
MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL REFERENCE PAMPHLET

**A Brief History Of
U. S. MARINE CORPS
OFFICER PROCUREMENT
1775 - 1969**



**HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF
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OFFICER PROCUREMENT
1775 - 1969



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PREFACE

This pamphlet is derived from official records and appropriate published manuscript sources. It is published for the information of those interested in the history of Marine officer procurement from 1775 to 1969.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "W. J. Van Ryzin", is positioned above the printed name.

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MARINE CORPS OFFICER PROCUREMENT, 1775-1969

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INTRODUCTION

In order to chronicle the history of Marine Corps officer procurement, a clarification of terminology is needed. "Procurement" is the normally accepted term to describe the obtaining of officers for the military. Actually, "procurement" is defined "as obtaining or securing." There are, of course, further definitions of the word, but all basically refer to the process of obtaining or securing.

Officer procurement, however, as witnessed throughout Marine Corps history, in both lean and plentiful years, has been more appropriately reflected in the term "selection," to wit: "...a choosing in preference to another or other; picked out especially for excellence or some special quality; picked."

Consequently, the business of procuring officers for the Marine Corps is officially known as "Officer Selection" and an officer who does in fact select officer candidates is known as an "Officer Selection Officer." (1)

Historically, officer selection or officer procurement, regardless of the terminology used, is and has been fundamental to the success of the Corps. Such was the case in 1775 ... and so it will be in the future.

I. FROM THE REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR I

The Continental Congress on 10 November 1775 adopted a resolution calling for the creation of two Marine battalions. A colonel was to command the new organization. Among his subordinate officers were two lieutenant-colonels, two majors and the number of junior officers needed by a regiment. This resolution, moreover, established definite standards for the selection of Marine officers by urging that "particular care be taken that no persons be appointed to office or enlisted into said battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required." (2)

In spite of the clarity of this directive, the problem of selecting officers was to plague the Naval establishment throughout the war. Officers in both the Navy and Marines usually were appointed by a committee on maritime affairs subject to the consent of Congress. The Continental Congress, however, sometimes appointed individuals without waiting for recommendations from the Marine Committee. To further the confusion, the various Navy Boards in America, the Continental agents in Europe, and the commanders of larger vessels all were empowered to appoint officers. Even state governors could obtain commissions for their friends. Nevertheless, the system was not thoroughly bad; for it often gave ships' captains an opportunity to handpick their subordinates, a great advantage in a Navy without standards of training and lacking any sort of tradition. (3)

Senior officer of the Continental Marines was Samuel Nicholas, who was appointed a captain on 28 November 1775. Although his commission bore the signature of John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress, the details of Nicholas' recommendation and appointment are not known. His background, as an inkeeper and sportsman, and his education--eight years at the Academy of Philadelphia--apparently convinced Congress that he could serve equally well on land or sea. The judgment of Hancock and his fellow legislators was vindicated when Nicholas led the successful raid on New Providence Island in the Bahamas and fought gallantly in the first sea battle of the war. Impressed by these exploits, the maritime committee recommended that Nicholas be placed at the head of the Continental Marines with the rank of major; and on 25 June 1776, Congress approved his appointment. (4)

Nevertheless, Major Nicholas had little voice in the selection of officers during the remainder of the war. As a matter of fact, Congressional control over the entire Naval establishment gradually relaxed until each ship's captain exercised what amounted to an independent command. A chronic lack of funds, inefficiency, and the lure of privateering hampered the efforts of the Marine Committee to find skilled Naval or Marine officers.(5) Skippers of Continental vessels obtained their junior officers as best they could. John Paul Jones, for example, while recruiting a crew for the Bon Homme Richard, enlisted a group of French soldiers to serve as Marines and acquired an officer of the French Marines, Paul de Chamillard, to lead them.(6)

After the successful close of the American Revolution, the Continental Navy, and with it the Marines, disappeared from the seas. Attacks on American shipping by Algerine pirates caused Congress in 1794 to authorize the construction of a new fleet; but after the signing of a peace treaty with Algiers, work on all but three frigates was suspended. In the meantime, France continued to try to lure the United States into her war with Great Britain. Gradually, both major belligerents began to disregard America's neutral rights; but the French government paid the added insult of attempting to wring a bribe from American diplomats. Enraged by the "X Y Z Affair," as the extortion attempt came to be called, Congress in the spring of 1789 voted funds for the building of a Navy to drive French privateers from the seas.(7)

Every ship of the line required its Marine Guard; but as yet there was no United States Marine Corps. Nevertheless, the necessary ships' detachments were formed and Marine officers appointed. Sometimes, the Naval officer chosen to command a particular frigate was ordered to nominate a Marine officer of his own choosing; in other cases, the officer would be selected from the city at which the ship was being built. Names of the nominees then were forwarded to the President of the United States, who made the actual appointments subject, of course, to the approval of the Senate. There were neither examinations nor any fixed course of instruction. Officers were merely appointed as needed.(8)

This unofficial, quasi-legal arrangement ended with the establishment of a United States Marine Corps on 11 July 1798. The President was empowered to appoint officers in the Corps with the advice and consent of the Senate and to make interim appointments when the Senate was not in session. Furthermore, the office of Commandant was created; at last there was one individual who might screen the many applications for commission to insure that only the best were accepted.(9)

First to hold office as Commandant of the newly reactivated Marine Corps was William Ward Burrows. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the success of the organization was his ability to select and recommend for commission only the most loyal and efficient of men. As yet there was no formal examination; selection rested for the most part on Burrows' own good judgment. If an applicant was considered suitable, he was required to accept in writing and execute an oath of allegiance. The government then sent the officer a signed commission which entitled him to his pay. Unfortunately, the commissions generally were slow in arriving. (10)

Following the example set by Burrows, the early Commandants continued to take an almost paternal interest in the appointment of officers from civil life. Throughout the war of 1812, and the Seminole, Creek, and Mexican Wars, responsibility for maintaining the high standards of the officer corps fell to the Commandant. Not until 25 July 1861, shortly after the outbreak of the Civil War, did Congress seriously modify the Marine Corps system of officer procurement. At that point in time, only young men between the ages of 20 and 25 who had passed a professional examination could be appointed lieutenants in the Corps. The test, moreover, was to be drawn up and administered under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. (11)

In 1882, Congress directed that the Marine Corps begin obtaining some its lieutenants from the United States Naval Academy. The first Academy graduates to be appointed in the Corps were ten members of the class of 1883; finally, the Marine Corps was assured of a steady influx of trained officers. (12)

Congress on 21 April 1898, less than two months after the mysterious sinking of the battleship Maine, declared war on Spain. To liberate Cuba and avenge the loss of the Maine required a Marine expeditionary force; so Congress early in May approved the appointment of 43 additional officers. Three lieutenants were commissioned from the enlisted ranks, while the remaining 40 came directly from civil life. (13)

At the termination of the war with Spain, Marine Corps officer procurement policies were overhauled. The Naval Academy remained the primary source of officers; but the Corps also was permitted to offer permanent commissions to those who had served as lieutenants in the recent conflict. Meritorious noncommissioned officers also were declared eligible for appointment, and additional officers also could be selected from civil life. All but Academy graduates, however, were required to pass "such examination as might be prescribed by the President of the United States." (14)

In general, the three major sources of Marine Corps officers during the first decade of the twentieth century were the Naval Academy, the enlisted ranks, and civil life. Civilians and noncommissioned officers who survived the rigorous examination were appointed second lieutenants and enrolled in the Marine Officers' School for further training. By 1914, however, Major General George Barnett, Commandant of the Marine Corps, had begun urging that only graduates of the Naval Academy and outstanding noncommissioned officers be eligible for appointment. (15) During World War I and even after, Barnett's views were to have considerable influence on officer procurement policies.

