L. Van Rhuylne, de Bruxelles (Dyle), au Conseil des Cinq-Cents, sur l'urgence de rassembler une armée en Belgique pour prévenir une insurrection générale et sur les moyens de faire rentrer les contributions arriérées (analyse jointe)*, 28 messidor VII/16 July 1799.
- **AF/III/183 (Archives du Directoire exécutif. Guerre. Volume IV [an IV – an VIII] – Rapports ministériels)**
- **Dossier 839 (Hôpitaux militaires)**
 - Pièce 1 – *Traité proposé pour le service des hôpitaux sédentaires et ambulants de l'armée d'Italie par la compagnie Souiris*, sans date/undated (an IV);
 - Pièces 2-4 – *Observations et pièces justificatives fournies par Souiris, directeur des Vivres, section Viandes, des 3^e et 4^e divisions militaires à Metz*, sans date/undated (an IV);

- Pièce 5 – *Observations de Pétiet, ministre de la Guerre, sur l'entreprise des hôpitaux de l'armée d'Italie et sur les conditions proposées par la compagnie Souiris, sans date/undated (an IV);*
- Pièce 24 – *Traité passé par le ministre de la Guerre avec la compagnie Mannier (copie), 9 prairial V/28 May 1797.*
- **Dossier 840**
- Pièces 17-18 – *Rapport du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire au sujet des plaintes portées contre les entrepreneurs Cerf-Berr par le général Bonaparte, au sujet du transport des vivres et des hôpitaux de l'armée d'Italie, 4 messidor IV/22 June 1796;*
- Pièce 19 – *Lettre du général Bonaparte au ministre de la Guerre, 27 prairial IV/15 June 1796.*
- **Dossier 841**
- Pièce 2 – *Compte de l'agence militaire de Lombardie, du 3 prairial au 9 fructidor an IV (brumaire an V);*
- *Proclamation du général en chef de l'armée d'Italie et du commissaire du Directoire exécutif près les armées d'Italie et des Alpes.*
- **Dossier 842 (Remontes et dépôts)**
- Pièces 11-12 – *Lettre (copie) adressée au ministre de la Guerre par Lanchère père et fils, entrepreneurs des équipages d'artillerie, au sujet de la répartition entre leur entreprise et les entreprises Boursault et Cerf-Berr des fournitures de chevaux d'artillerie à l'armée de l'Intérieur (analyse jointe), 19 ventôse IV/9 March 1796;*
- Pièces 13-16 – *Lettre et rapport du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire sur les mesures prises pour faire remplacer à l'armée de Sambre-et-Meuse les chevaux que l'artillerie a perdus (analyses jointes), 29 messidor IV/17 July 1796;*
- Pièces 17-18 – *Lettre du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire relative aux mesures prises pour activer la fourniture des chevaux de remonte à l'armée de Sambre-et-Meuse par les citoyens Godard (analyse jointe), 11 brumaire V/1 Nov. 1796.*
- **Dossier 844 (Transports et convois)**
- Pièce 35 – *Lettre du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire annonçant la mise en entreprise générale du service des Transports militaires de l'Intérieur à compter du 1er vendémiaire suivant, 14 prairial V/2 June 1797;*
- Pièce 36 – *Conditions jointes de l'adjudication des transports militaires de l'Intérieur (impr.), prairial an V.*

- **AF/III/184 (Archives du Directoire exécutif. Guerre. Volume IV [an IV – an VIII] – Rapports du Ministre de la Guerre)**
- **Dossier 847 (Avances et remboursements à des fournisseurs)**
- Pièces 26 – *Lettre de Pétiet, ministre de la Guerre, au Directoire au sujet des sommes à avancer à la compagnie Lanchère, entrepreneur des équipages d'artillerie de l'armée de Sambre-et-Meuse, 27 germinal IV/16 April 1796.*
- **Dossier 848**
- **Pièces 100-164 (Marchés relatifs à l'approvisionnement des armées et des divisions militaires)**
- Pièces 100-101 – *Lettre d'Aubert-Dubayet, ministre de la Guerre, au Directoire au sujet de l'état des marchés relatifs à l'approvisionnement des armées demandé par le Directoire dans son arrêté du 23 frimaire an IV (analyse jointe), 25 frimaire IV/16 Dec. 1795;*
- Pièce 102 – *Projet de marché pour la fourniture des blés nécessaires aux armées des Alpes, d'Italie, des Pyrénées-Orientales et Occidentales et aux divisions militaires qui en dépendent, par Bartholomeo Peragallo, négociant à Gênes, Sabin Peragallo, négociant à Marseille,*

Geoffroy Rebuffat et compagnie, négociants à Livourne, au nom de la compagnie Christophe Flachet, La Porte et Castellin, 6 nivôse IV/27 Dec. 1795;

- *Pièce 108 – Note de recommandation de Merlin de Thionville à Lagarde en faveur des associés Neu et Lafontaine, sans date/undated;*
- *Pièce 111 – Lettre des entrepreneurs de la compagnie Rousseau à Reubell pour lui transmettre la copie du mémoire et du projet d'arrêté concernant le service des Fourrages militaires, 21 floréal IV/10 May 1796;*
- *Pièces 117-119 – Mémoire et traité d'entreprise générale de la compagnie Jean-Louis-Joseph Rousseau, messidor an IV;*
- *Pièces 120-121 – Note (en double) de la compagnie Rousseau en réponse aux questions posées par le ministre de la Guerre après l'examen de la soumission d'entreprise générale, 25 messidor IV/13 July 1796;*
- *Pièce 163 – Lettre du ministre de la Guerre au Directoire pour lui transmettre le marché Gobert et Lanoue, 1 thermidor IV/19 July 1796.*

Pièces 165-166 (Armée d'Italie)

- *Pièces 165-166 – Marché passé par la compagnie Bodin pour l'approvisionnement extraordinaire de l'armée d'Italie et de la 23e division militaire (impr.), 28 pluviôse V/16 Feb. 1797). Note jointe pour le citoyen Chaalons.*

Pièces 167-189 (Armées de Sambre-et-Meuse, du Nord et de Rhin-et-Moselle)

- *Pièce 167 – Rapport de Pétiet, ministre de la Guerre, au Directoire relatif à la demande de paiement des citoyens Fluys et Bode, négociants hollandais pour fournitures de viande à l'armée de Sambre-et-Meuse, 27 ventôse IV/17 March 1796;*
- *Pièce 169 – Analyse par la section de la Guerre du Directoire du rapport du ministre de la Guerre relatif au citoyen Ottevaer, fournisseur de grains à l'armée du Nord, 27 prairial IV/15 June 1796;*
- *Pièce 170 – Rapport des munitionnaires généraux des subsistances militaires des 1re, 2e, 3e, 4e, 5e, 6e, 24e et 25e divisions militaires au ministre de la Guerre pour se justifier des plaintes portées contre leurs services (signé Delannoy, Dumas, Gobert, Poulain et Vanlerberghe), 15 ventôse V/5 March 1797;*
- *Pièce 171 – État général joint de la situation des magasins des vivres au 30 pluviôse an V;*
- *Pièce 172 – État général joint de la situation des magasins de fourrages au 30 pluviôse an V;*
- *Pièce 173 – Rapport de Pétiet, ministre de la Guerre, au Directoire sur le projet de soumission de Isaac May, négociant à Strasbourg, pour l'entreprise des subsistances militaires des armées de Sambre-et-Meuse et de Rhin-et-Moselle, 22 germinal V/11 April 1797;*
- *Pièces 174-175 – Projets de soumission joints adressés au Directoire et au ministre de la Guerre, sans date/undated.*

➤ **AF/III/185 (Archives du Directoire exécutif. Guerre. Volume IV [an IV – an VIII] – Armée d'Italie, an II – an VI)**

▪ **Dossier 850**

- *Dossier B : Objets divers. Comptabilité de la compagnie Flachet, La Porte et Castellin. Mémoire de Faipoult (Guillaume-Charles), envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire à Gênes, relatif aux recettes faites à Gênes par la compagnie Flachet, La Porte et Castellin et résultant des marchés d'objets précieux passés les 18 et 28 messidor an IV avec la Trésorerie nationale, 2 pluviôse V/21 Jan. 1797.*

▪ **Dossier 853**

- Pièces 27-30 – *Copies jointes des arrêtés des représentants du peuple Maisse, Peyre et Ritter relatifs à la poste militaire, aux fourrages et au mode général de comptabilité, 6 floréal III – 5 vendémiaire IV/25 April – 27 Sep. 1795;*
- Pièce 33 – *Lettre adressée au comité de Salut public et au comité de Sûreté générale par Dabray (Joseph-Séraphin), membre du Conseil des Cinq-Cents, pour demander le rappel du Peyre et la destitution de Baumont, président de l'administration municipale de Nice, et pour dénoncer la nomination d'Anglas au tribunal de cassation des Alpes-Maritimes, 12 brumaire IV/3 Nov. 1795;*
- Pièce 35 – *Lettre de Maisse, commissaire du Gouvernement près l'armée d'Italie et des Alpes, au Directoire exécutif transmettant la lettre qu'il a reçue de Peyre, 6 frimaire IV/27 Nov. 1795;*
- Pièce 38 – *Procès-verbal (copie) joint de la conférence secrète tenue par Maisse avec les agents en chef de toutes les administrations de l'armée d'Italie, 17 frimaire IV/8 Dec. 1795;*
- Pièce 39 – *Aperçu (copie) des dépenses des administrations de l'armée d'Italie;*
- Pièces 40-41 – *Arrêtés (copies) du représentant du peuple Ritzer, commissaire du Gouvernement près l'armée d'Italie et des Alpes, relatifs à la vente des olives provenant des biens nationaux des pays conquis en Piémont, 18 frimaire IV/9 Dec. 1795;*
- Pièce 48 - *Mémoire du citoyen Rebout [ou Reboul, sans doute le député de l'Hérault à la Législative (Henri-Paul-Irène)] sur les malversations des administrations militaires de l'armée d'Italie, 11 ventôse IV/1 March 1796;*
- Pièce 52 – *Lettre de Faipoult, ministre de la République près la République de Gênes, au président du Directoire relative à la situation déplorable de l'armée d'Italie, au départ de Saliceti pour Gênes et à l'expédition projetée sur l'île de Gavi, 2 germinal IV/22 March 1796;*
- Pièce 53 – *Lettre adressée de Savone par Saliceti, commissaire civil près l'armée d'Italie, au Directoire au sujet des ressources tirées de la vente de la prise anglaise se trouvant à Livourne, 6 germinal IV/26 March 1796;*
- Pièce 54 – *Lettre de Saliceti, commissaire civil près l'armée d'Italie, au Directoire exposant les moyens à employer pour contraindre le Gouvernement génois à consentir à un emprunt ; il suspend cependant toute opération avant de connaître l'avis du général Bonaparte qui vient d'arriver à Nice, 6 germinal IV/26 March 1796;*
- Pièces 56-57 – *Analyse par le cabinet historique et topographique (général Clarke) des lettres reçues du citoyen Gandolphi, observateur à l'armée d'Italie : dénonciations contre les employés des fourrages de Loano, réclamation au sujet de ses appointements [sans doute germinal an IV];*
- Pièce 59 – *Rapport de Pétiet, ministre de la Guerre, au Directoire au sujet du mémoire du citoyen Reboul (sic) sur les désordres de l'administration de l'armée d'Italie, 24 germinal IV/13 April 1796;*
- Pièce 65 – *Notes anonymes sur les moyens de tirer le plus grand parti des taxes à imposer aux habitants des États du Pape et du roi de Naples et des deux Siciles, floréal an IV;*
- Pièce 68 – *Opinion du citoyen Durand, négociant français à Gênes, sur les contributions à imposer à Naples, à Rome, à Venise, à Livourne, à Lucques, à Modène, à Gênes, aux États indépendants et à la Lombardie, floréal an IV;*
- Pièce 69 – *Note du citoyen Martorelli sur les contributions susceptibles d'être imposées à la Lombardie autrichienne, aux États de Parme et de Modène, au duché de Toscane, aux États de Rome et de Naples et à la République de Venise, floréal an IV;*
- Pièce 70 – *Lettre de Saliceti au Directoire sur l'utilisation des ressources et le recouvrement des contributions des pays conquis, floréal an IV;*

- Pièce 71 – *Arrêté joint donnant le citoyen Hector Sonolet, agent en chef des vivres de l'armée d'Italie, 16 floréal IV/5 May 1796;*
- Pièce 72 – *Arrêté joint supprimant les achats de fournitures par les entrepreneurs pour le service courant dans les pays conquis, 16 floréal IV/5 May 1796;*
- Pièce 73 – *Arrêtés (copie) pris par Bonaparte, général en chef de l'armée d'Italie et par Saliceti, commissaire du Directoire près l'armée d'Italie, relatif aux subsistances, 19 floréal IV/8 May 1796;*
- Pièce 77 – *Lettre des commissaires de la Trésorerie nationale au Directoire pour envoyer copie d'un rapport sur la situation du service de la Trésorerie à l'armée d'Italie, 29 floréal IV/18 May 1796;*
- Pièce 78 – *Rapport (copie) joint de Legros, contrôleur des dépenses de l'armée d'Italie, aux commissaires de la Trésorerie nationale sur les changements intervenus dans le service de la Trésorerie depuis l'arrivée du général Bonaparte, sans date/undated;*
- Pièce 79 – *Lettre adressée au Directoire par Saliceti pour l'informer de la formation d'une caisse particulière pour les matières d'or et d'argent tirée des pays conquis, 4 prairial IV/23 May 1796;*
- Pièce 80 – *Arrêté joint (copie) chargeant l'ordonnateur en chef de l'armée d'Italie de faire parvenir à Gênes toute l'argenterie et les bijoux existant dans la caisse du payeur de l'armée et de les remettre au banquier [de Gênes] Balbi, 1 prairial IV/20 May 1796;*
- Pièce 81 – *Arrêté joint (copie) autorisant l'ordonnateur en chef de l'armée d'Italie à dresser un inventaire sommaire des bijoux et argenterie provenant des dépôts publics de Milan et le chargeant de les remettre au banquier Balbi;*
- Pièce 83 – *Lettre de Saliceti au Directoire pour lui envoyer l'état des contributions levées dans les pays conquis et lui rendre compte de l'établissement d'agents militaires dans le Piémont pour activer la rentrée des contributions, de la nomination des citoyens Morin, ancien accusateur militaire, Reboul, ancien membre du Corps législatif, et Patrand, ancien professeur de mathématiques, en qualité d'agents militaires en Lombardie, et du citoyen Tinnet [ou Tinet], artiste attaché à la légation de Toscane, en qualité d'agent chargé à la légation de Toscane de la recherche, du triage et de l'envoi des objets d'art et de sciences, 4 prairial IV/23 May 1796;*
- Pièce 84 – *Tableau joint des contributions levées dans le Piémont, la Lombardie et les duchés de Parme et de Modène, 4 prairial IV/23 May 1796;*
- Pièce 87 – *Arrêté joint relatif aux objets d'art et de sciences des villes conquises : nomination du citoyen Pierre-Jacques Tinet, attaché à la légation de Toscane en qualité d'agent près l'armée d'Italie chargé de ramener les tableaux, chefs-d'œuvre et monuments antiques, 30 floréal IV/19 May 1796;*
- Pièce 88 – *Lettre de Saliceti au Directoire au sujet de la nomination du banquier Balbi et des sommes et envois de matières d'or et d'argent qui lui sont ou lui seront adressées, 11 prairial IV/30 May 1796;*
- Pièce 99 – *Lettre de Saliceti au Directoire pour demander des éclaircissements au sujet des fonctions de Pinsot, qui se dit chargé de tout ce qui a trait aux contributions et réquisitions, 23 prairial IV/11 June 1796;*
- Pièce 100 – *Lettre de Sauty, ancien trésorier des armées, au Directoire, pour exposer ses observations sur le traité du 26 floréal conclu avec le roi de Sardaigne et le parti à tirer des conquêtes en Italie, 13 prairial IV/1 June 1796;*
- Pièces 101-102 – *Analyse des observations du citoyen Sauty;*
- Pièce 107 – *Notes sur les caisses d'argenterie provenant de la contribution du duché de Parme. sans date/undated [prairial an IV];*

- Pièce 108 – *État sommaire des bijoux et argenterie provenant du mont-de-piété de Milan, sans date/undated [praïrial an IV];*
- Pièce 110 – *Lettre de Laporte (François-Alexis-Christophe), directeur de la compagnie Flachat, à Reubell pour se plaindre de l'administration de Pinsot et demander son rappel, 2 messidor IV/20 June 1796;*
- Pièce 111 – *Lettre de Garrau et Saliceti au Directoire au sujet de l'administration de Pinsot, 2 messidor IV/20 June 1796;*
- Pièce 112 – *Arrêté bilingue des commissaires du Directoire près les armées d'Italie et des Alpes relatif aux restitutions d'objets d'or et d'argent de peu de valeur et de tous les objets d'habillement déposés au Mont-de-piété de Bologne (impr.), 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796;*
- Pièce 113 – *Proclamation du Sénat de Bologne relative à ces restitutions (impr.), 24 June 1796;*
- Pièce 123 – *Lettre de Garrau et Saliceti au Directoire accusant réception des instructions reçues sur les fonctions de Pinsot, 13 messidor IV/1 July 1796;*
- Pièce 144 – *Lettre de Garrau au Directoire au sujet des difficultés que rencontre le recouvrement des créances ennemies détenues par les négociants de Livourne, 24 messidor IV/12 July 1796;*
- Pièce 145 – *Lettre (copie) des consuls de France à Livourne et à Gênes, Belleville et La Chèze, aux commissaires du Directoire près les armées d'Italie et des Alpes, au sujet de la contribution offerte par les députés du commerce de Livourne, 17 messidor IV/5 July 1796;*
- Pièce 146 – *Lettres (copie) des consuls de France à Livourne et à Gênes, Belleville et La Chèze, à Garrau au sujet de la remise par les négociants de Livourne de leurs livres de commerce, 22 messidor IV/10 July 1796;*
- Pièce 147 – *Extrait (copie) de la lettre de Miot, ministre de la République à Florence, à Belleville, au sujet des négociants livournais envoyés à Florence pour traiter avec Saliceti par l'intermédiaire du ministre d'Espagne Azara, 21 messidor IV/9 July 1796;*
- Pièce 149 – *Lettre de Bonaparte au Directoire pour lui communiquer la lettre qu'il a écrite à Miot et annoncer le paiement de 7 millions de lettres de change tirées par la Trésorerie sur Gênes, 26 messidor IV/14 July 1796;*
- Pièce 157 – *Lettre de Saliceti au Directoire au sujet de l'état des recouvrements restant à percevoir des impositions dues par les pays conquis et de l'état des réquisitions faites depuis l'entrée de l'armée en Italie ; nouvelles du siège de Mantoue, 3 thermidor IV/21 July 1796;*
- Pièce 159 – *Arrêté du commissaire du Gouvernement Saliceti pris en application de l'arrêté du Directoire du 3 messidor sur le recouvrement des impositions dans les pays conquis, stipulant aux communes de Lombardie le délai de deux décades pour le solde de leur contingent de contributions de guerre, 8 thermidor IV/26 July 1796;*
- Pièce 161 – *État par Saliceti des contributions de guerre levées en Italie, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796;*
- Pièce 162 – *État par Saliceti des caisses publiques saisies au profit de la République, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796;*
- Pièce 163 – *État par Saliceti des objets provenant des monts-de-piété et des dépôts publics, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796;*
- Pièce 164 – *État récapitulatif par Saliceti des caisses et saisies de Bologne, Ferrare et Ravenne, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796;*
- Pièce 165 – *Tableau par Saliceti du produit des contributions ordinaires de la Lombardie, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796;*
- Pièce 166 – *Tableau par Saliceti des impositions indirectes de la Lombardie, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796;*

- Pièce 167 – *État par Saliceti du produit des effets et marchandises vendus au profit de la République*, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796;
- Pièce 168 – *Résumé général par Saliceti des divers états précédents*, 10 thermidor IV/28 July 1796;
- Pièce 172 – *Copie jointe de l'arrêté du 13 messidor an IV chargeant les citoyens Belleville, consul de France à Livourne, et La Chèze, consul de France à Gênes, des opérations relatives aux prises de guerre*;
- Pièce 173 – *Ordonnance de paiement (copie) par le caissier général de l'État de Milan, Giuseppe Ceriani, de la somme de 2 millions sur ordre du général Bonaparte*, 30 thermidor IV/17 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 174 – *Extrait d'une lettre et d'un mémoire de Nerri Corsini, ministre de Toscane à Paris, contre les mesures prises par les agents français depuis l'occupation de Livourne*, 7 thermidor IV/25 July 1796;
- Pièce 175 – *Pétition de l'État de Modène au général Bonaparte pour une diminution de la contribution imposée*, thermidor an IV;
- Pièce 188 – *Lettre de Saliceti et Garrau au Directoire pour exposer les désordres qu'entraîne la confusion des pouvoirs des commissaires du Gouvernement et du général Bonaparte dans la disposition des fonds et pour lui soumettre l'arrêté qu'ils ont pris ordonnant la réunion de toutes les contributions dans une caisse centrale avec défense d'en disposer sinon par arrêté des commissaires du Gouvernement*, 1 fructidor IV/18 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 190 – *Arrêté des commissaires Saliceti et Garrau instituant une caisse centrale pour le produit de toutes contributions, prises de guerre, contributions ordinaires, finances, douanes levées et perçues dans les pays conquis en Italie et fixant les obligations de Ceriani, caissier provisoire de cette caisse centrale*, 2 fructidor IV/19 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 191 – *Arrêté des commissaires Saliceti et Garrau réglant l'exécution du traité passé par la Trésorerie nationale avec les compagnies Flachat, La Porte et Castellin au sujet du produit des contributions et prises de guerres en Italie*;
- Pièce 192 – *Arrêté des commissaires Saliceti et Garrau accordant à la compagnie Flachat, Laporte et Castellin la somme demandée pour l'exécution des engagements contractés envers la Trésorerie nationale*, 29 thermidor IV/16 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 193 – *Lettre (copie) des commissaires Saliceti et Garrau au ministre des Finances au sujet des ressources pouvant résulter de la rentrée des contributions ; post-scriptum relatif aux soies non ouvrées réclamées par la compagnie Flachat*, 1 fructidor IV/18 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 194 – *Arrêté des commissaires Saliceti et Garrau portant que les toiles fines, soies ouvrées et draps fins font partie des marchandises à remettre à la compagnie Flachat, Laporte et Castellin*, 1 fructidor IV/18 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 195 – *Lettre des commissaires Saliceti et Garrau au Directoire transmettant copie d'une lettre reçue du payeur général de l'armée d'Italie*, 2 fructidor IV/19 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 196 – *Lettre jointe (copie) de Delcros, payeur général de l'armée d'Italie, aux commissaires du Directoire près l'armée d'Italie au sujet des ordres de paiements qui lui ont été adressés par le général Bonaparte*, 1 fructidor IV/18 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 197 – *Lettre jointe (copie) du général Bonaparte au payeur général de l'armée d'Italie*, 28 thermidor IV/15 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 198 – *Lettre de Saliceti et de Garrau au Directoire au sujet du déficit constaté des caisses d'argenterie et de bijoux provenant des monts-de-piété de Bologne*, 2 fructidor IV/19 Aug. 1796;
- Pièce 199 – *Procès-verbal joint (copie) par Legros (Louis- François-Marie), contrôleur des dépenses de l'armée d'Italie, rendant le citoyen Pinsot, ex-commissaire du Directoire à*

l'armée d'Italie, responsable des objets qui pourraient manquer dans les caisses des matières d'or et d'argent et de bijoux provenant des monts-de-piété de Bologne et dirigées sur Tortone, 8 thermidor IV/26 July 1796;

- *Pièce 200 – Lettre de La Porte, directeur de la compagnie Flachet, à Reubell sur la suppression des agents militaires pour la rentrée des contributions et sur les mesures à prendre en vue d'en simplifier la comptabilité, 3 fructidor IV/20 Aug. 1796;*
- *Pièce 205 – Lettre de Saliceti et Garrau au Directoire sur les mesures prises pour le recouvrement des contributions de l'Italie, 9 fructidor IV/26 Aug. 1796;*
- *Pièce 206 – Arrêté joint (copie) fixant à un million par mois le produit des contributions ordinaires et impôts indirects de la Lombardie, 7 fructidor IV/24 Aug. 1796;*
- *Pièce 207 – Arrêté joint (copie) remettant en activité l'atelier des Monnaies de Milan et nommant le citoyen Haller directeur de cet atelier, 7 fructidor IV/24 Aug. 1796;*
- *Pièce 209 – Arrêté joint (copie) affectant les sommes nécessaires à la solde des troupes et aux besoins du service administratif de l'armée d'Italie sur les fonds provenant des contributions versés dans la caisse centrale des contributions des pays conquis établie à Milan, 7 fructidor IV/24 Aug. 1796;*
- *Pièce 210 – Traité (copie) passé entre les commissaires du Directoire près l'armée d'Italie et le chevalier Borghèse, chargé de pouvoirs du ministre des Finances du roi de Sardaigne, au sujet des contributions de guerre du Piémont restant dues, 9 fructidor IV/26 Aug. 1796;*
- *Pièce 211 – Tableau joint des contributions de guerre du Piémont, 9 fructidor IV/26 Aug. 1796;*
- *Pièce 213 – Lettre de Garrau au Directoire au sujet de la levée du séquestre mis sur les marchandises de Livourne appartenant à des Napolitains, 13 fructidor IV/30 Aug. 1796;*
- *Pièce 214 – Lettre du patriote lombard Henri-Michel Laurora à Carnot au sujet de la situation politique de la Lombardie : activité du comité républicain secret de Milan, vexations commises par les agents des administrations militaires de l'armée d'Italie suspects de royalisme, popularité de Bonaparte parmi les habitants, 18 fructidor IV/4 Sep. 1796;*
- *Pièce 220 – Lettre de Garrau au Directoire pour lui adresser les états des contributions de l'Italie de la première décade de fructidor, 20 fructidor IV/6 Sep. 1796;*
- *Pièces 221-224 – États joints;*
- *Pièce 226 – Lettre de Saliceti et Garrau au Directoire au sujet de la levée du séquestre des marchandises de Livourne appartenant à des Napolitains, 25 fructidor IV/11 Sep. 1796;*
- *Pièce 240 – Minute des instructions du Directoire au général Berthier pour l'expédition contre Rome provoquée par le meurtre du général Duphot (rédigées par Bonaparte), [22] nivôse VI/11 Jan. 1798;*
- *Pièce 243 – Minute des instructions du Directoire au général Berthier sur la conduite qu'il devra tenir en Italie comme général en chef (rédigées par Bonaparte), [22] frimaire VI]/12 Dec. 1797;*
- *Pièce 244 – Minute des instructions du Directoire au général Berthier sur la conduite qu'il devra tenir en Italie comme général en chef (rédigées par Bonaparte), [18 ventôse VI]/8 March 1798;*
- *Pièce 248 – Notes de Bonaparte pour la République Cisalpine [adressées au ministre des Relations extérieures] : obligations militaires à imposer à la République cisalpine, pluviôse an VI;*
- *Pièce 249 – Minutes des lettres rédigées par Bonaparte et adressées par le Directoire exécutif, [13 pluviôse VI]/1 Feb. 1798:*
 - *1/ au Directoire exécutif de la République cisalpine pour l'inviter à exciter dans la Suisse italienne un mouvement d'insurrection (cf. tome 3, n° 2424, p. 653);*

- 2/ au général Berthier au sujet des troupes mises à sa disposition pour encourager et soutenir les patriotes des bailliages suisses italiens (cf. n° 2423, p. 652);
 - 3/ note sur les mesures à prendre pour tenir prêtes sur les différentes frontières toutes les forces militaires de la République (cf. n° 2411, p. 638);
 - 4/ au Directoire exécutif de la République batave pour qu'il donne son appui à la descente en Angleterre.
- **AF/III/186 (Archives du Directoire exécutif. Guerre. Volume IV [an IV – an VIII] – Armée d'Angleterre)**
- **Dossier 856, Pièces 1-34 (Armée du Nord, Armée de Sambre-et-Meuse, Armée de Rhin-et-Moselle, Armée du Rhin)**
 - Pièce 12 – Note de [Carnot] sur la réponse à faire à Richard (Joseph-Étienne), représentant en mission à l'armée du Nord, au sujet de traites sur la Hollande destinées à assurer le versement d'un million en numéraire à l'armée de Sambre-et-Meuse, 20 brumaire IV/11 Nov. 1795.
 - **Dossier 857 (Projet de descente en Angleterre. An VI)**
 - Pièce 39 – Note du citoyen H.-G. du Lac au Directoire sur les moyens de ruiner le commerce anglais en facilitant l'armement des corsaires et en entretenant des négociateurs au Maroc, à Tunis et à Alger et sur l'avantage d'une expédition en Irlande avec l'appui des "Deffenders", an IV.
 - **Dossier 859 (Correspondance secrète. Nivôse an IV – Brumaire an V)**
 - Pièces 17-18 – Lettre de l'Irlandais Duckett au Directeur Rewbell pour lui révéler l'existence, en Italie, entre les mains de banquiers dont il peut donner les noms, d'une somme de 7 à 8 millions de livres sterling appartenant au roi Georges (analyse jointe), 7 prairial IV/26 May 1796;
 - Pièce 56 – Marché passé entre le ministre de la Guerre et le major général Ira Allen pour la fourniture de 20 000 fusils à baïonnette, 23 messidor IV/11 July 1796;
 - Pièce 92 – Copie jointe des articles séparés et secrets du traité de paix conclu à Bâle le 5 avril 1795 entre le baron de Hardenberg, ministre du roi Frédéric-Guillaume de Prusse, et François Barthélémy, ambassadeur de la République française en Suisse;
 - Pièce 128 – Billet du Truguet, ministre de la Marine, à Clarke au sujet de l'ordonnance de 50 000 livres destinée au général Quantin, 1^{er} jour complémentaire IV/17 Sep. 1796.
 - **Dossier 860 (Correspondance secrète. Vendémiaire-Pluviôse An V)**
 - Pièce 6 – Lettre du général Hoche au général Clarke, pour se plaindre des entraves apportées par la Marine aux préparatifs de l'expédition et de l'insurrection qui s'est mise dans les compagnies de grenadiers ; il commente avec amertume la situation générale, 10 vendémiaire V/1 Oct. 1796;
 - Pièce 8 – Lettre du général Hoche au général Clarke pour annoncer qu'il se rend à Paris afin d'exposer au Directoire les difficultés rencontrées du côté de la Marine, 16 vendémiaire V/7 Oct. 1796;
 - Pièce 12-13 – Lettre de Ira Allen au général Clarke, datée d'Ostende au sujet de la livraison des objets pour lesquels il a passé un marché avec le ministre de la Guerre. Traduction jointe. 12 vendémiaire V/3 Oct. 1796;
 - Pièce 17 – Note de John Bates (allias Ira Allen) proposant de fermer les ports du Portugal, de l'Espagne, de l'Italie et de la Hollande aux vaisseaux anglais et de travailler à établir la république en Irlande et en Angleterre, où la situation intérieure montre une opposition entre le peuple et le Gouvernement et entre le Gouvernement et les soldats (en anglais), an V;

- Pièce 90 – *Lettre du général Hoche au Directoire sur ses préparatifs d'embarquement des troupes et sur sa mauvaise situation financière*, 27 brumaire V/17 Nov. 1796;
- **AF/III/198 (Archives du Directoire exécutif. Guerre. Volume IV [an IV – an VIII] – Comptabilité de la Lombardie et paiements au payeur général de l'armée d'Italie)**
 - **Dossier 910 (Comptabilité de la Lombardie. 1^{er} prairial an IV – 30 frimaire an V)**
 - Pièce 6-7 – Caisse de la province de Milan :
 - Pièce 6 – *Tableau des recettes du 1er prairial au 14 fructidor an IV* (20 May – 31 Aug. 1796);
 - Pièce 7 – *Tableau des dépenses du 1er prairial au 14 fructidor an IV* (20 May – 31 Aug. 1796);
 - Pièce 8 – *Caisse de la poste de Milan. Tableau général des dépenses et versements faits du 1er prairial au 15 fructidor an IV* (20 May – 1 Sep. 1796);
 - Pièce 9 – *Caisse de la loterie de Milan. Tableau général des dépenses et versements faits du 1er prairial au 15 fructidor an IV* (20 May – 1 Sep. 1796);
 - Pièce 10 – *Caisse générale de la finance de Milan. Tableau des dépenses et versements faits du 1er prairial au 5e jour complémentaire de l'an IV* (20 May – 21 Sep. 1796);
 - Pièces 11-14 – Caisse des recouvrements des revenus domaniaux. Tableau des recettes faites du 1er prairial an IV au 30 vendémiaire an V (20 May – 21 Oct. 1796):
 - Pièce 11 – *Tableau des recettes faites depuis le 1^{er} prairial an IV jusqu'au 30 vendémiaire an V* (20 May – 21 Oct. 1796);
 - Pièce 12 – *Tableau des recettes faites pendant le mois de brumaire et frimaire an V*;
 - Pièce 13 – *Tableau général de dépenses et versements faits le 1er prairial an IV au 30 vendémiaire an V*;
 - Pièce 14 – *Tableau des sommes payées et versements faits pendant les mois de brumaire et frimaire an V*.
 - Pièces 15-18 – Comptabilité générale de la Lombardie :
 - Pièce 15 – *Tableau général des recettes et dépenses du 1er prairial an IV au 30 vendémiaire an V* (20 May – 21 Oct. 1796);
 - Pièce 16 – *Tableau général des recettes et dépenses du 1er brumaire au 30 frimaire an V* (22 Oct. – 20 Dec. 1796);
 - Pièce 17 – *Tableau général des recettes et dépenses faites du 1er prairial an IV au 30 frimaire an V* (20 May – 20 Dec. 1796);
 - Pièce 18 – *Observation sur la comptabilité des caisses du Pays*, sans date/undated [an V].
 - **Dossier 911 (Comptabilité de la Lombardie et paiements au payeur général de l'armée d'Italie)**
 - Pièce 1 – *État des contributions payées par la province de Mondovi par l'intermédiaire des agents militaires Mazade, Suchet et Rochejean*, sans date/undated [prairial-fructidor an IV];
 - Pièce 2 – *État des contributions payées par la province d'Alba par l'intermédiaire des agents militaires Villetard puis Rochejean*, sans date/undated [floréal-fructidor an IV];
 - Pièce 3 – *État des contributions payées par la province de Voghera par l'intermédiaire de l'agent [sans doute Jean-Baptiste Galleazzini, ex-maire de Bastia, puis commissaire central du Golo]*, sans date/undated [thermidor an IV];
 - Pièce 4 – *État des contributions payées par la province de Coni par l'intermédiaire de l'agent militaire Lombiac*, sans date/undated [prairial-fructidor an IV];
 - Pièce 5 – *État des contributions payées par la province d'Acqui par l'intermédiaire de l'agent militaire Ottavy*, sans date/undated [messidor-thermidor an IV];

- Pièce 6 – *État des contributions de la province de Tortone et d'Alexandrie par l'intermédiaire de l'agent militaire Barallier*, sans date/undated [floréal-thermidor an IV];
- Pièce 7 – *État récapitulatif de la recette et de l'emploi des sommes provenant des contributions levées sur les provinces du Piémont*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 10 – *État des contributions payées par les Fiefs impériaux par l'intermédiaire de l'agent militaire Gouin*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 11-12 – *État des contributions payées par la Lombardie : versements faits à Ceriani, caissier de la caisse centrale à Milan, du 2 prairial an IV au 30 frimaire an V (21 May – 20 Dec. 1796)*;
- Pièce 13 – *Contributions payées par le duché de Parme*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 14 – *Contributions payées par les États de Modène par l'intermédiaire de l'agent militaire Monglas*, sans date/undated [prairial an IV - brumaire an V];
- Pièce 15 – *Contributions payées par la ville de Bologne*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 16 – *Contributions payées par la ville de Ferrare*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 17 – *Contributions payées par la ville de Ravenne*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 18 – *Contributions payées par la ville de Rome*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 19 – *Contributions payées par le Mantouan*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 20 – *Contributions payées par Massa Carrara et les Fiefs impériaux et reçues par Bakry, receveur des contributions à Livourne*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 21 – *État des prises faites à Livourne d'après l'état fourni par Saliceti, commissaire du Gouvernement près les armées d'Italie et des Alpes*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 22 – *État du produit des diverses caisses publiques saisies*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 23 – *État des contributions et levées partielles*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 24 – *État du produit de la vente des propriétés ennemies saisies*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 25 – *État des recettes diverses faites par le payeur de l'armée*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 26 – *État de l'argenterie, bijoux, diamants, etc., provenant des contributions, des monts-de-piété et des saisies, avec indication de leur emploi*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce 27 – *Tableau général récapitulatif, visé par Garrau, commissaire du Gouvernement près les armées d'Italie et des Alpes, de la recette et de l'emploi des contributions levées sur l'Italie et des saisies opérées depuis l'entrée de l'armée en Italie jusqu'au 30 frimaire an V*;
- Pièce 28 – *État général de tous les versements faits dans la caisse du payeur général (contributions militaires, caisses publiques prises sur l'ennemi), de prairial an IV au 30 frimaire an V (20 May – 20 Dec. 1796)*.

➤ **AF/III/203/A (Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies – Administration Générale)**

▪ **Dossier 929 (Dépenses du Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies)**

- Pièces 1-4 – *Truguet, ministre de la Marine et des Colonies, expose au Directoire exécutif les motifs d'une transaction qu'il avait passée avec la Cie Gaillard et que le Conseil des Cinq-Cents avait incriminée. Message du Directoire transmettant aux Cinq-Cents les explications du ministre*. 12 prairial V/31 May 1797.

▪ **Dossier 930 (Soumissions et marchés adressés par la commission de la Marine et des Colonies au comité des Marchés et Approvisionnements)**

- Pièce 81 – *Le munitonnaire général des vivres de la Marine annonce à Riou, président de la commission de Marine, l'envoi de documents expliquant le marché qu'il a passé le 12 messidor an VI pour la fourniture de vivres aux marins de la République (Signé Ouvrard. Les pièces annoncées font défaut)*. 16 thermidor VII/3 Aug. 1799.

