1954 Packard Clipper: The car that ended the automaker’s independence

69 Comments

1. Thanks for the write-up, well written. And yes, the ’54 Clippers did have black hexagons on the hubcaps, no other Packard cars had black centers, only the ’54 Packards.

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2. The Big Three restyling their cars on a three-year cycle in the early 1950s ? Huh ? The 1948 Cadillacs were still using the basic body style in 1953 ! Where was Packard going to get the money to retool the 1951 body structure ? What killed Packard was G.M. and Ford mopping up every available sale in 1954, taking conquests from Nash, Hudson, Studebaker, Willys-Jeep, Packard, Kaiser, Chrysler corporate and Pontiac. Yes, each brand needed to field a competitive car, but again the economics of mass automobile manufacturing were already beginning to consolidate. The only true survivors by 1957-1958 were Rambler, Pontiac, Jeep and Chrysler corporate. Except for the Lark and Rambler resurgence, every other make from the independents were wounded mortally, although it took time for the brands to die.

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   • We’re talking about the 1954 Packard’s direct and indirect competition in the premium-priced class. The Buick and Oldsmobile were restyled in 1951 and again in 1954; a three-year cycle. The Mercury was redesigned in 1952 and again in 1955; a three-year cycle. The Chrysler and DeSoto were redesigned in 1953 and again in 1955 (so two years instead of three).

     Among the independents, the big car that was most viable as of 1954 was the Nash Statesman/Ambassador, which was redesigned in 1952 and given a facelift in 1955. Meanwhile, the Kaiser was redesigned in 1951 and given a facelift in 1954. Even Studebaker’s family cars were on a three-year cycle: from 1953-1955. Hudson’s big-car design was kept around the longest — from 1948-1954 — but the step-down wasn’t very competitive in its later years.

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3. There is a good article in The Cormorant from several years ago (I will try to find it) that lays out why sales fell so sharply for ’54. Basically, Packard over-produced for ’53 and had to sell them at a discount and delay the ’54 launch. Estimates of a 10,000 – 20,000 unit sales swing was estimated, if I recall correctly. This is partly why the ’54 sales dropped so much.

   Cadillacs were unchanged from ’50-53 except for switch to long deck on CdV for ’52 and addition of Eldorado for ’53. Roadmaster also stayed the same. Lincoln was on same body shell from ’52-55. Chrysler made an update for ’53-54 and a major for ’55-56, cut short a year to launch the hurried ’57s. GM had a 3-year cycle for ’54-56 and after that is when they started changing more frequently, though the basic body underpinnings were largely carried over from ’59-64 (look at the limo) and again from ’65-70 and possibly to ’76. Lincoln body was supposed to stay pat for ’58 but got pulled into the Wixom program.

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   • Paul, even if you deduct 20,000 units from 1953, Packard would have still seen a 55-percent drop in production for 1954. That would have been one of the largest declines in the industry.

     According to Hamlin and Heinmuller, Nance was trying to reach 135,000 units in 1953 but only topped 90,000 for the model year. Ward stated that even if Packard pushed back introducing the 1954 models to New Year’s Day, that dealers would still have “6,600 old cars and 12,000 to 14,000 new ones on hand.” Nance later admitted that he should have “cut way back” production in April of 1953 (p. 114).

     (I have subsequently added most of this background to the story.)

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4. No question Packard needed to make a grand gesture for ’54, because what they ended up doing really hurt them financially. I don’t think Clipper hurt them. Its sore thumbs added freshness and several inches of needed rear overhang. I think the fundamental problem was that Packard spent its limited funds on the wrong side of the showroom.

   Digging into photo mod archives, here’s an idea. A 127 wb pillared hardtop sedan (WheelsAge, AACA Forum) as part of a new Pacific series that included a similarly styled 122 hardtop coupe (formerly the Panama) and convertible.

   https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/1900476412_1954PackardPacific1274-DoorPillaredHardtop.jpg.c5b2c08a31253dd1a0df7aea20f422ce.jpg

   Two trim levels, the lower being what Panama offered. High trim would go against Cadillac. A version of the 4 door pillared hardtop that had removable B-pillars could have also been offered, likely a low volume car but early in with a 4 door hardtop. New front face for all (WheelsAge, AACA Forum), and all other Packards retired!

   https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/214731858_1954PackardClipperandAlternateGrill.jpg.76894424d082600be0afe024d482ba0d.jpg

   Cathedral taillights could have been added for ’55, perhaps even a wrapped windshield and new I/P. Not sure about the ’55’s starry eyes though. If they couldn’t resist, go with ’55 Clipper’s grill rather than Patrician/Four Hundred’s.

   To give the dealers a little more volume in ’54 perhaps a deal could have been struck with Hudson to supply Jets retrimmed to be a stand-alone Clipper brand. To alliviate the stubby look, rear fenders would be extended to surround a standard rear mount. Might have prompted Barit not to merge with AMC but unlikely (WheelsAge, AACA Forum), so car’s future would have been perilous, if it ever got off the ground in the first place.

   https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/1151756903_1954HudsonJetextendedrearfenders.jpg.0a7d9653b17893de41e158adbc57f429.jpg

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   • Paul, if you don’t think the Clipper hurt Packard in 1954, where else was the automaker going to generate sufficient volume for the Packard factory (a version of the Jet wouldn’t have helped in this regard)?

     In 1953 the Clipper made up 71 percent of Packard’s total production. All of the senior models together only generated around 26,000 units. And given that Lincoln produced under 41,000 units in 1953 — one of its best years in the 1950s — I question how much headroom Packard had in the luxury-car field even if it had much more aggressively tried to go upmarket.

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   • Steve, my mistake in saying Clipper didn’t hurt Packard in ’54. It did, and for me it was because as Clipper went, so went the company, even if its sales dropped no more, as a percentage, than the Cavalier/Patrician body.

     Given that you included an image of a ’55 Clipper, are we to assume that this is the Clipper, minus the V8 and Torsion-Level, that you think Packard should have offered in ’54?

     Mayfair “satisfied a growing demand for sportiness and partially altered the public’s perception of Packard as the car for old folks who drove slowly with the windows up” (Ward, pg. 75). This is why I favor an all-in hardtop-style roof strategy, though the company still needed to deliver low noise levels and no water intrusion (which Mayfair initially suffered from). I was remiss in not adding a pillared 2-door hardtop to the list of Pacific models, as the lowest cost model. Also, perhaps a third trim that was lower in quality than Panama was needed, something akin to the Clipper Deluxe, though I am not sure about this because lower trim models eroded Packard’s reputation.

     The Buick and Cadillac markets in the early 50s showed keen interest in the 52/72/62 sedans’ greater rear legroom versus 50/70/61. For Packard, total Cavalier/Patrician body sales went from a little over 5K in ’54 to a little over 9K in ‘55, and the ’55s were all the higher priced Patricians. Had a ’55 Cavalier with T-L been offered, the increase might have been appreciably higher. All of this leads me to believe that Packard should have offered a 4-door only on the 127 wb, and booked the savings from reduced plant complexity and vehicle tooling. Had Packard focused on efficiently producing two basic bodies, the pillared 122 hardtop coupe and pillared 127 hardtop sedan, and on making their bodies as efficiently as Clipper had been made, and created off-line derivatives (pillarless hardtops and a convertible), and had all these cars driven strong pricing because of their improved appeal, then the factory breakeven could have been significantly reduced. Cadillac and Lincoln currently generate incredible profits from their large SUVs even though sales of those vehicles are not particularly high.

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     • Paul West, In your comment, you said: “I was remiss in not adding a pillared 2-door hardtop to the list of Pacific models, as the lowest cost model. Also, perhaps a third trim that was lower in quality than Panama was needed, something akin to the Clipper Deluxe, though I am not sure about this because lower trim models eroded Packard’s reputation”.

       Were you perhaps thinking about the Clipper Deluxe Sportster when you mentioned a pillared 2-door hardtop in the Deluxe range? That would be the model 5497, and has always been one of the rarest ’54 Clipper models, with only 1,336 produced and less than a half dozen known to PAC. While it wasn’t a Pacific or Panama because it was actually a 2-door sedan, from what I understand it was a late production change to encourage sales of the Clipper Deluxe 2-door cars. I had a customer in the 1980s who owned one, a light green one with dark green roof.

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       • Bill, I was not thinking of the Sportster in that specific sense, instead was looking at both the higher price of Panama ($3125) versus Super Club Sedan ($2765) and Deluxe Sportster ($2830), and Panama’s higher weight (3805 lbs vs 3610 and 3595 lbs). The extra ~200 lbs presumably represented additional frame bracing to compensate for the loss of body stiffness due to lack of B-pillar (and perhaps less strength in the A-pillar). Adding a B-pillar would have likely reduced some or most of that weight, which would have reduced cost and allowed the car to be more affordably priced. A B-pillar might also have appealed to some 2-door buyers who hadn’t bought into the hardtop scene.

         I should note that my what-if assumes that a certain number of Packard buyers were intent on buying a Packard no matter what its starting price was, provided that that price was not completely out of reach. That said, my suggestion to go all-in on the sore thumb, hardtop-style theme is just one approach. There are many ways that Packard might have improved its 1954 profitability. I’d be interested in hearing other suggestions.

       • All that said, the proposed 2-door pillared hardtop would have been an awesome Sportster, so let’s call it that!

       • I’m confused about the concept of a two door pillared hardtop. Is this with the door a true frameless hardtop but with a permanent b pillar, that was popular in the mid 70s? I saw a picture of a Clipper deluxe sportster online, and it seems to me to be a straightforward 2 door pillared sedan.