II. WORLD WAR I

Not until almost two years after the outbreak of war in Europe did Congress lay the foundations for the expansion of the Marine officer corps. Legislation adopted on 29 August 1916 authorized the reappointment of former Marine Corps officers who had resigned in good standing. This same law also created the warrant ranks of Marine Gunner and Quartermaster Clerk and provided that officers commissioned from civil life or from an enlisted status should receive two year probationary appointments. (16)

Authorized by the same appropriations act was the establishment of the Marine Corps Reserve. Although Congress intended that this force be composed of officers and enlisted men possessing various degrees of skill and training, the Marine Corps was slow to implement the program. (17) In fact, little was done before the spring of 1917.

Shortly after the passage of this bill, General Barnett sent out a call for additional officers with some military experience. Graduates of colleges which offered military training were declared eligible to take an examination held on 18 September 1916. A total of 24 applicants passed the test and were appointed officers in the Corps. A second examination, this one for civilians without formal military training, was scheduled for the month of November. (18)

The Commandant did not ignore the enlisted ranks as a source of potential officers. While preparations were being made to obtain officers from the various military colleges, a group of 18 highly qualified noncommissioned officers were summoned to the Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C., to compete for commissions as second lieutenants. Twelve men passed the examination which was held on 7 August 1916. This method of selection was new to the Corps, for enlisted men previously had taken the test at the same time as the civilian candidates. (19)

After America's entry into the war on 6 April 1917, thousands of healthy, well educated, and patriotic young men volunteered to serve with the Leathernecks. The Marine Corps Reserve, of course, was mobilized, but this organization proved a disappointment. Since the requirement for appointment to the various classes of the reserve had not been set until 27 March 1917, only three officers were on the rolls and available for duty when war was declared.(20) The lack of a trained reserve, however, was more than offset by the influx of recruits. The Marines, therefore, decided in June 1917 to appoint no more civilians to the rank of second lieutenant. Instead, the Commandant announced his intention to fill all vacancies in this grade by appointing graduates of the United States Naval Academy and meritorious noncommissioned officers.(21)

Although the policy of commissioning only enlisted Marines already had been announced, a competitive examination for civilian applicants was held on 10 July 1917. Those qualified to take the test were authorized to enlist in the Marine Corps Reserve with the understanding that they would be transferred to Parris Island for recruit training while their examination papers were being processed. Should they fail, they would have the option of remaining in service as enlisted men or being discharged. On the other hand, the successful candidates would be commissioned second lieutenants in the reserve and given further training.(22)

For the remainder of the war, second lieutenants were selected mainly from among the best of the enlisted men. Quotas were established for each post and station; the commanding officer then convened a board of officers to select the best qualified of his men. Those who survived this initial screening were transferred to an Officer Training Class at Quantico, Virginia. The first of these classes, which met in the spring of 1918, graduated some 300 officers; the second provided 430 second lieutenants; and the third, 235. In the meantime the armistice had been signed, and officers commissioned upon completion of this last class were either discharged or released to inactive duty. Additional classes were conducted in France for officer candidates selected from the 4th Marine Brigade.(23)

Another source for procuring junior officers during the war was the Student Army Training Corps. A certain number of students enrolled in each college participating in the program were earmarked for the Marine Corps. Upon completion of their training, these men would receive reserve commissions; but before they could command troops, they were required to undergo recruit training. The war, however, ended before the Marine Corps could benefit from this program.(24)

There can be no doubt that the rapid increase in the officer strength of the Marine Corps was made possible by the policy of offering temporary commissions to outstanding enlisted men. During the period of actual hostilities--from 6 April 1917 to 11 November 1918--a total of 654 enlisted men and 90 warrant officers accepted temporary appointments, while only 273 officers were selected from civil life. Permanent appointments in the regular service were tendered to only 25 enlisted men, 13 graduates of the Naval Academy, three former officers, and 284 civilians, including reservists discharged to accept regular appointments.(25) The Commandant again urged that in the future all appointments to the rank of second lieutenant be made from graduates of the Academy or from the enlisted ranks.(26)

III. BETWEEN WORLD WARS

A. THE REGULARS

After the Armistice, demobilization left a total of 564 vacancies in the strength of the officer corps. Shortly after assuming the duties of Commandant in July 1920, Major General John A. Lejeune convened a board of officers to deal with this problem. Selections for permanent commissions were made from among the temporary officers, both regular and reserve, who had served during the war, and the enlisted men and warrant officers who had held wartime commissions. In short, the Marine Corps continued to obtain its junior officers from within its own ranks.(27)

Within a year, however, it had become obvious that General Barnett's goal of an officer corps staffed entirely by graduates of the Naval Academy and former noncommissioned officers could not be attained. In May 1921, General Lejeune approached all schools which the War Department had designated "Distinguished Military Colleges" and asked them to recommend a limited number of the graduating class for commissions in the Marine Corps. Twelve students selected in this manner were commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve, assigned to active duty at Quantico, and after a period of instruction, appointed probationary second lieutenants in the regular Corps. In addition, 26 graduates of the Naval Academy received commissions in the Marine Corps.(28)

The practice of appointing meritorious noncommissioned officers continued. An examination held in June 1921 resulted in the appointment of 17 enlisted men. A similar test, covering such subjects as history, geography, English, and mathematics was given in June of the following year. In this instance, 25 candidates survived the ordeal and began a six-month course at the Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C., to prepare them for a final examination. Of this number, 22 won the coveted gold bars. Marine Gunners continued to be selected exclusively from the enlisted ranks.(29)

Again in 1923, the Marine Corps turned to the "Distinguished Military Colleges" for its junior officers. Upon graduation, 12 seniors were tendered probationary regular commissions. Since each of these had received his degree and been recommended by the president of his school, the requirement for further instruction in a reserve officer status was waived. The academic examinations of applicants from noncommissioned officer ranks continued. Also, three former officers, two Marines and one Navy Ensign, were reappointed. (30)

Throughout the 1920s, the Marine Corps relied upon three sources of second lieutenants. The enlisted ranks were a primary source. Periodically, a class of carefully selected noncommissioned officers would be convened. After intensive study and thorough examination, the most outstanding of these "Candidates for Commission" were appointed probationary officers. A second source was the canvassing of military colleges and universities offering the Army's advanced ROTC course; graduates recommended by the presidents of the institutions and found physically fit were granted probationary commissions. The required professional examination was waived. A third major source was, of course, the graduating class of the Naval Academy. The Marine Corps, it seems, would have preferred to supplement the number of Annapolis trained officers with lieutenants appointed from the ranks rather than from civilian colleges; for in 1927 when there was an unusually small number of vacancies, no one was selected from the universities. Instead 14 midshipmen and 9 enlisted candidates were given commissions. (31)

During the depths of the depression in the 1930s, the few vacancies in the regular commissioned ranks that were available were easily filled since there were relatively few opportunities in civil life to lure an officer away from the service. Those vacancies which did appear were filled first from the graduates of the Naval Academy, second by noncommissioned officers, and thirdly by civilian applicants. During the fiscal years 1930, 1932, and 1935, no civilians were commissioned second lieutenants in the Marine Corps. In fiscal 1936, however, 95 civilians received appointments; and in the following fiscal year, 136. In these last two years only four noncommissioned officers were selected to don the gold bars of a second lieutenant. (32)

B. THE RESERVE

As for the Marine Corps Reserve, 13 officers were enrolled in 1922, 39 in 1923, and 67 in 1924. (33) Yet, it was not until the revival of the program in 1925 that there was any coordinated effort to obtain peacetime reserve officers. Under the provisions of a law enacted on 28 February of that year, the Marine Corps began establishing throughout the country a number of reserve companies, each with its own officers. (34)

At first, the Marine Corps hoped to staff these reserve units with former officers of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps who had previously left the service under honorable conditions. Provision was also made for a class of volunteer officers who performed no organized training duty and consequently received no pay. (35) Thus, when a new company was authorized, the commanding officer was designated by the Commandant; then the local recruiting officer assisted in obtaining the necessary platoon leaders by advertising through radio stations, veterans' organizations, and newspapers. (36) As a result of this publicity campaign, a large number of civilians, many of them with no military experience, stepped forward to apply for a commission. The difficulty lay in selecting from this large group of volunteers men who possessed the character and education to meet the standards demanded of Marine Corps officers. In processing an application, the candidate's position in the community, his schooling experience, and personal appearance all were taken into account. (37).