▪ **Dossier 931 (Courses et Prises)**

- Pièces 20-22 – *Pétition de Danet, armateur en course : il demande au Corps législatif que la loi du 29 nivôse an VI, qui déclare confisquables les navires chargés de marchandises anglaises, soit étendue aux navires transportant des marchandises provenant de tout pays ennemi de la République, en particulier du Portugal ; qu'en outre tout navire étranger ayant transité par un port ennemi ne soit admis qu'en relâche dans les ports de la République, 26 pluviôse – thermidor VI (14 Feb. – Aug. 1799);*
- Pièces 23-24 – *Des armateurs, capitaines, officiers et mariniers de Marseille demandent au Conseil des Cinq-Cents de prendre des mesures propres à faire cesser le trafic effectué par des Ottomans entre Lisbonne et l'Italie pour le compte des Anglais, en autorisant la course contre leurs navires, 19 vendémiaire VII/10 Oct. 1798;*
- Pièces 43-45 – *Pétition signée de plus de deux-cents armateurs, négociants et commerçants de Bordeaux défendant le principe de la guerre de course et demandant les mesures propres à la renforcer. Pièce jointe : extraits de lettres trouvées dans des navires neutres. Résolution du Conseil des Cinq-Cents ordonnant le renvoi de cette pétition à la commission des Prises maritimes et la confection d'un message au Directoire relatif à la guerre de course, 15 thermidor & 2 fructidor VII/2 & 19 Aug. 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/203/B (Ministère de la Marine et des Colonies – Administration Générale)**

▪ **Dossier 933 (Mémoires divers)**

- Pièces 8-16 – *Pièces envoyées par le capitaine de frégate Barré, commandant la frégate "l'Alceste", à Bonaparte, général en chef de l'armée d'Égypte, 25 messidor – thermidor VI (13 July – August 1798):*
 - Pièces 9-15 - *Rapport fait par le capitaine Barré au vice-amiral Brueys, commandant des forces navales de la Méditerranée, sur les moyens d'entrer dans le port vieux d'Alexandrie (une copie authentifiée par Barré pour Bonaparte ; trois copies réalisées au ministère de la Marine et accompagnées chacune d'un plan du port d'Alexandrie), 25 messidor VI/13 July 1798;*
 - Pièce 16 – *Copie de la réponse du vice-amiral Brueys au capitaine Barré, 2 thermidor VI/20 July 1798.*
- Pièces 23-24 – *Historique de l'expédition maritime conduite par le vice-amiral Bruix de Brest en Méditerranée en l'an VII, an VII.*

▪ **Dossier 938 (Comptabilité, Vendémiaire an VII)**

- Pièces 1-2 – *Note expliquant les soumissions faites par divers fournisseurs de la Marine qui ont pris des actions dans l'emprunt contre l'Angleterre pendant le mois de fructidor et les jours complémentaires de l'an VI. Lettre d'envoi du ministre Bruix au Directoire, 7 vendémiaire VII/28 Sep. 1798.*

▪ **Dossier 939 (Rapports de l'An IV)**

- Pièces 17-19 – *Le ministre invite le directeur Carnot à écrire à Salicetti, commissaire du Directoire à l'armée d'Italie, pour obtenir que les gouvernements italiens fournissent au port de Toulon les munitions navales (bois, chanvre, toile à voile) qui abondent dans la péninsule. Pièce jointe : extrait d'une lettre de Belleville, consul général en Toscane, exposant les événements survenus récemment en Corse ; les Anglais trouvent en Toscane un soutien important pour leur action dans l'île (15 prairial), 2 messidor IV/20 June 1796.*

▪ **Dossier 940 (Rapports de l'An V)**

- Pièce 56-57 – *Le vice-amiral Truguet conjure le Directoire de procurer l'argent de première nécessité à la Marine, et en particulier au port de Brest : "De l'argent, de l'argent en poste et vous sauvés tout", 10 thermidor V/28 July 1797.*

▪ **Dossier 941 (Rapports ministériels du premier semestre de l'An VI)**

- Pièce 70 – *Observations du ministre adressées au Directoire sur une lettre du général Bonaparte du 2 vendémiaire : le ministre propose de transférer de l'Adriatique à Cadix l'escadre commandée par le contre-amiral Brueys et d'envoyer plusieurs bâtiments à Toulon et à Corfou ; il recommande de "reconnaître la république aristocratique de Malte comme puissance neutre", 14 vendémiaire VI/5 Oct. 1797;*
- Pièce 112 – *Le ministre demande au secrétaire général du Directoire de lui renvoyer deux lettres écrites d'Angleterre à sir Sidney Smith, avec leurs traductions, 28 vendémiaire VI/19 Oct. 1797;*
- Pièces 163-165 – *Projet d'adresse du ministre "aux citoyens de toute profession employés dans le service de la Marine" attirant leur attention sur la proposition faite au Directoire par le commerce de Paris d'accorder une avance financière à la Marine. Lettre du ministre adressant ce projet au Directoire et sollicitant son approbation pour l'impression, 4 nivôse VI/24 Dec. 1797;*
- Pièce 199-200 – *Mémoire adressé par le ministre au Directoire rendant compte de l'état des activités maritimes dans les ports de France ; "il y a 35 jours, ajoute-t-il, que je n'ai pas en un sol à ma disposition" ; l'argent manque pour régler les fournisseurs, 1 ventôse VI/19 Feb. 1798.*
- **Dossier 943 (Rapports de l'An VII)**
- Pièces 80-81 – *Rapport du ministre au Directoire sur les abus commis par les corsaires français, en particulier sur les côtes hollandaises ; il demande l'adoption d'une nouvelle législation de la course, en remplacement de la loi du 29 nivôse an VI, 17 pluviôse VII/5 Feb. 1799.*
- **AF/III/257**
- f°29 – Decree granting Michel-Jean Simons indefinite leave to reside in Paris.
- **AF/III/295**
- *Fiche Schérer.* – Confidential intelligence claiming that Schérer lost 100,000 francs playing *biribi* and sold leaves of absence to soldiers.
- **AF/III/309**
- *Ritter au Directoire.* Nice, 10 ventôse IV/29 Feb. 1796 – Letter from Ritter to the Directory concerning supply problems of the *Armée d'Italie*.
- **AF/III/315**
- **Dossier 1246**
- *Instructions du Directoire exécutif aux commissaires civils aux armées du 22 brumaire an IV (13 Nov. 1795).*
- **AF/III/316**
- **Dossier 1252**
- *Arrêté du Directoire exécutif ordonnant que le citoyen Bassal se rendra sans délai à Bâle, où il se conformera aux instructions qui lui seront données par le Gouvernement, 24 brumaire IV/15 Nov. 1795.*
- **AF/III/331**
- **Dossier 1398**
- *Lettre de Maisse au Directoire, 3 frimaire IV/24 Nov. 1795;*
- *Lettre du Directoire à Peyre et à Maisse, 13 frimaire IV/4 Dec. 1795.*

- **Dossier 1442**
 - *Soumission faite par les citoyens Bauwens, Betts et compagnie d'échanger des pièces d'argenterie provenant des dépouilles des églises contre du numéraire et du papier sur l'étranger, 14 frimaire IV/5 Dec. 1795.*

- **AF/III/337**
 - **Dossier 1465**
 - *Arrêté permettant aux Citoyens Gildemester, Fallope, Vannes & Cie. d'exporter pour 1 700 000 livres de coton ou laine, 2 600 000 livres de sucre et 36 000 livres pesant d'indigo, 2 nivôse IV/23 Dec. 1795.*

- **AF/III/343**
 - **Dossier 1533**
 - *Rapport du ministre des Finances au Directoire, 4 pluviôse IV/24 Jan. 1796 – Complaint about civilian commissioners attached to armies illegally withdrawing mandates territoriaux from public coffers.*
 - **Dossier 1540**
 - *Arrêté du Directoire, 8 pluviôse IV/28 Jan. 1796 – Directory's response to the complaint.*
 - **Dossier 1542**
 - *Arrêté nommant Saliceti commissaire à l'armée d'Italie, 10 pluviôse IV/30 Jan. 1796.*

- **AF/III/345, dossier 1555 (Archives du Directoire exécutif (an IV - an VIII))**
 - **Plaque 1555**
 - *Pièce 14-18 – Arrêté et minutes autorisant le citoyen Caucault à négocier un emprunt de 40 millions à Gênes et portant intérêt à 3.5%, 15 pluviôse IV/4 Feb. 1796;*
 - *Pièces 19 – Minute détaillant les conditions acceptables pour négocier un traité avec le Pape;*
 - *Pièce 20 – Articles additionnels et secrets;*
 - *Pièce 21 – Addition secrète aux instructions et pouvoirs;*
 - *Pièce 48-50 – Lettre du citoyen Jean-Baptiste Paulée aux membres composant le Directoire exécutif, 15 pluviôse IV/4 Feb. 1796;*
 - *Pièce 49 – Projet de Banque adressé par le citoyen Jean-Baptiste Paulée au Directoire exécutif, 15 pluviôse IV/4 Feb. 1796;*
 - *Pièce 50 – Lettre manuscrite du Directoire exécutif au citoyen Piscatory (Commissaire de la Trésorerie nationale) l'autorisant à payer 20 millions en rescriptions au citoyen Riehard, porteur d'un mandat du ministre de l'intérieur.*
 - **Plaque 1557**
 - *Le Directoire à Ritter. Paris, 16 pluviôse IV/5 Feb. 1796 – Letter from the Directory to Ritter concerning supply problems of the Armée d'Italie.*

- **AF/III/346**
 - **Dossier 1570**
 - *Circulaire du Directoire, 20 pluviôse IV/9 Feb. 1796 – Instructions to civilian commissioners attached to armies complimenting those of 22 brumaire IV (see AF/III/315).*

- **AF/III/350**
 - **Dossier 1606**
 - *Séance du 3 ventôse an IV (22 Feb. 1796) – Law authorising the sale of a state building in the Rue Neuve-des-Capucins.*

- **AF/III/352**
 - **Dossier 1628**
 - *Arrêté approuvant les offres du Citoyen Sadler, porteur d'environ 43 000 pistoles des traites de la maison Magon-Labalue sur celle Sahiée, Guillet, et Cie, de Cadix, de rendre ces traites en les lui remboursant à raison de onze livres neuf sols par pistole et moyennant encore d'autres conditions, 13 ventôse IV/3 March 1796.*
 - *Arrêté approuvant une transaction avec les citoyens Fallope, Vane et Cie. et dont le but est de retirer de la circulation une grande quantité des traites de Magon Labalue & Cie., 13 ventôse IV/3 March 1796.*

- **AF/III/361**
 - **Dossier 1725**
 - *Arrêté ordonnant le citoyen Barthélemy, ambassadeur de la République en Suisse, de remettre aux citoyens Parceval et Sigismond Otto Treskow les diamants et bijoux appartenant à la République pour être par eux portés en dépôt à la banque de Berlin, 24 germinal IV/13 April 1796.*
 - **Dossier 1726**
 - *Le Directoire au ministre de la Guerre. Paris, 25 germinal IV/14 April 1796.*

- **AF/III/364**
 - **Dossier 1760**
 - *Lettre du Directoire à Saliceti, Paris, 6 floréal IV/25 April 1796.*

- **AF/III/367**
 - **Dossier 1792**
 - *Le Directoire à Saliceti. Paris, 18 floréal IV/7 May 1796 – Asks Saliceti to arrest dilapidators and reorganise the Armée d'Italie's supply service.*

- **AF/III/370**
 - **Dossier 1810**
 - *Pièce 30 – Le Directoire à Saliceti. Paris, 26 floréal IV/15 May 1796.*
 - **Dossier 1814**
 - *Pièce 59 – Le Directoire à Saliceti. Paris, 27 floréal IV/16 May 1796 – Encourages Saliceti to raise contributions quickly before resistance in Italy emerges.*

- **AF/III/371**
 - **Dossier 1824**
 - *Le Directoire à Saliceti. Paris, 29 floréal IV/18 May 1796 – Instructions to Saliceti about raising additional contributions in Italy.*

- **AF/III/373**
 - **Dossier 1843**
 - *Nomination de Pinsot en tant que commissaire civil à l'Armée d'Italie, 5 prairial IV/24 May 1796.*

- **AF/III/374**
 - **Dossier 1860**
 - *Le Directoire à Saliceti. Paris, 12 prairial IV/31 May 1796* – Letter from the Directory to Saliceti complaining about the low contribution imposed on the Duke of Modena.

- **AF/III/377**
 - **Dossier 1899**
 - *Pièce 42 – Le Directoire à Saliceti. Paris, 23 prairial IV/11 June 1796* – Letter encouraging Saliceti to continue sending money and valuable objects to Balbi after Bonaparte decreed the payment of his troops in hard currency;
 - *Pièce 45 – Le Directoire à Bonaparte. Paris, 23 prairial IV/11 June 1796* – Instructions on approaches to make to the Venetian Republic, including the negotiation of a loan for 5 million Dutch florins.

- **AF/III/379**
 - **Dossier 1920**
 - *Le Directoire à Hausmann, 29 prairial IV/17 June 1796.*

- **AF/III/380**
 - **Dossier 1928**
 - *Pièce 45 – Le Directoire à Balby. Paris, 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796* – Letter approving Balbi as the banker for the *Armée d’Italie*.
 - **Dossier 1930**
 - *Pièce 13 – Le Directoire à Saliceti et Garrau. Paris, 4 messidor IV/22 June 1796* – Letter ordering Garrau and Saliceti to seize all enemy merchandise at Livorno.

- **AF/III/383**
 - **Dossier 1958**
 - *Pièce 86 – Arrêté du Directoire. Paris, 13 messidor IV/1 July 1796* – Decree relieving Pinsot from his duties as civilian commissioner to the *Armée d’Italie*.
 - **Dossier 1965**
 - *Pièce 80 – Arrêté du Directoire, 14 messidor IV/2 July 1796* – Decree granting the surveillance of military warehouses and siege arsenals to generals-in-chief and civilian commissioners).

- **AF/III/385**
 - **Dossier 1980**
 - *Lettre du Directoire à Saliceti, Paris, 18 messidor IV/6 July 1796* – Letter instructing Saliceti to demand reparations from Genoa for its ‘insulting neutrality’.

- **AF/III/386**
 - **Dossier 1996**
 - *Le Directoire à Saliceti et Garrau. Paris, 23 messidor IV/11 July 1796* – Letter warning the riches of Genoa must not escape the attentions of Saliceti and Garrau.

- **AF/III/392**
 - **Dossier 2057**
 - *Le Directoire à Garrau. Paris, 14 thermidor IV/1 Aug. 1796* – Letter from the Directory admonishing Garrau for having ordered General Vaubois to requisition goods at Livorno;
 - *Le Directoire au général Bonaparte. Paris, 14 thermidor IV/1 Aug. 1796* – Letter from the Directory expressing sorrow at Bonaparte's feud with Garrau.
 - **Dossier 2063**
 - *Arrêté du 16 thermidor an IV (3 Aug. 1796) – reconnaissance au Dey d'Alger de la somme de 200.000 piastres fortes, montant du prêt par lui fait à la République française, laquelle somme lui sera remboursée dans deux ans à compter de la date à laquelle le versement aura été fait dans la caisse du consul de France à Alger.*
 - **Dossier 2066**
 - *Le Directoire à Saliceti. Paris, 19 thermidor IV/6 Aug. 1796* – Letter giving confusing instructions to Saliceti concerning the sale of confiscated merchandise at Livorno.

- **AF/III/397**
 - **Dossier 2121**
 - *Lettre du Directoire au général Bonaparte, Paris, 6 fructidor IV/23 Aug. 1796* – Letter congratulating Bonaparte on sending jewels and diamonds requisitioned in Italy back to Paris.

- **AF/III/400**
 - **Dossier 2150**
 - *Pièce 92 – Paris, 17 fructidor IV/3 Sep. 1796* – Letter from the Directory approving the disbanding of the *Agence Militaire de Lombardie*.
 - **Dossier 2155**
 - *Pièce 62-63 – Traité conclu entre le ministre des Finances et M. Van Recum, relativement à une coupe de bois extraordinaire dans les pays conquis, situé entre la Sarre et le Rhin, la Queich et la Moselle, en paiement de fourniture et fourrages à l'armée dedu Rhin et Moselle, et jusqu'à concurrence de 150,000 francs, ou environ, 19 fructidor 4/5 Sep. 1796;*
 - *Pièces 67-69 – Traité conclu entre le ministre des Finances et les citoyens Collot, Caillard et compagnie, fournisseurs généraux des vivres-viandes, relativement à une coupe extraordinaire de bois dans les pays conquis, situés entre la Sarre et le Rhin, la Queich et la Moselle, d'une valeur de 5 millions, 19 fructidor 4/5 Sep. 1796;*
 - *Pièce 70 – Traité conclu entre le ministre des Finances et la Compagnie Rousseau, chargée de l'entreprise générale des fourrages de l'armée de Rhin et Moselle, relativement à une coupe de bois extraordinaire dans les pays conquis, d'une valeur de 5 millions, 8 fructidor IV/25 Aug. 1796;*
 - *Pièces 74-75 – Arrêté ordonnant les mesures pour terminer la liquidation et le recouvrement de l'emprunt forcé, 19 fructidor 4/5 Sep. 1796;*
 - *Pièce 84 – Projet de marché proposé par les citoyens Bainoens, Beths et compagnie au ministre des Finances, pour la perception des revenus tant arriérés que de l'année courante des biens nationaux de la ci-devant Belgique, 19 fructidor 4/5 Sep. 1796.*

- **AF/III/403**
 - **Dossier 2191**
 - *Le Directoire à Denniée. Paris, 4^{ème} jour complémentaire IV/20 Sep. 1796* – Letter of reproach to Denniée for asking too much in expenses;

- *Le Directoire à Denniée. Paris, 5^{ème} jour complémentaire IV/21 Sep. 1796* – The Directory announces it will investigate Denniée for corruption.
- **AF/III/404**
 - **Dossier 2199**
 - *Pièce 40 – Le Directoire au ministre de la Guerre. Paris, 3 vendémiaire V/24 Sep. 1796* – Letter asking the war minister to investigate chief ordnance officer Denniée for corruption.
 - **Dossier 2202**
 - *Pièce 28 – Le Directoire à Garrau. Paris, 4 vendémiaire V/25 Sep. 1796* – Letter concerning the Compagnie Flachet's seizure of the Pope's contribution for the armistice of Bologna.
- **AF/III/407**
 - **Dossier 2230**
 - *Séance du 16 vendémiaire an V (7 Oct. 1796)* – Contractual agreement between the National Treasury and *Warnet, Klein, Perrottin et Cie.* awarding the government 3,600,000 francs in exchange for logging concessions. Also contains six letters sent by the Directory to Charles-Alexis Alexandre, *représentant en mission* attached to the *armée de Sambre-et-Meuse*.
 - **Dossier 2238**
 - *Le Directoire à Bonaparte. Paris, 20 vendémiaire V/11 Oct. 1796* – Letter ordering Bonaparte to reduce the number of bureaucrats in his army's military administration.
 - **Dossier 2239**
 - *Le Directoire à Saliceti et Garrau. Paris, 21 vendémiaire V/12 Oct. 1796* – Letter entrusting negotiations with the Papal States to Cacault.
- **AF/III/410**
 - **Dossier 2262**
 - *Pièce 47 – « Compte que le citoyen Pinsot, commissaire du gouvernement près l'armée d'Italie pour les contributions, rend de sa mission », 4 brumaire V/25 Oct. 1796;*
 - *Pièces 48-57 – Estimation des objets saisis dans les 112 caisses du mont-de-piété Saint-Dominique de Bologne, 13 thermidor IV/30 Aug. 1796.*
- **AF/III/413**
 - **Dossier 2295**
 - *Arrêté de Saliceti. Livourne, 2 brumaire IV/23 Oct. 1796* – Decree setting the contribution imposed on Livorno at 1,200,000 Tuscan *lira*.
- **AF/III/416**
 - **Dossier 2320**
 - *Arrêté du 3 frimaire an V (23 Nov. 1796) – Traité avec les citoyens Gobert, Moïse-Isaac et compagnie pour les fers en barre, tôle, fer-blanc, etc., qui existent dans les magasins et usines des pays conquis, situés entre Rhin et Moselle.*
- **AF/III/417**
 - **Dossier 2323**
 - *Arrêté du 4 frimaire an V (24 Nov. 1796) – Le citoyen Marc-François Séguy, négociant de Rouen, est nommé commissaire du Gouvernement, à l'effet de recevoir les denrées qui doivent être fournies par le roi des Deux-Siciles.*

➤ **AF/III/418**

▪ **Dossier 2331**

- *Pièce 1 – Arrêté du Directoire chargeant le ministre des Finances de faire connaître dans les ordonnances de paiements qu'il délivre l'objet pour lequel les sommes sont allouées et a date des dépenses ou fournitures, 8 frimaire V/28 Nov. 1796;*
- *Pièce 2 – Rente d'état de 1,200 livres par an accordée au Dr. Priestly, résidant à Philadelphie, 8 frimaire V/28 Nov. 1796;*
- *Pièce 24 – Arrêté du Directoire autorisant Jean-Baptiste Paulée à acheter des domaines nationaux en Belgique jusqu'à concurrence de 16 millions de livres prix d'adjudication, 8 frimaire V/28 Nov. 1796;*
- *Pièce 25 – Lettre de Jean-Baptiste Paulée au ministre des Finances, 5 frimaire V/25 Nov. 1796;*
- *Pièce 36 – Arrêté ordonnant la vente aux enchères de coupes de bois extraordinaires pour le chauffage de Paris et de la 17^e division militaire, 8 frimaire V/28 Nov. 1796.*

▪ **Dossier 2333**

- *Pièces 43-44 - Le Directoire à Bonaparte et Garrau. Paris, 11 frimaire V/1 Dec. 1796 – Letters from the Directory congratulating Bonaparte on his victory at Arcole and saying it will replace chief ordnance officer Denniée by Villemanzy;*
- *Pièces 33-34 – Ordre du ministre de la Justice de faire interroger Sidney Smith et ses co-détenus, 11 frimaire V/1 Dec. 1796;*
- *Pièce 40 – Arrêté du 11 frimaire an V (1 Dec. 1796) – Traité entre le ministre des finances et les citoyens Wouters, Delannoy et Compagnie, auxquels il est délégué, en rescriptions bataves, 5 millions de florins à diverses échéances, savoir deux millions à échéances fixes de toutes années et trois millions en loteries, valeur qu'ils conserveront pendant deux ans, à l'expiration desquels la somme de six millions cinq cent mille livres, qui leur reste due, leur sera payée en effectif, faute de quoi il sera pris de nouveaux arrangements avec le ministre des Finances;*
- *Pièce 41 – Projet de traité des citoyens Gobert, Lanoue, Barrillon & Cie., entrepreneurs généraux en fourrage des armées du Nord et de l'Est, de leur délivrer 600,000 livres en numéraire à prendre partie sur la monnaie de la République et en partie en lingots sur le Sieur Auguste, Directeur de l'affinage, les deux-tiers de cette somme leur seront imputé sur l'ordonnance de deux millions dont ils sont porteurs pour le service des fourrages et le restant pour l'approvisionnement en grain de la 17^e division militaire, 11 frimaire V/1 Dec. 1796.*

➤ **AF/III/419**

▪ **Dossier 2339**

- *Arrêté du 13 frimaire an V (3 Dec. 1796) – Traité conclu entre le ministre des finances et les citoyens Ragueneau et Compagnie, par lequel ces citoyens s'obligent à fournir au trésor public la somme de trois millions six cent mille livres, soit en numéraire effectif, soit en lettres de change, à la charge par le Gouvernement de leur abandonner le produit des coupes, pour l'an V, des forêts situées dans les départements de la Seine-Inférieure [Seine-Maritime], de la Meuse, des Ardennes, de la Moselle, etc.*

▪ **Dossier 2346**

- *Le Directoire à Garrau. Paris, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796 – Letter from the Directory to Garrau announcing the suppression of civilian commissioners.*

- **AF/III/458**
 - **Plaqueette 2739**
 - Pièce 14 – *Remboursement de 100 louis à Jean-Frédéric Perregaux pour une avance faite au chargé de mission Durand*, date uncertain (16 nivôse IV/6 Jan. 1796 or frimaire IV).

- **AF/III/460**
 - **Plaqueette 2762**
 - Pièce 26 – Reimbursement by the Directory of sums advanced by Perregaux in the Levant to cover expenses of the French navy, thermidor V.

- **AF/III/461**
 - **Plaqueette 2781**
 - Pièces 100 & 101 – Statement by Talleyrand concerning an Anglo-American citizen named ‘Melville’ who was suspected of being a spy, fructidor V – Talleyrand claims Melville was sent to Paris to facilitate Lord Malmesbury’s peace negotiations.

- **AF/III/473 (Dossiers de séances du Directoire, 28-30 vendémiaire An VI)**
 - **Plaqueette 2906**
 - *Pièce 14* – Report of Bonaparte to the Directory suggesting that “*all the men whose residence (in France) is judged dangerous by the Directory*” could be housed in Italy, dated October 1797.

- **AF/III/498**
 - **Dossier 3135**
 - *Notes de Talleyrand* (sans date/undated) – Note from Talleyrand suggesting Daunou, Cabanis, Florent and Saint-Martin be appointed to the civilian commission at Rome;
 - *Talleyrand au Directoire. Paris*, 5 pluviôse VI/24 Jan. 1798 – Talleyrand adds Monge to this list;
 - *Arrêté du Directoire. Paris*, 12 pluviôse VI/31 Jan. 1798 – Decree officially creating the civilian commission at Rome, with Daunou, Florent, Monge and Saint-Martin as members;
 - *Instructions pour les commissaires. Paris*, 12 pluviôse VI/31 Jan. 1798 – The civilian commission’s official instructions;
 - *Instructions pour le général en chef. Paris*, 12 pluviôse VI/31 Jan. 1798 – Berthier’s orders.

- **AF/III/503**
 - **Dossier 3176**
 - *Arrêté du Directoire*, 1 ventôse VI/19 février 1796 – Order instructing General Berthier to arrest the Pope and expel him from Roman territory.

- **AF/III/508**
 - **Plaqueette 3220**
 - *Arrêté du Directoire*, 19 ventôse VI/9 March 1798;
 - *Daunou à La Revellière*, 10 ventôse VI/28 Feb. 1798 – Letter from Daunou saying that Haller has already seized many of the Vatican’s treasures.
 - **Plaqueette 3212**
 - *Lettre de reproche du Directoire exécutif au général Brune*, 17 ventôse VI/7 March 1798.
 - **Plaqueette 3215**
 - *Documents sur Rome.*

- **AF/III/517**
 - **Dossier 3310**
 - *Le Directoire à Monge, 26 germinal VI/15 April 1798.*

- **AF/III/535**
 - **Plaquette 3533**
 - Pièce 72 – Agreement by which the French Treasury consents to reimburse the bills of exchange originally drawn on it by Letombe (French Consul in Philadelphia) and bought by the financiers Dallarde, Meyssonier and Perregaux. The Treasury will repay these financiers one-sixth of the value of the bills each month in Batavian rescriptions, starting on 21 December 1798. Perregaux holds bills worth 451,723 *livres*, Dallarde 495,963 *livres* and Meyssonier 826,446 *livres*. Contract dated 13 thermidor VI/31 July 1798.

- **AF/III/548**
 - **Plaquette 3671**
 - Pièce 37 – *Traité entre la Trésorerie nationale et le banquier Perregaux pour l'achat de piastres à deux négociants algériens, Jacob-Cohen Bacri and Simon Abucaya, 19 vendémiaire VII/10 Oct. 1798.*

- **AF/III/551**
 - **Plaquette 3792**
 - Pièces 1-2 & 8-9 – Nomination of Louis Monneron as the Directory's agent in the Mascarene Islands & instructions for his secret mission to Tipu Sultan, 5 brumaire VII/26 Oct. 1798.

- **AF/III/565**
 - Contract awarded to *d'Hautmesnil et Cie.* for the upkeep of French prisoners in Britain, 7 nivôse VII/27 Dec. 1798.

- **AF/III/566**
 - Contract awarded to *d'Hautmesnil et Cie.* for the collection of outstanding payments on *biens nationaux*, 9 nivôse VII/29 Dec. 1798.

- **AF/III/578**
 - **Plaquette 3948, pièces 77-79 or 3949, pièces 105-178**
 - *Rapport renvoyé au ministre de la Guerre proposant de rembourser Perregaux & Cie. des fonds payés sur ordre de Bonaparte aux familles de savants et artistes de l'expédition d'Égypte (Ces quatorze membres n'étant pas auparavant salariés de la République, leurs familles n'ont pas droit à des secours du gouvernement et le banquier Perregaux a interrompu ses versements en brumaire. Parmi eux Louis Bodard, ingénieur des Ponts et Chaussées, Nicolas-Jacques Conté, directeur de l'école des aérostiers et membre du Conservatoire des arts et métiers, le géographe Pierre Jacotin, les architectes Charles Norry et Jean-Constantin Protain, Jacques-Gérard Milbert (peintre en histoire naturelle) et le botaniste Hippolyte Nectoux, 22 pluviôse VII/10 Feb. 1799.*

- **AF/III/582**
 - **Plaquette 3980**
 - Pièces 38-40 – *Versement à la Trésorerie nationale de fonds déposés chez Perregaux et Doyen & Durieux à raison de traites avec les algériens Abucaya et Bacri pour*

l'approvisionnement de Malte, 13 ventôse VII/3 March 1799 (pour le traité original voir AF/III/548, 19 vendémiaire an VII).

➤ **AF/III/594**

▪ **Plaquette 4097**

- Pièces 24-27 – *Approbation d'un traité de mouvement de fonds avec Fulchiron, Récamier et autres banquiers de Paris, 27 germinal VII/16 April 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/598**

▪ **Plaquette 4137**

- Pièces 16-17 – *Traité de mouvement de fonds avec Baudecourt et Chalamel, et avec Fulchiron & Cie. et autres banquiers à Paris (Alexandre Barrillon, Geyler, Jordan & Cie., Lang, Hupais, Gelot & Cie., Jacques Récamier et Hugues Vignes pour la maison Vignes & Neveu de Bordeaux), 12 floréal VII/1 May 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/602**

▪ **Plaquette 4176**

- Pièces 21-25 – *Autorisation aux entrepreneurs des fournitures et subsistances des armées de terre et de mer d'employer à l'achat des denrées les délégations à eux données sur les contributions (Le ministre exposant la nécessité de faire rentrer l'arriéré des contributions et même celles de l'an VII d'ici au 1er vendémiaire an VIII dans l'intérêt du crédit public et de l'ordre de la comptabilité, et ayant dû remonter jusqu'aux rôles de 1787), 27 floréal VII/16 May 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/604**

▪ **Plaquette 4198**

- Pièces 19-21 – *Message des Cinq-Cents demandant des renseignements sur les sommes effectivement ordonnancées sur l'an VII par le ministère de la Guerre sous Schérer et pour divers articles des crédits de celui de l'Intérieur, à la suite d'un rapport de la commission chargée de mettre le niveau entre les recettes et les dépenses de l'an VII, 4 prairial VII/23 May 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/606**

▪ **Plaquette 4226**

- Pièces 27-30 – *Ordonnancement de fonds au ministre de la Marine et des Colonies pour payer des fournitures d'habillement et d'équipement à Von Treskow, de Berlin, 15 prairial VII/3 June 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/607**

▪ **Plaquette 4234**

- Pièces 3-10 – *État des dépenses du ministère de la Guerre sous Schérer en l'an VII, 18 prairial VII/6 June 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/608**

▪ **Plaquette 4249**

- Pièces 23-24 – *Transfert d'une délégation sur les contributions de l'an VII pour les banquiers Fulchiron & Cie. à la Compagnie Rochefort, chargée de l'entreprise des subsistances, étapes et convois, menacée par défaut de paiement, en la substituant avec le citoyen Vanlerberghe en*

ce qui concerne les sommes dues à ce dernier suivant le traité du 4^{ème} jour complémentaire an VI sur la négociation du diamant le Régent à cette banque, 25 prairial VII/13 June 1799.

➤ **AF/III/613**

▪ **Plaquette 4300**

- Pièces 61-73 & 78-80 – *Relevé d'accusation contre Schérer : affaire de la vente de fusils aux Anglais par l'intermédiaire du nommé Gaillard, vente des palissades de Gravelines, dilapidations et ventes à vil prix lors de la vente des ateliers et parcs aux entreprises, et intervention auprès d'un juge de paix de Paris pour faire arrêter des poursuites contres les fournisseurs infidèles, affaire sur laquelle le citoyen Lecourbe, frère du général, employé au ministère de la Justice, donnera des renseignements, 11 messidor an VII ; Rapport du ministre de la Justice sur l'échec de la perquisition dans la maison de campagne de Schérer appelée la Muette, au Bas-Meudon, dont il était absent, 21 messidor VII/9 July 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/614**

▪ **Plaquette 4313**

- Pièces 20-26 – *Sur l'indemnité de Garnier, chargé des messageries hors de Paris ; et pour les receveurs généraux responsables de recouvrements des contributions en les obligeant à souscrire des engagements personnels à date fix, mention de l'envoi au journal le Rédacteur, 23 messidor VII/11 July 1799.*

➤ **AF/III/617**

▪ **Plaquette 4342, pièces 1-11 ou 4344, pièces 47-62, 71-76, 85-89**

- *Financement d'un approvisionnement du port de Brest par délivrance par la Trésorerie nationale à Julien Ouvrard, munitionnaire générale des vivres de la Marine, de rescriptions admissibles en paiements des contributions de l'an VII contre remise par lui de valeurs en bons des deux tiers, 5 thermidor VII/23 July 1799.*
- **Plaquette 4346 ou 4347 ?**
- *Le ministre des Finances soumet au Directoire un traité passé entre lui et les entrepreneurs de différents services porteurs de délégations sur le produit des contributions et revenus de l'Etat de l'exercice des années cinq, six, et sept, par lequel traité lesdits délégataires se sont obligés à faire une avance de trente millions au trésor national à prendre sur le quart des rentrées des délégations qui leur ont été délivrées, à condition d'en être remboursés en nouvelles délégations sur le tiers des premières rentrées de l'emprunt forcé dont le Conseil des Cinq-Cents s'occupe en ce moment, 7 thermidor VII/25 July 1799 – Note: This file no longer exists in the archives and is only attested by a summarising note.*
- **Plaquette 4342**
- *Pièces 5 – Remplacement au Sieur Ouvrard de 5,500,000 en bons des deux tiers contre les rescriptions admissibles en paiement de contribution conformément à l'arrêté du 27 floréal, 5 thermidor VII/23 July 1799;*
- *Pièce 6 – Distribution décadaire – 1^{ère} décade de Thermidor an VII, 5 thermidor VII/23 July 1799;*
- *Pièce 7 – Arrêté du Directoire exécutif du 5 Thermidor an VII (23 July 1799) portant sur la distribution extraordinaire des fonds au Ministre de la Marine en faveur du Sieur Julien Ouvrard.*
- **Plaquette 4344**

- *Pièces 66-67 – Proposition de détacher définitivement de l'armée française en Batavie la 1ère et 8ème demi-brigade actuellement employées sur le Rhin et en Helvétie, 5 thermidor VII/23 July 1799.*
- **Plaqueette 4345**
- *Pièce 31 – Lettre de Robert Lindet au Directoire exécutif acceptant sa nomination en tant que Ministre des finances, 5 thermidor VII/23 July 1799.*
- **Plaqueette 4346**
- *Pièce 10 – Rapport sur la situation des recettes et des dépenses de l'exercice de l'an 7 fait au Directoire exécutif par le Ministre des finances, 7 messidor VII/25 June 1799;*
- *Pièce 11 – Tableau des produits affectés au Service de l'an 7.*
- **Plaqueette 4347**
- *Pièce 20 - Rapport sur la situation des recettes et des dépenses de l'exercice de l'an 7 fait au Directoire exécutif par le Ministre des finances, 7 messidor VII/25 June 1799;*
- *Pièce 21 – Tableau des produits affectés au Service de l'an 7.*

- **AF/III/619 (Dossiers de séances du Directoire, An VII, 14-19 thermidor)**
- **Plaqueette 4373**
- *Pièces 12-14 – Approbation d'un traité du 14 thermidor an VII avec les principaux négociants de Paris, signé par les commissaires nommés par la reunion des négociants de la place: F.A.G. Dejoly, Fulchiron, Germain, Mallet l'aîné, Perregaux, Auguste Sévène, qui ont accepté la cession du quart des délégations dont les entrepreneurs des divers services ont fait transport au gouvernement par le traité du sept du présent mois et qu'ils se sont obligés à lui fournir jusqu'à trente millions en effets et à diverses échéances, à condition d'en être remboursés sur le montant effectif de la moitié des recettes affectées aux délégations sur le produit de l'emprunt dans le département de la Seine et, en cas d'insuffisance, sur le produit de cet emprunt dans toute l'étendue de la République pour les deux-tiers seulement dudit produit à l'exception des départements réservés pour le service de la Trésorerie dans les précédentes délégations, 19 thermidor VII/6 Aug. 1799.*

- **AF/III/620**
- **Plaquettes 4383**
- *Pièces 51-53 – Autorisation d'ordonnancement sur les dépenses secrètes du ministre de la Police générale, lettre du ministre de l'Intérieur demandant à celui des Finances de faire prêter une avance au Mont-de-piété par la Loterie nationale.*

- **AF/III/621**
- **Plaqueette 4388**
- *Pièces 9-15 – Mode d'exécution du traité du 19 thermidor an II avec les commissaires du syndicat de commerce, 28 thermidor VII/15 Aug. 1799.*
- **AF/III/626**
- **Plaqueette 4443**
- *Pièce 1-2 – Dispositions pour le retour du diamant le Régent déposé chez Vanlerberghe à Amsterdam (suivant l'arrêté du 4^{ème} jour complémentaire an VI), 18 fructidor VII/4 Sep. 1799.*

Série AF IV (Consulat et Secrétairerie d'État impériale, an VIII-1815)

- **AF/IV/1**
 - **Plaquette 4**
 - Appointment of Perregaux, Mallet l'ainé, Germain, Fulchiron, Récamier, Doyen and Sévène were appointed commissioners to oversee the subscription of the loan of 12 million granted to the new consular regime, 3 frimaire VIII/24 Nov. 1799.

- **AF/IV/3**
 - **Plaquette?**
 - *Arrêté du 21 frimaire an VIII* (12 Dec. 1799) – Sums indicated by Lagarde found in a safe in the hall where the directors meet at the Luxembourg.
 - **Plaquette 11**
 - *Rapport du 24 frimaire an VIII* (15 Dec. 1799) – establishment of a lottery of 40,000 tickets of 300 livres to raise funds for the loan of 12 million agreed on 3 frimaire VIII (24 Nov. 1799).

- **AF/IV/4**
 - **Plaquette 15**
 - *Appointment of Perregaux to the Sénat conservateur*, 4 nivôse VIII/25 Dec. 1799.

- **AF/IV/5**
 - *Arrêté du 15 nivôse an VIII* (5 Jan. 1800) – *Suppression des délégations aux fournisseurs.*

- **AF/IV/6**
 - *Lettre des régents au ministre des Finances Gaudin sur la formation de la Banque de France*, 16 nivôse VIII/6 Jan. 1800;
 - *Arrêtés des consuls du 28 nivôse an VIII* (18 Jan. 1800) *accordant à la Banque de France un financement par la Caisse d'amortissement et mettant à sa disposition la maison de l'Oratoire.*

- **AF/IV/8**
 - **Plaquette 35**
 - Loan agreement for 3 million francs between the Consular government and a group of bankers including Perregaux, Mallet frères, Le Couteulx, Fulchiron, Récamier, Germain, Sévène frères, Barrillon, Doyen and Bastide, 14 ventôse VIII/5 March 1800.