     • Paul, I included a picture of the 1955 Clipper only to suggest that there was a lot of potential for updating the basic body — particularly in the front end. I could see a more incremental approach to change, such as adding the wrap-around windshield in 1955.

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5. Paul,
   My opinion is that the club coupe Clippers took sales away from the Panama, and that the company should have limited the 2 door Clipper line to the Sportster and the Panama, with the sedans covering the low end price ranges.

   By the time 1954 rolled into place, Packard was terribly boxed-in in regards to quickly adapting processes and ideas that would provide immediate financial gains. It wasn’t possible to introduce the new 1955 cars early [like the 1964 1/2 Ford Mustangs] because let’s face it, Packard was having a hard time ramping up production at Connor Ave as it was. The December ’53 sale of Briggs to Chrysler sure did put a hurt on PMCC at a time when it could least afford it.

   I’ve collected about every known Packard piece of literature, and when comparing the 1954 paper products with the V8 paper products, there is one hell of a difference. In my opinion the 1954 brochures, especially the senior cars, was very lackluster. Dull. They were still creating ads and dealer hand-outs like they did for the 24th series cars. Comparing Packard brochures with Cadillac and Lincoln brochures did little to bring potential buyers into the Packard showrooms. They needed a serious ramping up of paperwork as came about for 1955.

   Refusing to sell higher profit cars to dealers:
   PMCC had a habit of deciding how many of certain models and body styles a dealer could expect be sent to them, based on prior year’s sales. For example, if a dealer sold 4 convertibles in 1953, and only one was a Caribbean, they would only be allowed 1 Caribbean for 1954. Case-in-point; I interviewed the owner of what had been Covington Packard, located just a few miles outside of Washington DC, in what was [and still is] one of the wealthiest areas on the east coast; Bethesda-Chevy Chase, MD. When I interviewed him in the mid 1970s he said he could have sold 10 times the number of Caribbeans than he was allowed, yet he was denied the ability to place the orders. He said he had plenty of Clippers that sat on the lot, and yet they kept sending more, when it was the senior cars his clients wanted.

   GM and FoMoCo had the clout and ability to dictate how many cars the dealers were obligated to buy. If Cadillac told a dealer In Minneapolis, MN they had to buy 5 Eldorado convertibles, they had little choice. The dealer would be left with finding other dealers in warmer climes who were willing to buy the convertibles. Ford had seriously increased the policy of “dumping” cars at dealers about 1952, and GM quickly did the same. “You’re the dealer, you’ve got the job of selling what we send you, so do it!”

   Showroom traffic: “Selling the sizzle”
   In the 1950s and ’60s Cadillac management wanted an Eldorado in the showrooms, because it often lead to selling the Cadillac sedan next to it. While not impossible to find, it’s rare to see a photo of a Packard showroom with a Caribbean on display. Another thing that hurt Packard was many of their dealers had room for only one or 2 cars in the showroom, and if that dealer sold other brands in addition to Packards, sometimes there wasn’t room for a Packard inside. In the early 1950s PMCC wasn’t being aggressive enough in getting dealers to expand their premises, something that the big 3 was insisting on happening.

   I used to have my shop in the former Spaulding Desoto-Plymouth facility in Poplar Springs, MD. It was a very rural location, yet Mr. Spaulding said in 1955 Chrysler basically forced him to enlarge the showroom from a 2 car to a modern 8 car facility, requiring him to build a new building next to the existing one. For comparison, Zell Motors, the Packard dealer for Baltimore, had a 2-room showroom set-up, and could hold no more than 2 cars per room.

   In the early 1970s I was using an old Studebaker-Packard master dealer’s list to hunt down former dealers in the mid-Atlantic area. I was amazed at how many locations were still single or 2 car sized showrooms, most were no longer in automotive use, but the buildings were still there, often selling auto parts or home appliances. Let’s face it — If you are trying to sell upscale luxury goods, you need to look the part. Many Packard dealer locations I found just didn’t appear luxurious and successful, even for 1956.

   You can’t have the sizzle if the skillet’s cold.

   It’s always the same story, you have to spend money to make more money. From what former long-time dealers told me, PMCC’s lack-luster products up thru 1954 made it risky to expand. And by 1955 it was too late. Curtiss-Wright would steal the defense contracts and walk away. I’ve often wondered what PMCC would have been like if Jim Nance had come into the picture 2 years earlier.

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   • Bill, your assessment of the sales end of Packard’s business in these years is incredibly enlightening, thanks for sharing. Didn’t realize the dealership buildings were in such bad condition and the company was actually undermining dealers’ efforts to sell cars! This is not how Packard had operated in its heyday and they needed to find there way back.

     Far from being a hopeless case, there is so much that we can contemplate regarding Packard’s product options in these years. For all of Packard’s fixation on GM they missed something that actually might have helped: copying Fleetwood. In this time period Fleetwood made the 60 Special, 75 and 1953 Eldorado. It was basically a mass-production facility with semi-custom capability. For example, if one looks at the long fender skirts of the 60 Special it is pretty obvious that Fleetwood started with a standard 62 rear fender, cut it vertically above the skirt and added length (9 inches in ’50-53, 11 inches in ’54-56). They also appear to have built up 75’s body using many stock parts, such as the 61 coupe’s rear fenders trimmed several inches at its forward end. Packard likely could have set up an off-line area in Conner’s massive space to do such things. Briggs basically did just that when it built the long wheelbase 8-pass cars in 1948-50. Probably the convertibles and possibly the Mayfair hardtop were also built that way. There was no reason to go the Ionia to build up the Caribbean or to stop at a convertible. A hardtop coupe and pillared hardtop 127 wb sedan were also within Packard’s reach, as was pricing closer to CdV and 60 Special.

     Circling back to my current proposal, here are two Sportsters, latest thinking being that there could have been two series, Panama and Pacific. Panama would be the entry and use the side trim that the Clipper Special had used, and a painted B-pillar. Pacific would get full side trim and a chrome-covered B-pillar.

     1954 Packard Panama Sportster:
     https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/1848506030_1954PackardPanama1222-DoorSportster.jpg.07ac3ce08059f4f1a72ce6b3efc48b71.jpg

     1954 Packard Pacific Sportster:
     https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/2140229458_1954PackardPacific1222-DoorSportster.jpg.ad31635786d3f34ebc425417c99c3bf5.jpg

     For the 4-door cars a new 127 wb hardtop-style roof would have been needed, tooling cost offset somewhat by not needing to tool a new Patrician/Cavalier one-piece backlight and modify the rear part of it roof to extend downward several inches. It would have been fairly straightforward to build out a showroom using the basic 122 2-door and 127 4-door cars. (WheelsAge, AACA Forum).

     1954 Packard Showroom:
     https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/420870017_1954PackardLine-Up.jpg.f488211ea8a6abc01d3bdcc0588f5a2d.jpg

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   • Because the 127 car’s roof would have been new tooled for the proposed ’54 strategy, it could have been stamped full in the rear of enable the Sport Brougham included in the showroom image. I show the car’s details here to point out a major shortcoming of the strategy: an excessively wide B-pillar (WheelsAge, AACA Forum).

     https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/1624256729_1954PackardPacific1274-DoorSportBrougham.jpg.8138cb1b578a49d96dd0f78ec0b2aeb6.jpg

     Cadillac made an astonishing change to the ’55 60 Special to thin its B-pillar (Old Car Brochures):

     http://oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Cadillac/1955_Cadillac/1955_Cadillac_Brochure/1955%20Cadillac-04.html

     Because the 62 sedan did not receive the change I must conclude that it was Fleetwood alone that was able to accommodate Studio. They didn’t bother changing 75, I suspect because it wasn’t necessary on that type of car and/or the optional division window was designed to fasten to the wider pillar.

     For Packard, perhaps moving the door latch striker down to a point below where the window rolled down would have enabled a wider front window/narrower B-pillar. It would have involved real determination on Packard’s part to strive for maximum style and minimal blind spots but they could probably have afforded it had they focused on one theme supporting two bodies, instead of throwing money in every direction on too many insignificant changes.

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     • Paul, I’ve also owned & worked on Cadillacs too, and I’ve had both a ’55 and a ’56 60s, and having restored both, I can tell you these were not cut and lengthened 62 sedans, they were actually longer body parts with specific part numbers. For the series 75 cars, I’ve had several in my shop for repairs or restoration, and based on the Cadillac master parts book [1941 to 1959] and examining how the cars were originally assembled, it’s clear that the series 75 cars used specifically made parts and not modified existing sedan body shell parts.

       The 22nd and 23rd series Packard LWB cars were not made by Briggs, they were made by Henney, but the company never got the credit. Henney also made the ’53 and ’54 Packard LWB cars, and utilized the rear quarters, 1/4 windows and rear window of the Clipper 2-door body. They grafted the senior Packard taillights onto the Clipper fenders.
       Packard plans were to utilize Henney for it’s custom work, However Henney had been poorly managed and was literally so broke that Packard had to front the company money, to complete the last of the 1954 LWB cars. With the adaptation of the torsion level suspension, it wasn’t possible to create LWB cars for ’55, so Henney and Packard parted ways. As for a comparable facility like Fleetwood, GM had the finances to support a semi-custom shop, Packard did not, and Henney was gone.

       Let’s look at what happened to Cadillac [and other larger GM makes like Buick] in the 1946 to 1950 time period. Packard’s President George Christopher wanted increased production figures, and the smaller Packards used less materials to build than the larger cars, yet it was the larger cars that had a far more generous profit level.