This initial experience in the large scale recruiting of peacetime reservists led to the codification of the requirements for commission and their inclusion in the Marine Corps Manual. Former officers of the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve in good physical condition and within specified age limits were eligible to serve with an organized unit or in a volunteer status. Also eligible for reserve commissions were men who had been noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps for a minimum of 18 months. Furthermore, civilians who possessed the necessary moral character and education could be appointed as second lieutenants provided they could show evidence of prior military experience as an officer or noncommissioned officer in an advanced NROTC or ROTC unit, or as a cadet at any one of the military academies. The most significant feature of the revitalized reserve program was the clause which allowed enlisted reservists who had served for a year as noncommissioned officers and attended two summer camps to qualify for commission on the recommendation of their commanding officer. Credit for prior military experience also was given upon the completion of basic correspondence courses offered by the Army or Marine Corps. Last, but not least, the Manual now provided for the offering of reserve appointments to graduates of accredited colleges even though they may have had no military experience. (38)

Shortly after the authorization of the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves, Congress also established the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps which, it was hoped, would provide a large number of junior officers from the graduating classes of several universities. When this program got underway in 1926, it featured a Marine Reserve Officers' Training Corps; actually a small section within the Navy organization, in which a maximum of 1,200 cadets might be enrolled in any one year. (39)

Unfortunately, the Marine section of the NROTC did not live up to expectations. The handful of officers assigned to this organization as instructors was withdrawn in 1934; and in consequence the Marine Corps obtained very few reserve officers from this source. As late as the eve of World War II, the NROTC remained "a vein unworked."(40)

In 1935, the Marine Corps established the Platoon Leaders' Class for college students, which graduated its first officers in the following summer. Students in good physical condition who were attending a university not affiliated with either the Army or Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps could enroll as privates first class in the reserve to attend these classes. For two summers, the trainees spent six weeks at a summer camp. Those who successfully completed both camps were appointed reserve second lieutenants upon graduation from college.(41)

A reserve officer who attended one of these earlier Platoon Leaders' Classes felt that the program appealed to the sense of adventure latent in the heart of American youth even during the heyday of pacifism. Along with adventure, the college student of 1935 enrolled for a good time. Although most of the officer trainees carried these notions to their first summer camp, they generally grew more serious as their training progressed; and by the time they received their bars, most of them had a fair idea of the responsibilities of leading a platoon.(42)

The last graduates of the old Platoon Leaders' Class to be commissioned in the Marine Corps were the members of the class which first convened in the summer of 1940. All of these men had accepted their appointments by February 1942. From six two-year classes the Marine Corps had obtained 781 reserve and 39 regular officers.(43) The suspending of this program during World War II, however, did not end the flow of college men into the officer corps; for civilian students were allowed to enroll in the reserve for future officer training.(44) Thus the Corps was able to supplant the Platoon Leaders Class with the College Training and V-12 Programs.

Meanwhile, World War II was well under way. In Europe, the "Phony War" had ended, and Hitler's armor was sweeping toward the English Channel. Japan, too, was threatening war in the Pacific. Against this background, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Knighton, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector, prepared a memorandum for the Commandant urging the establishment of three-month courses of instruction open to students at accredited colleges. This would lead to a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve.(45) Major General Commandant Thomas Holcomb seized upon the suggestion and directed that the first Officer Candidate Class begin at Quantico in November 1940. If necessary, additional classes would be convened in February

and May 1941.(46) As Colonel Knighton had recommended, the course of instruction was designed for men without previous military training. The candidates in the first class, however, were required to be college graduates rather than students in a recognized university. The first class, which attracted some 260 men, proved successful; and a second was scheduled for March of the following year.(47)

IV. WORLD WAR II

At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Platoon Leaders' Classes had been suspended. The principal source of second lieutenants was now the Candidates' Class, which had been designed primarily for college men. In addition, the Marine Corps continued to receive its quota of graduates of the Naval Academy and awarded a few commissions to its enlisted men. Furthermore, there were many former Marine officers available, some civilians with special skills, and students in the Army and Navy ROTC programs. As might be expected, the Corps was forced to compete with the other services to obtain junior officers; and on college campuses, this rivalry became especially intense.

A. COLLEGE TRAINING PROGRAM

By February 1942, Marine Corps procurement teams had begun visiting the nation's accredited colleges to display the advantages of their particular branch of the service. In general, these teams were warmly received by educators in every part of the country; but the students were not overeager in their response to them. A member of one team complained that the average college student simply did not realize that his country was fighting for its survival.(48) This may have been true in some instances; but it is more likely that these young men felt that the Marine Corps did not offer the same advantages as the Navy or Army. The most adventurous, the kind of men who a generation before would have fought to become "Devildogs," now were enrolling in the aviation cadet programs. The lure of the "wild blue yonder" was claiming some of the best juniors and seniors; and Marine Aviation at this time was obtaining the majority of its pilots through the Naval Aviation Cadet program.(49) Additionally, the threat of the draft was still not so pressing as was the case at the end of the year.

Nevertheless, the Leathernecks continued to scour the campuses for potential junior officers. Students enrolled in a course leading to a recognized degree, other than medicine, dentistry or theology, and who were physically fit and between the ages of 17 and 27, might enlist in the reserve and with the anticipation of remaining on inactive status until graduation. An important feature of the program was the fact that married men were now eligible. On the other hand, like the other services, the Marine Corps could offer no iron-clad pledge that the student would not be called upon to begin his training before graduation.(50) Soon the wall of indifference was breached, and the college program began paying dividends.

Dealing with educators, the Marine Corps quickly discovered, was not a simple task. In organizing the program, Headquarters laid down a policy of accepting only the students of accredited colleges who were working toward a Bachelor of Arts or Science degree. No sooner had the operation begun than the University of Chicago voted to abolish the degree of Bachelor of Science and to award a diploma bearing some less imposing title. Wisely avoiding what apparently was an intra-faculty squabble, the Marine Corps refused to comment on the change except to remark that it would prove "a penalizing factor to college graduates who may apply for officer training." (51) Events soon proved that many universities offered degrees which were the equivalent of the B.S. or B.A. but were known by some different title. By the summer of 1942, candidates for commission were being enrolled even though they were working toward bachelor's degrees in such subjects as Forestry, Industrial Arts, and Commercial Science. (52)

The early confusion in competing for college students led to an agreement in June 1942 between the Secretaries of War and Navy. This compact provided that the Army have first choice of the men enrolled at schools offering ROTC courses, while the Navy selected the best students from universities affiliated with the NROTC. The Marine Corps was to concentrate on the accredited colleges which had neither program. To insure a minimum of friction, quotas were assigned to each Army Corps Area and Naval District. (53)

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps continued to obtain a certain number of officers directly from the Army ROTC program. Prior to 1942, each of the universities offering the advanced course was allowed to nominate one honor student for a regular appointment. Because of the need for officers both Army and Marine, this policy was modified to permit the Corps to accept a total of 80 graduates. Should one school fail to meet its quota, the vacancies might be filled from another institution. Instead of being commissioned in the Marine Corps, these men were appointed second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve, ordered to a Reserve Officers' Course, and given the same opportunities as any reservist to earn a permanent regular commission. (54)

Late in 1942, the draft age was lowered to 18, a change which threatened to completely destroy the Marine Corps College Training Program and many small colleges as well. To preserve these schools as a source of officers, the Navy organized its V-12 program, which included billets for 11,500 Marine trainees. Since over 12,000 students already had enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve as future officer candidates, it was necessary to screen the men already enrolled, select the best of the group, and offer the others a choice between serving as enlisted men or resigning from the Corps. (55) Undergraduates who survived the screening were ordered to active duty during the summer of 1943, formed into detachments, and assigned to specific colleges. (56)