- **AF/IV/12**
 - *Arrêté du 28 floréal an VIII* (18 May 1800) – Consular decree confirming Ouvrard's release from house arrest.

- **AF/IV/13**
 - **Plaquette 67**
 - Appointments of Le Couteulx to the *Sénat conservateur*, 24 December 1799;
 - Appointment of Perregaux to the *Sénat conservateur*, 25 December 1799;
 - Reimbursement of 360,000 francs made to Perregaux for advances to the French commissioner in London to cover costs of French prisoners held in Britain, 4 prairial VIII/24 May 1800.

- **AF/IV*/191 (Ancien numéro 4034)**
 - Marine : procès verbaux (originaux) du conseil d'administration (26 nivôse VIII/16 Jan. 1800-2 March 1811).

- **AF/IV/248**
 - *Rapport du ministre des Finances au Conseil des Finances*, 15 thermidor VIII/3 Aug. 1800;
 - *Analyse jointe au procès-verbal du Conseil des Finances*, 17 thermidor VIII/5 Aug. 1800.

- **AF/IV/332**
 - **Plaquette 2417**
 - Folio 13 – *Décret impérial ordonnant aux frères Michel-Jean et Henry Simons de payer au Trésor la somme d'un million de francs en rentes à 5% faisant suite au rapport du Conseil de Liquidation ordonné par le décret du 23 juillet 1806*, 21 septembre 1808.

- **AF/IV/1058**
 - Pièces 74-114 – *Compagnie Vanlerberghe*, an X–an XII.

- **AF/IV/1061**
 - **Dossier 2 (Commerce extérieur et maritime, 1811)**
 - Pièce 40 – *Projet Barillon, négociant, pour favoriser la culture du coton et de la canne à sucre en Andalousie*.

- **AF/IV/1070 (Banque de France, an IX-1813)**

This file contains a large report on banks entitled *Rapport aux Consuls de la République sur les Banques* written by the *ministre du trésor* François Barbé-Marbois. It is addressed to the consuls of the Republic and comprises several dossiers on individual banks. The rest of the file contains related documents published after the report.

 - **Livret Caisse d'escompte du commerce**
 - *Pièce 29 – Les Directeurs de la Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce au Citoyen Ministre du Trésor public*. Lettre du 20 floréal an X (10 May 1802);
 - *Pièce 28 bis – Rapport des commissaires nommés par l'administration de la Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce, À l'assemblée générale des actionnaires, en lui présentant l'acte de prorogation de son association*. Paris, le 16 messidor an VIII (5 July 1800);
 - *Pièce 30 – Projet remis le 16 messidor an X (5 July 1802) au Ministre du Trésor public et demeuré sans Exécution*;
 - *Pièce 31 – Lettre au ministre du Trésor public*, sans date/undated;
 - *Pièce 32 – Observations des actionnaires de la Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce. Sur la question de savoir : Quels sont les avantages et les inconvénients qui pourraient résulter de la réunion de la Caisse d'Escompte du commerce à la Banque de France ?* Paris: Moutardier, 24 floréal X/14 May 1802;
 - *Pièce 33 – Exposé de la discussion qui a eu lieu entre les Régens et Censeurs de la Banque de France dans leur séance du 12 germinal an X (2 April 1802)*;
 - *Pièce 34 – Vuës sur la formation des Caisses*, 6 messidor X/25 June 1802;
 - *Pièce 36 – Propositions des Régens de la Banque de France pour opérer la réunion de la Caisse du Commerce à ladite Banque*, sans date/undated;
 - *Pièce 38 ? – La Banque de France au Citoyen Barbé marbois, Ministre du Trésor public à Paris*. Lettre du 8 thermidor an X (27 July 1802).
 - **Livret Banque Territoriale**

- *Pièce 39 – Observation de Laffon-Ladébat sur le crédit territorial, floréal an X/May 1802;*
- *Le Directeur général et les Administrateurs de la Banque Territoriale. Au Ministre du Trésor Public. Lettre du 25 ventôse an X/16 March 1802.*
- **Livret d’observations sur les Banques de sols établis à Rouen**
 - *Pièce 45 – Observations sur les banques de sols Établies à Rouen. Le Préfet au Ministre du Trésor public, sans date/undated;*
 - *Pièce 48 – Rapport fait à la société libre, établie pour l’encouragement du Commerce Et de l’Industrie, à Rouen, en sa séance extraordinaire tenue le 26 Messidor an 9..., sur le danger auquel la circulation des Bons, remboursables en sous de cuivre et en métal de cloches, expose les Habitants de cette Commune. Rouen: Imprimerie de Periaux, [an IX];*
 - *Pièce 49 – Pétition aux citoyens Consuls de la République française par les marchands fabricants et autres chefs d’ateliers de Rouen et environs contre un rapport fait à la société libre, établie pour l’encouragement du commerce et de l’industrie à Rouen..., 26 messidor IX/15 July 1801.*
- **Dossier Caisse d’escompte du Commerce**
 - *Pièce 6 – Lettre de Poulard au Premier Consul, 6 vendémiaire XI/28 Sep 1802 [attached to pièce 7];*
 - *Pièce 8 – Les Administrateurs Directeurs de la caisse d’Escompte du commerce Au premier Consul, sans date/undated;*
 - *Pièce 9 – Au Citoyen Premier Consul. Lettre de la Caisse d’escompte du commerce du 19 germinal an XI (9 April 1803);*
 - *Pièce 10 – Observations des actionnaires de la Caisse d’Escompte du Commerce sur la question de savoir quels sont les avantages et les inconvénients qui pourraient résulter de la réunion de la Caisse d’Escompte du commerce à la Banque de France ? Sans date/undated;*
 - *Observations des associés de la Caisse d’Escompte du Commerce sur un projet de loi relative aux Banques présenté au Corps Législatif, le 14 germinal an 11ème. Manuscrit envoyé à Bonaparte le 19 germinal an XI (9 April 1803) – Note: also available in the Banque de France archives.*
- **Livret Comptoir Commercial**
 - *Pièce 18 – Observations adressées au Premier Consul pour l’établissement particulier d’Escompte, connu à Paris sous le nom de Comptoir Commercial. Paris: Renaudière, an XI (32p);*
 - *Pièce 41 – Les manufacturiers et marchands composants la société du Comptoir Commercial au Premier Consul, sans date/undated.*
- **Mémoires et notes diverses**
 - *Pièce 1 – Lettre de Talleyrand à Bonaparte du 30 messidor an IX (19 July 1801);*
 - *Pièce 2 – Caisse d’Amortissement et de Garantie. Rapport au Ministre. Rapport de Mollien à Barbé-Marbois du 2 brumaire an X (24 Oct. 1801);*
 - *Pièce 5 – Banque de France. Situation au 28 thermidor an X (16 Aug. 1802), matin;*
 - *Pièce 6 – Banque de France. Etat de ses mouvements du 20 au 26 Thermidor an X (8-14 Aug. 1802);*
 - *Pièce 7 – Propositions des Régents de la Banque de France pour opérer la réunion de la Caisse du Commerce à la dite Banque, 5 vendémiaire XI/27 Sep. 1802;*
 - *Pièce 13 – Barrillon Régent de la Banque de France au Citoyen Perregaux membre du Senat Conservateur et Président de la Banque de France. Lettre du 27 ventôse an XI (18 March 1803);*

- *Pièce 14 – Barrillon Régent de la Banque de France au Citoyen Perregaux membre du Senat Conservateur et président du Conseil de la Banque de France. Lettre du 29 ventôse an XI (20 March 1803);*
- *Pièce 17 – Banque de France. Procès-verbal de la séance extraordinaire du lundi soir 4 prairial an XI (24 May 1803);*
- *Pièce 19 – Articles principaux de la loi (pour le Banque de France), sans date/undated;*
- *Pièce 21 – Rapport aux Consuls de la République sur les Banques, sans date/undated;*
- *Pièce 22 – Observations sur le mémoire à la Régence relatif aux moyens d'alimenter la Banque, sans date/undated;*
- *Pièce 23 – Motifs de l'Audience demandée au Premier Consul par les Régents à la Banque de France, sans date/undated;*
- *Pièce 46 – Plan de formation d'une banque générale, 8 vendémiaire XI (30 Sep. 1802);*
- *Pièce 51 – Notes sur les banques. Note de Mollien de frimaire an XI;*
- *Pièce 52 – Seconde Note sur les Banques de Circulation, 11 frimaire XI/2 Dec. 1802;*
- *Pièce 53 – Troisième note sur les banques, 24 pluviôse XI/13 Feb. 1803;*
- *Pièce 59 – Mémoire sur la Banque de France et sur les moyens d'étendre son utilité. Mémoire du conseiller d'État Cretet envoyé à Bonaparte le 11 thermidor an X (30 July 1802);*
- *Pièce 62 – De la réunion des Établissements de crédit, 8 vendémiaire XI/30 Sep. 1802;*
- *Pièce 64 – observations sur le Plan de Banque Générale, 8 vendémiaire XI/30 Sep. 1802;*
- *Pièce 70 – Premier projet de loi pour la Banque de France, sans date/undated;*
- *Pièce 71 – Observations sur la Note par laquelle on propose le Triplement des Actions de la Banque de France. Texte de Mollien daté du 11 frimaire an XI (2 Dec. 1802);*
- *Pièce 72 – Note proposant le triplement des actions de la Banque de France. Manuscrit de 11p. non daté et non signé, envoyé à Mollien par Bonaparte le 4 frimaire an XI (25 Nov. 1802);*
- *Pièce 74 – Lettre de Faming de la Jutais au Premier Consul Bonaparte, 20 frimaire XII/12 Dec. 1803;*
- *Pièce 75 – Idées sur un établissement territorial, par Faming de la Jutais, 20 frimaire XII/12 Dec. 1803;*
- Lettres de Perregaux à Bonaparte:
 - *Pièce 3 – 25 messidor an X (14 July 1802);*
 - *Pièce 24 – 28 thermidor an X (16 Aug. 1802) [attached to pièces 5&6];*
 - *Pièce 9 – lettre du 8 pluviôse an XI (28 Jan. 1803) [attached to pièce 19];*
 - *Pièce 11 – 28 ventôse an XI (19 March 1803);*
 - *Pièce 12 – 1^{er} germinal an XI (22 March 1803);*
 - *Pièce 16 – 8 prairial an XI (28 March 1803).*

➤ **AF/IV/1071 (Banque de France, An IX-1813)**

This file is exclusively devoted to the *Banque de France* and contains letters from Jean-Frédéric Perregaux and Emmanuel Cretet to Bonaparte:

▪ **1^{er} Dossier**

- Lettres de Perregaux à Bonaparte:
 - *Pièces 10-12 – 19 vendémiaire an XI (11 Oct. 1802);*
 - *Pièces 16-18 – 11 brumaire an XI (2 Nov. 1802);*
 - *Pièces 24-26 – 8 frimaire an XI (29 Nov. 1802);*
 - *Pièces 38-40 – 6 nivôse an XI (27 Dec. 1802);*
 - *Pièces 41-43 – 13 nivôse an XI (3 Jan. 1803);*

- *Pièces 44-46 – 20 nivôse an XI* (10 Jan. 1803);
- *Pièces 47-49 – 27 nivôse an XI* (17 Jan. 1803);
- *Pièces 55-57 – 11 pluviôse an XI* (31 Jan. 1803);
- *Pièces 64-66 – 2 ventôse an XI* (21 Feb. 1803);
- *Pièces 95-97 – 12 floréal an XI* (2 May 1803);
- *Pièces 116-118 – 1 messidor an XI* (20 June 1803);
- *Pièces 128-130 – 29 messidor an XI* (18 July 1803);
- *Pièces 147-149 – 11 fructidor an XI* (29 Aug. 1803).
- **2ème Dossier**
 - Lettres de Perregaux à Bonaparte:
 - *Pièces 2-4 – 3 vendémiaire an XII* (26 Sep. 1803);
 - *Pièces 70-72 – 14 ventôse an XII* (5 March 1804).
 - Pièce 60 – Lettre de Cretet à Bonaparte du 3 pluviôse an XII (24 Jan. 1804);
 - Pièce 61 – Lettre de Cretet à Bonaparte du 8 pluviôse an XII (29 Jan. 1804).
- **AF/IV/1073**

Budgets, Caisse d'amortissement, liquidation des pensions. Cour des comptes, an IX-1814 – This file contains letters sent by Mollien and the Caisse d'amortissement to Bonaparte.
- **3ème Dossier**
 - Pièce 128 – Lettre de Mollien à Bonaparte du 17 germinal an XI (8 April 1803);
 - Pièce 129 – Lettre de Mollien à Bonaparte du 23 germinal an XI (13 April 1803);
 - Pièce 130 – Lettre de Mollien à Bonaparte du 25 germinal an XI (15 April 1803).
- **AF/IV/1075**
 - **Dossier 1**
 - Pièces 45-46 – *Situation des munitionnaires dépositaires des rescriptions bataves*, an VIII.
- **AF/IV/1076**
 - *Rapports du ministre des Finances. Contributions directes, cadastre*, an VIII-1812.
- **AF/IV/1089/B**
 - *Rapports du ministre du Trésor public. Correspondance du ministre*, an VIII-1811.
- **AF/IV/1248**
 - *Particularités d'une Conférence qui a eu lieu chez le Premier Consul le 7 du courant*, 17 pluviôse VIII/6 Feb. 1800.
- **AF/IV/1282**
 - *Rapport aux Consuls sur la comptabilité du citoyen Blanchard aîné, ex-munitionnaire général des vivres sous le cautionnement du citoyen Ouvrard*, sans date/undated (probably 31 Aug. 1801).
- **AF/IV/1321 (Rapports au Premier Consul, puis à l'Empereur, de Barbé-Marbois et de Mollien, ministres du Trésor public : pièces diverses concernant le Trésor public, an VIII – 1813)**
 - *Traité avec les banquiers Seguin, Michel frères et Vanlerberghe pour une négociation d'obligations.*

- **AF/IV/1498**
 - Request by Perregaux & Cie. demanding authorisation to continue managing payments sent to British prisoners in France by their families, and payments expedited to French prisoners held in Britain by their kin, in light of continued hostilities between Britain and France, December 1806.
- **AF/IV/1500**
 - Police report in which Fouché states that Perregaux has lost his mind and is near death, 17 July 1807.
- **AF/IV/1564**

Analyse des papiers anglais, 18-30 frimaire an VIII (9-21 Dec. 1799) – British newspaper coverage of the 18 Brumaire.
- **AF/IV/1671**
 - **Plaquette 1**
 - Pièce 82 – *Mémoire de Louis Monneron, chargé de mission en Angleterre, sur l'état de ce pays, les dispositions des esprits, ses ressources économiques et militaires, les projets de son Gouvernement*, 17 novembre 1795;
 - Pièce 84 – *1^{er} rapport présenté à un Directeur par un agent secret nommé Moyen, à l'occasion de l'arrivée à Paris de lord Malmesbury, ambassadeur d'Angleterre*, sans date/undated (1796).
- **AF/IV/1706/F**
 - Pièces 37-43 : *Rapport du ministre sur les dépenses de son département.*
 - ❖ Pièce 37 – *Rapport général*, pluviôse an IX;
 - ❖ Pièce 38 – *Recettes et dépenses du service secret pour les exercices de l'an V à l'an XI*;
 - ❖ Pièce 39 – *Compte des dépenses secrètes pour l'an IX*;
 - ❖ Pièce 40 – *Compte des dépenses secrètes pour l'an X*;
 - ❖ Pièces 41-42 – *Dépenses du ministère pour l'an V*;
 - ❖ Pièce 43 – *Projet d'arrêté fixant le budget du Gouvernement pour l'an XII.*

Série AP (Archives de personnes, de familles et d'associations)

- **29AP** – Pierre-Louis Rœderer.
- **31AP** – Joachim Murat (including correspondence between Fouché and Murat).
- **132AP** – Nicolas-François Mollien.
- **170AP** – Jean-Baptiste Annibal Aubert-Dubayet.
- **186AP** – Guillaume-Charles Faipoult.
- **187AP** – Joseph Fouché.
- **188AP** – Martin Michel Charles Gaudin.
- **215AP** – Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord.
- **284AP** – Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès.
- **286AP** – Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès.
- **381AP** – Joseph Bonaparte.

Série AQ (Archives économiques)

- **2AQ** – Jean-Joseph de Laborde.
- **8AQ** – Archives de la Troisième Compagnie des Indes.
- **26AQ** – Pièces isolées de la banque Perregaux-Laffitte à Paris.
- **44AQ** – Archives de la banque Neuflyze (André).
- **49AQ** – Archives de la Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin.
- **57AQ** – Archives de la banque *Mallet Frères et Cie*.
- **61AQ** – Archives de la banque *Greffulhe, Montz & Cie*.
- **164AQ** – Fonds Ouvrard-Rochechouart-Larochejacquelein.

Série BB (Ministère de la Justice)

- **BB/3/85**
 - *Rapport de police du Bureau central du canton de Paris sur Jean-Frédéric Perregaux, 19 ventôse V/9 March 1797.*
- **BB/16/742**
 - **Dossier 613**
 - *Renvoi devant l'autorité administrative demandée par le même de l'affaire Limoge et Mazère, ex-banquiers à Paris, contre l'entreprise Noë pour la fourniture des fourrages à l'armée d'Angleterre, Dailly, Rabourdin et David, créanciers de celle-ci, frimaire X.*
- **BB/16/762**
 - **Dossier 1092**
 - *Question du directeur général de la Caisse d'amortissement sur une décision pour refuser une consignation de 1.250.000 livres d'Ouvrard et de Vanderberghe, débiteurs de Seguin, décision rendu sur un faux exposé des conditions de la consignation, March 1808.*

Série C (Assemblées Nationales)

- **C//421**
 - **Dossier 49**
 - *Message du Directoire aux Cinq-Cents, 19 fructidor an V/5 Sep. 1797 – The message addressed by the Directory to the Cinq-Cents in the aftermath of the *Compagnie de Dijon* scandal.*
- **C//503 (Commission des Finances et de Surveillance de la Trésorerie Nationale)**
 - *Conseil des Cinq-Cents et Conseil des Anciens. Papers relating to the Agence de négociations de la Trésorerie nationale, a subsidiary of the French National Treasury set up by the Directory on 21 June 1796 to negotiate state purchases on foreign markets. Also contains documents relating to the *Compagnie Dijon*.*
 - **Dossier 393/1**
 - *Pièces justificatives du 1^{er} Rapport fait par Camus sur la Trésorerie Nationale le 5 germinal an V (25 March 1797) – Recettes, an III–an V.*
 - **Dossier 393/2**
 - *Idem – Dépenses, an IV–an V.*

- **Dossier 393/3**
- *Idem – Négociations, an IV–an V.*
- **Dossier 393/4**
- *Idem – Correspondance, an IV–an V.*
- **Dossier 393/5**
- *Idem – Paiements, an IV–an V.*
- **Dossier 393/6**
- *Idem – Comptabilité, an IV–an V.*
- **Dossier 393/7**
- *Idem. Assignats et mandats, an IV–an V.*
- **Dossier 393/8**
- *Idem – Dépôts, 1793–an V.*
- **Dossier 393/9**
- *Idem – Poursuites des débiteurs de la République (note relative aux sommes dues par les États-Unis d'Amérique), 1793–an V.*
- **Dossier 393/10**
- *Idem – Situation de la Trésorerie à diverses époques (à noter : pièces relatives à la liquidation de la dette des émigrés ; plusieurs rapports signalant le déséquilibre du budget).*

- **C//504 – Compagnie Dijon Scandal**
- **Dossier 394/1**
- *Rapport de Camus sur l'affaire de la Compagnie Dijon et pièces y relatives, séance du 18 germinal an V (7 April 1797).*
- **Dossier 394/2 (Affaire de la Compagnie Dijon - Pièces justificatives)**
- *Adresse des commissaires de la Trésorerie nationale, 17 prairial V/5 June 1797;*
- *Observations du ministre des finances (Ramel) sur l'affaire de la Compagnie Dijon, transmises par le Directoire aux Cinq-Cents, 29 prairial V/17 June 1797.*
- *Lemonnier à un citoyen représentant non-identifié (possibly Camus?), 13 fructidor V/30 Aug. 1797).*

- **C//505**
- Documents relating to the purchase of *biens nationaux* in Belgium, notably by the financiers Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Liéven-Bauwens, and Jean-Baptiste Paulée.

Série F (Versements des Ministères et des Administrations qui en dépendent)

- **F/4/1015 (Ministère de l'Intérieur – Comptabilité générale)**
- *Ministères des Contributions publiques (1793) et des Manufactures et du Commerce (1812-1814).*

- **F/4/1059**
- *Lettre du ministre de la Marine à l'administration du département de la Seine, 14 fructidor VII/31 Aug. 1799.*

- **F/4/2161**
- *Comptes et Comptabilité – Affaire Armand Seguin (découverte pour le tannage des cuirs), an III.*

- **F/7/3053**
 - *Affaire Araujo de Azevedo*. (Talleyrand's bribe for concluding a peace treaty with Portugal)

- **F/7/3339 (Listes, états, reçus, notes et feuilles de travail, an V-an VII)**
 - *Police Surveillance report concerning Jean-Frédéric Perregaux* – Note: only name and address are mentioned;
 - Undated 4-page list of people “*deserving of special surveillance*” (an V-an VII).

- **F/7/3434**
 - *Banque Greffulhe, Montz & Cie*.

- **F/7/3701**
 - *Tableau de la situation de Paris le 3 floréal an VIII* (23 April 1800) – Report indicating that the escaped Austrian general Mack instructed his servant to ask Perregaux for money if necessary.

- **F/7/3704**
 - *Bulletin de police*, 5 fructidor XI/23 Aug. 1803.

- **F/7/3829**
 - *Rapport de la préfecture de police du 6 frimaire IX* (27 Nov. 1800) – Report indicating Perregaux participated in a secret meeting to counter the ambitions of republican sympathisers during Bonaparte's absences from France.

- **F/7/3830**
 - *Rapport de la préfecture de police du 3 frimaire X* (24 Nov. 1801) – Report indicating that the British ambassador, Lord Cornwallis, dined at Perregaux's residence the previous evening;
 - *Rapport de la préfecture de police du 30 floréal X* (20 May 1802) – Report indicating that Perregaux and other bankers gave large sums of money to agents in order to purchase great quantities of wine following a particularly bad episode of frost which affected vineyards;
 - *Rapport de la préfecture de police du 28 prairial X* (17 June 1802) – Report indicating Talleyrand, Perregaux and Rœderer are working on a project to restore hereditary monarchy to France.

- **F/7/3831**
 - *Rapport de la Préfecture de police du 25 nivôse XI* (15 Jan. 1803) *indiquant que le fournisseur Collot à fait faillite suite à celle de Carié, Bézard & Cie. qui lui devait pour 1,200,000 francs en traites.*

- **F/7/3832**
 - *Rapport de la préfecture de police du 5 frimaire XII* (27 Nov. 1803) – Report stipulating that Perregaux was firmly against delivering a loan of 20 million to the Consular government.
 - *Rapport de la préfecture de police du 14 frimaire XII* (6 Dec. 1803) – Report noting that Michel jeune and Armand Seguin have sold a great many shares on the Parisian stock market and that Seguin is reputedly in financial straits.

- **F/7/3834**
 - *Rapport de la préfecture de police du 5 vendémiaire XIV (27 Sep. 1805) – Report indicating that Jean-Frédéric Perregaux may have attempted to take advantage of the Banque de France’s difficulties following the bankruptcy of the *Négociants réunis* in September 1805.*

- **F/7/4598**
 - *Mémoire du 20 décembre 1792.*

- **F/7/4968**
 - **Dossier 3 (Police générale, Émigrés, Demandes de radiation, arrêtés de radiation et de maintenue. An II-an VII [septembre 1793-septembre 1799]).**
 - *Dossier d’Étienne Louis Gabriel Collart-Dutilleul.*

- **F/7/4724**
 - *Dossier de Gibert des Molières.*

- **F/7/4738**
 - *Dossier de Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller.*

- **F/7/4774/51**
 - *Dossier de Jacques-Marc Montz.*

- **F/7/4774/68**
 - *Dossier de Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.*

- **F/7/4775**
 - **Dossier 19**
 - *Ordre de remise en liberté de Madame Simons, 28 thermidor II/15 Aug. 1794.*
 - **Dossier 24-3**
 - *Dossier de Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (his file while he was an émigré in London).*

- **F/7/5440/8 (Police Générale – Les Émigrés de la Révolution française)**
 - *Dossier d’Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe.*

- **F/7/5879**
 - *Dossier de Quentin Craufurd.*

- **F/7/6140**
 - **Plaquette 1**
 - *Dossier n°29 – “Notes aux Inspecteurs” recommandant la mise sous surveillance des banques Perregaux et Girardot;*
 - *Dossier n°31 – Undated police report (probably September/October 1797) inviting the minister of police to place Perregaux under surveillance.*
 - **Plaquette 5**
 - *Mandat d’arrêt contre ‘Melville’, citoyen anglo-américain soupçonné d’être un espion anglais, fructidor V.*

- **F/7/6187**
 - **Plaquette 4**
 - Dossier 2302 – Interrogations of the Scottish banker William Herries and his business associate George Keith (in particular questions concerning Keith’s role in the escape of Admiral Sidney Smith from the *Prison du Temple*), 23-25 floréal VI/12-14 May 1798.

- **F/7/6214,**
 - **Plaquette 4**
 - Pièce 663 – *Note aux inspecteurs généraux concernant le citoyen Perregaux.*

- **F/7/6374, dossier 7634**
 - *Interrogatoire d’Antoine-Omer Talon, neveu de Radix de Sainte-Foix, 5 vendémiaire XII/28 Sep. 1803.*

- **F/7/6453**
 - *Carnets et calepins ; lettres reçues par George Rumbold (ambassadeur anglais à Hambourg).*

- **F/7/6554**
 - **Dossier ?**
 - *Lettre de Michel jeune au ministre du Trésor Public Mollien, 18 April 1810.*
 - **Dossier 2217**
 - *Affaire des banquiers et munitionnaires Desprez, Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard, Armand Séguin et Vanlerbergh ; arrestation d'Ouvrard pour dette en janvier 1811 et libération en septembre 1813 (an VIII–1827).*

- **F/7/6555**
 - *Affaires politiques. Médard Desprez.*

- **F/7/6683**
 - *Papiers privés de Regnaud de Saint-Jean d’Angély saisis en 1815.*

- **F/11**
 - **Dossier 1229**
 - *Comptes de Jean-Baptiste Paulée et Cie., soumissionnaire de grains, an III-1808.*

- **F/12/606-608 (Conseil de Commerce et Bureau du commerce, administration du commerce, 1700-1833).**
 - *Commerce et industrie de la Belgique. Navigation du Rhin, an IV-1820.*

- **F/12/616-617 (Conseil de Commerce et Bureau du commerce, administration du commerce, 1700-1833).**
 - *Commerce : affaires diverses, enquêtes et statistiques. 1684-1835, particulièrement Premier Empire.*

- **F/12/798B**
 - *Le Sieur Ravel propose un ouvrage contre l’agiotage, une opération préférable au maximum, et l’établissement d’une banque nationale, 8 vendémiaire III/29 Sep. 1794;*

- *Lettre des administrateurs du bureau central du canton de Paris au ministre de l'intérieur concernant l'offre de la Compagnie Jean Bart d'émettre un certain nombre de billets de 50 francs tirés sur sa propre caisse, 28 thermidor VI/15 Aug. 1798;*
- *Rapport de la commission de commerce tendant à faire payer, à Basle, au Sieurs Perregaux et Amet, les sommes qu'ils ont fait remettre par ordre de la commission à Constantin Brun, de Copenhague, en à compte du prix des ? par lui faits pour la République, an III;*
- *Arrête du Comité du Salut Public et autres pièces relatives à la soumission des banquiers capitalistes et négociants de fournir un crédit de 50 million sur l'étranger, an II;*
- *Mémoire sur les moyens de rétablir le change avec l'étranger par le Sieur Durieux à Paris, an II;*
- *Lettre de Donovan de Londres à Anet, Ronus et Cie. chez messrs. Hottinguer à Paris, 15 March 1793;*
- *Lettre de Hottinguer et Cie. à Anet, Ronus et Cie. au Havre, 22 June 1791;*
- *Lettre de Bontems, Mallet frères à Anet, Ronus et Cie., 8 Oct. 1791;*
- *Lettre de Bontems, Mallet frères à Anet, Ronus et Cie., 18 July 1791;*
- *Lettre de Hottinguer et Cie. à Anet, Ronus et Cie., 15 Oct. 1791;*
- *Lettre de Anet, Ronus et Cie. à Hottinguer et Cie., 17 Oct. 1791;*
- *Lettre de Anet, Ronus et Cie. à Boscary, 13 Oct. 1791;*
- *La commune de Valenciennes dénonce les intéressés aux mines d'Anzin qui ne veulent vendre le charbon qu'en numéraire, 18 nivôse IV/8 Jan. 1796;*
- *Lettre du Ministre de l'Intérieur au Ministre des Finances, 29 pluviôse IV/18 Feb. 1796;*
- *Le chef de la 3^{ème} division des bureaux du Ministre de l'Intérieur au chef de la 1^{ère} division, 18 pluviôse IV/7 Feb. 1796;*
- *Le chef de la 3^{ème} division des bureaux du Ministre de l'Intérieur au chef de la 1^{ère} division, 3 germinal IV/23 March 1796;*
- *Le Ministre des Finances au Ministre de l'Intérieur, 17 ventôse IV/7 March 1796;*
- *Renard, agent de la Société des mines d'Anzin, au Directoire exécutif, 21 frimaire IV/12 Dec. 1795;*
- *Lettre du Ministre de l'Intérieur au Ministre des Finances, 18 nivôse IV/8 Jan. 1796;*
- *Le Ministre de l'Intérieur aux administrateurs du département du Nord, 5 nivôse IV/26 Dec. 1795;*
- *Le chef de la 3^{ème} division des bureaux du Ministre de l'Intérieur au chef de la 1^{ère} division, 11 nivôse IV/1 Jan. 1796;*
- *Le Ministre des Finances au Ministre de l'Intérieur, 4 nivôse IV/25 Dec. 1795.*

➤ **F/12/971**

This dossier regroups files from the Ministry of the Interior containing various projects to establish a national bank in France which were presented to the Directory in 1799. These are grouped with other documents from the Ministry of Interior:

- *Projet adressé au Premier Consul, par le Comptoir Commercial. Pour concilier les vues du Gouvernement, sur l'existence d'un seul billet de circulation, avec la conservation des trois Caisses de crédit existantes à Paris. Sans lieu ni date (s.l.n.d.), (15p).*
- **F/12/1413**
- Report on the Bastide family and their textile manufactories in France.

- **F/12/1465**
 - *Tanneries. Fabrication; secours à des manufactures projet d'organisation nouvelle des manufactures, 1791-an III.*
- **F/12/2285**
 - *Préparation des cuirs et peaux (en particulier le dossier de la manufacture Seguin), an VII-1826.*
- **F/14/188**
 - *Généralité de Paris – Moulins et usines sur la Seine, 1788-an IV.*
- **F/30/106 (Administration Centrale du Ministère des Finances)**
 - *Notice sur l'organisation et les travaux de la Trésorerie nationale, an IV.*

Other Documents

- **T//1157 (Papiers de Jean Tilly)**
 - *Lettres de Haller, régisseur des vivres de l'armée d'Italie, à Tilly, agent de la République à Gênes.*
- **W//20**
 - *Acte notariale de Pezet de Corval passé entre Jean-Jacques de Beaune, né à Amsterdam, et Berta Winter au sujet de la créance de 100,000 livres sterling garantie sur la tête des fils de George III.*
- **W//76**
 - *Actes du Tribunal Révolutionnaire. Volume III – Affaire Hébert, Chabot, Bazire, Julien de Toulouse, Launai d'Angers.*
- **W//473**
 - *Relax en jugement après interrogatoire de Radix de Sainte-Foy sur ordre de Bertrand Barère, 27 Feb. 1793.*

French National Archives – Notarial Archives (Minutier central des notaires)

Note: References for these documents are arranged as follows: MC (Minutier Central) / ET (*étude* – ‘study’) / # of the notarial study in Roman numerals / # of file.

- **MC/ET/IV/800.** Notaire : Charles Poultier.
 - **27 pluviôse III/15 Feb. 1795** – Sale of an *hôtel particulier* located at 16, Rue Basse du Rempart by Mme. Randon *née* Foissac to Jean-Charles Davillier and his sister-in-law Fillietaz for 200,000 *livres*.

- **MC/ET/V/885.** Notaire : Jean Vingtain.
 - **1 pluviôse an X/21 Jan. 1802** – Ratification pour les créances entre Denis Castanat et Alexandre Barrillon.

- **MC/ET/VII/541.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **7 ventôse VI/25 Feb. 1798** – Procuration de Lacaze, Michel et la Compagnie Desnoyers aux C.C. Castet et Leporquier;
 - **14 ventôse VI/4 March 1798** – Transport de droits successifs Rossignol à Michel.

- **MC/ET/VII/542.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **4 germinal VI/24 March 1798** – Transfert. Les Sieurs Michel et Lacaze à la République.

- **MC/ET/VII/543.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **12 prairial VI/31 May 1798** – Mainlevée de Marc Antoine Michel.

- **MC/ET/VII/545.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **29 vendémiaire VII/20 Oct. 1798** – Procuration de Lacaze, Michel et la Compagnie Desnoyers aux Sieurs Castet et Leporquier.

- **MC/ET/VII/554.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **27 nivôse IX/17 Jan. 1801** – 2 procurations de Marc Antoine Michel;
 - **21 ventôse IX/12 March 1801** – 2 procurations de Pierre Narcisse Michel.

- **MC/ET/VII/556.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **18 prairial IX/7 June 1801** – Transport. Pierre Narcisse et Marc Antoine Michel à Thérèse Laumonier. – Note : many other bankers (Fulchiron, Mallet, Doyen, Barrillon, etc.) make payments to the same person at this date ;
 - **14 fructidor IX/1 Sep. 1801** – Procuration de Marc Antoine Michel.

- **MC/ET/VII/558.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **22 pluviôse X/11 Feb. 1802** – Procuration de Pierre Narcisse Michel;
 - **29 pluviôse X/18 Feb. 1802** – Dépôt d’un acte de dissolution de société entre Pierre Narcisse Dorothee Michel et Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel ;
 - **2 ventôse X/21 Feb. 1802** – Procuration de Pierre Narcisse Michel;
 - **8 ventôse X/27 Feb. 1802** – Procuration de Pierre Narcisse Michel;
 - **13 ventôse X/4 March 1802** – Quittance de Pierre Narcisse Michel et Marc Antoine Michel à Jean Michel, résidant à La Bastide Sérou;

- **17 ventôse X/8 March 1802** – Procuration de Louis Solier et Louis Delarue à Pierre Narcisse Michel.

- **MC/ET/VII/560.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **10 fructidor X/28 Aug. 1802** – Vente d'immeubles et terres provenant de biens nationaux à Asche, Woluwe-Saint Lambert et Bruxelles, par François Liévin-Bauwens à Nicolas Lefebvre, négociant.

- **MC/ET/VII/562.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **22 frimaire XI/13 Dec. 1802** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à Louis Solier et Louis Delarue;
 - **18 nivôse XI/8 Jan. 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à *Solier, fils et Delarue*;
 - **23 nivôse XI/13 Jan. 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à *Solier, fils et Delarue*;
 - **25 nivose XI/15 Jan. 1803** – Obligation de Paul et Joseph Capon à Marc Antoine Michel;
 - **2 pluviôse XI/22 Jan. 1803** – Vente de 4 maisons à Paris situés Rue du Montblanc et de Provence par Gabriel Julien Ouvrard à Pierre Narcisse Dorothée Michel pour 640,000 francs;
 - **5 pluviôse XI/25 Jan. 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à *Solier, fils et Delarue*;
 - **9 pluviôse XI/29 Jan. 1803** – Vente de Bois dans la commune de Favières de Joseph Fouché à Joseph Fouschard pour 40,000 francs;
 - **9 pluviôse XI/29 Jan. 1803** – Quittance de Pierre Narcisse Michel à Marie Sophie Romère;
 - **9 pluviôse XI/29 Jan. 1803** – Quittance de Pierre Narcisse Michel à Jean-Baptiste Selver;
 - **16 pluviôse XI/5 Feb. 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à *Solier, fils et Delarue*;
 - **23 pluviôse XI/12 Feb. 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à Louis Delarue.
 - **29 pluviôse XI/18 Feb. 1803** – Procuration de Marc Antoine Michel;
 - **29 pluviôse XI/18 Feb. 1803** – Procuration de Jean-Jacques Louis Noel à Sieur Michel;
 - **29 pluviôse XI/18 Feb. 1803** – Transfert de Pierre Elie au Sieur Michel;
 - **29 pluviôse XI/18 Feb. 1803** – Transfert de Jean-Jacques Louis Noel à Sieur Michel;
 - **3 ventôse XI/22 Feb. 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à Louis Delarue;
 - **5 ventôse XI/24 Feb. 1803** – Obligation de Pierre Narcisse Michel à François Lanon;
 - **12 ventôse XI/3 March 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à Louis Solier et Louis Delarue;
 - **23 ventôse XI/14 March 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à Louis Delarue;
 - **27 ventôse XI/18 March 1803** – Procuration de Marc Antoine Michel;
 - **28 ventôse XI/19 March 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à *Solier, fils et Delarue* ;

- **MC/ET/VII/563.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
 - **2 germinal XI/23 March 1803** – Vente de la ferme du Château à Quend avec 180 hectares de terres labourables par Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard à Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel, pour 100,000 francs ;
 - **2 germinal XI/23 March 1803** – Vente des domaines de Preuilley et Azay-le-Ferron par Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard à Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel pour 800,000 francs;
 - **2 germinal XI/23 March 1803** – Vente des domaines de Villandry et Savonnières par Augustin Ouvrard à Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel, banquier, pour 250,000 francs ;

- **27 floréal XI/17 May 1803** – Consentement de Pierre Narcisse Michel à Louis Marie Solier et Louis François Delarue (*Solier & Delarue*) – for naval supplies to be purchased in Dutch, German and Baltic ports;
 - **28 floréal XI/18 May 1803** – Contrat de Mariage de Michel Antoine Grégoire Michel *jeune* et de Marie Elisabeth Antoinette Bernard de Civrieux.
 - **6 prairial XI/26 May 1803** – Obligation de Louis Marie Solier et Louis François Delarue (*Solier & Delarue*) à Pierre Narcisse Michel l'*ainé* ;
 - **11 prairial XI/31 May 1803** – Obligation d'Augustin Ouvrard à Michel Antoine Grégoire Michel jeune pour 300,000 francs.
- **MC/ET/VII/565.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
- **10 vendémiaire XII/3 Oct. 1803** – Vente des bâtiments et terrains de l'abbaye de Saint-Michel à Anvers par Michel-Jean Simons, négociant à Altona, et Jean Johannot, négociant à Paris, au ministre de la Marine.
- **MC/ET/VII/572.** Notaire : Antoine Pezet de Corval.
- **16 pluviôse XIII/5 Feb. 1805** – Vente des terres de Mézières, de Motz-Maraffin, situées à Subtray [Subray], Saunay Saint-Genne et Mézières, avec moulins, tuileries, étangs, bois, par Nicolas Olry et Charles François Ladoucette à Marie Élisabeth Antoinette Bernard, épouse de Marc Antoine Grégoire Michel, pour 483,710 francs.
- **MC/ET/IX/856 quater.** Notaire : Abraham Silly.
- **6 germinal VIII/27 March 1800** – Commercial project of the *Banque Territoriale* entitled '*Compagnie d'assurance d'obligations hypothécaires et d'effets de commerce.*'
- **MC/ET/IX/878.** Notaire : Abraham Silly.
- **25 nivôse XII/16 Jan. 1804** – Inventaire après-décès de Gabriel Fillietaz.
- **MC/ET/IX/1022.** Notaire : Jean Bertrand.
- **24 July 1817** – Inventaire après-décès de Jacques Bidermann.
- **MC/ET/X/764.** Notaire : Nicolas Jean-Baptiste Gobin.
- **30 Dec. 1786** – Création de société entre Perregaux et Gumpelzhaimer.
- **MC/ET/X/813.** Notaire : Nicolas Jean-Baptiste Gobin.
- **8 pluviôse II/27 Jan. 1794** – Inventaire après décès d'Adélaïde de Praël, Madame Perregaux.
- **MC/ET/X/818.** Notaire : Nicolas Jean-Baptiste Gobin.
- **22 thermidor III/9 Aug. 1795** – Obligation de Jean-Frédéric Perregaux à la Compagnie Winter et Cie. – This represents Perregaux's participation in the military supply contract signed between the businessman Jean-Nicolas Pache (his compatriot from Neuchâtel) and Winter & Cie., which proved a financial disaster for the French Republic, and was guaranteed by the so-called loan of the 'three sons of the King of England'. The supply contract was formalised by the notaries Brichard and Chaudon, both of whom were later guillotined.
- **MC/ET/X/825.** Notaire : Nicolas Jean-Baptiste Gobin.
- **29 floréal V/18 May 1797** – Plusieurs transferts de fonds dont Godefroy à Perregaux et Schraam à Hasselgreen.