       Cadillac on the other hand, concentrated on building the more expensive cars, because the executives knew they could sell ANY car they built over those immediate postwar years, so why not sell cars with more profit per unit? Packard hurt their own bottom line, and image as a luxury car builder, by following Christopher’s lead.

       I will endeavor to take a closer look at the wonderful photos you included for the 1954 Packard prototypes, and then try to respond, as I think they show merit as to some of the possibilities that existed.

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     • Glad you see some promise in the images, Bill.

       Am curious where you heard that Henney built the 22nd and 23rd Series (’48-50) Packard LWB cars. All the literature says production moved from Henney, which built the ’46-47 lwb cars, to Briggs for those cars.

       For the ’53-54 Henney lwb cars’ rear fenders, I think it involved more than grafting Senior taillights onto the Junior’s rear fenders. That simple procedure was what Packard did to make the ’54 Pacific. But the Henney cars appear to use Senior fenders from pretty much above the skirts and back. I say this because those fenders are shaped differently than the Juniors along the top and in back. They are taller and more creased as they approach and surround the taillights, and they have a bulge extended onto the fenders.

       Kimes’ book went into detail about Henney’s ’51-54 arrangement with Packard. According to that boo, Henney’s big mistake was tooling the shorter ’53 Junior commercial vehicle on 127 wb and promising to municipalities and other potential customers a price in the low $3,000s, but at production start realized that they needed to charge in the high $3,000s to make a profit, and ended up losing many potential customers as a result. It was a simple case of poor advanced product planning. Also, Packard was not happy with the fact that Henney was chronically late in delivering the 149 wb 8-pass sedans and limos, and their cost was too high to compete with Cadillac. It was Henney that finally pulled the plug on vehicle builds, the Junior commercial car’s tooling costing them dearly. Kimes’ did mention that Torsion-Level was not an issue and could have been adapted for ’55.

       On those Cadillac rear fenders, is it possible that more than one stamping welded together can constitute a part sold to customers? I ask because on those 60 Specials, while the ’50-53s long fender skirts vs 62 could be dismissed as simply Studio preferring a longer look, the ’54-56 are clearly longer on the rear portion of the skirt than the front. Why in the world would Studio execute such an unaesthetic design? The only think I can attribute it to is because they were ordered to, 62’s rear fenders being cut vertically above the skirts, 11 inches of continuous section fender was added, and only 4 of those inches were to compensate for the 4 inch longer longer wheelbase versus 62. The rest – 7 inches – was to accommodate the 7 longer rear overhang, and it was added to the rear of the skirt. Frankly, I would be shocked to learn that Cadillac tooled an entirely new set of rear fenders for a lower volume car when they could have simply tooled an 11 inch continuous section and used it on both sides of the car, and tooled a new set of longer fender skirts.

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       • Paul,
         I’m not the final expert on things Packard, so I may well be mistaken, I will consult with the local Packard guru with the initials GH and see what he says.

         The Henney cars used their own in-house rear fenders for the commercial vehicles, but I had heard years ago that the rear quarters on the limo were highly modified clipper 2-door quarters.

         About the longer Cadillac rear fenders; I can only talk with reference to the 1955 and ’56 cars, as I have not owned or worked on the earlier cars. In stripping down the rear fenders to bare metal, I know we never saw any evidence of welding panels together, and I know those 2 years had a separate part number for the longer fenders used in the 60s. That said, I know that the 60s was a longer wheelbase.

         I’m told that [at least for the 1954-56 cars] GM wanted Cadillac’s more expensive models like the 60s to be “longer” while not going to the expense of making the passenger cabin longer. Starting in 1954, the series 62 was back to the 133″ wheelbase, same as the 60s. It was cheaper simply to create new longer rear fender stampings along with longer trunk floor & lid, while still touting how roomy the passenger space is, and at the same time advertising the huge increase in luggage room. GM also used the longer rear body section on the Buick Roadmaster and [I think] the Olds 98.
         When considering the cost of production, it can actually be cheaper to tool up a new fender than start modifying existing panels that necessitate additional manual labor to assemble, weld and lead over the seams. If it takes 150 hours to create tooling for a panel, or 1/2 hour per panel to make the modifications [1 hour per car], and production is planned for 3,000 cars, the diemakers will be making the tooling.

         I’m no where near an expert on Cadillac or GM, but from the Fisher Body and Fleetwood films I’ve seen over the years, I’m pretty sure Fleetwood wasn’t assembling the steel bodies, they were mostly trimming & assembling the interiors once Fisher was finished building and painting the body shells. Postwar Fleetwood films I’ve seen don’t show evidence of any metalworking.

         As to Cadillac offering an assembled rear fender skin for the 1954 and newer 60s, I’m sure that’s possible, but I don’t see any evidence suggesting that. Was it done for the previous cars? I haven’t got a clue! I think that’s a question for Cadillac parts suppliers who have seen NOS rear 60s fenders.

       • Bill, your eyewitness testimony – which is as good a perspective as one could hope for! – compelled me to take a closer look at the fenders on a ’55 62 sedan and ’55 60 Special. My conclusion is that 60 Special’s fenders were the ones that were tooled, and the 62 sedan’s were derived from it by trimming the forward end. To reduce 62’s scrap they may have fed a shorter piece of sheet metal into the press. For both cars there is a minor downward curve around the skirt as the fender meets the rear door, which could have been accommodated by tooling the fender fuller in that area to leave sheet metal to trim. If all of this is true it would perfectly both the lack of weld seams and the odd shape of 60 Special’s skirts.

         Interestingly, CdV has 60 Special’s longer rear fenders and deck but 62’s shorter skirts. Perhaps the planners felt that volumes had become sufficiently high to justify this.

         I also looked at a ’53 62 sedan and 60 Special to see if they employed this potential strategy. It’s hard to say without putting a straight edge on top of the fender bulge of a 60 Special to see if it is flat or has a curve. Visually it appears that it could be flat, but might not be.

         Here are the dimensions for the ’54 Cadillacs, including lengths and wheelbases. The 60 Special did indeed go back to the 133 wb after using 130 from ’50-53. The 62s show a 129 wb, maintaining the 4 inch shorter length that Cadillac used for ’50-53, when the 62s were on a 126 chassis. Your comment about the 60 Special getting longer for ’54 is clearly shown, it now being 11 inches longer than ’62 rather than ’50-53’s nine inches longer.

         http://www.oldcarbrochures.com/static/NA/Cadillac/1954%20Cadillac/1954%20Cadillac%20Brochure/b_1954%20Cadillac%20Brochure-35-36.jpg

     • Come to think of it, those Caddy 60 Special rear fenders might not have even needed a new tooled 11 inch section, had the stamping plant simply used two shorter pieces of sheet metal, the first to stamp the front half of the fender, the second to stamp the rear half, and both with 5-1/2 inches of overlap. Weld them together and bingo, an 11 inch longer fender.

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       • “My conclusion is that 60 Special’s fenders were the ones that were tooled, and the 62 sedan’s were derived from it by trimming the forward end. To reduce 62’s scrap they may have fed a shorter piece of sheet metal into the press.”

         This is actually fairly common in the industry. For example, the Studebaker Champ pick-up roof panel was formed from a shortened sheet using the sedan’s roof tooling, then forming the back edge thru a different set of dies to create the finished edge.

         I remember about 1988 visiting a Leyland plant [in Oxford?] that made 4 different size cars on the same assembly line, and seeing a 4 section carousel that would allow the various different size panels to be installed, using different sized panels struck in the same dies, but based on the size of the flat sheet stock placed into the dies. [Hope that makes sense!]

   • Bill, thank you for offering such detailed information about Packard’s dealer network. Could it be that by the early-postwar period that an automaker of Packard’s size simply didn’t have the scale to compete effectively as a luxury-car brand?

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     • Steve,
       Rolls-Royce built less than 2,000 Silver Wraiths over 13 years ending in 1958, and at a profit. But then again, they didn’t lose their customer base and never really went for the lower price market. Even when they tried to sell a “cheaper” car [the silver Dawn] it was still expensive, selling a total of 700 cars over about 4 years. But again, it was going up against the Bentley Mark VI that was identical except for the trademarked parts.

       One of the things we keep dancing around is the fact that on it’s “Merger” with Studebaker, Packard was still profitable, with a financial cushion of around 6 Million Dollars. Had they done their due diligence and discovered Studebaker was in fact hemorrhaging money and cookin’ the books, Packard might have had a chance.

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6. Potential Packard “If only” mergers plan one with seemingly every outfit upscale of Crosley. Perhaps Packard should have looked overseas, not for a merger but for an example. Packard puttered with aero engines off and on from the 20s, and in WWII license built the Rolls Royce Merlin. RR was well into building aero engines since WWI, and I suspect that was where the real money was. Come the technological advances of the 40s, as far as jet engines go. everyone except GE is starting from scratch. Packard could partner with RR building their engines under license for the US market, and maybe, just maybe, learning something which they didn’t do from the Merlin. Using their aerospace experience they could make some truly cutting edge cars, and while they would probably be gone today they probably could have got a decade or two of fine cars before the plug was pulled.

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   • Taking the Rolls Royce example further, could Packard have developed equivalents of the all-alloy 4-litre FB60 IOE Six (if not converted to OHV) and L-Series V8 engines provided it is within that capability to do so?

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     • Lotus Rebel,
       First let me say that I ran a Rolls-Royce service and restoration shop for years, and I’ve owned around 30 R-R and Bentley cars, from a 1932 20/25 Hooper saloon, to a 1985 Silver Spur [one of the 25 “Centennial” models]. I have a great respect for the Marque. Their engines, when properly cared for, will almost run forever.