Once the wheels had begun to turn, the college machine functioned so efficiently that by 1944, the program was turning out more officers than the Marine Corps needed. Since the Navy required additional ensigns, 613 Marine trainees were changed over and allowed to continue their training as midshipmen.(57)

At the end of the war, some 1,900 men remained in the Marine Corps' part of the V-12 program. The Corps, however, did not wish to bear the expense of educating officers who would have no place in the peacetime establishment. After a great deal of discussion, Headquarters offered students who had completed seven or eight semesters an opportunity to accept a reserve commission and choose between immediate release to inactive duty or a brief tour of active service. Those who selected the latter could, if they desired, apply for a regular commission. Undergraduates ineligible for commission were allowed to resign, transfer to general duty or to an NROTC unit. Thus, on 1 July 1946 the Marines V-12 program was formally dissolved.(58)

B. FIELD COMMISSIONS

When the United States entered World War II, the Marine Corps already was building up its officer strength. The College Training Program, it was conceded, would prove effective; but the new officers were needed at once. To obtain experienced officers, a procurement team visited Canada to interview American citizens who were serving with the Canadian armed forces. Although the campaign helped promote good will between the two countries, the Canadian mission secured only a few officers, most of them pilots.(59)

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps adopted as a stopgap the policy followed during World War I. Shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Commandant had called attention to the fact that noncommissioned officers who held a college degree or could pass a college equivalent test were eligible for reserve or regular commissions.(60) Early in 1942, Headquarters began establishing quotas for field units, thus enabling the commanding officers to obtain appointments for the best of their noncoms. In general, the quotas varied from 5 percent of officer strength for most ground units to 10 percent for aviation.(61)

In December of that year, all field appointment quotas assigned to posts and stations were cancelled; only aviation units and elements of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, were authorized further quotas. Again in February 1943, the requirements were made more difficult. The quota system was abolished entirely. Henceforth, only noncommissioned officers of aviation units who possessed critical skills or those in ground units who had displayed outstanding leadership in combat with the enemy would be eligible for field appointments.(62)

In the year ending in May 1943, the Marine Corps had obtained a total of 1,275 officers and 332 warrant officers from among its noncommissioned officers.(63) Thus, the Corps was able to increase its officer strength even though the college program had not as yet made any significant contribution. Indeed, it was these former sergeants who were the leaders of many a platoon and company during the early days of the Pacific War.

C. OFFICER CANDIDATES' CLASS

While the Marine Corps was screening its noncommissioned officers and laying the foundations for what became the V-12 program, one means of procuring and training officers was in continuous use. This was the Officer Candidates' Class, a program which rendered outstanding service throughout the war. Along with the college students who reported for training when their classes graduated, many candidates were selected from the enlisted ranks.

By October 1942 Fleet Marine Force units had been urged to nominate likely candidates. During the following month, the Commandant directed the Commanding Generals at San Diego and Parris Island to convene at each recruit depot a board of three officers to nominate up to one half of one percent of the recruits under training for selection as officer candidates. These prospective officers were required to be citizens, from 20 to 35 years of age, and physically fit.(64)

The early attempts to procure candidates through the recruit training depots suffered from a lack of coordination. Whereas Parris Island not only met its full quota but requested an increase, the board at San Diego was hard put to nominate even eight of 1,671 recruits. Needless to say, the West Coast board was "spurred on" to produce its quota.(65)

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps was trying to obtain qualified candidates through the Selective Service System. Men with college degrees or combinations of college training and practical experience were urged to volunteer for induction in the Marine Corps with the understanding that they would be assigned to an Officer Candidates' Class.(66)

Early in 1943, Marine planners predicted a shortage of officers unless some 1,500 seniors in the College Training Program were called to active duty before graduation. To prevent this, the Commandant authorized that the quotas for officer trainees assigned Parris Island and San Diego be increased from one half of one percent to one percent of recruit strength. Also, age limits were so extended that extremely well-qualified 19-year-olds might be accepted for candidate training.(67)

The anticipated officer shortage, however, failed to develop; and by August, in spite of the fact that voluntary enlistment for candidate training no longer was permitted, there was an overabundance of second lieutenants. Standards therefore, were raised until only noncommissioned officers with two years of college and a high degree of natural aptitude were eligible for the classes.(68) A further obstacle placed in the path of the officer candidate occurred when the Commandant in April 1943 established Candidates' Detachments at Camp Elliott and Camp Lejeune for the further screening of potential platoon leaders.(69) To earn his appointment, the noncommissioned officer was required to survive two rigorous courses of instruction, the Pre-Officer Candidate School (as the Candidates' Detachments were called after their consolidation at Camp Lejeune) and the Officer Candidates' School itself.

Although the junior officer shortage predicted for 1943 failed to materialize, the invasion of the Marianas in the summer of the following year caused the Marine Corps to revise upward its personnel estimates. In anticipation of even higher casualties, the Commandant authorized a reduction in the period of officer training. In addition, the course was thrown open to enlisted Marines of less than noncommissioned rank and to men with only one year of college who had served a year overseas. Time spent at the Pre-Officer Candidate School depended upon the individual's experience, for the potential candidate was given only enough basic training to enable him to grasp the military instruction which was to follow. Noncommissioned officers were not required to attend classes in subjects in which they already were proficient.(70)

The year 1945 saw a further revision of the officer candidate system. Since shortly before the outbreak of war, candidates, upon receiving their commissions, had been required to attend the Reserve Officer Course for additional instruction. Effective in January 1945, the two schools were combined into the Platoon Commanders' School. Initial screening of potential officers was accomplished in the Candidates' Refresher Course, which was the old Pre-Officer Candidate School under a new name.(71)

D. SPECIALIST OFFICERS

With the coming of World War II, techniques of warfare undreamed of a generation before arose to challenge the Marine Corps. Each field, whether electronics, transportation, or propaganda, seemed to require a great number of specially skilled officers. Since few Marines were trained in these fields, the Corps moved to commission individuals directly from civil life and to reappoint former officers.

Early in the war, Headquarters adopted a policy of appointing former officers to their old ranks with the exception of former first lieutenants with World War I service, who were made captains, and onetime second lieutenants over 30 years of age, who became first lieutenants.(72) This solution, however, did not provide for the more mature specialists who might hold positions of great responsibility. Therefore, the policy was adopted of appointing the younger individuals as second lieutenants, those from 30 to 36 as first lieutenants, and men 36 years and older as captains. In general, no specialist was to be commissioned in the field grades, but the Commandant was authorized to make exceptions to this rule.(73)

Former officers, of course, were not restricted to technical or scientific work. In the spring of 1942, for example, the Marine Corps planned to reappoint some 300 of them for various tasks including duty as aviation ground officers.(74)

By the summer of 1942, the Marine Corps had begun searching in earnest for engineers and motor transport officers. The burden of procuring qualified civilian applicants fell to the Recruiting Divisions. The unearthing of electronic experts, however, proved more difficult. The Director of the Marine Corps Reserve admitted that radar technicians would be hard to find and even suggested that the Marine Corps begin training its own personnel in the mysteries of this new device. In spite of these doubts, in January 1943 the procurement offices began working with the Navy to find the needed men. Electronics specialists, between the ages of 22 and 42, with college training or practical experience, were urged to apply directly to Headquarters for commissions in the Marine Corps Reserve. In addition, various professional societies were asked to recommend experienced members who might be interested in serving with the Leathernecks.(75)

In spite of these intensive efforts, direct recruiting did not provide the solution to this vexing problem. Instead, the Navy's offer to train Marines in its own electronics courses insured a sufficient flow of trained radar technicians. Graduates of the Officer Candidates' and Reserve Officers' Courses could be selected for preliminary schooling at Bowdoin College, Harvard, or Princeton, and for an advanced course in radar engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.(76)

