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D R U G E N F O R C E M E N T A D M I N I S T R A T I O N 

a tradition of excellence 

1973-2003 

This book is dedicated to those DEA employees 

and their families who, with honor and courage, 

have led the way for those who follow.

Table of Contents 

1970-1975......................3 

1975-1980.....................24 

1980-1985.....................43 

1985-1990.....................58 

1990-1994.....................75 

1994-1998.....................90 

1998-2003...................115 

Acknowledgments 

DEA gratefully acknowledges 

the offices and employees who 

contributed photos, historical 

material and stories to this 30th 

Anniversary History Book. 

Many thanks to those people 

who helped create, compile and 

edit this book.



3 

In the spring and summer of 1973, 

the U.S. House of Representatives and 

the U.S. Senate heard months of 

testimony on Richard Nixon’s Reorganization 

Plan Number 2, which proposed 

the creation of a single federal 

agency to consolidate and coordinate 

the government’s drug 

control activities.

Drug use had not reached its alltime 

peak, but the problem was serious 

enough to warrant a serious 

response. 

The long, proud, and honorable tradition of federal drug law 

enforcement began in 1915 with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 

In the following decades, several federal agencies had 

drug law enforcement responsibilities. By the 1960s, the two 

agencies charged with drug law enforcement were the Bureau 

of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC) and the federal Bureau of 

Narcotics (FBN). It was during this period that America underwent 

a significant change. The introduction of drugs into 

American culture and the efforts to “normalize” drug use 

started to take a terrible toll on the nation. Nevertheless, American 

children could still walk to school in relative safety, worrying 

only about report cards or the neighborhood bully. Today 

however, as children approach their schools, they see 

barbed wire, metal detectors, and signs warning drug dealers 

that school property is a “drug free zone.” In too many communities, 

drug dealers and gunfire force decent, law-abiding 

citizens to seek refuge behind locked doors. 

In 1960, only four million Americans had ever tried drugs. 

Currently, that number has risen to over 74 million. Behind 

these statistics are the stories of countless families, communities, 

and individuals adversely affected by drug abuse and 

drug trafficking. 

Prior to the 1960s, Americans did not see drug use as acceptable 

behavior, nor did they believe that drug use was an inevitable 

fact of life. Indeed, tolerance of drug use resulted in 

terrible increases in crime between the 1960s and the early 

1990s, and the landscape of America has been altered forever. 

By the early 1970s, drug use had not yet reached its all-time 

peak, but the problem was sufficiently serious to warrant a 

serious response. Consequently, the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) was created in 1973 to deal with America’s 

growing drug problem. 

At that time, the well-organized international drug trafficking 

syndicates headquartered in Colombia and Mexico had not 

yet assumed their place on the world stage as the preeminent 

drug suppliers. All of the heroin and cocaine, and most of the 

marijuana that entered the United States was being trafficked 

by lesser international drug dealers who had targeted cities 

and towns within the nation. Major law enforcement investigations, 

such as the French Connection made by agents in 

the DEA’s predecessor agency, the Bureau of Narcotics and 

Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), graphically illustrated the complexity 

and scope of America’s heroin problem. 

4 

In the years prior to 1973, several important developments 

took place which would ultimately have a significant impact 

on the DEA and federal drug control efforts for years to come. 

By the time that the DEA was created by Executive Order in 

July 1973 to establish a single unified command, America was 

beginning to see signs of the drug and crime epidemic that lay 

ahead. In order to appreciate how the DEA has evolved into 

the important law enforcement institution it is today, it must 

be understood that many of its programs have roots in predecessor 

agencies. 

On December 14, 1970, at the White House, the 

International Narcotic Enforcement Officers’ Association 

(INEOA) presented to President Nixon 

a “certificate of special honor in recognition of the 

outstanding loyalty and contribution to support narcotic 

law enforcement.” Standing with President Nixon were 

(from left) John E. Ingersoll, Director of BNDD; John 

Bellizzi, Executive Director of INEOA; and Matthew 

O’Conner, President of INEOA. 

DEA Special Agents DEA Budget 

1973..........1,470 1973..........$74.9 million 

1975..........2,135 1975..........$140.9 million

BNDD 

John E. Ingersoll 

Director, BNDD 

1968-1973 

John E. Ingersoll served as Director of the U.S. Bureau 

of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) from 1968 

until 1973. He began his career as a patrolman and 

then sergeant for the Oakland, California, Police 

Department from 1956 until 1961, when he became the 

Director of Field Services for the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). He served with 

the IACP until 1966, when he became the chief of 

police for Charlotte, North Carolina, until his appointment 

as Director of BNDD in 1973. He was also the 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations Commission 

on Narcotic Drugs from 1969 to 1973. From 1973 to 

1993, Mr. Ingersoll worked for the IBM Corporation, 

serving as Director of Security for IBM’s International 

Business Unit and the IBM World Trade Subsidiary. 

Since April 1993, he has worked as an independent 

consultant to business and government. 

In 1968, with the introduction into Congress of Reorganization 

Plan No. 1, President Johnson proposed combining two 

agencies into a third new drug enforcement agency. The action 

merged the Bureau of Narcotics, in the Treasury Department, 

which was responsible for the control of marijuana and 

narcotics such as heroin, with the Bureau of Drug Abuse 

Control (BDAC), in the Department of Health, Education, 

and Welfare, which was responsible for the control of dangerous 

drugs, including depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogens, 

such as LSD. The new agency, the Bureau of Narcotics 

and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), was placed under the 

Department of Justice, which is the government agency primarily 

concerned with federal law enforcement. 

5 

Before the creation of 

the DEA in 1973, 

multiple law enforcement 

and intelligence organizations 

carried out federal 

drug enforcement policies. 

According to the Reorganization Plan, “the Attorney General 

will have full authority and responsibility for enforcing the 

federal laws relating to narcotics and dangerous drugs. The 

BNDD, headed by a Director appointed by the Attorney General, 

would: 

(1) consolidate the authority and preserve the experience and 

manpower of the Bureau of Narcotics and Bureau of 

Drug Abuse Control; 

(2) work with state and local governments in their crackdown 

on illegal trade in drugs and narcotics, and help to train 

local agents and investigators; 

(3) maintain worldwide operations, working closely with other 

nations, to suppress the trade in illicit narcotics and 

marijuana; and 

(4) conduct an extensive campaign of research and a nationwide 

public education program on drug abuse and its 

tragic effects.” 

The BNDD became the primary drug law enforcement agency 

and concentrated its efforts on both international and interstate 

activities. By 1970, the BNDD had nine foreign offices—in 

Italy, Turkey, Panama, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Thailand, 

Mexico, France, and Colombia—to respond to the dynamics 

of the drug trade. Domestically, the agency initiated 

a task force approach involving federal, state, and local officers. 

The first such task force was set up in New York City. 

In addition, the BNDD established Metropolitan Enforcement 

Groups, which were based on the regional enforcement 

concept that provided for sharing undercover personnel, 

equipment, and other resources from different jurisdictions. 

The BNDD provided training and operational support for 

these units. By February 1972, the BNDD’s agent strength 

had grown to 1,361, its budget had more than quadrupled, 

and its foreign and domestic arrest totals had doubled. In 

addition, the BNDD had regulatory control over more than 

500,000 registrants licensed to distribute licit drugs, and it 

had six sophisticated forensic labs.

ABOVE: With Proclamation 3981, President 

Richard Nixon designated the week of May 24 as 

Drug Abuse Prevention Week in 1970. 

BELOW: Vol.III No.I BNDD Bulletin 

6 

ODALE 

Myles J. Ambrose 

Director, ODALE 

1972-1973 

Myles J. Ambrose 

Director 

tice by Executive Order 11641. 

ODALE 

On January 28, 1972, President Nixon created the Office of Drug 

Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE), within the Department of Jus 

The Office was headed by Myles 

Ambrose, who had served as U.S. Commissioner of Customs at the 

Treasury Department from 1969 until 1972. As Director of ODALE, 

Mr. Ambrose served as Special Assistant Attorney General and as 

Special Consultant to the President. ODALE was established for an 

18-month period as an experimental approach to the problem of 

drug abuse in America. During that time, ODALE conducted intensive 

operations throughout the country, then evaluated their impact 

on heroin trafficking at the middle and lower distribution levels. 

ODALE’s objective was “to bring substantial federal resources to 

bear on the street-level heroin pusher.” 

Organizationally, the office drew heavily upon the expertise of existing 

federal law enforcement agencies to coordinate and focus resources 

and manpower. ODALE programs involved close, fulltime 

working relationships among participating federal, state, and 

local officers who, while reporting administratively to their respective 

agencies, took direction from ODALE. 

ODALE provided common office space for the personnel assigned 

to it, and all salaries and other costs were borne by the parent 

organization on a nonreimbursable basis. Justice Department entities 

involved included the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 

Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Marshals 

Service, the Tax Division, and offices of the U.S. Attorneys in the 

cities where the heroin problem was concentrated. Treasury Department 

entities included the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau 

of Customs, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 

addition, non-law enforcement federal agencies contributing personnel 

and other assistance included the Atomic Energy Commission, 

the U.S. Air Force, the Environmental Protection Agency, and 

the Interstate Commerce Commission. 

By 1972, ODALE headquarters had 79 authorized positions and 

nine regional offices. It targeted street-level drug dealers through 

special grand juries and pooled intelligence data for federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies. Regional offices were based in 

Los Angeles, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, Chicago, Cleveland, 

Atlanta, New York City, and Philadelphia. ODALE task forces 

operated in 38 target cities through investigation-prosecution teams 

and special grand juries which considered indictments. 

In 1998, Mr. Ambrose was with Arter and Hadden, LLP, in Washington, 

D.C.

Bureau of Prohibition 

Department of the Treasury 

1927-1930 

Bureau of Internal Revenue 


1915-1927 

Bureau of Narcotics 


1930-1968 

Bureau of Drug Abuse Control 

Food & Drug Administration 

Dept. of Health, Education & 

Welfare 

1966-1968 

Foreign Offices Opened 

DEA Genealogy 

Bureau of Narcotics and 

Dangerous Drugs 

Department of Justice 

1968-1973 

7 

U.S. Customs Service 

(Drug Investigations) 


Office of National Narcotics 

Intelligence 


Office of Drug Abuse Law 

Enforcement 

(ODALE) 


Narcotics Advance Research 

Management Team 

Executive Office of the President 

Drug Enforcement 

Administration 


1973 

1960 Paris, France 

1960 Rome, Italy 1970 Madrid, Spain 1972 New Dehli, India 

1961 Istanbul, Turkey 1970 Manila, Philippines 1972 Panama City, Panama 

1963 Bangkok, Thailand 1970 Santiago, Chile 1972 Quito, Ecuador 

1973 Islamabad, Pakistan 

1963 Mexico City, Mexico 1970 Tokyo, Japan 

1963 Monterrey, Mexico 1971 Ankara, Turkey 1973 Mazatlan, Mexico 

1963 Hong Kong 1971 Asuncion, Paraguay 1973 Ottawa, Canada 

1963 Singapore 1971 Caracas, Venezuela 1974 Guayaquil, Equador 

1966 Lima, Peru 1971 Chiang Mai, Thailand 1974 Karachi, Pakistan 

1966 Seoul, S. Korea 1971 Brasilia, Brazil 1974 Kingston. Jamaica 

1969 Guadalajara, Mexico 1971 Hermosillo, Mexico 1974 San Jose, Costa Rica 

1974 Songkhla, Thailand 

1970 Buenos Aires, Argentina 1971 Milan, Italy 

1970 Frankfurt, Germany 1972 Bogota, Colombia 1974 The Hague, Netherlands 

1974 Vienna, Austria 

1970 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 1972 Bonn, Germany 

1970 London, England 1972 Brussels, Belgium 

1972 La Paz, Bolivia

New York Task Force (1970) 

1970: Bruce E. Jensen, Chief, 

New York Drug Enforcement 

Task Force, explained how 

the prototype of the Task 

Force began with 43 

investigators from 

federal, state, and city 

personnel, along 

with a small 

support staff. 

In 1970, the first narcotics task force was established in 

New York under the auspices of the BNDD to maximize 

the impact of cooperating federal, state, and local 

law enforcement elements working on complex drug 

investigations. Bruce Jensen, former chief of the New 

York Drug Enforcement Task Force, described it “not 

as a monument...but a foundation firm enough to withstand 

the test of time.” At the time, heroin was a significant 

problem, and law enforcement officials were 

seeking ways to reduce availability and identify and prosecute 

those responsible for heroin trafficking. Federal, 

state, and municipal law enforcement organizations put 

aside rivalries and agreed to collaborate within the framework 

of the New York Joint Task Force. The task force 

program also became an essential part of the DEA’s 

operations and reflected the belief that success is only 

possible through cooperative investigative efforts. The 

BNDD, the New York State Police, and the New York 

City Police Department contributed personnel to work 

with Department of Justice lawyers and support staff. 

The rationale behind the Task Force was that each representative 

brought different and valuable perspectives 

and experiences to the table and that close collaboration 

among the membership could result in cross-training 

and the sharing of expertise. Since then, the Task 

Force expanded from the original 43 members. In 1971 

it increased to 172 members, and by 2003 it had 211 law 

enforcement personnel assigned. 

8 

In February 1972, the New York Joint Task Force seized 

$967,000 during a Bronx arrest. New York City Police 

Captain Robert Howe (left) and BNDD agent Theodore L. 

Vernier are shown counting the money. 

In April 1973, New York City Police and federal agents 

arrested 69 drug traffickers who were believed to be 

capable of distributing 100 kilograms of cocaine a week.

Comprehensive Drug Abuse 

Prevention and Control Act 

(1970) 

In response to America’s growing drug problem, Congress 

passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), Title 

II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 

Control Act of 1970. It replaced more than 50 pieces of 

drug legislation, went into effect on May 1, 1971, and 

was enforced by the BNDD, the DEA’s predecessor 

agency. This law, along with its implementing regulations, 

established a single system of control for both narcotic 

and psychotropic drugs for the first time in U.S. 

history. 

It also established five schedules that classify controlled 

substances according to how dangerous they are, their 

potential for abuse and addiction, and whether they possess 

legitimate medical value. Thirty three years later, 

the CSA, though amended on several occasions, remained 

the legal framework from which the DEA derived 

its authority. 

Members of a 1972 Compliance Investigator class were 

trained in drug identification. 

Diversion Control Program (1971) 

1970: BNDD’s Compliance Investigators frequently found 

that pharmacy violators of narcotics and drug laws also 

lacked professional responsibility in other areas. The 

unsavory sanitary conditions of the storage room pictured 

here were found during a BNDD pharmacy investigation 

in Louisiana. 

In the 1969 U.S. Senate hearings on the Controlled Sub- Thus, the controls mandated by the CSA encompassed 

stances Act (CSA), witnesses estimated that 50 percent scheduling, manufacturing, distributing, prescribing, imof 

the amphetamine being produced annually during the porting, exporting, and other related activities. They also 

1960s had found its way into the illicit drug traffic. Fol- provided the BNDD with the legal tools needed to deal 

lowing the passage of the CSA in 1970, it was impera- with the diversion problem as it existed at that time. Prior 

tive that the U.S. Government establish mechanisms to to the CSA, investigations involving the diversion of leensure 

that this growing diversion of legal drugs into the gitimate pharmaceuticals were conducted solely by speillicit 

market be addressed. In 1970, over two billion dos- cial agents as part of their enforcement activities. Howage 

units of amphetamine and methamphetamine were ever, shortly after implementation of the CSA, BNDD 

producing excessive amounts of pharmaceuticals. management recognized that the investigation of diver 

9

sion cases differed significantly from investigation of traditional 

narcotics cases. 

In late 1971, the Compliance Program, later renamed 

the Diversion Control Program, was created to provide 

a specialized work force that could focus exclusively on 

the diversion issue and take full advantage of the controls 

and penalties established by the CSA. 

This work force developed an in-depth knowledge of 

the legitimate pharmaceutical industry and the investigative 

techniques needed to make cases that were essential 

to investigate legitimate organizations and professionals 

engaged in drug diversion. The program was 

placed under the BNDD’s Office of Enforcement and 

staffed by compliance investigators, later called diversion 

investigators. 

The first major challenge these investigators faced was 

the extraordinary amount of amphetamines and barbiturates 

being diverted at the manufacturer and distributor 

levels. The year the CSA went into effect, over 2,000 

provisional registrations were issued to manufacturers 

and distributors who had been operating under the 

Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 and the Drug Abuse 

Control Amendments. In order to stem the diversion 

problem, it was necessary to enlist the support of manufacturers, 

wholesalers, distributors, and pharmacists for 

regular inspections of records and premises. It was also 

necessary to establish a system of registration to ensure 

that law enforcement investigators had access to the 

Prevent 

drug abuse 

8c United Staes Postage 

10 

records and physical plants maintained by those responsible 

for the manufacture and distribution of drugs. 

The first inspections of registrants revealed instances 

where drug handlers were operating out of basements 

and garages with little or no security and were unable to 

account for the receipt or distribution of the drugs they 

handled. In order to ensure that the diversion of dangerous 

drugs did not continue, it was critical that meaningful 

punitive measures could be taken against the minority 

of registrants responsible for the diversion of drugs 

into the illegal market. Offenders were given the option 

of either surrendering their controlled substances registration 

or instituting strict controls necessary to prevent 

diversion in their offices and organizations. Establishments 

and individuals who continued to violate the law 

were subject to criminal, civil, or administrative actions. 

As the program developed, it became clear that the diversion 

of drugs was not simply a domestic issue. It became 

essential that controls on international supplies of 

legal drugs also be established. In the early 1970s, there 

were several examples of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 

drug manufacturers becoming the main suppliers of illicit 

drugs, such as amphetamine, to the black market in 

the United States. Through revocation of drug manufacturers’ 

export licenses, the BNDD, and then the DEA, 

were able to successfully reduce the influx of illegal licit 

drugs into the United States. 

Drug Abuse Prevention 

Commemorative 

U.S. Postage Stamp 

On October 4, 1971, the U.S. Postal Service issued a stamp 

to commemorate the Prevention efforts of the Bureau of 

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. It was designed by 

Suzanne Rice and K. Gardner Perine of the BNDD Graphic 

Section.

French Connection 

French Connection (1971-1972) 

Diplomat-trafficker Mauricio Rosales, At Idlewild Airport (now JFK) in New Bureau of Narcotics agents who worked 

the Guatemalan ambassador to Belgium, York, Etienne Tarditi, a French Corsican on Rosales case pose with suitcases 

was using his diplomatic status to trafficker (trenchcoat),. He was coming filled with heroin. 

smuggle in 100 kilos of heroin in these to meet his drug courier, help deliver 

three suitcases. heroin to New York gangsters, and collect 

payment. 

Illegal heroin labs were first discovered near Marseilles, France, 

in 1937. These labs were run by the legendary Corsican gang 

leader Paul Carbone. For years, the French underworld had 

been involved in the manufacturing and trafficking of illegal 

heroin abroad, primarily in the United States. It was this heroin 

network that eventually became known as the French Connection. 

Historically, the raw material for most of the heroin consumed 

in the United States came from Turkey. Turkish farmers 

were licensed to grow opium poppies for 

sale to legal drug companies, 

but many sold 

their excess to 

the underworld 

market, where it 

was manufactured 

into heroin and transported 

to the United 

States. It was refined in Corsican laboratories in Marseilles, 

one of the busiest ports in the western Mediterranean. 

Marseilles served as a perfect shipping point for all types of 

illegal goods, including the excess opium that Turkish farmers 

cultivated for profit. 

The convenience of the port at Marseilles and the frequent 

arrival of ships from opium-producing countries made it easy 

to smuggle the morphine base to Marseilles from the Far East 

or the Near East. The French underground would then ship 

large quantities of heroin from Marseilles to Manhattan, 

New York. 

11 

The first significant post-World War II seizure was made in 

New York on February 5, 1947, when seven pounds of heroin 

were seized from a Corsican seaman disembarking from a vessel 

that had just arrived from France. 

It soon became clear that the French underground was increasing 

not only its participation in the illegal trade of opium, 

but also its expertise and efficiency in heroin trafficking. On 

March 17, 1947, 28 pounds of heroin were found on the French 

liner, St. Tropez. On January 7, 1949, more than 50 pounds of 

opium and heroin were seized on the French ship, 

Batista. 

The first major French Connection 

case occurred in 1960. In 

June, an informant told a drug 

agent in Lebanon that Mauricio 

Rosal, the Guatemalan Ambassador 

to Belgium, the Netherlands, 

and Luxembourg, was smuggling 

morphine base from Beirut, Lebanon, to Marseilles. 

Narcotics agents had been seizing about 200 pounds of heroin 

in a typical year, but intelligence showed that the Corsican 

traffickers were smuggling in 200 pounds every other week. 

Rosal alone, in one year, had used his diplomatic status to 

bring in about 440 pounds. 

The FBN’s 1960 annual report estimated that from 2,600 

to 5,000 pounds of heroin were coming into the United 

States annually from France. The French traffickers 

continued to exploit the demand for their illegal product,

and by 1969, they were supplying the United States with 

80 to 90 percent of the heroin consumed by addicts. The 

heroin they supplied was approximately 85 percent pure. 

Because of this increasing volume, heroin became readily 

available throughout the United States. In an effort to 

limit the source, U.S. officials went to Turkey to negotiate 

the phasing out of opium production. Initially, the 

Turkish Government agreed to limit their opium production 

starting with the 1968 crop. 

Following five subsequent years of concessions, combined 

with international cooperation, the Turkish government 

finally agreed in 1971 to a complete ban on the 

growing of Turkish opium, effective June 30, 1972. 

During these protracted negotiations, law enforcement 

personnel went into action. One of the major roundups 

began on January 4, 1972, when BNDD agents and 

French authorities seized 110 pounds of heroin at the 

Paris airport. Subsequently, traffickers Jean-Baptiste 

.Croce and Joseph Mari were arrested in Marseilles. 

In February 1972, French traffickers offered a U.S. Army Sergeant 

$96,000 to smuggle 240 pounds of heroin into the United 

States. He informed his superior who in turn notified the 

BNDD. As a result of this investigation, five men in New 

York and two in Paris were arrested with 264 pounds of heroin, 

February 14, 1973: A 20-kilo heroin seizure in Paris, 

France. Pictured left to right are,S/A Pierre Charette, S/A 

Kevin Finnerty, and French anti-drug counterparts. 

12 

From a 1973 French Connection seizure in France, (pictured 

above) are 210 pounds of heroin worth $38 million . 

which had a street value of $50 million. In a 14-month period, 

starting in February 1972, six major illicit heroin laboratories 

were seized and dismantled in the suburbs of Marseilles by 

French national narcotics police in collaboration with U.S. 

drug agents. On February 29, 1972, French authorities seized 

the shrimp boat, Caprice de Temps, as it put to sea near 

Marseilles heading towards Miami. It was carrying 415 kilos 

of heroin. Drug arrests in France skyrocketed from 57 in 1970 

to 3,016 in 1972. The French Connection investigation demonstrated 

that international trafficking networks were best 

disabled by the combined efforts of drug enforcement 

agencies from multiple countries. In this case, agents 

from the United States, Canada, Italy, and France had 

worked together to achieve success. 

First Female Special Agents 

1933: Mrs. Elizabeth Bass was appointed the first of 

many female narcotics agents in the United States and 

served as District Supervisor in Chicago. A longtime 

friend of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, she played a 

prominent role in gaining political support for the 

Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. 

1971: The DEA’s predecessor agency, the BNDD, 

became one of the first federal agencies to implement 

a program for hiring female special agents. 

1973: Ms. Mary Turner became the first female DEA 

special agent to graduate from the DEA’s training 

program. She finished first in her class. 

1974: Twenty-three female special agents were 

working in DEA field offices throughout the United 

States.

Creation of the DEA (July 1, 1973) 

In 1973, President 

Richard Nixon 

signed the Executive 

Order which created 

the DEA. 

No. 11727 

July 10, 1973, 38 F.R. 18357 

DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT 

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, which becomes effective on July 1, 1973, among other things establishes a Drug Enforcement 

Administration in the Department of Justice. In my message to the Congress transmitting that plan, I stated that all functions of the Office 

for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (established pursuant to Executive Order No. 11641 of January 28, 1972) and the Office of National 

Narcotics Intelligence (established pursuant to Executive Order No. 16676 of July 27, 1972) would, together with other related functions be 

merged in the new Drug Enforcement Administration. 

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 5317 of 

title 5 of the United States Code, as amended, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. The Attorney General, to the extent permitted by law, is authorized to coordinate all activities of executive branch departments 

and agencies which are directly related to the enforcement of laws respecting narcotics and dangerous drugs. Each department and agency of 

the Federal Government shall, upon request and to the extent permitted by law, assist the Attorney General in the performance of functions 

assigned to him pursuant to this order, and the Attorney General may, in carrying out those functions, utilize the services of any other 

agencies, federal and state, as may be available and appropriate. 

Sec. 2. Executive Order No. 11641 of January 28, 1972, 1 is hereby revoked and the Attorney General shall provide for the reassignment 

of the functions of the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and for the abolishment of that Office. 

Sec. 3. Executive Order No. 11676 of July 27, 1972, 1 is hereby revoked and the Attorney General shall provide for the reassignment of the 

functions of the Office of Narcotics Intelligence and for the abolishment of that Office. 

Sec. 4. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 11708 of March 23, 1973, 2 as amended, placing certain positions in level IV of the Executive 

Schedule is hereby further amended by deleting— 

(1) “(6) Director, Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, 

Department of Justice”; and 

(2) “(7) Director, Office of Narcotics Intelligence, 

Department of Justice.” 

Sec. 5. The Attorney General shall provide for the winding up of the affairs of the two offices and for the reassignment of their functions. 

Sec 6. This order shall be effective as of July 1, 1973. 

Richard Nixon 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

July 6, 1973 

In 1973, President Richard Nixon declared “an all-out 

global war on the drug menace” and sent Reorganization 

Plan No. 2 to Congress. “Right now,” he pointed 

out, “the federal government is fighting the war on drug 

abuse under a distinct handicap, for its efforts are those 

of a loosely confederated alliance facing a resourceful, 

elusive, worldwide enemy. Certainly, the cold-blooded 

underworld networks that funnel narcotics from suppliers 

all over the world are no respecters of the bureaucratic 

dividing lines that now complicate our anti-drug 

efforts.” 

13 

In the spring and summer of 1973, the U.S. House of 

Representatives and the U.S. Senate heard months of 

testimony on President Nixon’s Reorganization Plan 

Number 2, which proposed the creation of a single federal 

agency to consolidate and coordinate the 

government’s drug control activities. 

At that time, the BNDD, within the Department of Justice, 

was responsible for enforcing the federal drug laws. 

However, the U.S. Customs Service and several other 

Justice entities (ODALE and the Office of National

Narcotics Intelligence) were also responsible for various aspects 

of federal drug law enforcement. Of great concern to the 

Administration and the Congress were the growing availability 

of drugs in most areas of the United States, the lack of 

coordination and the perceived lack of cooperation between 

the U.S. Customs Service and the BNDD, and the need for 

better intelligence collection on drug trafficking organizations. 

According to the final report from the Senate Committee on 

Government Operations issued on October 16, 1973, the benefits 

anticipated from the creation of the DEA included: 

1. Putting an end to the interagency rivalries that have undermined 

federal drug law enforcement, especially the rivalry 

between the BNDD and the U.S. Customs Service; 

2. Giving the FBI its first significant role in drug enforcement 

by requiring that the DEA draw on the FBI’s expertise in 

combatting organized crime’s role in the trafficking of illicit 

drugs; 

3. Providing a focal point for coordinating federal drug enforcement 

efforts with those of state and local authorities, 

as well as with foreign police forces; 

4. Placing a single Administrator in charge of federal drug law 

enforcement in order to make the new DEA more accountable 

than its component parts had ever been, thereby safeguarding 

against corruption and enforcement abuses; 

5. Consolidating drug enforcement operations in the DEA and 

establishing the Narcotics Division in Justice to maximize 

coordination between federal investigation and prosecution 

efforts and eliminate rivalries within each sphere; and 

6. Establishing the DEA as a superagency to provide the momentum 

needed to coordinate all federal efforts related to 

drug enforcement outside the Justice Department, especially 

the gathering of intelligence on international narcotics 

smuggling. 

14 

DEA 

John R. Bartels, Jr. 

DEA Administrator 

1973-1975 

On September 12, 1973, the White House selected John R. 

Bartels, Jr., a native of Brooklyn, New York, a former federal 

prosecutor, and Deputy Director of the ODALE, to be the 

DEA’s first Administrator. He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate 

on October 4, 1973. Prior to his employment with the 

ODALE and the DEA, Mr. Bartels had been an Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, Southern District of New York, from 1964-1968. 

From 1969-1971, he was an Adjunct Professor, Rutgers University 

School of Law. From 1972-1973, Mr. Bartels was the 

Chief of the Organized Crime Strike-Force, U.S. Department 

of Justice, Newark, New Jersey; Counsel to Governor Nelson 

Rockefeller; and Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. 

Department of Justice, Criminal Division. He was later a 

delegate for the United Nations Commission on Narcotic 

Drugs in 1974. He currently resides in White Plains, New 

York. 

Early Developments in the DEA 

When John R. Bartels, Jr., was confirmed as the DEA’s first 

Administrator on October 4, 1973, he had two goals for the 

new agency: (1) to integrate narcotics agents and U.S. Customs 

agents into one effective force; and (2) to restore public 

confidence in narcotics law enforcement. From the very beginning, 

Mr. Bartels was faced with the unenviable task of 

unifying the efforts of several drug law enforcement entities. 

One of the most serious obstacles arose from conflicting philosophies 

of various agencies, particularly the BNDD and the 

U.S. Customs Service. To ease the process, U.S. Customs 

agents were placed in top positions throughout the DEA. For 

example, Fred Rody, Regional Director in Miami, became the 

DEA’s Deputy Administrator in December 1979; John Lund 

was appointed as Deputy Assistant Administrator; and John 

Fallon named as Regional Director in New York. Administrator 

Bartels issued specific instructions to federal narcotics 

agents: “This Statement of Policy outlines the measures taken 

by the Drug Enforcement Administration to prevent incidents 

which might infringe on individual rights or jeopardize the 

successful prosecution of a case. The guidelines require clearcut 

lines of command and control in enforcement situations 

and stress that operations must be carried out in a manner 

that is legally correct, morally sound, with full respect for the 

civil rights, human dignity of persons involved, and the sanctity 

of the home.” The guidelines also restricted vehicular 

arrests and prohibited participation in raids by non-law enforcement 

personnel.

Creation of the DEA Intelligence 

Program (1973) 

Intelligence had long been recognized as an essential element 

in the success of any investigative or law enforcement agency. 

Accurate and up-to-date information was required to assess 

the operations and vulnerabilities of criminal networks, to 

interdict drugs in a systematic way, to forecast new methods of 

trafficking, to evaluate the impact of previous activities, and to 

establish long-range drug strategies and policies. Included in 

the DEA mission was a mandate for drug intelligence. The 

DEA’s Office of Intelligence came 

into being on July 1, 1973, upon implementation 

of Presidential 

Reorganization Plan No. 2. The Code 

of Federal Regulations charged the 

Administrator of the DEA with: 

The development and maintenance 

of a National Narcotics Intelligence 

system in cooperation with federal, 

state, and local officials, and the provision 

of narcotics intelligence to 

any federal, state, or local official that 

the Administrator determines has a 

legitimate official need to have access 

to such intelligence. 

To support this mission, specific functions 

were identified as follows: 

• Collect and produce intelli 

George M. Belk 

Assistant Administrator for Intelligence 

July 1973-July 31, 1975 

gence to support the Administrator 

and other federal, state, and local agencies; 

• Establish/maintain close working relationships with all 

agencies that produce or use drug intelligence; 

• Increase the efficiency in the reporting, analysis, storage, 

retrieval, and exchange of such information; and 

• Undertake a continuing review of the narcotics intelligence 

effort to identify and correct deficiencies. 

The DEA divided drug intelligence into three broad categories: 

tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical intelligence provides 

immediate support to investigative efforts by identifying 

traffickers and movement of drugs. Operational intelligence 

provides analytical support to investigations and structuring 

organizations. Strategic intelligence focuses on developing a 

comprehensive and current picture of the entire system by 

which drugs are cultivated, produced, transported, smuggled, 

and distributed around the world. These definitions 

remain valid in 1998. 

15 

To build upon its drug intelligence mandate in 1973, the 

DEA’s Intelligence Program consisted of two major 

elements: the Office of Intelligence at Headquarters and 

the Regional Intelligence Units (RIU) in domestic and 

foreign field offices. The structure of the Office of 

Intelligence was divided into five entities: International 

and Domestic Divisions, Strategic Intelligence Staff, 

Special Operations and Field Sup- 

port Staff, and the Intelligence 

Systems Staff. Its structure paralleled 

that of the Office of 

Enforcement. 

The RIUs had four objectives: (1) 

Provide a continuing flow of actionable 

intelligence to enhance the 

tactical effectiveness of regional 

enforcement efforts; (2) Support 

management planning of the overall 

regional enforcement program; 

(3) Contribute to interregional and 

strategic collection programs of the 

Office of Intelligence; and (4) Facilitate 

exchange of intelligence 

information with state and local law 

enforcement domestically and with 

host-country enforcement abroad. 

Initially, the Intelligence Program was staffed by DEA 

special agents, with very few professional intelligence 

analysts (I/As). In DEA’s first I/A class in 1974, there 

were only eleven I/As. However, during the last 30 

years, the Intelligence Program has grown significantly. 

From only a few I/As in the field and Headquarters in 

1973, the cadre of I/As now numbers 730.

The Unified Intelligence 

Division (UID) (1973) 

In October 1973, the DEA’s first field intelligence unit based 

on the task force concept was created. The unit, named the 

Unified Intelligence Division (UID), included DEA special 

agents, DEA intelligence analysts, New York State Police 

investigators, and New York City detectives. Along with its 

unique status as an intelligence task force, the UID was also 

one of the first field intelligence units to systematically 

engage all aspects of the intelligence process, specifically 

collection, evaluation, analysis, and dissemination. This 

pioneering role expanded the horizons of drug law 

enforcement field intelligence units, which, at the time, were 

often limited to collecting information, maintaining dossiers, 

and providing limited case support. This proactive stance 

was immediately successful as UID was able to develop and 

disseminate extensive intelligence on traditional organized 

crime-related drug traffickers and identify not only the 

leaders, but also those who were likely to become leaders. 

UID also developed and disseminated intelligence throughout 

the federal, state, and local law enforcement community 

on the members, associates, and contacts of infamous heroin 

violator Leroy “Nicky” Barnes. Significant intelligence 

operations continued through the 1980s, with UID taking a 

leading role in providing intelligence on the crack cocaine 

epidemic and on Cali cocaine mafia operations in New York. 

The UID’s proactive intelligence task force concept 

continues to build upon successes of the past. 

Shortly after the creation of UID, the Drug Enforcement 

Coordinating System (DECS) was developed. DECS is a 

repository index system of all active drug cases in the New 

York metropolitan area. The DECS system connects 

agencies that have common investigative targets or common 

addresses that are part of their investigations. It was created 

to enhance officer safety and to promote greater cooperation 

and coordination among drug law enforcement agencies by 

preventing duplication of effort on overlapping investigations 

being conducted by member agencies. DECS, which 

began as a joint venture of DEA/NYSP/NYPD housed in the 

UID, now has a membership of 40 investigative units 

involved in drug law enforcement, and is the prototype for 

many similar systems that have since been developed across 

the country. 