       In my opinion there is an exception; the B range motor. I’ve also owned 3 Vanden Plas Princess “R cars, 2 US LHD, 1 UK RHD. I’ve also worked on several more. Of the 4,000 “R” cars built, very few have mileage in excess of 50,000. In America, they run hot, overheat, blow head gaskets, and are difficult to make run smoothly. I’ve heard from UK military collectors that the engine was not loved by the guys who repaired the vehicles they were used in.

       If Packard had been asked to re-work the B range engine during wartime duress, I’m certain they could do whatever was needed. But in the 1950s, Packard had very little experience [or success] with alloy engines, one of the reasons they chose to stick with cast iron heads & blocks on the new V8 for 1955. I doubt the automobile division of PMCC would have taken on the challenge, however their defense engine division might have been interested in designing upgraded specs for the engine.

       In the 1950s there were few automobile manufacturers who had a real understanding of all alloy engines when it came to large production figures. I think it took another 30 years for the industry to begin making reliable all alloy engines on a large production scale. It took things like creating the correct anti-freeze solutions to make their cooling systems more reliable.

       As for the new 1959 L series engines, while the early cars did have some problems with valve train issues, the company’s engineering department was successful in quickly solving these problems. The motor is rooted in early 50s designs for cars like the Cloud. I think the Cloud II and III cars were their pinnacle of engine design, and the L motors in the Cloud engine compartment, they are very easy to work with, but that’s not the same when it’s in the Shadow and later cars. As designed, we are talking about a very limited yearly run of engines, with the ability to hand assemble them on a leisurely basis. The L V8 was never intended for a major production run, as the engines DO require a high level of assembly specifications. Could Packard have assembled them in quantity? Of course, providing [as in WW2] they had plenty of money and manpower thrown into the pot.

       I would personally love to have had the opportunity to stick a Cloud III motor in a 1955-’56 senior Packard, but it’s unlikely to happen in my lifetime, especially when you consider the value of a Cloud III motor in excellent condition. I actually considered it 30 years ago when I had a wrecked but running S II and a ’55 Packard 400 with a locked engine, and I also had a 1958 Oldsmobile Hydramatic gearbox that could easily be bolted onto the Cloud engine. That Hydramatic would solve the Hispano brake problem and I could use the Packard power brake system. Never did consider if the Hydramatic would fit into the trans tunnel on the Packard body. When I sold the Bentley engine to Chicago, that ended the fantasy.

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       • Bill McCoskey

         Thanks for the insight.

         With the B range motor out of the question short of a major redesign, were there other templates Packard could have easily followed for suitable Six-cylinder and V8 engines, particularly motors with the ability to form the basis of other engines, have wider applicability for smaller lighter models (including non-Packards) and possess suitable longevity?

         Examples include:

         – 3rd gen Chevrolet Straight-Six, Big Block Chevrolet 153 4-cylinder, Small Block Opel (& Vauxhall) OHV 4-cylinder, (Chevy Six based) Pontiac OHC-6 and SBC V8 plus 90-degree V6

         – Also W.O. Bentley’s 6-cylinder designs for Aston Martin and Armstrong-Siddeley, the latter being essentially a copy of the former that was redesigned into an OHV for production.

         Both would form the basis of 4-cylinder engines via the Aston engined Volvo P1800 and Sapphire 234 as well as V8s. Although the Armstrong-Siddeley V8 prototype (based on two 234 blocks as mentioned in Bill Smith’s book on the marque) never reached production, whereas Tadek Marek played a role in redesigning both the Aston Martin 6-cylinder and developing the V8.

         Fascinated to know what was within Packard’s ability to change at minimum in order to improve their prospects (beyond a slight weight reduction to put the existing Studebaker V8 in a more unfavourable light as there was said to be roughly 25-48 lbs between depending on its configured), since from my admittingly very limited non-US perspective it seems the Packard V8 (and stillborn V8-based V12 mentioned in Karl Ludvigsen’s V12 Engine book) for all their latent capability in terms of displacement come across as a bit of a white elephant due to the circumstances surrounding Packard later Studebaker-Packard.

   • Kim, Studebaker-Packard actually explored the possibility of a special 4-door hardtop sedan in 1958, a very high quality and expensive vehicle. They were in discussion with Jean Deninos of Facel Metallon in Paris, the maker of the Facel-Vega cars. Facel was planning on a new 4-door pillarless hardtop, and the idea was to produce them as a Packard, & import them to America.

     As S-P happened to be the sole importer of Mercedes-Benz cars in North America, M-B realized this new car would have a negative impact on the sale of the big M-B 300 sedans, so they nixed the project.

     Facel went on to build the car as the limited-production Facel-Vega Excellence, a car that could have done well as a Packard. I know, as I used to own 1961 Excellence #101. I actually considered modifying the car into a Packard based on some drawings created for the effort. I didn’t do it, and as the price of Excellence cars skyrocketed, I’m glad I didn’t make the alterations.

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7. I’ve seen the drawings of the Packard-Facel and it is for the best. I don’t know for a fact, but IO suspect that there was probably some crossover parts between Cadillac and senior Olds and Buicks. You know, things like seat motors and the like. It’s never been discussed much, but how much damage did the prewar junior line do to Packard as a whole? Look st the 110, 115, and 120. The same crisp lines on the hood, the beautiful tombstone grille, and graceful lines that would do a 160 or 180 proud. Every inch a Packard. And, available to anyone with a Christmas bonus, a 3 year old Pontiac trade in, and low monthly payments. The quote was from another author whose name I forgot. But hey, when you are trying to make it through the fiscal year, strategy 15 years down the road is the least of your worries. The 1954 Ciipper didn’t do any damage to Packard that wasn’t already done.

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   • Kim, my sense of the auto history literature is that virtually everyone agrees that Packard undercut its luxury-car cachet by going downmarket without using a different brand name. I’m more ambivalent on that point, e.g., Mercedes-Benz made the one-brand approach work.

     I have yet to see advocates of a two-brand strategy convincingly answer a basic question: How could an automaker the size of Packard afford to field two brands that were distinctive enough that it was worth the effort? And if all they could afford was a badge-engineered junior brand, how would that appreciably help? Once Nance spun off the Clipper as a separate brand in 1956, customers rebelled and demanded that Packard scripts be put back on their cars.

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     • Steve and Kim,
       For more than 80 years historians have debated the overall decision to create the junior Packard cars using the same name and trademarks. Most historians today agree that it saved the company for another 20 years, but it did damage the brand’s appeal to a wealthy clientele, damage they were never able to erase. Part of that was due to Christopher’s decision to concentrate limited resources on junior cars after WW2.

       I think Packard should have used their time machine to go forward a few years to see what Cadillac was planning for their cheaper car, the LaSalle. Caddy pulled it off and as overall production numbers rose, they made the correct decision to begin selling a lower priced Cadillac instead of a badge engineered LaSalle. GM also realized the LaSalle was taking away sales from Buick. With the LaSalle gone Buick Senior car production rose, and Buick’s 1941 total production rose about 70,000 over 1940. [And yea, Buick had the Marquette and Olds the Viking, but their numbers are fairly low.]

       Packard didn’t make the same decision, and while it did wonders for production numbers and overall profits, I have always said that once they realized what the LaSalle meant, it was too late to stop the 120 line, but they should have followed Cadillac’s lead in establishing a 6 cylinder line under a different name. [Perhaps the “Ward” car to honor James Ward Packard?]

       Advertise the new 6 as a car built by Packard but at an affordable price. Look at Oakland as an example. GM wanted a cheaper line that still used many Oakland parts, but they wisely called the car “Pontiac”. Sharing the same basic parts allowed Pontiac-Oakland to increase production and profits, keeping Pontiac prices low.

       Prior to WW2, Packard Senior cars were held high regards all over the world. But after the war, with the company’s focus on production of the 6 and 120 lines, the name Packard started it’s serious decline towards the public’s belief the name no longer held the top level of the big 3 P’s [Packard, Pierce Arrow and Peerless].

       And one more thing I forgot to mention in my last comment about Packard failures; Have you guys ever taken a close look at the 1951 and 1952 Packard 2-page Color magazine ads? They often feature the 200 and 250 models, in lackluster colors. Boring ads with boring cars.

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   • Kim,
     As to other possible engines for Packard, remember that the company was already designing the new V8 starting around 1952, when it was still a profitable organization. To consider opting for a non-north American engine would have likely meant the engine having either Whitworth or Metric measurements, and that wasn’t going to be acceptable. Plus, the Packard V8, produced in 320, 352 and 374 cu in sizes, was a very sound engine with one notable exception; they added a manual vacuum pump to the oil pump and a outsourced seal between the 2 sections was found to be unable to withstand the application, but this was quickly solved. The engine was said to be able to have it’s size upped to 400 cu in as well. It’s not uncommon to find V8 Packards that are still running on the original engine, never having been rebuilt.

     Also to consider was the reliability of the Packard straight 8 motor. They are so inherently balanced, that I can balance a US 5 cent coin ON EDGE on top of the cylinder head, while the engine is at idle, and this also includes the cheaper 5 main bearing engine. The 9 main bearing engine, with a cast iron cylinder head, is almost indestructible as long as it’s taken care of and not allowed to run out of oil or coolant.
     Packard had a great set of engines, but the public was enamored with V8 engines and horse power, instead of torque. Packard didn’t need another engine, it simply needed the new V8 a few years earlier.

     And Paul, You are correct. I checked with my top Packard expert, and he reminded me I had indeed forgotten the company had the 22nd and 23rd series LWB cars built by Briggs, as Henney was too backed up with the pent-up demands for Hearses and Ambulances. Yea, I was mistaken. I plead the 5th due to my brain forgetting too much stuff, now that I’m getting old!