- **MC/ET/X/829.** Notaire : Nicolas Jean-Baptiste Gobin.
 - **22 germinal VI/12 April 1798** – Contrat de mariage entre Auguste Frédéric Louis de Viesse de Marmont et Anne-Marie-Hortense Perregaux.
- **MC/ET/X/832.** Notaire : Nicolas Jean-Baptiste Gobin.
 - **16 vendémiaire VII/7 Oct. 1798** – Transport mobilier (pour un fusil). Jean Augustin Rose à Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.
- **MC/ET/X/850.** Notaire : Nicolas Jean-Baptiste Gobin.
 - **17 frimaire XI/8 Dec. 1802** – Procuration de Galon-Boyer à Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.
- **MC/ET/X/882.** Notaire : Jean-Baptiste Théodore Sensier.
 - **25 Feb. 1808** – Inventaire après décès de Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.
- **MC/ET/XI/807.** Notaire : Jean-Baptiste Lecerf.
 - **4 germinal IX/25 March 1801** – Vente de 278 hectares de la forêt d’Avesnes par Charles-Pierre Ducancel à Michel-Jean Simons.
- **MC/ET/XI/810.** Notaire : Jean-Baptiste Lecerf.
 - **23 vendémiaire X/15 Oct. 1801** – Vente de 477 hectares de bois par Pierre-Jean Gamba père à Michel-Jean Simons.
- **MC/ET/XI/811.** Notaire : Jean-Baptiste Lecerf.
 - **19 frimaire X/10 Dec. 1801** – Vente de 108 hectares de bois de la forêt d’Avesnes par Michel-Jean Simons à Sébastien Vansserviek pour 51,000 francs.
- **MC/ET/XI/817.** Notaire : Jean-Baptiste Lecerf.
 - **22 fructidor X/9 Sep. 1802** – Contrat de mariage entre Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord et Catherine Noël Worlee, divorcée de Georges François Grand.
- **MC/ET/XV/1037.** Notaire : Théodore Girardin.
 - **2 avril 1789** – Sale of the estate of Benais (Indre-et-Loire) comprised of several farms and 280 hectares of woods (a total of 560 *arpents*) for 330,000 *livres* by Madame de Montmorency-Robecq to Jean-Pierre Germain.
- **MC/ET/XV/1068.** Notaire : Théodore Girardin.
 - **16 Jan. 1792** – Marriage contract between Jean-Pierre Germain and Reine-Marthe Rousseau.
- **MC/ET/XV/1110.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **29 nivôse V/18 Jan. 1797** – Sale of Boubilly and Sauvigné (near Semur in the Côte d’Or) for 4,000,000 francs (one quarter of the estate to Jean-Pierre Germain [1,000,000 francs] and the other three-quarters to Madame Pomme).
- **MC/ET/XV/1128.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **9 prairial VII/28 May 1799** – Papers relating to Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy’s membership on the board of the *régie et ferme des canaux d’Orléans et du Loing*.

- **MC/ET/XV/1130.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **29 frimaire VIII/20 Dec. 1799** – Traité d’association des *Vingt Négociants réunis*.

- **MC/ET/XV/1132.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **18 ventôse VIII/9 March 1800** – Traité d’association pour l’avance de 3,000,000 au gouvernement pour le premier quart des cautionnements & bordereau des notaires pour la compagnie (dix négociants réunis) – Founding charter of the *Dix Négociants Réunis*. The company was dissolved on 29 fructidor Year VIII after all business had been concluded.

- **MC/ET/XV/1135.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **29 fructidor VIII/18 Sep. 1800** – Dissolution de l’association du 29 frimaire an VIII (20 décembre 1799) – Act of dissolution of the *Vingt Négociants Réunis*, which had been created on December 20, 1799.

- **MC/ET/XV/1136.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **16 brumaire IX/7 Nov. 1800.**
 - Reconnaissance de dette du citoyen Louis François Passy, receveur général du département de la Dyle, envers l’association des Dix Négociants Réunis pour la somme de 126,725 francs ;
 - Procuration des Dix Négociants Réunis donnant pouvoir au banquier Jean-Pierre Germain d’accepter au nom de la société l’acte de garantie et d’obligation qui doit être fourni par le citoyen Passy, en raison de la somme de 126,725 francs qu’elle a fourni à la caisse d’amortissement.

- **MC/ET/XV/1136.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **27 brumaire XI/18 Nov. 1800** – Minutes of the general assembly of the *Dix Négociants Réunis*.

- **MC/ET/XV/1156.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **10 germinal XI/31 March 1803** – Inventaire après-décès de Jean-Pierre Germain.

- **MC/ET/XV/1180.** Notaire : Claude Chodron.
 - **19 vendémiaire XIV/11 Oct. 1805** – Minute transport entre Nicolas Marie Monttessuy Jacques-Rose Récamier pour 300,000 francs.

- **MC/ET/XVII/1094.** Notaire: Prosper-Louis Léger.
 - **9 floréal X/29 April 1802** – Papers relating to the liquidation of the Michel brothers’ company in 1802. The company’s net worth, after six years of existence, was valued at 17 million francs;
 - **23 floréal X/13 May 1802** – Substitution. Mademoiselle Lange pour le sieur Simons;
 - **28 prairial X/17 June 1802** – Révocation. Mademoiselle Lange/Michel Simons.

- **MC/ET/XVII/1096.** Notaire: Prosper-Louis Léger.
 - **16 vendémiaire XI/8 Oct. 1802** – Procuration frères Michel.

- **MC/ET/XVII/1241.** Notaire: Henri-Joseph Yver.
 - **9 Aug. 1842** – Inventaire après-décès de Médard Desprez.

- **MC/ET/XVIII/967.** Notaire : Jean-Louis Gauldrée-Boilleau.

- **4 pluviôse VII/23 Jan. 1799** – Obligation de Jeanne Agnès Gabrielle Depestre (divorcée d’acte d’Omer Talon) à la maison *Couderc, Bryants et Changuyon* d’Amsterdam.
- **MC/ET/XVIII/975-977, 979, 984-986.** Notaire : Jean-Louis Gauldrée-Boilleau.
- **date unknown** – Records of purchases of *biens nationaux* by the *Compangie Bodin* in various Belgian departments.
- **MC/ET/XVIII/988.** Notaire : Jean-Louis Gauldrée-Boilleau.
- **14 brumaire XI/5 Nov. 1802** – Inventaire après décès de Pierre Sevène.
- **MC/ET/XVIII/1020.** Notaire : Jean-Louis Gauldrée-Boilleau.
- **23 Aug. 1806** – Papers relating to the bankruptcy of the *Féline frères et Cie.* bank following the “Monneron” scandal which hit the *Caisse des comptes courants* in 1796.
- **MC/ET/XVIII/1050.** Notaire : Jean-Louis Gauldrée-Boilleau.
- **7 Aug. 1811** – Transaction entre le Général Rapp et Vanlerberghe.
- **MC/ET/XIX/922.** Notaire : Simon Lefebvre
- **2 frimaire XI/23 Nov. 1802** – Procuration de Jean-Louis Johannot à Jacques Antoine Odier de Geneva.
- **MC/ET/XIX/921.** Notaire : Alexandre Toussaint Delacour.
- **28 prairial X/17 June 1802** – Procuration de la Maison Veuve Rabaud de Marseille à Carié Bézard et Cie.
- **MC/ET/XIX/922.** Notaire : Alexandre Toussaint Delacour.
- **2 frimaire XI/23 Nov. 1802** – Constitution de la société *La Ville-Le Roux et Carié fils* de Lorient (Clément-Hercule Carié – frère de Henry-Liévain Carié).
- **MC/ET/XX/796.** Notaire : Augustin Rameau.
- **16 ventôse XI/7 March 1803** – Contrat de mariage entre Pierre-Louis Roederer et Marie Catherine Adélaïde Decrétot, fille de Jean-Baptiste Decrétot.
- **MCN/ET/XXI/616.** Notaire : Pierre Victor Raffeneau de Lille.
- **15 frimaire III/5 Dec. 1794** – Foundation of a company specialising in trade with Basel and Switzerland to succeed *Toudouze, Ducaurroy & Popp* founded on 1 November 1793. The partners are Jean-Louis Toudouze, Armand Prospère Ducaurroy, Théophile Frédéric Chrétien Popp (all Parisian merchants) and Chrisoph Bolli (a Basel merchant). Each of them brings a starting investment of 10,000 *livres* on which they are promised 3% interest. This company is established for four years and guaranteed for up to 60,000 *livres* by Béer Léon Fould.
- **MC/ET/XXIII/752.** Notaire : François Brichard.
- **21 June 1777** – Contrat de mariage entre Guillaume-Charles Faipoult de Maisoncelles et Maris-Claude Bergeat.
- **MC/ET/XXXV/989.** Notaire : Auguste Thion de La Chaume.
- **28 pluviôse & 27 messidor VII/16 Feb. & 15 July 1799** – Copies of the rental leases on two farms owned by Étienne Delessert located at Reuilly (Oise) and Borest (near Senlis).

- **MC/ET/XXXV/998.** Notaire : Auguste Thion de La Chaume.
 - **25 nivôse X/15 Jan. 1802** – Inventaire après-décès de Pierre-Léon Basterrèche.

- **MC/ET/XLII/739.** Notaire : Jean-Étienne Trubert.
 - **23 février 1808** – Contrat de mariage entre Jean-Baptiste-Joseph-Dominique Ramel et Marie-Anne-Philippe-Delphine Bochet.

- **MC/ET/XLII/789.** Notaire : Alexandre Trubert.
 - **2 April 1822** – Contrat de mariage entre Martin Michel Charles Gaudin et Anna Summaripa.

- **MC/ET/XLIV/740.** Notaire : Nicolas Hua.
 - **18 pluviôse XIII/7 Feb. 1805** – Inventaire après-décès de Jean Lanchère, père.

- **MC/ET/XLV/660.** Notaire : Jean-François Mathieu de heudolsheim.
 - **8 floréal V/27 April 1797** – Military contracting agreement granting the Brussels trading house *Frédéric Romberg et fils* the right to supply the *Armée du Nord* with clothing. The Parisian bank *Doyen et Durieux* is the financial guarantor for a sum of 1,500,000 francs;
 - **27 floréal V/16 May 1797** – Procuration d'Alexandre Antoine Limoges à Alexandre Barrillon.
 - **13 prairial V/1 June 1797** – Military contracting agreement awarding the *Compagnie Mannier* the general supply of all military hospitals in the French Republic;
 - **27 fructidor V/13 Sep. 1797** – Cautionnement & convention de la compagnie Schunk à Cerr Berf;
 - **28 fructidor V/14 Sep. 1797** – Foundation act of the *Compagnie Saint-Victor*, a military contracting company, whose partners are listed as Jean-Baptiste Paulée, his associate from Douai Mr. Claro, and the Parisian bankers Levrat et Vve. Panckoucke.

- **MC/ET/XLV/661.** Notaire : Jean-François Mathieu de heudolsheim.
 - **5 vendémiaire VI/26 Sep. 1797** – Military contracting agreement granting the *Compagnie Saint-Victor* the right to supply artillery transports for the *Armée de Sambre et Meuse*;
 - **19 vendémiaire & 26-27 brumaire VI/10 Oct. & 16-17 Nov. 1797)** – Files relating to Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy, a military contractor, indicating he started a company with entirely borrowed funds to speculate in *biens nationaux* in both 'domestic and foreign' lands;
 - **13 brumaire VI/3 Nov. 1797** – Military contracting agreement awarding Jean Baptiste Ouin's company the right to supply the *Armée d'Angleterre*. Among his partners in the venture are Fouché and Tallien. Fouché put up a sugar plantation in the plain of Léogâne in Saint Domingue estimated at 300,000 *livres tournois* as security for his participation;
 - **19 brumaire VI/9 Nov. 1797** – Military contracting agreement granting Jean-François Seguin exclusive rights to supply the *Armée d'Italie* in leather goods;
 - **26 brumaire VI/16 Nov. 1797** – Traité pour le Service des subsistances militaires entre Jean Joseph Wauthier et le ministère de la guerre (Joseph Lonnoy caution).
 - **1 frimaire VI/21 Nov. 1797** – A military supply contract awarding *Bayard & Cie.* the right "to supply stageposts and military convoys throughout the whole extent of French territory and of the départements réunis."

- **MC/ET/XLV/662,**
 - **14 nivôse VI/3 Jan. 1798 & MC/ET/XLV/663, 18 floréal VI/7 May 1798.** Notaire : Jean-François Mathieu de heudolsheim.
Files relating to Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy concerning a financial guarantee put forward by Joseph Lonnoy on a military supply contract worth 300,000 francs, based on real estate he owned in the department of l'Escaut (now part of Belgium & Holland).
- **MC/ET/XLV/663.** Notaire : Jean-François Mathieu de heudolsheim.
 - **13 prairial VI/1 June 1798** – Copy of the marriage contract between Alexandre Barrillon and Françoise-Marguerite Chassy-Poulet which took place on 2 August 1787.
- **MC/ET/XLV/664.** Notaire : Jean-François Mathieu de heudolsheim.
 - **6 messidor VI/24 June 1798** – Military contracting agreement for the supply of the Army of the Rhine, indicating that the company of Jean-Baptiste Olry will take over from *Charpentier, Augst, Gimpel et Mercking* (a conglomerate of Strasbourg merchants) as the army's main supplier.
- **MC/ET/XLV/665 & MC/ET/XLV/669.** Notaire : Jean-François Mathieu de heudolsheim.
Military contracting agreement awarding Jean Gosuin, director of the arms manufactures of Charleville and Liège, the right to supply 150,000 weapons. The Parisian banker Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron is the financial guarantor for up to one million francs.
- **MC/ET/XLV/665.** Notaire : Jean-François Mathieu de heudolsheim.
 - **7 vendémiaire VII/28 Sep. 1798** – Military contracting agreement granting Jean-Louis Joseph Rousseau the right to supply the *Armée du Rhin* with forage. His associates for this venture were the bankers Geyler and Jordan;
 - **4 frimaire VII/24 Nov. 1798** – Traité pour le ministre de la guerre en faveur de Jean Gosuin & Cautionnement de Aimé-Gabriel Fulchiron en faveur de Jean Gosuin;
 - **9 Frimaire VII/29 Nov. 1798** – Cautionnement de 2,358,556 francs en faveur de la Compagnie Musset par L'habillement et L'Equipement;
 - **26 frimaire VII/16 Dec. 1798** – Vente par le Sieur Duhual au Sieur Bastide;
 - **27 frimaire VII/17 Dec. 1798** – Cautionnement Lanchère;
 - **28 frimaire VII/18 Dec. 1798** – Remise de service et d'équipement d'artillerie à la Compagnie Lanchère;
 - **29 frimaire VII/19 Dec. 1798** – Vente d'une maison par Jean-Joseph Finitse à Jean Gosuin;
 - **29 frimaire VII/19 Dec. 1798** – Dévolution de société entre la Compagnie Gosuin et la Compagnie Finiste;
 - **29 frimaire VII/19 Dec. 1798** – Vente d'une maison à Nancy à Joseph Lonnoy;
 - **29 frimaire VII/19 Dec. 1798** – Ratification de Gosuin;
 - **29 frimaire VII/19 Dec. 1798** – Procuration de Gosuin.
- **MC/ET/XLV/669.** Notaire : Jean-François Mathieu de heudolsheim.
 - **9 germinal VII/29 March 1799** – La *Compagnie Laurensen et Nobelly* se rend adjudicataire de la ferme générale des droits de passe aux barrières de Paris pour trois ans. Fulchiron, Récamier et Roëttier de Montaleau (ancien directeur de la Monnaie de Paris) se portent caution pour 2,936,000 francs et avancent 675,000 francs pour le premier trimestre;
 - **14 prairial VII/2 June 1799** – Vente d'un terrain à Créteil par Henry Liévain Carié au Général Milet-Mureau;

- **23 prairial VII/11 June 1799** – Procuration de la Compagnie Olry à Frédéric Godard;
 - **23 prairial VII/11 June 1799** – Military contracting agreement for the supply of the French naval squadron at Brest, awarded to the company of Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard (in the name of his brother-in-law, Claude Blanchard), and listing Jean-Baptiste Olry as one of his subcontractors;
 - **16 fructidor VII/2 Sep. 1799** – List of payments made by the French state to artillery suppliers for Year VIII.
- **MC/ET/XLV/673.** Notaire : Joseph François Mathieu de Heudolsheim.
- **9 messidor IX/28 June 1801** – Obligation pour 150,000 francs d’Alexandre Antoine Limoges à Alexandre Barrillon.
- **MC/ET/XLV/676.** Notaire : Joseph François Mathieu de Heudolsheim.
- **19 germinal XI/9 April 1801** – Traité de société entre la maison de commerce de laines Jacques Récamier et la maison de commerce *Geyler, Jordan et Cie.*
- **MC/ET/XLV/668.** Notaire : Joseph François Mathieu de Heudolsheim.
- **2 nivôse VII/2 Jan. 1799** – Déclaration de Jacques Antoine Rochefort en faveur de Jean-Baptiste Ouin, Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe, Claude Florence, Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy et André Marie Taupin Dorval.
- **MC/ET/XLV/680.** Notaire : Joseph François Mathieu de Heudolsheim.
- **11 vendémiaire XIII/3 Oct. 1804** – Inventaire après-décès de Jean-Joseph-Paul Itier (nephew of Alexandre Barrillon).
- **MC/ET/XLV/723.** Notaire : Antoine Louis Gillet.
- **29 May 1817** – Inventaire après-décès de Jean-Joseph-François-Alexandre Barrillon.
- **MC/ET/XLVI/641.** Notaire : Charles-François Drugeon.
- **10 fructidor XI/28 Aug. 1803** – Advance of 1,400,000 francs by Armand Seguin to Ouvrard (can’t find it in the online inventory).
- **MC/ET/XLVI/642.** Notaire : Charles-François Drugeon.
- **3 vendémiaire XII/26 Sep. 1803** – Obligation of Christophe Flachet to Armand Seguin;
 - **8 vendémiaire XII/1 Oct. 1803** – Obligation of Christophe Flachet to Armand Seguin.
- **MC/ET/XLVI/652.** Notaire : Charles-François Drugeon.
- **3 vendémiaire XII/26 Sep. 1803** – Obligation du Sieur Flachet à M. Seguin ;
 - **14 messidor XII/3 July 1804** – Loan of 5,400,000 franc by Armand Seguin to Ouvrard (not in online inventory – however, some advances by Seguin to the Compagnie Rousseau for 12 messidor).
- **MC/ET/XLVI/876.** Notaire: Adrien-Philippe Moisant.
- **7 Feb. 1835** – Inventaire après-décès d’Armand Jean-François Séguin.
- **MC/ET/XLVII/329.** Notaire : Pierre Paulmier.
- **19 Feb. 1783** – Inventaire après-décès de Pierre Germain ‘*le Romain*’.

- **MC/ET/XLVII/435/B.** Notaire : Charles Le Maire.
 - **31 Jan. 1791** – Documents relating to the foundation of the *Caisse Patriotique*.
- **MC/ET/XLVIII.** Notaire : Jean-Baptiste Patu.
 - **12 August 1760** – Mariage de Jean-Joseph de Laborde et Rosalie-Claire-Josèphe de Nettine.
- **MC/ET/XLVIII/390.** Notaire : Louis-François Robin.
 - **2 vendémiaire III/23 Sep. 1794** – Division of the *biens nationaux* purchased by Jean-Pierre Germain, Isaac-Louis Grivel and Étienne Delessert during the early Revolution.
- **MC/ET/XLVIII/432.** Notaire : Louis-François Robin.
 - **26 vendémiaire IX/18 Oct. 1800** – *Procuration pour Antoine Louis Girardot*. Files relating to the 1798 bankruptcy of the *Compagnie Noé* and its financial guarantor, the *Limoges et Mazères* bank. This bankruptcy forced Antoine Louis Girardot, a banker and wood trader who held a 400,000 franc stake in the venture, to cease all his payments. The *Caisse des comptes courants*, in which Girardot had a 100,000 franc investment, attempted to save him by granting him a loan of 940,000 francs guaranteed by a mortgage on all of its real-estate holdings, including 38 Parisian houses.
- **MC/ET/XLVIII/434.** Notaire : Louis-François Robin.
 - **5 & 12 prairial IX/25 Jan. & 2 Feb. 1801** – Mainlevée et Déclaration de Pierre-François Tiberghien à Marie Charles Monglas et Accord de transport entre Claude Elziar Jullien (fondé de procuration de Jean André Caillard et de Jean-Pierre Collot) et Pierre-François Tiberghien.
- **MC/ET/XLVIII/437.** Notaire : Louis-François Robin.
 - **1 fructidor IX/19 Aug. 1801** – Sale of an *hôtel particulier* at 5 Rue Cerutti in Paris by the widow of Jean-Joseph de Laborde to Charles Martin Doyen for 200,000 francs.
- **MC/ET/XLVIII/550.** Notaire : Louis-François Robin.
 - **12 Sep. 1808** – Inventory after decease of Guillaume Sabatier (including an annex listing details of the sale of the shares of the *Compagnie des Mines d'Anzin* on 10 July 1795).
- **MC/ET/XLVIII/551.** Notaire : Louis-François Robin.
 - **9 March 1809** – Règlement à titre de transaction entre les héritiers de M. Guillaume Sabatier.
- **MC/ET/L/634.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **17 Sep. 1777** – Marriage contract between Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller and Gérardine Van der Dussen from the Walloon church in Delft, Holland.
- **MC/ET/L/703.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **20 Sep. 1785** – Bail de location d'une maison à Fontainebleau au nom de Jean-Frédéric Perregaux pour John Sackville, duc de Dorset, ambassadeur d'Angleterre à la Cour.
- **MC/ET/L/724.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **30 Aug. 1787** – Procuration par Robert Herries à John Forbes, par arrangement avec *Girardot, Haller et Cie*.

- **MC/ET/L/738.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **30 April 1789** – Procuration de Rodolphe-Emmanuel de Haller à Jean Girardot de Marigny.
- **MC/ET/L/748.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **17 March 1790** – Transport. M. le duc d'Orléans à MM. Greffulhe et Montz.
- **MC/ET/L/749.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **20 April 1790** – Transport. M. le duc d'Orléans à MM. Greffulhe et Contremontz.
- **MC/ET/L/756.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **17 December 1790** – Obligation de Louis-Philippe-Joseph d'Orléans aux Sieurs Greffulhe et Montz.
 - **17 December 1790** – Transport. Henri-Jacques-Guillaume Clarke aux mêmes (Sieurs Greffulhe et Montz).
- **MC/ET/L/757.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **15 January 1791** – Procuration de Jean Girardot de Marigny au Sieur Coutanceau (maire de Gonnesse) pour l'adjudication de biens nationaux dans son district.
- **MC/ET/L/761.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **18 May 1791** – Procuration de Rodolphe Emmanuel Haller à Louis Greffulhe;
 - **19 May 1791** – Procuration de Rodolphe Emmanuel Haller à Jean-Jacques Hogguer;
 - **20 May 1791** – Vente de Rodolphe Emmanuel Haller à Madeleine Sophie Van Robais, épouse de Jean-Jacques Hogguer.
- **MC/ET/L/763.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **18 October 1791** – Dépôt. Procuration donnée à MM. Greffulhe et Montz et autres pièces.
- **MC/ET/L/767.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **11 March 1792** – Vente de M. et Mme. Fleuriau de Tonehelonge à M. Louis Greffulhe.
- **MC/ET/L/768.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **5 April 1792** – Procuration de Jean Girardot de Marigny à Maheu (pour la perception des fermages et déclarations d'imposition foncière).
- **MC/ET/L/769.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **5 May 1792** – Obligation de Levassor de la Touche à Greffulhe et Montz.
- **MC/ET/L/773.** Notaire : Jacques-Michel Mony.
 - **4 September 1792** – Obligation de Montz à Beaudouin.
 - **6 September 1792** – Quittance de la Veuve Panchaud à Montz.
 - **7 September 1792** – Obligation de Montz à Viat.
- **MC/ET/LI/1187.** Notaire : François-Emmanuel Arnaud.
 - **21 Sep. 1786** – Contrat de mariage entre François-Nicolas Mollien et Charlotte-Rosalie Mignotte.

- **MC/ET/LIII/543.** Notaire : Jules Le Pot d'Auteuil.
 - **4 Dec. 1778** – Marriage contract between Jean-Frédéric Perregaux and Adélaïde Harenc de Presle de Surville. Adélaïde brought a dowry of 20,000 *livres*.

- **MC/ET/LIII/723, 2 frimaire XI/23 Nov. 1802; MC/ET/LIII/740, 16 fructidor XIII/3 Sep. 1805; MC/ET/LIII/743, 31 Jan. 1806.** Notaire: François Nicolas Pérignon (all three files) – Records relating to the marriages of Jean-Jacques Dollfus's two sons, who married two daughters of the Méric family from Montauban. Jean-Jacques Régis de Cambacérès and Jean-Antoine Chaptal were witnesses at one of these weddings.

- **MC/ET/LIII/724.** Notaire : François Nicolas Pérignon.
 - **28 nivôse XI/18 Jan. 1803** – Sale of 846,369 francs of biens nationaux by Pierre-Laurent Hainguerlot to reimburse debts owed to Louis Bastide.

- **MC/ET/LIII/717.** Notaire : François Nicolas Pérignon.
 - **14 ventôse X/5 March 1802** – Obligation de 1,047,000 francs de Louis Barthélémy Bastide à Pierre-Laurent Hainguerlot.

- **MC/ET/LIII/734.** Notaire: François Nicolas Pérignon.
 - **6 vendémiaire XIII/28 Sep. 1804** – Files relating to Joseph Alphonse Lonnoy and his participation in the supply of the *Armée d'Angleterre*.

- **MC/ET/LIII/743.** Notaire: François Nicolas Pérignon.
 - **31 Jan. 1806** – Bilan de Louis Barthélémy Bastide (après sa faillite du 20 décembre 1805).

- **MC/ET/LV/189.** Notaire : Hubert Antoine Gibé.
 - **25 frimaire VIII/16 Dec. 1799** – Renonciation de Barbe-Rosalie Lemaire, épouse divorcée de Ignace-Joseph Vanlerberghe, à la communauté de biens établie entre eux.

- **MC/ET/LV/167.** Notaire : Hubert Antoine Gibé.
 - **12 vendémiaire V/3 Oct. 1796** – Vente immobilière par les citoyens Piau et Conseil à Barbe-Rosalie Lemaire, femme Vanlerberghe.

- **MC/ET/LV/178.** Notaire : Hubert Antoine Gibé.
 - **7 germinal VI/27 March 1798** – Vente d'un hôtel particulier et de son mobilier dans la rue Saint-Georges par Michel-Jean Simons et la Citoyenne Lange à Louis Mitouart.

- **MC/ET/LV/340.** Notaire : Étienne Prospère Vavasseur-Desperriers.
 - **13 June 1831** – Inventaire après décès de Jean-Baptiste-César Paulée, propriétaire.

- **MC/ET/LVIII/826.** Notaire : Émile Fourchy.
 - **25 Nov. 1855** – Inventaire après décès de la duchesse de Gaète.

- **MC/ET/LX/591.** Notaire : Claude Oudinot.
 - **26 ventôse VII/16 March 1799** – Purchase of 55 acres of woods at Longniolle for 23,000 francs by Fouché;

- **23 & 24 March 1813** – Inventaire après décès de la Duchesse d’Otrante (Madame Fouché). 3^e prise du 1^{er} avril : Contrat du 17 novembre 1798 passé avec Charles Gabriel Montbrayen – indicates Fouché purchased the *ferme du parc de Pontcarré* for 38,000 francs.
- **MC/ET/LXII/698**. Notaire : Jean-François Cabal-Castel.
- **11 April 1793** – Marriage de Jacques-Rose Récamier et Jeanne-Françoise-Julie-Adélaïde Bernard.
- **MC/ET/LXII/734**. Notaire : Jean-François Cabal-Castel.
- **5 germinal V/25 March 1797** – Procuration de Jacques Bidermann à James Odier;
- **19 germinal V/8 April 1797** – Sale of a house located at 17 Rue de Provence for 80,000 francs by Madame Lafontaine-Gradcourt (*née* Lemaistre) to Jean-Pierre Germain.
- **MC/ET/LXV/662**. Notaire : Claude-Nicolas Ballet.
- **3 nivôse VI/23 Dec. 1797** – Files relating to the purchase of various real-estate properties by Max Cerf Berr, a Jewish banker and merchant trader from Nancy based in Paris. These include a house in the rue Saint-Honoré worth 100,000 francs and 320,000 francs of *biens nationaux* in Saint-Maur.
- **MC/ET/LVIII/597/A**. Notaire : Denis Trutat
- **2 fructidor V/19 Aug. 1797** – Notarial act for the sale of the Hotel Massiac in the Place des Victoires by Jean Godard to the *Caisse des comptes courants* bank.
- **MC/ET/LVIII/603**. Notaire : Denis Trutat
- **10 nivôse VII/30 Dec. 1798** – Constitution de la deuxième société de la *Caisse des Comptes Courants*.
- **MC/ET/LXVII/876**
- **1 fructidor X/19 Aug. 1802** – Contrat de mariage entre François-Nicolas Mollien et Adèle-Rosalie Collart-Dutilleul.
- **MC/ET/LXVIII/700**. Notaire : Maurice-Jean Raguideau de la Fosse.
- **8 thermidor X/27 July 1802** – Vente de Michel Jean Simon et Anne Françoise Élisabeth Lange, son épouse demeurant rue de la Victoire, n° 16, à Louis Bonaparte et Hortense Eugénie Beauharnais son épouse, d'une grande maison sise à Paris, rue de la Victoire, ci -devant Chantereine n° 16, terrain, jardin et autres dépendances, moyennant 200 000 francs « *et cinq actes faisant suite* ».
- **MC/ET/LXXXII/698**. Notaire : Jean-Pierre Dosne.
- **19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800** – Notarial act stipulating that Jean-Baptiste Paulée renounces all manner of commercial and trading activity in order to devote himself to managing his property portfolio.
- **MC/ET/LXXXIV/635**. Notaire: Pierre Charles Moine de La Versine.
- **22 Sep. 1789** – Compte de Tutelle d’Anne-Marie-Isabelle Braeckman pour Henry-Liévain Nicolas Carié et Clément-Hercule Carié.

- **MC/ET/LXXXIV/684.** Notaire: Pierre Charles Moine de La Versine.
 - **4 prairial III/23 May 1795** – Contrat de mariage entre Henry-Liévain Carié et Gabrielle-Jeanne-Eulalie Bézard.

- **MC/ET/LXXXIV/697.** Notaire: Pierre Charles Moine de La Versine.
 - **6 vendémiaire V/27 Sep. 1796** – Sale of the Château of Ville d’Avray to Henry-Liévain Carié for 125,000 *livres*;
 - **19 brumaire V/9 Nov. 1796** – Inventaire après-décès de Anne-Marie-Isabelle Braeckman (mère de Henry-Liévan Carié).

- **MC/ET/LXXXIV/709.** Notaire: Pierre Charles Moine de La Versine.
 - **29 vendémiaire VIII/21 Oct. 1799** – Contrat de mariage entre Dominique-Vincent Ramel et Ange-Pauline-Charlotte-Josèphe Panckoucke.

- **MC/ET/LXXXIV/723.** Notaire: Pierre Charles Moine de La Versine.
 - **10 nivôse XI/31 Dec. 1802** – Procuration pour contrat de fourniture pour la Marine d’Henry-Liévain Carié;
 - **13 nivôse XI/3 Jan. 1803** – Mainlevée d’Henry-Liévain Carié à Jacques Augustin Perier;
 - **13 nivôse XI/3 Jan. 1803** – Procuration de *Carié & Cie.*;
 - **18 nivôse XI/8 Jan. 1803** – Procuration de Gabrielle-Jeanne-Eulalie Bézard à Henry-Liévain Carié;
 - **21 nivôse XI/11 Jan. 1803** – Gabrielle-Jeanne-Eulalie Bézard & Henry-Liévain Carié à Jean-Baptiste Darrieux;
 - **21 nivôse XI/11 Jan. 1803** – Cession et Concordat provisoire entre la Cie. d’Henry-Liévain Carié et *Carié, Bézard & Cie.*;
 - **19 pluviôse XI/8 Feb. 1803** – Procuration de Jean-François Martigny, liquidateur de la Cie. *Carié, Bézard & Cie.*, à D. René Allain.

- **MC/ET/LXXXVI/921.** Notaire : Pierre-Henri-Charles Huguet.
 - **Date unknown** – Military contracting agreement in which Jean-Louis Joseph Rousseau agrees to mortgage 600,000 francs of *biens nationaux* as security in exchange for the right to supply forage to the *Armée du Rhin*.

- **MC/ET/LXXXVI/921.** Notaire : Pierre-Henri-Charles Huguet.
 - **19 nivôse VIII/9 Jan. 1800** – Papers relating to the *Compagnie Noë*, the Parisian banking house *Limoges et Mazères*, and their contract to supply the *Armée d’Angleterre*’s 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 17th, 20th and 22nd divisions with forage. Salvatore Poli and Ignace Augustin Reynaud are financial guarantors for 600,000 francs (mortgaged property). Jacques Abraham Pallard guarantees Antoine Louis Girardot and Pierre Noë for another 400,000 francs. The contract is witnessed by General Berthier.

- **MC/ET/LXXXVI/923.** Notaire : Pierre-Henri-Charles Huguet.
 - **19 fructidor VIII/6 Sep. 1800** – Military contracting agreement granting Jean-Louis Joseph Rousseau the right to supply transport vehicles to the *Armée du Nord* and the *Armée de Sambre et Meuse*.

- **MC/ET/LXXXVIII/880.** Notaire : Étienne Thomé.
 - **1^{er} fructidor VII/18 Aug. 1799** – Papers relating to the foundation of the *Banque Territoriale*.

- **MC/ET/LXXXVIII/927.** Notaire: Antoine Omer Faugé.
 - **1 vendémiaire VIII/23 Sep. 1799 – 30 thermidor VIII/18 Aug. 1800** – Minutes concernant la Banque Territoriale, vendémiaire – thermidor VIII.
- **MC/ET/XCI/1959.** Notaire : Étienne-François Guéin.
 - **1 June 1844** – Inventaire après-décès d’Anne-Victorine-Claudine Lajard, veuve de Jean-Pierre Collot.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/221.** Notaire: Georges-Victor de Mautort.
 - **date unknown** – Files relating to the purchase of seven different properties in the Belgian department of Jemmapes worth 157,000 francs by the banker Pierre François Tiberghien from the military contractor Jean-Baptiste Paulée, Year VII.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/222.** Notaire: Georges-Victor de Mautort.
 - **29 ventôse VII/19 March 1799** – Files relating to the purchase by Augustin Ouvrard of several *biens nationaux* in the Vendée from real-estate speculator and future US president, William Henry Harrison. Most of these were confiscated émigré properties, including the Château de Landreau, the Château des Herbiers and the Château de La Routière.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/225.** Notaire: Georges-Victor de Mautort.
 - **23 prairial VII/11 June 1799** – *procuration générale et spéciale*, signed by Claude Blanchard, delegating his responsibilities as supplier general of the French navy to his brother-in-law, Gabriel Julien Ouvrard.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/227.** Notaire : Georges-Victor de Mautort.
 - **15 vendémiaire VIII/7 Oct. 1799** – Société en commandite pour exploiter les forges d’Azay-le-Ferron et de Preuilley [Preuilley-la-Ville], et les bois environnants situés dans les départements de l’Indre et de l’Indre-et-Loire, entre Julien Ouvrard, négociant, et Jean Marie Faure.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/230.** Notaire : Georges-Victor de Mautort.
 - **13 prairial VIII/2 June 1800** – Dissolution de la société de la Caisse des comptes courants, 14, rue Saint-Marc, et fusion avec la Banque de France, par les directeurs : Jean Jacques Lafrête, Gaspard Louis Caze-Labove et Jean Louis Ricqbourg.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/255.** Notaire : Georges-Victor de Mautort.
 - **10 frimaire XII/2 Dec. 1803** – Files relating to the Filliettaz family, textile traders from Geneva, indicating that Gabriel Filliettaz settled as a trader in Paris in 1798.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/286.** Notaire : Louis-Auguste Marchoux.
 - **16 Sep. 1807** – Sale of the domain of Guermange near Sarrebourg in the Meuse (225 hectares of land, 132 hectares of fields, 624 hectares of woods) to Jean-Charles Davillier and his sister-in-law Fillietaz for 500,000 francs.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/330.** Notaire : Louis-Auguste Marchoux.
 - **9 April 1812** – Files relating to the company of the Michel brothers, including a budget published in June 1810 which values the company’s total net worth at 29.5 million francs.