DEA Intelligence Analyst 

DEA Intelligence Analyst Training School #1 

Training School #1 

(November 1974) 

SA Robert McCall SA Omar Aleman 

SA Thomas Shreeve SA Ron Garribotto 

SA Leonard Rzcpczynski SA Angelo Saladino 

SA Charles Henry IA Beverly Singleton 

SA John Hampe IA Ann Augusterfer 

SA Thomas Anderson IA Adrianne Darnaby 

SA Robert Janet IA Beverly Ager 

SA Christopher Bean IA Janet Gunther 

SA Michael Campbell IA Joan Philpott 

SA Donald Bramwell IA Wiliam Munson 

SA Murry Brown IA Brian Boyd 

SA Donald Stowell IA Joan Bannister 

SA Arthur Doll IA Jennifer Garcia-Tobar 

SA Frank Gulich IA Eileen Hayes 

SA Norman Noordweir 

SA Lynn Williams 

National Narcotics Intelligence 

System (NADDIS) 

In 1973, the DEA developed the National Narcotics Intelligence 

System (NADDIS), which became federal law 

enforcement’s first automated index. The creation of NADDIS 

was possible because the DEA was the first law enforcement 

agency in the nation to adopt an all-electronic, centralized, 

computer database for its records. NADDIS, composed of 

data from DEA investigative reports and teletypes, provided 

16 

agents in all DEA domestic offices with electronic access to 

investigative file data. NADDIS searches could be conducted 

NADDIS contained approximately 4.5 million records, with 

5,000 new records being added every week. NADDIS remains 

the largest and most frequently used of the 40 specialized 

information systems operated by the DEA.

Graduation of the First DEA 

Special Agents 

The first DEA Special Agent Basic Training Class (BA-1) 

graduated on November 16, 1973. Reverend James W. 

McMurtie, Principal of Bishop Denis J. O’Connell High School 

in Arlington, Virginia, gave the Invocation honoring the 40 

men and women of BA-1, and DEA Administrator Bartels gave 

the welcome and introductions. The Training Division chief 

was Paul F. Malherek, and the class counselors were Calvin C. 

Campbell of the Miami Regional Office, Allen L. Johnson of the 

New Orleans Regional Office, and Henry S. Lincoln of the San 

Diego District Office. 

BA-1 Graduates 

Ralph Arroyo 

Terry T. Baldwin 

Richard J. Barter 

Richard E. Bell 

Donald H. Bloch 

Henry J. Braud, Jr. 

Michael E. Byrnes 

James W. Castillo 

Andrew G. Cloke 

George L. Coleman 

Cruz Cordero, Jr. 

Salvadore M. Dijamco 

Clark S. Edwards 

John H. Felts 

Andrew G. Fenrich 

Carliese R. Gordon 

Annabelle Grimm 

Bernard Harry 

Richard Phillip Holmes 

Antonio L. Huertas 

Dennis F. Imamura 

James Jefferies, Jr. 

Richard C. Kazmar 

Anthony V. Lobosco 

Sherman A. Lucas III 

John W. Lugar, Jr. 

Edward C. Maher 

Charles E. Mathis 

Thomas L. Mones 

Donald E. Nelson 

Dennis A. O’Neil 

Juan R. Rodriguez 

Thomas J. Salvatore 

Edward J. Schlachter 

Arthur T. Tahuari 

Frank Torres, Jr. 

Mary A. Turner 

Robert Bruce Upchurch 

Adis J. Wells 

James Hiram Williams 

Joint Efforts with Mexico 

(1974) 

By 1972, the quantity of brown heroin from Mexico available 

in the United States had risen 40 percent higher than the 

quantity of white heroin from Europe. Traditional international 

border control was no longer effective against the problem, 

and in 1974, the Government of Mexico requested U.S. 

technical assistance. On January 26, 1974, Operation SEA/M 

(Special Enforcement Activity in Mexico) was launched in 

the State of Sinaloa to combat the opium and heroin traffic. 

One month later, a second joint task force, Operation Endrun, 

began operations in the State of Guerrero, concentrating on 

marijuana and heroin interdiction. Meanwhile, a third effort, 

Operation Trident, focused on controlling the traffic of illegally 

manufactured dangerous drugs produced in Mexico. 

Despite the fact that law enforcement in Mexico had some 

successes, these early efforts did not, in the long term, prevent 

the development of powerful drug trafficking organizations 

based in Mexico. 

17 

BA 2 graduate Michael Vigil accepts his certificate from 

William Dirken, Perry Rivkind, and Paul Malherek of DEA 

Training. 

Administrator John R. Bartels, flanked by two armed 

members of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, made an 

on-the-spot inspection of the poppy eradication program 

during a 1974 visit to Mexico.

The Collapse of the DEA 

Miami Office Building (1974) 

The DEA was still a new agency when tragedy struck the 

Miami Field Division. On August 5, 1974, at 10:24 a.m., the 

roof of the Miami office came crashing down, killing seven 

and trapping others in a pile of twisted steel and concrete. 

Between 125 and 150 people worked in the building. Those 

who died included: Special Agent Nicholas Fragos; Mary 

Keehan, Secretary to the Acting Regional Director; Special 

Agent Charles Mann; Anna Y. Mounger, Secretary; Anna 

Pope, Fiscal Assistant; Martha D. Skeels, Supervisory Clerk- 

Typist; and Mary P. Sullivan, Clerk-Typist. Although the 

people who were in the building thought it was an explosion 

or an earthquake, officials initially theorized that the dozens 

of cars in the parking facility on the roof were too heavy for 

the six-inch-thick slab of concrete supporting them. Later, it 

was found that the resurfaced parking lot, coupled with salt in 

the sand, had eroded and weakened the supporting steel structure 

of the building. The section that collapsed contained a 

processing room and a laboratory. The building was erected 

in 1925, and in 1968 had undergone a full engineering inspection, 

at which time it was cleared to house DEA offices. 

El Paso Intelligence Center 

(1974) 

In 1973, with increasing drug activity along the Southwest 

Border, the BNDD found that information on drugs 

was being collected by the DEA, Customs, BNDD, FBI, 

and FAA, but was not being coordinated. The DEA and 

the INS were also collecting information on the smuggling 

of aliens and guns. In 1974, the Department of Justice 

submitted a report from that BNDD study entitled, 

“A Secure Border: An Analysis of Issues Affecting the 

U.S. Department of Justice” to the Office of Management 

and Budget that provided recommendations to im 

Drug Abuse Warning 

Network (1974) 

In 1974, the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) was 

designed and developed by the scientific staff of the DEA’s 

Office of Science and Technology. DAWN was created to 

assist the federal government in identifying and evaluating 

the scope and extent of drug abuse in the United States. It 

was jointly funded with the National Institute of Drug Abuse. 

DAWN incorporated data from various sources of intelligence 

within the DEA and from such outside sources as fed 

18 

Rescue workers took injured victims from the Miami 

building. 

prove drug and border enforcement operations along the 

Southwest Border. One of the recommendations proposed 

the establishment of a regional intelligence center 

to collect and disseminate information relating to drug, 

illegal alien, and weapons smuggling to support field enforcement 

agencies throughout the country. As a result, 

in 1974, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) was 

established to provide tactical intelligence to federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies on a national 

scale. Staffed by representatives of the DEA and the 

INS, EPIC has since expanded into a national drug intelligence 

center supporting U.S. law enforcement entities 

that focus on worldwide drug smuggling. 

eral, state, and local law enforcement agencies, the pharmaceutical 

industry, and scientific literature. Over 1,300 different 

facilities supply data to the program. 

Beginning in the early 1970s, DAWN collected information 

on patients seeking hospital emergency treatment related to 

their use of an illegal drug or the nonmedical use of a legal 

drug. Data were collected by trained reporters (nurses and 

other hospital personnel) who reviewed medical charts. They

monitored notations by the hospital personnel who treated 

the patients that drug use was the reason for the emergency 

visit. 

Hospitals participating in DAWN are non-federal, short-stay 

general hospitals that feature a 24-hour emergency department. 

Since 1988, the DAWN data was collected from a 

representative sample of these hospitals located throughout 

the United States, including 21 specific metropolitan areas. 

The data from this sample were used to generate estimates of 

the total number of emergency department drug episodes and 

drug mentions in all such hospitals. 

In 1972, Timothy Leary (center) was brought to justice by 

DEA Special Agents Don Strange (right) and Howard 

Safir (left). Leary, a psychology instructor, was fired from 

his post at Harvard University as a result of his 

experimentation with LSD. In 1969, he founded a 

clandestine drug-trafficking ring, known as the 

Brotherhood of Eternal Love, that became the largest 

supplier of hashish and LSD in the United States. 

19 

Narcotic Addict Treatment Act 

(1974) 

Public Law 93-281 

The Narcotic Addict Treatment Act was passed in 1974 and 

amended the Controlled Substances Act to provide for the 

separate registration of doctors and other practitioners who 

used narcotic drugs in the treatment of addicts. It also provided 

physicians who were treating narcotic addiction with specific 

guidelines and medications. This act eliminated the indiscriminate 

prescription of narcotics to addicts and reduced the 

diversion of pharmaceutical narcotics. 

A 1970 raid on a Washington, D.C., apartment by 

metropolitan police officers resulted in the seizure of 

LSD and marijuana, as well as the unusual antique 

chandelier pictured above. The light fixtures on the 

chandelier had been removed and replaced with rubber 

hose, creating a giant marijuana pipe.

Aviation Training 

In 1971, the BNDD launched its aviation program with 

one special agent/pilot, one airplane, and a budget of 

$58,000. The concept of an Air Wing was the brainchild 

of Marion Joseph, an experienced former United States 

Air Force pilot and a veteran special agent stationed in 

Atlanta, Georgia. Over the years, Special Agent Joseph 

had seen how the police used aircraft for surveillance, 

search and rescue, and 

the recapturing of fugitives. His 

analysis led him to conclude that 

a single plane “could do the 

work of five agents and five vehicles 

on the ground.” 

As drug trafficking increased 

nationwide, it became evident 

that it had no boundaries and 

that law enforcement needed 

aviation capabilities. Although 

Special Agent Joseph convinced 

his superiors of the merits 

of his idea, no funding was 

available. Management told 

Agent Joseph that if he could 

find an airplane, they would further 

consider the Air Wing concept. 

At this point, Special 

Agent Joseph approached the 

United States Air Force, and under the Bailment Property 

Transfer Program that allows the military to assist 

other government entities, he secured one airplane—a 

Vietnam war surplus Cessna Skymaster. 

The benefit of air support to drug law enforcement operations 

became immediately apparent, and the request 

for airplanes grew rapidly. By 1973, when the DEA was 

formally established, the Air Wing already had 41 special 

agent pilots operating 24 aircraft in several major 

cities across the United States. Most of these aircraft 

were fixed-wing, single-engine, piston airplanes that were 

primarily used for domestic surveillance. 

20 

The National Training Institute, the DEA’s first training 

program, was located at DEA headquarters, 1405 “Eye” 

Street in Washington, D.C. At that time, training was 

divided into three major divisions: special agent training, 

police training, and international training. 

Training was carried out in a three-story bank building 

adjacent to DEA headquarters that had been converted 

for training purposes. The building had a gymnasium 

located on the first floor, lockers and showers in the 

basement, and a 5-point firing range on the second floor. 

Special agent trainees were housed in hotels within 

walking distance of DEA headquarters. 

In the absence of the realistic “Hogan’s Alley,” a lifesized, 

simulated neighborhood of today, training practicals 

were conducted on public streets. The DEA had leased 

a 20-acre farm near Dulles Airport in rural Virginia, as 

well as a house in Oxen Hill, Maryland, to practice raids 

and field exercises. Basic Agent training lasted 10 

weeks, and the Training Institute supported three classes, 

with 53 students per class, in session at all times. Graduations 

occurred every three weeks. Coordinators were 

from the headquarters staff, and counselors were brought 

in from the field for temporary training duty. In addition 

to training basic agents, the DEA also offered training 

programs for compliance investigators, intelligence analysts, 

chemists, supervisors, mid-level managers, executives, 

technical personnel, state and local police officers, 

and international law enforcement personnel. 

Trainee John Wilder

Technology 

Over the years, the combination of tech 

1975: After seized drugs were used as 

nology and law enforcement have solved evidence, they were burned by DEA 

some of the biggest criminal cases in the evidence technicians using special ovens 

world. However, by 1998, the DEA’s tech- in the presence of responsible witnesses. 

nology ranked among the most sophisticated. 

That was not always the case. 

During the DEA’s formative years, technical 

investigative equipment was limited 

both in supply and technical capabilities. 

In 1971, the entire budget for investigative 

technology was less than $1 million. 

This budget was used to buy radio and 

investigative equipment and to fund the 

teletype system. 

Video surveillance was rare because of cause as was required for a Title III 

the size and expense of camera equip- Wire Intercept. 

ment. Cameras were tube type, required 

special lighting, and could not be concealed. Early video 

tape recorders were extremely expensive and were reelto-reel 

or the very early version of cassettes called U- 

Matic. 

Pen registers, or dialed number recorders, were more 

advanced than the older versions, which actually punched 

holes in a tape, similar to an old ticker tape, in response 

to the pulses from a rotary dialed phone. Pen registers 

were also limited because federal law at the time required 

the same degree of probable 

21 

Title IIIs were conducted with reel-to-reel tape recorders. 

However, the DEA did not conduct many Title 

IIIs because they were labor intensive, and the agency 

seldom had sufficient personnel to work the intercepts. 

In 1973, body-worn recorders used by agents during 

investigations had advanced from large belt packs to 

smaller versions. However, reliability was always a concern. 

These old belt types, called KELsets, consisted 

of a transmitter and a belt of batteries worn by the undercover 

agent. Unfortunately, the belt was not easily 

concealable, and the batteries would occasionally overheat 

and burn the backs of the agents. 

When the BNDD was formed it did not have a radio 

system, but in 1971, the agency began installing a nationwide 

UHF radio system for operations. (The DEA’s 

radio system was installed in 1973.) When an early facsimile 

machine was installed in 1972, it took six minutes 

to transmit one page, and pages often had to 

be re-sent due to communication failures. No 

paging equipment was available because 

dedicated frequencies had to be used for 

each pager. Only doctors and a few 

select individuals could obtain pagers. 

Although cellular phones did not exist, 

there was a mobile telephone service. 

However, only the DEAAdministrator had 

a mobile phone, and the service was slow 

and unreliable.

Laboratories 

One of the essential functions carried out by the DEA and its 

predecessor agencies was providing laboratory support. The 

success of cases made against major drug traffickers depended 

in part upon analysis of the drug evidence gathered 

during narcotics investigations. The DEA’s laboratory system, 

one of the finest in the world, has roots in the DEA’s 

predecessor agencies. Although the two predecessor agencies, 

BDAC and FBN, did not have laboratories under their 

direct supervision, lab support was available within their respective 

departments. Ultimately, the DEA’s laboratory system 

began to take shape through the consolidation and transfer 

of several lab programs within the U.S. Government. The 

first laboratory personnel transferred to the BNDD came from 

the Food and Drug Administration‘s (FDA) Division of Pharmaceutical 

Chemistry and Microanalytical Group in Washington, 

D.C. They were primarily responsible for performing 

the ballistics analyses of tablets and capsules, identifying 

newly-encountered compounds found in drug traffic, and 

conducting methods development. According to the agreement 

with the FDA, the new agency would take control of 

one of the FDA labs. In August 1968, six chemists formed 

what eventually became the Special Testing and Research 

Laboratory. The first of the five regional DEA laboratories 

was the Chicago Regional Laboratory that opened in December 

1968. The New York, Washington, Dallas, and San Francisco 

Regional Laboratories were formed in April 1969. The 

original chemist work force for these laboratories came from 

several field laboratories run by government agencies. The 

professional staffing of the six laboratories consisted of 36 

“bench” chemists doing physical lab research, supplemented 

by five supervisory chemists. In 1970, the first full year of 

operation, the laboratories analyzed almost 20,000 drug exhibits. 

During the next two years, the laboratories’ work load 

increased by 46 percent and 19 percent, respectively. To 

meet the increased work load demand, staffing more than 

doubled to 94 by 1972 (including laboratory and BNDD headquarters 

management personnel.) In 1971, both the Washington 

and Dallas Regional Laboratories moved to larger facilities, 

and in January 1972, the BNDD opened its sixth regional 

laboratory in Miami. After the DEA was created, a 

seventh field laboratory was opened in San Diego in August 

1974. 

The Original DEA Forensic Chemists 

Headquarters 

Frederick Garfield, John Gunn, Richard Frank, and William Butler. 

Special Testing and Research Laboratory 

Director Stanley Sobol, Albert Tilson, Joseph C. Koles, Victor A. 

Folen, Robert Ferrera, Francis B. Holmes, and Albert Sperling. 

Chicago Regional Laboratory 

Director Jerry Nelson, Roger B. Fuelster, Ferris H. Van, David W. 

Parmalee, Nora L. Williams, Lawrence O. Buer, Dennis E. Korte, and 

James P. Done. 

22 

Creation of the Federal Drug 

Laboratory System 

DEA forensic 

chemist Dr. Albert 

Tillson is shown 

analyzing an 

illegal drug. 

The analysis of seized drugs 

performed by DEA forensic 

chemists provides evidence that 

is often essential for the 

successful prosecution and 

conviction of drug traffickers. 

New York Regional Laboratory 

Director Anthony Romano, Elinor R. Swide, Robert Bianchi, Roger F. 

Canaff, and Paul DeZan. 

Washington DC Regional Laboratory 

Director Jack Rosenstein, Richard Moore, Thaddeus E. Tomczak, 

Richard Fox, and Benjamin A. Perillo. 

Dallas Regional Laboratory 

Director Jim Kluckhohn, Buddy R. Goldston, Charles B. Teer, John D. 

Wittwer, Richard Ruybal, and Michael D. Miller. 

San Francisco Regional Laboratory 

Director Robert Sager, Robert Countryman, Claude G. Roe, James 

Look, James A. Heagy, and John D. Kirk.

Killed in the Line of Duty 

Hector Jordan 

Died on October 14, 1970 

Working as a Supervisory Special Agent with 

the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 

Drugs, Special Agent Jordan died in Chicago 

in an unprovoked attack by a roving gang. 

Gene A. Clifton 

Died on November 19, 1971 

Palo Alto, California Police Officer Clifton 

died from injuries received during a joint 

operation with the Bureau of Narcotics and 

Dangerous Drugs. 

Frank Tummillo 


Working in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 

Drugs, Special Agent Tummillo was 

killed during an undercover operation in 

New York City. 

George F. White 

Died on March 25, 1973 

Special Agent Pilot White of the Bureau of 

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was 

killed when his plane hit a power line near 

Tucson, Arizona. 

Richard Heath, Jr. 

Died on April 1, 1973 

Special Agent Heath of the Bureau of Narcotics 

and Dangerous Drugs died in Quito, 

Ecuador, from a gunshot wound received 

during an undercover operation in Aruba, 

Netherlands Antilles. 

Emir Benitez 

Died on August 9, 1973 

DEA Special Agent Benitez died from a gunshot 

wound he received during an undercover 

cocaine investigation in Fort Lauderdale, 

Florida. 

Gerald Sawyer 


Detective Sawyer of the Los Angeles, California 

Police Department, was killed while 

working in a joint undercover investigation 

with the DEA. 

Leslie S. Grosso 

Died on May 21, 1974 

Investigator Grosso of the New York State 

Police was shot during an undercover operation 

in New York City. He was assigned 

to the DEA’s New York City Joint Task Force. 

23 

Nickolas Fragos 


DEA Special Agent Fragos was killed on 

his first day of work as a DEA Special 

Agent. He died as a result of the collapse 

of the Miami Regional Office Building. 

Mary M. Keehan 


Ms. Keehan, secretary to the Acting Regional 

Director of the DEA’s Miami Regional Office, 

died as a result of the collapse of the 

Miami Regional Office building. 

Charles H. Mann 


DEA Special Agent Mann was killed on his 

first day of work after returning from an overseas 

assignment. He died as a result of 

the collapse of the Miami Regional Office 

building. 

Anna Y. Mounger 


Ms. Mounger, a secretary at the DEA’s Miami 

Regional Office, died as a result of the 

collapse of the Miami Regional Office building. 

Anna J. Pope 


Mrs. Pope, a fiscal assistant at the DEA’s 

Miami Regional Office, died as a result of 

the collapse of the Miami Regional Office 

building. 

Martha D. Skeels 


Ms. Skeels, a supervisory clerk-typist at the 

DEA’s Miami Regional Office, died as a 

result of the collapse of the Miami Regional 

Office building. 

Mary P. Sullivan 


Ms. Sullivan, a clerk-typist at the DEA Miami 

Regional Office, died as a result of the 

collapse of the Miami Regional Office building.


Because marijuana and 

cocaine were not considered high 

priorities for law enforcement 

agencies, many Americans 

believed they were free to use both 

drugs. 

24

DEA 

Henry S. Dogin 

Acting 

Administrator 

1975-1976 

Henry S. Dogin was appointed Acting Administrator by 

Attorney General Edward H. Levi on May 30, 1975, following 

the resignation of Administrator Bartels. Prior to his 

appointment, Mr. Dogin was Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General in the Criminal Division and was responsible for 

directing the Department of Justice’s organized crime strike 

forces as well as overseeing prosecutions related to narcotics. 

Dogin served as Acting Administrator until January 23, 

1976, when he assumed the position of Deputy Commissioner 

of the Division of Criminal Justice Services for the State of 

New York. 

DEA Special Agents 

1975.....2,135 

1980.....1,941 

DEA Budget 

1975.....$140.9 million 

1980.....$206.6 million 

25 

By 1979, 26 million Americans 

were considered regular drug 

users. 

During this period, drug use in America escalated, and by 

1979, 26 million Americans were considered regular drug 

users. Government policies urged law enforcement organizations 

to de-emphasize marijuana and cocaine investigations 

in favor of increased heroin enforcement activities. Because 

marijuana and cocaine were not considered high priorities for 

law enforcement agencies, many Americans believed they 

were free to use both drugs. Consequently, cocaine and 

marijuana use became widespread throughout the United 

States. 

The White House White Paper 

In early 1975, drug abuse was escalating and the nation faced 

new challenges on the drug front. By September 1975, 

President Ford set up the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task 

Force, chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, to assess 

the extent of drug abuse in America and to make recommendations 

for handling it. The resulting report, the White Paper, 

maintained that “all drugs are not equally dangerous. Enforcement 

efforts should therefore concentrate on drugs 

which have a high addiction potential...” This report deemed 

marijuana a minor problem and declared that cocaine was not 

a problem. “Cocaine,” the report stated, “is not physically 

addictive...and usually does not result in serious social consequences, 

such as crime, hospital emergency room 

admissions, or death.” The report recommended that “priority 

in both supply and demand reduction should be directed 

toward those drugs which inherently pose a greater risk— 

heroin, amphetamines...and mixed barbiturates.” 

Specifically, the panel recommended that the DEA and U.S. 

Customs Service de-emphasize investigations of marijuana 

and cocaine smuggling and give higher priority to heroin 

trafficking. This policy shifted enforcement efforts, resources, 

and manpower away from cocaine cases towards heroin. The 

report recommended that agents focus on Mexico, a source

of both heroin and dangerous drugs, rather than on domestic 

posts, such as Miami, where they are more likely to “make a 

cocaine or marijuana case.” 

Government policy makers were primarily concerned with 

heroin, and to a lesser extent, amphetamines and barbiturates. 

Marijuana was still considered by many to be a harmless 

recreational drug, typically used by college students, and 

cocaine wasn’t considered a serious drug problem. This lack 

of emphasis on marijuana and cocaine meant that the marijuana 

smugglers from Colombia and cocaine traffickers faced minimal 

law enforcement opposition. Moreover, it allowed the 

traffickers from Colombia to lay the foundations for what 

would become the powerful Medellin and Cali drug cartels. 

Both were to pose significant threats to the United States by 

the late 1970s and early 1980s. Having already established 

marijuana distribution networks along the East Coast, they 

were easily able to add cocaine to their illegal shipments. 

Central Tactical Units (1975) 

In April 1975, the DEA created the first of its central tactical units 

(CENTAC) to concentrate enforcement efforts against major 

drug trafficking organizations. Prior to this, due to lack of 

coordination on a national level, many drug investigations were 

terminated following the arrest of low-level dealers or an occasional 

top figure, who was quickly replaced. However, CENTAC 

targeted major worldwide drug trafficking syndicates from a 

central, quick-response command post in Washington, D.C. 

Eight CENTACs investigated heroin manufacturing organizations 

in Lebanon, Asia, and Mexico. Three other CENTACs 

targeted large cocaine organizations from Latin America that 

operated in the United States. Yet other CENTACs dismantled 

criminal groups that manufactured and distributed LSD, PCP, 

and amphetamines. 

DEA Miami special agents pose with 854 pounds of 

cocaine seized in May 1980. Pictured from left are: 

Special Agents Richard Fiano, Rafael Saucedo, John 

Lawler, Richard Vandiver, David Kunz, and David 

Gorman. 

26 

One CENTAC, 16, was split into West Coast and East Coast 

investigations, and extended its investigations into Mexico, 

Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic. It dismantled a 

major international heroin organization, three import groups, 

and five major New York distribution networks. In addition, it 

seized approximately $1 million and reaped another $1 million 

in bail left by fleeing defendants. CENTAC 16 ultimately 

indicted 100 major traffickers, along with 61 lesser criminals. 

The CENTAC program was considered extremely successful. 

According to a 1980 General Accounting Office Report, “The 

results of CENTAC investigations have been impressive, not 

only in terms of the number of high-level traffickers arrested, 

but also the sentences the traffickers have received...CENTAC 

results are particularly impressive in light of the small percentage 

of the DEA’s enforcement effort CENTAC comprised.” 

Using only 3 percent of the DEA’s enforcement staff and 1.3 

percent of its expenditures for information and evidence, 

CENTAC arrested 2,116 traffickers. This total represented 

over 12 percent of all Class I violators arrested by the DEA 

over a three-year period. 

Operation Trizo (1976) 

In 1976, the DEA and the Mexican government began a 

poppy eradication program called Operation Trizo. The 

operation called for Mexican nationals to fly helicopters 

donated by the U.S. State Department to spray herbicides 

onto poppy fields in the states of Durango, Sinaloa, and 

Chihuahua. 

By the end of 1977, approximately 22,000 acres of poppy, 

enough to be processed into eight tons of heroin, had been 

destroyed. Because of Operation Trizo, by 1979 the purity of 

Mexican heroin fell to just five percent, its lowest level in 

seven years. In addition, 4,000 members of organizations in 

Mexico were arrested. Operation Trizo lessened the demand 

for Mexican heroin in the U.S. market. 

The large numbers of arrests that resulted from Operation 

Trizo caused an economic crisis in the poppy-growing regions 

of Mexico. In order to reduce the social upheaval, the 

Mexican government formally asked the DEA to stop participating 

in the surveillance flights. Operation Trizo was called 

off in the spring of 1978 at the request of the Mexican 

government. While successful in the short term, the operation 

did not prevent the growing sophistication of these drug 

organizations and their distributions systems in the United 

States.

DEA 

Peter B. Bensinger 

Administrator 

1976-1981 

On December 9, 1975, Peter B. Bensinger, a native of Chicago 

and graduate of Yale University, was nominated as 

DEA Administrator. Peter Bensinger became the second 

DEA Administrator, following John Bartels, who had resigned 

in May 1975. He immediately followed Henry Dogin, 

who had served as acting head of the DEA, filling in until 

Administrator Bensinger took office. When tapped for the 

job, Mr. Bensinger was serving as the first director of the 

Illinois Department of Corrections. In this position, he was 

in charge of all state penitentiaries, reformatories, training 

schools, parole supervision, and jail inspection. Previously, 

he had served as chief of the Crime Victims Division of the 

Illinois Attorney General’s Office and executive director of 

the Chicago Crime Commission. He was also the general 

sales manager (Frankfurt, London, Chicago) with the 

Brunswick Corporation (1958-1968). He became Acting 

Administrator on January 23, 1976, was confirmed by the 

Senate on February 5, 1976, and was sworn in on February 

23, 1976. 

Mr. Bensinger began his term by writing a mission statement 

for the agency, and then he launched efforts to repair the 

DEA’s image with the public and with Congress. Administrator 

Bensinger stated that “ (I did not come to the DEA) to 

reorganize everything right away...I arrived and set about 

doing work and listening...[I] met the executive staff members 

and people and found a lot of talent, dedication, and 

great ability. I was very impressed with the investigative 

skills that were clearly there and the type of work that was 

done. But the agents didn’t have the sense that they were 

appreciated. And I felt there was a lack of communication 

with both the public and Congress. So one of the first steps 

I tried to take was to put out a mission statement that the DEA 

was here to protect the lives of the citizens of the United States 

and to curb drug abuse through effective enforcement, investigations, 

regulation of legitimate drugs, and through 

reaching to our counterparts overseas, at the state and local 

law enforcement, and in other branches of the government.” 

27 

“......I met with the executive staff 

members and people and found a 

lot of talent, dedication, and great 

ability. I was very impressed with 

the investigative skills....” 

Mr. Bensinger also began to focus the agency’s investigations 

away from a statistical emphasis on arrest and seizure 

totals, to a focus on arresting major traffickers who had a 

large impact on the drug trade. He stepped down as Administrator 

on July 10, 1981. Currently, Mr. Bensinger is 

president and chief executive officer of Bensinger, DuPont 

& Associates, a privately owned professional services 

company.

Jaime Herrera-Nevares 

Jaime Herrera-Nevares was the patriarch of a huge criminal profits to their home in Mexico, using neighborhood currency 

syndicate based in the mountain top village of Los Herreras, exchanges to send money orders back to Durango. In the mid- 

Durango, Mexico. As far back as 1957, the Herrera organization 1970s, the DEA traced just under $2 million from these exchanges 

ran a farm-to-the-arm heroin operation that cultivated opium and Western Union records. This figure represented approxipoppy 

plants, processed and packaged heroin in Mexico, and mately one percent of the total cash transferred to Mexico by 

transported it to Chicago. There 

it was either sold locally or dis 

the Herrera organization annually. 

tributed to other U.S. cities. This 

By 1978, the Chicago Herreras were grossgroup 

was extremely difficult to 

ing $60 million a year and had established 

penetrate because family mem 

branches in Denver, Los Angeles, Miami, 

bers controlled the entire heroin 

and Pittsburgh. By 1980, the family had 

process from top to bottom. 

established connections in South America 

and had diversified into cocaine. By the 

U.S. law enforcement agencies 

mid-1980s, the family’s gross income had 

were well acquainted with the 

Herrera organization and its 

reached approximately $200 million a year. 

“Heroin Highway,” a drug traf- 

CENTAC 19, launched in 1979, targeted 

ficking network that stretched 

the Herrera family trafficking organization 

from Durango to Chicago. The 

and eventually resulted in the seizure of 39 

family frequently smuggled 

kilograms of heroin, as well as the arrest 

heroin in their invention, the 

and long-term incarceration of three key 

“Durango drive-shaft,” a 

sleeve-like device that sur- 

While criminal syndicates such as the Jaime 

Herrera organization were trafficking heroin 

Chicago-based members of the Herrera 

organization. 

rounded the vehicle’s 

drive-shaft and held several kilos 

of heroin. They also used 

compartmentalized gas tanks 

and door panels to conceal the 

contraband. 

At one time, Chicago area law 

enforcement agencies believed 

into the United States, cocaine trafficking was 

also a major problem facing law enforcement 

officials. In September 1977, DEA agents at 

JFK Airport in New York seized 85 pounds of 

cocaine that had been concealed in 4,500 

pounds of chocolate bars. Special Agent 

Michael J. Tobin displayed how the cocaine 

had been hidden in the candy bars. 

During the 1980s investigations against 

the Herreras continued. On July 23, 1985, 

as a result of a two-year investigation 

called Operation Durango, between 450 

and 500 federal, state, and local law enforcement 

officers in Chicago, Illinois, and 

Gary, Indiana, arrested 120 traffickers (of 

the 132 indicted) connected to the polydrug 

the Herreras controlled as much as 90% of local heroin distri- 

trafficking Herrera and Zambrana families. 

bution. The DEA estimated that the Herrera organization Officers seized 10 pounds of heroin, 13 pounds of cocaine, 47 

imported 746 pounds of pure heroin into the United States each properties, and $300,000. In August 1988, the Mexican leaders 

year. When cut, this amounted to over eight tons of five- of the organization, Jaime Herrera-Nevarez, Sr., and Jaime 

percent pure heroin. The Herreras were considered the largest Herrera-Herrera, Jr., were arrested in Mexico on drug charges 

heroin trafficking organization in Mexico, with profits esti- and remain incarcerated in Mexico City. They continued being 

mated at $1 million a year. They returned the majority of their listed as DEA fugitives based on prior indictments in Miami, 

Florida. 

Fire at DEA Headquarters 

(1976) 

In October 1976, a small fire erupted on the second floor of DEA 

headquarters at 14 th and “Eye” streets in Northwest Washington, 

D.C. Through the quick actions of DEA employee Marc 

Cunningham of the Forensic Science Division, the fire was 

brought under control, limiting the damage to a corner of the 

room in which it started. As D.C. firefighters arrived on the scene, 

DEA headquarters was evacuated and no injuries were reported 

as a result of the incident. Nevertheless, the fire prompted a 

thorough review and an updating of the DEA’s Facility 

Self-Protection Plan. 

28

The Black Tuna 

Gang 

and Operation 

Banco 

In 1979, a joint DEA/FBI task force in Miami immobilized 

the Black Tuna Gang, a major marijuana 

smuggling ring responsible for bringing 

500 tons of marijuana into the 

United States over a 16month 

period. 

The Black Tuna gang derived 

its name from the 

radio code name for a 

mysterious Colombian 

sugar grower and drug 

dealer, Raul Davila- 

Jimeno, who was the 

major supplier of the organization. 

Many of the 

gang members wore solidgold 

medallions bearing a 

black tuna emblem. The 

medallions served as a talisman 

and symbol of their 

membership in this smuggling 

group. With the assistance of this 

small private army, Davila, who called 

himself a sugar, coffee, and petroleum exporter, 

virtually ruled Santa Marta, Colombia, where the majority 

of Colombian marijuana was grown. It was a highly organized 

ring, with gang members maintaining security and eavesdropping 

on radio frequencies used by police and U.S. Customs 

officials. 

The Black Tuna gang operated, at least briefly, from a suite in 

Miami Beach’s Fontainebleau Hotel and arranged bulk deliveries 

to a moored houseboat. They were affiliated with the 

vice-president of a prestigious Ft. Lauderdale yacht brokerage 

and were thus able to obtain specialized boats that could carry 

tons of marijuana without sitting suspiciously low in the water. 

The contraband was transported in these modified boats and 

unloaded at a series of waterfront “stash houses” in posh 

neighborhoods. 

The Black Tuna Gang ran an elaborate operation, complete with 

electronically equipped trucks used to maintain contact with 

the freighters and to monitor law enforcement channels. They 

were also creative. As a signal that they were ready to proceed 

with a drug deal, the smugglers sent Davila a box of disposable 

diapers. This meant, “the baby is ready, send the mother.” 

29 

Ultimately, partners in a Miami used car agency were indicted 

as the masterminds of the Black Tuna Gang, which federal 

prosecutors called the “biggest and slickest” gang yet 

uncovered. It was the meticulous work of a DEA 

FBI probe of Florida banks called Operation 

Banco, which began in 1977, that led investigators 

to the auto dealers and ultimately 

resulted in the downfall of the Black Tuna 

Gang. Operation Banco traced the 

group’s drug profits through South 

Florida banks until members of the 

Black Tuna Gang made a large cash 

deposit in Miami Beach Bank. This 

case was notable as the first combined 

investigation by the DEA and 

the FBI on drug profits behind the 

marijuana trade. 

Raul Davila-Jimeno’s fingerprint chart. 

Year Foreign Office Opened 

1975 Copenhagen, Denmark 

1975 Guatemala City, Guatemala 

1976 Merida, Mexico 

1977 Lahore, Pakistan 

1979 Nassau, Bahamas

Heroin from Mexico 

For decades, traffickers based in Mexico had been involved in 

the production and smuggling of drugs. During World War 

II, when fighting cut the Allies off from other legal sources of 

drug supplies, Mexico became a source of morphine for the 

legal market and heroin for the illegal market. The war also 

created a need for hemp fiber for rope, which led to large-scale 

cultivation of marijuana in both Mexico and the United States. 

Until the 1960s, when major traffickers began operating in 

Mexico, the marijuana issue was not considered a very serious 

one. 

By the late 1960s, Mexico was a major source of both heroin 

and marijuana, as well as barbiturates and amphetamines. As 

a result, many U.S. enforcement efforts were directed toward 

stemming the tide of drugs coming across our southern 

border. In 1969, in an effort to stop trafficking across the 

Southwest Border, the Nixon Administration ordered that 

each person and vehicle crossing the border be inspected. 