Another source of commissioned specialists was the Coast and Geodetic Survey which by 1945 had assigned seven of its officers to serve with the Marines. After three weeks of indoctrination at Quantico, these officers joined artillery units, generally as survey officers.(77)

As the need for commissioned technicians diminished, the Commandant directed that no regular officer be allowed to specialize until he had completed at least one year of infantry service. In addition, the old requirement that regular officers serve two years before entering flight training was revived. (78)

V. THE KOREAN CONFLICT

With the coming of peace, the Marine Corps allowed the V-12 program to lapse and halted the wartime candidates' courses. During this period of transition from war to peace, the principal source of permanent Marine officers was the vast number of temporary and reserve officers appointed during the war. (79) As far as specialists were concerned, selections were made in much the same way. When demobilization caused a shortage of supply officers, the vacancies were filled from among these officers holding regular commissions or selected for regular appointments. (80) By July 1947, the first phase of the integration was nearing completion. According to the law of 18 April 1946, temporary and reserve officers had been declared eligible for permanent commissioned or commissioned warrant status. Temporary warrant officers and reserve officers serving in the warrant grade could be considered for appointment as permanent commissioned warrant officers. This was the forerunner of a stabilization rather than a procurement program, but plans also were being made for a normal, peacetime system of obtaining officers. (81)

Mainstay of the procurement program was still the Naval Academy which was commissioning in the Marine Corps about five percent of each graduating class. A second source of second lieutenants, both regular and reserve, was the NROTC. A few Marine trainees, mainly men who had transferred from the now defunct V-12, were enrolled in the early classes; but not until 1949 did the colleges begin to provide appreciable numbers of second lieutenants. Although there was no separate Marine Corps Reserve Officers' Training Corps, as had been envisaged in the law of 1926, a group of Marine instructors was assigned to each college training unit. (82) In general, however, the NROTC proved something of a disappointment; for the Marine Corps did not receive the anticipated number of officers from this source. Nevertheless, the program did provide a steady input of a limited number of officers each year. (83)

Meanwhile, the Platoon Leaders Class was revived on a more extensive scale than ever before. In the summer of 1947, the first postwar class convened at Quantico for six weeks of instruction. A total of 433 college students, most of them freshmen and sophomores, attended the encampment. As in the past, procurement teams visited certain accredited colleges; but under the new program applications also were accepted from students at schools which were not on the original approved list. (84)

Along with the Naval Academy and the NROTC, the Platoon Leaders' Class became the third major source of regular and reserve officers. (85)

There were, of course, other supplementary means of obtaining junior officers. In many instances, former enlisted Marines or seniors in the Army or Air Force ROTC units applied for commissions in the Corps. Such applications usually were accepted, but the Marine Corps attempted to avoid any appearance of luring potential officers away from the other services. (86)

The Corps, however, had not abandoned its time honored policy of offering commissions to outstanding enlisted men. First, there was the Meritorious Noncommissioned Officer program which provided for the appointment of certain regular Marines recommended by their commanding officers. Later, former meritorious noncommissioned officers no longer on active duty and reservists on extended tours were declared eligible for commissions. (87)

Prior to the Korean conflict, the Meritorious Noncommissioned Officer program had provided only a few officers, most of them veterans of World War II who had attended college under the G.I. Bill. Nevertheless, it served its purpose; for it was designed primarily as a means of permitting former enlisted men to resume a Marine Corps career in an officer status. With the conclusion of Korean hostilities, the number of officers appointed in this way dropped from 98 in fiscal year 1952 to four in 1955. No one was appointed in 1956, but 32 meritorious noncommissioned officers were awarded commissions in the following year. (88)

Another means of obtaining officers from the ranks was the Officer Candidate Screening Course (OCSC), established in the summer of 1949. Originally planned as an annual camp to test the leadership potential of a small group of talented enlisted men, the course was not as elaborate as the wartime candidates' classes. It was open to enlisted Marines with a college education or who had a GCT score of 120. Candidates were given four weeks in which to demonstrate their ability; those who indicated aptitude were commissioned and ordered to the Basic School for further training. (89)

In June 1950, when the North Korean Peoples' Army drove south across the 38th Parallel, the Officer Candidate Screening Course leaped into prominence as a ready means of providing junior officers. In September, the course was thrown open to reservists on active duty; and in January 1951 a call was issued for still more candidates. Both regulars and enlisted reservists on extended active duty who held degrees or could attain a minimum score of 120 on the General Classification Test, and who would be between 20 and 27 years of age on 1 July of that year, were eligible for the course. Under the terms of this memorandum,

2,025 enlisted men were recommended for officer training, 1,130 found qualified by examining boards, and 1,077 assigned to screening courses. By the end of hostilities in Korea, Marine reservists on inactive duty and former Marines could be accepted for this program.(90)

To speed the expansion of the Corps, Headquarters in January 1951 decided to appoint some 500 master sergeants, warrant officers, and commissioned warrant officers as temporary second lieutenants. Special consideration was given applicants who formerly had held commissions, but in general any senior noncommissioned officer or warrant officer who was less than 36 years of age and who had a GCT of 110 or higher could be recommended.(91)

The best feature of the program was its simplicity. Although the temporary officer agreed to serve only 17 months from the date of his appointment, he was not required to attend the Special Basic Course. In addition to being relieved of the administrative burden of sending him to MCS, Quantico for training, the Marine Corps could rely on the services of the temporary officer from the moment he accepted his commission. Because no time was lost in instruction, the 17 month tour of duty was the equivalent of 22 months' service by an officer obtained through any other program.(92) In spite of this obvious advantage, the temporary officer program was considered a wartime expedient, a means of obtaining additional lieutenants to be used only in an emergency.

The Korean conflict caused an increased demand for specialists and technicians. To meet this challenge, the Marine Corps employed two methods of officer procurement, the Warrant Officer and the Limited Duty Officer programs.

The term "warrant officer" is fairly new to the Corps. Not until 1943 were the picturesque titles of Chief Marine Gunner, Marine Gunner, Quartermaster Clerk and Pay Clerk replaced with the less descriptive Commissioned Warrant Officer or Warrant Officer. With demobilization at the end of the war against Japan, a large number of warrant officer specialists were lost to the Corps. Upon the outbreak of violence in Korea, the Marine Corps began scouring the enlisted ranks again for qualified men. To obtain the needed men as quickly as possible, the Commandant in 1951 began offering temporary appointments as warrant officers to technical sergeants and master sergeants who possessed critical skills.(93)

Authorized by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, the Limited Duty Officer program was established to provide officers in fields requiring considerable technical skill and training. Temporary officers, warrant officers, and senior noncommissioned officers were eligible for selection. To the temporary commissioned officer, who was generally a specialist, this plan meant an opportunity to regularize his status on a permanent basis, while it offered the warrant and noncommissioned officers an opportunity for advancement not found in the Warrant Officer program.

This new program offered a new incentive to the enlisted Marine, for it presented him an opportunity to enter the commissioned ranks and to advance within his field of specialization up to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In general, the program was open to those who held permanent appointments as warrant officers or enlisted men in the top two pay grades, who had at least ten years' active Naval service, and who were less than 37 years of age. The various fields in which a Marine might be commissioned included administration, intelligence, infantry, logistics, artillery, engineers, tanks and amphibian tractors, ordnance, communications, supply, food, motor transport, and aviation. (94) In short, the Marine Corps was trying to obtain as many specialists as possible from within its own ranks.

College students and graduates continued to be obtained through the Officer Candidate Course, Army, Navy, or Air Force ROTC systems, and the Platoon Leaders' Classes. Also, a small portion of each Naval Academy graduating class was commissioned in the Marine Corps.