- **MC/ET/XCIII/442.** Notaire : Louis-Auguste Marchoux.
 - **16 July 1824** – Sale of the domain of Morainvilliers (Yvelines) by Jean-Charles Davillier to his son Charles for 362,000 francs. Davillier acquired it on 18 brumaire XIII/9 November 1804 for 280,000 francs.
- **MC/ET/XCIII/507.** Notaire : Pierre Corbin.
 - **12 July 1830** – Inventaire après décès de Jacques-Rose Récamier.
- **MC/ET/XCVII/651.** Notaire : Jean-Baptiste Lefèbvre de Saint-Maur.
 - **29 Nov. 1807** – Bankruptcy statement of Médard Desprez.
- **MC/ET/XCVIII/705.** Notaire : François Monnot.
 - **28 brumaire III/18 Nov. 1794** – Inventaire après-décès de Vincent Le Couteulx.
- **MC/ET/XCVIII/707.** Notaire : François Monnot.
 - **8 ventôse III/26 Feb. 1795** – Contrat de mariage entre Guillaume-Charles Faipoult et Anne-Germaine Duthé.
- **MC/ET/XCVIII/878.** Notaire : Victor Petit.
 - **30 Dec. 1818** – Inventaire après-décès de Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu.
- **MC/ET/XCIX/?.** Notaire : Pierre-Charles Gondouin ?
 - **29 messidor II/17 July 1794** – Marriage contract of Antoinette-Elisabeth-Rose-Joséphine Hugues de La Garde (1772-1851), daughter of Joseph de Hugues-Lagarde.
- **MC/ET/XCIX/761.** Notaire : Charles-François Lenormand.
 - **27 fructidor VI/13 Sep. 1798** – Sale of the estates of Preully and Azay-le-Ferron by Louis Lecomte and his wife Marie Renée Jacqueline Pinchina to Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard for 866,000 francs.
- **MC/ET/XCIX/774.** Notaire : Charles-François Lenormand.
 - **18-19 & 27 frimaire XI/9-10 & 18 Dec. 1800** – Bankruptcy inventory of Joseph Hugues-Lagarde, and his wife's statement to his creditors.
- **MC/ET/XCIX/789.** Notaire : Charles-François Lenormand.
 - **7 nivôse XIV/28 Dec. 1805** – Fixation de règlement entre les deux frères de La Garde.
- **MC/ET/CVII/686.** Notaire : Joseph-Charles Guenoux.
 - **26 Sep. 1806** – État des crédits dont le marquis d'Almenara autorise Eugenio Izquierdo à suivre le recouvrement.
- **MC/ET/CVII/689.** Notaire : Joseph-Charles Guenoux.
 - **12 Oct. 1807** – Dépôt de pièces relatives à l'adoption de Charlotte-Germaine-Julie Grandjean-Delisle.
- **MC/ET/CIX/913.** Notaire : Louis Antoine Debruge.
 - **26 Oct. 1808** – Union des créanciers de la *Compagnie Vanlerberghe & Ouvrard*.

- **MC/ET/CXII/827**. Notaire : René François Fourcault de Pavant.
 - **8 July 1793** – Sale of land in Indre-et-Loire to Charles Martin Doyen & Jean Claude Moynat for 600,000 *livres*.

- **MCN/ET/CXV/1047**. Notaire : Pierre-Nicolas Jallabert.
 - **6 brumaire IX/28 Oct. 1800** – Pierre Laurent Hainguerlot uses lands in Belgian *départements* as guarantees to build six brigs equipped with sixteen cannons each at Le Havre.

- **MC/ET/CXV/1056**. Notaire : Pierre-Nicolas Jallabert.
 - **28 vendémiaire XI/20 Oct. 1802** – Inventaire après décès d'Angélique-Charlotte-Josèphe Panckoucke (née Petit).

- **MCN/ET/CXV/1075**. Notaire : Pierre-Nicolas Jallabert.
 - **21 July 1806** – Inventaire après-décès d'Armand Frédéric Ernest Nogaret, ex-trésorier du comte d'Artois. Placide-Joseph Panckoucke est nommé exécutant testamentaire.

- **MC/ET/CXVI/663**. Notaire : Jean-Baptiste Pierre Jacques Mignard.
 - **14 April 1813** – Contrat de mariage entre Alphonse-Claude-Charles Perregaux et Adèle-Élisabeth MacDonald.

Archives of the City of Paris (Archives de la Ville de Paris)

- **3B6 88-91**
 - Various requests by Parisian investors to establish joint-stock companies. Some of these cases have been examined by Jean Bouchary.

- **4B6 110**
 - **Dossier 7883**
 - Papers relating to the bankruptcy of the financier Doucet de Suriny, 27 Sep. 1790.

- **6U3 11**
 - Henri Grandin & Antoine Delon vs. *Lanux père, Dubernard et Cie.*, 4 fructidor VIII/22 Aug. 1800.

- **C6 263**
 - **Dossier 191**
 - Bequeathment by will of 60,000 *livres* by the banker Nicolas Beaujon to Anne-Marie Hortense Perregaux to help her marry, 1786.

- **DQ7 1884**
 - f° 1v°-2r°, contract de mariage entre Séganville et Grandjean-Delisle-Faipoult, 19 Oct. 1807.

- **DQ7 3002**
 - Déclaration après-décès de Jean-Barthélémy Le Couteulx de Canteleu, 17 March 1819.

- **DQ7 3421**
 - Inventaire n°1243 – Inventaire après-décès de Guillaume Mallet l'ainé, 9 Sep. 1826.

- **DQ7 3561**
 - Déclaration de succession de Jean-Louis Johannot, 4 August 1836.

- **DQ7 3905**
 - Déclaration de succession du comte François-Nicolas Mollien, 21 Sep. 1850.

- **DQ7 5616**
 - **Dossier 66**
 - Notarial act of liquidation of the succession of Jean-Conrad Hottinguer.

- **DQ7 10520**
 - n°389, Déclaration de la Succession de la duchesse de Gaëte, 17 April 1856.

- **DQ7 10521**
 - n°526, Déclaration de la succession de la duchesse de Gaëte, 27 May 1856.

- **DQ7 11799**
 - Déclaration de succession de la comtesse Mollien, 21 Oct. 1878.

- **DQ7 11800**
 - Déclaration de succession complémentaire de la comtesse Mollien, 16 Nov. 1878.

- **DQ10 449**
 - **Dossier 6859**
 - Vente à Armand Jean-François Seguin de l'Île de Sèvres, la Maison Brancas et le domaine de Ravailles.

- **DQ10 644**
 - **Dossier 3231**
 - Rapport de Lakanal sur les dégradations commises dans le Parc Monceau, an II.

- **D2U1 70**
 - 6 Aug. 1811 – Scellé après décès de M. François Lanchère, Rue de Provence;

- **D3B6 96**
 - Papers relating to the bank established by Frédéric Faber in partnership with Joachim Schlutter from Hamburg and the Parisian textile merchant Pierre Sagnier, nivôse an X.

- **D6U3 11**
 - 21 ventôse IV/11 March 1796 – *André-Daniel Laffont contre Tourton & Ravel. Les Sieurs Mallet L'ainé et Perregaux nommés arbitres d'office aux juges du Tribunal de Commerce du Département de la Seine;*
 - 3 germinal IV/23 March 1796 – *Lettre de Baguenauti aux citoyens juge & consuls de Paris au sujet de l'affaire Durieux & Cie. vs. Carvalho & Cie.;*
 - 24 germinal IV/13 April 1796 – *Lettre du citoyen Mallet l'ainé aux citoyens juges du Tribunal de Commerce de département de la Seine;*
 - 26 germinal IV/15 April 1796 – *Rapport contre Sévène frères;*
 - 6 floréal IV/25 April 1796 – *Citoyen Mallet l'ainé aux citoyens juges du tribunal de commerce de la Seine;*
 - 7 floréal IV/26 April 1796 – *Rapport. Le Sieur Saucedo contre la Compagnie Mannier;*
 - 28 floréal IV/17 May 1796 – *Jugement du tribunal de commerce de la Seine dans l'affaire entre le Sieur Lamey et les Sieurs Dollfus, Schlumberger et Cie.;*
 - 1 prairial IV/20 May 1796 – *Le Sieur Grienet contre la Compagnie Senne & Bidermann;*
 - 10 prairial IV/29 May 1796 – *Le Sieur Grienet contre la Compagnie Senne & Bidermann;*
 - 3 messidor IV/21 June 1796 – *Jugement de l'affaire Fulchiron contre Carvalho & Cie.;*
 - 8 thermidor IV/26 July 1796 – *Jugement de l'affaire Le Couteulx contre la Compagnie Charlemagne;*
 - 14 thermidor IV/1 Aug. 1796 – *Jugement de l'affaire Vandenyver contre Nagel;*
 - 8 fructidor IV/25 Aug. 1796 – *Jugement de l'affaire Warent & Cie. vs. Dollfus, Schlumberger & Cie.;*
 - 28 fructidor IV/14 Sep. 1796 – *Jugement de l'affaire Durieux & Cie. contre Carvalho & Cie.;*
 - 18 brumaire IX/9 Nov. 1800 – *Collot, Caillard & Cie. en partenariat avec Lavauverte sollicitent l'entreprise général des vivres-viandes pour le service des armées.*

- **D11U3 13**
 - **Dossier 880**
 - Papers relating to the *Compagnie Noé*, the Parisian banking house *Limoge et Mazère*, and their contract to supply the *Armée d'Angleterre*, 4 germinal IX/25 March 1801.

- **D11U3 22**
 - **Dossier 1546**
 - Papers relating to the bankruptcy of the *Féline frères et Cie.* bank following the “Monneron” scandal which hit the *caisse des comptes courants* in 1796.

- **D11U3 23**
 - **Dossier 1562**
 - Papers relating to the bankruptcy of the Sarrus trading house in Paris following its inability to honour a major military supplying contract.

- **D11U3 33**
 - **Dossier 2164**
 - *Faillite de Jacques Récamier*, 1 Feb. 1806.

- **D31U3 1**
 - **Dossier 8**
 - Papers relating to the *Compagnie Noë*, the Parisian banking house *Limoges et Mazères*, and their contract to supply the *Armée d’Angleterre*;
 - **Dossier 17**
 - Papers relating to the foundation of the *Banque Territoriale* (founded 1 thermidor VII/19 July 1799);
 - **Dossier 33**
 - Minutes of the *Banque Territoriale*’s general assembly of shareholders, dated 5 thermidor VIII/24 July 1800;
 - **Dossier 79**
 - Extension mandate of the *Caisse d’Escompte du Commerce*, which had been founded in Year VI (1797) for a duration of three years, 6 Thermidor VIII/25 July 1800.
 - **Dossier 84**
 - Establishment of a new *Compagnie des Laines* by José Martinez de Hervas, Jacques and Laurent Récamier, *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.* and Alexandre Barrillon (19 germinal IX/9 April 1801). Henri Grandin is awarded the company’s general procuration on 16 thermidor IX/4 Aug. 1801.

- **D31U3 2**
 - **Dossier 214**
 - Papers relating to the bankruptcy of the *Féline frères et Cie.* bank following the Monneron scandal which hit the *caisse des comptes courants* in 1796;
 - **Dossiers 218 & 222**
 - Statutes of the *Compagnie des Mines d’Elbe* founded in 1802: a subsidiary of the *usine de fonderie et de laminage de plomb et de cuivre* located in Boury (Saint Denis);
 - **Dossier 334**
 - Loan agreements dated Year V in which Jean Louis Pourtalès agrees to lend Christophe Philippe Oberkampff 150,000 francs;
 - **Dossier 361**
 - Liquidation de la *Compagnie des Laines* (Hervas, Récamier, Fulchiron, *Geyler, Jordan & Cie.*), 1 ventôse XIII/20 Feb. 1805.

- **D31U3 3**
 - **Dossier 520**
 - 29 Dec. 1807 – The banker Jean-Frédéric Perregaux’s testament.
 - 31 Dec. 1808 – Fils relating to *Johannot, Carié et Cie.* (involving Clément-Hercule Carié, brother of Henry-Liévain Carié).

- **D31U3 4**
 - **Dossier 16**
 - Founding acts of the *Compagnie des canaux d’Aigues-Mortes à Beaucaire et d’Aigues-Mortes à l’étang de Mauguio*, 27 Oct. 1808.
 - **Dossier 120**
 - Papers relating to *Chaptal, fils et Cie.*, the company of Jean-Antoine Chaptal, and its trading house in the rue des Jeûneurs;
 - **Dossier 126**
 - Papers relating to *Chaptal, fils et Cie.* in which Jean-Antoine Chaptal cedes control of the company to his son and a third business partner, Amédée Berthollet (*fils*).
 - **Dossier 205**
 - Act of dissolution of *Johannot Carié Jacquet et Cie.*, 31 Dec. 1808.
 - **Dossier 206**
 - Founding contract of *Johannot Carié et Cie.*, 1 Jan. 1809.

- **D31U3 7**
 - **Dossier 66**
 - Notarial documents relating to the *Limoge et Mazères* bank and its contract to supply the French navy with wine in partnership with the banker Alexandre Barrillon from Years V-VIII, 20 November 1811 & 20 April 1812.

- **D31U3 9**
 - **Dossier 231**
 - Loan agreements dated Year VII in which Jean Louis Pourtalès agrees to lend Christophe Philippe Oberkampf 300,000 francs.

- **D31U3 32**
 - **Dossier 2116**
 - Faillite d’Henri Grandin, 4 Jan. 1806.

- **V10 E9**
 - 9 fructidor X/27 Aug. 1802 – Mariage de François-Nicolas Mollien et Adèle-Rosalie Collart-Dutilleul.

- **VD* 17**
 - **Dossiers 2790-2999**
 - Reports on Michel Simons.

- **VD* 18**
 - **Dossiers 3000-3209**
 - Papers relating to military contracting agreements awarding Jean-Pierre Collot the right to supply meat to the armies of Italy, the Alps and the Midi.

Archives of the French National Bank (Archives de la Banque de France)

- **Caisse des Comptes Courants – 1^{ère} société ou « ancienne société »**
- **1069200402/1**
- *Administration – création et organisation de la Caisse de Comptes courants*
 - ❖ Procès-verbal des réunions du conseil d'administration, 14 Vendémiaire V – 9 Nivôse VII (5 Oct. 1797 – 29 Dec. 1798) (227p).
- *Administration – création, organisation et liquidation de la Caisse de Comptes courants*
 - ❖ Registre des délibérations de l'Assemblée générale des actionnaires :
 - 1^{ère} Société : du 11 Messidor an IV au 30 Frimaire VII (29 June 1796 – 20 Dec. 1798) & 2^{ème} société : du 10 Nivôse VII (30 Dec. 1798) au 10 décembre 1833 (fin de la liquidation des deux sociétés) (196p);
 - Règlement général;
 - Rapport fait par le Sieur Cordier sur la liquidation de la société, 19 June 1807;

This dossier contains the foundational act and act of liquidation of the two Caisses des Comptes Courants, as well as their statutes, 1797-1833.

- **1069200402/32**
- Liquidation et dissolution de la Caisse de Comptes courants (1^{ère} Société), 1797-1798 ;
- Acte, note (an VII), 1799;
- Liquidation & dissolution de la 2^{ème} société de la Caisse des comptes courants, an VIII.
- **1069200402/2**
- *Liquidation de la Caisse de Comptes courants (1^{ère} Société)*
 - ❖ Délibérations des commissaires liquidateurs, 11 Nivôse VII – 9 Germinal VII (30 Dec. 1798 – 29 March 1799).
- **Caisse des Comptes Courants – 2^{ème} société ou « nouvelle société »**
- **1069200402/22**
- *Administration*
 - ❖ Création et organisation de la Caisse de Comptes courants : procès-verbal des réunions du conseil d'administration, 11 Nivôse VII-30 Pluviôse VIII (31 Dec. 1798-19 Feb. 1800).
- *Administration*
 - ❖ Actions de la Caisse de Comptes courants : livre-journal, 11 Nivôse VII-5 Ventôse VIII (31 Dec. 1798-24 Feb. 1800).
- **1069200402/23**
- *Administration*
 - ❖ Délibérations de l'Assemblée générale des actionnaires (2^{ème} Société) : du 10 Nivôse VII au 27 Pluviôse VIII (30 Dec. 1798-16 Feb. 1800).
- **1069200402/32 (same dossier as that listed for the 1^{ère} société above)**
- *Administration – actionnaires de la Caisse de Comptes courants*
 - ❖ Note;
 - ❖ Liste des actionnaires de la Caisse des comptes courants (5 Brumaire VIII/27 Oct. 1799);
 - ❖ Rapports à l'assemblée générale des actionnaires (1798-1800):
 - 30 frimaire VII (20 Dec. 1798);
 - 15 germinal VII (4 April 1799);
 - 15 vendémiaire VIII (7 Oct. 1799);
 - 25 Vendémiaire VIII (17 Oct. 1799);
 - Discours à l'assemblée générale, sans date/undated.

- *Administration*
 - ❖ Organisation de la Caisse de Comptes courants, règlement intérieur : brochure, sans date/undated.
- *Comptabilité*
 - ❖ Budget : état, note, correspondance (1799-1800);
 - ❖ Immobilier et mobilier de la Caisse de Comptes courants, organisation : inventaire, devis, note (1799).
- *Opérations bancaires*
 - ❖ Escompte -extraordinaire : étude, 23 Frimaire VII (13 Dec. 1798).
- *Relations avec la clientèle*
 - ❖ Registre de copies de lettres-départs, 20 frimaire VII-29 ventôse VIII (10 Dec. 1798-20 March 1800) (222p);
- *Règlement général de la nouvelle société de comptes courants* (1798).
- **1069200401/284**
- *Comptoir Commercial*
 - ❖ Liste des actionnaires du Comptoir Commercial, an XII;
 - ❖ Supplément d'actions à porter au crédit des dénommés en dessous pour celles qu'ils ont déposées depuis le 25 ventôse jusqu'au 1^{er} messidor an XII (16 March-20 June 1804);
 - ❖ Les Directeurs et administrateurs du Comptoir Commercial aux citoyens Régents et Censeurs de la Banque de France, 6 germinal an IX (27 March 1801);
 - ❖ Les Directeurs et administrateurs du Comptoir Commercial aux citoyens Régents et Censeurs de la Banque de France, 22 germinal an XI (12 April 1803);
 - ❖ Rapport sur les propositions du Comptoir Commercial, messidor an XI ;
 - ❖ Propositions du Comptoir Commercial aux Régents de la Banque de France, 29 messidor an XI/18 July 1803;
 - ❖ Propositions du Comptoir Commercial aux Régents de la Banque de France, 1^{er} thermidor an XI/20 July 1803;
 - ❖ Rapport sur les propositions du Comptoir Commercial relativement à ses relations avec la Banque depuis la nouvelle loi, 1 thermidor XI/20 July 1803;
 - ❖ Les Commerçants, Manufacturiers et Fabricants composant le Comptoir Commercial aux Régents de la Banque de France, 5 fructidor XI/23 Aug. 1803;
 - ❖ Les Directeurs du Comptoir Commercial aux citoyens Régents de la Banque de France :
 - 14 fructidor XI/1 Sep. 1803;
 - 6 vendémiaire XII/29 Sep. 1803.
 - ❖ Les Directeurs du Comptoir Commercial aux membres du Comité central de la Banque de France :
 - 20 nivôse XII/11 Jan. 1804;
 - 2 ventôse XII/22 Feb. 1804.
 - ❖ Les Directeurs du Comptoir Commercial au Président de la Banque de France, 25 nivôse XII/16 Jan. 1804;
 - ❖ Les Directeurs du Comptoir Commercial à M. Garat, Directeur Général de la Banque, 11 pluviôse XII/1 Feb. 1804;
 - ❖ Comptoir Commercial : Extrait du registre des Délibérations du 1^{er} ventôse an IX (20 Feb. 1801);
 - ❖ Les Directeurs du Comptoir Commercial à M. Audibert, secrétaire général de la Banque de France :
 - 9 germinal XII/30 March 1804;
 - 24 messidor XII/13 July 1804.

- ❖ Les Directeurs du Comptoir Commercial à Messers. le Président et Membres du Comité centrale de la Banque de France :
 - 23 messidor XII/12 July 1804;
 - 25 messidor XII/14 July 1804;
 - 27 messidor XII/16 July 1804;
 - 28 thermidor XII/16 Aug. 1804;
 - 25 fructidor XII/12 Sep. 1804.
- ❖ Comptoir Commercial : situation du portefeuille :
 - 3 messidor XII/22 June 1804;
 - 9 messidor XII/28 June 1804.
- ❖ Comptoir Commercial : situation du compte de change au 30 frimaire XII (22 Dec. 1803);
- ❖ État de la position du Comptoir Commercial au 2 nivôse XII (24 Dec. 1803);
- ❖ État général des billets de circulation souscrits par les actionnaires du 24 brumaire IX au 30 ventôse XII (15 Nov. 1800-21 March 1804).
- *Fusion de la Banque de France avec la Caisse des Comptes Courants, 1798-1800*
 - ❖ Pièce 2 – Traité en forme de transaction entre les commandités de la Caisse des Comptes Courants et les Régents de la Banque de France, 27 floréal VIII (17 May 1800);
 - ❖ Pièce 3 – Acte de société en nom collectif et en commandite de la Caisse des comptes courants reconstituée;
 - ❖ Pièce 5 – Lettre type de la Caisse des Comptes Courants à ses actionnaires pour la fusion avec la Banque de France;
 - ❖ Pièce 6 – Discours prononcé pendant la Séance des Actionnaires de la Caisse des Comptes Courants, le 9 pluviôse VIII (29 Jan. 1800), par Léon Basterrèche;
 - ❖ Pièce 7
 - Procès-verbal et extrait de la première assemblée des actionnaires de la Banque de France tenue à Paris dans le local de l’Oratoire, 24 pluviôse VIII (13 Feb. 1800);
 - Procès-verbal et extrait de la deuxième assemblée des actionnaires de la Banque de France tenue à Paris dans le local de l’Oratoire, 27 pluviôse VIII (16 Feb. 1800);
 - ❖ Pièce 8 – Lettre de la Caisse des Comptes Courants aux Régents de la Banque de France, 21 ventôse VIII (12 March 1800);
 - ❖ Pièce 8bis – Opinion des Conseils de la Banque de France sur la marche à suivre pour régulariser la transmission de la Caisse des Comptes Courants à la Banque et des intéressés commandités;
 - ❖ Pièce 8ter – Traitements accordés par la Caisse des Comptes Courants à ses commandités;
 - ❖ Observations des commandités de la Caisse des Comptes Courants;
 - ❖ Mise en conformité avec la loi du 24 Germinal XI sur les banques relative au retrait de la circulation des billets émis par les caisses, relations avec la Banque de France : rapport, correspondance, état, liste, état nominatif des actionnaires du comptoir commercial [Ventôse an IX-août 1807].

➤ **Caisse d'escompte du commerce**

▪ **1069199708/2 (Historique de la Banque de France)**

- *Observations des associés de la Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce sur le projet relatif aux banques, présenté au corps législatif le 14 germinal an XI (4 April 1803);*
- *Rapport des commissaires nommés par l'administration de la Caisse d'escompte du Commerce à l'assemblée générales des actionnaires, en lui présentant l'acte de prorogation de son association, 16 messidor VIII/5 July 1800;*
- *Liste de banquiers et négociants, sans date/undated;*

- *Prospectus de la Caisse d'escompte du Commerce*, sans date/undated;
- *Sur une Caisse de Commerce ou bourse commune des négociants*, sans date/undated.
- **1069200401/305**
- *Certificats d'inscriptions d'actions (classement par ordre alphabétique des actionnaires)*.
- **1180200501/591**
- *Versements effectués à la Banque de France lors de la liquidation de la Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce*.
- **1180200501/592**
- *Liquidation de la Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce*.
- **1069201238/1**
- *Projet de convention pour opérer la fusion de la caisse d'escompte du commerce dans la Banque de France*, 7 Fructidor II/24 Aug. 1794 (this date is written on the file but is obviously a mistake as the merger took place in 1803);
- *Agence des receveurs généraux*, 1802.

- **Banque de France – Secrétariat du conseil général, 1800–1986**
- **1069200401/194**
- *Immeubles de la Banque centrale*
 - ❖ *Acquisition de biens, Hôtel Massiac* : correspondance, bail, transcription, note, plan, 1778-1908.
- **1069200401/195**
- *Personnel*
 - ❖ *Liste des employés de la Banque de France*, [avec indication du nom, du prénom, de la date et du lieu naissance, de l'adresse, des dates de service, des fonctions occupées, du traitement et observations diverses (date de décès, ...)] : registre [avec index] (registre n°1 : 1796-1818), 1796-1857.
- **1069200401/212**
- *Emploi du capital* [rentes disponibles, rentes immobilisées] *et des réserves* [réserves statutaires, facultatives et provisoires]
 - ❖ *Situations mensuelles et semestrielles* [actions, circulation de billets, espèces, escompte, effets au comptant, dividendes, réserves, opérations extraordinaires, ...] (1800-1819, 1800-1849), 1800-1850.
- **1069200401/283**
- *Fusion de la Caisse d'Escompte du Commerce de Paris et de la Banque de France*
 - ❖ *Projet de convention* : bilan, état, correspondance, rapport, compte-rendu de réunion, messidor an VIII-messidor an XIII, (1800-1805).
- **1069200401/289**
- *Effet, obligation, action, mandat, assemblée des actionnaires, dividende, escompte, recette, avoir, bon*
 - ❖ *Relations avec M. Garat, directeur de la Banque de France* [16 lettres] : correspondance, sans date [s.d.]/undated;
- *Suspension de paiement*
 - ❖ *Lettre au gouverneur de la Banque de France* [1 lettre] : correspondance, sans date [s.d.]/undated;
- *Actions, obligations, effets, demande d'emploi, achat de piastres, receveurs départementaux, échange et ouverture de comptes*
 - ❖ *Relations avec le Directeur général et les régents de la Banque de France* [an IV-an X] : correspondance, 1796-1802;

- *Actions, obligations, effets, demande d'emploi, achat de piastres, receveurs départementaux, échange et ouverture de comptes et escompte*
 - ❖ Relations avec le Directeur général et les régents de la Banque de France [an XI-1800] : correspondance, 1802-1811;
- *Assemblée générale des actionnaires, Comité central, crédit, dividende, rentes, action, obligation, opérations, Comité des caisses, traite, compte, assemblée des régents et des censeurs et effet*
 - ❖ Relations avec M. Garat, directeur de la Banque de France [16 lettres] : correspondance, floréal VIII-vendémiaire XI.
- **1069200901/1 (Législation de la Banque de France)**
 - *Lettre des Régents au ministre des Finances*, 6 Jan. 1800;
 - *Arrêtés des consuls du 28 nivôse VIII* (18 Jan. 1800);
 - *Délibérations de la Caisse des Comptes-Courants*, 23 Jan. 1800;
 - *Extrait du Procès-verbal de la première Assemblée des Actionnaires de la Banque de France, tenue à Paris, dans le local de l'Oratoire, le vingt-quatre pluvios an huit* (13 Feb. 1800);
 - *Statuts primitifs de la Banque de France, 24 et 27 pluviôse VIII* (13 & 16 Feb. 1800) : *Dépôt des statuts fondamentaux chez M^e Demautort*. Available online at: <https://www.banque-france.fr/la-banque-de-france/histoire/institution>. NOTE: these are different from the *Statuts fondamentaux de la Banque de France* drawn up in 1806 following the bankruptcy of the *Négociants Réunis* (available at the same address);
 - *Discours du Président à l'assemblée générale de la Banque de France*, 25 vendémiaire IX/17 Oct. 1800;
 - *Loi du 24 Germinal An XI* (14 April 1803) *sur les statuts de la Banque de France : Discussion du Conseil de Régence sur la présence d'autres banques à Paris que la Banque de France*, 12 April 1806.
 - *Réflexions d'un actionnaire touchant le projet de loi sur les Banques présenté au Corps législatif les 14 et 19 germinal An 11*. Paris : Imprimerie d'Ant. Bailleul, s.d. (sans date)/undated (28p).
- **1069201116/1**
 - *Registre des Délibérations du Conseil General de Régence de la Banque de France. Tome 1. Du 29 pluviôse VIII au 1 vendémiaire XI* (18 Feb. 1800-23 Sep. 1802) (369p);
 - *Registre des Délibérations du Conseil General de Régence de la Banque de France. Tome 2. Du 2 vendémiaire XI au 17 pluviôse XII* (24 Sep. 1802-7 Feb. 1804).
- **1069201214/1**
 - *Les crises économiques et financières*.
 - ❖ *Le rôle de la Banque de France, I (recueil factice de documents, Banque de France, Bibliothèque) : Crise de 1802-1803*.
- **Other Documents**
 - *Banque de France. Compte rendu des opérations. Exercices 1800 à 1820*. Available online at: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb327033321/date.r=banque%20de%20france%20compte%20rendu%20des%20op%C3%A9rations>.
 - *Recueil imprimé des discours et comptes rendus aux assemblées générales de 1800 à 1839, 1 Volume*. Available online at: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb327033321/date.r=banque%20de%20france%20compte%20rendu%20des%20op%C3%A9rations>.

Archives du Service Historique de la Défense (Archives de la Guerre)

➤ **B1/63**

- *Notes anonymes de Vendémiaire IV.*

➤ **B1/68**

- *Joubert au Directoire, Metz, 19 nivôse IV/9 Jan. 1796.*

➤ **B2/52 & 53**

- *Le Directoire à Moreau, Paris, 12 & 25 messidor IV/30 July & 12 Aug. 1796.*

➤ **B2/74**

- *Rapport fait par le commissaire civil du gouvernement près l'armée d'Helvétie, sans date/undated (probably prairial VII).*

➤ **B3/18**

- *Ritter à Letourneur, Albenga, 24 brumaire IV/15 Nov. 1795;*
- *Ritter au citoyen Villars, envoyé extraordinaire de la République à Gênes, Finale, 6 frimaire IV/27 Nov. 1795;*
- *Maisse au Directoire, Nice, 11 frimaire IV/2 Dec. 1795.*
- *Ritter à Letourneur, Finale, 11 frimaire IV/2 Dec. 1795.*
- *Rincheval, secrétaire du représentant Ritter, à Carnot, Gênes, 4 nivôse IV/25 Dec. 1795;*
- *Ritter à Letourneur, Savone, 7 nivôse IV/28 Dec. 1795;*
- *Rincheval, secrétaire du représentant Ritter, à Carnot, Gênes, 4 nivôse IV/25 Dec. 1795.*

➤ **B3/19**

- *Le Citoyen Gandolphi à Ritter, Oneille, 24 nivôse IV/14 Jan. 1796;*
- *Saliceti à Carnot, Nice, 4 ventôse IV/23 Feb. 1796;*
- *Saliceti à Carnot, Gênes, 18 ventôse IV/8 March 1796;*
- *Saliceti au Directoire, Gênes, 24 ventôse IV/14 March 1796.*

➤ **B3/20**

- *Ritter au commissaire ordonnateur en chef de l'armée d'Italie, Nice, 27 ventôse IV/17 March 1796;*
- *Faipoult au Directoire, 9 germinal IV/29 March 1796.*

➤ **B3/21**

- *Saliceti au Directoire exécutif. Lezegno, 4 floréal IV/23 April 1796;*
- *Saliceti au Directoire. Cherasco, 7 floréal IV/26 April 1796.*

➤ **B3/22**

- *Saliceti au Directoire. 20 floréal IV/9 May 1796;*
- *Augereau à Bonaparte. 21 floréal IV/10 May 1796;*
- *Saliceti à Berthier. Lodi, 22 floréal IV/11 May 1796;*
- *Saliceti au Directoire. Lodi, 25 floréal IV/14 May 1796.*

➤ **B3/23**

- *Saliceti au Directoire. Milan, 3 prairial IV/22 May 1796 – Contributions imposed on Milan;*

- *Saliceti à Berthier*. Milan, 3 prairial IV/22 May 1796 – Letter confirming the objects confiscated from the mont-de-piété in Milan are being shipped to Balbi in Genoa;
 - *Saliceti au Directoire*. Milan, 4 prairial IV/23 May 1796 – Report of Saliceti to the Directory after Bonaparte decrees the wages of his army will be paid half in hard currency;
 - *Saliceti à l'ordonnateur en chef Lambert*. Milan, 28 floréal IV/17 May 1796 – Letter from Saliceti asking the chief ordnance officer to stop supervising finances.
- **B3/25**
- *Pinsot aux agents militaires de la Lombardie*. Milan, 22 prairial IV/10 June 1796;
 - *Garrau à Carnot*. Bologne, 2 messidor IV/20 June 1796 – Letter denouncing Pinsot;
 - *Saliceti au Directoire*. Bologne, 2 messidor IV/21 June 1796 – Letter sent after the negotiations at Bologna announcing that all formalities in collecting contributions hadn't been observed but that French agents would be closely monitored;
 - *Saliceti et Garrau au Directoire*. Livourne, 12 messidor IV/30 June 1796 – Letter stating that 67 ships of the Royal Navy slipped out of Livorno the day before French forces occupied the city.
- **B3/26**
- *Saliceti au Directoire*. Castiglione, 25 messidor IV/13 July 1796 – Letter appraising the value of the goods seized at Livorno at 10 million livres.
- **B3/28**
- *Arrêté de Saliceti et Garrau*. Milan, 7 fructidor IV/24 Aug. 1796 – Decree ordering the sale of the bells of Pavia.
- **B3/29**
- *Berthier à Clarke*. Bologne, 15 messidor IV/3 July 1796 – Berthier recommends there only be a single commissioner attached to the *Armée d'Italie*;
 - *Denniée à Garrau*. Peschiera, 23 fructidor IV/9 Sep. 1796 – Note from Denniée informing Garrau that the army needs 10,600,000 francs for expenses in Vendémiaire Year V;
 - *La Compagnie Flachet, Laporte et Castelin à Garrau*. Milan, 29 fructidor IV/15 Sep. 1796 – Letter concerning the *Compagnie Flachet's* seizure of the Pope's contribution to the armistice of Bologna.
- **B3/30**
- *Garrau au Directoire*. Milan, 1^{er} jour complémentaire IV/17 Sep. 1796 – Letter in which Garrau complains of his powerlessness to root out corruption in the military administration;
 - *Le ministre de la Guerre à Denniée*. Paris, 2 vendémiaire V/23 Sep. 1796 – The war minister announces he will investigate chief ordnance officer Denniée for corruption;
 - *Denniée au Directoire*. Vérone, 9 vendémiaire V/30 Oct. 1796 – Denniée attempts to justify his demand for 10.6 million francs to fund the army for the month of Vendémiaire an V.
- **B3/31**
- *Denniée aux commissaires du gouvernement*. Vérone, 5 vendémiaire V/26 Sep. 1796 – Denniée attempts to justify his demands for 10.6 million.

➤ **B3/32**

- *Saliceti et Garrau au Directoire*. Modène, 26 vendémiaire V/17 Oct. 1796 – Letter discussing the Cispadane Republic's offer to repurchase the funds confiscated from its public coffers;
- *Propositions du gouvernement de Modène aux commissaires du Directoire*. Modène, 23 vendémiaire V/14 Oct. 1796 – The offer of repurchase made by the Cispadane Republic;
- *Arrêté de Saliceti et Garrau « acceptant » ces conditions*. Modène, 24 vendémiaire V/15 Oct. 1796 – French acceptance of the offer;
- *Belleville à Bonaparte*. Livourne, 25 vendémiaire V/16 Oct. 1796 – Letter appraising the value of the goods seized at Livorno at 7 million *livres*;
- *Arrêté de Saliceti et Garrau*. Modène, 26 vendémiaire V/17 Oct. 1796 – Decrees issued by Saliceti and Garrau to force the *Compagnie Flachet* to pay up;
- *Berthier à Clarke*. Vérone, 4 brumaire V/25 Oct. 1796 – Letter from Berthier to Clarke praising Bonaparte.

➤ **B3/33**

- *Saliceti au Directoire*. Livourne, 10 brumaire V/31 Oct. 1796 – Letter estimating the total amount of captured goods at Livorno at 2,200,000 *livres*.

➤ **B3/34**

- *Baraguey d'Hilliers aux commissaires du gouvernement en Lombardie*. Milan, 5 brumaire V/26 Oct. 1796 – Letter from Baraguay d'Hilliers announcing to the civilian commissioners their destitution in Lombardy;
- *Garrau à Bonaparte*. Milan, 14 brumaire V/4 Nov. 1796 – Garrau's letter to Bonaparte responding to his destitution in Lombardy and defending his administration against accusations of corruption;
- *Garrau au Directoire*. Milan, 14 brumaire V/4 Nov. 1796 – Garrau informs the Directory of his destitution in Lombardy by Bonaparte;
- *Garrau au Directoire*. Milan, 14 brumaire V/4 Nov. 1796 – Letter from Garrau stating he has been able to raise 8 million francs for the army out of the 10.6 million demanded by Denniée.

➤ **B3/35**

- *Garrau au Directoire*. Vérone, 29 brumaire V/19 Nov. 1796 – Garrau defends himself against Bonaparte's accusation that he spent 5 million without justification;
- Paris, 26 brumaire V/16 Nov. 1796 – Decree issued by the Directory ordering all army personnel to comply with information requests made by General Henri Clarke.

➤ **B3/36**

- *Le ministre de la Guerre au citoyen Leroux, commissaire ordonnateur*. Paris 19 vendémiaire V/10 Oct. 1796 – Letter dispatching Leroux to investigate Denniée in Italy;
- *Arrêté de Garrau*. Milan, 10 frimaire V/30 Nov. 1796 – Garrau borrows 1,660,000 *livres* from various chambers of commerce of Lombard cities;
- *Arrêté de Garrau*. Milan, 12 frimaire V/2 Dec. 1796 – Decree appointing Lombiac and Rovingana as tax collectors for the district of Modena and Antoine-Romain Hamelin for the district of Ferrara;
- *Rapport de Clarke au Directoire*. Milan, 17 frimaire V/7 Dec. 1796 – Report of Clarke on General Bonaparte.

➤ **B3/39**

- *Saliceti et Garrau au Directoire*. Florence, 26 fructidor IV/12 Sep. 1796 – Note from Saliceti and Garrau objecting to Denniée’s request for 10.6 million francs for the army’s operational costs for Vendémiaire V.

➤ **B3*/210**

- *Le Directoire au général Clarke*. Paris, 26 brumaire V/16 Nov. 1796 – Letter detailing Clarke’s secret mission to report on the Armée d’Italie and its leadership.

Archives des Affaires Étrangères

➤ Gênes

▪ 169

- *Villars à Charles Delacroix*. Gênes, 2 nivôse & 1 pluviôse IV/23 Dec. 1795 & 21 Jan. 1796.

▪ 170

- *Saliceti à Cacault*, Gênes, 20 ventôse IV/10 March 1796;
- *Faipoult au ministre des Relations extérieures*, 2 germinal IV/22 March 1796;
- *Saliceti au ministre des Relations extérieures*, Savone, 6 germinal IV/26 March 1796;
- *Faipoult au ministre des Relations extérieures*, Gênes, 9 germinal IV/29 March 1796;
- *Charles Delacroix à Saliceti*. Paris, 28 germinal IV/17 April 1796.