However, Operation Intercept, as the project was called, tied 

up border traffic, angered the Mexican government, and 

disturbed the economy on both sides of the border. As a 

result, Operation Intercept was soon terminated. Recognizing 

that interdiction alone was not a successful strategy, the 

United States Government subsequently increased aid to 

Mexico, and offered greater cooperation and technical assistance 

to eradicate cannabis and opium poppy plants. 

It was not until 1972, with the dismantling of the French 

Connection, that heroin market structures and distribution 

patterns radically shifted. At that point, drug trafficking from 

Mexico expanded and the cultivation of opium poppy fields 

increased. “Mexican mud,” or brown heroin, was suddenly in 

great demand and from 1972 through 1976, groups from 

Mexico dominated the heroin trade and supplied an everincreasing 

demand for marijuana. By 1974, traffickers from 

Mexico controlled three-fourths of the U.S. heroin market. 

Development of the Heroin 

Signature Program (1977) 

In 1977, the DEA developed the Heroin Signature Program 

(HSP). This program classified samples of heroin according to 

the process by which they were manufactured, enabling 

investigators to determine the geographic areas where the 

samples were produced. Data from the HSP were used in 

conjunction with investigative intelligence, drug production, 

and seizure data to develop an overall assessment of heroin 

trafficking to and within the United States. The Special 

Testing and Research Laboratory conducted the analysis for 

the program and developed the protocol that revolutionized 

the way analytical data were used for tracking the origins of 

heroin exhibits. With this information, law enforcement was 

alerted to emerging drug problems and developed strategies 

to counter them. For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 

30 

the HSP documented the decrease in the proportion of Mexican 

heroin seized in the United States and the concomitant 

increase in heroin seized from Southwest Asia. 

Shown above are brand name labels of heroin sold in the 

illicit market in Southeast Asia during the late 1970s. 

Tighter PCP Controls (1977) 

In the mid-1970s, the abuse of phencyclidine (PCP) was an 

increasing problem. PCP-related deaths had increased 60 

percent from 1976 to 1977, and PCP was involved in 35 of the 

36 deaths attributed to hallucinogens for that year. In addition, 

the number of PCP laboratory seizures during 1977 was 42 

percent higher than the combined totals of the two previous 

years. 

In 1977, Administrator Bensinger recommended to the Department 

of Health, Education, and Welfare that PCP, an animal 

tranquilizer, be rescheduled from Schedule III to Schedule II 

of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. In 1977, the Food 

and Drug Administration’s scientific and medical evaluations 

confirmed the necessity for this action, and effective February 

24, 1978, PCP was moved from Schedule III to the Schedule II 

classification. 

The DEA also combated escalating nationwide manufacture 

and abuse of PCP or “angel dust” by creating a new Special 

Action Office (SAO/PCP) in 1977. During its first 18 months, 

the SAO/PCP was responsible for initiating 96 PCP investigations 

and arresting 149 defendants. In addition, more than 5.1 

million dosage units of PCP and 23 clandestine labs were 

seized.

The DEA’s success in curbing PCP trafficking continued on 

December 17, 1978, when it completed one of the largest PCP 

seizures in the agency’s history. In a pre-dawn search, more 

than 50 special agents and several deputies confiscated $300 

million worth of PCP in a clandestine lab in Los Angeles. 

Upwards of 900 pounds of PCP, in either the finished or 

intermediate stage, was seized. This quantity of PCP would 

have yielded 36 million dosage units. A large amount of lab 

equipment, including a sophisticated high-speed pill press, 

was also seized. Five suspects were arrested at the scene. 

Colombian Marijuana 

In the mid-to-late 1970s, trends in drug abuse were beginning 

to change. In fact, drug smuggling was taking on an entirely 

different scope. Cocaine and Colombian marijuana had become 

the drugs of choice, and the burgeoning drug 

organizations in Colombia took full advantage of new markets 

in the United States. It was no longer unusual for law 

enforcement to seize cocaine in 100-pound shipments. Also, 

marijuana was being shipped to the United States in ton 

quantities, as evidenced by a 113-ton seizure from a single ship 

off the northeastern coast of Florida in August 1978. 

Colombian marijuana, or “Colombian Gold,” a highly potent 

marijuana, was reaching the United States in “mother ships,” 

which were large maritime vessels that carried bulk shipments 

of marijuana to prearranged points off the U.S. coast. These 

ships were moored far enough away from the shore to avoid 

notice, and off-loaded smaller quantities of the drug to smaller 

yachts, “go fast” boats, and fishing vessels that could smuggle 

the drug ashore less conspicuously and avoid detection by 

law enforcement. During the mid-to-late 1970s and early 1980s, 

the DEA conducted a number of notable operations targeting 

the organizations behind these mother ships. One such 

program, Operation Stopgap, was created in December 1975. 

As part of this program, DEA pilots flew up and down the coast 

of La Guajira, Colombia, which was a major source of drug 

smuggling. They reported suspect vessels to the DEA’s El 

31 

Carlo Boccia (right), 

coordinator of a special 

operation that targeted PCP 

distribution and abuse, was 

photographed consulting with 

Special Agent Joe Brzostowski, 

who helped initiate the 

operation in 1978. 

The lab was by far the largest of its kind ever dismantled in the 

West and one of the largest of any type ever seized in the 

United States. The seizures and arrests concluded a year-long 

joint investigation between the DEA and the Los Angeles 

Sheriff’s Department. 

Pictured above are porcelain vases concealing thai-sticks 

(marijuana) that were confiscated as part of a 1977 

seizure of 100 pounds of thai-sticks in Tijuana, Mexico. 

Paso Intelligence Center, which then relayed the information 

to U.S. Coast Guard cutters. The operation also used U.S. 

Navy satellites to track the suspect vessels. 

By 1978, Operation Stopgap effectively reduced the flow of 

marijuana from Colombia to the United States by at least onethird. 

The Stopgap program seized over one million pounds 

of marijuana. These significant seizures caused the price of

marijuana in Colombia to increase from $20 a pound to as much 

as $80. In addition, more than 220 people were arrested, almost 

all of whom were Colombian nationals. 

SAC Charles Hill of the San Diego District Office helped 

unload a 2.5 ton marijuana seizure in 1977. 

The Arrest of Nicky Barnes 

Leroy “Nicky” 

Barnes, 

convicted on 

December 2, 

1977. 

Leroy “Nicky” Barnes, a former street addict and common thief 

turned multi-millionaire drug lord, was the subject of one of the 

DEA’s most significant investigations of the 1970s. Since the 

1940s, African-American criminal groups had controlled portions 

of the heroin traffic in New York City, and their influence 

increased significantly after the French Connection in the early 

1970s. Growing up in Harlem, Barnes saw that people who 

controlled the drug trade had considerable power. While in his 

20s, Barnes became a mid-level drug dealer until sent to prison 

in 1965. There, he teamed up with gangster “Crazy Joey” Gallo 

who taught him how to operate a drug trafficking organization. 

Gallo had wanted to be a major force in the Harlem drug trade, 

32 

but he lacked the personnel. He urged Barnes to recruit 

African-Americans into the business. With the help of a 

lawyer provided by Gallo, Barnes’ conviction was reversed 

and he was released from prison. Barnes went back to the 

streets of New York and began establishing his own trafficking 

network. 

Barnes’ organization was among the first of a new trend of 

African-American and Hispanic trafficking groups which 

took over from long-entrenched Italian organizations. His 

syndicate made enormous profits by cutting and packaging 

low-quality heroin. Barnes controlled heroin sales and manufacture 

throughout New York State and extended his business 

into Canada and Pennsylvania. By 1976, he had at least seven 

major lieutenants working for him, each of whom controlled 

a dozen mid-level distributors, who in turn supplied up to 40 

street-level retailers. 

Barnes modeled his growing empire after some of the more 

successful organized crime families and built administrative 

layers between himself and his crimes. Even though he was 

arrested numerous times, few charges against Barnes himself 

were able to stick, which earned him the nickname of “Mr. 

Untouchable.” Barnes reveled in his nickname. He developed 

an aggressive style when dealing with police, often 

leading surveillance teams on hundred-mile-an-hour car rides 

into New York City and then out again with no apparent 

purpose. Also, he would make scores of pointless stops, just 

to aggravate his surveillance officers. 

In 1976, he estimated that his trafficking income was at least 

several million dollars, and like most organized crime leaders, 

he lived a life of extravagant self-indulgence. He owned five 

homes, wore expensive, hand-tailored outfits and furs, owned 

luxury cars, and surrounded himself with a half dozen bodyguards. 

In 1977, a New York Times article reported that Barnes owned 

300 suits, 100 pairs of shoes and 50 leather coats. His fleet of 

cars included a Mercedes-Benz, a Citroen-Macerate, and 

several Thunderbirds, Lincoln Continentals, and Cadillacs. 

To prevent his cars from being seized and forfeited, Barnes 

set up phony leasing companies to make it appear that the cars 

he drove were not owned by him, but merely rented. Eventually 

federal agents unraveled his scheme and proved that 

his front companies were phony. 

Working closely with the U.S. Attorney in New York, DEA 

agents infiltrated the Barnes syndicate and put together a 

case that led to his conviction. On January 19, 1978, in the 

Federal District Court in Manhattan, Leroy “Nicky” Barnes 

was sentenced to life in prison on a federal charge that he 

headed, in the words of the prosecutor, “the largest, most 

profitable and venal drug ring in New York City.” For many 

DEA agents, the arrest of Leroy “Nicky” Barnes was the most 

significant of their careers, the result of almost four years of 

dangerous undercover work.

The Office of Compliance and 

Regulatory Affairs 

In October 1976, the DEA established the Office of Compliance 

and Regulatory Affairs, under the direction of Kenneth Durrin. 

The office was created to provide a specialized work force that 

could focus exclusively on the diversion of legitimate drugs 

and take full advantage of the controls and penalties established 

by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). 

From 1971 through 1978, 33 previously uncontrolled drugs of 

abuse were brought under CSA control. The best known of 

these drugs was methaqualone, which was controlled in Schedule 

II. An additional 11 drugs, including amphetamine, 

methamphetamine, and the fast-acting barbiturates were rescheduled 

from lower schedules into Schedule II, where the 

tightest security, import, record-keeping and reporting controls 

were applied. For example, a Schedule II drug could only 

be distributed on official order forms between registrants, 

exported only by official permit, and produced only in limited 

quantities. This significantly curtailed the amount of many 

popular drugs that were available for diversion. 

While the DEA had been successful in regulating manufacturers 

and distributors, it now had the opportunity to work 

cooperatively with doctors and pharmacists at the retail level. 

The 1979 National Institute on Drug Abuse survey showed 

that non-medical use of prescription drugs was second only 

to marijuana use. More startling statistics came from the Drug 

Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), which measured hospital 

emergency room episodes and medical examiner reports concerned 

with specific drugs. 

In 1980, legally produced drugs accounted for 15 of the 20 most 

frequently mentioned controlled drugs in DAWN emergency 

mentions and 75 percent of total mentions of controlled drug 

use. In addition, legally produced drugs constituted 74 

percent of controlled substance mentions in deaths reported 

by medical examiners. 

Up until then, diversion by unscrupulous practitioners had 

not been the major investigative focus of the DEA because the 

huge quantities of drugs diverted at the manufacturer and 

distributor level had overshadowed this problem. However, 

when estimates indicated that 80-90 percent of diversion was 

now occurring at the practitioner level, it became time to 

increase efforts against practitioner diversion. Because practitioners 

and pharmacies had emerged as the main sources of 

diverted controlled substances, the Office of Compliance and 

Regulatory Affairs changed its priorities to deal with this 

problem. This was a daunting challenge for a work force of 

about 200, because by the late 1970s, there were over 550,000 

practitioners and pharmacies registered under the CSA. An 

example of practitioner-level abuse in the mid-1970s occurred 

at “weight” clinics where “patients” were able to obtain many 

diverted drugs. In October of 1979, the DEA initiated Operation 

Script, a pilot program designed to focus the DEA’s 

33 

technical, investigative, and legal expertise on this problem. A 

total of 94 priority targets in 23 cities were identified by 

analyzing drug sales data reported to DEA by manufacturers 

and distributors through a system known as the Automated 

Reports and Consummated Orders System (ARCOS). This 

ARCOS system contained information for estimating drug 

requirements and alerted investigators to sources of diversion 

in the legal drug distribution chain. In September 1980, a DEA 

internal review of Operation Script showed that investigations 

had resulted in 28 convictions, 10 additional indictments, 5 

surrenders or revocations, and 17 state board actions. 

An important aspect of the overall investigative program was 

that data developed through these investigations was used to 

initiate significant regulatory actions. For example, the maximum 

quantity of commonly abused drugs that could be 

manufactured legally was reduced through the quota process. 

Manufacturing quotas were applied to Schedule I and II 

substances and limited production to the actual amount 

necessary for legitimate medical and scientific need. Information 

documenting the diversion of these substances was used 

to justify reductions in these quotas, greatly reducing the 

amount of drugs available for diversion. 

The DEA also actively pursued the enhancement of statelevel 

investigative capabilities by funding Diversion 

Investigation Units (DIUs). The DIUs combined state law 

enforcement and regulatory bodies into a single unit dedicated 

to investigating and taking action against practitioners 

who were diverting controlled substances. 

By the late 1970s both the U.S. Congress and the General 

Accounting Office (GAO) recognized the significant contributions 

that DEA’s efforts had achieved in eliminating diversion 

at the manufacturer and distributor level. These efforts were 

able to successfully shore up the weakest portions of the 

upper end of the distribution chain. Drug manufacturers and 

distributors either improved their controls or ceased controlled 

substance activity altogether. The Office of Compliance 

and Regulatory Affairs was ultimately changed to the Office 

of Diversion Control in 1982. 

This was the Kansas City plant where drugs that had 

been surrendered to compliance investigators were 

burned in blast furnaces at multi-thousand degree 

temperatures.

South Florida The disguised truck 

that the two gunmen 

exited before 

By the mid-1970s, Miami had become the drug capital of the murdering two men 

Western Hemisphere because of its geography and coopera and wounding 

tive international banks. Within a short time, South Florida another in a liquor 

was overwhelmed by violent cocaine and marijuana traffickers 

from Latin America. 

store. 

In 1975, the U.S. Customs Service seized 729 pounds of 

cocaine, up from only 108 pounds in 1970. During that same 

period, in Miami Airport alone, cocaine seizures increased 

from 37 pounds to over 271. By 1979, the South Florida illegal 

drug trade was the state’s biggest industry and was said to be 

worth $10 billion a year wholesale. “There is so much money, One of the two bodies 

they weigh it instead of counting it,” commented Administra- found in the Dadeland 

tor Bensinger. In what had once been a tranquil vacation spot, Mall massacre. 

violence was becoming commonplace. In July 1979, an 

incident that occurred in the Dadeland Mall, Florida’s largest 

shopping center, offered a startling glimpse of the emerging 

drug trade in South Florida. In broad daylight, two gunmen 

exited a paneled truck, entered a liquor store, gunned down 

two men and wounded the store clerk. The dead men were 

eventually identified as a Colombia-based cocaine trafficker 

and his bodyguard. 

1976-77 

Heroin was a major problem in 1976, but cocaine was 

gaining in popularity. As a result, the DEA was featured 

in ABC-TV’s five-part television report on cocaine, titled 

“Snow Blind: The Cocaine Connection.” Shown here are 

two publicity posters for the series that aired in 1977. 

1978 

1978 lab seizure. 

34 

1979 

Special Agent Bob Parks posed with a 1964 Rolls 

Royce seized during the June 1979 arrest of 20 

heroin traffickers.

Paraphernalia Law (1979) 

As drug use grew in America, especially on college campuses, 

the paraphernalia industry developed to support the drug 

culture. Retailers sold items such as “bongs,” “roach clips,” 

and specialized razor blades purchased to enhance the use of 

marijuana, hashish, heroin, cocaine and a variety of other 

drugs. These “head shops,” as they were called, became big 

business. In 1980, it was estimated that 25,000 retail outlets for 

drug paraphernalia grossed up to $3 billion annually in sales. 

The sale and advertising of drug paraphernalia glamorized the 

drug culture, promoted drug use, and undermined educational 

and community programs designed to prevent drug abuse 

among our youth. 

In 1979, in response to the growing problem, President Carter 

asked the DEA to draft a model anti-drug paraphernalia law 

which could be adopted by state and local governments. Early 

state laws aimed at controlling drug paraphernalia were ineffective 

because they had dealt with the problem on a piecemeal 

basis, and were so vaguely worded they could not withstand 

a constitutional attack. In contrast, the Model Act, which was 

designed by Harry Myers in the DEA’s Office of Chief Counsel, 

was clear and comprehensive and contained a detailed definition 

of “drug paraphernalia.” It also included lists of criteria that 

courts could use in order to determine if particular objects 

should be considered paraphernalia. 

The Model Act made the possession of paraphernalia, with the 

intent to use it with illicit drugs, a crime. Manufacturing and 

delivering paraphernalia was a crime, and the delivery of 

paraphernalia to a child by an adult was a special offense. In 

addition, the publication of commercial advertisements promoting 

the sale of paraphernalia was unlawful. 

By mid-1981, 20 states had enacted DEA’s Model Drug Paraphernalia 

Act. However, the head shops did not go without a 

legal fight. One Illinois business challenged a drug paraphernalia 

ordinance on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally 

broad and vague. However, on March 3, 1982, the U.S. Supreme 

Court ruled that the ordinance did not violate the head shop 

owner’s First Amendment rights nor was there a danger of 

arbitrary enforcement, which is necessary to render a law void 

for vagueness. As more and more states adopted these antidrug 

measures, thousands of paraphernalia shops were 

essentially legislated out of business. 

35 

Cocaine 

By the late 1970s, a flood of cocaine was entering the country 

in Miami and being transported north to New York City and to 

cities and towns all along the East Coast. Cocaine, however, 

was not yet considered a major threat because many believed 

that its use was confined to the wealthy. 

Cocaine Use: However, statistics indicated otherwise: by 

1974, 5.4 million Americans acknowledged having tried cocaine 

at least once. By 1979, cocaine use was at its peak. That 

year, the Household Survey showed that almost 20 percent of 

Americans had used cocaine in the past year, and 9.3 percent 

had used cocaine in the previous month. By the early 1980s 

about 22 million Americans admitted to having tried cocaine. 

The rise in drug use was fueled, in part, by the tolerant attitudes 

prevalent in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Many people saw 

cocaine as a benign, recreational drug, celebrated for its 

“pleasureability” in the media. Dr. Peter Bourne, drug advisor 

to Jimmy Carter and Special Assistant for Health Issues, wrote, 

“Cocaine...is probably the most benign of illicit drugs currently 

in widespread use. At least as strong a case could be made for 

legalizing it as for legalizing marijuana. Short-acting....not 

physically addicting, and acutely pleasurable, cocaine has 

found increasing favor at all socioeconomic levels.” This was 

an attitude shared by the public at large. 

Cocaine Trafficking: In 1974 the DEA began to make connections 

between cocaine seizures and realized that cases that 

appeared to be isolated were actually linked. It became obvious 

that a well-organized smuggling effort was being orchestrated 

from abroad. Traffickers from Colombia monopolized the 

cocaine business in Queens and Manhattan, New York. However, 

a large-scale cocaine problem was still believed to exist 

only in Miami. 

In January 1980, a joint investigation by the Peruvian 

Investigation Police and the DEA Lima and Mexico City 

Offices resulted in the seizure of 506 kilograms of cocaine 

base and the arrest of 11 defendants. DEA Special Agents 

Russell Reina (left) and Gary Wheeler are shown pointing 

out Chosica, Peru, where the cocaine convoy was 

intercepted.

The DEA estimated that Colombia-based traffickers had been 

processing 70 percent of the cocaine entering the United States 

each year, which was estimated to yield approximately $150 

million in gross profits to the dealers. In more and more 

investigations around the nation, the DEA encountered trafficking 

networks controlled from Colombia, who were running 

stash houses, moving money, and developing drug market 

networks for their suppliers back home. 

Initially, traffickers from Cuba controlled the distribution organizations 

in South Florida and New York. Eventually, however, 

through violence and the so-called “cocaine wars,” Colombiabased 

traffickers wrested control of the cocaine business. 

Other groups were allowed into the cocaine business, but 

strictly on terms set by the traffickers from Colombia who 

controlled the market. Meanwhile, law enforcement continued 

to make small seizures that were viewed as isolated, independent 

cases. 

The Origins of the 

Medellin Cartel 

The 1979 incident at Dadeland Mall in Florida that had received 

national attention was the first visible evidence of the growing 

presence of a network of Colombia-based drug dealers in the 

United States. This drug alliance had been conceived by Carlos 

Enrique Lehder-Rivas, who had met George Jung, a drug 

trafficker, while in prison. Jung had been transporting tons of 

marijuana in private planes. Noting how successful this 

method of smuggling marijuana had been, Lehder reasoned 

that cocaine could also be moved in ton quantities. 

In the late 1970s, Carlos Enrique Lehder-Rivas began cooperating 

with other Colombia-based traffickers in the manufacturing, 

transportation, and distribution of tons of cocaine to the United 

States and around the world. Lehder’s idea evolved into of the 

most lucrative, powerful, and deadly partnerships known—the 

Medellin cartel. Its membership included some of the most 

notorious drug lords of the 1980s—Jorge Ochoa, Pablo Escobar, 

Griselda Blanco, Gustavo and Benjamin Herrera, and Jose 

Rodriguez-Gacha. 

By the summer of 1976, Jung and Lehder were out of jail and in 

the cocaine business. Lehder bought Norman’s Cay, an island 

in the Bahamas, which served as a base for air smuggling 

between Colombia and the United States. Lehder was just one 

of the hundreds of Colombia-based traffickers expanding the 

cocaine business. 

By the mid-1970s, these traffickers, already active in marijuana 

trade, had established a virtual monopoly over cocaine distribution. 

The Andean city of Medellin, Colombia’s second 

largest city, was home to most of these traffickers. With 

cooperation, the cartels began processing even greater amounts 

36 

Carlos Lehder (left) is shown using cocaine with his former 

prison buddy Steven Yakovac on Norman’s Cay in 1978. 

Lehder purchased Norman’s Cay, shown here in 1981, to 

facilitate his smuggling operations. 

of cocaine—from 25 tons in the late 1970s to 125 tons by the 

early 1980s. In the United States in 1978, a kilo of 12-percent 

purity cocaine had sold on the street for an average of 

$800,000. But by early 1984, cocaine was so plentiful that there 

were substantial price reductions in many U.S. cities. Prices for 

a kilo of cocaine dropped as low as $30,000 in New York City 

and $16,000 in South Florida.

Major Cocaine Seizures 

In late 1979, the DEA and the U.S. Customs Service conducted 

a two-part drug air interdiction campaign in the Turks and 

Caicos islands near the Bahamas. The campaign, which was 

called Operation Boomer/Falcon, mostly focused on South 

Caicos island. The island had become an established transhipment 

and refueling point for drug smugglers from South 

America because many corrupt South Caicos government 

officials were easily bribed. 

One phase of the operation involved a covert surveillance of 

nearby uninhabited West Caicos island, which was also used 

as a transhipment point. When aircraft laden with illicit drugs 

landed on the island, DEA agents and local law enforcement 

officers were on-hand to seize the aircraft and arrest the pilots. 

The other phase of the operation was an undercover investigation 

used to collect intelligence about aircraft transporting 

drugs. Two DEA agents posing as mechanics lived in a DEA 

DC-3 plane for six weeks. During that time, they collected 

identification information about planes that were smuggling 

drugs and relayed this information to a command post in 

Miami, Florida. Using this information, which included the tail 

identification numbers and take-off times of planes transporting 

illicit drugs, the command post launched aircraft to intercept 

the traffickers. 

The operation was enormously successful and resulted in the 

seizure of 27 aircraft, 1,203 pounds of Quaaludes and almost 

8 tons of marijuana, as well as the 1985 arrest and conviction 

of the Prime Minister of South Caicos, Norman Saunders, who 

had accepted bribes from drug traffickers. Operation Boomer/ 

Falcon was responsible for the seizure of a total of 785 pounds 

of cocaine, of which two seizures were of record quantities— 

329 and 384 pounds. Previously, agents rarely seized more 

than 10-20 pounds at a time. These large seizures alerted law 

enforcement of the increase in cocaine trafficking from South 

America. 

In addition to 

significant cocaine 

cases, the DEA also 

confronted major 

heroin trafficking. In 

this photograph, 

DEA New York 

Regional Director 

John Fallon (right) 

examined 24 

kilograms of highquality 

heroin 

confiscated at 

Kennedy Airport in 

1980. 

37 

U.S. Drug Use Peaks (1979) 

Drug use by Americans reached its all-time high in 1979. With 

relaxed attitudes regarding the harmfulness of marijuana, cocaine, 

and other illegal substances, young people recklessly 

experimented with these drugs and suffered severe consequences 

as a result. According to the 1979 National Survey on 

Drug Abuse, more than two-thirds of young adults, age 18-25, 

reported experience with an illicit drug. About three in ten 

youth, age 12-17, and one in five older adults, age 26 and older, 

reported having used an illicit drug. These statistics sent shock 

waves through the law enforcement, civic, and educational 

communities. As a result, in subsequent years, anti-drug campaigns 

and concerted efforts were launched by governments 

and communities across the nation aimed at decreasing teen 

drug use. 

Katy’s coloring book was originally conceived 

and illustrated by Suzie Rice in 1970. It was 

innovative in that it was the first publication 

which addressed the subject at a child’s level.

Domestic Cannabis Eradication 

and Suppression Program 

(1979) 

Marijuana was the only major drug grown within U.S. 

borders, and since the 1960s, had been the most widely 

used drug in the United States. In the late 1970s, it was 

estimated that the United States was producing almost 

25 percent of all the marijuana consumed domestically. 

During the two-year period from 1977 to 1979, the 

demand for it was confirmed by the percentage of adults 

who admitted to ever having tried marijuana in their 

lifetime. These rates increased from 59.9 percent to 

68.2 percent for young adults, and from 15.3 percent to 

19.6 percent for older adults. 

In 1979, an estimated 10-15,000 tons of marijuana were 

consumed in the United States. It is believed that up to 

10 percent of that amount was cultivated in the United 

States, a majority from California and Hawaii. In response 

to this serious problem, the DEA began its 

Domestic Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Program 

in 1979 with only two states participating, California 

and Hawaii. The DEA provided three special agents to 

work with local authorities in California on case development 

and intelligence gathering. 

The DEA Air Wing also provided aircraft and pilots as 

part of the search effort, and local police received aerial 

search techniques instruction. In the same year, three 

DEA agents also worked with the U.S. Customs Service 

and U.S. Coast Guard in Operation Green Harvest that 

targeted marijuana growers in the Hawaiian Islands. 

More and more states joined the cannabis eradication 

program and by 1982, 25 states had joined. 

This program was established as a partnership of federal, 

state, and local agencies. In addition to cultivating 

an illegal drug that contributed to wholesale abuse, 

marijuana growers presented other problems to law 

enforcement and the environment. They encroached on 

national forests and parks and threatened innocent 

people. To protect their marijuana crops, many growers 

equipped their marijuana patches with booby traps, trip 

wires, and explosives. Marijuana growers also threatened 

the environment by using pesticides, building harmful 

dams for irrigation, and cutting down trees. By 1982, 25 

states were participating in the cannabis eradication 

program. 

38 

Women Competing 

Four DEA women ran in the 10,000 meter Bonnie Belle 

Classic in Washington, D.C. Over 1500 women competed 

in the race which was held at Haines Point. 

Colleen Finnegan, Cardie Dalton, Dee Zugby and Eileen 

Scire all finished the race in about an hour. 

International Cooperation 

Cooperative international law enforcement efforts 

allowed the DEA to stop the flow of drugs at the source. 

Pictured above, Colonel Choktip (left) of the Thai Office 

of Narcotics Control Board and DEA Case Agent Paul 

Salute (right) questioned a defendant after the 1980 

arrest of 10 morphine traffickers in Thailand.

Training 

In 1975, the DEA began adjusting the focus of its Basic Agent training class, and by 1977 the length of the course had increased 

from 10 weeks to 12 weeks. Students trained from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. and were given only five days off, receiving what would be 

equivalent to 16 weeks of training. The rigorous schedule insured that DEA agents-in-training would be prepared to face the 

challenges ahead of them. Other changes to the training class included an increase in field training and report writing exercises, 

as well as the addition of a three-day conspiracy school. Students also spent more hours studying law than did their predecessors. 

These changes were made in response to the DEA’s increasing focus on conspiracy cases and to a survey to agents in the field 

that indicated more training was needed. Starting in June 1977, basic agents received increased training in law, the use of technical 

investigative aids, and new conspiracy techniques. Training was still performed at the National Training Institute, which was 

located at DEA Headquarters, 1405 “Eye” Street in Washington, D.C. 

In April 1978, the Philadelphia District Office staff designed and implemented a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory school 

that proved to be a catalyst for similar seminars conducted throughout the United States. This school combined laboratory 

exercises with realistic, practical exercises on the street. 

A major improvement in lab training occurred in April 1979, when the DEA began clandestine laboratory synthesis training, 

coordinated by Forensic Chemist Alan B. Clark of the Southwest Regional Laboratory. Groups of three agents per class were trained 

in the synthesis of PCP and methamphetamine, the two substances most frequently produced in clandestine lab operations. 

Previously, new agents were trained only in the investigative aspects of clandestine labs, but had little or no training in chemical 

synthesis. With this new training, they were better equipped to identify what substances were being synthesized and which 

procedures were being used in the clandestine labs they encountered. This training not only increased agents’ investigative 

capabilities, but also improved safety by increasing their knowledge of the toxic dangers encountered in clandestine labs. 

At a firearms instruction school held in May 1977, 

instructor Neal Crane demonstrated a Remington Model 

870P 12-gauge shotgun. 

39 

Firearms classes were originially conducted in two inside 

ranges in the “bank” building on Eye Street. 

Physical Fitness was also a part 

of training given to state and 

local police officers. The 

gymnasium was located in a 

former bank, which was next 

door to the original 

Headquarters building at 14th 

and Eye streets in Washington, 

D.C. 

Police officers from these classes 

would often later become DEA 

Agents. This is class P-19, 

1978.

Technology 

During the period 1975 through 1980, the DEA continued to 

take advantage of the latest in law enforcement technology. 

For example, in 1976, the DEA employed the Policefax DD-14, 

a new system for transmitting information about criminals. The 

system, a precursor to modern-day fax machines, transmitted 

photo-quality fingerprints over the conventional telephone 

network. This communication tool served as a link between 

DEA field offices and the DEA’s Central Identification Bureau. 

Transmitting fingerprints via Policefax DD-14 allowed the field 

offices to quickly determine if suspects had previous records 

and obtain those records, when necessary. 

These Policefax machines required several hours to transmit 

data to a receiving machine, which would then take 14 minutes 

per page to print eight-inch square reproductions of the 

original fingerprint card. Nevertheless, according to Dr. Al 

Glass of the DEA’s Office of Enforcement, the new system was 

the fastest way to send fingerprints and significantly reduced 

the time spent waiting for ‘rap sheets.’ 

The DEA also made use of the best available communication 

technology at its improved its communication centers. The 

Dallas Regional Communications Center (DRCC), which began 

providing around-the-clock support in February 1976, 

was one of the first to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a 

week. The center provided tactical, near-real-time response 

support for agents in the field, as well as day-to-day support 

for regional and district offices. DEA personnel used the 

center to quickly access intelligence sources such as NCIC, 

driver’s license checks, and NADDIS. This center was the first 

fully operational DEA network, with 16 manned sub-stations 

and 11 unmanned base-repeaters, and covered the entire 

Texas and Oklahoma area. In addition to Dallas, similar DEA 

communications centers began operating in the Los Angeles, 

New York and Seattle regions. 

1980 

40 

Herb Thompson of the Research and Engineering Division 

in Merrifield, Virginia, was photographed working on his 

CAT system, which tracked suspect vehicles in real time. 

In 1978, Special Agents Steve Prator (left) and Ron Hall 

examined chemical equipment seized from a clandestine 

methamphetamine lab in Shreveport, Louisiana. 

The 1980 arrest of Leroy 

Butler, one of the most 

significant heroin traffickers in 

New York City, also led to the 

seizure of the $40,000 Rolls 

Royce shown here. Posing with 

the car are, from left to right: 

SA Lewis Rice, SA Thor 

Nowozeniuk, and GS Fred 

Gormandy.

Aviation Laboratories 

By the mid-1970s, the DEA Air Wing was comprised of 38 

pilots stationed across the country. Many had commercial 

flight experience, or had flown in Vietnam or World War II. Air 

Wing service became available to every DEA regional and 

district office in the continental United States. 

Supervision of Air Wing operations was divided between the 

chief pilot, Marion Joseph, at the central Air Wing facility in 

Addison, Texas, and four regional air coordinators. The air 

coordinators were responsible for the four Air Wing regions—Eastern, 

Central, Midwestern, and Western—that 

were centered in Miami, Dallas, Denver, and Los Angeles, 

respectively. The chief pilot had jurisdiction over the aircraft, 

while the air coordinators supervised personnel. This division 

of supervision over Air Wing resources made it difficult to 

coordinate aircraft and personnel for Air Wing missions. In 

1975, supervision was centralized and the chief pilot at Addison 

became responsible for both the Air Wing personnel and 

aircraft. The program became more structured as it grew, and 

eventually included uniform safety and flight procedures. 

While the Addison facility handled the coordination of resources, 

headquarters established and standardized 

administrative procedures and developed an official aviation 

manual. When additional air support was needed, planes and 

pilots were rescheduled on a temporary duty basis or were 

provided by the Central Air Wing in Addison. 

In 1978, the chief pilot position was reassigned to headquarters 

to focus on program management, budget, and policy. The 

deputy chief pilot assumed responsibility for the day-to-day 

operations of the Addison Aviation Facility. At the same time, 

four area supervisor positions were transferred to Addison 

from regional offices to improve management structure. Shortly 

thereafter, a full-time safety/training position was created at 

Addison. By the late 1970s, Air Wing operations provided 

eradication support and transportation of prisoners, personnel, 

and evidence. Air Wing employees also performed 

undercover work and surveillance. 

41 

In early 1975, the DEA was busy constructing a new regional 

lab in the San Diego area. The impetus behind the decision 

to build it was the dramatic increase in heroin trafficking from 

Mexico into the southwestern United States. For two years, 

San Diego lab employees worked in a temporary facility, the 

old U.S. Customs Bureau Laboratory, while their new lab was 

being designed and constructed. The new building, which 

was completed in July 1976, featured the latest in safety and 

efficiency features. The fact that the structure was only onestory 

high allowed for safer utilization of extremely heavy 

equipment. The building also contained a vault space that 

was four times larger than that in any other DEA lab at that 

time. 

Another important event for DEA laboratories occurred in the 

fall of 1976, when chemists from around the world studied in 

DEA lab facilities as part of the International Forensic Chemist 

Seminar. Fourteen chemists from Hong Kong, Germany, 

France, Iran, Belgium, and the Netherlands spent two weeks 

at the DEA’s Special Testing Research Lab in McLean, 

Virginia. They also visited the DEA’s Southeast Regional 

Lab. 

The program included advanced training for the already 

proficient chemists. Courses covered such subjects as the 

history of drug abuse and control, advanced techniques, and 

ballistics. 

1977: DEA 

Chemists Chuck 

Harper and Al 

Spurling 

analyzed 

findings at the 

Special Testing 

and Research 

Lab. 

1977: Chemists at the Special Testing and Research Lab 

supported many DEA investigations. From left to right: 

Phil Patterson, Ted Kram, Jim Moore, and Joe Koles.