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     • Bill, you are clicking on all cylinders sharing your vast knowledge. Please keep doing so.

       Never knew why Briggs took over the build, now I do. It’s a reminder that Briggs did indeed have the ability to build lwb cars. Why didn’t they get the work for the ’53 lwb cars? If ’48-50 was any guide, their pricing would have been much lower than Henney.

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8. Paul, my [pure speculation] hunch is that Briggs would not be interested in the order because it was for only 150 cars. Not enough production to allow amortization of setup expenses. When the agreement was made for the 1948 LWB cars, not only did it include the Super 8 and the Custom 8 LWB cars, but also the LWB taxicabs for New York and other cities.

   And yes, one of those LWB taxicabs has been rescued from a junkyard and is now being restored. It is probably the rarest surviving production post-war Packard. I used to have a 2286 Packard 6-cylinder Taxicab [1 of 3 known], but it burned in my big fire back in 1995. Until I found my Taxi in 1972, it was widely believed in PAC that Packard never actually made any 22nd series Taxicabs. I have lots of Packard Taxi stories, but those are for another day.

   And while the year end figures would show there was plenty of production room at Briggs, I suspect Packard and Briggs were expecting a large production run like the prior year. And Henney, desperate for a LWB car to match the Hearses it was selling, probably bid too low. Remember, for Henney the 2 main makes of competition came from Cadillac and Oldsmobile, and both Makes had matching LWB cars, something that funeral home directors desire*. Cadillac with the Fleetwood 75, and Oldsmobile offering a LWB car alongside the Comet Coach/Cotner Bevington line of hearses, but I’m not sure exactly when they started making them.

   * Funeral homes are fussy about consistency and everything in it’s place. To their way of thinking, NOT having matching limousines for your hearse suggested your home was of lesser standing.

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9. Bill, AFAIK the Packard Merlin used SAE compatible parts. My feeling is Packard should have started on an OHV V8 long before 1952. The straight 8 was magnificent, but you need to sell sizzle, not steak. It was my intent that they build on the aero engine technology, not copy Rolls auto engines for auto use. Come out with Packard’s new “Merlin” V8 when the memory of the aircraft engine is fresh in everyone’s mind and stealing a few years on the competition was my intent.

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10. Steve, yes Packard built the Merlin to SAE standards, and at least for the war effort, SAE was the primary standard used by the Allies.

    I absolutely agree the company should have begun the V8 project in early 1948. Prior to that date, the Packard straight eight [all 3 versions] was considered an up-to-date motor for a luxury car, plenty of torque needed to move heavy cars. However as we all know, things can change fast, and once Caddy had the 331 OHV, Imperial the Hemi, and Lincoln the 279 OHV “Y” motor, Packard was quickly labeled as behind the curve. Other than the Big 3, no one in the industrial engine manufacturing business had a modern V8 capable of being used in a Packard. Buying something from Europe would suggest the company didn’t have the engineering capability anymore, and that was far from the truth.

    As for the value of building on the memory of the Merlin, I really don’t think that was on the minds of potential Packard buyers in the early 1950s. During the war, Packard only published a couple of magazine ads touting the miracle of building the Merlin engines, and it really wasn’t widely known to the car buying public. Once the war was history, American advertising generally avoided anything relating to the war. People were looking forward, and really didn’t want to be reminded of what they went thru. I’ve spent 50 years analyzing American magazine advertising in the post-war years. It was a fast paced time, few adverts were “looking back” to the 1940s, most of the ads reflecting older traditions, focused on the pre-depression years. The few ads mentioning the Korean conflict were usually for companies suppling military supplies or materials.

    As for the sizzle, Packard never went for the sizzle until Jim Nance took over. On his appointment, Nance couldn’t get the stove fired up fast enough to make things sizzle!

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    • Bill, I agree that Nance shook Packard out of its complacency in key ways. The challenge for such a small automaker is that it couldn’t afford to keep up with the Big Three’s type of “sizzle,” which was grounded in planned obsolescence. Packard simply didn’t have the money to restyle its cars as frequently and extensively. Nor could Packard have kept up with the horsepower race. That wasn’t just because Studebaker proved to be such a weak partner — even a grand merger would have resulted in Packard struggling to keep up.

      Nance didn’t understand that a small automaker that spends money like a big one is eventually going to go out of business. And that’s exactly what happened.

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      • Steve, sometimes I think the entire debacle fell apart in 1954 with the death of but ONE MAN — George Mason. He had shepherded Romney into position to operate Nash/Kelvinator and Hudson, and brought Nance on board for S-P. Then he promptly died!

        Both Nance and Romney said they were the Heir-Apparent to combine them all into the giant 4 way manufacturer with Studebaker at the low end, then Nash and Hudson, and Packard at the luxury end. It might have been grand, had it actually happened. But neither Nance or Romney were willing to play second fiddle.

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        • Bill, a number of historians challenge the perspective that a grand merger died with Mason. Charles K. Hyde (2009) blamed it on a Mason and Nance disagreeing as to who would head the new company. Patrick Foster (2017) argued that Nance talked the Packard board out of approving a three-way merger with Nash and Hudson. James Ward wrote that Mason’s proposal for Packard to join AMC “was lost in Packard’s and Studebaker’s rush to embrace” (1995, p. 150).

      • And that is the dilemma. Spend the money you’ll go broke. Don’t spend the money you’re left in the dust. I’m somewhat of a Supermarine Spitfire buff, so in my little world the Merlin is a big deal. Thanks for cluing me in on the mood of the car buying public during the post war era.

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        • Kim, as both a Packard & Rolls-Royce enthusiast, I agree the Merlin was [and still is] a big deal, between the 2 companies they really pushed the limits of what a piston engine fighter plane could accomplish.

          In the late 1980s while visiting Duxford, I had an unexpected & last minute invite to go up in a Spitfire trainer, and every second of that all-to-brief experience is embedded in my memory. And about a year later, across the pond I attended a RROC meet where a member brought a Merlin engine mounted to a substantial trailer. They used multiple truck axles driven into the ground, and strapped the trailer securely to the earth before starting the Merlin [complete with prop]. Wow, what an incredible show of pure power!

          One of my big regrets is when I befriended Lucky Mehalchik who owned a huge military surplus yard outside Ft. Dix in New Jersey, and knowing of my passion for Packard & Rolls-Royce, offered me my CHOICE of any complete surplus and never used Packard-built Merlin engines, for $1,500. This was in January 1972, I was a PFC at Dix, and simply didn’t have the money. Lucky had at least 100 of them, along with another building holding dozens of Packard M2500 PT boat motors, all unused surplus.

      • I think Steve put his finger on a key element: “Nance didn’t understand that a small automaker that spends money like a big one is eventually going to go out of business. And that’s exactly what happened.”

        Prior to joining Packard in May, 1952, Nance had a year to think about what he would do as President. Did he seek council from former auto executives? Did he ask Packard to let him see what it was planning for ’53? Did he ask them to let him make recommendations? It was they who wanted him, so he had a certain amount of leverage. What does appear to be the case is that he arrived on Day 1 intent on directing the company to make a separate Clipper brand. This when the company couldn’t even make a compelling Packard brand!

        The 54th Series (1951) was Packard’s last great opportunity to hit the reset button, and it seems to me that a fundamental problem with their planning was that it focused first on a Buick competitor (the 200), then tried to create a Cadillac competitor from it (the 300/400), rather than starting with a Cadillac competitor and trying to take it down, in its lowest trims, to Buick. They needed one great 4-door and one great 2-door, both with greenhouse derivatives (2-door hardtop and convertible, 4-door Formal). And they needed to try to do what the designers proposed, pay attention to Hudson’s step-down floorpan, and pay attention to Italian grill designs, particularly Farina. Though a nice design in a generic sense, Contour’s grill did not communicate a brilliant, must-own 1951 Packard.

        Regarding Mason, I would just add that creating a successful Big 4th would have been 1/10th forming the company and 9/10ths developing winning products after it was formed. In that respect, Mason represented 1/10th of what a successful Big 4th would have needed. Where was the other 9/10ths going to come from? Nance? Barit? Romney? Hoffman and Vance? Seems a few important tenths would have been missing, and was there a designer truly up to the task?

        Kim – I looked at the Pontiacs… your right!!!

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        • Paul, I have added a graph with Packard’s production from 1948-56. Senior Packards are those cars that competed in the upper reaches of the premium-priced market and luxury-car market. Throughout the post-war period the junior Packards, which were positioned in the middle of the premium-priced class, sold upwards of 70 percent of the automaker’s total volume.

          The peak year for the senior Packards was 1951, when fewer than 30,000 units were produced. That year Cadillac produced roughly 110,000 units and Lincoln almost 33,000 units.

          It may be also helpful to know that Imperial’s all-time-peak year of production was in 1957, when it almost hit 38,000 units. During the 1950s Lincoln’s top year was 1956, when it reached 56,000 units. Cadillac utterly dominated the luxury-car market, but from 1949 to 1954 the brand hovered between 100,000 to 110,000 units.

          If you take a look at the price graph I added, you can see that in 1951 Lincoln’s pricing strategy didn’t look all that different from Packard’s — the brand had a major presence in the premium-priced field and did not compete directly with Cadillac in the upper reaches of the luxury-car class.

          I have added this information to cultivate a more granular discussion about how Packard could have sold enough cars to break even if it had moved upmarket in 1951.