An important administrative reform effected during the Korean struggle and retained afterwards was the establishment of permanent officer procurement billets in the field. This permitted better screening of applicants and insured continuous contact with the colleges and universities. Thus, it placed the Marine Corps in a better position to compete with the other services. From a public relations standpoint, this policy provided for smoother cooperation with college officials, as these officers served as a year-round source of information and publicity. (95)

VI. BETWEEN KOREA AND VIETNAM

Officer procurement after Korea was characterized by a gradual reduction and stabilization of needs rather than the abrupt demobilization which followed World War II. A major factor behind this situation was what turned out to be the permanent reestablishment of the 3d Marine Division on 7 January 1952. (96)

Overall, the procurement effort was trimmed and solidified as the Korean period programs were phased out; the last OCSC terminated in 1953 and the last temporary appointments were made in fiscal year 1954.(97) Also of note is the fact that the new reserve second lieutenants had to serve three years of active duty rather than the two years previously required.

New officer accessions (See Figure 1, page 21) from fiscal years 1957 through 1965 ran from a low of 1,675 to a high of 2,153 lieutenants. In analysis, these figures indicate a stabilization in the procurement effort and an end to wartime influence in accession levels despite the omnipresence of the "Cold War."

During this same period of stabilization, the number of program sources for accessions fluctuated from 13 to a maximum of 22 (including women officers). West Point and the Air Force Academy became regular sources. The Platoon Leaders' Class program expanded to embrace aviation and law candidates. Also, the Naval Scientific Education Program (NESEP) came into being along with the Marine Aviation Cadet (MARCAD) program. Other minor sources in the procurement spectrum included the Inter-Service Transfer (IST) program, restricted primarily to both regular and reserve technical specialists; the Former Officer (ForOff) program; and the Civilian College Graduate (CCG) program for enlisted men in reserve units. Traditionally, the procurement of officers continued from the noncommissioned ranks but with varying qualification criteria over the years.

Another interesting facet of this period is the fact that reserve accessions exceeded those of regulars between Korea and Vietnam resulting in a junior officer structure heavily endowed with reserve officers. This emphasis was and is not without its merits as a healthy number of reserve officers integrated and are still in the regular establishment after first-hand appreciation of the realities of a Marine officer's career. As a practical matter, the existence of an exclusively regular officer corps between wars became a thing of the past.

VII. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

After approximately a decade of "quiet Cold War" procurement, a new phase came to pass--"the hot Cold War." On 8 March 1965, the Marines landed in force in the Republic of Vietnam. Ultimately the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and supporting Force Troop elements were committed. The subsequent demand for new accessions rose to the extent that temporary officer programs were again effected. Accessions rose from a level of 4,907 in fiscal year 1966 to 5,452 in fiscal year 1967 (See Figure 2).

ACCESSIONS TO MARINE OFFICER STRENGTH FY 1957-1965(98)

SOURCE	FY-57	FY-58	FY-59	FY-60	FY-61	FY-62	FY-63	FY-64	FY-65	FY-65								
NAVAC	62	3.1	70	3.4	57	3.2	63	3.7	58	3.3	59	2.7	65	3.4	73	4.3	70	3.6
MILAC (REG)	-	-	-	-	7	.4	7	.4	4	.2	11	.5	7	.4	3	.2	6	.3
AFAC (REG)	-	-	-	-	1	.1	6	.4	2	.1	3	.1	5	.3	2	.1	2	.1
NROTC (REG)	188	9.5	176	8.6	215	12.1	195	11.5	169	9.6	166	7.7	171	9.1	125	7.5	159	8.3
NROTC (RES)	160	8.1	52	2.5	138	7.8	108	6.4	157	8.9	81	3.8	37	2.0	65	3.9	103	5.4
AROTC (RES)	9	.5	11	.5	5	.3	6	.4	3	.2	3	.1	3	.2	2	.1	8	.4
PLC (REG)	26	1.3	18	.9	23	1.3	25	1.5	25	.7	34	1.6	41	2.2	40	2.4	29	1.5
PLC (RES)	522	26.4	474	23.1	558	31.4	560	33.0	553	31.4	546	25.4	489	25.9	589	35.2	760	39.5
PLCAVN (RES)	-	-	*112	5.5	*76	4.3	*91	5.4	*120	6.8	*125	5.8	*92	4.9	*82	4.9	*118	6.1
PLCLAW (RES)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	.1	7	.3	18	.9	84	5.0	75	3.9
OCC (RES)	559	28.3	727	35.5	332	18.7	313	18.4	482	27.3	857	39.8	*571	30.3	248	14.8	*338	17.6
AOC (RES)	81	4.1	162	7.9	137	7.7	128	7.5	111	6.3	167	7.8	115	6.1	83	4.9	91	4.7
MNCO (REG)	32	1.6	47	2.3	30	1.7	46	2.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MNCO (RES)	-	-	43	2.1	-	-	19	1.1	32	1.8	38	1.8	38	2.0	26	1.5	37	1.9
NESEP (REG)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	.1	3	.2	11	.5	32	1.7	33	2.0	14	.7
LDO (REG)	7	.4	12	.6	14	.8	10	.6	4	.2	24	1.1	31	1.6	43	2.6	13	.7
NAVCAD (RES)	304	15.4	225	11.0	226	12.7	183	10.8	66	3.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MARCAD (RES)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	4.0	*113	5.2	226	12.0	227	13.5	184	9.6
FOROFF (REG)	2	.1	3	.1	2	.1	1	.1	2	.1	-	-	2	.1	-	-	-	-
CCG (RES)	-	-	3	.1	1	.1	-	-	4	.2	6	.3	-	-	6	.4	2	.1
IST (REG)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	.1	3	.2	1	.1	1	.1	1	.1	1	.1
IST (RES)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	.1	4	.2	-	-	1	.1	6	.4	5	.3
WOCC (RES)	23	1.2	26	1.3	29	1.6	26	1.5	21	1.2	26	1.2	31	1.6	19	1.1	26	.14

GRAND TOTAL 1975 2049 1775 699 1775 2153 1884 1675 1923

*Included in total for PLC (RES)
 #Includes 3 OCC (LAW)
 §Includes 1 OCC (LAW)

Figure 1
21

ACTUAL OFFICER ACCESSIONS (99)

<u>Source</u>	<u>FY 66</u>		<u>FY 67</u>		<u>FY 68</u>		<u>FY 69</u>	
	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>
<u>Direct Procurement</u>								
PLC	447	595	605	454	786	951	966	882
OCC/AOC/NFO	1,226	1,230	1,694	1,869	1,800	1,317	1,933	1,522
ECP	--	--	400	410	310	580	600	599
MARCAD	146	223	175	179	--	62	--	--
WOC	50	21	50	49	75	59	75	72
(Sub Total)	1,869	2,069	2,924	2,961	2,971	2,969	3,634	3,075
<u>Department of Navy Programs</u>								
NAVAC	80	80	87	86	102	85	85	111*
NROTC	232	235	239	189	240	183	195	168
(Sub Total)	312	315	326	275	342	268	280	279
Miscellaneous Programs	2,218	2,523	2,295	2,216	310	361	884	506
(WO/LDO)								
(SWAGS)								
(INTERSERVICE TRANSFER)								
(TEMPS)								
TOTAL	*5,119	4,907	*5,496	5,542	3,623	3,598	4,798	3,860

* Includes Military Academy and Air Force Academy

Figure 2

This officer buildup generated a temporary surfeit of lieutenants in inappropriate enlisted billets throughout the Marine Corps. Within a given command or activity, local readjustment in jobs helped somewhat; but in many cases, the newly promoted officers just held their enlisted billets until a transfer was appropriately effected. It was not unusual for a potential recruit to be talking to a gunnery sergeant at a recruiting booth in the morning and be addressing a second lieutenant that same afternoon.

No survey of officer procurement during this period would be complete without mention of the draft. The draft invariably eased or impeded the officer procurement effort according to its levies. If draft pressure was high, the procurement business was good. If the levies were low, the number of officer aspirants diminished.