Mexico City 

Management 

Team June 

1980 

Left to right back: CA Rudy 

Ramirez, Costa Rica CO, RAC 

Richard Canas, Monterey RO, 

RAC Ruben Salinas, Mazatlan 

RO, CA Guatemala, RAC 

William Rochon, Guadalajara 

RO, RAC William Farnan, 

Merida RO, RAC Thomas Telles, 

Hermosillo RO. Left to right 

front: GS Charlie Lugo, Mexico 

City,Asst. Regional Director 

Frank Macolini, Mexico City, 

DEA Administrator Peter 

Bensinger, Regional Director 

Edward Heath, Mexico City, 

GS Freank Cruz, Mexico City 


Larry D. Wallace Octavio Gonzalez 

Died on December 19, 1975 Died on December 13, 1976 

DEA Special Agent Wallace, of the To- DEA Special Agent Gonzalez was the 

kyo District Office, died at the Naval Country Attache in Bogota, Colombia, 

Regional Medical Center in Guam when he was shot and killed in the 

from gunshot wounds received dur office by an informant. 

ing an undercover drug investigation. 

Ralph N. Shaw Francis J. Miller 

Died on May 14, 1976 Died on March 5, 1977 

DEA Special Agent Shaw, of the DEA Special Agent Miller, a Group Su- 

Calexico, California District Office, died pervisor at the Newark Division, was 

in a plane crash north of Acapulco dur killed in an automobile accident in 

ing an operations flight in support of New York. 

Mexico’s opium eradication program. 

James T. Lunn Robert C. Lightfoot 

Died on May 14, 1976 Died on November 23, 1977 

DEA Special Agent Lunn, a pilot as- DEA Special Agent Lightfoot died in 

signed to the Office of Enforcement at a firearms accident in Bangkok, 

DEA headquarters, died in a plane Thailand. 

crash north of Acapulco during an operations 

flight in support of Mexico’s 

opium eradication program. 

42


During the 1980s, 

international drug trafficking 

organizations reorganized 

and began operating on an 

unprecedented scale. The rise 

of the Medellin cartel, the 

influx of cocaine into the 

United States, and the violence 

associated with drug 

trafficking and drug use 

complicated the task of law 

enforcement at all levels. 

One of the first wireless phones to 

be used in enforcement. 

43

DEA 

Francis M. Mullen, Jr. 

Administrator, DEA 

July 10, 1981 (acting)- 

March 1, 1985 

Francis M. “Bud” Mullen, Jr., a career FBI agent of almost 

20 years, was appointed Acting Administrator of the DEA on 

July 10, 1981. He began his FBI career in May 1962 at the 

Bureau’s Los Angeles office, serving from 1963 to 1969. From 

there, he was assigned to the Administrative Services Division 

in Washington (1969-1972), the Planning and Inspection 

Division (1972), and was Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

in Denver, Colorado (1973-1975). Later, he served as 

Special Agent in Charge in Tampa, Florida (1975-1976) and 

in New Orleans, Louisiana (1976-1978), and he was the 

FBI’s Inspector and Deputy Assistant Director, Organized 

Crime & White Collar Crime (1978-79); Assistant Director, 

Criminal Investigative Division (1979-80); and Executive 

Assistant Director, Investigations from 1980 until his appointment 

to DEA Administrator. He continued to serve in an 

acting capacity from July 1981 until he was confirmed by the 

U.S. Senate on September 30, 1983, and sworn in as the DEA’s 

third administrator on November 10, 1983. He is currently 

the Director of Mohegan Tribal Gaming Commission in 

Uncasville, Connecticut. 

Administrator Mullen began his term at a time when the 

tremendous impact of drug abuse was being felt across the 

United States. The problem was especially acute in southern 

Florida, where unprecedented drug-related violence accompanied 

the cocaine transit routes of the Colombian 

cartels. It was clear to the Reagan Administration that U.S. 

drug fighting agencies needed help. 

Acting Administrator Mullen stressed multi-agency cooperation 

with other members of the enforcement and 

intelligence communities. He made the policy official in a 

July 14, 1981, memo to DEA employees: “On policy, strategy 

and tactical levels, your cooperation with other agencies in 

all current and future DEA efforts is hereby ordered.” 

Special Agents DEA Budget 

1980......1,941 1980.....$206.6 million 

1985......2,234 1985.....$362.4 million 

44 

During the early 1980s, international drug trafficking organizations 

reorganized and began operating on an unprecedented 

scale. The rise of the Medellin cartel, the influx of cocaine into 

the United States, and the violence associated with drug 

trafficking and drug use complicated the task of law enforcement 

at all levels. Violent crime rates rose dramatically during 

this period and continued to rise until the early 1990s. The 

“normalization” of drug use during the previous two decades 

continued as the U.S. population rediscovered cocaine. Many 

saw cocaine as a benign, recreational drug. In 1981, Time 

magazine ran a cover story entitled, “High on Cocaine” with 

cover art of an elegant martini glass filled with cocaine. The 

article reported that cocaine’s use was spreading quickly into 

America’s middle class: “Today...coke is the drug of choice 

for perhaps millions of solid, conventional and often upwardly 

mobile citizens.” Drug abuse among U.S. citizens in the 

early 1980s remained at dangerously high levels. 

The Rise of the Medellin 

Cartel 

By the early 1980s, the drug lords of the Medellin cartel were 

well established in Colombia, where they used murder, intimidation, 

and assassination to keep journalists and public 

officials from speaking out against them. Law enforcement 

officers and judges were favored targets of these brutish drug 

cartels that controlled entire towns and economies to support 

their criminal business. By 1985, Colombia had the highest 

murder rate in the world. In Medellin alone, 1,698 people were 

murdered, and the following year, that number more than 

doubled to 3,500. The Medellin cartel was fast becoming the 

richest and most feared underworld crime syndicate the world 

had ever encountered. 

During the period 1980 through 1985, the Medellin mafias 

delivered to the United States a large measure of the wholesale 

violence and terror that their drug trafficking activities had 

inflicted on their home country. In a grim parody of their 

campaign to control Colombia, they insinuated themselves 

into legitimate, and useful, sectors of the U.S. economy, such 

as the banking and import industries. The United States 

suffered badly from the cartel’s presence as local drug gangs 

began to form, communities were terrorized, and drug use 

among teens continued to climb. 

Colombian Marijuana 

Colombian marijuana continued to be a problem in the early 

1980s as Colombia-based traffickers brought boatloads of 

high-potency marijuana to the shores of the United States. 

Consequently, the DEA ran several investigations targeting 

these smugglers, including Operations Grouper and Tiburon.

In 1981, Operation Grouper was conducted in cooperation 

with the U.S. Coast Guard and 21 other federal, state, and local 

government agencies. It was one of the largest enforcement 

operations launched against marijuana traffickers from Colombia. 

The operation targeted 14 separate Florida, Louisiana, 

and Georgia-based trafficking organizations that were smuggling 

large-scale, multi-ton quantities of marijuana and millions 

of dosage units of methaqualone into the United States. For 

22 months, nine DEA special agents operated undercover, 

some posing as off-loaders to a number of smuggling organizations. 

The smuggling network had negotiated deliveries 

to states as far away as Maine and New York. As a result of 

the operation, agents ultimately arrested 122 out of the 155 

indicted subjects, and seized more than $1 billion worth of 

drugs, and $12 million worth of assets, including 30 vessels, 

two airplanes and $1 million in cash. 

The following year, the DEA concluded Operation Tiburon, 

another major operation targeting marijuana smuggling from 

Colombia. Tiburon resulted in the arrest of 495 people and the 

seizure of 95 vessels, 1.7 million pounds of marijuana in the 

United States, and 4.7 million pounds of marijuana in Colombia. 

U.S. Attorney General William French Smith praised this 

operation as a “classic example of how agencies, and indeed 

entire governments, can work together sharing intelligence 

and expertise and zeroing in on the sea and air routes used by 

major smugglers.” 

Operation Swordfish (1980) 

In December 1980, the DEA launched a major investigation in 

Miami aimed against international drug organizations. The 

operation was dubbed Operation Swordfish because it was 

intended to snare the “big fish” in the drug trade. The DEA 

set up a bogus money laundering corporation in suburban 

Miami Lakes that was called Dean International Investments, 

Inc. The DEA agents teamed up with a Cuban exile who had 

fallen on hard times and was willing to lure Colombian traffickers 

to the bogus bank. In addition to spending time in Cuban 

prisons after the Bay of Pigs invasion, the exile had also served 

jail time in the United States for tax fraud and was heavily in 

debt to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. During the 18month 

investigation, agents were able to gather enough 

evidence for a federal grand jury to indict 67 U.S. and Colombian 

citizens. At the conclusion of the operation, drug agents 

seized 100 kilos of cocaine, a quarter-million methaqualone 

pills, tons of marijuana, and $800,000 in cash, cars, land, and 

Miami bank accounts. Operation Swordfish was a significant 

attack on South Florida’s flourishing drug trade. 

45 

NotableCases 

On February 20, 1981, DEA Miami Field Division special 

agents of Group No. 1 and the Florida Department of Law 

Enforcement (FDLE) seized 826 pounds of cocaine—a 

record seizure at that time. Florida Governor Bob 

Graham (center) applauded their success. 

In 1981, DEA Albuquerque, the New Mexico State Police, 

and the Taos Police Department seized the first cocaine 

processing laboratory in the Southwest. Pictured (left) 

are special agents and 7.5 pounds of cocaine, which had 

been impregnated into articles of clothing. 

Members of DEA Philadelphia Group 1 seized 20 pounds of 

methamphetamine in a joint DEA/FBI investigation of 

organized crime in 1981. From left are SAs Dennis Malloy, 

Richard B. Shapiro, and William McGinn.

International Security & 

Development Cooperation 

Act of 1981 

The International Security and Development Act, Public Law 

97-113, was passed in 1981. Among its provisions, this act 

authorized appropriations for the International Narcotics 

Control program under section 482 of the Foreign Assistance 

Act, specifically, $37.7 million for each of the fiscal years 1982 

and 1983. The act allowed for the use of herbicides in drug crop 

eradication while requiring the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services to monitor any potentially harmful impacts of the use 

of such herbicides. Finally, the act directed the President to 

make an annual report to Congress on U.S. policy for establishing 

an international strategy to prevent narcotics trafficking. 

This mandated report was the forerunner of the International 

Narcotics and Controlled Strategy Report (INCSR), which the 

President issues every March and which highlighted the drug 

control efforts in every foreign country that receives aid from 

the United States. 

Concurrent Jurisdiction with 

the FBI (1982) 

In January 1982, Attorney General William French Smith 

announced a federal law enforcement reorganization. In an 

effort to bolster the drug effort with more anti-drug manpower 

and resources, the FBI officially joined forces with the DEA. 

The DEA would continue to be the principal drug enforcement 

agency and continue to be headed by an administrator, but 

instead of reporting directly to Associate Attorney General 

Rudy Giuliani, as Administrator Bensinger had, Administrator 

Mullen would report to FBI Director William H. Webster. 

Therefore, the FBI gained concurrent jurisdiction with the 

DEA over drug offenses. This increased the human and 

technical resources available for federal drug law enforcement 

from 1,900 agents to almost 10,000. 

Administrator Mullen was the first FBI special agent to head 

the DEA. The Administration intended to increase cooperation 

between the two agencies by combining the street savvy 

of DEA agents with the variety of unique FBI investigative 

skills, especially in the area of money laundering and organized 

crime. 

During the previous summer, high-ranking Justice Department 

officials had formed a committee to study the most 

effective method of coordinating the efforts of the DEA and 

FBI. Although the committee had considered an outright 

merger of the two agencies, they decided that formalizing a 

closer working relationship would be the most effective way 

to enhance the nation’s drug fighting effort. 

46 

In order to implement concurrent investigations, the two 

agencies began an intensive cross-training program, and 

similar programs were established to coordinate intelligence 

gathering efforts and laboratory analyses. Several DEA 

executives were reassigned to make room for additional FBI 

agents who assumed managerial responsibility for the DEA. 

Over time, the FBI and the DEA shared many administrative 

practices, and the years between 1981 and 1986 proved to be 

a time of growth and development for both agencies. The DEA 

expanded its global responsibilities and placed greater emphasis 

on conspiracy and wiretap cases. 

Southwest Asian Heroin 

After years of aggressive law enforcement efforts aimed 

against heroin traffickers, several significant benefits were 

achieved. During the 1970s, the heroin addict population was 

reduced from over a half million to 380,000 addicts; heroin 

overdose deaths dropped by 80 percent; and heroin-related 

injuries decreased by 50 percent. In 1981, it was estimated that 

there was 40 percent less heroin available than in 1976. But, by 

the early 1980s, a new wave of heroin from the poppy fields of 

the “Golden Crescent” countries in southwest Asia—primarily 

Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—began to flood the U.S. 

East Coast. Heroin traffickers reopened the notorious French 

Connection drug route of the 1970s, using many of the same 

organized crime smugglers in Italy, France, and West Germany. 

In 1980, DEA and U.S. Customs intercepted one of the 

largest illicit shipments of heroin since the French Connection. 

In Staten Island, New York, U.S. Customs detector dogs 

pointed to a shipment of furniture imported from Palermo, Italy. 

Inside the furniture, officers discovered 46 pounds of 65 

percent-pure southwest Asian heroin. DEA agents then 

posed as truck drivers to make a controlled delivery of the 

furniture in New York City and Detroit, resulting in the Detroit 

arrest of a naturalized U.S. citizen from Sicily. In addition, three 

others were arrested in New York City. 


1981 Athens, Greece 

1981 Tegucigalpa, Honduras 

1982 Cairo, Egypt 

1982 Barranquilla, Colombia 

1982 Curacao, Netherlands Ant. 

1982 Nicosia, Cyprus 

1982 Peshawar, Pakistan 

1982 Santo Domingo, Dom. Rep. 

1984 Bern, Switzerland 

1984 Santa Cruz, Bolivia

Methaqualone (1982) 

Methaqualone, also called “Quaalude,” was first marketed in 

the United States in 1965 as a sedative. By 1972, methaqualone 

had become one of the most popular drugs of abuse in the 

United States. Methaqualone abuse then increased suddenly 

in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to the Drug Abuse 

Warning Network (DAWN) survey, methaqualone abuse in 

1979 increased almost 40 percent. 

One contributing factor to the increase of methaqualone abuse 

was the establishment of “stress clinics” in New York, New 

Jersey, and Florida. The sole purpose of these clinics was to 

issue prescriptions for methaqualone. Investigation of these 

clinics was complicated by the fact that patients underwent 

physical examinations so that there was a facade of legitimate 

medical treatment. 

Responding to the alarming increase in methaqualone abuse 

in the early 1980s, the DEA targeted the major stress clinics. By 

mid-1982, these investigations resulted in 38 indictments. In 

addition, Florida and Georgia placed methaqualone in Schedule 

I, eliminating its medical use in those states. 

At the peak of the U.S. methaqualone problem in the early 

1980s, an estimated 85 percent of the methaqualone tablets that 

were being abused in the U.S. were counterfeit Quaalude 

tablets from overseas sources. In response, the DEA Diversion 

Control Program (renamed in 1982 from the Office of 

Compliance and Regulatory Affairs), in cooperation with the 

U.S. Department of State, launched a series of successful 

diplomatic initiatives with the major drug manufacturing and 

exporting countries in Europe and Asia. As a result, five source 

countries placed more stringent controls on the exportation of 

methaqualone. Also, cooperative investigations with foreign 

law enforcement agencies and the development of a “Drug and 

Chemical Watch Manual” by the DEA and the U.S. Customs 

Service resulted in more effective interdiction measures. 

By the end of 1982, there were clear signs that the comprehensive 

effort against methaqualone diversion was working. Then, 

in 1984, Congress rescheduled methaqualone into Schedule 

47 

Chemist Romulo Reyes reviewed a drug analysis at the 

Southwest Regional Laboratory. 

I, effectively eliminating its domestic production and medical 

use. That same year, the United Nations reported that there 

were only two countries in the world manufacturing methaqualone. 

By 1985, there were so few methaqualone emergency 

room mentions (down 83 percent from 1980 levels) that it no 

longer showed up on the DAWN Top 20 controlled substance 

list. The results of the coordinated domestic and 

international actions were described as a total victory against 

methaqualone abuse. 

1983: FBI Director WIlliam Webster (left) and DEA 

Acting Administrator Francis Mullen are shown at the 

unveiling of an exhibit focusing on the cooperative DEA/ 

FBI efforts to enforce drug laws.

Reorganization of DEA 

Headquarters Functions 

In 1982, when the FBI gained joint jurisdiction over drug 

investigations with the DEA, CENTAC was replaced with 

drug-specific operations, and the headquarters functions of 

the DEA were restructured into major drug enforcement investigations 

sections, known as the heroin, dangerous drugs, 

cocaine, and cannabis “drug desks.” Each drug desk assumed 

responsibility for the direction, funding, and coordination of 

worldwide investigations for that drug category. Individual 

CENTAC investigations were renamed Special Enforcement 

Operations (SEOs), were removed from any central, overall 

control, and assigned to the drug desks. The new structure 

replaced the former geographical organization (domestic and 

foreign) with the expectation that it would improve the control 

and coordination of major investigations. 

Centralizing Operations 

(1982) 

With the FBI being assigned concurrent jurisdiction, Administrator 

Mullen reorganized the nine-year-old DEA structure 

to centralize operations. Upper-level management positions 

were moved from the regional offices to headquarters. Field 

divisions reported directly to headquarters in accordance with 

FBI management procedures. Administrator Mullen also 

raised the qualifications bar for new recruits, making college 

degrees mandatory for new agents, and reorganized the office 

responsible for investigating internal cooperation. Crosstraining 

programs were developed and each of the 10 field 

offices received a training coordinator (previously, training 

coordinators were located only at the five regional offices). 

The major policy shift, however, was to eliminate quotas or 

arrest goals once mandated for all DEA regions, and then to 

establish pursuing major traffickers as an agency-wide goal. 

“In the past,” Mullen explained, “we concentrated on arrests. 

Now we’re concentrating on convictions at the highest levels.” 

Task Force on South Florida 

(1982) 

As the drug trade grew in South Florida, murder and crime rates 

soared. In 1979, there were 349 murders—almost one drug 

killing per day in Miami. By 1981, murders had climbed to 621. 

Local law enforcement and politicians pleaded for help. In 

February 1982, President Reagan announced that “massive 

immigration, rampant crime, and epidemic drug smuggling 

have created a serious problem” in South Florida. Soon, 

hundreds of additional federal agents were detailed to the 

Southern Florida Task Force. The DEA added 20 agents 

48 

and the FBI 43 agents to their Miami offices. The U.S. Treasury 

Department contributed 20 analysts to track drug money, and 

for the first time, the U.S. armed services became involved in 

drug interdiction. Meanwhile, because drug traffickers were 

also establishing offshore banks to facilitate their money 

laundering, the U.S. Government heightened its emphasis on 

financial investigations. Vice-president Bush stated that “Our 

investigative efforts will be as stringent on bankers and 

businessmen who profit from crime, as on the drug traffickers, 

the pushers, the hired assassins, and others. There will be no 

free lunch for the white collar criminal.” 

Domestic Marijuana 

By the 1980s, more than 60 percent of American teenagers had 

experimented with marijuana and 40 percent became regular 

users. Supply also continued to increase. In addition to the 

smuggling of Colombian marijuana across U.S. borders, domestic 

cultivation of marijuana continued to be a problem. As 

cultivation techniques improved, the potency of marijuana 

(THC content) also climbed from 3.68 percent in 1979 to 7.28 

percent in 1985. To counter this trend, the Domestic Cannabis 

Eradication/Suppression Program, initiated by Hawaii and 

California in 1979, rapidly expanded to encompass all 50 states 

by the close of 1985. 

Administrator Mullen cuts cannabis plants during South 

Dakota seizures in 1983.

Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Force 

(1982) 

On October 14, 1982, Attorney General William French Smith 

announced an 8-point program (see side-bar) to crackdown on 

organized crime, particularly syndicates involved with illegal 

drug trafficking. One highlight of the program was to establish 

12 additional Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces 

(OCDETF), modeled after the successful South Florida Task 

Force, which was initiated under the leadership of Vice President 

George Bush. The President explained that “these task 

forces...will work closely with state and local law enforcement 

officials. 

Following the South Florida example, they’ll utilize the resources 

of the federal government, including the FBI (Federal 

Bureau of Investigation), the DEA, the IRS (Internal Revenue 

Service), the ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms), 

Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States 

Marshal Services, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Coast 

Guard. In addition, in some regions, Department of Defense 

tracking and pursuit capability will be made available...These 

task forces will allow us to mount an intensive and coordinated 

campaign against international and domestic drug trafficking 

and other organized criminal enterprises.” 

OCDETF was one of the first multi-jurisdictional task forces to 

combat drug trafficking, and over the years, the DEA has 

participated in 85 percent of all OCDETF investigations. 

Scheduling of Dangerous 

Drugs 

The scheduling of dangerous drugs and precursor chemicals 

has long been a mainstay in DEA’s arsenal in curtailing drug 

trafficking. For example, in early 1980, phenylacetone (P2P), 

a precursor chemical favored by outlaw motorcycle gangs in 

manufacturing methamphetamine, was placed in Schedule II, 

which forced drug traffickers to search for alternative chemicals 

that were more difficult to obtain and synthesize. 

50th State Joins EPIC (1984) 

On October 24, 1984, the State of Pennsylvania signed a 

participation agreement with EPIC, becoming the 50th state to 

do so. A signing ceremony and news conference were held at 

the Pennsylvania State Police Headquarters in Harrisburg. 

Also announced at the conference was the opening of the 

DEA’s new Harrisburg office, comprised of a supervisor and 

three agents. 

49 

8-Point Crackdown on 

Organized Crime 

• Establish 12 additional task forces, modeled 

after the South Florida Task Force, in key 

areas of the United States. 

• Create a 15-member panel to monitor 

organized crime’s influence, hold public 

hearings on the findings for legislative 

recommendations and to heighten public 

awareness. 

• Launch a project to enlist the nation’s 

governors’ support to strengthen criminal 

justice reforms against organized crime. 

• Bring under a cabinet-level committee, 

chaired by the Attorney General, all federal 

agencies and law enforcement bureaus to 

bring a comprehensive attack on organized 

crime. The committee will review interagency 

and intergovernmental cooperation and report 

the findings directly to the President. 

• Found a national center for state and local law 

enforcement training at the federal facility in 

Glynco, Georgia. 

• Open a new legislative offensive aimed to 

reform criminal statutes concerning bail, 

sentencing, criminal forfeiture, exclusionary 

rule, and racketeering. 

• Direct the Attorney General to submit an 

annual report on the fight against organized 

crime and organized drug trafficking groups. 

• Allocate millions of dollars for prison and jail 

facilities. 

Fitness for 

EVERYONE 

Deputy Administrator 

Jack Lawn and 

Administrator “Bud” 

Mullen stretch before a 

fitness run.

OPBAT (1982) 

Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Islands (OPBAT), 

launched in 1982, continued in the 1990s to combat the flow 

of illegal drugs through the Caribbean into the southeastern 

United States. Historically, the United States had an excellent 

working relationship with both the Commonwealth of the 

Bahamas and the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands 

(as a dependent territory of the United Kingdom). The DEA, 

along with U.S. Coast Guard, Department of State, Army, 

Customs Service, Southern and Atlantic Military Commands, 

actively supported the Royal Bahamas Police Force and Royal 

Turk and Caicos Police Forces in combating drug trafficking 

through 100,000 square miles of open water surrounding 700 

islands with a land mass of 5,382 square miles. With increasingly 

effective law enforcement efforts along the Mexican 

border, there had been a resurgence of smuggling through the 

Caribbean. The traffickers used turboprop twin-engine aircraft, 

large “go fast” high-powered vessels, global positioning 

systems, cellular telephones, and Cuban territorial air and seas 

as cover for their trade. All of these factors made OPBAT’s 

law enforcement operations exceedingly difficult. 

Joint DEA/FBI 

SAC Conference (1983) 

In March 1983, the first joint DEA/FBI Special Agent in Charge 

Conference was held. Attorney General William French Smith 

joined the assembly for the first day of the conference. In his 

address, the Attorney General expressed his personal satisfaction 

with the progress of the DEA/FBI relationship, and 

commended those present for working to ensure the program’s 

success. The Attorney General also spoke about the significance 

of drug law enforcement in the Reagan Administration’s 

overall crime control program and acknowledged the danger 

inherent in the drug control mission. 

First Joint DEA/ 

National Narcotics Border 

Interdiction System (1983) 

In March 1983, President Reagan announced the formation of 

the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to 

interdict the flow of narcotics into the United States. NNBIS 

was headed by then Vice President George Bush, and had an 

Executive Board made up of members from the State Department, 

Treasury, Defense, Justice, Transportation, Central 

Intelligence Agency, and White House Drug Abuse Policy 

Office. Acting Administrator Mullen also participated as a 

member of the board. 

50 

Special Agents Mark Johnson (left) and Dempsey Jones 

(right) met with Vice President George Bush during his 1984 

trip to the National Narcotic Border Interdiction System 

(NNBIS) at Long Beach, CA. 

NNBIS was designed to coordinate the work of those federal 

agencies with existing responsibilities and capabilities for 

interdiction of seaborne, airborne, and cross-border importation 

of narcotics. The role of NNBIS was to complement, but 

not to replace, the duties of the regional Drug Enforcement 

Task Forces operated by the Department of Justice. NNBIS 

monitored suspected smuggling activity originating outside 

national borders that targeted the United States, and coordinated 

the seizure of contraband and the arrest of suspects 

involved in illegal drug trafficking. The DEA committed one 

agent and one analyst to each of the six regional centers 

(South Florida, Los Angeles, El Paso, New Orleans, 

Chicago, and New York City) in liaison capacities. 

Career Board (1983) 

The Career Board was established in 1983 by Acting Administrator 

Francis M. Mullen, Jr., as a way to ensure a more 

comprehensive career mobility system within the DEA. In the 

words of Administrator Mullen, “the Career Development 

Program has been designed to reinforce the concepts of equal 

opportunity for advancement, mobility, diversity of assignment 

and centralized selection of managerial personnel. The 

objective of the special agent career ladder is to assist DEA 

criminal investigators in attaining the highest level of competence 

while, at the same time, developing a highly capable 

managerial corps.” When formed, the Career Board was composed 

of the Deputy Administrator (as chairman) and three 

Assistant Administrators. A Senior Special Agent at the GS 

15 level was selected to serve as Executive Secretary for the 

Career Board to provide administrative and technical support. 

This configuration assured diversity and tried to ensure that 

the most qualified personnel for promotions were selected. To 

do so, the Board evaluated each employee’s overall record of 

experience and expertise, the Special Agent in Charge’s personal 

recommendations, the overall needs of the DEA, and 

most important, the fair and equitable treatment of each individual.

Operation Pisces (1984) 

In 1984, the DEA set up an undercover money laundering 

operation called Operation Pisces with the IRS and several 

state and local agencies. 

This two-year, undercover intelligence investigation successfully 

revealed a direct connection between the Colombian 

cartels, including drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, and street 

gangs in the United States, as well as deals negotiated in 

Denmark and Italy. 

During the operation, DEA agents, posing as money launderers, 

also discovered that the drug lords were moving a ton of 

cocaine per week and reaping profits of almost $4 million a 

month. The organizations used check cashing businesses to 

launder the enormous proceeds from the sale of cocaine. 

When the operation ended in 1987, law enforcement had 

arrested 220 drug dealers and seized $28 million in cash and 

assets and more than 11,000 lbs. of cocaine in Southern 

California. The investigation was further proof of the continuous 

flow of drugs and money between Colombia and the 

United States. 

Operation Pipeline (1984) 

As drug traffickers established their networks within U.S. 

borders, they began to rely heavily on the highway system to 

move their wares from entry points to distribution hubs 

around the country. Beginning in the early 1980s, New Mexico 

state troopers grew suspicious when they noticed a sharp 

increase in the number of motor vehicle violations that resulted 

in drug seizures and arrests. At the same time, and 

unknown to the troopers in New Mexico, troopers in New 

Jersey began making similar seizures during highway stops 

along the Interstate-95 “drug corridor” from Florida to the 

Northeast. Independently, troopers in New Mexico and New 

Jersey established their own highway drug interdiction programs. 

Over time, as their seizures mounted, law enforcement 

officers found that highway drug couriers shared many characteristics, 

tendencies, and methods. Highway law enforcement 

officers began to ask key questions to help determine whether 

or not motorists they had stopped for traffic violations were 

also carrying drugs. These interview techniques proved 

extremely effective. The road patrol officers also found it 

beneficial to share their observations and experiences in 

highway interdiction. 

The success of the highway interdiction programs in New 

Jersey and New Mexico led to the creation of Operation 

Pipeline. This DEA-funded training program featured state 

police and highway patrol officers with expertise in highway 

interdiction who provided training to other officers throughout 

the country. Pipeline, a nationwide highway interdiction 

program, was one of DEA’s most effective operations and 

51 

continued to provide essential cooperation between the DEA 

and state and local law enforcement agencies. The operation 

was composed of three elements: training, real-time communication, 

and analytic support. Each year, state and local 

highway officers delivered dozens of training schools across 

the country to other highway officers. These were intended to 

inform officers of interdiction laws and policies, to build their 

knowledge of drug trafficking, and to sharpen their perceptiveness 

of highway couriers. Training classes focused on: (1) 

the law, policy, and ethics governing highway stops and drug 

prosecution; and (2) drug trafficking trends and key characteristics, 

or indicators, that were shared by drug traffickers. 

Also, through EPIC, state and local agencies shared real-time 

information with other agencies, obtained immediate results to 

their record checks, and received detailed analysis of drug 

seizures to support their investigations.

In December 1984, over 1,600 pounds of cocaine were seized in the New York area as a result of a six-month investigation 

by the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force. Pictured with the cocaine seized are, from left to right: Raymond Jones, 

Chief of the Organized Crime Control Bureau, New York City Police Department; Thomas A. Constantine, Deputy 

Superintendent of the New York State Police; Raymond Dearie, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York; New 

York Field Division SAC Bruce Jensen; and John Luksic, U.S. Customs SAC at the JFK airport office. 

The Crime Control Act (1984) 

In 1984, the Crime Control Act targeted various aspects of civil and criminal sanctions related to drug trafficking. Specifically, federal 

criminal and civil asset forfeiture penalties were expanded and increased. The law also established a determinate sentencing system 

for drug offenses. In addition, it amended the Bail Reform Act to target pretrial detention of defendants accused of serious drug 

offenses. The National Drug Policy Board was created by the Act to coordinate international and criminal justice issues related 

to drugs. Chaired by the Attorney General and composed of members of the Departments of Treasury and Defense, it was the 

forerunner to the Office of National Drug Control Policy. 

Explorers wait for a signal from DEA agents participating in a mock exercise at the 1984 National Law Enforcement 

Explorer Conference at Ohio State University. This was the third year that the DEA took part in the conference, which is 

sponsored by the Boy Scouts of America. 

52

Tranquilandia 

(1984) 

In March of 1984, another very important discovery signaled 

just how sophisticated the Medellin cartel’s operations had 

become. Colombian law enforcement officials conducted a 

raid against Tranquilandia or “Quiet Village.” It was much 

more than a cocaine lab located 160 miles south of San Jose 

del Guaviare. What they found was a fully equipped cocaine 

factory, complete with living quarters for 100 people, several 

storage rooms for chemicals and supplies, and workshops for 

automobiles and airplanes. With this efficient production 

line, traffickers were synthesizing 20 tons of cocaine a month, 

putting $12 billion in the coffers of the Medellin cartel in only 

two years. Authorities seized more than 10 tons of cocaine 

and cocaine base at Tranquilandia and found more labs and 

similar compounds in the surrounding jungle. The police 

destroyed drugs and material conservatively estimated to be 

worth $1.2 billion. 

This startling discovery had actually begun when the DEA 

country attache in Bogota asked for a study on chemical 

imports, especially ether and acetone entering Colombia. The 

study determined that 98 percent of the imported ether (90 

percent originating from the United States and West Germany) 

was being used to make cocaine. Due to the findings 

of the chemical report, the DEA contacted U.S. chemical 

companies to ask for their cooperation in alerting law enforcement 

about unusually large chemical orders. 

When an individual from Colombia walked into the chemical 

company office in New Jersey requesting to pay cash for 

nearly two metric tons of ether—an amount equivalent to half 

of all the legitimate ether imports for the entire country of 

Colombia for 1980—the chemical company notified the DEA. 

The processing of cocaine base to paste. 

53 

A cache of precursor chemicals near a South American 

cocaine processing lab. 

Seizing this opportunity, the DEA set up a sting in Chicago 

code-named Operation Scorpion. A front company called 

North Central Industrial Chemical (NCIC), purposely using the 

same initials as the National Crime Information Center, was 

established and contacted the individual with an offer to fill his 

order. Eventually, 76 drums of ether were sent to New Orleans. 

Two of the drums had been wired with electronic tracking 

devices. By satellite, agents were able to monitor the movements 

of the chemicals. After several days, the chemicals were 

traced to a dense jungle area in Colombia. The DEA worked 

with the Colombian National Police to help raid the site, never 

anticipating the magnitude of the operation. 

The DEA had long understood the vital link of chemicals and 

drugs. Without chemicals, traffickers could not manufacture 

their drugs. One of the DEA’s early attacks on the chemical 

trade had occurred in 1982 with Operation Chem Con, short for 

Chemical Control. The DEA gradually expanded its efforts to 

control chemicals essential to the processing of coca to 

cocaine with governments worldwide, and it was this chemical 

tracking that led to major laboratory seizures in South America, 

including Tranquilandia.

Owners and Commissioners of 

Professional Sports Leagues met with 

President Ronald Reagan to express 

their support and to participate in 

prevention efforts. DEA sponsored a 

series of posters featuring the 

Washington Redskins which augmented 

Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” 

campaign. 

Drug Prevention Programs problem. Law enforcement officials recognized that without 

With skyrocketing drug seizures, trafficker arrests, and drug 

use, public awareness about the drug issue was greatly heightened. 

Concerned citizens called on their elected officials to do 

more to control the destructive tide of drugs washing across 

the country. Parents of teens and young children were particularly 

alarmed, and some 4,000 formal parent organizations 

formed all over the United States. It was this national awareness 

and outcry that led to First Lady Nancy Reagan’s “Just 

Say No” program that was formally announced in February 

1985. 

The DEA realized that the unharnessed energy of parents, 

teachers, and other concerned citizens in communities across 

the nation could be a vital asset in reducing drug use among 

teens. Over the next few years, the DEA ventured into a new 

and very important aspect of our nation’s drug problem— 

prevention and education. The DEA had long understood the 

important equation between supply and demand, and knew 

that enforcement efforts alone would not solve the drug 

a dramatic reduction in the U.S. public’s demand for illegal 

drugs, the problem would never go away. 

In September 1984, President Reagan signed a proclamation 

for National Drug Abuse Education and Prevention Week, 

saying, “We are on the right track.” 

In June 1984, the DEA joined forces with the National High 

School Athletic Coaches Association in a cooperative education 

and prevention program that focused on 5.5 million 

high school athletes. The Sports Drug Awareness Program, 

as the program was called, began with Frank Parks, a high 

school coach in Washington, D.C., who believed that high 

school athletes, with their coaches as leaders, could serve as 

positive role models to help young people resist the temptation 

of drugs. More than 40 organizations of professional, 

college, and high school sports joined the program. The DEA 

also recruited and trained many professional athletes to work 

with the Sports Drug Awareness Program. These popular 

sports figures captured the attention of the children and 

helped instill the message that drug use was dangerous. 

1984 Amendment to the Controlled Substances Act 

Legislation passed in 1984 addressed many of the problems 

that had emerged since passage of the CSA in 1970. The most 

important amendment was the inclusion of a “public interest 

revocation” provision. This amendment provided additional 

authority for the denial or revocation of a practitioner controlled 

substance registration based on a demonstration that 

such registration was contrary to the public interest. 

This is the same authority that the DEA always had under the 

CSA with respect to manufacturers and distributors. However, 

the DEA needed the tools to eliminate a source of 

diversion without solely relying on a state regulatory action 

or having to go through a lengthy and labor intensive criminal 

prosecution. For the practitioner, this provision also provided 

a means of removing controlled substance privileges without 

affecting their medical license or giving them a criminal record. 

54 

After the Public Interest Revocation (PIR) program was initiated, 

revocations and surrenders rose from less than 100 per 

year, prior to PIR authority, to more than 400 per year. Subsequently, 

by 1989, DAWN emergency room mentions for prescription 

drugs had dropped to 33 percent of total mentions for 

all controlled substances. 