        • Paul, You are correct, as with all the production efforts under Christopher, the 24th series focused FIRST on the junior cars, with the senior versions almost as an afterthought. While the 1951 Patrician was plush, it was not as luxurious as the 22nd & 23rd Custom 8 sedans.

          One of the earliest Nance sponsored changes was the hiring of interior designer Dorothy Draper for the 25th series cars. Finally the insides of Packards started to resemble upscale GM cars. One of the best ideas the company had was to stop using the huge 356 super 8 engine, and create a new 9-main bearing 327 motor that was physically the same size as the 5 main bearing 288. All the engines even used the same head gasket. This standardization allowed Reinhart to combine the entire model line to one set of front end sheet metal, and since there was still a difference in wheelbase, the senior lines could have a more luxurious, longer back seat area. One of the complaints the 22nd and 23rd series Custom 8 owners made was the interior dimensions of the Custom 8 sedan was identical to the standard 8.

          As for the contour cars grill assembly, I never liked it, except for the rare NOS versions I sold, only then did I like it, ’cause of the prices they brought! The 51 & 52 grills [and plating in general] suffered from a restriction in copper and nickel during the Korean war. This meant those cars had plated parts that were painted with clear lacquer, however that quickly flaked or was rubbed away, leaving the porous chrome plating that allowed water to fill the tiny air bubbles in the potmetal castings, leading to the dreaded “pitting” we know so well. I’ve seen a photo of a 1952 250 being traded in on a new 55 Clipper, and it’s easy to see the severe pitting in the grill, where the front corners of the hood meet the grill.

          Are you aware the original 1941 Clipper body shell was still the basis of the Detroit Packard body shell right up until the end in 1956? While most of the exterior panels were changed thru the years, the basic front door opening remained the same size until the V8 windshield made it’s debut. As for the rear door, as part of a bet, I took the left rear door off a 1948 sedan and set it in place in a 1956 Clipper rear door opening, but because the depth of the doors were different, I couldn’t bolt it to the center post. But I did win the bet!

          Mason;
          Packard was drowning from Studebaker’s debt when Packard needed to re-tool for the 1957 models. The big insurance companies were the traditional avenue for automaker’s updating their car lines. However like Christopher, the insurance companies only looked at production figures, and as Studebaker was selling [not sure of the exact figure] something like 7 to Packard’s 1, they would only finance Studebaker’s tooling for mild facelifts until they could get the Lark into production.

          Had Mason prevailed and created a 5 line company [Studie, Nash, Hudson, Clipper & Packard], I suspect the Studebaker losses would have not panicked the insurance companies as much, as they would have seen the planned product lineup where they all shared the same basic chassis design with different wheelbases and exterior trim. That economy of scale was expected to bring back serious profits within 2 years.

          I’ve seen the original venn diagram showing the 5 product lines, however I cannot seem to find it on the internet now, I can only find the one for Studebaker & Packard products where they share various components, but I assume you’ve seen that one.

        • Bill, what I’ve read is that the same insurance companies that denied Nance’s proposal agreed to additional funding for AMC. Simply put, Romney had the more viable plan.

        • Bill, hour comment about the Clipper’s inner structure being carried over is… incredible! Are folks at PAC aware?

          Steve, thanks for including that data, is very helpful.

          Regarding the 1951 Packard alternative showroom, am not suggesting a move far upmarket in price, more a move upmarket in vehicle size, to the extent that larger size is associated with higher-priced, more luxurious cars. Here’s the scenario:

          In the early part of Q4 1950 as it was about to commence tooling for the 122 wb 200 2 and 4-door sedans, with the 300/400 sedan trailing by three months, Packard should have first taken a read on Buick and Cadillac’s early sales of its all-new ’51 models. Had it done this it would have discovered that Buick’s longer 52 sedan was tracking at a 2:1 sales ratio over its shorter 51 sedan, and Cadillac’s versions of these cars were seeing an almost 3:1 ratio in favor of the longer car. The market was signaling its preference for generous rear legroom in these price classes and GM had done Packard a big favor by demonstrating it, had Packard been wise enough to take advantage of it.

          To get that read, if no monthly industry reports were available then Packard would have needed to get the word out to its dealers to reach out to sales people at nearby Buick and Cadillac dealers, buy them a drink and talk to them about the reception that their cars were getting, and also reach out to people who bought one of the cars to ask why they did. Good dealers were good at social networking.

          With feedback in hand, Packard’s leaders should have felt compelled to ask: “Why are we leading with a 51/61-sized car if the similar-sized Buicks and Cadillacs are selling in far fewer numbers compared to their larger cars? In fact, why do we even need to tool the shorter sedan? Why don’t we just offer a de-contented version of our planned 300 and call it a 200? Given the better manufacturing scale we will achieve, we can probably offer it within a hundred dollars of what the 122 sedan would have been priced at [similar to Buick’s price spread]. The only thing we would need to determine is how far down market we would want to take the trim level [200 Deluxe or standard 200], which would set final pricing. We probably shouldn’t do a standard 200 type interior anymore, but let’s do the analysis.”

          There would also have been the question of whether to tool one or two rear fenders/taillights, of which the Junior style would be used for the 200 and 300 to compete with Buick 52 and 72. A good argument could have been made either way, and someone could have also argued that the 400 should get a longer rear overhang, or a least a version with one, pointing out that Engineering and Studio had concluded that the 62 and 60 Special’s rear fenders likely came from a common die set tooled for the 60. The trunk floor would need extended too, as would the end panel between the decklid and backlight.

          The subject would have then turned to the 122 Club Sedan, and here Packard would have known that Cadillac was only offering a hardtop, while Buick’s 50 series included both a fastback coupe and a hardtop, the latter (again per dealer due diligence) handily outselling the former (by better than a 5:1 ratio). Upon this realization, a call would have been made to Studio to get to work – if it hadn’t already – on a hardtop design. Again, the question of fenders would arise, and it is perhaps here where the Junior/Senior fender proliferation might have been shut down, the volumes on the 2-door cars not justifying both styles. The Senior fenders/taillights would rightfully be chosen, given that they would be unique in the market while the Juniors would be an more of an “any” design.

          Yet another question would arise regarding which wheelbase to put the 2-door cars on. Retain the planned 122 wb or move to the 127? If the latter, would the hardtop roof be 5 inches longer or would some or all of that difference be added to the end panel? Cadillac appears to have done the latter. Let’s assume that Packard stuck with the 122 because the theme was already complete and work on the inner structure was well along, only needing reshaped to reflect Senior fenders. Most importantly, Briggs’ commitment to building the hardtop would need to be absolute, doing it as efficiently as the cancelled Club Sedan would have been.

          With the 122 hardtop coupe now in the program, issues with the convertible’s business case would go away and it would become a permanent part of the program. Discussion of a 3-passenger Business Coupe would have never happened.

          The last box to check would have been the fate of the long wheelbase 8-passenger car. There wouldn’t have been a Club Sedan to base it on, only a hardtop, so it’s build would have become more expensive. Also, Packard’s lwb sales had collapsed in 1949-50. Despite a brief attempt in early 1950 by Henney, the Packard/Henney team never figured out how to offer a lwb car for 1951. It wasn’t until Nance arrived that the 149 car was green-lighted, and in retrospect it was largely because Nance was green, because there certainly wasn’t any green to be made – not by Packard, anyway. To move them, Packard ended up having to price them at cost.

          Here’s an alternative approach to an ultra-luxurious Formal Car for 1951: do to the standard 127 wb sedan the opposite of what the 122 wb convertible did to the 122 wb hardtop coupe. That car opened passengers up to the outside, so for the Formal Car close them in. Where the convertible gave them a view, in the Formal Car take that view away – and onlookers’ view of them. Where the convertible gave them fresh air when it was warm outside, in the Formal Car give them air-conditioned air. Where the convertible reduced rear seat comfort by narrowing the seat to package the folding top, in the Formal Sedan increase comfort by including headrests and enabling the seatbacks to recline. Make a division window optional.

          How to build the car: call Derham, right? Wrong! The only way to minimize the asking price and earn a handsome profit would have been for Briggs to modify the standard sedan’s body, and do so the way the modified the hardtop to create the convertible. In fact, the convertible’s decklid and inner structure in the trunk area would form the basis of the car. This is because the convertible used its own approximately five-inch shorter decklid, which freed up space to enable the top to fold down without reducing rear legroom. The decklid was either new-tooled or trimmed from a standard decklid. Same with the decklid inner structure. The hinges were mounted further rearward on the wheel housings. The net effect was an open space to package the folding top, and it is this space that the Formal Car’s rear seatbacks would have reclined 5 inches into.

          On the exterior a new rear roof panel would need to be tooled and welded to the existing roof, and a small backlight would need tooled unless the center part of the 3-piece backlight could have been trimmed by the supplier. To save on finishing the roof weld seam to Class A, the entire roof could have been covered in padded leather or other material typical of the day. Of benefit, this would have reduced interior noise.

          In a study that I am doing for the ’53 line-up I created this image to depict the Formal Car. I removed the chrome stone guards for a cleaner look. (BestCarMagazine, AACA Forum)

          https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/1931726931_1953PackardPatricianTouringSedanandPatricianFormalCar.jpg.f326509d48e773fbdb4e28d08803e76b.jpg

          Had Packard’s leadership approved what Studio had initially wanted, the 1951 windshield would have been squared like the ‘53s. Also, note the steeper rake of the rear versus standard car sedan. The convertible also has a steeper rake. The tops make both cars look a bit ungainly but their missions were, or in the Formal Car’s case would have been, focused on the occupants.

        • There’s a one-off 1952 Mayfair with Senior rear fenders that shows how my above suggested 2-door hardtop would have looked.