➤ Milan

▪ 55

- *Saliceti au ministre des Relations extérieures*. Milan, 9 fructidor IV/26 Aug. 1796;
- *Les députés de Bologne au ministre des Relations extérieures*. Paris, 11 brumaire V/1 Nov. 1796;
- *Arrêté de Garrau*. Modène, 7 brumaire V/28 Oct. 1796 – Decree dispatching Bianchi to evaluate the goods confiscated by the French army in the Duchy of Modena.

➤ Rome

▪ 220, supplément

- *Saliceti et Garrau au Directoire*. Bologne, 2 messidor IV/20 June 1796;
- *Conditions d'un armistice conclu entre Saliceti, Garrau, Bonaparte et le Pape*. Bologne, 5 messidor IV/23 June 1796 – Armistice terms imposed on the Papal States at Bologna.

▪ 919

- *Saliceti au ministre des Relations extérieures*. Gênes, 19 ventôse IV/9 March 1796;
- *Saliceti à Cacault*. Gênes, 20 ventôse IV/10 March 1796;
- *Cacault au ministre des Relations extérieures*. Gênes, 20 germinal IV/9 April 1796;
- *Lettre de Pommereul* – Early May 1796;
- *Lettre de Cacault au ministre des Relations extérieures*. Gênes, 27 floréal IV/16 May 1796.

▪ 926

- *Instructions pour les commissaires du Directoire allant à Rome*. Paris, 4 pluviôse VI/23 Jan. 1798.

➤ Sardaigne

▪ 272

- Paris, 20 ventôse IV/10 March 1796;
- *Note pour le ministre des Relations extérieures signée de Buonarroti, Celentani, Murzio, Cerise*. Paris, 4 floréal IV/23 April 1796.

➤ Suisse

▪ Correspondance diplomatique, 442

- Dossier 169 & 175 – *Recommandation de Jean-Frédéric Perregaux par Sandoz de Travers, chef de la commission secrète du gouvernement de Neufchâtel, à l'ambassador de Franc en Suisse François Barthélémy*.

▪ Correspondance diplomatique, 447

- Dossier 20 & 26 – *Rapports du Comité de Subsistances sur Jean-Frédéric Perregaux*.

➤ **Toscane**

▪ **147**

- *Note sur Livourne*. Livourne, 3 floréal IV/22 April 1796.

▪ **148**

- *Belleville au ministre des Relations extérieures*. Livourne, 21 brumaire V/11 Nov. 1796 – Letter from Belleville denouncing corrupt practices in the sale at auction of goods seized at Livorno by the *Compagnie Flachet*;
- *Mémoires des 28 messidor et 3 thermidor an IV* (16 & 21 July 1796) – Complaints submitted by Neri Corsini – ambassador of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany – to the Directory concerning the French occupation of Livorno.

Archives départementales de l'Hérault – Montpellier

➤ **I E 1290, Fonds Sabatier & 2U 71, actes de sociétés**

- Records indicating the holdings of the Sabatier family in the Anzin Coal Mining Company.

Archives départementales des Yvelines

➤ **IV Q 62**

- Bill of sale of the *Maison Brancas* in Sèvres by Armand Seguin to Napoleon, 1809.

Archives générales du Royaume de Belgique

➤ **Archives générales du Royaume à Anderlecht, Bruxelles**

- CB 705 (16 Nov. 1829);
- CB 782, château de Gretz. Declaration of inheritance (*déclaration de succession*) by Placide-Joseph Panckoucke's heirs in Brussels on 11 August 1829, n°1353.

▪ **Saisie Michel Jean et Henry Simons**

- Pièces n^{os} 269-286, 698-776, 802-808 – various contracts awarded to Michel Simons by the Directory for the supply of the French Navy;
- Pièce n°313 – *Les membres de la Chambre de commerce d'Anvers à Napoléon*, 4 fructidor XII/22 Aug. 1804;
- Pièces n^{os} 638-688 – *Project du Citoyen Simons pour l'ouverture d'une voie navigable entre Paris, Bruxelles, Anvers et les départements de la rive gauche du Rhin*, date incertaine;
- Pièce n° 783 – *Rapport de Michel-Jean Simons décrivant l'état dilapidé du réseau routier du département de l'Oise*, 1803;
- Pièces n^{os} 1586, 1597, 1598, 1636, 1643 & 1655 – relatives à la vente de l'Abbaye de Saint-Michel à Anvers par Jean-Baptiste Paulée à Michel-Jean Simons, août 1800;
- Pièce n°1599 – Ordre de Napoléon Bonaparte de construire un arsenal sur le site de l'Abbaye de Saint-Michel à Anvers, 2 thermidor XI/21 juillet 1803;
- Pièces n^{os} 1667 & 1669 – Accord de Jean Werbrouck, maire d'Anvers, pour installer une nouvelle place du commerce proche de l'Abbaye de Saint-Michel, date incertaine;
- Pièce n°1732 – *Les propriétaires de l'abbaye de Saint-Michel au Ministre de la Marine*, sans date/undated;
- Pièce n°1734 – *Jean Johannot à Michel Simons*, 28 thermidor XI/16 Aug. 1803;

- Carton IV – Lettre d’Henry Simons à son frère Michel-Jean Simons lui annonçant sa banqueroute, décembre 1810;
- Carton V – Création par Michel Simons et Jean Werbrouck d’une société pour l’import de guinées anglaises, 2 frimaire V/22 November 1796;
- Carton V – Lettre de Radix de Sainte-Foix à Jean Werbrouck détaillant les termes d’un traité conclu entre le Directoire français et la société Simons-Werbrouck, janvier 1797;
- Carton V – Lettre de Michel Simons au ministre de la Marine Forfait proposant un traité pour la fourniture générale de la Marine française dans les neuf *départements réunis* de Belgique, / frimaire VIII/29 novembre 1799;
- Carton V – Accord pour un projet joint de traité de fournitures générales pour la Marine française entre Michel Simons, Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard, Michel frères et Solier, fils et Delarue, 9 frimaire VIII/30 novembre 1799;
- Carton V – *Proposition de Michel-Jean Simons de fournir du bois pour la construction de navires*, 19 prairial IX/8 June 1801;
- Carton V – Cautionnements de José Martínez de Hervás, ambassadeur d’Espagne à Paris, envers la société Simons frères à Anvers, 1802-1803;
- Carton XIII-2 – Lettre de Michel Simons au président de la Cour d’Appel de Paris, 1 thermidor XIII/20 July 1805;
- Carton XIV – *Lettre de Dumouriez à Tort de La Sonde*, 28 mars 1792;
- Carton XIV – *Lettre de Dumouriez à Tort de La Sonde*, 21 octobre 1792;
- Carton XIV – *Observations générales pour Henry Simons contre Tort de la Sonde, termes d’un contrat pour l’approvisionnement de l’Armée du Nord*, 4 novembre 1792;
- Carton XIV – Affaire Tort de La Sonde vs. Les frères Simons;
- Carton XIV – Offre des frères Michel et Henry Simons de fournir 100,000 quintaux de blé aux troupes de la République française, Juin 1795;
- Carton XIV – *Letter of Michel Simons to Walckiers*, 2 vendémiaire V/23 Sep. 1796;
- Carton XV – *Protocole de mes conférences à Amsterdam*, mai 1806.
- Carton XV – *Mollien à Michel-Jean Simons*, 19 mai 1806;
- Carton XV – *Copie de la lettre de Michel-Jean Simons à Talleyrand*, 19 mai 1806;
- Carton XV-1 – *Lettre de Michel-Jean Simons au ministre des Affaires étrangères espagnol Izquierdo*, 20 Feb. 1806;
- Acte du 21 fructidor VIII/8 Sep. 1800 – Étude de M^e Wauters, notaire du département des Deux-Nèthes – Acte relatif à la vente de l’Abbaye de Saint-Michel à Anvers par Jean-Baptiste Paulée à Michel-Jean Simons;
- Fondation de la société Simons frères – Acte du 5 fructidor X/23 Aug. 1802. Enregistré à Paris le 29 pluviôse XIII/18 Feb. 1805 (Étude de M^e Lezain);
- S 2209 (faillites).
- **Enregistrement et Domaines, Bureau de Bruxelles**
- 1^{er} trimestre 1841, n^o791, Déclaration de la succession d’Ange-Pauline-Charlotte-Josèphe Panckoucke, veuve de Dominique-Vincent Ramel, 12 janvier 1841.
- Notariat du Brabant, n^o17150/3, acte n^o164, Contrat de mariage d’Édouard-Louis Lorois et de Pauline-Angélique-Rose Ramel, 11 Aug. 1818;
- Notariat du Brabant, n^o17213, acte n^o82, Contrat de mariage de Frédéric-Guillaume Ronstorff et d’Henriette-Mélanie Ramel, 2 May 1828.

British National Archives

➤ **British Library/Manuscript Collections.**

- Add MSS 34908-17 passim. Letter from Sir Sidney Smith to Lord Nelson, Limassol, 7 Sep. 1799.
- Herries papers, Add MSS 57366-465.

➤ **British Museum**

- Add MSS 34.454, f°37. *Letter from Lord Auckland to William Pitt concerning Jean-Frédéric Perregaux.*
- *Papers of British Cabinet Ministers, 1782-1800*, London, H.M.'s Stationary Office, 1982.

Swiss Federal Archives

➤ **Archives d'État de Bâle**

- NA 172, Johannes Gysendörfer IV.

➤ **Schweizerisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (S.W.A.), Bâle**

- B 1-44, Zirkularsammlung

➤ **Archives d'État de Zurich**

- Papiers de famille Escher vom Glas, 171205/2, Correspondance.

II. Primary Sources – Published Works

Books/Essays/Pamphlets

- Boulay de la Meurthe, Antoine-Jacques-Claude-Joseph. *Théorie constitutionnelle de Sieyès. Constitution de l'An VIII. Extrait des mémoires inédits*. Paris: P. Renouard, 1836.
- Burke, Edmund. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Reprint ed. London: Penguin, 1982.
- Chateaubriand, François-René de. *De Buonaparte, des Bourbons et de la nécessité de se rallier à nos princes légitimes pour le bonheur de la France et celui de l'Europe*. Paris: Mames frères, 1814.
- Constant, Benjamin. *De la force du gouvernement actuel de la France et de la nécessité de s'y rallier/Des réactions politiques/Des effets de la Terreur*. Paris: Éditions Flammarion / Champs Classiques, 2013.
- , *Écrits politiques*. Edited by Marcel Gauchet. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1997.
- Creuzé-Latouche, Jacques Antoine. *Réflexions sur les Finances en général*. Paris: Baudouin, 11 brumaire an VIII (BN, Le⁴³ 4036).
- Desmoulins, Camille. *Histoire des Brissotins, ou fragment de l'histoire secrète de la Révolution et des six premiers mois de la République*. Paris: Imprimerie patriotique et républicaine, 1793.
- Fabre de l'Aude, Jean-Claude. *Histoire secrète du Directoire*. 4 vols. Paris: Ménard, 1832.
- Faipoult, Guillaume-Charles. *Essai sur les finances*. Paris: Chez Pougin, 24 vendémiaire IV/16 October 1795.
- Gallais, Jean-Pierre. *Histoire du dix-huit brumaire et de Bonaparte*. 4 vols. Paris: L. Michaud, 1814-1817.
- Gautier, Jules. *Essai sur la restauration des Finances de la France*. Marseille: Imprimerie de Bertrand, An VII (1799).
- Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Jean-Barthélemy. *Essai sur les contributions proposées en France pour l'an VII*. Paris: Imprimerie Du Pont, 1798.
- , *Le cri de la conscience, ou réflexions d'un français ami de la justice, adressées à la Convention Nationale et à ses concitoyens, sur le procès de Louis XVI*. 1792. (BN, 8° Lb41 115).
- Mallet du Pan, Jacques. *Considérations sur la nature de la révolution française et sur les causes qui en prolongent la durée*. Reprint. Paris: Éditions du Trident, 2008.
- Mercier, Louis-Sébastien. *Tableau de Paris*. 12 vols. Neuchâtel: Samuel Fauche, 1782-1788.
- Molleville, Antoine-François Bertrand de. *Histoire de la Révolution*. 14 vols. Paris: Chez Giguet, 1801-1803.
- Nigulà ibn Yusufal-Turk (Nakoula el-Turk). *Histoire de l'expédition des français en Égypte*. Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1839.

Ramel (de Nogaret), Dominique-Vincent. *Des finances de la république française en l'an IX*. Paris: M. Agasse, 1801.

Reybaud, Louis. *Histoire scientifique et militaire de l'expédition française en Égypte*. 10 vols. Paris: A.-J. Denain, 1830-1836. (Published by former members of the scientific expedition to Egypt.)

Rœderer, Pierre-Louis. *Œuvres du comte Pierre-Louis Rœderer*. 8 vols. Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et Cie., 1853-1859.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*. Paris: Flammarion, 2011.

Saint-Aubin, Camille. *Des banques particulières*. Paris: Pougin, 1795.

-----, *Ne peut-on pas sauver la République en la faisant aimer ? N'y-a-t'il pas moyen d'emprunter 100 millions sans ruiner la France et mécontenter tous les citoyens ? Ou Réflexions isolées sur l'emprunt des 100 millions*. Paris: Imprimerie de A. Bailleul, sans date (s.d.) (BN, Lb⁴² 726).

Sieyès, Emmanuel-Joseph. *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?* Paris: Éditions Flammarion/Champs Classiques, 2009.

Smith Adam. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (The Glasgow Edition of the Works & Correspondence of Adam Smith)*. Edited by R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner & W.B. Todd. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Thornton, Henry. *An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1939.

Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet). *Essai sur l'histoire générale et sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations, depuis Charlemagne jusqu'à nos jours*. Genève: Éditions Cramer, 1756.

Correspondence

Bailleu, Paul (ed.). *Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807: Diplomatische Correspondenzen*. 2 vols. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1880-1887.

Beauharnais, Joséphine de. *Impératrice Joséphine – Correspondance, 1782-1814*. Presented & annotated by Bernard Chevallier. Paris: Bibliothèque Payot, 1996.

Bland-Burges, James. *Selections from the Letters and Correspondence of Sir James Bland Burges*. Edited by James Hutton. London: John Murray, 1885.

Bretonne, Léonce de. *Dernières lettres inédites de Napoléon I^{er}*. 2 vols. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1903.

Caillé, Dominique. *Le duc d'Otrante d'après une correspondance privée inédite*. Vannes: Imprimerie de Lafoyle, 1893.

Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, publiée par ordre de l'empereur Napoléon III. 32 vols. Paris: Henri Plon/J. Dumaine, 1858-1870.

- Correspondance inédite, officielle et confidentielle de Napoléon Bonaparte. Avec les cours étrangères, les princes, les ministres, et les généraux français et étrangers. En Italie, en Allemagne, et en Égypte.* 7 vols. Paris: C.L.F. Panckoucke, 1819-1820.
- Constant, Benjamin. *Correspondance générale.* Edited by C.P. Courtney. Tome III. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlaag, 2003.
- Eden (Lord Auckland), William. *The Journal and Correspondence of Lord Auckland.* 4 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1861-1862.
- Greppi, Paolo. *La rivoluzione francese nel carteggio di un osservatore italiano.* 3 vols. Milano: Ulrico Hoepli, 1900-1904.
- Kaulek, Jean (ed.). *Papiers de Barthélémy, ambassadeur de France en Suisse.* 6 vols. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1886-1910.
- Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Jean-Barthélemy. *Le Couteulx-Canteleu, représentant du peuple, membre du Conseil des Anciens : à ses compatriotes les négocians, manufacturiers, fabricans, du département de la Seine-Inférieure.* Paris: Guyot, An IV (1796).
- Lentz, Thierry (ed.). *Napoléon Bonaparte : Correspondance générale. Tome II : La campagne d'Égypte et l'avènement 1798-1799.* Paris: Éditions Fayard/Fondation Napoléon, 2005.
- *Napoléon Bonaparte : Correspondance générale. Tome I : Les apprentissages 1784-1797.* Paris: Éditions Fayard/Fondation Napoléon, 2004.
- Lescure, Mathurin-François Adolphe de (ed.). *Correspondance secrète inédite sur Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, La Cour et la ville.* 2 vols. Paris: Plon, 1866.
- Mallet du Pan, Jacques. *Correspondance inédite de Mallet du Pan avec la Cour de Vienne.* 2 vols. Paris: Plon, 1884.
- Malmesbury, James Harris (Lord). *The Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, Lord Malmesbury.* 4 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1844.
- Masson, Frédéric & Guido Biagi (eds.). *Napoléon : manuscrits inédits, 1786-1791.* Paris: Société d'éditions littéraires et artistiques, 1910.
- *Napoléon inconnu : papiers inédits (1786-1793). Accompagnés de Notes sur la jeunesse de Napoléon (1786-1793).* 2 vols. Paris: Paul Ollendorf, 1895.
- Melzi d'Eril, Francesco. *Memorie-Documenti e Lettere Inedite di Napoleone I e Beauharnais.* 2 vols. Milano: Gaetano Brigola, 1865.
- Miles, William Augustus. *The Correspondence of William Augustus Miles on the French Revolution.* 2 vols. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1890.
- Morris, Gouverneur. *The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris.* 2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1888.
- Murat, Joachim. *Lettres et documents pour servir à l'histoire de Joachim Murat 1767-1815.* 8 vols. Edited by Paul Le Brethon. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1908-1914.
- Nelson, Horatio (Lord Viscount). *The Dispatches and Letters of Lord Nelson.* 7 vols. London: Henry Colburn, 1844-1845.

Pallain, Georges (ed.). *Correspondance Diplomatique de Talleyrand: Le Ministère de Talleyrand Sous Le Directoire*. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1891.

----- . *La Mission de Talleyrand à Londres en 1792*. Paris: Plon, 1889.

Redon de Belleville, Godefroy. *Notes et correspondance du Baron Redon de Belleville, consul de la république française à Livourne et à Gênes (du 17 pluviôse an IV au 21 fructidor an X, 1796-1802), réunis et imprimés par son petit-fils H. Du Chanoy*. 2 vols. Paris: Techener, 1892.

Remacle, Louis (Comte de). *Relations secrètes des agents de Louis XVIII à Paris sous le Consulat (1802-1803)*. Paris: Plon, 1899.

Rosebery, Rt. Hon. Earl of (ed.). *The Windham Papers*. 2 vols. London: Herbert Jenkins Ltd., 1913.

Staël-Holstein, Anne-Louise Germaine Necker de. *Correspondance générale*. Tome IV. Edited by Béatrice W. Jasinski. Paris: J.-J. Pauvert, 1976.

Verri, Pietro & Alessandro. *Lettere e scritti inediti*. 4 vols. Milano: Giuseppe Galli, 1879-1881.

Wickham, William. *The Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. William Wickham*. 2 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1870.

Documents

“Le coup d’état du 18 Fructidor raconté par Talleyrand.” (circulaire du ministre des Relations extérieures aux agents, 27 Fructidor, an V (13 septembre 1797)). *Bulletin du bibliophile et du bibliothécaire*, 1888: 21-25.

Aulard, François-Alphonse. *Paris pendant la réaction Thermidorienne et sous le Directoire, recueil de documents pour l’histoire de l’esprit public à Paris*. 5 vols. Paris: Librairie Léopold Cerf, Librairie Noblet, Maison Quantin Éditeurs, 1898-1902.

----- . *Paris sous le Consulat*. 4 vols. Paris: Librairie Léopold Cerf, 1903-1909.

----- . *Recueil des actes du Comité de Salut Public*. 27 vols. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1899-1933.

Buchez, Philippe-Joseph-Benjamin & Prosper Charles Roux. *Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française*. 40 vols. Paris: Paulin, 1834-1838.

Bulletin des Lois de la République, neuvième partie, 1 vendémiaire-27 nivôse an VIII. Paris: Imprimerie de la République, Pluviôse VIII.

Caron, Pierre. *La Commission de subsistances de l’an II, procès-verbaux et actes*. Paris: E. Leroux, 1925 (Collection des documents économiques de la Révolution).

Chabert, Théodore. *Corps législatif. Conseil des Cinq-Cents. Motion d’ordre de Théodore Chabert... sur les dilapidations commises par les fournisseurs et sur les moyens propres à les prévenir*. Séance du 21 thermidor an VI. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, an VI.

Chomel, Vital & Brigitte Blanc. *Inventaire des archives du château de Vizille et de la famille Périer*. Grenoble: Archives départementales de l’Isère, 1985.

Code pénal de l'empire français. Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1810. Available online at: <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k57837660>

Colenbrander, Herman Theodoor. *Gedenkstukken der algemeene geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840*. 10 vols. Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1905-1920.

Comptes rendus au Directoire exécutif par le citoyen Schérer, ex-ministre de la Guerre, pour l'an VI et les cinq premiers mois de l'an VII. Paris: Chez Dentu, an VII.

Cornet, Mathieu-Augustin (comte de). *Notice historique sur le 18 brumaire*. Paris: Lheureux & Ladrange, 1819.

Costaz, Louis. Tribunat. *Rapport fait par Costaz, au nom de la section des finances, sur le projet de loi concernant les banques*. Séance du 15 germinal an XI. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, An XI.

Debidour, Augustin. *Recueil des actes du Directoire exécutif (procès-verbaux, arrêtés, instructions, lettres et actes divers)*. 4 vols. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1910-1917.

Documens particuliers en forme de lettres sur Napoléon Bonaparte. Paris: Chez Plancher, 1819.

Ferrières, Jacques-Annibal. *Plan pour rétablir solidement les finances, et payer sur le champ en numéraire, les rentiers, les fonctionnaires publics, et insensiblement toutes les dettes de l'État, par le C. Ferrières*. Paris: Marchant, undated, 8 pages.

Fourcroy, Antoine-François. *Rapport sur les arts qui ont servi à la défense de la République & sur le nouveau procédé de tannage découvert par le citoyen Armand Séguin*, 14 nivôse an III. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1795.

Grenville, William Wyndham (Lord). *The Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore*. 10 vols. London: Historical Manuscripts Commission (Series 30), 1892-1927.

Laffon-Ladébat, André-Daniel. *Observations sur le crédit territorial*. Paris: Imprimerie de la Banque Territoriale, Floréal An X (Mai 1802).

Le Couteulx, Jean-Barthélémy. *Rapport fait par Lecouteulx, au nom de la commission de surveillance de la Trésorerie nationale*. Séance du 9 fructidor an VI. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, an VII.

Rapport fait par Lecouteulx-Canteleu, sur la résolution relative à la liquidation de l'arriéré de la dette publique et au mode de remboursement des deux tiers, au nom d'une commission composée des représentants du peuple Vernier, Liborel, Levacher, Desgraves (de l'Escaut), Lecouteulx-Canteleu, Séance du 14 frimaire an VI. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 14 frimaire an VI.

----- . *Rapport sur l'entier retirement des mandats, fait par Lecouteulx-Canteleu, séance du 16 pluviôse an V*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 16 pluviôse an V.

----- . *Rapport du Comité des finances, sur l'échange des assignats, contre les billets de la Caisse d'escompte*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 29 juillet 1790.

Lecoite-Puyraveau, Michel-Matthieu. *Rapport fait par Lecoite-Puyraveau sur les projets de Banques*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, An VII (1799).

- Lullin de Châteauvieux, Frédéric (ed.). *Le Manuscrit venu de Sainte-Hélène*. Paris: Baudouin frères, 1821.
- Mangourit, Michel-Ange-Bernard. *Défense d'Ancône et des départements romains, le Tronto, le Musone et le Metauro, par le général Monnier, aux années VII et VIII*. 2 vols. Paris: C. Pougens, 1802.
- Méchin, Alexandre-Edme. *Précis de mon voyage et ma mission en Italie dans les années 1798 et 1799 et relation des évènements qui ont eu lieu à Viterbe depuis le 27 novembre 1798 au jusqu'au 28 décembre suivant*. Laon: Imprimerie de Melleville, 1808.
- Melzi D'Eril, Francesco. *Memorie-Documenti e Lettere Inedite di Napoleone I e Beauharnais*. 2 vols. Milano: Gaetano Brigola, 1865.
- Mengin, Martin Philippe. *Plan de finances...* Paris: les marchands de nouveautés, 1^{er} vendémiaire An VIII (23 septembre 1799).
- Observations sur le rapport du Comité de constitution concernant la nouvelle organisation de la France*, 2 octobre 1789. Available online at: <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k41691t>
- Palmieri, Gregorio & Isidoro Carini (eds.). Biblioteca apostolica vaticana & Archivio vaticano. *Spicilegio Vaticano Di Documenti Inediti E Rari*. Roma: E. Loescher & Co., 1890.
- Procès-verbal de la séance des banquiers et négocians convoqués chez le Consul Bonaparte le 3 Frimaire an VIII*. S.l.n.d. (sans lieu ni date), Bibliothèque Nationale, 4^o Lb⁴³ 388. Available online at: <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6317916b/f5.image>
- Raikes, Thomas. *Portion of the Journal kept by Thomas Raikes esq. From 1831 to 1847*. 4 Vols. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans & Roberts, 1853-1856.
- Rapinat, Jean-Jacques. *Précis des opérations du Cen. Rapinat en Helvétie*. Paris: Imprimerie de Cellot, 1799.
- Recueil des pièces justificatives de l'acte énonciatif des crimes de Louis Capet, réunies par la Commission des 21*, 1792.
- Reubell, Jean-François. « Conversation avec le Premier consul, le 3 ventôse an X (22 février 1802). » *Nouvelle Revue rétrospective*, 2^e série, 9^e semestre, janvier-juin 1904: 361-413.
- Rocquain, Félix. *L'état de la France au 18 Brumaire, d'après les rapports de conseillers d'État chargés d'une enquête sur la situation de la République*. Paris: Didier & Cie., 1874.
- Savary, Jean-Julien-Michel. *Mon examen de conscience sur le 18 brumaire an 8 (9 novembre 1799)*. Paris: Barrois l'Ainé, 1819.
- Schérer, Barthélémy Louis Joseph. *Comptes-rendus au Directoire exécutif par le citoyen Schérer, ex-ministre de la Guerre, pour l'an VI et les cinq premiers mois de l'an VII*. Paris: Chez Dentu, an VII.
- Soufflot de Mérey. *Précis sur la banque territoriale et moyen d'assurer sa liquidation avec utilité pour les créanciers, et sans perte pour les débiteurs*. Paris: Imprimerie d'A. Bailleul, 15 ventôse an XII.
- Thuillier, Guy. *Témoins de l'Administration. De Saint-Just à Marx*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1967.

Troisième Recueil des papiers trouvés dans l'armoire de fer au Château des Tuileries, pièces imprimées d'après le décret de la Convention nationale du 5 décembre 1792. 2 vols. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1^{er} janvier 1793.

Tuetey, Alexandre (ed.). *Répertoire général des sources manuscrites de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution française.* 11 vols. Paris: Imprimerie nouvelle (association ouvrière), 1890-1914.

Veladini, Luigi. *Raccolta delle leggi, proclami, ordini ed avvisi stati pubblicati dopo il cessato governo austriaco.* 6 vols. Milano: Presso Luigi Veladini, 1796-1798.

Memoirs

[Anonymous]. *Mémoires historiques sur le dix-huit brumaire, contenant les détails exacts et plus circonstanciés que tous ceux qui ont paru jusqu'à ce jour, des séances des deux Conseils, des 18 et 19 brumaire an VIII, et des évènements remarquables, qui se sont passés dans ces journées, avec les pièces officielles qui s'y rapportent.* Paris: Gauthier, 1800.

D'Abrantès, Laure Junot (duchesse). *Mémoires de madame la duchesse d'Abrantès. Souvenirs historiques sur Napoléon, la Révolution, le Directoire, le Consulat, l'Empire et la Restauration.* 16 vols. Paris: Librairie L. Mame, 1831-1835.

-----, *Histoire des salons de Paris.* 6 Tomes. Paris: Ladvocat, 1837-1838.

Arnault, Antoine-Vincent. *Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire.* 4 vols. Paris: Librairie Dufrey, 1833.

Barère de Vieuzac, Bertrand. *Mémoires de Barère.* 4 vols. Paris: Jules Labitte, 1842.

Barras, Paul François Jean Nicolas (Vicomte de). *Mémoires de Barras, membre du Directoire.* Edited by Georges Duruy. 4 vols. Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1895-1896.

Beugnot, Jacques Claude (comte). *Mémoires du comte Beugnot, ancien ministre (1783-1815).* 2 vols. Paris: E. Dentu, 1867-1868.

Berryer, Pierre-Nicolas. *Souvenirs de M. Berryer, doyen des avocats de Paris de 1774 à 1838.* 2 vols., Paris: Dupont, 1839.

Bertrand, Général Henri Gatien. *Cahiers de Sainte-Hélène.* 3 vols. Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 1949-1959.

Boigne, Adèle (Adélaïde Charlotte Louise Éléonore) d'Osmond (comtesse de). *Récits d'une tante. Mémoires de la comtesse de Boigne née d'Osmond. Publiés d'après le manuscrit original par M. Charles Nicoullaud.* 4 vols. 15th ed. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1907-1908.

Bonaparte, Joseph. *Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du Roi Joseph.* Edited by Albert du Casse. 10 vols. Paris: Perrotin, 1853-1854.

Bonaparte, Lucien. *Mémoires.* Paris: Charles Gosselin, 1836.

-----, 'Révolution de Brumaire, ou Relation des principaux évènements des journées des 18 et 19 brumaire' in Mathurin-François Adolphe de Lescure, *Mémoires sur les Journées Révolutionnaires et les Coups d'État.* Volume 2. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1875.

----- . *Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires, 1775-1840*. 3 vols. Presented & annotated by Théodore Iung. Paris: Charpentier, 1882-1883.

Bourrienne, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de. *Mémoires de M. de Bourrienne sur Napoléon, le Directoire, le Consulat, l'Empire et la Restauration*. 5 vols. Edited by Désiré Lacroix. Paris: Garnier frères, 1899-1900. – For corrections and conflicting versions related to Bourrienne's memoirs, see the collective tome: A. Bulos (ed.), *Bourrienne et ses erreurs volontaires ou involontaires* (particularly 'Notes sur les mémoires de M. de Bourrienne par le comte de Survillier (pseudonym of Joseph Bonaparte)'). 2 vols. Paris: Charles Heidelhoff & Urbain Canel, 1830.

Cambacérés, Jean-Jacques de. *Mémoires inédits. Eclaircissements publiés par Cambacérés sur les principaux événements de sa vie politique*. 2 vols. Presented & annotated by L. Châtel de Brancion. Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1999.

Campan, Jeanne-Louise-Henriette. *Journal anecdotique de Mme. Campan, ou souvenirs recueillis dans ses entretiens*. Bruxelles: P.J. de Math, 1825.

Carnot, Hippolyte. *Mémoires sur Lazare Carnot, 1753-1823, Nouvelle Édition des Mémoires sur Carnot par son fils, revue sur les Manuscrits de L'auteur et accompagnée de 23 Héliogravures tirées des collections de la famille*. 2 vols. Paris: Hachette, 1907.

Chaptal (de Chanteloup), Jean-Antoine (conte de). *Mes souvenirs sur Napoléon*. Paris: Plon, 1893.

Chastenay, Louis-Marie-Victoire (a.k.a. 'Victorine) de. *Mémoires (1771-1815)*. Edited by Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret. Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1987.

Constant Wairy (dit Constant). *Mémoires intimes de Napoléon I^{er} par Constant, son valet de chambre*. 2 vols. Edited by Maurice Dernelle. Paris: Mercure de France, 2002.

Costa de Beauregard, Charles (Marquis de). *Un homme d'autrefois. Souvenirs recueillis par son arrière-petit-fils*. Paris: Plon, 1877.

De Kock, Paul. *Mémoires de Ch. Paul de Kock, écrits par lui-même*. Paris: Édouard Dentu, 1873.

Desmarest, Pierre-Marie. *Quinze Ans de Haute Police sous le Consulat et l'Empire*. Paris: Garnier frères, 1900.

Duveyrier, Honoré (baron). *Anecdotes historiques*. Paris: Alphonse Picard et fils, 1907.

Frénilly, François-Auguste (baron Fauveau de). *Souvenirs*. Paris: Plon, 1909.

Gaudin (duc de Gaëte), Martin Michel Charles. *Mémoires, souvenirs et opinions du duc de Gaëte*. 2 vols. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1826 – This work was followed by *Supplément aux mémoires et souvenirs de M. Gaudin, duc de Gaëte*. Paris: Goestchy fils & Cie., 1834.

Genlis, Stéphanie Félicité du Crest de Saint-Aubin (comtesse de). *Mémoires inédits sur le dix-huitième siècle et la Révolution française, depuis 1756 jusqu'à nos jours*. Paris: Ladvocat, 1825.

Girardin, Louis Stanislas (comte de). *Journal et souvenirs, discours et opinions*. 4 vols. Paris: Moutardier, 1828.

- Goldsmith, Lewis (pseudo: Stewarton). *Memoirs of C.M. Talleyrand de Périgord, One of Bonaparte's principal secretaries of State, his Grand Chamberlain and Grand Officer at the Legion of Honour, Ex-Bishop of Autun, Ex-Abbé of Celles and St. Denis, etc., containing the particulars of his private and public life, of intrigues in boudoirs as well as in cabinets, by the author of the Revolutionary Plutarch*. 2 vols. London: J.M. Murray, 1805.
- Goldsmith, Lewis (pseudo: Stewarton). *The Secret History of the Court and Cabinet of Saint Cloud*. 2 vols. London: H.S. Nichols & Co., 1895.
- Gohier, Louis-Jérôme. *Mémoires*. 2 vols. Paris: Bossange frères, 1824.
- Gourgaud, Général Gaspard (baron). *Journal intégral*. 2 vols. Presented & annotated by Jacques Macé. Paris: Perrin/Institut Napoléon, 2019.
- Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, Laurent de. *Mémoires pour servir l'histoire militaire sous le Directoire, le Consulat et l'Empire*. 4 vols. Paris: Anselin, 1831.
- Hamelin, Antonie-Romain. 'Douze ans de ma vie, 1796-1808.' *La Revue de Paris*, Vol. 6, novembre-décembre 1926: 5-24 (part 1), 281-309 (part 2), 544-566 (part 3), 811-839 (part 4).
- Hanet-Cléry, Pierre Louis. *Mémoires de P.L. Hanet*. 2 vols. Paris: Alexis Eymery, 1825.
- Hardenberg, Karl August von. *Mémoires tirés des papiers d'un homme d'État sur les causes secrètes qui ont déterminés la politique des cabinets dans les guerres de la Révolution depuis 1792 jusqu'en 1815*. 13 vols. Paris: Ponthieu, 1828-1838.
- Hemlow, Joyce & Althea Douglas (eds.). *The Journals and Letters of Fanny Burney (Madame d'Arblay) 1791-1840*. 12 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972-1984.
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von. *Wilhelm von Humboldt. Journal parisien (1797-1799)*. Traduit par Elisabeth Beyer. Paris: Solin/Actes Sud, 2001.
- Hyde de Neuville, Jean-Guillaume (baron). *Mémoires et souvenirs*. 2 vols. Paris: Plon, 1888-1890.
- Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste. 'Le dix-huit brumaire. Extraits des Mémoires du maréchal Jourdan.' *Le Carnet Historique et Littéraire*, février 1901: 161-172.
- La Révellière-Lépeaux, Louis-Marie de. *Mémoires de La Révellière-Lépeaux*. 3 vols. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1895.
- Laffitte, Jacques. *Mémoires, 1767-1844*. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1932.
- Landrieux, Jean. *Mémoires de l'Adjudant-Général Jean Landrieux*. 3 vols. Paris: Albert Savine, 1893-1895.
- Las Cases, Emmanuel de. *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*. 2 vols. Presented & annotated by Joël Schmidt. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1968.
- Lavalette, Antoine-Marie Chamans (comte) de. *Mémoires et souvenirs*. 2 vols. Paris: Fournier jeune, 1831.
- Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Jean-Barthélémy. 'Souvenirs du comte Le Couteulx de Canteleu' in Mathurin-François Adolphe de Lescure (ed.), *Mémoires sur les Journées Révolutionnaires et les Coups d'État*. Volume 2. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1875.

- Le Doucet de Pontécoulant, Gustave. *Souvenirs historiques et parlementaires*. 4 vols. Paris: Michel Levy frères, 1861-1865.
- Lebrun, Charles-François. *Opinions, rapports et choix d'écrits politiques*. Paris: Bossange père, 1829.
- Marmont, Auguste-Frédéric-Louis Viesse de. *Mémoires du maréchal Marmont, duc de Raguse*. 9 vols. Paris: Perrotin, 1856.
- Masséna, André. *Mémoires de Masséna*. Edited by Frédéric Koch. 7 vols. Paris: Paulin et Lechevalier, 1849-1850.
- Mélito, André-François Miot (comte de). *Mémoires du comte Miot de Mélito, ancien ministre, ambassadeur...* 3 vols. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1858.
- Mémoires et souvenirs d'un pair de France*. 4 vols. Paris: Tenon, 1829-1830.
- Mollien, Nicolas François (comte de). *Mémoires d'un ministre du Trésor public, 1780-1815*. 4 vols. Paris: H. Fournier et Cie., 1845.
- Montgaillard, Jean-Gabriel Rocques (comte de). *Souvenirs du comte de Montgaillard*. Corbeil: Paul Ollendorff, 1895.
- Necker, Jacques. *Histoire de la Révolution française depuis l'assemblée des notables, jusques et y compris la journée du 13 vendémiaire an IV (18 octobre 1795)*. 4 vols. Paris: La Librairie Académique, 1821.
- Niello Sargy, Jean-Gabriel de. *Mémoires sur l'expédition d'Égypte*. Paris: Vernarel et Tenon, 1825.
- Ouvrard, Gabriel-Julien. *Mémoires de G.-J. Ouvrard sur sa vie et ses diverses opérations financières*. 3 vols. Paris: Éditions Moutardier, 1826-1827.
- Pelleport, Pierre de. *Souvenirs militaires et intimes de 1793 à 1853*. 2 vols. Paris: Didier & Cie., 1857.
- Réal, Pierre-François (Comte). *Indiscrétions, 1798-1830. Souvenirs anecdotiques et politiques d'un fonctionnaire de l'Empire*. Paris: Dufey, 1835.
- Récamier, Jeanne-Françoise-Julie-Adélaïde (Juliette). *Souvenirs et Correspondances de Mme. Récamier*, publiés par sa nièce, Mme. Lenormand. 2 vols. Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1859.
- Rochechouart, Général Louis-Victor-Léon de. *Souvenirs sur la Révolution et l'Empire*. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1889.
- Roguet, François. *Mémoires militaires du lieutenant-général Roguet*. 4 vols. Paris: Dumaine, 1862-1865.
- Rovigo, Anne Jean Marie René Savary (duc de). *Mémoires du duc de Rovigo pour servir à l'histoire de l'empereur Napoléon*. 5 vols. Paris: Garnier, 1900 (update of 1828 edition).
- Staël-Holstein, Anne-Louise Germaine Necker de. *Considérations sur les principaux évènements de la Révolution française* in Laurent Theis (ed.), *Madame de Staël : La passion de la liberté*. Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont/Bouquins, 2017.