Under the provisions of the CSA, the formal administrative 

scheduling process could take years to complete. In the 

interim, the DEA was unable to take effective action against the 

traffickers responsible for these new and often dangerous 

drugs. The amendments provided for one-year emergency 

scheduling of a drug if the abuse of that drug constituted an 

“imminent hazard to the public safety,” while normal scheduling 

procedures were being pursued. As a result of this 

amendment, incidents of controlled substance analogue abuse 

significantly declined.

. 

Training Aviation 

Until 1981, the DEA continued its training at the National 

Training Institute, located at DEA Headquarters, 1405 “Eye” 

Street, in Washington, D.C. That year, DEA’s Domestic 

Training Division was moved to the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. In addition to 

Basic Agent training, the program included subject matter 

training, such as intelligence collection, executive development, 

and technical skills, as well as occupational training for 

compliance investigators, intelligence analysts, chemists, supervisors, 

mid-level managers, state and local police officers, 

and international law enforcement officers. With the exception 

of FBI training, all other federal law enforcement training was 

conducted at FLETC. The first FBI/DEA firearms instructor 

school was held in November 1984 at the FBI Academy in 

Quantico. Training included current firearms training concepts 

practiced by the FBI, and practical training in various combat 

shooting courses utilizing revolvers and semiautomatic pistols. 

Shoulder weapons training included shotgun, M-16, and 

H&K and K-MP5 machine guns. Additional training included 

stress obstacle shooting courses, building entry and clearance, 

arrest, and handcuff procedures. 

Vehicle stops and ammunition ballistics were also addressed 

and applied to practical situations. This was the first of several 

such schools that fostered the sharing of ideas and concepts 

in the application and training of firearms in federal law enforcement. 

Special Agent Jerry Jensen, the Regional Director of Los 

Angeles, headed up the new institute in Glynco. Special Agent 

Frank Monastero, who had served as director of training, was 

reassigned to the position of chief pilot. 

On December 17, 1982, the DEA graduated its first class of Basic 

Agents from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 

(FLETC) located at Glynco, Georgia. The BA-18 class was 

composed of 32 men and 2 women who ranged in age from 23 

to 35. The 34 members of BA-18 were selected from a pool of 

more than 4,000 candidates. Admission to BA-18 was a highly 

prized honor because it had been two years since the graduation 

of the previous BA-17 class. The DEA continued to train 

at Glynco until it moved its training facilities to the FBI Training 

Academy at Quantico, Virginia, in 1985. 

Participants in DEA’s first firearms instructor school held 

at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, in 1984. 

55 

In March 1980, the DEA Air Wing completed its 

20,000th airborne law enforcement mission. Working in 

close support of domestic regional and district offices, 

Air Wing personnel daily provided a unique surveillance 

and role enhancement capability. Additionally, aviation 

resources and special agent / pilots were called upon to 

support special operation both domestically and overseas. 

Focusing on maximum use of current aircraft and 

assignment personnel, the Air Wing brought this valuable 

support element to many priority investigations. 

During fiscal year 1983, the DEA Aviation Wing logged 

more than 12,000 hours of flight time in support of 

domestic and overseas enforcement missions. Because 

the missions were progressively more complex, demanding, 

and hazardous, a new safety program was 

implemented. The Aviation Safety Council, which was 

a five-member group, composed of four agents and one 

maintenance specialist, met on a regular basis for the 

purpose of eliminating conditions which represented 

hazards to DEA aviation operations. 

Rocky Andresano and Vance Huffman in a DEA Aero 

Commander.

Technology Laboratories 

In 1981, the DEA, in coordination with the Department of State, 

represented by Thomas M. Tracy, Assistant Secretary for 

Administration, signed an agreement that provided the DEA 

with telecommunication facilities supporting automated data 

processing (ADP) in the DEA’s foreign offices. 

The ADP support safeguarded the DEA’s computerized 

data holdings worldwide. This program formulated 

the procedures for the protection of DEA sensitive and 

administratively controlled information promulgated by 

other federal agencies. This automated support also 

provided for the rapid interchange of vast amounts of 

information with other federal and state law enforcement 

agencies. 

In May 1994, Special Agent Bob Johannsen showed 

Deputy Administrator Lawn the Title III room during a 

Washington Field Division briefing. 

Special Agents Charles R. Henderson (left) and 

Dennis E. Checkoway displayed technological equipment 

seized during the 1981 raid of a clandestine amphetamine 

laboratory in Campe Verde, Arizona. Shown above are a 

voice stress analyzer, a telephone scrambler, two 

scanners, and lab equipment capable of producing six 

pounds of amphetamine a day. 

56 

In 1977, field laboratory and headquarters personnel 

prepared the first edition of the Clandestine Laboratory 

Guide for Agents and Chemists. This was the first 

compilation of illicit drug manufacturing procedures and 

investigative techniques published in a single volume. 

The Guide was revised and reissued in 1981. This 

publication has since been revised several times to keep 

up with changing clandestine laboratory practices and 

newly encountered illicitly manufactured drugs. 

DEA tape librarian Dorothy Dupree from the Office of 

Information Services prepared tapes for use in support of 

DEA investigations and prosecutions. 

In the early 1980s, communications equipment operator 

Bobbie Peters transmitted messages on this teletype 

machine.

The workload of DEA laboratories increased in the 

early 1980s. When the Attorney General of the United 

States announced that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) would be given concurrent jurisdiction with 

DEA over federal drug law violations in 1982, DEA 

laboratories became responsible for conducting analysis 

of all drug evidence purchased or seized by FBI agents 

in connection with their investigations. Also, a dramatic 

increase in the number of exhibits submitted by the 

District of Colombia Metro Police Department as a 

result of “Operation Clean Sweep” gave rise to a period 

of mandatory Saturday overtime, as well as reinforcement 

and support from the Special Testing and Research 

Lab in McLean and the North Central Laboratory in 

Chicago. 


Thomas J. Devine 

Died on September 25, 1982 

DEA Special Agent Devine, a Group Supervisor 

at the Newark Field Division, 

died in Passaic, NJ, from gunshot 

wounds received during an undercover 

investigation in New York City. 

Larry N. Carwell 

Died on January 9, 1984 

DEA Special Agent Carwell of the Houston 

District Office died in a helicopter 

crash during an operations flight near the 

Bahamas. 

Marcellus Ward 

Died on December 3, 1984 

Detective Ward of the Baltimore, Maryland 

Police Department was shot and killed 

while working on an undercover assignment. 

He was assigned to the DEA’s 

Baltimore District Office Task Force. 

57


Many U.S. communities were gripped by violence 

stemming from the drug trade. 

58 

The Hot Box was the first means of 

“field testing” heroin and cocaine. By 

placing a small amount of the drug 

onto the metal element, the drug could 

be identified by its melting temperature.

DEA 

John C. Lawn 

July 26, 1985 

March 23, 1990 

On March 1, 1985, Francis M. Mullen retired and 

John C. “Jack” Lawn, Deputy Administrator since 

1982, became Acting Administrator. On April 4, 

1985, he was nominated as DEA Administrator. Mr. 

Lawn was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on July 16, 

1985, and sworn in on July 26, 1985, as the DEA’s 

fourth Administrator. Before coming to the DEA, Mr. 

Lawn had been an FBI Agent for 15 years. As FBI 

Special Agent in Charge in San Antonio from 1980 

to 1982, he had directed the successful investigation 

into the assassination of Federal Judge John H. 

Wood, Jr. Before this historic case, Mr. Lawn had 

supervised all FBI civil rights cases, including allegations 

of police brutality and color of law 

complaints. In addition, he was responsible for 

background investigations of White House officials, 

federal judges, and U.S. attorney nominees. He also 

served in the Criminal Division of FBI headquarters 

where he supervised Congressional review of the 

assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and 

President John F. Kennedy. From 1990-1994, Mr. 

Lawn served as vice-president and chief of operations 

of the New York Yankees. In 1998, he was 

serving as the chairman and CEO of The Century 

Council, a national organization dedicated to fighting 

alcohol abuse. 


1985.....2,234 

1990.....3,191 

DEA Budget 

1985.....$362.4 million 

1990.....$769.2 million 

59 

During the late 1980s, the international drug trafficking organizations 

grew more powerful as the cocaine trade dominated 

the Western Hemisphere. Mafias headquartered in the Colombian 

cities of Medellin and Cali wielded enormous influence 

and employed bribery, intimidation, and murder to further their 

criminal goals. Many U.S. communities were gripped by violence 

stemming from the drug trade. At first, the most dramatic 

examples of drug-related violence were experienced in Miami, 

where cocaine traffickers fought open battles on the city 

streets. Later, in 1985, the crack epidemic hit the United States 

full force, resulting in escalating violence among rival groups 

and crack users in many other U.S. cities. By 1989, the crack 

epidemic was still raging and drug abuse was considered the 

most important issue facing the nation. DAWN data showed 

a 28-fold increase in cocaine-related hospital emergency room 

admissions over a four-year period. 

The Crack Epidemic 

In the early 1980s, the majority of cocaine being shipped to the 

United States was coming through the Bahamas. Soon there 

was a huge glut of cocaine powder in these islands which 

caused the price to drop by as much as 80 percent. Faced with 

dropping prices for their illegal product, drug dealers made a 

shrewd marketing decision to convert the powder to “crack,” 

a smokeable form of cocaine. It was cheap, simple to produce, 

ready to use, and highly profitable for dealers to develop. As 

early as 1981, reports of crack appeared in Los Angeles, San 

Diego, Houston, and in the Caribbean. 

At this time, powder cocaine was available on the street at an 

average of 55 percent purity for $100 per gram, and crack was 

sold at average purity levels of 80-plus percent for the same 

price. In some major cities, such as New York, Detroit, and 

Philadelphia, one dosage unit of crack could be obtained for 

as little as $2.50. Never before had any form of cocaine been 

available at such low prices and at such high purity. More 

important from a marketing standpoint, it produced an instant 

high and its users became addicted in a very short time. 

Eventually, Caribbean immigrants taught young people in 

Miami how to produce crack, and they in turn went into 

business in the United States.

With the influx of traffickers and cocaine, South Florida had 

become a principal area for the “conversion laboratories” that 

were used to convert cocaine base into cocaine HCl, the form 

in which cocaine is sold. The majority of these labs were found 

in South Florida, but they also appeared in other parts of the 

country, indicating the expansion of Colombian trafficking. 

For example, in 1985, four conversion laboratories were seized 

in New York State [see “Minden Lab” on page 65], four in 

California, two in Virginia, and one each in North Carolina and 

Arizona. One year later, 23 more conversion labs were seized 

in the United States. 

The first crack house had been discovered in Miami in 1982. 

However, this form of cocaine was not fully appreciated as a 

major threat because it was primarily being consumed by 

middle class users who were not associated with cocaine 

addicts. In fact, crack was initially considered a purely Miami 

phenomenon until it became a serious problem in New York 

City, where it first appeared in December 1983. In the New York 

City area, it was estimated that more than three-fourths of the 

early crack consumers were white professionals or middleclass 

youngsters from Long Island, suburban New Jersey, or 

upper-class Westchester County. However, partly because 

crack sold for as little as $5 a rock, it ultimately spread to less 

affluent neighborhoods. 

The crack epidemic dramatically increased the numbers of 

Americans addicted to cocaine. In 1985, the number of people 

who admitted using cocaine on a routine basis increased from 

4.2 million to 5.8 million, according to the Department of Health 

Approximately 5,000 pounds of cocaine, valued at $250 

million, were seized in Chicago in July 1987. The cocaine 

was smuggled in 130 banana boxes. Pictured in front of 

the seized cocaine are, left to right, Chicago ASAC John 

T. Peoples; Police Superintendent Fred Rice; Attorney 

General Edwin Meese III; Chicago SAC Philip V. Fisher; 

and ASAC Garfield Hammonds, Jr. 

60 

and Human Service’s National Household Survey. Likewise, 

cocaine-related hospital emergencies continued to increase 

nationwide during 1985 and 1986. According to DAWN 

statistics, in 1985, cocaine-related hospital emergencies rose 

by 12 percent, from 23,500 to 26,300; and in 1986, they increased 

110 percent, from 26,300 to 55,200. Between 1984 and 

1987, cocaine incidents increased fourfold. 

By this time, the Medellin cartel was at the height of its power 

and controlled cocaine trafficking from the conversion and 

packaging process in Colombia, to the transportation of 

cocaine to the United States, as well as the first level of 

wholesale distribution in U.S. communities. While the Medellin 

cartel had established a foothold in U.S. communities, its rival, 

the Cali mafia, began to dominate markets in the Northeastern 

United States. The Cali mafia was less visible, less violent, and 

more businesslike than the Medellin cartel. Operating through 

a system of cells, where members were insulated from one 

another, the Cali mafia steadily began establishing far-reaching 

networks that eventually ensured that they would 

dominate the cocaine trade well into the 1990s. 

By early 1986, crack had a stranglehold on the ghettos of New 

York City and was dominated by traffickers and dealers from 

the Dominican Republic. Crack distribution and abuse exploded 

in 1986, and by year-end was available in 28 states and 

the District of Columbia. According to the 1985-1986 National 

Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report, crack 

was available in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, Kansas City, Miami, 

New York City, Newark, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, 

Dallas, Denver, Minneapolis, and Phoenix. 

By 1987, crack was reported to be available in the District of 

Columbia and all but four states in the Union. Crack was 

abundantly available in at least 19 cities in 13 states: Texas 

(Dallas), Oklahoma (Tulsa, Oklahoma City), Michigan (Detroit), 

California (Los Angeles, Riverside, Santa Barbara), 

Florida (Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, Tampa), New York (New York 

City), Oregon (Portland), Washington (Seattle), Missouri 

(Kansas City), Minnesota (Minneapolis), Colorado (Denver), 

Nevada (Las Vegas), and Maryland (Hagerstown, 

Salisbury). By 1988, crack had replaced heroin as the greatest 

problem in Detroit, and it was available in Los Angeles in 

multi-kilo quantities. 

Meanwhile, wholesale and retail prices for cocaine had declined, 

while purity levels for kilogram amounts of the drug 

had remained at 90 percent or higher. Street-level gram purity 

rose from 25 percent in 1981, to 55 percent in 1987, to 70 percent 

in 1988. By the late 1980s, over 10,000 gang members were 

dealing drugs in some 50 cities from Baltimore to Seattle. 

The crack trade had created a violent sub-world, and 

crack-related murders in many large cities were skyrocketing. 

For example, a 1988 study by the Bureau of 

Justice Statistics found that in New York City, crack 

use was tied to 32% of all homicides and 60% of drug

elated homicides. On a daily basis, the evening news reported 

the violence of drive-by shootings and crack users trying to 

obtain money for their next hit. Smokeable crack appealed to 

a new group of users, especially women, because it did not 

have the stigma associated with needles or heroin, and because 

it was smoked, many mistakenly equated crack with 

marijuana. As a result, a generation of addicted children were 

born to—and frequently abandoned by—crack-using mothers. 

By the late 1980s, about one out of every 10 newborns in 

the United States (375,000 per year) had been exposed in the 

womb to one or more illicit drug. 

Meanwhile, wholesale and retail prices for cocaine had declined, 

while purity levels for kilogram amounts of the drug had 

remained at 90 percent or higher. Street-level gram purity rose 

from 25 percent in 1981, to 55 percent in 1987, to 70 percent in 

1988. By the late 1980s, over 10,000 gang members were 

dealing drugs in some 50 cities from Baltimore to Seattle. The 

crack trade had created a violent sub-world, and crack-related 

murders in many large cities were skyrocketing. For example, 

a 1988 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that in 

New York City, crack use was tied to 32% of all homicides and 

60% of drug-related homicides. On a daily basis, the evening 

news reported the violence of drive-by shootings and crack 

users trying to obtain money for their next hit. Smokeable crack 

appealed to a new group of users, especially women, because 

it did not have the stigma associated with needles or heroin, 

and because it was smoked, many mistakenly equated crack 

with marijuana. As a result, a generation of addicted children 

were born to—and frequently abandoned by—crack-using 

mothers. By the late 1980s, about one out ofevery 10 newborns 

in the United States (375,000 per year) had been exposed in the 

womb to one or more illicit drug. 

In October 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese explained the 

U.S. anti-crack strategy: “The most effective long-term way to 

reduce crack trafficking is to reduce the amount of cocaine 

entering this country. The federal government’s main priorities 

against cocaine are reducing production in source countries, 

interdicting shipments entering the United States, and disrupting 

major trafficking rings.” Thus, the DEA attacked the 

major trafficking organizations, primarily the Medellin and Cali 

cartels, which were producing cocaine and smuggling it into 

the United States. To help accomplish this, the Anti-Drug 

Abuse Act of 1986 allocated $8 million for domestic cocaine 

enforcement. A portion of this budget was used to establish 

DEA Crack Teams. Each of these teams consisted of two DEA 

special agents who assisted state and local law enforcement 

agencies in the investigation of large-scale violators and 

interstate trafficking networks. 

The agents either worked with existing DEA-funded state and 

local task forces or with local law enforcement agencies that 

had established their own special crack groups. In addition, 

DEA Crack Teams were also deployed to states experiencing 

extensive crack problems. Examples included Arizona, which 

was vulnerable to a rapid influx of crack dealers from Los 

Angeles street groups, and Louisiana, where traffickers from 

61 

1985: Chicago Division personnel were photographed 

with the results of raids developed through Operation 

Durango. The 6-month investigation into the Chicago 

and Durango, Mexico-based polydrug trafficking group 

led to the arrest of 120 defendants and the seizure of 

heroin, cocaine, marijuana and $25 million in assets. 

Haiti were dealing to migrant workers in rural areas. Another 

significant source of support for the Crack Teams was the 

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 that provided for 

asset forfeiture sharing with state and local law enforcement 

agencies. 

Paz where they developed daily situation reports and drafted 

a strategic intelligence report. In addition, their analysis of 

ledgers found at three laboratory sites helped identify several 

major Bolivian violators. On the day of the law enforcement 

action, six U.S. military Black Hawk helicopters, operated by 

U.S. Army pilots and support personnel, transported the strike 

teams to the suspected laboratory sites. Eight cocaine laboratories 

and one shipment location were located and destroyed. 

Some of the labs destroyed had been capable of producing 

1,000 kilograms of cocaine per week. At least one lab had been 

in operation since 1982. Operation Blast Furnace brought 

cocaine production to a virtual standstill in Bolivia. Traffickers 

fled the country and coca paste buyers from Colombia stayed 

away. The coca leaf market collapsed and quantities that had 

previously sold for $1.50 dropped to 10 cents. Following the 

success of Operation Blast Furnace, many coca farmers approached 

the U.S. Agency for International Development 

asking for assistance in planting legal substitute crops.

Trafficking Via Mexico 

During the latter half of the 1980s, the role of traffickers 

based in Mexico and the use of Mexican territory 

increased dramatically. Mexico’s strategic location, 

midway between source and consumer nations, and an 

increasingly powerful international drug mafia headquartered 

in Mexico made it an ideal transit point for 

South American-produced cocaine. Mexico’s topography 

offered several seaports along its Pacific and Gulf 

coasts and countless airstrips scattered across its interior 

allowed vessel and aircraft refueling to be quickly 

and easily accomplished. Equally significant was 

Mexico’s 2,000-mile land border with the United States, 

over 95 percent of which had no fences or barricades. 

Moreover, the remoteness of many border areas made 

patrolling and surveillance exceedingly difficult. Cocaine 

traffickers from Colombia expanded their 

trafficking routes to include Mexico, and increasingly 

used Mexico as a shipping point. 

Employee Assistance 

Program Expanded (1985) 

Recognizing the importance of meeting the unique needs of 

DEA agents, support personnel, and families, the DEA had 

created an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) in 1978, which 

was expanded in 1985. By April 1986, the EAP provided each 

of the DEA’s field divisions with access to an area clinician and 

at least one backup clinician, enabling all DEA employees and 

their families to become eligible to receive professional, confidential 

assistance in marital/family/parenting and relationship 

concerns, alcohol and drug abuse, job stress and other emotional/psychological 

problems, as well as guidance regarding 

financial and legal concerns. The DEA also implemented a 

program whereby each division had a team of personnel 

trained to assist employees and their families following traumatic 

incidents related to the dangerous nature of working in 

drug law enforcement. This Trauma Team program was originally 

established in 1978, when Yvonne Conner, the head of the 

EAP, conducted extensive research to determine the special 

needs of DEA personnel. This enabled her to design a professional 

and confidential program that is uniquely responsive to 

DEA employees and their families. 

Drug-Free Workplace (1986) 

On September 15, 1986, President Reagan issued Executive 

Order 12564, The Drug-Free Federal Workplace Program. He 

called on all federal employees to refuse drugs and instructed 

each federal agency to set up programs to “test for 

the use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions.” 

62 

Meanwhile, the Guadalajara mafia was formed in Mexico 

with close ties to Colombian mafia, to ship heroin, 

marijuana, and cocaine to the United States. Included in 

these shipments would be smaller quantities of Mexican 

black tar or brown powder heroin, piggybacked on the 

larger Colombian drug loads. Drug-laden private aircraft 

from Colombia began using thousands of registered and 

unregistered airstrips located throughout Mexico to deliver 

their product. However, the preferred method of 

smuggling drugs remained the overland routes, and 90 

percent of cocaine seizures made by U.S. law enforcement 

on the southwest border in 1989 were land seizures. 

Cocaine seizures made by U.S. law enforcement increased 

from under 2,000 kilograms in 1985 to over 

40,000 kilograms in 1989. 

By March 1988, the DEA established its own Drug-Free 

Workplace Program. The Drug Deterrence Staff, along with 

a state-of-the-art contract laboratory, conducted almost 2,000 

drug tests at 51 DEA sites. Over 1,600 of those tests 

were conducted by the unannounced, random test method 

using a computer-generated program to select employees 

for testing. 

National Security Decision 

Directive 221 

On April 8, 1986, President Reagan proclaimed that drug 

production and trafficking constituted a threat to the security 

of the United States, and extended executive sanction to an 

active war on drugs with National Security Decision Directive 

221. 

Foreign Office Opened 

1986 Cochabamba, Bolivia 

1987 Canberra, Australia 

1987 Lagos, Nigeria 

1987 Port-au-Prince, Haiti 

1988 Bridgetown, Barbados

The Murder of DEA Special 

Agent Enrique Camarena 

Perhaps no single event had a more significant impact on the 

DEA than the abduction and murder of Special Agent Enrique 

Camarena in Mexico in 1985. His murder led to the most 

comprehensive homicide investigation ever undertaken by the 

DEA, which ultimately uncovered corruption and complicity 

by numerous Mexican officials. 

Known as “Kiki” to his friends, Special Agent Camarena had 

a reputation for believing that the actions of each and every 

individual made a difference in the drug war. He was assigned 

to the DEA’s Guadalajara Resident Office in Mexico, and was 

working to identify drug trafficking kingpins when he left his 

office to meet his wife for lunch on February 7, 1985. A 

late-model car pulled up beside Camarena and four men grabbed 

him, threw him into the back of the car, and sped off. Hours later, 

Alfredo Zavala Avelar, a Mexican Agriculture Department 

pilot working with anti-drug authorities, was also abducted. 

Immediately after Mrs. Camarena reported her husband missing, 

the DEA Guadalajara Resident Office made every effort to 

locate him. After determining that Special Agent Camarena’s 

disappearance had no innocent explanation, Resident Agent 

in Charge James Kuykendall promptly notified his superiors 

and began attempting to enlist the support of the Mexican 

police. Meanwhile, special agents assigned to the Guadalajara 

Resident Office began to query confidential informants and 

police contacts for information about the whereabouts of 

Special Agent Camarena. Mexico Country Attache Edward 

Heath then requested assistance from U.S. Ambassador Gavin, 

who called the Mexican Attorney General and requested his 

assistance in resolving the disappearance of the special agent. 

Next, all DEA domestic SACs and country attaches in Latin 

America were notified of the agent’s disappearance and were 

requested to query all sources knowledgeable about Mexican 

trafficking organizations for any intelligence that might lead to 

his rescue. DEA headquarters then quickly established a 

special group to coordinate the investigation and 25 special 

agents were sent to Guadalajara to assist in the search for 

Special Agent Camarena. 

Throughout February 1985, the DEA continued its efforts to 

locate Special Agent Camarena. Witnesses were interviewed 

and numerous leads were followed. Searches of several residences 

and ranches in Mexico. Based on the information that 

was developed, the DEA requested the Mexican Federal Judicial 

Police (MFJP) to consider Rafael Caro-Quintero, Miguel 

Felix-Gallardo, and Ernesto Fonseca-Carrillo as suspects in the 

kidnapping. All three were notorious narcotics traffickers 

based in Guadalajara, and were believed to have the resources 

and motive to commit such an act. 

On February 9, 1985, Rafael Caro-Quintero was confronted by 

MFJP officers at the Guadalajara Airport as he was preparing 

to leave on a private jet with several of his associates. After an 

63 

Administrator Lawn comforted Geneva Camarena, widow of 

Agent Enrique Camarena. 

armed stand-off, the Mexican officer in charge, an MFJP 

Comandante, spoke privately with Caro-Quintero and then 

allowed him and his associates to depart. 

Subsequently, a local farm worker discovered two bodies in a 

field adjacent to a busy road about one kilometer from a ranch 

in Michoacan, Mexico. The bodies, which apparently had 

been dumped there, were identified as those of Special Agent 

Camarena and Captain Zavala. Soil samples taken from the two 

bodies by FBI special agents in Mexico proved the bodies had 

“Kiki” Camarena with Nicole Telles,( daughter of RAC 

Tom Telles, in Hermosillo, Mexico). SA Camarena stayed 

in the Telles home for security reasons while he helped 

launch an operation against a Mexican marijuana 

trafficking organization.

previously been buried elsewhere and then moved. On 

March 7 and 8, 1985, a U.S. pathologist and forensic team 

analyzed the discovery site and performed an autopsy. 

The pathologist’s findings made positive identifications 

and indicated that death in both cases was due to blunt 

force injuries to the head. 

On March 8, 1985, Agent Camarena’s body was returned 

to the United States for burial. For the DEA and the 

American public, the 1985 torture and murder of Agent 

Camarena marked a turning point in the war on drugs. His 

violent death brought the American public face-to-face 

with the vicious brutality of drug trafficking. 

Camarena Investigation 

Leads to Operation 

Leyenda 

On March 14, 1985, the DEA was notified by MFJP officials 

that they had taken into custody five Jalisco State Police 

officers who were believed to have participated in the abduction 

of Special Agent Camarena. However, the DEA was 

neither advised in advance of this operation, nor invited to 

participate in the subsequent interviews of the suspected 

Jalisco State Police officers. 

Under Mexican police questioning, the Jalisco officers gave 

statements implicating themselves and others in the abduction 

of Special Agent Camarena. One suspect died during the 

interrogation. The statements of the Jalisco officers implicated 

Caro-Quintero and Fonseca-Carrillo, among others, in 

planning and ordering the abduction of Special Agent 

Camarena. 

On March 17, 1985, Mexican newspapers reported that 11 

individuals had been arrested by the MFJP for the kidnapping 

of Special Agent Camarena. Arrest orders were also issued for 

seven international drug traffickers, including Caro-Quintero, 

on kidnapping and murder charges. 

The DEA subsequently discovered that Caro-Quintero was in 

Costa Rica. On April 4, 1985, the DEA Office in San Jose, in 

conjunction with the local authorities in Costa Rica, located 

and apprehended Caro-Quintero and seven of his associates. 

The Mexican Government then sent MFJP officials to Costa 

Rica after persuading the Costa Rican Government to expel 

Caro-Quintero to Mexico on immigration violations. On April 

5, 1985, Caro-Quintero and the others arrested with him left 

Costa Rica for Mexico aboard two jets belonging to the 

Mexican Government. In Mexico City, Caro-Quintero was 

64 

interrogated for several days by police officials. Ultimately he 

gave a statement implicating himself and others in the abduction 

of Special Agent Camarena. 

But Caro-Quintero denied any knowledge of who actually 

killed Special Agent Camarena or how he died. He also denied 

any knowledge of the abduction and death of Captain Zavala. 

On April 7, 1985, drug trafficker Ernesto Fonseca-Carrillo and 

several of his bodyguards were arrested by Mexican police 

officials and military forces in Puerto Vallarta and taken to 

Mexico City for questioning. Fonseca and his right-hand 

man, Samuel Ramirez-Razo, gave statements to the MFJP 

implicating themselves in the abduction of Special Agent 

Camarena. However, neither individual admitted having any 

knowledge of Camarena’s death or Captain Zavala’s abduction. 

Although there were some discrepancies in the testimony of 

Caro-Quintero, Fonseca-Carrillo, and Ramirez-Razo, all claimed 

that they had nothing to do with the death of the DEA agent 

and further stated that these crimes were probably the work 

of another narcotics trafficker, Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo. 

Meanwhile, in April 1985, the DEA learned that certain 

members of the Mexican Government had in their possession 

a series of audio tapes of Camarena’s torture and interrogation. 

These tapes allegedly had been seized by Mexican 

military authorities from Fonseca during his arrest in Puerto 

Vallarta. When the DEA confirmed that the voice on the tape 

was Camarena, the Mexican Government, after great pressure 

from the U.S. Government, turned over copies of all five tapes. 

On April 12, 1985, a team of one DEA and four FBI agents 

arrived in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico, via DEA aircraft. 

These agents were advised that the house where Special 

Agent Camarena was alleged to have been taken after his 

abduction had been located by the MFJP in Guadalajara. 

On May 3, 1985, a new DEA investigative team was established 

to coordinate and investigate the abduction of Camarena 

and Captain Zavala. This investigation was given the name 

Operation Leyenda (the Spanish word meaning “lawman”). 

Through evidence gained from cooperating individuals and 

relentless investigative pursuit, this team was able to ascertain 

that five individuals abducted Special Agent Camarena 

and took him to a house at 881 Lope de Vega in Guadalajara 

on February 7, 1985. Ultimately, the agents were successful 

in securing the indictments of several individuals connected 

to the abduction and murder. The hard work, long hours, and 

total agency commitment had yielded positsive results. 

In retrospect, Operation Leyenda was a long and complex 

investigation, made more difficult by the fact that the crime 

was committed on foreign soil and involved major drug 

traffickers and government officials from Mexico. It took 

several years to develop the facts, to apprehend the perpetrators, 

and to finally bring them to justice.

Red Ribbon Campaign 

The National Red Ribbon Campaign was sparked by the 

murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena by drug 

traffickers. Within weeks of his death in March of 1985, 

Camarena’s Congressman, Duncan Hunter, and high school 

friend Henry Lozano launched “Camarena Clubs” in the 

Imperial Valley, California, Camarena’s home. Hundreds of 

club members pledged to lead drug-free lives to honor the 

sacrifices made by Camarena and others on behalf of all 

Americans. That spring, two club members presented the 

“Camarena Club Proclamation” to then-First Lady Nancy 

Reagan, bringing the program national attention. That 

summer, parent groups in California, Illinois, and Virginia 

began to expand the Camarena Club program and promoted 

the wearing of red ribbons nationwide during one week in 

late October. In 1988 the National Federation of Parents 

organized the first National Red Ribbon Week, an eight-day 

event proclaimed by the U.S. Congress and chaired by 

President and Mrs. Reagan. The Red Ribbon Campaign 

also became a symbol of support for the DEA’s efforts to 

reduce demand for drugs through prevention and education 

programs. 

Demand Reduction Section 

(1987) 

In 1987, the DEA took another step forward in the 

demand reduction arena by establishing the Demand 

Reduction Section. “If we are truly the leaders in drug 

efforts,” said DEA Administrator Jack Lawn, “we must 

also establish a leadership role in drug education efforts 

. . . I believe . . . that our personnel can do more to direct 

the attitudes of young people than can many other 

professions because our personnel know the reality of 

drugs.” 

Following its establishment, the DEA’s Demand Reduction 

Program provided leadership, coordination, and 

resources for drug prevention and education. Each of 

the DEA’s domestic field divisions was assigned a 

demand reduction coordinator whose role was to provide 

leadership and support to local agencies and organizations 

as they developed drug education and prevention 

programs. The program soon evolved from a few drug 

awareness presentations, to a nationwide effort that 

worked to change attitudes about drugs in sports, schools, 

and communities all across the nation. 

65 

Speaking at a 1985 Memorial Day Service, Vice President 

Bush noted, “Today we honor the men and women of the 

Drug Enforcement Administration who sacrificed for an 

honorable cause.” 

At the 1987 National High School Athletic Coaches 

Association Convention, Nancy Reagan greeted 

Jacquelyn D. Rice, an assistant in the DEA’s Demand 

Reduction Section, as Administrator Lawn looked on.

Anti-Drug Abuse Act 

of 1986 

In 1986, Congress approved a significant bill authorizing 

$6 billion over three years for interdiction and enforcement 

measures, as well as demand reduction education 

and treatment programs. On the enforcement side, 

increases in criminal penalties were passed as part of the 

Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Mandatory prison sentences for 

large scale marijuana distribution were reinstated and 

Federal Drug Control scheduling was expanded to include 

analogues (designer drugs). A federal grant 

program for state drug enforcement was also created to 

assist local efforts at thwarting traffickers. On the 

demand side, federal funds were allocated for prevention 

and treatment programs, giving these programs a 

larger share of federal drug control funds than did 

previous laws. Prevention efforts were expanded under 

this law with the creation of the White House Conference 

for a Drug-Free America and the establishment of 

the Office for Substance Abuse Prevention (OSAP), 

aimed at community prevention strategies. In the international 

arena, the 1986 law established a requirement 

that foreign assistance be withheld from countries if the 

President could not certify that they had cooperated fully 

with the United States or taken adequate steps on their 

own to prevent drug production, drug trafficking, and 

drug-related money laundering. 

The Certification Process 

(1986) 

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by the Anti- 

Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, required the President to 

make yearly determinations and file a report to Congress 

regarding the progress of drug producing and/or drug transit 

countries’ efforts to eliminate the drug threat. 

After the President’s certification of a country for fully cooperating 

in counter-drug efforts, decertification for 

noncooperation, or decertification with a waiver for vital U.S. 

national interests, the Congress had 30 days in which to 

disapprove of the President’s certification decisions by a 

simple majority vote before the decisions took effect. If the 

President vetoed a disapproval action, Congress could override 

the veto with a two-thirds vote. Decertification resulted in 

reduction of foreign aid by 50 percent and U.S. opposition to 

loans from any international agency, such as the International 

Monetary Fund (IMF). 

66 

For those countries not certified, the Act required that most 

forms of U.S. foreign assistance, with the exception of counternarcotics 

assistance and humanitarian aid, be withheld, and 

further required the United States to vote against bank lending 

to non-certified countries. 

As part of the certification process, the U.S. Department of 

State, through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs, presented findings on the drug strategies 

and policies, as well as current drug trafficking and abuse 

situations in every country listed as a major drug producing 

and/or drug-transit country, precursor chemical source country, 

or money laundering country. This Department of State 

report, known as the International Narcotics Control Strategy 

Report, provided an objective basis for the certification determinations 

and was issued at the same time as the list of 

certification. 

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 also required that every 

certified country have a treaty in effect with the United States 

addressing drug eradication, interdiction, demand reduction, 

chemical control, and cooperation with U.S. drug law enforcement 

agencies. The DEA’s role in the certification process is 

limited to providing the Attorney General and other U.S. policy 

makers with an assessment of the level of cooperation between 

the DEA and foreign law enforcement counterparts. 

The success of Operation Blast Furnace set the stage for one 

of the DEA’s most extensive and unprecedented enforcement 

efforts— Operation Snowcap. This initiative was developed 

by the DEA and the Department of State’s Bureau of International 

Narcotics Matters (INM) in 1987, and was designed to 

disrupt the growing, processing, and transportation systems 

supporting the cocaine industry. 

The DEA and INM coordinated Operation Snowcap operations 

in 12 countries including Guatemala, Panama, Costa 

Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, 

Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. The Department of Defense and the 

U.S. Border Patrol also participated in the operation. The 

majority of Snowcap activity was concentrated in Bolivia, 

Peru, and Ecuador because of the prevalence of coca processing 

in these nations. 

Planning for Operation Snowcap began in September 1986, 

two months before Operation Blast Furnace was concluded. 