In September 1963, President Kennedy signed an executive order that deferred married men from the draft.(100) Ultimately, response to commissioning programs became less enthusiastic throughout 1964 and the first half of 1965. However, as the draft pressure increased during the Vietnam buildup in the latter part of 1965 and 1966 and young married men lost their draft deferment, the situation eased. Officer selection officers diverted their attention from salesmanship to the new problem of handling the volume of officer applications effectively. In retrospect, the influence of General Hershey, Head of Selective Service, proved to be a provocative inducement to college boys for commissioned service, much to the delight of the officer recruiters across the nation.

Even though increased pressure eased the selling aspect of officer procurement temporarily, another problem arose to frustrate the selection teams, the ever rebellious "Vietniks." These protesters set up tables displaying their literature against U. S. involvement in Vietnam and conducted active demonstrations that many times became disorderly. The often long-haired and bearded demonstrators openly harassed officer procurement personnel of all services. In a number of cases, the military was refused permission to return to campus because of the possibility of causing future disturbances.(101)

An early sample of this type of activity is reflected in situations that developed in the New York area. A young officer selection officer, who had just returned from Vietnam and had been decorated for his service there, was again cited with a Navy Achievement Award for "combat" service in New York; his citation read in part:

"In April 1967, in full view of the President of Columbia University, senior Naval and Marine Corps officers, and national press and wire services, Captain [Donald K.] Angel skillfully and tactfully dealt with a militant student demonstration of great magnitude.

...he again exhibited extreme coolness during a demonstration at New Paltz, New York, which resulted in the arrest of twenty-nine students and external agitators." (102)

The long and short of officer selection duty soon became "Vietnam is only a small piece of the action."

As the war continued, both enlisted and officer recruiting became increasingly difficult. Anti-government reaction against the Vietnam War and the draft, among many other espoused issues, were the prominent reasons for developing a hostile recruiting environment. With the spread of protests and radicalism on the nation's campuses, including numerous violent clashes with local and state police and National Guardsmen, the recruiting climate deteriorated. Colleges and universities experienced violence never before realized in the history of the nation's educational institutions. ROTC buildings and campus research facilities involved in government research became popular targets for the protesters and rioters. Incidents of arson, vandalism, and bomb threats accompanied the rash of outbreaks on campus.

Consequently, as FY 1969 passed, the production of candidates for Marine Corps officer training fell well short of established goals. Aside from the generalized anti-war and anti-draft atmosphere, there were other contributing factors: the relatively high quotas caused by the expansion of the Marine Corps to meet the demands of the war; the prohibition of visiting a number of campuses for fear of causing violent reaction; and, on campuses which still permitted service recruiting, a distinct trend to relegate officer selection personnel to remote locations well out of sight of students.

Reviewing the candidate production and commissioned accession figures for FY 69, the civilian college campus programs were the main areas of concern. In the PLC program only 77% of the quota of 2,200 was realized.. This shortage affected three graduation year groups. The OCC program, with a quota of 2,679, scored only 76% attainment.*

* Resorting to measures to alleviate the poor procurement climate, a new OCC input source was instituted to attract promising two-year college men with an opportunity to finish college after commissioning and a period of satisfactory service.

NROTC results were also disappointing; only 168 officer accessions out of 195 programmed were attained. These candidate production and accession figures quickly prove how damaging the civilian campus climate really was. The PLC, OCC, and NROTC situation became one of the Commandant's most aggravating problems. Even though the OSO table of organization was increased by 14 additional officers, the prospects for FY 70 offered an even grimmer outlook. Further increase of campus disruption across the nation unhappily clouded hopes for improvement of an already bleak situation.(103)

VIII. MARINE AVIATION

Prior to 1911, Alfred A. Cunningham, the first Marine aviator, had tried his hand at several trades. While still in his teens, he had been a corporal in the Georgia Volunteer Infantry during the Spanish-American War. After completing his schooling and working for a time in a real estate office, he applied for a commission in the Marine Corps. He was appointed, trained at Parris Island, and assigned to the Marine Barracks, Philadelphia.

While stationed at Philadelphia, the young lieutenant became interested in aviation. He rented an airplane from a local civilian, obtained permission to test the craft at the Navy Yard, and began teaching himself to fly. Although he never could coax the plane into the air, Cunningham did not lose heart; instead he joined the Aero Club of Philadelphia to pursue his hobby. At last, he received orders to report to the Navy aviation camp at Annapolis for formal flight training. On 1 August 1912, after two hours and forty minutes of instruction, Cunningham soloed to become the first Marine Corps aviator.(104)

During this period of military aviation, officer procurement posed no problem, since it was necessary only to detail an interested officer to the Navy flying school. With the establishment of its aviation school at Pensacola in 1915, the Navy reserved a certain percentage of each class for Marine Corps officers and enlisted men. In general, the ratio of Marines to Naval personnel in these classes stood at about one-to-four.(105)

The procurement program, however, grew more complicated in 1916, when Congress authorized the establishment of a Marine Corps Reserve which was to include a class composed of aviators.(106) Not until 21 March 1917, less than three weeks before America entered World War I, did the Marine Corps finally take steps to organize its Reserve Flying Corps. Eligible for membership in this organization were former Marine pilots who wished to transfer from the Naval Flying Corps, reservists in other categories who learned to fly, surplus graduates of the Navy's aeronautic school, and trained

civilian airmen.(107) Since it had been in existence for so short a time, the Reserve Flying Corps was unable to provide trained flyers at the outbreak of hostilities; but it did serve as a means of obtaining commissioned pilots for the duration of the war.

In general, the Marine Corps in World War I followed a policy of commissioning its officers from among the best of its enlisted men, a plan also followed by Marine Aviation. (108) The future pilot officers first studied the theory of flying at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, then entered flight training at the Marine Flying Field, Miami, Florida. Those who passed both phases of the course were commissioned second lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps. There was, however, one minor exception to this policy as far as aviation was concerned. Certain graduates of the Student Army Training Corps were to be allowed to enter flight training; but the war ended before any officers could be obtained from this source.(109)

Following the signing of the Armistice, Marine Corps aviation continued to control the selection and training of pilots, both commissioned and enlisted. During the 1920s, Marine aviators were drawn from the permanent line officers of the Corps. Only those volunteers under 31 years of age who had completed two years of troop duty were eligible for flight training.(110)

In 1925, Congress again turned its attention to the problem of maintaining a Marine Corps Reserve. The law of 1916 was stricken from the books, and the Marine Corps was authorized to create a reserve establishment complete with aviation squadrons.(111) To become a reserve aviator was no easy task; for every applicant was interviewed and carefully investigated before he was allowed to enlist as a private for flight training. Not until the candidate had earned his gold wings was he commissioned a second lieutenant, Marine Corps Reserve.(112)

During the 1930s, a comparatively large number of reservists accepted the challenge of the skies. In fiscal year 1932, for example, 41 of them began the ground phase of their training in the various reserve squadrons throughout the country. Of this number, 28 passed and were ordered to Pensacola to complete their training. Some 19 naval aviators, graduates of Pensacola, were commissioned in the reserve and then called to a year's active duty.(113)

As the Axis threat became more imminent, it became apparent that closer cooperation was needed between the two services with the expansion of both the Navy and Marine Corps pilot training programs. The Marines, therefore, abandoned their pilot procurement program and, for the sake of efficiency,

began drawing their flyers from the Naval Aviation Cadet Program. After 1 July 1941, no person could enlist in the Marine Corps for pilot training; instead all candidates for the wings of a naval aviator entered the cadet program, and the Marine Corps received its quota of the graduates.(114)

Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Commandant urged the nomination of qualified officers and enlisted men for the aviation training course. Line officers were assigned to flight training; and enlisted pilots called Naval Aviation Pilots were offered commissions. Men serving with the rank of private first class or higher, nominated by their commanding officers for this program, could eventually be commissioned upon winning their wings. To become a cadet, an enlisted man was required to possess pertinent skills, to be less than 27 years of age, and to be certified as sound of health and temperament.(115)