          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPirwNdH8YI&t=40s

          The car in the video has several things that the ’51 Mayfair would not have had, such as the second bumper stacked on top of the first. It also has the 1952’s more streamlined hood ornament, which would have been appropriate for the proposed ’51 hardtop’s sporting nature. Note that it has been retrofitted with Packard’s V8 A very interesting car indeed.

          For my proposed ’51 strategy a legitimate lobbying effort could have been made by Studio to section the car and reduce its roof crown. This would not have been an altogether unwarranted request given their beef with the high pockets and the fact that the body from the firewall rearward would have required almost completely new tooling anyway, only the decklid and other incidentals being carried over from the 127 sedan. But the front fenders and hood would have been impacted, not to mention the firewall and underhood packaging. In the image below, the car on the bottom has been modified to section the body by 2 inches and to remove an inch from the roof’s crown, resulting in a 59 inch high car. (Poppi’s Garage, AACA Forum)

          https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/648721155_1952PackardMayfair122StdHeightvs1-2Lower.jpg.c078ea465a3f255449d894917b3e28d1.jpg

          A possible showroom could have included these cars. Variations on the naming convention would have been many:

          ‘200’ 122 wb 2-door Sports Coupe
          ‘200’ 127 wb 4-door Touring Sedan

          ‘300’ 122 wb 2-door Sports Coupe
          ‘300’ 127 wb 4-door Touring Sedan

          Mayfair ‘400’ 122 wb 2-door Sports Coupe
          Mayfair ‘400’ 122 wb 2-door Convertible Coupe
          Patrician ‘400’ 127 wb 4-door Touring Sedan
          Patrician ‘400’ 127 wb 4-door Formal Sedan

        • Getting back to the 1954 discussion and using that ’52 Mayfair one-off, another approach would have been to forgo the sore thumbs and work with what largely existed. A Pacific 122 wb hardtop was possible as was a pillared 4-door version, both with Senior taillights. The 4-door would need 5 inch shorter rear doors. A Patrician Club Sedan on 127 wb was also possible, likley not seeing too many takers but who knows. If all these cars had been offered in three trim levels as suggested for the ’51 line-up, the Clippers could have been retired.

          A big opportunity this year would have been to offer Nash’s new lower cost A/C system with all components packaged underhood. I added the feature in the ad copy. The Pacific’s ad copy is unchanged yet speaks directly to the sport sedan.

          (PackardInfo, AACA Forum)
          https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/1184780347_1954PackardPacific400SportSedan122.jpg.ee4447e8b7aacc390d9771482ac41831.jpg

          (AACA Forum)
          https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/2089744318_1954PackardPatrician400ClubSedan127.jpg.5939673de6849505efe68188f5dcf97d.jpg

      • My mistake… the 24th Series.

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        • Steve, I agree. Studebaker = Albatross.

    • Yeah, on second thought the first mention of the new “Merlin” V-8 would have sent a squadron of RCAF bombers across the border to bomb Conner Avenue into dust. 🙂

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11. I’m amazed at the depth of knowledge, both historical and practical, shown by commentators here.
    I’m torn about the ’54 Clipper and Packard. While I know Dad always held them in high regard (though they were quite unattainable for the proprietor of a small Australian engineering works) and I admire all that Packard stood for, the 1951 body wasn’t their most attractive. And yet, comparing it to the 1954 Oldsmobile pictured, aside from the wraparound windshield on the Olds, the Clipper doesn’t come off too badly. The reshaping of the rear ‘fender’ on the door pressing imparts a sense of motion rather than stasis, emphasized by those taillights and the slant on the trailing edge of the rear fenders. In contrast, the Oldsmobile just sits there like a lump, relying on applied chrome trim and that wraparound screen to suggest movement.
    I suspected the Packard/Clipper’s shell might be taller, a quick Google search puts the difference at about two inches. A flatter roof panel would have helped; I recall several brands retooling for this later in the decade. That Panama roofline looks rather unfortunate, but at least rear seat passengers would not be wanting headroom! I assume that interior comfort would have had a higher priority at Packard than style.

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    • Actually the Packards of that era more resembled the Pontiac. As a little kid in the 50s I couldn’t tell them apart.

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      • Remember that movie “The Hearse” from early 1980? When I first saw the ads I thought the 1951 – 1954 Packard hearse was a 1953 or 1954 Pontiac.

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12. That sectioned photochopped coupe is gorgeous. Woulda coulda shoulda. One quick question on the feasibility. Was the straight 8 taller than the V8?

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    • Kim, I don’t know but my guess is that the Eight was taller than the V8, though not enough to prevent sectioning. The ’52 Pan American was sectioned somewhere between 3 and 4 inches, so Packard proved that it could re-position any underhood component that needed moved. That car did have a hood scoop though, which I have always assumed was due to something, perhaps the radiator, needing clearance. But maybe it was the engine itself.

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      • Kim and Paul,
        The last time I had the opportunity to drive & ride in a Pan American was 1970 [I think it was owned at the time by Paul Stern in PA, but not sure]. Doing a serious search over the internet failed to provide me with any under hood photos, so I will just have to go from memory, imperfect as it is.

        My recollection is that the heater box and the fan assembly on the inner right fender were not in the car, even though the heater controls were still on the dashboard. The air cleaner from a senior car would have had the oil bath section off to the side of the engine, making the top of the air cleaner snorkel to the carb only about 2 inches tall, so it should have easily fit.

        I will continue looking for an under hood shot of the Pan American. If I find one, I’ll let you know.

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      • Here are images that depict two alternatives for the 1951 sedans and hardtop & convertible, respectively. Perhaps they will spark ideas from others.

        (Bonhams, AACA Forum)
        https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/2076701150_1951Packard200-300-4004D1275DegBLPatrician4004D127or129.5-TwoAlternatives.jpg.65f2c110924132649229545552ae50d8.jpg

        (Peppi’s Garage, AACA Forum)
        https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/2076701150_1951Packard200-300-4004D1275DegBLPatrician4004D127or129.5-TwoAlternatives.jpg.65f2c110924132649229545552ae50d8.jpg

        Alternative #1
        In each image the cars on the left are based on the standard 127 wb 4-door and 122 wb 2-door cars, all with standard height and Senior rear fenders and taillights. I think 300/Patrician 400’s worst design element was its upright, bulbous 3-piece backlight. To remediate, the car now has what would have been the cancelled 200’s one piece backlight, creating a more traditional, stately appearance and better matching the rounded one-piece windshield. The Formal Sedan has a leather top to cover the weld seam where the roof was extended rearward by 5 inches. The Formal Sedan and Convertible share the 5-inch shorter decklid, hinge assembly and location, and other structure. The Formal Sedan’s rear seatback would recline, and given that Nash began offering 5-position reclining front seats in 1950, it was Packard’s opportunity to jump on that feature too, again with the mindset that it needed to benchmark and quickly react to the industry’s 1950 models before it locked in its final designs.

        Alternative #2
        Were Packard to have carefully benchmarked the 1950 Buicks and Cadillacs, the vehicles on the right side of the images demonstrate how they could have reacted much more comprehensively. For example, by approving the Studio’s squared windshield design for the sedan (which Packard ended up doing for ’53 at who knows what cost). Also, matching GM’s backlight rake, which on its sedans was approximately 5 degrees faster than Packard’s sedan (and was similar to Packard’s hardtop, though GM’s hardtop backlights were even steeper). This would have decreased rear headroom in the sedan, but oddly the hardtop’s rear headroom was the same as the sedans. Perhaps its seat bottom was lower.

        Using the 200’s 5-inch shorter fender bulge would have thinned the body sides a bit, which may or may not have been an improvement. A minor change would have been to improve the B-pillar’s appearance by moving forward the front door window frame trailing edge, if the door latch assembly would have allowed. As it was, none of the vertical surfaces on the B-pillar were the same width, which wasn’t befitting a car of Packard’s caliber.

        If Packard really wanted to elevate its position relative to Cadillac, it also needed to respond to the 60 Special. Like that car, wheelbase and rear overhang could have been increased, and the approach that I took was to add a total of 5 inches to OAL while retaining the standard decklid, and end panel ahead of it. To keep rear overhang from becoming too long (driveway scrape… not that it seemed to matter as the decade wore on), I split the 5 inches thusly: a 2.5-inch longer rear overhang and a 2.5-inch longer wheelbase.

        The carrot driving the latter was the opportunity to move the wheel housing rearward relative to the rear seat, to allow the entire seatback to recline (the Formal Sedan described above probably would have needed a dogleg in the seatback). The other enabler for a reclining rear seat would have been a 5-inch longer roof, which could have been created by stamping a front and rear half of the standard roof, each with a 2.5-inch overlap, and welding them together. Reuse of the existing backlight would have required a 5-inch wider C-pillar, created by welding flat sheet metal to each side of the new roof. Alternatively, these surfaces could have been made a part of the standard roof’s dies, and trimmed off for those cars, which would have been a minor cost hit.

        Sportster vertical chrome trim on the window frames would have been discerned later in the development but still in time for launch, the design team now fully “into the spirit” of the hardtop. I put them on the Formal Sedan too.

        I also applied the 60 Special-fighter’s trunk floor changes and wider fender skirts to the sectioned convertible, increasing its wheelbase from 122 to 124.5 inches. This because the top is 5 inches longer than the hardtop and I wanted to retain the elegance of the standard decklid’s length, rather than shortening it. The rear fenders would have needed built up similar to the lwb sedan’s roof: stamp two halves with 2.5-inch overlap, then weld together. Like the lwb sedan, the convertible would have been higher-priced as a result. Both cars needed to be profitable but just as important, they needed to be halo cars that built the Packard name back up.