When the 1987 operation was launched, there was a smooth 

transition of responsibility for air operations from the U.S. 

Army to the Government of Bolivia. Six Bell UH-1 Huey 

helicopters, loaned by the U.S. Army to the INM, and a U.S. 

Army training team arrived on the same C5-A transport that 

withdrew the Blast Furnace equipment from Bolivia. 

Besides coca suppression operations, the Snowcap strategy 

included chemical control, vehicular interdiction, and marine 

law enforcement interdiction operations. The marine law 

enforcement and vehicular interdiction concepts mirrored

successful programs in the United States. The marine law 

enforcement operations grew from the DEA’s close coordination 

with the U.S. Coast Guard, while vehicular interdiction 

originated from the DEA’s Operation Pipeline, EPIC’s national 

highway interdiction program. 

With DEA support, Bolivian troops burned a cocaine 

conversion lab. 

Carlos Lehder Extradition 

(1987) 

In 1981, Carlos Lehder was indicted on U.S. federal charges in 

Jacksonville, Florida, and a request for his extradition from 

Colombia was formally presented to that government in 1983. 

Up until that time, no extradition requests had been honored 

by the Colombian Government. Lehder, a major cocaine 

trafficker, had formed his own political party and adopted a 

platform which was vehemently opposed to extradition. He 

viewed cocaine as a very powerful weapon that could be used 

against the United States and referred to the substance as an 

atomic bomb. Lehder also claimed that he was allied with the 

Colombian guerilla movement, M-19, in an effort to protect 

Colombian sovereignty. 

Fanatical in his efforts to prevent extradition, Lehder was 

instrumental in forcing a political debate on the merits of 

extradition and publicly faced off against Colombia’s Justice 

Minister, Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla. When Lara-Bonilla was suddenly 

murdered in 1984, Lehder and the Medellin cartel, who 

had hidden behind the pseudonym “The Extraditables,” were 

suspected. Embarrassed and outraged by the terrorist tactics 

employed by the Medellin organization, the Colombian Government 

turned Lehder over to the DEA and extradited him to 

the United States in February 1987. Lehder was convicted and 

sentenced to 135 years in federal prison. He subsequently 

cooperated in the U.S. investigation of Panama dictator Manuel 

67 

Carlos Lehder 

conceived the 

idea of 

transporting 

loads of cocaine 

from Colombia to 

the United States. 

Noriega and received a reduced sentence in return for his 

testimony. However, the Medellin reign of terror did not end. 

The Medellin cartel was responsible for the murders of many 

government officials, including Attorney General Carlos Mauro 

Hoyos-Jiminez in 1988, and presidential candidate Luis Carlos 

Galan in 1989. 

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 

1988 

The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act (PL 100-690) increased criminal 

penalties for offenses related to drug trafficking and 

created new federal offenses and regulatory drug control 

requirements. Federal funding for state and local drug enforcement 

grant programs were also bolstered under this law. 

The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act also expanded a change to the 

certification process established by the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse 

Act. The 1986 legislation required all certified countries to 

sign a treaty with the United States that addressed drug 

eradication, interdiction, demand reduction, chemical control, 

and cooperation with U.S. drug enforcement agencies. The 

1988 act went a step further and made it unlawful to certify a 

country’s compliance unless it had signed such a treaty. 

Another requirement called for the Secretary of the Treasury 

to initiate negotiations with governments whose banks were 

known to engage in significant U.S. dollar transactions. This 

requirement helped to identify money laundering and illicit 

drug transaction funds. 

Perhaps the most significant provision of this legislation was 

the creation of the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(ONDCP) and it’s director, the “Drug Czar.”

The Creation of a Drug Czar 

(1988) 

The Anti-Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1988 established the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and its 

director became the nation’s “Drug Czar.” ONDCP was 

charged with setting national priorities and implementing a 

national drug control strategy. The ONDCP director was 

required to ensure that the national drug control strategy was 

research-based, contained long-range goals and measurable 

objectives, and sought to reduce drug abuse, drug trafficking, 

and their consequences. In 1993, Executive Orders No. 12880, 

12992, and eventually 13023 (1996), extended ONDCP as the 

leading entity for drug control policy. The Executive Orders 

also created the President’s Drug Policy Council. In 1994, the 

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act extended 

ONDCP’s mission to assessing budgets and resources related 

to the National Drug Control Strategy. It also established 

specific reporting requirements in the areas of drug use, 

availability, consequences, and treatment. 

. 

Colombian Government 

Helps Seize Gacha Funds 

(1989) 

In 1989, a successful international cooperative effort 

helped to bring down one of the highest ranking members 

of the Medellin drug cartel, Jose Rodriguez-Gacha, 

the right-hand man of cocaine kingpin Pablo Escobar. 

First, the Government of Colombia provided the investigation 

and enforcement actions that revealed the extent 

and location of Gacha’s drug assets. These efforts also 

uncovered documents disclosing that some of Gacha’s 

assets were hidden in accounts in Switzerland and 

elsewhere. Next, the DEA and other law enforcement 

agencies in Europe and Latin America, working closely 

with the Colombian National Police, froze over $80 

million of Gacha’s assets in bank accounts throughout 

the world. Large amounts of Gacha’s financial empire 

were forfeited and disbursed to the governments of 

countries aiding in the cooperative effort to bring down 

Gacha. Over $1.5 million was allotted to the Government 

of Colombia. This investigation and seizure 

represented one of the largest financial efforts in the 

history of the DEA and underscored the importance of 

attacking a cartel’s financial holdings as well as its 

physical assets. 

68 

Rescheduling of Marijuana 

Denied (1989) 

During the late 1980s, as a proposed solution to the enormous 

drug problem in the United States, a small, but vocal minority 

began supporting the wholesale legalization of drugs, particularly 

marijuana. However, in December 1989, DEA 

Administrator Jack Lawn overruled the decision of one administrative 

law judge who had agreed with marijuana advocates 

that marijuana should be moved from Schedule I to Schedule 

II of the Controlled Substances Act. This proposed rescheduling 

of marijuana would have allowed physicians to prescribe 

the smoking of marijuana as a legal treatment for some forms 

of illness. 

Administrator Lawn maintained that there was no medicinal 

benefit to smoking marijuana. While some believed that 

smoking marijuana alleviated vomiting and nausea experienced 

by cancer patients undergoing radiation, scientific 

studies indicated otherwise. These also showed that smoking 

marijuana did not benefit patients suffering from glaucoma or 

multiple sclerosis. In addition, it was found that smoking 

marijuana might further weaken the immune systems of patients 

undergoing radiation and might speed up, rather than 

slow down, the loss of eyesight in glaucoma patients. 

It was found that pure Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), 

one of 400 chemicals commonly found in marijuana, had some 

effect on controlling nausea and vomiting. However, pure 

THC was already available for use by the medical community 

in a capsule form called Marinol. For these reasons, and the 

fact that no valid scientific studies offered proof of any 

medicinal value of marijuana, Administrator Lawn maintained 

that marijuana should remain a Schedule I controlled substance. 

Joint Investigation 

Agents of the DEA’s Phoenix Field Division and the 

Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) posed with 

700 pounds of cocaine seized in 1987. The seizure, which 

took place 50 miles south of Phoenix, was the result of a 

joint DEA, U.S. Customs Service, and Arizona DPS 

investigation.

Operation Snowcap (1987) 

The success of Operation Blast Furnace set the stage for one 

of the DEA’s most extensive and unprecedented enforcement 

efforts— Operation Snowcap. This initiative was developed 

by the DEA and the Department of State’s Bureau of International 

Narcotics Matters (INM) in 1987, and was designed to 

disrupt the growing, processing, and transportation systems 

supporting the cocaine industry. 

The DEA and INM coordinated Operation Snowcap operations 

in 12 countries including Guatemala, Panama, Costa 

Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, 

Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. The Department of Defense and the 

U.S. Border Patrol also participated in the operation. The 

majority of Snowcap activity was concentrated in Bolivia, 

Peru, and Ecuador because of the prevalence of coca processing 

in these nations. 

Planning for Operation Snowcap began in September 1986, 

two months before Operation Blast Furnace was concluded. 

When the 1987 operation was launched, there was a smooth 

transition of responsibility for air operations from the U.S. 

Army to the Government of Bolivia. Six Bell UH-1 Huey 

helicopters, loaned by the U.S. Army to the INM, and a U.S. 

Army training team arrived on the same C5-A transport that 

withdrew the Blast Furnace equipment from Bolivia. 

69 

Besides coca suppression operations, the Snowcap strategy 

included chemical control, vehicular interdiction, 

and marine law enforcement interdiction operations. The 

marine law enforcement and vehicular interdiction concepts 

mirrored successful programs in the United States. 

The marine law enforcement operations grew from the 

DEA’s close coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard, 

while vehicular interdiction originated from the DEA’s 

Operation Pipeline, EPIC’s national highway interdiction 

program. 

Operation Snowcap depended on agents who volunteered 

for temporary assignments in foreign countries. 

These special agents left domestic field divisions for 

temporary tour of duty assignments to work closely with 

host country law enforcement counterparts. As envisioned, 

Operation Snowcap was designed to be a 

temporary program to assist law enforcement entities in 

Latin America with training and investigative work. 

Organized 

Crime Targeted 

January 8, 1986: Enforcement Group 

31 in New York specialized in 

traditional Italian organized crime 

targets. This case targeted the Philipp 

Vasta trafficking organization and 

resulted in 18 arrests and seizures 

totaling $6 million including drugs, real 

estate, cars and currency.

Operation Polar Cap 

Medellin cartel. Operation Polar Cap involved two 

international organizations that were laundering the proceeds 

of cocaine sales by using false gold sales and 

wholesale jewelry businesses as cover. Between 1988 

and 1990, these two organizations laundered almost $1.2 

billion in drug proceeds. Operation Polar Cap led to the 

first conviction of a foreign financial institution, Banco de 

Occidente/Panama, for violating U.S. money laundering 

laws. As a result of this operation, over 100 people were 

arrested, and more than $105 million in assets, including 

currency, bank accounts, real estate, jewelry, gold, and 

vehicles were seized. The money forfeited by the Banco 

de Occidente/Panama was shared with other governments, 

including Canada and Switzerland, which each 

received $1 million. 

Sylmar Seizure (1989) 

On September 29, 1989, the American public was 

presented with irrefutable evidence of the enormous 

volume of cocaine coming into the country when the 

DEA raided a warehouse in Sylmar, California, and 

seized 21.5 tons of cocaine. Such a huge amount of 

cocaine was amassed at the Sylmar warehouse because 

of a conflict between Colombia-based distributors and 

the Mexico-based group they had hired to transport the 

drug. The group from Mexico had continued to transport 

cocaine to the warehouse but refused to release it to the 

Colombian distributors until they were paid for their 

transportation services. This was the largest cocaine 

seizure in U.S. history. Colombian drug traffickers 

responded to the staggering Sylmar seizure by changing 

the way they compensated transportation groups from 

Mexico; they began to pay Mexico-based smuggling 

organizations up to 50 percent of each cocaine shipment 

in product rather than in cash. This shift to using cocaine 

as compensation for transportation services radically 

changed the role and sphere of influence of Mexicobased 

trafficking organizations in the U.S. cocaine 

trade. Criminal groups from Mexico became not only 

transporters, but also distributors of cocaine. 

70 

DEA Headquarters 

Relocated (1989) 

By the late 1980s, the DEA headquarters building at 1405 

“Eye” St. in Washington, D.C., was no longer large enough to 

house the increasing headquarters staff. In fact, many of the 

1,500 headquarters employees had already been dispersed to 

13 nearby buildings in an effort to accommodate the agency’s 

continued growth. 

The search for a new headquarters location included an 

evaluation of land in Arkansas and Mississippi, as well as 

abandoned military bases around the country. However, 

Attorney General Edwin Meese determined that the DEA 

headquarters had to be located in close proximity to the 

Attorney General’s offices. Thus, the location selected for the 

new headquarters building was on Army-Navy Drive in Arlington, 

Virginia. The new facility consisted of two buildings 

that provided 292,000 square feet of available space. 

The relocation of headquarters was the largest non-enforcement 

related project ever undertaken by the DEA or its 

predecessor agencies. The physical relocation began in May 

1988. 

Aviation

Aviation Training 

During this period, the DEA’s Air Wing program was expanding 

rapidly. From 1975 to 1985, the number of Air Wing planes 

had doubled, rising from 30 to 61. After a budget increase from 

$1,310,00 in 1980 to $3,760,000 in 1985, the Aviation Division 

anticipated purchasing more aircraft and increasing the Air 

Wing’s staff. 

With the rapid growth of the Air Wing, the facility at Addison 

quickly became inadequate. Operations had been separated 

among several buildings and security had become a problem 

because the airport was located right on the street with public 

access to several ramps. In addition, airplanes were parked in 

the open and were subject to vandalism. From 1986 to 1988, 

the DEA’s Air Wing looked for a secure location in Texas in 

order to be equally accessible for DEA officials located on the 

East and West Coasts. In addition, Texas was an ideal location 

based on its proximity to Central and South America, where 

many Air Wing support operations were performed. The 

location chosen for the new facility was a 12.3 acre site 

adjacent to Alliance Airport, north of Forth Worth, Texas. The 

site selected was spacious and accommodated future expansion. 

The new facility also offered greater security and included 

a guarded fence. 

71 

Although DEA training had been conducted at the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia 

since 1981, Administrator Lawn wanted the DEA to establish 

a unique training facility that focused specifically on drug law 

enforcement. Because FBI and DEA agents cooperated on 

many cases and would benefit from a degree of shared training, 

Administrator Lawn decided that the new training center 

should be located near the FBI Training Academy in Quantico, 

Virginia. Ultimately, he acquired 155 acres of land adjacent to 

the FBI Academy from U.S. Marine Corps Commandante 

Alfred M. Gray for the construction of the new training center. 

Originally the move was expected to take several months, with 

new classes not beginning until January 1986, but a special 

appropriation from Congress was earmarked for agent classes 

starting in 1985. Consequently, the pace of the move was 

accelerated and the DEA Office of Training officially moved 

to Quantico on October 1, 1985. 

Members of the first basic agent class to train at Quantico 

are shown learning how narcotics test kits work. 

On June 27, 1987, the DEA flag was flown at the FBI 

Academy in Quantico for the first time. The occasion was 

the graduation of Basic Agent Training Class 43. The 

guest speaker was Attorney General Edwin Meese III.

Arrest of Noriega (1989) 

On February 4th, 1989, Manuel A. Noriega and 15 defendants were indicted by the grand jury in Miami, Florida. The structure 

of the RICO indictment alleged that Noriega was a drug facilitator for the Medellin cartel. Noriega had utilized his position as 

the Commander of the Panamanian Defense Forces and as the ruler of Panama to assist the Medellin cartel in shipping cocaine; 

procuring precursor chemicals for the manufacture of cocaine; providing a safe haven for cartel members following the 

assassination of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla on April 30, 1984; and sponsoring the laundering of 

narco-proceeds in Panamanian banks. 

When the United States invaded the country of Panama on December 20, 1989, Noriega eluded capture by the U.S. military for 

the next several weeks. Finally, Noriega surrendered to the DEA in Panama and was immediately taken to Miami to answer the 

indictment. Over the next 21 months, enforcement Group 9 in Miami interviewed hundreds of individuals and reviewed reams 

of seized papers in the United States and Panama. In September 1991, the drug “Trial of the Century” began. 

During the next eight months, over 100 prosecution witnesses, including Carlos Lehder, ex-DEA Administrators Bensinger, 

Mullen, and Lawn, an ex-Panamanian Attorney General, cartel leader Pepe Cabrera, and others testified at the trial. In supporting 

the prosecution, the DEA had special agents deployed in 15 countries around the world, including Panama, Colombia, Spain, 

Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Cuba. 

Finally, on April 9,1992, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on eight of the ten counts in the indictment. Noriega, who had become 

Panama’s political leader in 1988 after President Eric Arturo Delvalle was ousted, was convicted on racketeering and 

cocaine-trafficking charges for protecting Colombian smugglers who had routed drugs through Panama. On July 9,1992, Manuel 

Noriega was sentenced to 40 years in federal prison. 

On April 6, 1998, he failed to overturn his drug trafficking conviction and the 40-year prison sentence it drew. Noriega’s appeal 

contended that the drug cartel had paid $1.25 million to a witness to testify falsely against him, and that the government must 

be held responsible for the alleged bribe. The U.S. Supreme Court, acting without comment, let stand a ruling that said Noriega 

received a fair trial. The Noriega case was the most notorious drug trial in U.S. history and demonstrated to the American public 

the global scope of corruption that accompanied international drug smuggling. 

General Manuel Antonio Noriega surrendered to U. S. 

authorities on January 3, 1990. 

72 

Manuel Noriega

Laboratories Technology 

In 1989, the Western Field Laboratory, under the leadership of 

Robert Sager, moved to a new location in San Francisco, 

California. The new laboratory featured 17,000 square feet of 

floor space and had benches for 16 chemists, special purpose 

instrument rooms, and natural light from several windows. 

1989: Evolving computer technology improved the speed 

of complex searches for references. Pictured above are Dr. 

Judy Lawrence (left) and DEA librarian Lavonne Wienke. 

The first office automation (OA) system for the DEA was 

procured in 1986 for a contract cost of $36 million. The 

operating system of this computer network provided DEA 

employees with E-mail, word processing, spreadsheets and 

other standard desktop tools. Based on its experience with the 

OA system, the DEA’s introduction to and reliance on automation 

tools to assist in all facets of the agency’s day-to-day 

operations were established. This computerization of the 

agency produced increased demands for more capabilities 

through the office automation infrastructure. 

In January 1989, members of the DEA Phoenix Task Force 

seized 4.5 kilograms of black tar heroin, the largest seizure of 

its kind in Arizona at that time. The task force members from 

left are: Sgt. Doug Stine, Task Force Agent Charlie Adams, SA 

Steff Stewart, Group Supervisor Bill Ruzzamenti, SA Michelle 

Ashley, Task Force Agents Ben Quezada, Tom Reynolds, Phil 

Smyth, and Bob Hajek, SA Gerry Courtney, and Task Force 

Agents Garry Applegate, Adam Kurgan, and Dan Kelly. 

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) Dedication (1989) 

73 

To celebrate the opening of a new facility, the El Paso 

Intelligence Center (EPIC) held a dedication ceremony 

on February 22, 1989, in Ft. Bliss, Texas. The new 

installation was dedicated in the name of slain DEA SA 

Enrique Camarena. Heartfelt remarks made by Dora 

Camarena, his mother, were the highlight of the ceremony. 

Pictured at the EPIC groundbreaking ceremony in 

September 1987 are, from right to left, William I. 

Norsworthy, EPIC staff assistant; Larry L. Orton, EPIC SAC; 

Thomas G. Byrne, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Intelligence; and Fort Bliss staff.


Enrique S. Camarena 

Died on February 9, 1985 

DEA Special Agent Camarena of the 

Guadalajara, Mexico Resident Office 

was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by 

drug traffickers from Mexico. 

James A. Avant 

Died on July 24, 1986 

Deputy Sheriff Avant of the Pulaski County, 

Arkansas, Sheriff’s Office, was killed in a 

helicopter crash in Mount Ida, Arkansas. 

He was assigned to the DEA’s Task Force 

in Little Rock, Arkansas. 

Charles M. Bassing 


Criminal Investigator Bassing of the Arkansas 

State Police was killed in a helicopter 

crash in Mount Ida, Arkansas. He 

was assigned to the DEA’s Task Force in 

Little Rock, Arkansas. 

Kevin L. Brosch 


Criminal Investigator Brosch of the 

Jefferson County, Arkansas, Sheriff’s Office, 

was killed in a helicopter crash in Mt. 

Ida, Arkansas. He was participating in a 

DEA Marijuana Eradication Spotter 

School. 

Susan M. Hoefler 


Ms. Hoefler, an office assistant at the DEA 

Office in Guadalajara, Mexico, died from 

injuries suffered in an automobile accident 

in Guadalajara. 

William Ramos 


DEA Special Agent Ramos of the McAllen 

District Office was shot and killed by a 

drug-trafficking suspect during an undercover 

investigation at Las Milpas, Texas, 

near the Mexican border. 

Raymond J. Stastny 

Died on January 26, 1987 

DEA Special Agent Stastny of the Atlanta 

Field Division died from gunshot wounds 

he received six days earlier while working 

in an undercover operation in Atlanta. 

74 

Arthur L. Cash 


DEA Special Agent Cash, who was in 

charge of the Sierra Vista Post of Duty 

in Arizona, was killed in a traffic accident 

while transporting three prisoners 

to Tucson. 

Terry W. McNett 


Detective McNett of the Sedwick County, 

Kansas Sheriff’s Office was shot and 

killed in the execution of a search warrant 

in Wichita, Kansas, while assigned 

to a DEA task force. 

George M. Montoya 


DEA Special Agent Montoya of the Los 

Angeles Field Division was shot and 

killed during an undercover operation 

in Los Angeles, California. 

Paul S. Seema 


DEA Special Agent Seema of the Los 

Angeles Field Division died of 

gunshot wounds received during an 

undercover operation in Los Angeles, 

California. 

Everett E. Hatcher 


DEA Special Agent Hatcher of the New 

York Field Division was shot and killed 

during an undercover investigation in 

New York City. 

Rickie C. Finley 


DEA Special Agent Finley was killed in 

a plane crash as he was returning from 

a jungle operation to a base camp in 

Lima, Peru.


75 

President George 

Bush began to 

immediately 

focus national 

efforts on a 

comprehensive 

drug 

enforcement 

strategy that 

targeted both 

supply and 

demand 

reduction.

DEA 

Robert C. Bonner 

August 16, 1990 

October 31, 1993 

When John Lawn retired on March 23, 1990, Terrance M. 

Burke, a career DEA agent, was named Acting Administrator. 

On May 11, 1990, President George Bush nominated 

Robert C. Bonner, a Federal Judge and United States Attorney 

from Los Angeles, as Administrator. He was confirmed by 

the Senate on July 27, 1990 and sworn in as the DEA’s fifth 

Administrator on August 13, 1990. 

In prior years, Mr. Bonner was the United States Attorney for 

the Central District of California (1984-1989) and Federal 

Judge, United States District Court for the Central District 

of California (1989-1990). He had worked closely with the 

DEA on two record-breaking money laundering cases, Operations 

Pisces and Polar Cap, and had led the prosecution 

team against the killers of DEA Special Agent Camarena. 

Judge Bonner understood that the drug trade was a global 

enterprise, and because of this, federal drug law enforcement 

had to target drug trafficking organizations overseas, as 

well as their networks within our borders. 

After leaving DEA, Mr. Bonner was a partner in the Los 

Angeles and Washington, D.C., law firm Gibson, Dunn & 

Crutcher. In September 2001, he was sworn in as Commissioner 

of the U.S. Customs Service, and in 2003, he became 

the first head of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 

a new agency under the Department of Homeland 

Security. 


1990.....3,191 

1994.....3,418 

DEA Budget 

1990.....$769.2 million 

1994.....$1,050 million 

76 

DEA was called upon to work 

with its foreign counterparts to 

reduce the supply of drugs in the 

country and reduce the demand 

through prevention, education 

and treatment. 

Robert C. Bonner was sworn in as the DEA’s Fifth 

Administrator in August 1990. Attending the inaugural 

ceremony at headquarters were (from left): Administrator 

Bonner, Mrs. Bonner, Supreme Court Justice Antonin 

Scalia, and Attorney General Dick Thornburgh. 

Year 

1990 

1990 

1990 

1992 

1992 

Foreign Office Opened 

Freeport, Bahamas 

Rangoon, Burma 

Udorn, Thailand 

Belize, Belize 

San Salvador, El Salvador

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Americans considered the drug issue a major concern, and public awareness about drug 

trafficking and drug abuse increased significantly. The media had provided the American people with critical information about 

the damage caused by drugs. 

President George Bush began immediately to focus national efforts on a comprehensive drug enforcement strategy that targeted 

both supply and demand reduction. On one hand, his strategy called for the DEA and other federal agencies to work with our 

counterparts overseas and at home to reduce the supply of drugs in the country. At the same time, complementary efforts were 

directed at reducing the demand for drugs through prevention, education, and treatment, including a comprehensive advertising 

program launched by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America. 

Cocaine and crack remained the number one drug challenge facing law enforcement, and the Colombian cartels and their cells were 

firmly entrenched in virtually every U.S. city and in many countries around the globe. Both the Medellin Cartel and the Cali mafia 

had a devastating impact on U.S. communities. In the Northeast, especially the New York area, the Cali mafia had quietly established 

a network of cells to carry out all of the mafia’s various tasks involving the shipment of cocaine, its storage, communications 

between Colombia and the United States, and the return of profits to Colombia. The Cali mafia sent armies of surrogates into the 

United States to ensure that the cocaine business was run smoothly and profitably. 

In 1992, the DEA instituted the Kingpin Strategy to attack the drug organizations at their most vulnerable areas—the chemicals 

needed to process the drugs, their finances, transportation, communications, and leadership infrastructure here in the United 

States. The Kingpin program essentially controlled investigations from DEA headquarters and selected a finite number of targets 

for intensive investigative activity. 

Because extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States was prohibited by Colombia’s 1991 constitution, it was essential 

that Colombian drug lords were arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated in their own country. With the help of law enforcement 

counterparts overseas and at home, most notably the Colombian National Police (CNP), one by one the Medellin leaders were 

toppled. By the time Pablo Escobar, the most notorious and murderous drug lord of the Medellin Cartel, was killed by the CNP 

on a Colombian rooftop in 1993, the cartel had already been severely damaged. But there would be no rest, because waiting to 

emerge on the world scene was the Cali mafia, which over the years had been less visible, but no less formidable than its Medellin 

counterpart. 

Decline of the Medellin Cartel and the Rise of the Cali Mafia 

Pablo Escobar “Wanted” poster with faces crossed out 

signifying that he and his entourage had been killed or 

catured. 

77 

In the early 1990s the Medellin Cartel was waging a 

campaign of terror and bribery to pressure the Colombian 

government to prohibit the extradition of native 

Colombians. Pablo Escobar and several other Medellin 

leaders, labeled “The Extraditables,” took increasingly 

violent measures to try to force the government to 

accept legislation that would protect them from extradition. 

The cartel was responsible for the assassinations 

of dozens of government officials, and the bribery of 

many more. When, in July 1991, the Colombian congress 

adopted a new constitution that prohibited the extradition 

of the Colombian natives, it was considered a major 

victory for the Medellin Cartel. 

However, the many law enforcement efforts to topple 

the Medellin cartel were resulting in numerous surrenders 

and arrests that eventually led to the cartel’s 

demise. For example, in December 1990, cartel leader 

Fabio Ochoa surrendered to authorities near Medellin. 

Shortly, after, in January 1991, Fabio Ochoa’s brother,

Fabio Ochoa-Vasquez Juan Ochoa-Vasquez Jorge Ochoa-Vasquez 

Jorge Luis, also turned himself into the CNP. The brothers, 

along with Pablo Escobar, had been the top leaders of the 

cartel. Also, in January 1991, the CNP killed David Ricardo 

Prisco Lopera, Pablo Escobar’s top assassin, along with his 

younger brother, Armando Alberto Prisco. The Priscos were 

wanted for ordering the murders of 50 Medellin police officers, 

for several terrorist bombings, and for nine assassinations, 

including that of a Colombian Justice Minister in 1984. In 

February 1991, a third Ochoa brother, Juan David surrendered. 

Law enforcement efforts were increasingly directed at Pablo 

Escobar, the kingpin of the Medellin cartel. In June 1991, 

Escobar surrendered to authorities, and was put in Envigado 

prison. However, the Colombian government had agreed in 

Escobar’s surrender negotiations that security at Envigado 

prison would be the responsibility of Army guards and 

Escobar’s own, handpicked bodyguards. In reality, Envigado 

prison protected, rather than incarcerated him. Escobar’s 

period at the prison was considered his “Golden Age,” during 

which time he ran his drug empire without fear of being hunted 

by the Colombian Government or assassinated by his rivals. 

In July 1992, Escobar “escaped” from Envigado prison in 

order to avoid being transferred to a Bogota jail after it was 

confirmed that Escobar had ordered the murder of some 22 of 

his own drug mafia associates. One or two of Escobar’s 

victims were even tortured, killed, and buried on the grounds 

of Envigado prison. Escobar clearly had prior warning of the 

plan to transfer him to a more secure prison, and 28 guards 

were later charged with aiding and abetting Escobar’s “break 

out.” For 17 months, Escobar was the target of the largest 

manhunt in Colombian history. In December 1993, the CNP 

killed Escobar in a fire fight at a private residence in downtown 

Medellin. Escobar’s death, along with the surrender and 

arrest of the Ochoa brothers marked the decline of the Medellin 

cartel. 

The Cali mafia had been formed in the early 1970s by Gilberto 

Rodriguez-Orejuela and Jose Santacruz-Londono, and rose 

quietly alongside its violent rival, the Medellin Cartel. But 

while the Medellin Cartel gained an international reputation 

for brutality and murder, the Cali traffickers posed as legitimate 

businessmen. This unique criminal enterprise initially 

78 

Miguel Gilberto Jose 

Rodriguez-Orejuela Rodriguez-Orejuela Santacruz- 

Londono 

involved itself in counterfeiting and kidnapping, but gradually 

expanded into smuggling cocaine base from Peru and Bolivia 

to Colombia for conversion into powder cocaine. 

Up through the early 1990s, the Medellin Cartel had dominated 

the drug trade, but its reign of relentless public terror against 

the Colombian government had driven Colombian authorities 

to serious action that led to their ultimate defeat. By the early 

1990s, the Medellin drug lords were either killed or incarcerated. 

Having observed the fate of the brutal and violent 

Medellin Cartel, the Cali leaders passed themselves off as lawabiding 

businessmen, investing in their country’s future, 

earning public respect, and taking economic control of the Cali 

region. Because they operated in a less violent manner, the 

government did not aggressively pursue them, thereby allowing 

the Cali mafia leaders to operate and grow in wealth and 

power with virtual impunity. 

In the global arena, the cartels began expanding their markets 

to Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, they 

quickly moved into Eastern Europe, taking advantage of the 

political and economic chaos by using these newly-created 

democracies as the “backdoor” to transit their cocaine to 

Western Europe. For example in 1992, large loads of cocaine 

were seized in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. In 1993, 

Russian authorities seized 1.1 tons of cocaine hidden in cans 

of corned beef hash. This shipment originated in Cali, Colombia, 

and was destined for the Netherlands, via St. Petersburg, 

Russia. 

In the new, post-Cold War Europe, without border 

controls and an eastern border sealed against communism, 

international businesses and world governments 

were threatened by the drug cartels from Colombia. 

In the early 1990s, the DEA estimated that they collectively 

produced and exported from Colombia between 

500 and 800 tons of cocaine a year. The organizations 

were structured and operated much like major international 

corporations. They had enormous financial 

resources, with which they could afford to buy the best 

legal minds, the most sophisticated technology, and the 

most skilled financial experts.

Among the major Cali drug lords, the Rodriguez-Orejuela 

brothers—Gilberto and his younger brother, Miguel— 

were known as the transportation specialists who moved 

cocaine out of Colombia into the United States and other 

countries. Gilberto was responsible for the strategic, 

long-term planning of the organization. Miguel was the 

hands-on manager who ran the day-to-day operations. 

Jose Santacruz-Londono was responsible for establishing 

distribution cells in the United States. 

These Cali leaders ran an incredibly sophisticated, highlystructured 

drug trafficking organization that was tightly 

controlled by its leaders in Cali. Each day, details of loads 

and money shipments were electronically dictated to 

heads of cocaine cells operating within the United States. 

The Cali drug lords knew the how, when, and where of 

every cocaine shipment, down to the markings on the 

packages. The Cali bosses set production targets for the 

cocaine they sold and were intimately involved in every 

phase of the business—production, transportation, financing, 

and communications. 

Each organization had its own hierarchy of leaders, its 

own distribution networks, and customers in nations 

around the world. The operations were divided into 

separate cells. Each cell was run by a cell director— 

always a Colombian national—who reported directly to 

the drug lords in Colombia. These organizations were 

truly international operations run with efficiency and 

geared for huge profits. The massive scale of their 

trafficking operations dwarfed law enforcement efforts 

in Colombia, in the United States, and in the transit 

nations between them. 

79 

On December 2, 1993, Escobar’s exact location 

was determined using electronic, directionalfinding 

equipment. With authorities closing in, a 

fire fight with Escobar and his bodyguard ensued. 

The two fugitives attempted to escape by running 

across the roofs of adjoining houses to reach a 

back street, but both were shot and killed by 

Colombian National Police. 

Heroin 

During the 1980s, worldwide illicit opium production had 

doubled, with Southeast Asia then emerging as the major 

source of the world’s heroin supply. In Burma, self-styled 

rebels, like drug lord Khun Sa, financed private armies and 

generated an estimated $200 million gross profits per year from 

his heroin and opium enterprises. This wealth made him so 

powerful that the Burmese government allowed him to operate 

with impunity, and he controlled most of the Shan State of 

Burma. 

In the early 1990s, the United States was faced with a resurgence 

of heroin. As the decade progressed, the heroin became 

purer and cheaper than ever before in U.S. history. New 

traffickers and new sources for the drug also contributed to the 

tide of heroin abuse. 

In South America, the Colombian cocaine cartels were beginning 

to diversify into the production and distribution of 

heroin. Colombian heroin seizures in the United States began 

to rise. It was estimated that the Colombian cartels had 

financed the cultivation of up to 25,000 hectares. That made 

Colombia one of the largest cultivators of illicit opium, behind 

Burma and Laos, but ahead of the traditional opium-producing 

nations, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon. In 

February 1992, the first heroin lab was seized and destroyed 

in Colombia, and in that year, the Colombian National Police 

eradicated more than 10,000 hectares of opium poppies. 

More heroin was available in the United States than ever 

before, and this drove prices down and purity up. The national 

average purity level of an ounce of heroin being sold on U.S. 

streets was 66 percent in 1993, compared to less than 5 percent 

in the early 1980s. In some cases, the DEA seized heroin that 

was 95 percent pure. Aggressive international heroin traffickers, 

such as those based in Nigeria, emerged to join the 

traditional heroin trafficking organizations based in China, 

Turkey, and the Middle East. 

In 1991, DEA made the largest seizure of heroin in U.S. history 

when over 1,000 pounds of Southeast Asian white heroin, with 

an estimated wholesale value of more than $1 billion, was 

seized in San Francisco. Agents from San Francisco, Sacramento, 

and New York monitored a controlled delivery of the 

heroin 24-hours-a-day for nearly a month prior to the arrest

of five suspects. The heroin was found in 59 of 1,360 cartons 

of plastic produce bags imported from Taiwan. Each of the 59 

cartons contained two cylinders of heroin coated in white wax 

or wrapped in “happy birthday” paper. By 1993, Southeast 

Asian heroin, which was smuggled by both China and 

Nigeria/West Africa-based traffickers, was one of the greatest 

threats to the United States. At that time, roughly 68 

percent of the heroin seized in the United States came from 

Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle—Burma, Laos, and Thailand. 

China-based traffickers controlled sophisticated 

international networks that smuggled multi-hundred kilo quantities 

of heroin in commercial cargo on a regular basis. 

Police examined a test sample of the 977 pounds of heroin 

seized in the Gulf of Thailand in 1991. Looking on are 

(from left): General Sawat Amornivivat, Director General 

of Police; DEA Country Attache Glennon L. Cooper (third 

from left); General Pow Sarasin (fifth from left), Deputy 

Prime Minister; and Thai Police General Pratin 

Santiprapop (upper right corner). 

DEA Mini-Series 

Network series lasted 6 episodes before being cancelled. 

80 

Marijuana 

With 

the explosion in 

the use of crack, 

cocaine, and 

heroin in the 

1980s, public concern 

about marijuana 

was diminished, despite 

the fact that 

marijuana continued to be 

the most commonly used illegal 

drug in the United States. 

According to the 1991 National 

Household Survey on Drug 

Abuse, 13 percent of young 

adults, age 18 to 25, were regular 

users of marijuana. In addition, 4 

percent of youth, age 12-17, and 

10 percent of older adults, age 26 to 

34, reported using marijuana regularly. 