----- . *Des circonstances actuelles qui peuvent terminer la Révolution française et des principes qui doivent fonder la république en France* in Laurent Theis (ed.), *Madame de Staël : La passion de la liberté*. Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont/Bouquins, 2017

----- . *Dix années d'exil* in Laurent Theis (ed.), *Madame de Staël : La passion de la liberté*. Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont/Bouquins, 2017.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. *Mémoires du prince de Talleyrand*. 5 vols. Paris: Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 1891.

Thaon di Revel, Ignacio. *Mémoires sur la guerre des Alpes et les évènements en Piedmont pendant la Révolution française*. Turin, Rome & Florence: Imprimerie Royale/Bocca Frères, 1871.

Thibaudeau, Antoine-Clair. *Mémoires sur la Convention et le Directoire*. 2 vols. Paris: Baudouin frères, 1824.

----- . *Mémoires, 1799-1815*. Paris: Plon, 1913.

Thiébaud, Paul-Charles-François-Adrien-Henri-Dieudonné. *Mémoires*. 5 vols. Paris: Plon, 1893-1896.

Victor (Claude-Victor Perrin), Maréchal. *Mémoires de Claude-Victor Perrin, duc de Bellune*. Paris: Dumaine, 1847.

Newspapers & Press Articles

Brissot, Jacques-Pierre. 'De quelques erreurs dans les idées et dans les mots relatifs à la révolution française'. *Chronique du mois*, Paris: Imprimerie du Cercle Social, mars 1793.

Condorcet (Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat), Marquis de. 'Que toutes les classes de la société n'ont qu'un même intérêt'. *Journal d'instruction sociale*, n° 2, 8 juin 1793.

Gazette de France, n°774, 6 pluviôse an VIII (26 janvier 1800).

Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur universel, année 1799, 2 vols.

Journal d'économie publique, de morale et de politique, n°11, 20 frimaire An V (10 décembre 1796).

----- . n°35, 20 thermidor An V (7 août 1797).

----- . n°36, 30 thermidor An V (17 août 1797)

La Décade philosophique, Tome 12, 20 nivôse An V, nivôse-pluviôse-ventôse.

----- . Tome 12, 10 pluviôse An V, nivôse-pluviôse-ventôse.

----- . Tome 19, 10 frimaire An VII, vendémiaire-brumaire-frimaire.

----- . Tome 19, 30 frimaire An VII, vendémiaire-brumaire-frimaire.

Marat, Jean-Paul. *L'Ami du Peuple contre M. Necker, Premier Ministre des Finances, ou Supplément à la dénonciation d'un citoyen contre un agent de l'autorité*. Paris: Rosé, 1790.

Mercier, Louis-Sébastien. 'Que plus un état est vaste, plus une constitution lui devient avantageuse'. *Chronique du Mois*. Paris: Imprimerie du Cercle Social, décembre 1792.

Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur, seule histoire authentique et inaltérée de la Révolution française, depuis la réunion des États-Généraux jusqu'au Consulat (mai 1789-novembre 1799), tome 15. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1858-1870.

Speeches to the National Assembly, Legislative Assembly, National Convention and Conseil des Cinq-Cents

Bailleul, Jacques-Charles. *Corps législatif – Conseil des Cinq-Cents. Motion d'ordre pour la proposition d'une banque, par Jacques-Charles Bailleul, représentant du peuple, séance du 29 pluviôse an 7*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, An VII.

Barnave, Antoine. *Discours d'Antoine Barnave sur l'inviolabilité royale, séance du 15 juillet 1791*. Available online at: <http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/histoire/grands-moments-d-eloquence/barnave-15-juillet-1791>

Boulay de la Meurthe, Antoine-Jacques-Claude-Joseph. *Opinion sur la situation de la République et sur le projet présenté par la Commission chargée d'examiner la cause de ses maux et d'indiquer les moyens de les faire cesser. Séance de la nuit du 19 brumaire an VIII, à Saint-Cloud*. Saint-Cloud: Imprimerie Nationale, 1799.

Du Pont de Nemours, Pierre Samuel. *Discours prononcé à l'Assemblée Nationale par M. Du Pont, sur les banques en général et sur la Caisse d'Escompte en particulier, et sur le projet du premier ministre des finances, relativement à cette dernière, le 20 novembre 1789*. Versailles: Baudouin, 1789.

Du Pont de Nemours, Pierre Samuel. *Discours prononcé à l'Assemblée nationale, par M. Du Pont, sur l'état & les ressources des finances*. Versailles: Baudouin, 1789.

Du Pont de Nemours, Pierre Samuel. *Opinion de Dupont (de Nemours) sur la résolution du 1er messidor relative à l'urgence des paiemens et aux négociations à faire par la trésorerie, 9 messidor an V*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, an V.

Du Pont de Nemours, Pierre Samuel. *Sur la Banque de France, les causes de la crise qu'elle a éprouvée, les tristes effets qui en sont résultés, et les moyens d'en prévenir le retour; avec théorie des banques*. Paris: Delance, 1806.

Dumolard, Joseph-Vincent. *Motion d'ordre sur nos rapports actuels avec l'Italie. Séance du 3 messidor an V*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1797.

Le Couteulx de Canteleu, Jean-Barthélemy. *Opinion de Lecouteulx-Canteleu, représentant du peuple, sur la résolution du Conseil des Cinq-cents, qui propose un emprunt forcé de six cents millions en numéraire*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, frimaire an IV.

-----. *Opinion de M. Le Couteulx, député de Rouen, sur l'émission de deux milliards d'assignats-monnoie pour le remboursement de la dette exigible*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, le 27 septembre 1790.

-----. *Opinion de M. Le Couteulx de Canteleu, député de Rouen, sur le commerce de France aux Indes Orientales*. Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, 1790.

----- . *Discours et motion sur le plan de banque nationale du premier ministre des finances prononcé à l'Assemblée nationale le 6 décembre 1789 par M. Le Couteulx de Canteleu*. Versailles: Baudouin, 1789.

Pétion (de Villeneuve), Jérôme. *Discours de M. Pétion de Villeneuve sur l'établissement de caisses territoriales en France* suivi d'un projet de décret. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1790.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. *Motion de M. l'évêque d'Autun sur la proposition d'un emprunt, faite à l'Assemblée nationale, par le premier ministre des Finances, et sur la consolidation de la dette publique, du jeudi 27 août 1789*. Versailles: Baudouin, s.d. (1789), rééd. 1823.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. *Motion de M. l'évêque d'Autun sur les biens ecclésiastiques. Du 10 octobre 1789*. Versailles: Baudouin, s.d. (1789), rééd. 1823.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. *Opinion de M. l'évêque d'Autun sur la question des biens ecclésiastiques. Discours non prononcé à la séance du 2 novembre 1789*. Paris: Baudouin, s.d. (1789).

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. *Opinion de M. l'évêque d'Autun sur les banques et sur le rétablissement de l'ordre dans les finances, prononcée à l'Assemblée nationale le vendredi 4 décembre 1789 et imprimée par son ordre*. Paris: Baudouin, 1789, rééd. 1823.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. *Opinion de M. l'évêque d'Autun sur la proposition de faire deux milliards d'assignats forcés*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 18 septembre 1790.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. *Opinion de M. l'évêque d'Autun sur les assignats forcés*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1790.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. *Opinion de M. l'évêque d'Autun sur la vente de biens domaniaux. Du 13 juin 1790*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, s.d. (1790).

III. Secondary Sources

General Reference

- Bergeron, Louis & Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret (eds.). *Grands Notables du Premier Empire, notices de biographie sociale*. 28 vols. Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1978-1990.
- Bergeron, Louis. *Nouvelle Histoire de la France contemporaine, tome 4 : L'épisode napoléonien, aspects intérieurs, 1799-1815*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972.
- Boudon, Jacques-Olivier. *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*. Paris: Perrin, 2000-2003.
- Crook, Malcolm. *Napoleon Comes to Power: Democracy and Dictatorship in Revolutionary France, 1795-1804*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998.
- Furet, François & Mona Ozouf (eds.). *Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française*. 5 vols. Paris: Flammarion, 1988-2007.
- Furet, François. *La Révolution, de Turgot à Jules Ferry (1770-1880)*. Paris: Hachette, 1988.
- Gaxotte, Pierre. *La Révolution française*. Paris: Éditions Tallandier / Collection Texto, 2014.
- Godechot, Jacques. *La vie quotidienne en France sous le Directoire*. Paris: Hachette, 1977.
- . *Les Institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l'Empire*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.
- Goncourt, Edmond & Jules de. *Histoire de la société française pendant le Directoire*. Paris: Collection Le Promeneur/Éditions Gallimard, 1992.
- Guillemin, Henri. *1789-1792 / 1792-1794 : Les deux Révolutions françaises*. Paris: Éditions d'Utopie, 2013.
- Guyot, Raymond. *Le Directoire et la paix de l'Europe : Des traités de Bâle à la Deuxième Coalition (1795-1799)*. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1911.
- Lefebvre, Georges. *Les Thermidoriens/Le Directoire*. Paris: Armand Collin, 2016.
- . *La France sous le Directoire : 1795-1799*. Paris: Terrains/Éditions Sociales, 1984.
- Lentz, Thierry. *Dictionnaire des ministres de Napoléon*. Paris : JAS Éditions, 2000.
- . *Le Grand Consulat : 1799-1804*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1999.
- Lyons, Martyn. *France under the Directory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Madelin, Louis. *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*. 16 vols. Paris: Hachette, 1937-1953 (reissued in 4 vols. by Robert Laffont in 2003).
- Michelet, Jules. *Histoire de la Révolution française*. 7 vols. Folio ed. Paris: Les Compagnons de Jean Bonnot, 1974.
- . *Histoire du XIX^e siècle*. 3 vols. Paris: Librairie Germer Baillière, 1872-1875.
- Révérénd, Albert (Vicomte). *Armorial du Premier Empire : Titres, Majorats et Armoiries concédés par Napoléon I^{er}*. 4 vols. Paris: Alphonse Picard & fils, 1894-1897.

- . *Titres, anoblissements et pairies de la Restauration, 1814-1830*. 6 vols. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1901-1906.
- . *Titres et confirmations de titres. Monarchie de Juillet à la 3^e République (1830-1908)*. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1909.
- Robert, Adolphe & Gaston Cougny (eds.). *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français. Depuis le 1^{er} mai 1789 jusqu'au 1^{er} mai 1889*. 5 vols. Paris: Bourloton, 1889-1891.
- Sciout, Ludovic. *Le Directoire*. 4 vols. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1895-1897.
- Soboul, Albert; Jean-René Suratteau & François Gendron (eds.). *Dictionnaire historique de la Révolution française*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989.
- Soboul, Albert. *La Révolution française*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1984.
- Sorel, Albert. *L'Europe et la Révolution française*. 8 vols. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1885-1904 – particularly Volume 5 (Bonaparte et le Directoire).
- Taine, Hippolyte. *Les origines de la France contemporaine*. 2 vols. Paris: Robert Laffont / Collection « Bouquins », 1986.
- Thiers, Adolphe. *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*. 20 vols. Paris: Paulin, 1845-1862.
- . *Histoire de la Révolution française*. 10 vols. 9th edition. Paris: Furne & Cie., 1839.
- Tulard, Jean; Jean-François Fayard & Alfred Fierro (eds.). *Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française : 1789-1799*. Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1998.
- Tulard, Jean; André Palluel-Guillard & Alfred Fierro (eds.). *Histoire et dictionnaire du Consulat et de l'Empire : 1799-1815*. Paris: Éditions Bouquin/Robert Laffont, 1995.
- Tulard, Jean & Louis Garros. *Napoléon au jour le jour, 1769-1821*. Revised & updated ed. Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 2002.
- Tulard, Jean (ed.). *Dictionnaire Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1987.
- Tulard, Jean. *Le Directoire et le Consulat*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991.
- Woronoff, Denis. *La République bourgeoise, de Thermidor à Brumaire 1794-1799*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972.

18 Brumaire

Bainville, Jacques. *Le dix-huit Brumaire*. Paris: Bernard Giovanangeli, 1998. (Reprint of 1925 Hachette edition)

Bertaud, Jean-Paul. *1799, Bonaparte prend le pouvoir*. Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 1998.

Bessand-Massenet, Pierre. *Le Dix-huit Brumaire*. Paris: Hachette, 1965.

Bigonnet, Jean-Adrien. *Coup d'état du dix-huit Brumaire*. Paris: Le bureau du Censeur européen, 1819.

Boissonnade, Euloge. *18 Brumaire, an VIII : Le coup d'état de Napoléon Bonaparte*. Paris: Éditions Michel Hagège, 1999.

Cherrier, Emmanuel. *18 Brumaire et 2 Décembre: d'un coup d'État à l'autre. Éléments pour une étude du coup d'État*. Ph.D. dissertation. 3 vols. Paris: EHESS, 1999.

Espitalier, Albert. *Vers Brumaire : Bonaparte à Paris, 5 décembre 1797 – 4 mai 1798*. Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1914.

Gueniffey, Patrice. *Le Dix-huit Brumaire : L'épilogue de la Révolution française, 9-10 novembre 1799*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2008.

Jessenne, Jean-Pierre (ed.). *Du Directoire au Consulat. Tome 3 : Brumaire dans l'histoire du lien politique et de l'État-Nation*. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Centre de recherche sur l'histoire de l'Europe du Nord-Ouest (CRHENO)/Université Lille III, 2001.

Langres, Vincent Lombard de. *Le Dix-huit Brumaire, ou Tableau des évènements qui ont amené cette journée ; des moyens secrets par lesquels elle a été préparée ; des faits qui l'ont accompagné, et des résultats qu'elle doit avoir*. Paris: Garnery, Catineau et Rat, 1800.

Lentz, Thierry. *Le 18 Brumaire : Les coups d'État de Napoléon Bonaparte*. Paris: Éditions Jean Picollec, 1997.

Madelin, Louis. *L'ascension de Bonaparte*. Paris: Éditions Hachette, 1937.

Morton, John Bingham. *Brumaire, the Rise of Bonaparte: A study of French history from the death of Robespierre to the establishment of the Consulate*. London: T.W. Laurie, 1948.

Ollivier, Albert. *Le dix-huit Brumaire*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1959.

Thiry, Jean. *Le coup d'État du 18 Brumaire*. Paris: Éditions Berger-Levrault, 1947.

Tulard, Jean. *Le 18 Brumaire. Comment terminer une révolution*. Paris: Perrin, 1999.

Vandal, Albert. *L'Avènement de Bonaparte*. 2 vols. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1902-1907.

Biographies

D'Arcier, Louis Faivre. *Cambacérés : L'art de servir tous les régimes*. Paris: Belin Littératures et Revues, 2015.

Alberts, Robert C. *The Golden Voyage: The Life and Times of William Bingham, 1752-1804*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969.

Antonetti, Guy (ed.). *Les ministres des Finances de la Révolution française au Second Empire. Tome I : dictionnaire biographique, 1790-1814*. Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France (CHEEF), 2007.

Arnaud, Raoul. *La Débâcle financière de la Révolution : Cambon, 1756-1820 d'après des documents inédits*. Paris: Perrin, 1926.

Aude, André-Félix. *Un ancien châtelain d'Azay-le-Ferron, Michel jeune, 1771-1852*. Paris: Charles Bosse Éditeur, 1931.

Bain, Robert Nisbet. *Gustavus III and his Contemporaries, 1746-1792*. 2 vols. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1894.

Bainville, Jacques. *Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions Tallandier / Collection Texto, 2012.

Barrow, John. *The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith*. 2 vols. New Haven & London: Richard Bentley, 1848.

Bastid, Paul. *Sieyès et sa pensée*. Paris: Éditions Hachette, 1970.

Bigard, Louis. *Le comte Réal, ancien jacobin (De la Commune Révolutionnaire de Paris à la Police Générale de l'Empire)*. Versailles: Léon Bernard, 1937.

Brancion, Laurence Chatel de. *Cambacérés : maître d'œuvre de Napoléon*. Paris: Perrin, 2001.

Bredin, Jean-Denis. *Sieyès. La clé de la Révolution française*. Paris: Éditions de Fallois, 1988.

------. *Une singulière famille. Jacques Necker, Suzanne Necker et Germaine de Staël*. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1999.

Chimay, Élisabeth de. *Madame Tallien, royaliste et révolutionnaire*. Paris: Plon, 1936.

Chuquet, Arthur. *La jeunesse de Napoléon*. 3 vols. Paris: Armand Colin, 1898.

Cioran, Émil Michel. *Anthologie du portrait, de Saint-Simon à Tocqueville*. Paris: Gallimard, 1996.

Cope, S.R. *Walter Boyd. A Merchant Banker in the Age of Napoleon*. London: Alan Sutton Publishing/London School of Economics, 1983.

Daridan, Geneviève. *MM. Le Couteulx et Cie, banquiers à Paris : un clan familial dans la crise du XVIII^e siècle*. Paris: Éditions Loysel, 1993.

Decours, Catherine. *Juliette Récamier : L'art de la séduction*. Paris: Perrin, 2013.

Diesbach, Ghislain de. *Madame de Staël*. Paris: Perrin, 1983.

Dwyer Philip G. *Napoleon: The Path to Power 1769-1799*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

- Garnier, Jean-Paul. *Barras, le roi du Directoire*. Paris: Perrin, 1970.
- Grand, Christian. *Trois siècles de banque. De Neuflyze Schlumberger Mallet 1667-1991*. Paris: EPA, 1991.
- Graux, Lucien. *Boutier de Catus : commissaire des guerres aux armées de la Révolution, 1765-1839*. Paris: G. Ficker, 1930.
- Gueniffey, Patrice. *Bonaparte : 1769-1802*. Paris: Paris: Gallimard, 2013.
- Guillemin, Henri. *Napoléon, légende et vérité*. Paris: Éditions d'Utopie, 2005.
- . *Madame de Staël et Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1987.
- Herold, John Christopher. *Mistress to an Age: A Life of Madame de Staël*. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1958.
- Herriot, Édouard. *Madame Récamier et ses amis*. Paris: Payot, 1946.
- Höjer, T.T. *Bernadotte maréchal de France*. Traduit du suédois par Lucien Maury. Paris: Plon, 1943.
- Kermina, Françoise. *Bernadotte et Désirée Clary*. Paris: Perrin, 1991.
- Lacour-Gayet, Georges. *Talleyrand*. 4 vols. Paris: Payot, 1928-1932. Re-edited in 1991.
- Lanfrey, Pierre. *Histoire de Napoléon I^{er}*. 5 vols. 7th ed. Paris: Charpentier et Cie., 1870.
- Larrey, Dominique Jean (baron). *Madame Mère*. 2 vols. Paris: E. Dentu, 1892.
- Le Nabour, Éric. *Barras, le vicomte rouge*. Paris: Éditions Jean-Claude Lattès, 1982.
- Lentz, Thierry. *Ræderer*. Metz: Éditions Serpenoise, 1989.
- Lévy, Arthur. *Un grand profiteur de guerre sous la Révolution, l'Empire et la Restauration, G.-J. Ouvrard*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy (Nouvelle Collection historique), 1929.
- Lhomer, Jean. *Perrégaux et sa fille la duchesse de Raguse*. Paris: Imprimerie générale Lahure, 1905.
- Madelin, Louis. *Fouché, 1759-1820*. Paris: Perrin, 1900.
- Marcaggi, Jean-Baptiste. *La genèse de Napoléon*. Paris: Perrin, 1902.
- Martineau, Gilbert. *Lucien Bonaparte, prince de Canino*. Paris: France-Empire, 1989.
- Mascilli Migliorini, Luigi. *Napoléon*. Paris: Perrin, 2004.
- Massie, Michel. *Le troisième consul Roger Ducos*. Biarritz : J&D Éditions, 1992.
- Masson, Frédéric. *Napoléon et sa famille*. 13 vols. 8^{ème} édition. Paris: Société d'Éditions Littéraires et Artistiques, 1906-1907.
- Mathiez, Albert. *Autour de Danton*. Paris: Payot, 1926.
- Montier, Arnaud. *Robert Lindet*. Paris: Alcan, 1899.
- Norvins, Jacques Marquet de Montbreton (baron de). *Histoire de Napoléon*. 4 vols. Paris: Furne & Cie., 1839.

- Payard, Maurice. *Le financier G.-J. Ouvrard, 1770-1846*. Reims: Académie nationale de Reims, 1958.
- Pinaud, Pierre-François. *Cambacérès : 1753-1824*. Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1991.
- Poniatowski, Michel. *Talleyrand et le Directoire, 1796-1800*. Paris: Perrin, 1982.
- Proth, Mario. *Bonaparte comediante tragediante*. Paris: A. Le Chevalier, 1869.
- Reilly, Robin. *Pitt the Younger, 1759-1806*. London: Cassell, 1978.
- Savant, Jean. *Tel fut Barras, l'homme qui « inventa » Bonaparte*. Paris: Fasquelle, 1954.
- Savant, Jean. *Tel fut Ouvrard, le financier providentiel de Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions Fasquelle, 1954.
- Seilhac, Victor (comte de). *L'Abbé Marc-René d'Espagnac, 1752-1794*. Tulle: Imprimerie Crauffon, 1881.
- Sené, Clovis. *Joseph Cambon (1756-1820), le financier de la Révolution, biographie*. Paris: J.-C. Lattès, 1987.
- Stern, Jean. *Le mari de Mademoiselle Lange, Michel-Jean Simons (1762-1833)*. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1933.
- Tersen, Émile. *Napoléon*. Paris: Le club français du livre, 1959.
- Thiry, Jean. *Jean-Jacques-Régis de Cambacérès, archichancelier de l'Empire*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1935.
- Tulard, Jean. *Murat*. Revised & updated ed. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1999.
- *Joseph Fouché*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1998.
- *Napoléon ou le mythe du sauveur*. Revised ed. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1983.
- *Le Mythe de Napoléon*. Paris: Armand Colin, 1971.
- *L'Anti-Napoléon. La légende noire de l'Empereur*. Paris: Julliard/ « Archives », 1965.
- Vialles, Pierre. *L'Archichancelier Cambacérès*, Paris: Perrin, 1908.
- Waresquiel, Emmanuel de. *Fouché : Les silences de la pieuvre*. Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 2014.
- *Talleyrand : Dernières nouvelles du Diable*. Paris: CNRS, 2011.
- *Talleyrand : Le prince immobile*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 2006.
- Wolff, Jacques. *Le Financier Ouvrard. 1770-1846. L'argent et la politique*. Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 1992.
- Zweig, Stefan. *Fouché*. Paris: Éditions Hachette/Le Livre de Poche, 2000.
- Zylberberg, Michel. *Capitalisme et catholicisme dans la France moderne. La dynastie Le Couteulx*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2001.

Economic Issues

Antonetti, Guy (ed.). *État, finances et économie pendant la Révolution française*. Colloque tenu à Bercy les 12, 13, 14 octobre 1989 pour le bicentenaire de la Révolution française. Paris: Comité pour l'Histoire Economique et Financière de la France (CHEEF), 1991.

Antonetti, Guy. *Une maison de banque à Paris au XVIII^e siècle, Greffulhe, Montz & Cie : 1789-1793*. Paris: Éditions Cujas, 1963.

Aubert, Félix; François de Juvigny, André Messin, André Charriaux *et al.* *La Banque de France*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1975.

Barral, Pierre. *Les Périer dans l'Isère au XIX^e siècle*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.

Béaur, Gérard & Philippe Minard (eds.). *Atlas de la Révolution française, volume 10 : Économie*. Paris: Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), 1997.

Beerbühl, Margrit Schulte & Jörg Vögele (eds.). *Spinning the Commercial Web: International Trade, Merchants, and Commercial Cities, c. 1640-1939*. Bern: Peter Lang Publishing, 2004.

Beerbühl, Margrit Schulte. *The Forgotten Majority: German Merchants in London, Naturalization, and Global Order, 1660-1815*. Translated by Cynthia Klohr. New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014.

Berard, Maurice. *Une famille du Dauphiné, les Bérard*. Paris: Larose, 1937.

Berchtold, Jean & Michel Porret (eds.). *Être riche au siècle de Voltaire. Actes du colloque de Genève, 18-19 juin 1994*. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1996.

Bergeron, Louis & Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret. *Les masses de granit : cent mille notables du Premier Empire*. Paris: Bibliothèque générale de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1995.

Bergeron, Louis. *Banquiers, négociants et manufacturiers parisiens du directoire à l'empire*. Paris: Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales (Éditions de l'EHESS), 1995.

----- . *Les capitalistes en France 1780-1914*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1978.

Bernstorff, Clarita; Hartwig Bernstorff & Emanuel Eckardt. *Change is the only constant: Berenberg. A history of one of the world's oldest banks*. Munich: Hanser Literaturverlage, 2015.

Bigo, Robert. *La Caisse d'escompte (1776-1793) et les origines de la Banque de France*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1927.

Blanc, Olivier. *La corruption sous la Terreur : 1792-1794*. Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1992.

Bodinier, Bernard & Eric Teyssier. *L'évènement le plus important de la Révolution : la vente des biens nationaux*. Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques (CTHS), 2000.

Bosher, John Francis. *French Finances 1770-1795: From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

- Bouchary, Jean. *Les Manieurs d'argent à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle*. 3 vols. Paris: Marcel Rivière & Cie., 1939-1943.
- . *Les compagnies financières à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle*. 3 vols. Paris: Marcel Rivière & Cie., 1940-1942.
- Bougerol, Pierre. *La Banque de France et la crise de 1805*. Thèse pour le doctorat de sciences économiques. Paris: Faculté de droit et de sciences économiques, 1969.
- Bourset, Madeleine. *Casimir Perier : Un prince financier au temps du romantisme*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1995.
- Branda, Pierre (ed.). *L'économie selon Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions Vendémiaire, 2016.
- Branda, Pierre. *Le Prix de la gloire: Napoléon et l'argent*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 2007.
- Braudel, Fernand. *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme*. 3 vols., Paris: Armand Colin, 1979.
- Bronne, Carlo. *Financiers et comédiens au XVIII^e siècle. Madame de Nettine, banquière des Pays-Bas*. Bruxelles: Goemaere Éditeur, 1969.
- Bruguière, Michel (ed.). *Pour une renaissance de l'histoire financière XVIII-XX^e siècles*. Paris: Comité pour l'Histoire Economique et Financière de la France (CHEEF), 1998.
- Bruguière, Michel. *Gestionnaires et profiteurs de la Révolution : L'administration des finances françaises de Louis XVI à Bonaparte*. Paris: Éditions Olivier Orban, 1986.
- Bruneel, Claude & Jean-Paul Hoyois (eds.). *Les grands commis du gouvernement des Pays-Bas autrichiens : dictionnaire biographique du personnel des institutions centrales*. Bruxelles: Archives générales du royaume, 2001.
- Buist, Marten Gerbertus. *At spes non fracta: Hope & Co. 1770-1815. Merchant Bankers and Diplomats at Work*. Den Haag: Bank Mees & Hope NV, 1974.
- Cameron, Rondo; Olga Crisp; Hugh T. Patrick & Richard Tilly (eds.). *Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialisation. A Study in Comparative Economic History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Capefigue, Jean-Baptiste Honoré Raymond. *Histoire des grandes opérations financières. Banques, bourses, emprunts, compagnies industrielles, etc.* 4 vols. Paris: Librairie d'Aymot, 1855.
- Carrière, Charles. *Négociants marseillais au XVIII^e siècle*. 2 vols. Marseille: Institut historique de Provence, 1973.
- Cassis, Youssef & Philip L. Cottrell (eds.). *The World of Private Banking*. London & New York: Routledge, 2016.
- . *Private Banking in Europe: Rise, Retreat and Resurgence*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Cassis, Youssef. *Capitals of Capital: The Rise and Fall of International Financial Centres 1780–2009*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Chabert, Alexandre. *Essai sur les mouvements des revenus et de l'activité économique en France de 1798 à 1820*. 2 vols. Paris: Librairie de Médicis, 1949.

- Chagny, Robert. *Une dynastie bourgeoise dans la Révolution: Les Perier*. Grenoble: Conseil Général de L'Isère, 1984.
- Chassagne, Serge. *Le coton et ses patrons. France, 1760-1840*. Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), 1991.
- Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy. *Gens de finance au XVIII^e siècle*. Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 1993.
- . *Les financiers de Languedoc au XVIII^e siècle*. Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1970.
- Claeys, Thierry. *Les Institutions financières en France au XVIII^e siècle*. 2 vols. Paris: Éditions de L'Harmattan, 2011.
- Crouzet, François. *La guerre économique franco-anglaise au XVIII^e siècle*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 2008.
- . *De la supériorité de l'Angleterre sur la France : L'économique et l'imaginaire, XVII^e-XX^e siècle*. Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1999.
- . *La Grande inflation : La monnaie en France de Louis XVI à Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 1993.
- Crowhurst, Patrick. *The French War on Trade: Privateering, 1793-1815*. London: Scolar Press, 1989.
- Dauphin-Meunier, Achille. *La Banque de France*. Paris: Éditions Gallimard/Nouvelles Revues Françaises, 1936.
- Davis, John R.; Stefan Manz & Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (eds.). *Transnational Networks: German Migrants in the British Empire, 1670–1914*. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishing, 2012.
- Delatte, Ivan. *La vente de biens nationaux dans le département de Jemmapes*. Bruxelles: Mémoires de l'Académie royale de Belgique, 1938.
- Depauw, Carl (ed.). *Bonaparte et l'Escaut : le spectaculaire développement d'Anvers à l'époque française*. Anvers: BAI, 2013.
- Flour de Saint-Genis, Victor-Bénigne. *La Banque de France à travers le siècle*. Paris: Guillaumin, 1896.
- Frémont, Paul Jean Michel Ráoul. *Les Payeurs d'armée*. Paris: Plon-Nourrit/Historique du service de la trésorerie et des postes aux armées, 1906.
- Gautier, Florence & Guy-Robert Ikni (eds.). *La guerre du blé au XVIII^e siècle : la critique populaire contre le libéralisme économique au XVIII^e siècle*. Montreuil: Éditions de la Passion, 1988.
- Gayot, Gérard & Jean-Pierre Hirsch (eds.). *La Révolution française et le développement du capitalisme*. Lille: Revue du Nord, 1989.
- Geiger, Reed G. *The Anzin Coal Company, 1800-1833: Big Business in the Early Stages of the French Industrial Revolution*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974.
- Gérard, Max. *MM. Hottinguer, banquiers à Paris*. 2 vols. Paris: Draeger frères, 1968.

- Girard, Pierre. *Hentsch & Cie, 1796-1946*. Genève: Imprimerie Kots-Sag, 1946.
- Gontard, Maurice. *La bourse de Paris : 1800-1830*. Saint-Rémy-de-Provence: Éditions Édisud, 2000.
- Guillemin, Henri. *1789 : silence aux pauvres!* Paris: Éditions d'Utopie, 2012.
- Harris, John R. *Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer: Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Heils, Kirsten. *Les rapports économiques franco-danois sous le Directoire, le Consulat et l'Empire. Contribution à l'étude du système continental*. Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1953.
- Hentsch, Robert. *Hentsch: banquiers à Genève et à Paris au XIX^e siècle*. Neuilly-sur-Seine: Robert Hentsch, 1996.
- Hincker, François. *La Révolution française et l'économie : Décollage ou catastrophe?* Paris: Éditions Nathan, 1989.
- Hoffman, Philip T.; Gilles Postel-Vinay & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal (eds.). *Des marchés sans prix. Une économie politique du crédit à Paris, 1660-1870*. Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), 2001.
- Jacoud, Gilles. *Le billet de banque en France, 1796-1803*. Paris: Éditions de L'Harmattan, 2000.
- Kaplow, Jeffrey. *Elbeuf during the Revolutionary Period*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963.
- Kermina, Françoise. *Heurs et malheurs des grands argentiers*. Paris: Perrin, 2018.
- Léon, Pierre. *La naissance de la grande industrie en Dauphiné*. Gap: Imprimerie Louis- Jean, 1954.
- Lévy, Arthur. *Un grand profiteur de guerre sous la Révolution, l'Empire et la Restauration, G.-J. Ouvrard*. Paris: Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 1929.
- Lévy-Leboyer, Maurice. *Les banques européennes et l'industrialisation internationale dans la 1^{ère} moitié du XIX^e siècle*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.
- Lutchysky, Ivan. *La petite propriété en France avant la Révolution et la vente des biens nationaux*. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1897.
- Herbert Lüthy. *La Banque protestante en France : de la Révocation de l'Édit de Nantes à la Révolution*. 3 vols. Paris: Les réimpressions des Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études Sociales (EHESS), 1998.
- Manger jr., Johannes Bernardus. *Recherches sur les relations économiques entre la France et la Hollande pendant la Révolution française (1785- 1795)*. Besançon: Imprimerie Jacques et Demontrond, 1923.
- Marion, Marcel. *Ce qu'il faut connaître des crises financières de notre histoire*. Paris: Boivin, 1926.
- . *Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715*. 6 vols. Paris: A. Rousseau, 1914-1931.

- . *Vente des biens nationaux pendant la Révolution*. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1908.
- Marzagalli, Silvia. *Les boulevards de la fraude. Le négoce maritime et le blocus continental, 1806-1813*. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 1999.
- Mathan, Anne de; Pierrick Pourchasse & Philippe Jarnoux (eds.). *La guerre, la mer et les affaires : Enjeux et réalités maritimes de la Révolution française*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2018.
- Mathiez, Albert. *La Corruption parlementaire sous la Terreur*. Paris: Armand Colin, 1917.
- . *Un Procès de Corruption sous La Terreur: L'Affaire de La Compagnie des Indes*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1920.
- Maurepas, Arnaud de. *Économie et finances au XIXe siècle : Guide du chercheur, 1789-1870*. Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France/IGPDE, 1998.
- Meadows, R. Darrell. *The Planters of Saint Domingue, 1750-1804 : Migration and Exile in the French Revolutionary Atlantic*. Ph.D. dissertation. Pittsburgh: Carnegie Mellon University, 2004.
- Mottet, Louis H. *Regards sur l'histoire des banques et banquiers genevois*. Geneva: Tribune Éditions, 1982.
- Oliveira, Mathieu de. *Les routes de l'argent: Réseaux et flux financiers de Paris à Hambourg: 1789-1815*. Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France/IGPDE, 2011.
- Pazzis, Henry de. *Origines, histoire et descendance de la famille Perier*. 6 vols. Presented & annotated by Yves Floch. Mayenne: Éditions régionales de l'Ouest, 1992-2006.
- Payard, Maurice. *Le financier G.-J. Ouvrard, 1770 – 1846*. Reims: Académie nationale de Reims, 1958.
- Pétre-Grenouilleau, Olivier. *Les Négoces maritimes français, XVIIe-XXe siècles*. Paris: Belin, 1997.
- Pinaud, Pierre-François. *Les Receveurs généraux des Finances, 1790-1865. Répertoires nominatif et territorial*. Genève: Librairie Droz, 1990.
- Pohl, Manfred & Sabine Freitag (eds.). *Handbook on the History of European Banks*. Published by the European Association of Banking History. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994.
- Poisson, Charles. *Les Fournisseurs aux armées sous la Révolution française. Le Directoire des achats 1792-1793, J. Bidermann, Cousin, Marx-Berr*. Paris: A. Margraff, 1932.
- Pollitzer, Marcel. *Le règne des financiers : Samuel Bernard, J. Law, G.-J. Ouvrard*. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1978.
- Pommier, Louis. *La Banque de France et l'État depuis sa création jusqu'à nos jours*. Paris: Rousseau, 1904.
- Prate, Alain. *La France et sa monnaie. Essai sur les relations entre la Banque de France et les gouvernements*. Paris: Julliard, 1987.
- Ramon, Gabriel. *Histoire de la Banque de France d'après les sources originales*. Paris: Grasset, 1929.

- Richard, Camille. *Le Comité de Salut public et les fabrications de guerre sous la Terreur*. Paris: F. Rieder, 1922.
- Riley, James C. *International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market, 1740-1815*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Robin, Pierre-Ernest-Marie. *Le Séquestre des biens ennemis sous la Révolution française*. Paris: Éditions Spes, 1926.
- Rosenbaum, Eduard. *M.M. Warburg & Co. Merchant Bankers of Hamburg, 1798-1938*. Translated by A.J. Sherman. London: Holmes & Meier Publishing, 1979.
- Sédillot, René. *Le Coût de la Révolution française*. Paris: Perrin, 1987.
- Sherwig, John M. *Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969.
- Sigaut, Marion. *De la Centralisation monarchique à la révolution bourgeoise*. Paris: Éditions Kontre Kulture, 2014.
- Sonenscher, Michael. *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Spang, Rebecca L. *Stuff and Money in the Time of the French Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015.
- Stourm, René. *Les finances du Consulat*. Paris: Guillaumin, 1902.
- . *Les finances de l'Ancien Régime et de la Révolution*. 2 vols. Paris: Guillaumin et Cie., 1885.
- Szramkiewicz, Romuald. *Les régents et censeurs de la Banque de France nommés sous le Consulat et l'Empire*. Genève: Librairie Droz, 1974.
- Thuillier, Guy. *La Monnaie en France au début du XIXe siècle*. Genève: Librairie Droz, 1983.
- Turc, Sylvain. *Les Elites grenobloises des Lumières à la monarchie de Juillet : Noblesses, notabilités et bourgeoisies 1760-1848*. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 2009.
- Vovelle, Michel (ed.). *Bourgeoisie de province et révolution (Actes du Colloque de Vizille)*. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1987.
- White, Andrew Dickson. *Fiat Money Inflation in France*. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1896.
- White, Ashli. *A Flood of Impure Lava: Saint Dominguan Refugees in the United States, 1791-1820*. Ph.D. dissertation. New York: Columbia University, 2003.
- Williams, Eric Eustace. *Capitalism and Slavery*. London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1964.
- Wilson, Charles H. *Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.
- Woronoff, Denis. *L'industrie sidérurgique en France pendant la Révolution et l'Empire*. Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), 1984.
- Ziegler, Philip. *The Sixth Great Power: Barings 1762–1929*. London: Harper/Collins, 1988.

Zylberberg, Michel. *Une si douce domination. Les milieux d'affaires français et l'Espagne vers 1780-1808*. Paris: Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France/IGPDE, 1993.

Political / Military / Social Issues

Agulhon, Maurice. *Coup d'Etat et République*. Paris: Les Presses de Sciences Po, 1997.

Bianchi, Nicomede. *Storia della monarchia piemontese*. 4 vols. Roma, Torino & Firenze: Fratelli Bocca, 1877-1885.

Blanc, Olivier. *Les espions de la Révolution et de l'Empire*. Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1995.

----- . *Les hommes de Londres : Histoire secrète de la Terreur*. Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 1989.

Branda, Pierre. *Les secrets de Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions Vuibert, 2014.

Botta, Carlo Giuseppe Guglielmo. *Histoire d'Italie de 1789 à 1814*. 6 vols. Paris: P. Dufart, 1824.

Boulay de la Meurthe, Alfred. *Le Directoire et l'expédition d'Égypte. Étude sur les tentatives du Directoire pour communiquer avec Bonaparte, le secourir et le ramener*. Paris: Hachette, 1885.