        I didn’t address the Cadillac Series 75 8-passenger long wheelbase car directly, instead indirectly by creating the 60 Special-fighter, which given its wider C-pillar and leather top would be seen by some as a more open and airier version of a Formal Sedan, especially when equipped with optional partition window and A/C (which Packard needed to reinstate after a decade’s absence).

        Given the higher prices of the 129.5 wb sedan and 124.5 wb convertible, the following naming scheme would have called special attention to them, with the volume cars receiving numbers only:

        ‘200’ 122 Sports Coupe
        ‘200’ 127 Touring Sedan

        ‘300’ 122 Sports Coupe
        ‘300’ 127 Touring Sedan

        ‘400’ 122 Sports Coupe
        ‘400’ 127 Touring Sedan

        Mayfair ‘400’ 124.5 Convertible Coupe
        Patrician ‘400’ 129.5 Formal Sedan

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      • Sorry about the repeated link in previous post. Here are the hardtops and convertibles.

        https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/1864883376_1951Packard200-300-400HT12262or59Mayfair400Conv122or124.5-TwoAlternatives.jpg.bc1e321fa1a22d043b5889f22caccccb.jpg

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      • One of Packard’s biggest challenges in the chrome-laden Fifties was creating a front appearance that was as compelling as its traditional pre-war cars. The grill that it created for ’51 was not the kind of design that caused people to pause and admire.

        Europe took a different approach. Some manufacturers retained their traditional pre-war grill, Rolls-Royce the most notable. Others, particularly in Italy, were finding a balance between a defined grill and modern appearance. Cistalia was an early example:

        https://classiccarcatalogue.com/CISITALIA_1950.html

        With the Italians in mind, I have reworked this ’51 Patrician at WheelsAge:

        https://s36.wheelsage.org/picture/p/packard/patrician_400_sedan/packard_patrician_400_sedan_3.jpeg

        Because Italian cars of this era tended to favor simplicity and rounded forms, including in the windshield corners, I left Patrician’s windshield unchanged, fashioned 200-style rounded rear fenders and simple taillights, and removed all side trim. Also like the Italians, I changed the hood from clamshell to one that closes flush with the surrounding sheet metal.

        (WheelsAge, AACA Forum)

        https://content.invisioncic.com/r277599/monthly_2022_07/135768481_1951Packard400-200BacklightandFendersandItalianFrontTheme.jpg.d2022a7aa6157bded8d89dea9ba50a46.jpg

        In the aerodynamic age of the 1930s, Packard took care to refine its traditional grill every few years, sometimes from one year to the next as with the 1935 to 1936 Senior cars. Had Packard followed Italy’s lead for ’51, it could have launched its best inaugural effort, then continually refined it over the next several years, improving appearance and presenting freshness.

        Craftsmanship, delicacy of design, and tailoring of the grill and surrounding area would once again become a Packard trademark. The question is, would such a car have found favor in early 1950s America? Perhaps the grill would have needed to be part of a more exciting body that was more uniquely American.

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        • Paul, I think you’re right that the 1951 Packard’s grille was too horizontal and generic. I talk a little about this here as well as assess the 1955 Packard Request concept car here.

      • The Italians eventually transitioned from grills that were “outie” to ones that were “innie” (inset). My work-up is supposed to represent the latter but didn’t come off too convincing.

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13. Somewhat OT though as one largely unfamiliar with the marque beyond it being comparable to Rolls-Royce, could what the latter and other marque have done serve as a template for Packard to better navigate the post-war era?

    Had Packard been able to strengthen its position to be able to successfully spin-off Clipper or another better received-better entry-level marque earlier on, was it within their technical ability (if not their management) to develop what amounts to a more stylist Packard-developed take on the post-war Rover P4 plus Rover Marauder sports-car and possible Road Rover spin-offs?

    Because Packard did have previous experience with a Rover-like F-Head or IOE layout on the pre-war Packard V12, although could see them going down a more Rolls-Royce B range later 3.9-litre FB60 type engine direction as strictly a six rather than a modular design. Rover were also seriously investigating V6s beginning pre-war initially with OHV later IOE as mentioned in Rover Cars of the 1930s by James Taylor that could have allowed Packard to revisit the idea of a V12.

    Add an Harry Weslake head as on the Rover P5 3-litre IOE as well as planned Rolls-Royce Twin-Cam 200-268+ hp G60 developments for the alloy FB60 intended for the Austin-Healey 4000 prototype (TNX 65G) and Packard has itself a Euro-inspired inline-six.

    Fwiw in Rolls-Royce and Bentley Experimental Cars Book by Ian Rimmer, they did look at a wide range of proposed models for possible use of their B range engines as far downmarket as a Minor type model before dispensing with the idea on grounds of impact to its image and the state of post-war Britain. Rover themselves similarly looked at a Topolino-like Rover M1 prototype only to be surprised by the runaway success of the original Land Rover.
    http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~nicouls/maymyth.html

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14. RR’s economics were quite different from Packard’s. RR was a large aircraft engine company comparable to Pratt and Whitney. Their automotive line was was limited production. Much was hand built and so did not need the machinery or the design work to go into a part where you needed to make 50k per year.

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15. Rover would possibly be more apt if taking P4, P5 and Land Rover sales into account, that said prior to the Silver Shadow and T-Series, Rolls Royce were looking to expand production numbers towards that amount by collaborating with BMC on a number of admittingly ill-fated projects using the FB60 Six until the latter acquired Jaguar.

    Even though Vanden Plas Princess 4-litre R never reached such numbers, joint-capacity was aimed to be 12k per year and trend upwards as other Rolls-BMC developed models were introduced though in retrospect they would have been better off developing the Austin-Healey 4000 prototype much earlier than was the case (where it directly competed with in-house rival the Jaguar E-Type).

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16. Concerning the Princess 4-litre “R”, I read in a book on Rolls-Royce & Bentley prototype vehicles [don’t remember the name of the book, but I think it was written By Ian Rimmer] that when the new Silver Shadow was in the initial planning stages, the company decided not to produce a similar Bentley, and they entered into a contract with Vanden Plas & BMC to make a smaller Bentley body shell with full leather & wood interior trimming. Mechanicals were to be supplied by Rolls-Royce. Production was to be a minimum of 4,000 cars.

    When Rolls-Royce decided to keep Bentley production in-house*, they had a problem, because there was a signed contract. To satisfy Vanden Plas & BMC, they agreed to supply 4,000 Rolls-Royce commercial engines [The B-60 F-head alloy motor] to Vanden Plas, and the Princess 4-litre “R” was created.

    In the late 1980s I arranged to visit and interview Roland Fox, the last Managing Director of the Vanden Plas Works at the Kingsbury facility in north London. Mr Fox confirmed this account of how and why the Princess 4-litre “R” was created, and added they had built and tested a coachbuilt “R” based 7-passenger limousine, to replace the aging Vanden Plas 4-liter coachbuilt limousine [the DM4 series cars]. The longer “R” went no further in testing as the B-60 engine simply didn’t have the power needed to handle the additional weight. Somewhere I have some B&W photos of this LWB “R” that Mr. Fox gave me, and it was evident the interior space was very tight with the jump seats in use.

    * As I heard it from someone familiar with the situation, many Bentley dealers and current Bentley owners were up in arms about the Bentley being downgraded and not assembled at Crewe. Senior management at Rolls-Royce said “What the hell were we thinking”, and wisely decided to keep the Bentley in-house, sharing the Silver Shadow body shell.

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17. The original plan at Rolls-Royce was to develop a three car family composed of the V8-only Tibet / Borneo, FB60 Six-only (soon ditched for V8) Burma / Tonga and lastly V8-only Bentley Korea Coupe with different styling.

    Eventually the separate projects were cancelled and development continued in one direction as the SY, which combined the best features of Tibet and Burma with increased commonality between the Rolls-Royce and Bentley variants when it dawned on the company Bentley would not be anything more than a badged-engineered Rolls-Royce due to the projected costs of developing three quite different models.

    At the same time Rolls-Royce were open to the idea of having BMC produce a toned down lightened version of Burma with altered front and rear styling plus FB60 engine, to be produced exclusively by BMC according to their quality standards under one of their upmarket brands such as Riley, Wolseley or Vanden Plas.

    If only as a way for BMC to take its contracted allocation of FB60 engines after they had committed to buying significant quantities for the 4-litre R, however neither ADO58 nor any other project created as a vehicle to put surplus FB60 engines in including the Austin-Healey 4000 prototype amounted to anything for one reason or another.

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18. There is another funny if tragic part of the whole Rolls-Royce/BMC episode where by the time BMC was actually developing a FB60-powered car capable of selling well and able to be uprated to G60 Twin-Cam specification (that would have competed against the E-Type and made up for the short-fall in power had it been used in a large saloon), Rolls-Royce got rid of a lot of tooling with certain critical castings not being available and Rolls-Royce not being in a position to start immediate production of the engine.

    In theory with the right decisions Packard could have had engine broadly similar to the Rover IOE and Rolls FB60/G60, the shift to Twin-Cam easily giving it the jump ahead of the regular US OHV Sixes not to mention the Pontiac OHC-Six and IKA/Jeep Tornado Six in North American terms.

    The Tornado Six is relevant as it was fitted into the Rambler American to create the IKA Torino, since in ideal circumstances a short-term alliance between AMC and a better-run/managed Studebaker-Packard (whose constituent companies themselves made better decisions prior) would have been able to make the move onto the Junior / Senior Car platforms towards a more European-esque direction.

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