The marijuana of the early 1990s was an 

entirely different drug from the version that was available in 

the 1960s or 1970s. Due to modern sophisticated cultivation 

techniques, U.S.-grown marijuana became one of the most 

potent and highly-prized cannabis products in the world. 

While the THC (the psychoactive ingredient) content of 

marijuana averaged 1.5 percent in 1970, by the 1990s it was 7.6 

percent. The sinsemilla (seedless) variety ranged from 8 to 19 

percent, and marijuana seizures in Alaska registered a THC 

potency of almost 30 percent. 

In addition, marijuana growers continued to encroach on 

national forests and parks and to threaten the environment by 

using harmful pesticides. With the wholesale price of highquality 

sinsemilla averaging between $3,000 and $8,000 a 

pound, marijuana cultivation became big business. It was 

estimated that domestically grown marijuana constituted 25 

percent of the supply for the United States. 

In recognition of the growing threat from marijuana, by the 

1990s, all 50 states were actively participating in the Domestic 

Cannabis Eradication and Suppression Program. With the 

marijuana market increasing, the program looked for more 

efficient ways to eradicate the plant. Along with the traditional 

“whack and stack” method, the DEA added herbicidal eradication. 

One of the first herbicidal eradication efforts, Operation 

Wipe Out in Hawaii, was an overwhelming success. In the 

summer of 1990, almost 90 percent of Hawaii’s cannabis crop 

was eradicated. Half of the crop was destroyed by spot 

herbicidal spraying, a new and more efficient eradication 

technique, which had little, if any, environmental impact.

Nationwide eradication efforts, such as Wipe Out, put so 

much pressure on growers that many abandoned their outdoor 

cultivation on public and private land for the safety of 

indoor cultivation. Indoor cultivated marijuana created new 

concerns for law enforcement; it was of such high quality and 

potency that American marijuana became the most soughtafter 

cannabis in the world. 

One of the most important enforcement tools that had developed 

during the late 1980s was thermal imagery, which was 

used to identify indoor marijuana operations. With the 

availability of this new heat-seeking technology, seizure 

records for indoor grows jumped from 951 in 1985 to 3,849 in 

1992. 

Throughout the early 1990s, the DEA closed down thousands 

of indoor marijuana grows. For example, in August 1993 at the 

Advance Mine site in northern California, investigators found 

sinsemilla plants, which ounce for ounce, could produce 

extremely high-grade marijuana. The mine, which had been an 

operational gold mine during the late 1800s and the early 1900s, 

contained everything needed to grow more than 3,000 marijuana 

plants. The 8-section complex included five rooms for 

growing plants, and a pumping system that continually supplied 

water and nutrients to the marijuana plants. 

The total value of the plants found inside the mine was 

estimated to be between $6 and $9 million. Four people were 

arrested. It took 40 DEA, U.S. Forest Service, and county law 

enforcement personnel two days to remove more than 5 tons 

of marijuana cultivation equipment from inside the mine. 

1993: The Advance Mine was one of the largest marijuana 

growing operations discovered in California. Special agents 

removed 2,394 cannabis plants from the former gold mine. 

1 

Steroids 

In the 1980s and 1990s, abuse of steroids, particularly by 

young athletes, became a problem. Trafficking in steroids had 

become increasingly common, and as the market expanded, 

use of steroids was seen in younger and younger populations. 

Steroid sources included doctors, trainers, and foreign 

suppliers. A Government Accounting Office (GAO) study of 

the problem, published in 1989, reviewed 15 separate studies 

and reported one which showed that more than six percent of 

male high school seniors, mostly athletes, used or had used 

steroids. Another survey indicated that 20 percent of athletes 

in five colleges surveyed used steroids. It also reported on 

the significant side effects of steroid use. The GAO supported 

federal and state efforts to exercise greater control over 

steroid distribution and use. A 1990 study by the Inspector 

General of Health and Human Services reported that over a 

quarter of a million adolescents used steroids. 

Congress responded to the steroid problem by passing The 

Anabolic Steroid Enforcement Act of 1990, which placed 

certain anabolic steroids in Schedule III of the Controlled 

Substances Act (CSA). Previously, steroids had been un 

scheduled and controlled only by state and local laws. The 

Anabolic Steroid Enforcement Act brought anabolic steroids 

under the record-keeping, reporting, security, 

prescribing, import and export controls of the CSA. Because 

steroids were now classified as a Schedule III substance, all 

manufacturers and distributors of steroids were required to 

register with the DEA. 

This legislation, combined with an aggressive enforcement 

effort, virtually eliminated domestic sources of illicit steroid 

use and provided the legal authority to attack the smuggling 

of steroids from foreign sources. In order to heighten 

international awareness of the steroid problem, the DEA 

sponsored an international conference which was attended 

by nations where steroids were produced, as well as nations 

concerned with steroid abuse. This conference was also 

attended by scientific experts in the field of steroids and 

representatives of the U.S. and the International Olympic 

Committees.

Operation Man (1990) 

Through the 1980s and early 1990s, the forfeiture of traffickers’ 

assets became an important and effective tool for law 

enforcement. In 1991, President Bush signed a bill expanding 

the the DEA’s authority to administratively forfeit assets 

from $100,000 to an unlimited amount with respect to financial 

instruments, including cash, CD’s and bonds; and $100,000 

to $500,000 on all other items except real estate. One of the 

DEA’s most successful financial cases was Operation Man, 

where agents tracked and forfeited drug assets laundered 

through banks based in the British Isle of Man, off the West 

Coast of England. Assets seized from this operation included 

a $9.5 million bank account and the Bicycle Club, a gambling 

establishment in Bell Gardens, California, valued at $150 

million. In April 1990, after a club partner was convicted of 

smuggling marijuana, the U.S. Government seized the club, 

believed to be the world’s largest card casino, assumed 30 

percent ownership in the club, and received almost $600,000 

a month in profits. 

After Hurricane Andrew struck Florida in August 1991, 

nearly 200 employees of the DEA’s Miami regional office 

assisted employees and other Florida residents whose 

homes had been damaged by the hurricane. The DEA 

employees pictured above helped repair damaged roofs 

to protect employees’ homes. From left, are: SA Pete 

Sarron, SA Tom Golden, Mrs. Margarita Milan, 

homeowner; Jorge Milan, homeowner and DEA seized 

asset specialist; SA Brad Brown; SA Milo Grasman; and, 

kneeling, SA Mike Stokes. 

Operation REDRUM (1991) 

The REDRUM (murder spelled backwards) program 

had been established in 1985 to create a multi-agency 

operational force to pursue investigations that demonstrated 

an association between drug trafficking and the 

violence that it fostered. The primary goals of the 

program were the identification of major drug traffick 

2 

ers and organizations; the seizure of drugs and assets; 

and the analysis of strategic intelligence provided by 

informants. 

On January 1, 1991, a Metropolitan Area Drug Enforcement 

Task Force (MATF), was formed as a pilot project 

under Operation REDRUM and addressed the influx of 

illegal drugs and accompanying violence associated with 

drug trafficking in Northern Virginia, Washington, D.C., 

and the contiguous suburban Maryland counties. The 

MATF was divided into several operational units designed 

to focus on different aspects of the drug problem. 

This 90-day project investigated individuals based in 

New York City who were responsible for drug-related 

homicides in the Washington, D.C., area. In addition to 

15 state and local agencies working to reduce violent 

drug-related crime, participating federal agencies included 

the DEA, FBI, INS, and the Marshals Service. 

According to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh in 

April 1991, “The urgency of the nation’s war on drugs 

has intensified the need for information on innovative 

programs and approaches to counter illicit drug trafficking 

and its related violence. This project will test and 

evaluate a promising cooperative enforcement initiative 

that can be replicated by state and local law enforcement 

agencies nationwide.” 

Because of the success of this operation and other 

REDRUM pilot projects, Administrator Bonner in April 

1992 expanded Operation REDRUM to include drugrelated 

homicide investigative units or task forces in 

Chicago, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, and New 

Orleans. REDRUM, based in DEA headquarters, 

provided the divisional task forces with the funding for 

their investigations. In 1990, the program was initially 

funded with $48,000, and during the ensuing years the 

funds increased to a high in 1993 of $189,000. 

DEA agents are shown making an arrest during Operation 

REDRUM.

LSD Conference (1991) 

The early 1990s saw a resurgence of the popular 1960s and 

1970s drug, LSD. While the use of most other illegal drugs had 

declined, LSD use was on the rise and was particularly popular 

among teenagers, as evidenced by rising emergency-room 

mentions for LSD as well as LSD-related arrests and violence. 

For example in 1991, LSD led to violence in Fairfax County, 

Virginia, where a high school student who allegedly had taken 

six or more hits of LSD shot a police officer, wounding her 

seriously. In San Marcos, Texas, a college student used a rifle 

to kill two acquaintances and wound his girlfriend after taking 

several hits of LSD. 

To call attention to increasing abuse of the drug and to 

emphasize the need for stronger cooperative law enforcement 

and a commitment to reduce demand, Administrator Bonner 

held an LSD Conference in San Francisco in December 1991. 

This conference was held in California because it was a major 

source for LSD production and was attended by demand 

reduction experts from across the nation as well as law 

enforcement representatives from local, state, and federal 

levels. 

In May 1992, Philadelphia Division ASAC Lewis Rice 

(left) briefed President George Bush and Philadelphia 

Police Commissioner Willie L. Williams (center) on the 

division’s strategy to dismantle neighborhood drug 

gangs and street organizations. 

Medical Use of Marijuana 

Denied (1992) 

In 1989, former Administrator Lawn had officially denied 

the petition of the National Organization for Reform 

of Marijuana Laws (NORML) to reschedule marijuana 

from Schedule I to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances 

Act. When NORML appealed that decision, 

3 

Administrator Bonner had to review the issue and assess 

whether or not marijuana had any medicinal value. In 

order to develop a concrete, objective means of determining 

if marijuana should be rescheduled, Administrator 

Bonner relied on a five-point test, based somewhat on 

the criteria Congress had used to decide if certain drugs 

should be rescheduled. If the drug failed to meet just one 

of the five criteria, it could not be rescheduled, asserted 

Administrator Bonner. Marijuana failed to meet all five. 

The criteria consisted of: 

1. The drug’s chemistry must be known and reproducible. 

2. Adequate safety studies must have been performed 

on the drug. 

3. There must have been adequate and well-controlled 

studies proving the drug’s efficacy. 

4. The drug’s medicinal value must be accepted by 

qualified experts. 

5. The scientific evidence of the drug’s safety and 

efficacy must be widely available. 

Administrator Bonner ruled that marijuana had no 

currently accepted medical use on March 26, 1992. 

DEA Special Agent 

Promotion Program 

In 1992, the DEA implemented the Special Agent Promotion 

Program (SAP), a bias-free system for testing and promoting 

its special agents. It was based upon an objective identification 

of the most qualified candidates, regardless of their race 

or gender. The SAP resulted in important gains for female 

employees, in addition to African-American and Hispanic 

employees. 

Operation Green Ice 

(1992) 

By the late 1980s, the DEA’s financial investigative skills had 

evolved to such a high degree that the agency set up its own 

bank to lure drug traffickers looking to launder their profits. In 

1989, the investigative team created Trans America Ventures 

Associates (TARA) and established its credentials in the 

financial community. The result was so convincing that 

Hispanic Business Weekly listed TARA as one of the top 500 

Hispanic Corporations in America. Undercover agents then 

posed as money launderers and offered to pick up funds

anywhere in the world. They used informants to identify drug 

money brokers from Colombia who acted as middlemen between 

Cali mafia kingpins and money laundering operations 


Beginning in San Diego and Los Angeles, the investigations 

took undercover agents to Houston, Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, 

Chicago, and New York to pick up money and to establish 

“fronts,” such as leather goods shops, in these cities. During 

the course of the investigation, DEA agents laundered more 

than $20 million for the Colombia-based cartels. As the investigation 

developed, cartel operatives asked the undercover 

agents to provide money laundering services in Europe, 

Canada, and the Caribbean. Consequently, Operation Green 

Ice was expanded into a coordinated international law enforcement 

effort involving Canada, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, 

Costa Rica, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United 

States. 

In September 1992, undercover agents finally arranged a 

meeting with top-ranking Cali financial managers at locations 

in the United States, Italy, Spain, and Costa Rica. The drug 

lords arrived, expecting to discuss plans for their criminal 

business, but instead were arrested. Operation Green Ice was 

an unprecedented collaboration of talent and financial expertise 

that successfully formed the first international task force 

to attack the monetary networks of the Cali mafia. Operation 

Green Ice led to the arrest of seven of the Cali maifa’s top 

financial managers, the seizure of more than $50 million in 

assets worldwide, and the arrest of 177 persons, including 44 


Major Cocaine Seizure (1992) 

In 1992, 500 pounds of cocaine The packages had been covered 

A welder used a high-tech torch to 

belonging to the Cali mafia were cut through the bottom plate of the in red grease to conceal the scent 

found by DEA agents in a Texas oil pump to remove cocaine from drug-sniffing dogs. 

field mud pump. packages. 

4

Creation of the Intelligence 

Division(1992) 

For most of its first 20 years, the DEA’s headquarters intelligence 

function and responsibility for managing DEA’s intelligence 

program was located in the Operations Division. The 

DEA was responsible for managing a National Narcotics Intelligence 

System with federal, state, local, and foreign officials, 

and coordinating the collection, analysis, and dissemination 

of drug intelligence. However, as drug trafficking 

around the world increased and more law enforcement, intelligence, 

and military entities joined in the anti-drug effort, it 

became clear that the DEA had to focus additional resources 

and attention on drug intelligence. In August 1992, the Office 

of Intelligence became the Intelligence Division. The 

primary purposes of the change in status was to bring together 

all intelligence functions within the DEA, enhance the 

profile of the DEA’s entire intelligence program, place increased 

emphasis on the DEA’s intelligence mission, and 

improve the span of control of senior management. 

Federal drug efforts and the demands of the law enforcement, 

intelligence, and defense communities were growing at 

a rapid and sometimes uncoordinated manner. Their demands 

on the DEA intelligence program were increasing dramatically 

at a time when the DEA was barely able to meet its own 

intelligence needs. The information collected by DEA special 

agents around the world constitutes one of the richest 

sources of federal drug information. Programs needed to be 

established to ensure that the information was properly shared 

and that other agencies dedicated and focused resources to 

add to that information for law enforcement purposes. More 

and better analysis had to be conducted in order to provide 

the details that could link apparently unrelated cases and 

support the development of successful prosecutions. 

By establishing the Intelligence Division, the DEA sought to 

achieve a uniformity of purpose among federal drug intelligence 

efforts, establish intelligence program and policy functions, 

and provide a more proactive direction for DEA’s intelligence 

program. Intelligence management resources were 

expanded to ensure that the intelligence programs of the interagency 

drug community were addressing the tactical, operational, 

and strategic needs of the DEA. 

The Intelligence Division included three entities: the El Paso 

Intelligence Center (EPIC), the Office of Investigative Support, 

and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Liaison. EPIC 

continued to expand its support to law enforcement officers 

across the country with its Pipeline and Jetway Programs, 

and the timely provision of information from the Watch. The 

Office of Investigative Support, collocated with its enforcement 

counterparts, provided intelligence support to the Kingpin 

Strategy. Functions of the Office of Intelligence Policy 

and Liaison included: establishing programs and policies to 

5 

ensure support from the interagency community; strategic 

intelligence; planning, policy analysis, and program development; 

and, the Special Field Intelligence Program (SFIP). 

Although a separate entity, the functions and programs of 

the Intelligence Division remained focused on supporting 

DEA’s enforcement mission. 

The Kingpin Strategy (1992) 

In 1992, the DEA instituted the Kingpin Strategy that 

focused investigative and enforcement efforts on specific 

drug trafficking organizations. The DEA planned to disable 

major organizations by attacking their most vulnerable 

areas—the chemicals needed to process the drugs, their 

finances, communications, transportation, and leadership 

structure. 

The Kingpin Strategy held that the greatest impact on the drug 

trade took place when major drug organizations were disrupted, 

weakened, and destroyed. This strategy focused 

enforcement efforts and resources against the highest-level 

traffickers and their organizations, and provided a systematic 

way of attacking the various vulnerabilities of the organizations. 

By systematically attacking each of these vulnerabilities, 

the strategy aimed to destroy the entire organization, and with 

it, the organization’s capacity to finance, produce, and distribute 

massive amounts of illegal drugs. Each blow weakened the 

organization and improved the prospects for arresting and 

prosecuting the leaders and managers of the organizations. 

The Kingpin Strategy evolved from the DEA’s domestic and 

overseas intelligence gathering and investigations. It was a 

strategy that encompassed the DEA’s enforcement actions in 

the United States, in the transit nations of the Caribbean, 

Mexico and Central America, and in the source countries of the 

Andes. The DEA also expanded Operation BAT in the 

Caribbean to include Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and 

the Lesser Antilles. 

Eventually, the Kingpin Strategy would be revised, although 

the DEA retained the emphasis on going after the top level of 

the international drug trade. When Mr. Constantine became 

the Administrator, the SACs of DEA field divisions requested 

greater flexibility within their areas of command to target the 

major drug trafficking figures who were having a significant 

impact in their regions. Under the original Kingpin Strategy, 

DEA headquarters often dictated the selection of Kingpin 

targets. In response to the SACs’ concerns, Administrator 

Constantine agreed to allow them more latitude in target 

selection. In conjuction with this decision, he established the 

Special Operations Division at Newington, Virginia, in 1994 to 

coordinate multi-jurisdictional investigations against major 

drug trafficking organizations responsible for the flow of 

drugs into the United States.

In November 1991, the DEA destroyed two major distribution 

cells of Cali Kingpin Helmer “Pacho” Herrera in New York City. 

Herrera was the primary supplier of cocaine to the New York 

market, and his organization was shut down through a massive 

wiretap effort, using as many as 100 simultaneous, 

court-authorized wiretaps on cellular phones. Almost 100 

traffickers were arrested, more than $20 million in cash and 

assets were seized, and 2.7 tons of cocaine were taken off the 

streets. In addition, computerized records of transactions and 

personnel were seized, providing valuable insight into the Cali 

distribution cell operations and was an indication that the Cali 

drug lords were becoming more dependent on computer 

systems. 

In November and December 1991, the DEA teamed up with the 

CNP to carry out the first major raids ever against Cali mafia in 

Cali, Colombia. As a result, the DEA seized important financial 

records that permitted it to freeze trafficker bank accounts in 

Colombia, Miami, and London. In addition, during one of 

these successful raids, the CNP arrested Ivan Urdinola, one of 

the most violent of the Cali kingpins. 

At the close of 1991, collective law enforcement efforts against 

the cartels resulted in the seizure of more than 300 metric tons 

of cocaine worldwide. Almost two-thirds of this amount was 

seized in the Andes and the transit nations, such as Mexico 

and Guatemala. 

In another investigation, the DEA, working with the U.S. 

Customs Service, exposed one of the Cali mafia’s principal 

means of smuggling cocaine into the United States. In 

December of 1991, more than 15 tons of cocaine hidden in 

cement fence posts were seized in Miami and Texas and five 

Cali distributors based in the U.S. were arrested. The posts 

were shipped from Venezuela. 

As a follow-up to that investigation, the DEA and the U.S. 

Customs Service seized 7.5 tons of cocaine concealed in 

shipments of broccoli and okra. Ten members of the organization 

were arrested in Miami, Florida, including one of the Cali 

mafia’s top managers in the United States. Federal agents also 

seized $1.6 million in cartel bank accounts located in Florida, 

California, New York, and New Jersey. 

Finally, in July 1992, Panamanian police and the DEA raided 

a warehouse in Panama and seized 5.3 tons of cocaine concealed 

in boxes of hollowed-out ceramic tiles. 

Brooklyn Clandestine 

Cocaine Lab Seizures (1992) 

The Mid-Hudson Drug Enforcement Task Force, which 

consisted of three DEA special agents, six New York state 

troopers, and seven local police officers, conducted an 

intensive investigation of the Jose Santa Cruz- Londono 

6 

trafficking organization.The cooperative, year-long operation 

required multiple wiretaps and sophisticated video 

surveillance, which was installed inside the warehouse lab 

and captured several individuals actually going through the 

cocaine processing procedures. These efforts came to fruition 

on June 15, 1992, when the Task Force seized two major 

clandestine cocaine laboratories in Brooklyn, New York. 

Agents found 100 pounds of cocaine base chemically altered 

into ceramic floor tiles for smuggling into the United States. 

It was believed that each lab was capable of producing 50 to 

100 kilograms of cocaine HCl a day, making them two of the 

largest labs seized during that time period. Unique to these 

labs was the use of Dupont gun-cleaning solvent in the 

extraction process as well as the use of an “extractor,” a piece 

of equipment that used dry ice to condense vapors in the 

laboratory. This device enabled the lab to function in a densely 

populated area without the presence of strong chemical odors 

usually associated with clandestine labs. The other lab had 

been abandoned following an unrelated New York City Police 

raid of a nearby building. As a result of these seizures, an 

additional 70 pounds of cocaine were seized on March 3, 

1993, when one of the cooperating Brooklyn lab defendants 

led the task force to a crack cocaine laboratory located in 

Liberty, New York. In addition, the chemist responsible for 

the tile method of smuggling was arrested, and one of the 

Brooklyn arrestees was later charged in the conspiracy to kill 

an editor of El Diario, a Spanish-language newspaper 

published in New York City. The drug lords from Colombia 

had threatened the editor’s life when the newspaper ran 

several articles condemning their activities. At the conclusion 

of these investigations, the labs were traced to the Jose Santa 

Cruz-Londono trafficking organization and 30 of its members 

were brought to justice. 

Hudson Task Force officers display some of the crushed 

cocaine “tiles” recovered from the clandestine lab in 

Liberty, New York.

The Tucker 

Special Agent Claude Powers of the San Diego Division 

Narcotics Task Force posed with the 1948 Tucker 

automobile seized from a major methamphetamine 

trafficker in 1992. 

Rules of the Game 

(1993) 

For years after the DEA first began operating in Mexico in the 

early 1970s, special agents worked there, as in most countries 

of the world, without formal regulations other than their own 

agency’s guidelines. This changed in April 1990, when a 

physician, Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain, was kidnaped in 

Guadalajara by four men who identified themselves as members 

of the Mexican Judicial Police. Machain was then driven 

to a neighboring state, held overnight in a hotel, and forced to 

board a plane that took him to United States. 

U.S. authorities maintained that the Guadalajara gynecologist 

had injected DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena with 

stimulants to keep him conscious during the final interrogation 

before his murder in 1985, and they were frustrated by 

Mexico’s failure to arrest Machain after his earlier indictment 

in Los Angeles. As a result, American officials paid Mexican 

bounty hunters to kidnap Machain and take him to El Paso, 

Texas. This fact aroused Mexican furor, and even more so 

when the United States Supreme Court ruled in June 1992 that 

the abduction did not violate American law. In 1992, the 

Government of Mexico imposed the first written regulations 

that the DEA had faced anywhere in the world. The rules 

capped the number of DEA agents in Mexico, designated a 

half-dozen cities in which they must live, prohibited them from 

traveling without written Government of Mexico permission, 

denied them diplomatic immunity from prosecution, and stipulated 

that all useful intelligence information “must be 

immediately transmitted to the competent Mexican authorities.” 

They also prohibited weapons. Dr. Machain was 

ultimately released in December 1992 due to a directed verdict 

of acquittal. 

7 

Aviation 

In late 1991, the Chief Pilot position was moved out of 

headquarters and sent to Addison to run operations. By this 

time, the DEA’s Aviation Section had grown to 115 special 

agent/pilots, 110 DEA-owned aircraft, 152 contractor maintenance 

technicians, and an operating budget of $23 million. In 

the 1990s, about 85 percent of the air fleet was from asset 

forfeiture and the remainder was from military surplus and 

newly-purchased aircraft. 

In June 1992, ground was broken for the new Aviation Operation 

Center at the Alliance Airport, which was four times larger 

than the facility at Addison. The three-story hanger included 

large bays with an overhead crane for working on every kind 

of aircraft from small fixed-wing, single-engine planes, to large 

turbine-powered transports and helicopters. The facilities 

provided for machine repairs, engine shops, avionics, spare 

parts, modification work, metal work, and hydraulic repairs. 

Air intelligence, photo labs, maintenance, and the operations 

center and office space were also housed in the new facility. 

In the connected two-story office building were workstations, 

training rooms, conference areas, and computer systems.

Training Technology 

When Administrator Robert C. Bonner began his tenure in 

August 1990, one of the first challenges facing him was the 

issue of overcrowding at the FBI Training Center at Quantico, 

Virginia. The training needs of the FBI had grown to such an 

extent that there was literally no space to accommodate the 

DEA training functions that were likewise expanding. As a 

result, the DEA was given notice to find another place to 

conduct its training. 

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, 

Georgia, offered to provide the DEA some space, but after 

evaluating a number of facilities in other states, Administrator 

Bonner determined that it was in the DEA’s interest to retain 

a training facility at Quantico, Virginia. Mr. Bonner confirmed 

the U.S. Marine Corps’ offer of land to the DEA, and set about 

to acquire the funding for a DEA training center. 

In 1992, with the approval of Attorney General Dick 

Thornburgh, Administrator Bonner was successful in obtaining 

$7 million for architectural plans and an engineering study. 

However, it was not until FY 1997 that sufficient funds were 

appropriated to build and complete the DEA Training Center 

at Quantico. 

Office of Investigative 

Agency Policies (1993) 

On November 18, 1993, the Attorney General established the 

Office of Investigative Agency Policies (OIAP) at the Department 

of Justice. This new office, reporting directly to the 

Attorney General, was created to increase efficiency within the 

Department of Justice by coordinating specified activities of 

the department’s criminal investigative components that warrant 

uniform treatment or coordination. Agencies that fell 

under this program included the DEA, FBI, U.S. Marshals 

Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service. Some 

resolutions/issues addressed by this office that affected the 

DEA included drug intelligence (February 1994), wireless 

communications (April 1994), criminal investigations overseas 

(May 1994), aviation policy (September 1994), armor piercing 

ammunition (October 1994), Interagency Laboratory Working 

Group (June 1995), post-shooting incidents (October 1995), 

law enforcement training (December 1995), and confidential 

informants and cooperating witnesses (May 1996). 

8 

Given the evolving sophistication of criminal drug organizations 

around the world in the 1990s, the DEA was challenged 

to keep pace, particularly technologically. With the cartels’ 

extensive wealth, these international criminal organizations 

purchased the latest and most sophisticated state-of-the-art 

technological equipment, and used this equipment to control 

every phase of their drug business—production, transportation, 

financing and communications. Technology provided 

them with the vital link to their managers and dealers here in 

the United States and around the world, allowing the mafia 

leaders to maintain total control over every detail of the drug 

business from their safe havens abroad. 

Cellular Phones: Mafia leader surrogates who controlled 

operations in the United States engaged in complicated efforts 

to avoid having their telephone communications vulnerable to 

legal wiretaps. These criminal surrogates within the United 

States bought cell phones in lots of 10-20, which were used for 

a few weeks or even days and then quickly discarded and 

replaced. This was done in order to evade wiretaps by moving 

from phone to phone more quickly than law enforcement could 

keep up. 

Digital Pagers: The use of digital pagers also created new 

problems. Traffickers sent messages, often in code, to set up 

deliveries, cancel meetings, or warn of problems. But law 

enforcement’s ability to intercept these transmissions was 

limited. The DEA’s primary method was to use a clone of a 

pager used by a suspected trafficker. However in order to set 

up the clone, specific information was needed from the company 

providing the paging service, and the suspect was often 

tipped by the paging service that he was under investigation. 

In response and with the cooperation of the cellular and 

paging industries, the DEA developed equipment to intercept 

cellular and paging services. 

Debit Telephone Cards: Traffickers also used debit cards to 

avoid detection by law enforcement. From stores, such as the 

7-11, traffickers bought telephone debit cards similar to telephone 

credit cards that are not billed to any specific person or 

telephone number and are difficult to trace. 

Encryption: Encrypted communications became a major 

problem for law enforcement in the 1990s. To help counter the 

threat of criminal organizations exchanging encrypted messages 

with impunity, Congress approved the Communications 

Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in 1994. It required 

telephone companies to ensure that their systems and networks 

had the capability to accommodate federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies’ court-approved intercepts as 

new technology was developed.

. 

Digital Communications: Another important technological 

development occurred in the 1990s when new carriers, such as 

cable television companies and electric companies, entered 

the “telephone business.” Where once a pair of wires carried 

only one analogue signal conversation, today’s communications 

were sent in pulses of digital information over wires or 

fiber optic cables, allowing for multiple, simultaneous voicand 

data transmissions, known as multiplexing. This meant that 

telephone calls were forwarded to a different location without 

detection by law enforcement intercept equipment. 

. 

Laboratories 

The laboratory system marked its 25th anniversary in August 

1993. From the original staff of 6 chemists at the Washington, 

D.C., BNDD laboratory, the authorized staff had grown to a 

nationwide staff of 159 bench chemists, 12 latent fingerprint 

specialists, 36 laboratory managers and supervisors, 4 headquarters 

upper managers, 12 headquarters program managers, 

2 hazardous waste specialists, 2 diversion investigators, and 

numerous support personnel. 


Joseph T. Aversa 


Criminal Investigator Aversa of the 

New York State Police was shot to 

death on March 5, 1990, while serving 

on the New York Drug Enforcement 

Task Force. 

Wallie Howard, Jr. 


Police Investigator Howard of the 

New York Police Department was 

shot and killed during an undercover 

operation with the Central New York 

Drug Enforcement Task Force. 

Eugene T. McCarthy 


DEA Special Agent Pilot McCarthy was 

on a second Snowcap tour in November 

1990 when he was called to active 

duty in the Persian Gulf War. He 

was killed in a helicopter accident in 

Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf 

War. 

Alan H. Winn 


DEA Special Agent Pilot Winn was 

killed in a helicopter crash during an 

operations flight over the island of 

Hawaii. 

9 

George D. Althouse 


DEA Special Agent Althouse was 

killed during an attempted car theft 

in Shelby County, Alabama. 

Becky L. Dwojeski 


DEA Special Agent Dwojeski, who 

was assigned to the Office of Training, 

was killed in an automobile accident 

on the Quantico Marine 

Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. 

Stephen J. Strehl 


Detective Strehl, a St. Louis, Missouri 

Police Officer, was killed in a 

helicopter crash during a surveillance 

mission. He was assigned 

to a DEA task force.


10 

The drug trade had 

evolved into a well-organized, 

highly structured 

enterprise that spanned 

the world.

DEA 

Thomas A. 

Constantine 

April 15, 1994 

1999 

Thomas A. Constantine was appointed Administrator of the 

United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) by 

President William J. Clinton on March 11, 1994. Prior to this 

appointment, Mr. Constantine had been serving as the 

Superintendent of the New York State Police and was a veteran 

law enforcement officer with over 34 years of service with that 

agency. 

When Mr. Constantine was selected by Governor Mario Cuomo 

in 1986 to be Superintendent of the New York State Police, it was 

the first time in 30 years that a member of that agency had risen 

through the ranks from Trooper to Superintendent. During his 

tenure as Superintendent, the 4,800-member New York State 

Police received numerous awards, including the Governor's 

Excelsior Award as the best quality agency in state government. 

Upon assuming the leadership of the DEA, Administrator 

Constantine said that the agency would play a leading role 

in changing attitudes about drugs and reducing violence. 

However, he emphasized that “DEA cannot do it alone.” He 

explained, “The key is cooperation with state and local 

police departments...and federal agencies, which leaves no 

room for turf wars or jurisdictional conflicts.” 

Mr. Constantine now serves as a Public Service Professor at 

the State University of New York in Albany, Rockefeller 

College of Public Affairs and Policy. 


1997 Moscow, Russia 

1997 Pretoria, South Africa 

1998 Trinidad, Bolivia 

1998 Sao Paulo, Brazil 

1998 Beijing, China 

1998 Vietiane, Laos 

1998 Ciudad Juarez, Mexico 

1998 Tijuana, Mexico 

1998 Managua, Nicaragua 

1998 Port of Spain, Trinidad/Tobago 

11 

Two of the most significant features of the drug trade in the 

mid-1990s were its scope and sophistication. The drug trade 

had expanded into a global problem, and the unprecedented 

power and wealth of the traffickers allowed them to manage 

their worldwide business with the most sophisticated technology 

and communications equipment that money could buy. 

The drug trade had evolved into a well-organized, highly 

structured enterprise that spanned the world. Drug trafficking 

activities were conducted in a seamless continuum, with 

individual organizations controlling all aspects of the drug 

trade, from cultivating or manufacturing drugs in source 

countries to transporting them through international zones 

and eventually selling them on the streets of American communities. 

The DEA adjusted its strategy to address the unprecedented 

influence and power of the international drug mafias while 

working to reduce violent drug-related crime in American 

communities. Initially hampered by budget cutbacks in the 

late 1980s, by the mid-to-late 1990s, the agency had increased 

its budget, its staffing, and its cooperation with law enforcement 

counterparts in the United States and abroad. 

During this time period, violent drug gangs proliferated around 

the country. Violence and drug trafficking went hand-in-hand. 

More than 1.5 million Americans were arrested for drug law 

violations in 1996. Many crimes (e.g., assault, prostitution, 

and robbery) were committed under the influence of drugs or 

motivated by a need to get money for drugs. Competition and 

disputes contributed to violence as did the location of drug 

markets in areas where legal and social controls on violence 

tended to be ineffective. 

The availability of automatic weapons also made drug violence 

more deadly. In addition to the rampant violence and 

denigration of neighborhoods, child abuse, crack babies, 

AIDS, homelessness, and a host of other drug-related afflictions 

also degraded the quality of life in many communities. 

Some influential intellectuals in America, in their frustration, 

began to advocate the wholesale legalization of drugs as a 

solution to the drug problem. 

Another challenge facing drug law enforcement was the fact 

that heroin, which previously had been smuggled mostly from 

Asia, was being smuggled into the United States from a new 

source—South America. 


1994.....3,418 

1998.....4,261 

DEA Budget 

1994.....$1,050 million 

1998.....$1,349.4million

1995: Special Agent Jake Carter (far right) helped with an 

enforcement operation against the Northwest Raiders in Ft. 

Lauderdale, Florida. 

Conviction of Dandeny 

Munoz- Mosquera (1994) 

Dandeny Munoz-Mosquera, the Medellin cartel’s chief assassin, 

was arrested in Queens, New York, on September 25, 

1991, for making false statements to a DEA special agent. 

Following Munoz’s trial, conviction, and subsequent six-year 

sentence under the false statement charge, Munoz was then 

tried for his involvement in the 1989 midair bombing of 

Avianca flight-203, in which 107 people died when the cartel 

wanted to kill one informant on the plane. Because two 

American citizens were on board, the United States was able 

to charge Munoz with homicide in that case. Munoz was also 

linked to hundreds of other murders that he committed while 

serving as the cartel’s most prolific assassin. In December 

1994, Munoz was convicted in New York and sentenced to 10 

life terms for the Avianca homicide charges, as well as two 

20-year terms and one 5-year term on a variety of drug 

trafficking and RICO charges, all to be served consecutively. 

12 

Operation Snowcap is 

Concluded (1994) 

Operation Snowcap was one of the major issues of concern 

that the SACs brought to the attention of incoming Administrator 

Constantine. The program was originally instituted to 

eliminate the flow of cocaine by building up internal law 

enforcement resources in the source countries and by teaching 

enforcement techniques to foreign counterparts. However, 

it had evolved to the point that DEA agents were also 

participating in drug law enforcement activities. 

Snowcap was envisioned as a temporary program, but after 

seven years of operation it became a serious drain on DEA 

domestic field division resources. The constant rotation of 

individuals from domestic field investigations made it difficult 

for the agents to initiate and follow through on casework 

and follow-up court testimony. In addition, because of the 

dangerous terrain the agents worked in, many agents who 

volunteered for Snowcap tours underwent intensive jungle 

training to prepare for the adversity that their tours of duty 

to the Latin American jungles created. This training, although 

a necessity to the agents, further depleted the domestic 

field divisions of badly needed special agents. 