Bouvier, Félix. *Bonaparte en Italie, 1796*. Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1902.

Buonarotti, Philippe. *Conspiration pour l'égalité. Dite de Babeuf*. 2 vols. Bruxelles: Librairie Romantique, 1828.

Campbell, Peter R.; Thomas E. Kaiser & Marisa Linton (eds.). *Conspiracy in the French Revolution*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010.

Chandler, David G. *The Campaigns of Napoleon*. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Chevalier, Bernard. *Malmaison, château et domaine des origines à 1904*. Paris: Éditions de la Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1989.

Cobb, Richard. *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Cusani, Francesco. *Storia di Milano. Dall'origine a nostri giorni*. 4 vols. Milano: Presso la Libreria Pirotta, 1861-1865.

Davis, John A. *Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the European Revolutions, 1780–1860*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Dry, Adrien Fleury. *Soldats ambassadeurs sous le Directoire, an IV-an VIII*. 2 vols. Paris: Plon, 1906.

Du Teil, Joseph. *Rome, Naples et le Directoire*. Paris: Plon, 1902.

Dufourcq, Albert. *Le régime jacobin en Italie*. Paris: Perrin & Cie., 1900.

- Dupuy, Roger & Marcel Morabito (eds.). *1795. Pour une République sans Révolution*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1996.
- Durey, Michael. *William Wickham, Master Spy: The Secret War Against the French Revolution*. New York: Taylor & Francis/Routledge, 2009.
- Elliott, Marianne. *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1982.
- Fabry, Gabriel Joseph. *Histoire de l'Armée d'Italie*. 3 vols. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1900.
- Fugier, André. *Napoléon et l'Italie*. Paris: J.-B. Janin, 1947.
- Gaffarel, Paul. *Bonaparte et les républiques italiennes (1796-1799)*. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1895.
- Godechot, Jacques. *Les Commissaires aux armées sous le Directoire : contribution à l'étude des rapports entre les pouvoirs civils et militaires*. 2 vols. Paris: Fustier, 1937.
- d'Hauterive, Ernest. *La Police secrète du Premier Empire, 1804-1810*. 5 vols. Paris: Perrin, 1922-1964.
- Herold, John Christopher. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- Huerta, Carlos de la. *The Great Conspiracy: Britain's Secret War against Revolutionary France, 1794-1805*. Stroud, UK: Amberley Publishing, 2016.
- Imbert, Jean (ed.). *La protection sociale sous la Révolution française*. Paris: Association pour l'étude de la Sécurité sociale/La Documentation française, 1990.
- James, Cyril Lionel Robert. *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. New ed. London: Penguin, 2001.
- Kropotkin, Peter. *The Great French Revolution*. 2 vols. Trans. N.F. Dryhurst. New York: Vanguard Press, 1929.
- La Jonquière, Clément de. *L'Expédition d'Égypte, 1798-1801*. 5 vols. Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle, 1899-1907.
- Lazzari, Alfonso. *La sommossa e il sacco di Lugo nel 1796*. Bologna: Luigi Beltrame, 1906.
- Lefebvre, Georges. *Les Thermidoriens*. Paris: Éditions Armand Colin, 1951.
- Lemmi, Francesco. *Li origini del Risorgimento italiano*. Milano: Ulrico Hoepli/Libraio della Real Casa, 1906.
- Lenormand, Frédéric. *La pension Belhomme : Une prison de luxe sous la Terreur*. Paris: Fayard, 2002.
- Malaparte, Curzio. *Technique du coup d'État*. Revised ed. Paris: Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle/Les Cahiers Rouges, 2008.
- Manfredi, Silio. *L'insurrezione ed il sacco di Pavia nel maggio 1796*. Pavia: Giuseppe Frattini, 1900.
- Marx, Karl & Freidrich Engels. *The Holy Family*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956.

- Masson, Frédéric. *Le Département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787-1804*. Paris: Plon, 1877.
- Mathiez, Albert. *La Révolution et les étrangers*. Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1918.
- . *La réaction thermidorienne*. Paris: Éditions La Fabrique, 2010.
- Meynier, Albert. *Le dix-huit fructidor an V (4 septembre 1797)*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1928.
- Mitchell, Harvey. *The Underground War against Revolutionary France: The Missions of William Wickham, 1794-1800*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Mori, Jennifer. *William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997.
- Quilliet, Bernard. *L'affaire Du Petit-Val : un crime mystérieux sous le Directoire*. Paris: Albin Michel, 1989.
- Sainte Beuve, Charles-Augustin. *Causeries du lundi*. 15 vols. Paris: Garnier frères, 1851-1862.
- Schama, Simon. *Patriots and Liberators: Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780-1813*. New ed. London: Harper Press, 2005.
- Séché, Léon. *Les origines du Concordat*. 2 vols. Paris: Charles Delagrave, 1894.
- Sparrow, Elizabeth. *Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815*. Woodbridge (UK): The Boydell Press, 1989.
- Stinchcombe, William. *The XYZ Affair*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980.
- Tocqueville, Alexandre de. *L'Ancien régime et la Révolution*. New & revised ed. Paris: Éditions Gallimards/Folio Histoire, 1985.
- . *Œuvres complètes. Tome II : L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution. Vol. 2: Fragments et notes inédites sur la Révolution*. Edited by A. Jardin. Paris: Gallimard, 1953.
- Trolard, Eugène. *De Montenotte au Pont d'Arcole*. Paris: Albert Savine, 1893.
- Tulard, Jean. *Les Thermidoriens*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 2005.
- Vovelle, Michel (ed.). *Le tournant de l'an III. Réaction et terreur blanche dans la France révolutionnaire*. Paris: Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, 1997.
- Walter, Gérard. *La conjuration du neuf thermidor*. Paris: Gallimard, 1974.
- Zobi, Antonio. *Storia della Toscana dal 1737 al 1848*. 4 vols. Firenze: Luigi Molini, 1850-1852.

Articles/Book Chapters

- Agnelli, Giovanni. 'Una piccola città lombarda (Lodi) durante la Repubblica Cisalpina – (Maggio 1796 - Aprile 1799).' *Archivio storico italiano*, Tome XXIV, n°216, Issue 4, 1899: 193-247.

- Andrews, Richard. 'Réflexions sur la Conjuration des Égaux.' *Annales : Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 1974 (1): 73-106.
- Antonetti, Guy. 'Les relations Franco-Bataves et l'échec de l'emprunt français de l'an VIII.' *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, 53 (1), 1975: 61-72.
- Arrigon, L.J. 'Magistrat et conspirateur : Le père d'une favorite royale.' *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 juin & 1^{er} juillet 1952: 726-744 & 118-132.
- Bairoch, Paul. 'L'économie française dans le contexte européen à la fin du XVIII^e siècle.' *Revue économique*, 40 (6), 1989: 939-964.
- Ballot, Charles. 'Les banques d'émissions sous le Consulat.' *Revue des Études Napoléoniennes*, 1912: 42-77.
- '. 'Les prêts aux manufactures sous le Premier Empire.' *Revue des Études Napoléoniennes*, 1912: 42-77.
- Barbier, Frédéric. 'Les origines de la maison Fould : Beer Léon et Bénédic Fould (vers 1740-1864).' *Revue Historique*, Tome 281, n°569, janvier-mars 1989: 159-192.
- Bergeron, Louis. 'Le négoce international de la France à la fin du XVIII^e siècle : quelques remarques en guise de conclusion' in François Crouzet (ed.), *Le négoce international, XIII^e-XX^e siècle*. Paris: Economica, 1989: 199-203.
- '. 'Paris dans l'organisation des échanges intérieurs français au XVIII^e siècle' in Pierre Léon (ed.), *Aires et structures du commerce français au XVIII^e siècle*. Lyon, 1975.'
- '. 'Les conditions générales du développement industriel dans l'Europe du Nord-Ouest à l'époque napoléonienne.' *Francia*, 1972-1973: 537-556.
- '. 'A propos des biens nationaux : la signification économique du placement immobilier.' *Annales : Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, Mars-Avril 1971 (2): 415-419.
- '. 'Problèmes économiques de la France napoléonienne.' *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, Tome 17 (3), Juillet-Septembre 1970: 469-505.
- '. 'Pourtalès et Cie, 1753-1801: apogée et déclin d'un capitalisme.' *Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, Mars-Avril 1970: 498-517.
- '. 'Profits et risques dans les affaires parisiennes sous le Directoire et le Consulat.' *Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française*, 185, Juillet-Septembre 1966: 359-389.
- Birembaut, Arthur. 'La Mission de Louis Monneron en Angleterre en 1795' in 'Glans', *Annales historique de la Révolution française*, 171, Janvier-Mars 1963: 103-104.
- Blanc, Olivier. 'Cercles politiques et "salons" du début de la Révolution (1789-1793).' *Annales historique de la Révolution française*, 2006 (2): 63-92.
- '. 'Les "affaires" des Jacobins : des corrompus contre l'Incorruptible.' *Historama*, n° 32, May 1993.
- '. 'Les indices de la Révolution.' *L'Histoire*, n° 62, 1981.

Boghaert-Vaché, Arthur. 'Un précurseur de Richard-Lenoir, Liévin Bauwens, le véritable importateur en France de la filature mécanique du coton.' *Bulletin de la Société industrielle de Mulhouse*, Vol. 56 (October), 1886: 383-398.

Bonin, Hubert. 'La Révolution a-t-elle brisé l'esprit d'entreprise?' *La Recherche historique*, 1985 (5): 193-204.

Bonnales de Ganges, Edmond. 'Les agioteurs aux armées de la Révolution.' *Revue du monde catholique*, 7^e série, Tome IV, juillet 1900: 532-554.

Bordo, Michael D. & Eugene N. White. 'A Tale of Two Currencies: British and French Finance During the Napoleonic Wars.' *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 51 (2): 303-316.

Bosher, John Francis. 'The Paris Business World and the Seaports under Louis XV: speculators in marine insurance, naval finances and trade.' *Social History*, November 1979: 281-297.

-----'. 'The 'premier commis' in the reign of Louis XVI.' *French Historical Studies*, vol.3 (4), 1964: 475-494.

Bouchary, Jean. 'Un manieur d'argent à Paris à la fin du XVIII^e siècle, Joseph-François-Xavier de Pestre, Comte de Sénéffe et de Turnhout', *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, 25 (3/4), 1939: 261-292.

-----'. 'Les manieurs d'argent sous la Révolution française : Le banquier Édouard de Walckiers.' *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, 86, mars-avril 1938: 133-155.

Boudard, René. 'Le rôle du général Bonaparte dans les événements insurrectionnels de Gênes, en prairial an V.' *Revue de l'Institut Napoléon*, 1993 (1): 7-43.

Bouvet, Marc. 'Entourages et cabinets ministériels de la révolution à la monarchie de juillet (1791-1848)' in Jean-Michel Eyméri-Douzans; Xavier Bioy & Stéphane Mouton (eds.). *Le règne des entourages. Cabinet et conseillers de l'exécutif*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.), 2015: 141-194.

Bouvier, Félix. 'L'Italie de 1794 à 1796, d'après les papiers de Paul Greppi.' *La Révolution française*, Tome XLV, juillet-décembre 1903: 161-169.

Boyer, Ferdinand. 'Les responsabilités de Napoléon dans le transfert à Paris des œuvres d'art de l'étranger.' *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 11(4), octobre-décembre 1964: 241-262.

Branda, Pierre. 'Les finances de l'Égypte' in Thierry Lentz (ed.), *Napoléon Bonaparte : correspondance générale. Volume II : La campagne d'Égypte et l'avènement 1798-1799*. Paris: Éditions Fayard, 2005: 1147-1151.

Bruguière, Michel. 'Révolution et finances : Réflexion sur un bilan impossible.' *Revue économique*, 40 (6), Novembre 1989: 985-1000.

-----'. 'L'aristocratique descendance des affairistes de la Révolution' in *Les noblesses européennes au XIX^e siècle*. Actes du colloque de Rome, 21-23 novembre 1985. Rome: École Française de Rome, 1988: 105-120.

-----'. 'Louis XVI's Receivers-General and their Successors.' *French History*, 1 (2), 1987: 238-256.

-----'. 'Finance et noblesse : l'entrée des financiers dans la noblesse d'Empire.' *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 17 (3), juillet-septembre 1970: 664-670.

Buist, Marten G. 'The Sinews of War: The Role of Dutch Finance in European Politics (c.1780-1815)' in A.C. Duke & C.M. Tamse (eds.), *Britain and The Netherlands. Volume VI: War and Society (Papers Delivered to the Sixth Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference)*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977: 124-140.

Burnand, René. 'Les Johannots d'Echandens.' *Revue historique vaudoise*, Tome LXVI, 1958: 177-189.

Butel, Paul. 'Les difficultés du commerce maritime bordelais sous le Directoire. Exemple de l'adaptation à la conjoncture de guerre maritime.' *Actes du congrès national des sociétés savantes*, n° 94 (Pau), Tome II, Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1969: 331-344.

-----'. 'Crise et mutation de l'activité économique à Bordeaux sous le Consulat et l'Empire.' *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, Tome 17, 1970: 540-558.

-----'. 'Réorientations du négoce français à la fin du XVIII^e siècle, les Monneron et l'Océan Indien' in Paul Butel & L.M. Cullen (eds.), *Négoce et industrie en France et en Irlande aux XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles : Actes du Colloque franco-irlandais d'histoire*. Bordeaux: Éditions du CNRS, 1980: 65-73.

Charrière de Sévery, W. de. 'George-François Grand : Premier mari de la Princesse de Talleyrand : quelques lettres écrites de lui de 1802 à 1808.' *Revue Historique Vaudoise*, 1925, n°1: 2-17.

Chassagne, Serge. 'Le négoce et la banque' in Michel Vovelle (ed.), *L'état de la France pendant la Révolution (1789-1799)*, Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1988.

Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy. 'Aux origines de la Révolution : noblesse et bourgeoisie.' *Annales : Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 2, 1975: 265-278.

Courbis, Bernard. 'De la notion de cours à la notion de pouvoir libérateur légal' in Philippe Kahn (ed.), *Droit et Monnaie : États et espace monétaire transnational*. Dijon: CREDIMI, 1988.

-----'. 'L'origine de la "monnaie banque centrale" : étude comparée des expériences française et anglaise à la fin du XVIII^e siècle et au début du XIX^e siècle.' *Cahier Monnaie et Financement*, Université Lyon 2, n°3, novembre 1976: 1-37.

Cramer, Marc. 'Les trente Demoiselles de Genève et les billets solidaires.' *Revue suisse d'économie politique et de statistique*, Vol. 82, 1946: 109-138.

Croisset, Charles de. 'Si les banques venaient à disparaître quelles seraient les raisons de les réinventer?' *Banque*, janvier 1989: 7-10.

Crouzet, François. 'The Second Hundred Years War: some reflections.' *French History*, 10 (4), 1996: 432-450.

-----'. 'Les conséquences économiques de la Révolution française. Réflexions sur un débat.' *Revue économique*, 40 (6), 1989: 1189-1203.

- '. 'Guerre, blocus et changement économique, 1792-1815' in his *De la supériorité de l'Angleterre sur la France : L'économique et l'imaginaire, XVII^e-XX^e siècles*. Paris: Perrin, 1985: 280-298.
- '. 'La ruine du grand commerce' in François-Georges Pariset (ed.), *Bordeaux au XVIII^e siècle*. Bordeaux: Fédération historique du Sud-Ouest, 1968: 485-510.
- Daly, Gavin. 'English Smugglers, the Channel, and the Napoleonic Wars, 1800–1814.' *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 46 (1), 2007: 30-46.
- Delaisi, Francis. 'La Banque de France et le 18 Brumaire.' *Europe*, 40 (159), Mars 1936: 315-326.
- Delatte, Ivan. 'La vente des biens nationaux en Belgique.' *Revue d'histoire moderne*, Tome IX (nouvelle série), janvier-mai 1940: 44-51.
- '. 'La vente de biens nationaux dans l'arrondissement de Namur.' *Annales de la Société Archéologique de Namur*, Tome XL (deuxième livraison), 1932-1933: 189-339.
- Démier, François. 'Les 'économistes de la nation' contre 'l'économie-monde' du XVIII^e siècle' in *La pensée économique pendant la Révolution française : actes du colloque international de Vizille (6-8 septembre 1989)*, Gilbert Faccarello & Philippe Steiner (eds.). Grenoble, 1990: 281-303.
- Dermigny, Louis & Gabriel Debien. 'La révolution aux Antilles: marins et colons — marchands et petits blancs.' *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, Vol. 8 (4), mars 1955: 496-517.
- Dermigny, Louis. 'La France à la fin de l'ancien régime : une carte monétaire.' *Annales, Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 10 (4), 1955: 480-493.
- Desaunay, François. 'L'État centralisé de l'an VII et la fondation de la Banque de France.' *La revue administrative*, Tome 29, septembre-octobre 1952: 471-478.
- Deyon, Pierre. 'Proto-Industrialization in France,' in *European Proto-Industrialization*, Sheilagh C. Ogilvie & Markus Cerman, eds. Cambridge, 1996: 38-48.
- Donaghay, Marie. 'Calonne and the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786.' *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 50 (3), On Demand Supplement (September 1978): D1157-D1184.
- Dorigny Marcel. 'Les Girondins et Jean-Jacques Rousseau.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, n°234, 1978: 569-583.
- Douin, Georges. 'Le retour de Bonaparte d'Égypte en France.' *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte*, Tome XXIII, 1941: 184-216.
- Dufraisse, Roger. 'Régime douanier, blocus, système continental : essai de mise au point.' *Revue d'Histoire Économique et Sociale*, 1966 (4): 518-543.
- '. 'La politique douanière de Napoléon I^{er}.' *Revue de l'Institut Napoléon*, 1974: 3-25.
- Dupuy, Pascal. 'Le 18 Brumaire en Grande-Bretagne : le témoignage de la presse et des caricatures.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, Vol. 318, 1999: 773-787.

- Durand, Charles. 'Le pouvoir napoléonien et ses légitimités.' *Annales de la faculté de droit et de science politique d'Aix-Marseille*, 1972: 7-33.
- Durey, Michael. 'The British Secret Service and the escape of Sir Sidney from Paris 1798.' *History*, Vol. 84 (275), July 1999: 437-457.
- Evans, Howard V. 'William Pitt, William Miles and the French Revolution.' *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 43 (108), 1970: 190-213.
- Evrard, Fernand. 'Le commerce des laines d'Espagne sous le Premier Empire.' *Revue Historique*, July-August 1937.
- '. 'Les Ouvriers du textile dans la région rouennaise (1789-1802).' *Annales historique de la Révolution française*, 108, Octobre-Décembre 1947: 333-352.
- Flammermont, Jules. 'L'Authenticité des mémoires de Talleyrand.' *La Révolution française*, Tome XXIII, Juillet-Décembre 1892: 385-409.
- Fohlen, Claude. 'Une expérience de crédit foncier. La Banque Territoriale (An VII-An XI)' in *Mélanges offerts à G. Jacquemyns*. Bruxelles: Éditions de l'Institut de sociologie (Université libre de Bruxelles), 1968: 275-285.
- Forrest, Alan. 'L'armée et la politique sous le régime thermidorien' in Roger Dupuy & Marcel Morabito (eds.), *1795. Pour une République sans Révolution*. Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1996: 275-285.
- 'Fouché à Nevers.' *Bulletin de la Société nivernaise des sciences, lettres et arts*, seconde série, Tome I. Nevers: Imprimerie de L.-M. Fay, 1863: 245-253.
- Franchescini, Émile. 'Saliceti et Napoléon.' *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, Tome XXXI, juillet-décembre 1930: 131-155.
- Frémy, Comte E. 'L'enceinte de Paris construite par les fermiers généraux et la perception des droits d'octroi de la ville (1784-1791).' *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France*, 1912.
- Fugier, André. 'Un financier diplomate : José Martinez de Hervas, chargé d'affaires d'Espagne à Paris, 1803-1804.' *Revue des Études Napoléoniennes*, Septembre-Octobre 1924: 81-102.
- Gabillard Jean. 'Le financement des guerres napoléoniennes et la conjoncture du Premier Empire.' *Revue économique*, 4 (4), 1953: 548-572.
- Gaffarel, Jacques. 'Documents inédits : Opinion de M. Dupont de Nemours sur Bonaparte en l'an IV.' *La Révolution française*, Tome XXXV, juillet-décembre 1898: p.376.
- Gille, Bertrand. 'Contributions à l'étude de la crise de 1805', *Bulletin du Centre de Recherches sur l'Histoire des Entreprises*, Bulletin n°3, 3 juin 1954.
- Godechot, Jacques. 'Sens et importance de la transformation des institutions révolutionnaires à l'époque napoléonienne.' *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, juillet-septembre 1970: 796-813.
- '. 'Les aventures d'un fournisseur aux armées : Hanet-Cléry.' *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, 73, Janvier-Février 1936: 30-41.

- Golinelli, Michel. 'Joseph Fouché, duc d'Otrante, ministre de la Police et notre région.' *Société d'histoire et d'archéologie de la Goële*, n°29-30, 1999-2000.
- Goodwin, Albert. 'War transport and counter-revolution in France in 1793: the case of the Winter company and the financier Jean-Jacques de Beaune' in Michael Richard Daniell Foot (ed.). *War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J.R. Western*. London: Paul Elek, 1973: 212-224.
- Grimoüard, Henri (Vicomte) de. 'Les origines du Domaine Extraordinaire.' *Revue des questions historiques*, Tome XXXIX, 1908: 160-192.
- Guyot, Raymond. 'Madame Grand à Paris.' *Feuilles d'Histoire du XVII^e au XX^e siècle*, Mai 1909: 395-398.
- Hamilton, Earl J. 'The Foundation of the Bank of Spain.' *The Journal of Political Economy*, 53 (2), 1953: 97-114.
- Heller, Henry. 'Bankers, Finance Capital and the French Revolutionary Terror (1791-1794).' *Historical Materialism*, 22 (3-4), 2014: 172-216.
- H.E.B. 'The Flight of Capital from Revolutionary France.' *The American Historical Review*, 41 (4), July 1936: 710-727.
- Joslin, D.M. 'London Private Bankers, 1720-1785.' *Economic History Review*, 7 (2), 1954: 167-186.
- Jourdan, Annie. 'Le rôle des agents français dans la constitution batave.' *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, 351, Janvier-Mars 2008: 99-119.
- Karmin, Otto. 'À la recherche de la fortune du duc d'Orléans.' *Revue de la Révolution française*, 9, Janvier-Mars 1912: 529-569.
- Kenney Jr., James J. 'Lord Whitworth and the Conspiracy Against Tsar Paul I: The New Evidence of the Kent Archive.' *Slavic Review*, 36 (2), 1977: 205-219.
- Labouchère, G. 'Pierre César Labouchère (1772-1839), un financier diplomate au siècle dernier.' *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, XXVII, 1913: 425-455.
- Lacour-Gayet, Georges. 'Les premières relations de Talleyrand et de Napoléon.' *Lecture faite à la séance de rentrée de la Société des études historiques le 23 novembre 1916*. Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1927.
- Lalévée, Thomas. 'National Pride and Republican *grandezza*: Brissot's New Language for International Politics in the French Revolution', *French History and Civilisation*, Vol. 6, 2015: 66-82.
- Langlois, Claude. 'Napoléon Bonaparte plébiscité ?', in Léo Hamon & Guy Lobrichon, *L'Élection du chef de l'État en France de Hugues Capet à nos jours*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1988: 81-93.
- '. 'Le plébiscite de l'an VIII et le coup d'État du 18 pluviôse an VIII', *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, Tome XLIV, 1972: 43-65; 231-246; 390-415.
- Lefebvre, Bernard. 'Argent et révolution : esquisse d'une étude de la fortune à Douai (1748-1820).' *Revue du Nord*, 61, n°241, avril-juin 1979: 403-415.

- Lemarchand, Guy. 'Du féodalisme au capitalisme : à propos des conséquences de la Révolution sur l'évolution de l'économie française.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 1988 (272): 171-207.
- Lentz, Thierry. 'De l'expansionnisme au système continental' in Dominique de Villepin (ed.), *Histoire de la diplomatie française. Volume I: Du Moyen Age à l'Empire*. Paris: Tempus/Perrin, 2005: 405-505.
- Lespagnol, André. 'Mondialisation des trafics inter-océaniques et structures commerciales nationales au XVIII^e siècle : contradictions et compromis.' *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 1-2, 1997: 80-91.
- Lestapis, Arnaud de. 'Un grand corrupteur : le duc du Chatelet. L'Affaire Baillemont. III^e Partie.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 138, janvier-mars 1955: 5-26.
- '. 'Un grand corrupteur : le duc du Chatelet. II^e Partie.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 133, octobre-décembre 1953: 316-339.
- '. 'Les Gentilshommes charretiers.' *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1^{er} septembre 1953: 151-166.
- '. 'Un grand corrupteur : le duc du Chatelet.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 131, avril-juin 1953: 104-126.
- '. 'Batz et la liquidation de la créance Guichon.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 128, septembre-octobre 1952, 1952: 377-399.
- Lévy-Leboyer, Maurice. 'Le rôle historique de la monnaie de banque.' *Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 23 (1), janvier-février 1968: 1-8.
- Longfellow, David L. 'Silk Weavers and the Social Struggle in Lyon during the French Revolution, 1789-1794.' *French Historical Studies*, 12 (1), 1981: 1-40.
- Manas, Arnaud. 'Le mythe des trente deniers du 18 Brumaire' in Pierre Branda (ed.), *L'économie selon Napoléon*. Paris: Éditions Vendémiaire, 2016: 79-100.
- Manguin, Georges. 'Salicetti et l'arrestation de Bonaparte à Nice.' *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, Tome XXXIX, juillet-décembre 1934: 261-264.
- Marzagalli, Sylvia. 'Le négoce maritime et la rupture révolutionnaire : un ancien débat revisité.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 352 (March-April), 2008: 184-207.
- '. 'Hambourg, Bordeaux et les États-Unis dans les années 1790 : Quelques remarques à propos des circuits commerciaux en temps de guerre' in Burghart Schmidt & Bernard Lachaise (eds.), *Hamburg-Bordeaux, Zwei Städte und ihre Geschichte/Bordeaux-Hambourg. Deux villes dans l'histoire*. Hamburg: DOBU Verlag, 2007: 389-398.
- '. 'Les modifications commerciales dans l'espace atlantique à l'époque révolutionnaire' in Robert Chagny & Jean-Clément Martin (eds.), *La Révolution française. Idéaux, singularités, influences. Actes des journées d'étude en hommage à Albert Soboul, Jacques Godechot et Jean-René Suratteau*. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 2002: 35-49.

Mathiez, Albert. 'Saint-Simon, Lauraguais, Barras, Benjamin Constant, etc., et la réforme de la Constitution de l'an III après le coup d'État du 18 Fructidor an V.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 31, 1929: 5-23.

-----'. 'Danton : L'histoire et la légende.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 23, Septembre-Octobre 1927: 417-461.

-----'. 'Danton, Delacroix et le pillage de la Belgique' in his *Autour de Danton*. Paris: Payot, 1926.

-----'. 'Le Comité de Salut public et le complot de l'étranger.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 16, Juillet-Août 1926: 305-329.

-----'. 'Danton, Delacroix et le pillage de la Belgique.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 10, Juillet-Août 1925: 384-390.

-----'. 'Encore le banquier Perrégaux.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, XII (3), Mai-Juin 1920: 237-243.

-----'. 'Quelques affaires de commerce et d'intelligences avec l'ennemi sous la Terreur. Le banquier Boyd et ses amis.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, XII (3), Mai-Juin 1920: 218-231.

-----'. 'Danton et Durand.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, XI (2), Mars-Avril 1919: 141-159.

-----'. 'Le Banquier Perrégaux.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, XI (2), Mars-Avril 1919: 242-252.

-----'. 'Danton, Talon, Pitt et la mort de Louis XVI.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, VIII (3), Mai-Juin 1916: 367-376.

-----'. 'Danton et l'or anglais.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, VIII (2), Mars-Avril 1916: 167-172.

-----'. *Danton agent de la liste civil* in 'Notes et Glanes.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, VII (1), Janvier-Février 1914: 98-111.

-----'. 'La fortune de Danton.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, V (4), Juillet-Septembre 1912: 453-477.

-----'. 'La corruption parlementaire sous la Terreur.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, V (2), Mars-Avril 1912: 157-177.

Mercier, Pierre. 'Armand-Jean-François Seguin (1767-1835), chimiste, tanneur et financier.' *Bulletin de la section d'histoire des Usines Renault*, juin 1976: 218-233.

Meurthe, Comte Boulay de la. 'Les justifications de Talleyrand pendant le Directoire. Rapport sur la situation extérieure de la république, 8 messidor an VII (26 juin 1799).' *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, n°3, 1889: 481-495.

Morineau, Michel. 'La vraie nature des choses et leur enchaînement entre la France, les Antilles et l'Europe (XVIIe-XIXe siècles).' *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, n° 314, Tome 84, janvier 1997: 3-24.


- Neal, Larry. 'How it all began: the monetary and financial architecture of Europe during the first global capital markets, 1648–1815.' *Financial History Review*, 7 (2), 2000.
- Newman, K. 'Anglo-Dutch Commercial Co-operation and the Russia Trade in the Eighteenth Century' in W.J. Wieringa (ed.), *The Interactions of Amsterdam and Antwerp with the Baltic region, 1400-1800*. Leiden: M. Nijhoff, 1983: 95-103.
- Oliveira, Matthieu de. 'Lille, place financière intermédiaire sous la Révolution et l'Empire.' *Annales Historiques de la Révolution française*, 352, avril-juin 2008: 155-181.
- Ozouf, Mona. 'Les décrets des deux tiers ou les leçons de l'Histoire' in Roger Dupuy (ed.), *1795. Pour une République sans Révolution*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1996: 193-209.
- '. 'De Thermidor à Brumaire: Le discours de la Révolution sur elle-même.' *Revue Historique*, 243, no.1 (1970): 31-66.
- Palmer, R. R. 'Much in Little: The Dutch Revolution of 1795.' *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 26 (1), March 1954: 15-35.
- Pascal, François. 'Lindet face à Napoléon.' *Revue de l'Institut Napoléon*, 1991 (II): 23-44.
- Payard, Maurice. 'Bonaparte et le fournisseur Collot.' *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, janvier-juin 1935: 129-143.
- Pichot, Amédée. 'Chronique et bulletin bibliographique.' *Revue Britannique*, II, avril 1868:
- Pinaud, Pierre-François. 'The Settlement of the Public Debt from the Ancien Régime, 1790-1810.' *French History*, 5 (4), 1990: 414-425.
- Pinkney, David. 'Paris, capitale du coton sous le Premier Empire.' *Annales : Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 1950 (1): 55-60.
- Plessis, Alain. 'La création de la Banque de France et la genèse des banques nationales d'émission en Europe au XIX^e siècle' in O. Feiertag & M. Margairaz (eds.), *Politiques et pratiques des banques d'émission en Europe (XVII^e – XX^e siècle)*. Paris: Albin Michel, 2003.
- '. 'La Révolution et les banques en France : de la Caisse d'escompte à la Banque de France.' *Revue économique*, 1989, Vol. 40 (6): 1001-1014.
- Poitras, Geoffrey. 'Life annuity valuation: from de Witt and Halley to de Moivre and Simpson' in Poitras, Geoffrey (ed.). *Pioneers of Financial Economics: Volume I, Contributions Prior to Irving Fisher*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006.
- Price, J.M. 'What did merchants do? Reflections on British overseas trade, 1660-1790.' *Journal of Economic History*, 49 (2), 1989: 267-284.
- Rao, Anna Maria. 'Conspiration et Constitution : Andrea Vitaliani et la République napolitaine de 1799.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, n°313, 1998: 545-573.
- Riley, J.C. 'Life Annuity-Based Loans on the Amsterdam Capital Market Toward the End of the Eighteenth Century.' *Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek*, 36, 1973: 102-130.
- Rose, Le Caporal. 'Saliceti à Lodi (1796).' *Nouvelle revue rétrospective*. Tome XV, juillet-décembre 1901: 13-22.

- Rudé, George E. 'Prices, Wages and Popular Movements in Paris during the French Revolution.' *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 6, 1953: 246-67.
- Sainson, Katia. 'Le régénérateur de la France: Literary Accounts of Napoleonic Regeneration, 1799-1805.' *Nineteenth Century French Studies*, 30 (1&2) Fall-Winter 2001: 9-25.
- Saumade, Gratien. 'Cambon et sa famille acquéreurs de biens nationaux (1791 et 1793).' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, mai-juin 1939 (93): 228-244.
- '. 'Cambon et sa famille acquéreurs de biens nationaux (1791 et 1793) (Suite).' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, juillet-août 1939 (94): 313-338.
- Schama, Simon. 'The Exigencies of War and the Politics of Taxation in the Netherlands: 1795-1810' in J.M. Winter (ed.), *War and Economic Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Schmitt, Jean-Marie. 'Du textile alsacien aux monnaies de confiance : le groupe Bidermann et les frères Monneron.' *Moneta milhusina*, vol. 45, 1979.
- Sciout, Ludovic. 'Le Directoire et la République Cisalpine.' *Revue des questions historiques*. Tome XII (nouvelle série), juillet 1894: 169-216.
- '. 'Les banqueroutes du Directoire.' *Revue des questions historiques*. Tome IX (nouvelle série), janvier 1893: 457-507.
- '. 'Le Directoire et la République Romaine.' *Revue des questions historiques*. Tome XXXIX, janvier 1886: 148-217.
- Sparrow, Elizabeth. 'Secret Service under Pitt's Administrations, 1792-1806.' *History*, 82 (270), 1998: 280-294.
- '. 'The Swiss and Swabian agencies: 1795-1801.' *The Historical Journal*, 35 (4), 1992: 861-884.
- '. 'The Alien Office, 1792-1806.' *The Historical Journal*, Issue 2, June 1990: 361-384.
- Stigler, George J. 'The Theory of Economic Regulation.' *The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science*, Vol.2 (1), Spring 1971.
- Stinchcombe, William. 'The Diplomacy of the WXYZ Affair.' *The William & Mary Quarterly*, 34 (4), October 1977: 590-617.
- Suratteau, Jean-René. 'Le Directoire : points de vue et interprétations d'après des travaux récents.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 224, avril-juin 1976: 181-214.
- Tassier, Suzanne. 'Édouard de Walckiers promoteur de l'union des Belges et des Liégeois, 1792.' *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles*, décembre 1938-janvier 1939, no. 2: 139-165
- Taylor, George V. 'Types of Capitalism in Eighteenth Century France.' *English Historical Review*, 79 (1964): 478-97.
- Thiveaud, Jean-Marie. 'Naissance de l'assurance-vie en France.' *Revue d'économie financière*, 1989 (11): 318-333.

- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 'Discours de M. de Tocqueville, prononcé à la séance publique du 21 avril 1842, et venant prendre séance à la place de M. le comte de Cessac', in F. Mélonio (ed.), *Œuvres complètes*. Vol. 16. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1989: 251-269.
- Vauthier, Gabriel. 'Les maisons de jeu sous le Consulat et l'Empire.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, X (3), Mai-Juin 1918: 327-340.
- Velde, François R. & David R. Weir. 'The Financial Market and Government Debt Policy in France, 1746-93.' *Journal of Economic History*, 52 (1), March 1992: 1-39.
- Vermale, François. 'Les fournisseurs à l'Armée des Alpes après le 9 Thermidor.' *Annales révolutionnaires*, VIII (1), Janvier-Février 1916: 34-46.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 'A Theory of Economic History in Place of Economic Theory?', *Revue Économique*, 42 (2), mars 1991: 173-180.
- Weir David R. 'Les crises économiques et les origines de la Révolution française.' *Annales : Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, 46 (4), 1991: 917-947.
- '. 'Tontines, Public Finance and Revolution in France and England, 1688-1789.' *Journal of Economic History*, 49 (1), 1989: 95-124.
- White Eugene Nelson. 'The French Revolution and the Politics of Government Finance, 1770-1815.' *The Journal of Economic History*, 55 (2), 1995: 227-255.
- '. 'Measuring the French Revolution's Inflation: the Tableaux de dépréciation.' *Histoire & Mesure*, 6, 1991: 245-274.
- '. 'Free Banking during the French Revolution.' *Explorations in Economic History*, 27 (3), 1990: 251-276.
- Whitmore Richard & James Livesey. 'Etienne Clavière, Jacques-Pierre Brissot et les fondations intellectuelles de la politique des Girondins.' *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 2000 (321): 1-26
- Williams, David. 'The Missions of David Williams and James Tilly Matthews to England (1793).' *English Historical Review*, 53 (212), 1938: 621-668.
- Winock, Michel. 'Autopsie d'un coup d'Etat.' *L'Histoire*, n° 237, novembre 1999: 32-40.
- Wolff, Jacques. 'Les insuffisantes finances napoléoniennes. Une des causes de l'échec de la tentative d'hégémonie européenne.' *Revue du Souvenir Napoléonien*, n°397 (septembre – octobre 1994): 5-50.
- Zylberberg, Michel. 'Capitalisme français et banque espagnole à la fin de l'Ancien Régime : le Canal de Saint-Denis.' *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 27 (3), 1980: 353-373.
- '. 'François Cabarrús, agriculteur éclairé, ou un banquier aux champs. Un exemple d'Agriculture nouvelle en Nouvelle-Castille à la fin du XVIII^e siècle', in *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez*, Tome 15, 1979: 415-450.


Map III

Financiers of Northern France



This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com (https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=2970&lang=en).
Some icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.
All other modifications created by the author.

Map IV Financiers of the Atlantic Seaboard



This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com (https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=14434&lang=en).


Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.

Frigate icon by Natasha Sinegina downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.creazilla.com.

All other modifications created by the author.

Map V

Financiers of the Mediterranean Seaboard



This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com (https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=2902&lang=en).


Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.

Frigate icon by Natasha Sinegina downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.creazilla.com.

All other modifications created by the author.

Map VI

Financiers of the Lyon Area



This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com


(https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=3050&lang=en).

Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.

All other modifications created by the author.

Map VII

Financiers of the Seine Basin



This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com (https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=14378&lang=en).


Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.

Frigate icon by Natasha Sinagina downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.creazilla.com.

All other modifications created by the author.

Map VIII

Financiers of the Rhineland




This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com

(https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=5284&lang=en).

Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.

All other modifications created by the author.

Map IX Swiss Financiers




This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com

(https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=2640&lang=en).

Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.

All other modifications created by the author.

Map X Belgian Financiers



This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com


(https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=2082&lang=en).

Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.

All other modifications created by the author.

Map XI

Commercial Networks in the Baltic & North Seas




This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com (https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=3472&lang=en).

Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com.

Frigate icon by Natasha Sinegina downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.creazilla.com.

All other modifications created by the author.

Financiers of the Ile de France




This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com (https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=14378&lang=en).

Several icons downloaded and used with permission under CC-BY-4.0 license from www.icon-icons.com. All other modifications created by the author.

Map XIII

Leading European Financiers



This map is based on a template used with permission under license from www.d-maps.com.

https://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=2250&lang=en.

All other modifications created by the author.