In its attempt to procure qualified flyers, the Marine Corps obtained permission from the Civil Aeronautics Authority to enroll young men from the Civilian Pilot Training Program.(116) Commissions also were tendered to civilian aviators with two years' college training or equivalent experience. If necessary, the Marine Corps was willing to provide refresher training. The individual pilot's rank was to be determined by his "age, prominence, and experience."(117)

With the coming of war, Marine Corps Aviation needed pilots; but it also needed administrators, communications officers, and technicians to support the increasing number of squadrons. At first, it was decided to offer commissions as aviation ground officers to air cadets who had failed as pilots but still wanted to serve in the Marine Corps.(118) The number of officers obtained in this manner proved insufficient, and Marine Aviation began commissioning civilians as specialists. The Marine Corps wanted men under 40 years of age with special skills or managerial experience.(119) In brief, Aviation hoped to procure some 1,900 ground officers by appointing 673 civilians before 30 June 1943 and accepting 75 graduates of each Reserve Officers Class from February through June of that year.(120)

In spite of these measures, Marine Corps Aviation could not find enough officers in such fields as fighter direction and communications. The Commandant, therefore, in February 1944 authorized a quota of enlisted men to obtain temporary commissions through the Aviation Ground Officers School at Quantico. In screening the applicants, interviewing officers were directed to be especially alert for any signs of immaturity.(121) Many of the younger graduates of the Officer Candidates' Course, it seems, had lacked the judgment necessary for their ground assignments. For this reason, the Director of Plans and Policies later requested that no further

aviation ground officers be obtained through the candidate program, a recommendation approved by the Commandant.(122)

Following World War II, the chief means of procuring commissioned pilots remained the Naval Aviation Cadet Program, while specialists were commissioned through the Limited Duty and Warrant Officer programs. In 1955, two years after the Korean armistice, the Marine Corps began the Aviation Officer Candidate Course and Platoon Leaders' Class, Aviation. Except for stricter physical requirements, these courses were similar to those by which university graduates and college-trained men become ground officers. Instead of attending the Basic School, however, the aviation volunteers went directly into flight training upon the completion of their course.(123)

In fiscal year 1961, the Marine Aviation Cadet Program superseded the Naval Aviation Cadet Program for Marine aviation officer aspirants with only two years of college. This program continued actively until 1968 when the last of the MARCADs completed their training. Currently, the emphasis is upon obtaining civilian officer applicants with four years of college training.(124)

With the introduction of the F-4 Phantom and later the A-6 Intruder aircraft, a need for a separate flight officer program developed. In 1966 the Naval Flight Observer program came into being to train bombardiers/navigators, airborne radar intercept officers and electronic countermeasures/reconnaissance officers. These candidates receive the same basic flight preparation training as a Marine pilot and then attend specialized training in radar, electronics, navigation, aviation communications, nuclear weapons, meteorology, and combat information analysis. This "back-seat driver" program continues to attract many aviation applicants who are initially rejected for pilot training because of slightly imperfect eyesight.(125)

IX. WOMEN MARINES

The Marine Corps first began selecting officer candidates for the Marine Corps Women's Reserve in February 1943. In general, the early women's candidate classes were restricted to college graduates and young women with two years of college plus an additional two years of business or professional experience. Although the age limits had been set at 20 to 49 years, the Marine Corps preferred women between the ages of 28 and 35 for the first class. Especially in demand were executives or supervisors experienced in dealing with other women.(126)

Because of the need for women in industry, procurement and recruiting officers were not allowed to accept anyone employed in an essential occupation. Nor was intensive recruiting permitted in a critical manpower area.(127)

The first three candidate classes received their training at Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts, utilizing the facilities of the U. S. Naval Midshipmen's School (WR) where the Navy WAVES were training. The fourth class moved from Mount Holyoke College to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, when the Marine Corps Women's Reserve School complex was established there on 30 June 1943. Women in the first seven Officer Candidate Classes came directly from civilian life to officer training. Enlisted women with meritorious records and the necessary qualifications were admitted as candidates when the eighth class began in October 1943. In all, some 43 percent of Marine Corps Women's Reserve officers who served during World War II were commissioned from the ranks by way of the candidate school.(128)

Officers for the Marine Corps Women's Reserve were obtained from civilian life and from the enlisted ranks; but in either case, candidate training was required before the individual was commissioned. The chief factor which spurred women to enlist and to accept commissions seems to have been a sincere desire to aid in the war effort--to free a Marine to fight.(129)

In March 1945, an appraisal was made at Headquarters Marine Corps of the required qualifications and methods of selection of officer candidates. It was decided that the current methods of selection and requirements should be modified to insure the commissioning of officers of greater maturity. These changes were approved and were about to be put into effect when hostilities ended.(130)

By September 1946, the majority of the wartime Marine Corps Women's Reserve that had numbered approximately 1,000 officers and 18,000 enlisted had been released from active duty. About 300 women who had volunteered to aid in demobilization were retained at Headquarters Marine Corps and by the following year this number had decreased to about 150. During this period plans were made for creation of a permanent women's organization within the postwar Marine Corps. At last on 12 June 1948, passage of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act enabled Women Marines to serve the Marine Corps for the first time as members of the regular establishment. Women officers were then appointed in the Marine Corps as well as the Marine Corps Reserve.(131)

Currently, qualified young women who are interested in a Marine Corps career receive their initial training through the Woman Officer Candidate Course. This is an intensive seven-week pre-commission training program given at Quantico, Va. College graduates, junior or senior students, and outstanding enlisted women are eligible to apply for WOCC. After their appointment as second lieutenants, newly-commissioned officers then receive an additional nine weeks of advanced instruction in the Woman Officer Basic Course (WOBC), also at Quantico. As with the men, the majority of new officers receive reserve commissions and prepare for assignment to their new duty stations; a small number of high-ranking students are commissioned directly into the Marine Corps. The Woman Marines thus have a program patterned after the Platoon Leaders Class for male officers.(132)

In time of national emergency or need, the Commandant is authorized to establish quotas for the selection of temporary officers and warrant officers from the enlisted ranks. In short, the Marine Corps has developed a flexible system of supplementing the number of officers commissioned through its basic Woman Officer Candidate Course.(133)

X. CONCLUSION

Officer procurement or selection as the term is used in the Marine Corps has undergone many changes since 1775. No single individual is able to select the officer corps in toto as was the case with the first Commandant of the Marine Corps. Eighty-eight officers and 137 enlisted are involved as well as 48 civil service employees, not to mention the tremendous training establishment that supports the final making of a candidate into a successful accession.(134)

Even so, there is a relation between the one-man selection process and the big-business recruiting system extant today. Whether one or many are involved in the process of selection, the responsibility is a grave one, for the success or failure of the future leadership of the Corps depends upon the choosing.

Glossary of Abbreviations

AFAC -	U. S. Air Force Academy
AOC -	Aviation Officer Candidate
AROTC -	Army Reserve Officer Training Corps
CCG -	Civilian College Graduate (Reserve)
ECP -	Enlisted Commissioning Program
FOROFF -	Former Officer
IST -	Inter-Service Transfer
LDO -	Limited Duty Officer
MARCAD -	Marine Aviation Cadet
MILAC -	U. S. Military Academy
MNCO -	Meritorious Noncommissioned Officer
NAVAC -	U. S. Naval Academy
NAVCAD -	Naval Aviation Cadet
NESEP -	Naval Enlisted Scientific Education Program
NROTC -	Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
OCC -	Officer Candidate Course
PLC -	Platoon Leaders Class
PLCAVN -	Platoon Leaders Class Aviation
(REG) -	Regular
(RES) -	Reserve
SWAG -	Standard Written Agreement (Reserve Officer Contract Program)
TEMPS -	Temporary Officer
WOCC -	Woman Officer Candidate Class

Notes

General Files 1965-90-10, 1515-25, 1520-30-60, and 1525-25 were obtained through the National Archives. Files A3/1, P14-5/1, P14-5/2, and "Candidates Classes MCR" were drawn through the Officer Procurement Section, HQMC. The location of all other files or folders is given in the note.

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