These personnel limitations made it increasingly difficult for 

the domestic field divisions to combat the rising tide of drugrelated 

violent crime in their regions. In order to address the 

SACs concerns, and because Operation Snowcap had 

achieved its goal of helping other countries’ drug law enforcement 

agencies become more self-sufficient, a decision 

was made to phase out Snowcap and refocus the DEA’s role 

in overseas operations. As a result, Snowcap’s temporary 

positions were gradually eliminated. Nevertheless, the DEA 

continued to support permanent positions in Peru, Bolivia, 

and Colombia. The agents in these positions provided support 

and training assistance and served as liaison officers 

and advisors. The phase-out of Operation Snowcap 

marked a significant change in the role of DEA agents 

in certain overseas posts.

Peru Airplane Crash (1994) 

On August 27, 1994, during a routine reconnaissance mission 

near Santa Lucia, Peru, a DEA airplane carrying five special 

agents crashed, killing all aboard. The DEA special agents 

were assigned to Operation Snowcap [see page 72], which had 

provided support and training for Peruvian and Bolivian law 

enforcement personnel between 1987 and 1994. The crash site 

was 15 miles west of Santa Lucia, an airstrip in the foothills of 

the Andes Mountains of western Peru in the Upper Huallaga 

River Valley, where much of the world’s coca leaves for cocaine 

were grown. They were searching for clandestine drug operations 

in an area that is known for its multitude of laboratories 

and airstrips. The DEA transport plane had been traveling from 

Santa Lucia when it lost contact with air traffic control. 

Operation Dinero (1994) 

Operation Dinero, a joint DEA/IRS (Internal Revenue Service) 

operation, was launched by the DEA’s Atlanta Division in 

1992. In this investigation, the U.S. Government successfully 

operated a financial institution in Anguilla for the purpose of 

targeting the financial networks of international drug organizations. 

In addition, a number of undercover corporations were 

established in different jurisdictions as multi-service “front” 

businesses designed to supply “money laundering” services 

such as loans, cashier’s checks, wire transfers, and peso 

exchanges, or to establish holding companies or shell corporations 

for the trafficking groups. Believing these services 

were legitimate, the Cali mafia engaged the bank to sell three 

paintings, a Picasso, a Rubens, and a Reynolds. These paintings, 

estimated to have a combined value of $15 million, were 

seized by the DEA and IRS in 1994. The operation resulted in 

116 arrests in the United States, Spain, Italy, and Canada and 

the seizure of nine tons of cocaine, and the seizure of more than 

$90 million in cash and other property. The two-year joint 

enforcement operation was coordinated by the DEA, IRS, INS, 

FBI, and international law enforcement counterparts in the 

United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, and Spain. 

13 

The DEA, the Peruvian Air Force, the Peruvian Police, and U.S. 

Special Forces teams assigned to Peru joined in the search for 

the lost aircraft. On August 28 they were scouring the area 

around Puerto Piana, about 285 miles northeast of Lima, when 

they spotted the wreckage of the twin-engine cargo aircraft. A 

six-man search team began hacking through the jungle but was 

slowed by heavy rains and nightfall. The search team, which 

included two DEA agents, reached the site on Monday, August 

29, and discovered the bodies of the two pilots and the 

three agents amid the wreckage of the Casa aircraft. 

The special agents were: Frank Fernandez, Jr., stationed at 

DEA headquarters; Jay W. Seale, stationed in Los Angeles; 

Meredith Thompson, stationed at the Miami office; Juan C. 

Vars, stationed at the San Antonio office; and Frank S. Wallace, 

Jr., stationed at the Houston office. Their bodies arrived back 

in the United States on September 3, 1994, on a C-141 transport 

jet that landed in front of hundreds of family members, friends, 

and DEA agents, each of whom wore black ribbons over their 

badges. 

“This is just so tragic. They were fine special agents and fine 

young people,” DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine said. 

“For those people who say there is no price to pay for casual 

drug use, tell that to the families and friends going through this 

tragic time.” In May 1995, the families of the five special agents 

received the Administrator’s Award of Honor. This posthumous 

award recognized the bravery of Special Agents Wallace, 

Vars, Thompson, Seale, and Fernandez.

Charlestown, 

Massachussetts 

Between 1975 and 1992, Charlestown, a small community in 

North Boston, Massachusetts, experienced 49 murders, 33 of 

which were unsolved. The difficulty in finding information 

about the murders was caused by the unspoken “Code of 

Silence” that the Charlestown citizens had adopted. The 

community was unwilling to share information that would 

facilitate homicide investigations, possibly because of fear of 

retaliation by criminals, anti-police sentiment, or reliance on 

vigilante justice. Charlestown was a major PCP and cocaine 

distribution center that was run by the “Irish Mob,” a group 

of career criminals. Because drugs were a large part of 

Charlestown’s crime problem, the DEA got involved and 

joined forces with the Massachusetts State Police, Boston 

Police Department, and Boston Housing Police Department. 

DEA agents and local officers worked together to establish a 

comprehensive case against the criminals in the neighborhood 

and found informants and other intelligence critical to 

solving both drug and murder cases. Agents arranged to 

protect any witnesses who agreed to testify against the 

Charlestown criminals. As a result of three years of extensive 

investigations in Charlestown, by July 1994, 40 defendants 

Creation of the 20th Field 

Division: Special Operations 

(1994) 

In a decision to elevate the level of attention given to targeting 

the highest levels of the international drug traffic, Administrator 

Constantine approved the creation of a new division called 

Special Operations (SOD) which became fully functional in 

1994. Its mission was to target the command and control 

capabilities of major drug trafficking organizations from Mexico, 

Colombia, and elsewhere. Originally, the division was exclu- 

New Wall of Honor (1995) 

In order to pay a fitting tribute to the men and women of the 

DEA and state and local task forces who have given their lives 

in the line of duty, Administrator Constantine directed that a 

new, more visible Memorial Wall of Honor be erected in the 

lobby of DEA headquarters. The 20-foot memorial displayed 

a picture of each DEA agent and state and local task force 

member who died in the line of duty. 

14 

were indicted on charges that included racketeering, murder, 

attempted murder, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and armed 

robbery. Once the violent criminals were taken from Charlestown 

community, the threat of retaliation was removed and the code 

of silence was broken. A hotline set up by the DEA yielded 

hundreds of calls from community residents that resulted in 

valuable leads and more significant arrests. The cooperative 

efforts by the DEA and local law enforcement agencies greatly 

diminished Charlestown’s violence problem. 

sively operated by the DEA. In 1995, the FBI became full 

partners in the division, followed by the U.S. Customs Service 

in 1996. SOD was given the ability to collect, collate, analyze, 

evaluate, and disseminate intelligence derived from worldwide 

multi-agency elements. This information was then passed 

to domestic field divisions and foreign country offices for realtime 

or near real-time support to programmed investigative 

and enforcement activity directed against major trafficking 

organizations that operated on a regional, national, or international 

basis. With regard to domestic enforcement, the 

division’s formost function was to help field divisions build 

national conspiracy cases derived from multi-jurisdictional 

wiretap investigations.

Operation Tiger Trap (1994) 

Operation Tiger Trap was conceived at DEA’s Bangkok 

Office during June of 1994 with the goal of identifying and 

targeting the major heroin traffickers in the region. Operation 

Tiger Trap was the first of its kind, a multi-agency international 

operation designed to dismantle or disrupt the trafficking 

activities of the world’s largest heroin trafficking organization, 

the Shan United Army (SUA). Also known as the Mong 

Tai Army, it was located primarily in the areas of Burma 

adjacent to the northern border provinces of Thailand. The 

SUA Warlord Khun Sa claimed that his army, which was 

financed primarily through heroin trafficking, was fighting the 

Burmese for the independence for the Shan people. 

The SUA controlled the cultivation, production, and transportation 

of heroin from the Shan State. Although other 

insurgent groups in Burma also trafficked heroin, the SUA had 

been the dominant force in worldwide distribution. Prior to 

Operation Tiger Trap, the percentage of southeast Asian 

heroin from the DEA’s Heroin Signature Program rose from 9 

percent in 1977 to 58 percent in 1991. 

Tiger Trap was divided into phases which would all target key 

Shan United Army (SUA) functionaries. On November 27, 

1994, the operation culminated when teams of Royal Thai 

Police, Office of Narcotics Control Board Officers, and Royal 

Thai Army Special Forces Soldiers working with DEA agents 

lured targets in Burma into Thailand where they were then 

arrested. This action significantly damaged the ability of the 

SUA to distribute heroin. The Royal Thai Army then worked 

with the Thai Border Patrol Police to close the Burma border 

to “commercial quantities” of goods entering the Shan State. 

When law enforcement authorities had completed their operations, 

13 senior SUA traffickers were arrested, and all were 

pursued for extradition/expulsion to the United States. These 

13 principal defendants in Operation Tiger Trap included 

some of the most persistent and high-level heroin traffickers 

operating out of Thailand. They were all subjects of U.S. 

indictments in the Eastern District of New York (EDNY). The 

defendants were a mixture of three distinct categories: those 

who were eligible for expulsion (illegal aliens in Thailand); 

those who possessed fraudulent identification; and authentic 

Thai citizens. 

15 

Operation Tiger Trap toppled SUA Warlord and heroin 

trafficker Khun Sa. 

On December 3, 1993, law enforcement authorities seize 

315 kilos of heroin in Pae, Thailand. 

Khun Sa’s men. From left to right, Chang Tetsa, Liu 

Fangte, Meedian Pathummee, Kuo Fa Mou, Ma Tsai Kuei, 

Chao Fusheng.

MET 

Mobile Enforcement Teams 

(1995) 

Many communities across America were suffering the devastating 

effects of drug-related crime and violence. Numerous 

drug-related homicides were unsolved, and, in too many 

cases, witnesses were afraid to come forward with information. 

Administrator Constantine believed that the DEA had a great 

deal of expertise and the resources necessary to assist state 

and local law enforcement agencies address drug-related 

problems in their communities. He established the Mobile 

Enforcement Team (MET) program in April 1995 to overcome 

two major challenges that faced state and local agencies in 

drug enforcement: limited resources—equipment, funding, 

and diversification of personnel—that were needed to effectively 

perform drug enforcement; and the fact that local law 

enforcement personnel were often recognizable to local drug 

users and sellers, making undercover buys and penetration of 

local distribution rings difficult and dangerous. 

The MET teams, composed of specially trained and equipped 

DEA special agents, were strategically located across the 

country to facilitate rapid deployment to communities where 

police chiefs or sheriffs requested their assistance. MET 

investigations were immediately successful in reducing the 

impact of drug-related violence. 

One of the DEA’s first MET deployments was in Galveston 

County, Texas, in May 1995. In a single week, Galveston 

County had experienced five drive-by shootings, and the 

Sheriff of Galveston County requested assistance from the 

DEA’s Houston Division to combat the increasing violence. 

The Galveston Narcotics Task Force, working with the Houston 

MET, launched an investigation of the drug gang believed 

to be connected to the shootings. Only days later, five adults 

were arrested on charges of attempted homicide and deadly 

conduct. Two juveniles were also arrested and charged with 

the theft of the firearms used in the shootings. On June 12, 

1995, three additional suspects were arrested; one was believed 

to be responsible for multiple homicides in the area. 

In another example of a DEA MET success, a MET team 

dispatched to Opa-Locka, Florida, worked to dismantle a 

dangerous crack cocaine organization. This group was headed 

by Rickey Brownlee, a violent trafficker who had intimidated 

the citizens of Opa-Locka for years and was alleged to have 

been involved in 13 murders since 1993. In a letter to the 

Attorney General, Mayor of Opa-Locka Robert B. Ingram, 

thanked the DEA for its expertise in the January 1998 dismantling 

of one of South Florida’s most notorious criminal 

enterprises. To further show his appreciation, Mayor Ingram 

issued an official proclamation declaring March 19, 1998, 

“Drug Enforcement Administration/Mobile Enforcement Team 

Day.” 

16 

Similar MET success stories were recorded all across the 

country as state and local law enforcement requested assistance 

from the DEA. From their 1995 inception through 

September 1998, the Mobile Enforcement Teams arrested 

over 6,800 violent drug traffickers across the country, seized 

vast quantities of drugs, and helped many state and local 

police departments restore peace to their communities. 

This highway billboard proclaimed public appreciation 

of DEA efforts. 

(To Left) 1995: DEA Special Agent Michael Moser and 

Galveston County Narcotics Task Force Agent Hugh 

Hawkins arrest a member of one of Galveston’s violent 

drug dealing gangs.

Oklahoma City Bombing 

(1995) 

The DEA was again touched by tragedy on April 19, 1995, 

when a bomb exploded at the Alfred E. Murrah Federal Building 

in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and killed 168 people, including 

19 children. Five DEA employees were killed and three additional 

DEA personnel sustained injuries in the explosion. DEA 

offices on the seventh and ninth floors were completely 

destroyed. Twenty-seven employees had been assigned to 

the DEA’s Oklahoma City Resident Office, including ten DEA 

special agents, four DEA diversion investigators, three secretaries, 

and several task force personnel. 

Within minutes of the blast, DEA agents were assisting the fire 

and rescue workers in evacuating the federal building. The 

DEA sent personnel from the Tulsa, McAlester, Dallas, Tyler, 

Lubbock, St. Louis, Los Angeles, Ft. Lauderdale, and San 

Antonio Offices to assist in rescue and investigative efforts. 

By the first afternoon, the DEA had a command post set up at 

the scene and a DEA trauma team was providing counseling 

for the survivors. The rescue efforts were extremely difficult 

and time consuming, and DEA employees joined in the search 

for lost personnel. The first priority was to locate the bodies 

of the employees that were unaccounted for and to take care 

of their families. 

On April 21, 1995, the DEA confirmed the deaths of two 

employees assigned to the Oklahoma City Resident Office, 

Kenneth G. McCullough and Carrie Ann Lenz and her unborn 

son, Michael James Lenz, III. Mrs. Lenz was six months 

pregnant with her first child. Rescue workers next recovered 

the bodies of DEA employee Rona L. Chafey and DynCorp 

Legal Technician Shelly Bland. During the early morning hours 

of April 24, 1995, workers recovered the body of office 

assistant Carrol Fields from the ruins. 

Upon learning of the deaths, DEA Administrator Constantine 

flew to Oklahoma City to offer support to the grieving families. 

He stated that “Our condolences go out to the families of 

these...good people, and to all the families who have lost loved 

ones in this cowardly and inhumane attack. The entire DEA 

family mourns their loss.” Administrator Constantine then 

pledged to commit the DEA’s “resources and professional 

expertise, in collaboration with other agencies, to bring all of 

the perpetrators of this crime to justice.” 

On June 2, 1997, Timothy McVeigh was convicted of 11 counts 

of conspiracy and first-degree murder after a jury trial. The 

same panel later recommended the death penalty for the 

murders of 168 people, including eight federal law enforcement 

agents, in the April 19, 1995, bombing. 

April 19, 1995: The Alfred Murrah 

Federal Building 

17 

For their heroic actions in response to the Oklahoma City 

Bombing, Midwest City Police Corporal Regina Bonny and 

DEA Special Agent David Schickedanz were recipients of the 

1996 Police Officer of the year Award given by Parade and the 

International Asso- ciation of Chiefs of Police. Regina Bonny 

was an undercover narcotics officer on assignment with the 

DEA at the time of the explosion. After initially being knocked 

unconscious by the blast, she assisted an ATF officer before 

exiting the collapsed building. Although she was injured (and 

was later diagnosed with irreparable nerve damage, brain 

injury, and hand and shoulder wounds), she returned to the 

building, sprinted up the stairs to the ninth floor, and searched 

for other DEA employees. David Schickedanz was in an 

elevator with ATF supervisor Alex McCauley when the explosion 

dropped the elevator six floors. After he escaped from the 

elevator through a trap door, he returned to the destroyed 

DEA office to look for survivors. He suffered from smoke 

inhalation and a partial loss of hearing. 

After the bombing, the DEA Oklahoma City Resident Office 

made efforts to recover some of the law enforcement resources 

lost in the explosion. The office rebuilt its record file by 

obtaining copies of any records available at headquarters. As 

all evidence at the office was destroyed, the evidence collection 

had to be completely rebuilt. The DEA relocated the office 

to 990 Broadway Extension, Oklahoma City, approximately 10 

miles from the former Murrah Building.

Operation Green Ice II (1995) 

Green Ice II, a spin-off of the successful 1992 Green Ice 

investigation, culminated in April 1995 with the arrest of 109 

individuals and the seizure of 13,882 pounds of cocaine, 16 

pounds of heroin, and $15.6 million in cash. This second 

phase operation concentrated on the Cali mafia’s money 

brokers and cocaine distribution networks from Mexico to 

the United States. Once again, the DEA established storefront 

operations and bank accounts throughout the world, 

then convinced drug traffickers that undercover DEA agents 

had connections to launder their drug proceeds. Most of the 

individuals arrested were high-ranking Cali cell leaders or 

money brokers in the United States. Green Ice II had three 

distinct phases. The first targeted certain Casas de Cambio 

and check cashing institutions along the Southwest border. 

Casas de Cambio are legal, unregulated money exchange 

houses that operated much like banks. These organizations 

wire-transferred large sums of money and did not keep 

records of the source or owner of the funds. Second, the DEA 

agents working on this case created their own money exchange 

houses and also infiltrated existing Casas de Cambio 

to identify major narcotic traffickers, money launderers, and 

the financial institutions used by the traffickers. The third 

portion of the investigation followed the money into Colombia 

and linked specific cartel members with the narcotics 

proceeds. Ultimately, more than 200 federal agents from 27 

federal, state, and foreign law enforcement agencies contributed 

to the indictment of over 80 individuals. In addition, 

Operation Green Ice II enabled the DEA to gain a wealth of 

knowledge on wire transfer information, bank accounts, and 

identification of money couriers/brokers. It also proved that 

corrupt businessmen, bankers, and attorneys had created an 

alliance with drug dealers to funnel their drug profits back to 

them. 

Agents counted money seized during Operation Green Ice II. 

18 

Operation Global Sea (1995) 

In 1994, Southeast Asian heroin, which was smuggled by 

ethnic China and Nigeria-based traffickers, was one of the 

greatest drug threats to the United States. Almost 60 percent 

of the heroin that came to the United States at that time 

originated in Southeast Asia’s “Golden Triangle”—Burma, 

Laos, and Thailand. Those mainly responsible were ethnic 

Chinese traffickers who controlled sophisticated international 

networks that smuggled hundreds of kilograms of heroin in 

commercial cargo on a regular basis. In addition to the China, 

Nigeria and West Africa-based trafficking organizations helped 

smuggle the heroin, typically using the “shotgun” approach 

to smuggling by recruiting third party couriers to travel aboard 

commercial airlines and smuggle from one to 10 kilograms of 

heroin per trip. In response to this facet of the drug trade, 

Operation Global Sea targeted a Nigerian, female-led, drug 

trafficking organization that was responsible for smuggling 

into the United States $26 million worth of high-purity Southeast 

Asian heroin. Global Sea, an Organized Crime Drug 

Enforcement Task Force operation, was comprised of the DEA, 

the U.S. Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

and law enforcement authorities in Thailand, Great Britain, 

France, Switzerland, Mexico, and the Netherlands. By the end 

of this 18-month investigation, Operation Global Sea had 

immobilized the Chicago-based drug organization by seizing 

55.5 kilograms of heroin with an average purity of 80 percent 

and arresting 44 defendants in Bangkok, Chicago, New York 

City, Detroit, and Pakistan. 

The heroin distribution operation targeted in Operation 

Global Sea was directed by Ms. Kafayat Majekodunmi, 

shown after her arrest by DEA special agents.

Arrest of Cali Leaders (1995) 

CNP Gen. Rosso Serrano (right) is pictured with Miguel 

Rodriguez-Orejuela (center) shortly after his 1995 arrest. 

During the summer of 1995, six top leaders of the Cali mafia 

surrendered or were arrested by Colombian authorities under 

the leadership of CNP Director General Rosso Serrano, and the 

Cali mafia began to collapse. The arrest of the entire hierarchy 

of the wealthiest and most powerful international criminal 

organization was the most significant enforcement action 

taken against organized crime leaders since the Apalachin 

Gangster Raid in 1957 that exposed the existance and power of 

organized crime syndicates in the United States. 

On June 9, 1995, Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela was arrested by 

the Colombian National Police (CNP) during a house raid in 

Cali. When the police searched the home several days earlier, 

Rodriguez-Orejeula hid in a hollowed-out bathroom cabinet 

with an oxygen tank. The CNP’s excellent police work led to 

his arrest. After he was taken into custody, police discovered 

that he had a copy of an unclassified DEA report titled “The 

Kings of Cocaine” that had been translated into Spanish. He 

was sentenced to a prison term of 13 years. 

On June 19, 1995, Henry Loiaza-Ceballos, who had overseen 

the mafia’s military infrastructure, surrendered to police. He 

was considered one of the most violent members of the Cali 

drug mafia and was linked to at least three massacres in 

Colombia. 

On June 24, 1995, Victor Julio Patino- Fomeque, who was 

responsible for ensuring the security and effectiveness of the 

mafia’s maritime operations, also surrendered and was sentenced 

to 12 years behind bars. 

19 

“No one has sacrificed more than the 

Colombian National Police.” 

On July 4, 1995, Jose Santacruz-Londono, the number three 

leader in the Cali mafia, was arrested by the CNP as he dined 

with associates at a Bogota steak house. He was never 

sentenced because he escaped from prison and was killed in 

March 1996 during a confrontation with the CNP. 

Finally, on August 6, 1995, Miguel Rodriguez-Orejuela, the 

brother of Gilberto, was arrested when the CNP broke down 

the door of his apartment and found him hiding in a secret 

closet during another house raid. He was sentenced to 21 

years. 

Less than one year later, there were two more arrests of major 

Cali mafia leaders. In March 1996, Juan Carlos “Chupeta” 

Ramirez-Abadia, surrendered to Colombian authorities and 

was later sentenced to 24 years in prison. 

On September 1, 1996, Helmer “Pacho” Herrera-Buitrago surrendered 

to Colombian authorities. He was one of the charter 

members of the Cali mafia and was the remaining “Kingpin” 

being sought by Colombian authorities. He was sentenced to 

six years in prison. 

These arrests marked the beginning of the decline of the Cali 

mafia and were the results of extensive investigation by the 

DEA. However, the investigations of the Cali mafia would not 

have been as successful if not for the outstanding efforts of 

the CNP. Remarking on the CNP’s contributions to combatting 

the drug problem in Colombia, Administrator Constantine 

remarked in 1998, “No one has sacrificed more than the Colom

ian National Police. At great sacrifice to themselves, and 

in the face of extraordinary temptations for corruption, 

General Rosso Serrano and his brave law enforcement 

officers have fought the powerful drug traffickers in Colombia.” 

Henry Loiaza-Ceballos 

Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela 

was fingerprinted following 

his arrest. 

Victor Patino-Fomeque 

Jose Santacruz- 

Londono was arrested 

while meeting with 

associates in Colombia 

on July 4, 1995. 

Helmer “Pacho” 

Herrera-Buitrago 

20 

Rise of Traffickers in Mexico 

When enforcement efforts intensified in South Florida and the 

Caribbean, the Colombian organizations formed partnerships 

with the Mexico-based traffickers to transport cocaine through 

Mexico into the United States. This was easily accomplished 

because Mexico had long been a major source of heroin and 

marijuana, and drug traffickers from Mexico had already established 

an infrastructure that stood ready to serve the 

Colombia-based traffickers. 

Mexican cocaine trafficking had been pioneered by Juan Ramon 

Matta-Ballesteros, a Honduran who, from the mid-1970s to the 

mid-1980s, was actively involved with the Mexican Guadalajara 

cartel. This was the group largely responsible for the kidnapping, 

torture, and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena in 

1985. By the mid-1980s, the organizations from Mexico were wellestablished 

and reliable transporters of Colombian cocaine. 

Throughout the 1990s, the United States was faced with trafficking 

organizations from Mexico that worked with the Cali drug 

organizations to smuggle more and more cocaine into the United 

States. By the 1990s, traffickers from Colombia were buying large 

cargo and passenger jets similar to 727s, gutting them, and using 

them to transport multi-ton loads of cocaine to Mexico. The 

planes were then refueled and returned to Colombia loaded with 

millions of dollars in cash. At first, the Mexican gangs were paid 

in cash for their transportation services. But in the late 1980s, the 

Mexican transport organizations and the Colombian drug traffickers 

settled on a payment-in-product arrangement. 

Transporters from Mexico usually were given 35 to 50 percent of 

each cocaine shipment. This arrangement meant that organizations 

from Mexico became involved in the distribution, as well as 

the transportation, of cocaine, and became formidable traffickers 

in their own right. 

The criminal organizations based in Mexico demonstrated an 

ability to corrupt officials serving in high-level positions. Drugrelated 

corruption was probably the single greatest obstacle that 

law enforcement faced in its battle against drug traffickers from 

Mexico. Ernesto Zedillo, the President of Mexico, recognized 

drug-related corruption as a threat to Mexican national security 

and, in 1998, announced a national initiative to fight, crime, 

violence, and corruption. In another attempt to overcome the 

problem of widespread corruption in law enforcement, the Mexican 

Government replaced civilian authorities with military officers. 

The following describes the most powerful drug traffickers and 

their status as of 1998. 

TheAmadoCarrillo-Fuentes 

Organization 

When Amado Carrillo-Fuentes died in Mexico City on July 4, 

1997, after undergoing plastic surgery, he was considered the 

most powerful trafficker in Mexico. In 1999, the Carrillo-Fuentes 

organization , based in Juarez, is still involved in

the trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Its regional 

bases are in Juarez, Hermosillo, and Reynosa, where the 

organization stores drugs for eventual shipment into the 

United States. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes’ organization has 

been associated with the Cali-based Rodriguez-Orejuela 

organization and the Ochoa brothers of Medellin. 

Amado 

Carrillo-Fuentes 

The Arellano-Felix Brothers 

Organization 

This Tijuana-based organization is one of the most powerful, 

violent, and aggressive trafficking groups in the world. The 

Arellano-Felix Organization has high-level contacts within 

the Mexican law enforcement and judicial systems and is 

directly involved in street-level trafficking within the United 

States. This criminal organization is responsible for the 

transportation, importation, and distribution of multi-ton 

quantities of cocaine and marijuana, as well as large quantities 

of heroin and methamphetamine. The Arellano family, 

composed of seven brothers and four sisters, inherited the 

organization from Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo upon his 

incarceration in Mexico in 1989 for his complicity in the 

murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena. Alberto 

Benjamin Arellano-Felix assumed leadership of the family 

enterprise and provides a businessman’s approach to the 

management of their drug empire which operates in Tijuana, 

Baja California, and parts of the States of Sinaloa, Sonora, 

Jalisco, and Tamaulipas. Benjamin coordinates the activities 

of the organization through his brothers Ramon, Eduardo, 

and Francisco. 

Benjamin 

Francisco Ramon 

Eduardo 

21 

The Juan Garcia-Abrego 

Organization 

The Juan Garcia-Abrego organization was involved in smuggling 

drugs from the Yucatan area in Mexico to South Texas 

and north to New York. This organization transported large 

quantities of cocaine for the Cali mafia, as well as marijuana and 

heroin for other traffickers. Garcia-Abrego pioneered deals in 

which Mexican traffickers were compensated in cocaine. This 

substantially raised their profits and allowed them to distribute, 

as well as smuggle, cocaine. He and his organization were 

notorious for their violence. In 1996, Juan Garcia-Abrego was 

added to the FBI’s top ten most wanted fugitives, with a $2 

million reward for his capture. This was the first time an 

international drug trafficker had been included on the FBI list. 

In January 1996, he was arrested in Mexico and brought to the 

United States for trial. He was sentenced to 11 life terms and 

fined $128 million. 

Juan Garcia-Abrego 

The Miguel Caro-Quintero 

Organization 

The Miguel Caro-Quintero organization is based in Sonora, 

Mexico. It is involved in cultivating, processing, smuggling, 

and distributing heroin and marijuana, and in transporting 

methamphet-amine and Colombian cocaine into the United 

States. It was led by Rafael Caro-Quintero, known as the 

“Mexican Rhinestone Cowboy,” until he was arrested and 

placed in a Mexican maximum security prison for his 

involvement in the kidnapping, torture, and murder of DEA 

Special Agent Enrique Camarena. Rafael Caro-Quintero was 

also convicted on marijuana and cocaine trafficking charges. 

His brothers, Miguel ,Jorge, and Genaro, assumed control of 

the organization. Miguel was arrested in 1992, but was able to 

use a combination of threats and bribes to have the charges 

dismissed by a federal judge in Hermosillo, Mexico, under 

questionable circumstances. 

Miguel 

Caro-Quintero

Creation of 21st Field Division: The Caribbean (1995) 

While it is true that the majority of cocaine that entered the United States came across the United States-Mexican border, traffickers 

were beginning to reactivate their trafficking routes in the Caribbean. Many trafficking groups from Colombia, particularly those 

who had risen to power since the Cali syndicate’s fall, returned to traditional Caribbean routes to transport their product to market. 

As these groups from Colombia reestablished their ties with their Caribbean confederates, increasingly larger shipments of 

cocaine and heroin were shipped through the Caribbean. The resulting drug activity in Puerto Rico led to a tremendous increase 

in violence on the island, and Puerto Rico became the nation’s 7th major High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. 

In response to this escalating problem, in 1995, the DEA established the Caribbean Division based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, as 

its 21st Field Division. The division was responsible for five country offices that had previously reported to the Miami regional 

office: Netherlands Antilles, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic, in addition to the St. Thomas Resident Office 

and the St. Croix Post of Duty in the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Ponce Resident Office in Ponce, Puerto Rico. 

Automated Booking System 

(1995) 

1995: An agent checked data stored in the Automated 

Booking System.. The program can retrieve images of 

evidence and surveillance photos (weapons, crime scenes, 

license plate numbers), mug shots, and fingerprints. 

22 

Vice President Al Gore looked through a device at DEA 

headquarters that magnified and compared ballistic 

markings on evidence to prove that two bullets were fired 

from the same weapon.

Atlanta Olympics (1996) 

The White House requested that the DEA and other 

federal law enforcement agencies assist with security 

during the 1996 Olympic games in Atlanta, Georgia. As 

a result, over 200 men and women from the DEA were 

detailed to Atlanta. Security was an important issue 

because national leaders from some 197 participating 

nations, athletes, coaches, and visitors from all over the 

world attended the event. The DEA had previously 

provided assistance at the Los Angeles Olympics in 

1984 and at the 1987 Pan American Games in Indianapolis, 

Indiana. When a bomb exploded in Centennial 

Olympic Park in Atlanta on the ninth day of the Olympic 

games, DEA agents were instrumental in preserving 

the safety of hundreds of spectators. They had been on 

hand when FBI and Defense Department experts 

identified a suspicious-looking knapsack as a bomb just 

minutes before it exploded. DEA agents, along with 

Georgia State patrol and other law enforcement officers, 

hurriedly began evacuating the few hundred people 

in the park. The agents risked their own safety by 

attempting to evacuate nearby civilians and, after the 

explosion, administering first aid. The agents’ ability to 

23 

remain calm and focused during this chaotic situation 

undoubtedly saved many lives. One DEA agent, Craig 

Wiles, was injured in the blast. He was stationed just 25 

to 30 feet from the explosion and was struck in the back 

of the head by a piece of wood. Despite his injuries, 

Special Agent Wiles continued to help fellow agents and 

wounded civilians. He was later taken to nearby Georgia 

Baptist Medical Center where doctors removed wood 

splinters from his head. Wiles fully recovered within a 

few days and was the first agent to receive the DEA’s 

Purple Heart Award. All of the DEA agents who helped 

evacuate Centennial Olympic Park were honored for 

their courage when that group, Atlanta Olympic Division 

Squad 23, was given the Administrator’s Award for 

Outstanding Group Achievement in 1997. 

Left: Honoring Heroism: During an August 1998 visit to 

Colombia, Administrator Constantine and General 

Serrano met with a wounded Colombian National Police 

officer who survived an attack by a rebel group against 

Colombian anti-narcotics headquarters. (Photo courtesy 

Semana Publicaciones.) 

Below: March 1997, DEA Ft. Worth and DEA Midland, 

Texas offices jointly investigated a large-scale drug 

smuggling operation and seized 2,175 pounds of marijuana 

in Odessa, Texas.

The Methamphetamine 

Problem 

In the mid-nineties, trafficking groups from Mexico became 

deeply involved in the methamphetamine trade, replacing 

domestic outlaw motorcycle gangs as the predominant methamphetamine 

producers, traffickers, and distributors. Their 

involvement was made tragically clear when, during an undercover 

operation, DEA Special Agent Richard Fass was shot 

and killed in Tucson, Arizona, on June 30, 1994, by a methamphetamine 

trafficker from Mexico. 

By the late 1990s, these trafficking organizations had virtually 

saturated the western United States market with high-purity 

methamphetamine, known also as “speed” or “crank.” In some 

areas of California, methamphetamine replaced cocaine as the 

drug of choice. With a saturated West Coast market, the 

traffickers then began to expand their markets to the East 

Coast, South, and the Mid-West. 

As supplies increased, prices fell, making it a cheap alternative 

to cocaine. Some called it the “poor man’s cocaine.” In 1991, 

for example, the lowest price nationwide for a pound of methamphetamine 

was $6,000. By 1995, in California, 

methamphetamine sold for between $2,500 and $3,600 per 

pound. 

With increased availability, methamphetamine use increased. 

According to the Drug Abuse Warning Network, the number 

of emergency room episodes involving methamphetamine 

increased steadily after 1991, particularly in the West. From 

1991 to 1993, episodes more than doubled in both Los Angeles 

and Phoenix. 

The sophistication of the organizations from Mexico was also 

clear. Their long-standing expertise in polydrug smuggling 

and the smuggling skills developed while transporting cocaine 

for the Cali mafia had enabled these organizations to branch 

out into other contraband, such as the precursor chemicals 

ephedrine and pseudoephedrine that are used in the manufacture 

of methamphetamine. 

They also established international connections in Europe, 

Asia, and the Far East to have tons of precursor chemicals, 

particularly ephedrine, shipped to addresses in both the United 

States and Mexico. During 1993 and 1994, the majority of 

ephedrine shipments destined for Mexico were supplied by 

such diverse countries as China, India, the Czech Republic, 

and Switzerland. From mid-1993 to early 1995, the DEA documented 

the diversion of almost 170 tons of ephedrine used in 

illicit methamphetamine production. 

Unlike other drugs, methamphetamine is one that these criminal 

organizations from Mexico controlled entirely from 

beginning to end. They had the international contacts to 

obtain the necessary precursor chemicals to make the drug. 

24 

They also had the clandestine labs to process the chemicals 

into methamphetamine on both sides of the border. They 

expanded their distribution networks across the nation by the 

use and intimidation of illegal aliens. Also, unlike when they 

served as middlemen moving cocaine and heroin, they kept 

100 percent of the profits from their methamphetamine sales. 

In late 1994, state and local authorities in California requested 

a meeting with Administrator Constantine to express their 

growing concerns about escalating methamphetamine abuse 

and the increasing number of clandestine meth labs being 

encountered in that state. Their concerns and the information 

they provided mirrored intelligence the DEA was receiving 

about a scourge of meth abuse cases in many areas of the 

country. Working closely with California law enforcement, the 

DEA hosted a National Methamphetamine Conference in 

February 1996. 

The conference brought together experts from around the 

United States to examine enforcement and policy options. It 

was structured to incorporate not only the input of knowledgeable 

DEA personnel, but also the experience of the state 

and local law enforcement agencies that had been encountering 

the problem. Conferees heard reports from state, local, and 

other federal agencies about the methamphetamine situation 

and exchanged ideas on a number of strategies to address the 

problem in the United States. 

In his opening remarks, Administrator Constantine stated that 

the benefit of holding the conference was that it allowed those 

with extensive experience in drug law enforcement “to help 

identify the scope of the methamphetamine problem and to 

ensure that [there would be] a coordinated response.” Participants 

offered their input by filling out surveys and taking part 

in group discussions. 

Billion Dollar Budget 

(1997) 

In 1997, the DEA achieved its first-ever billion dollar direct 

appropriation budget. This $1.054 billion budget was approximately 

$200 million, or 23 percent, greater than the DEA’s 1996 

budget, which had been the previous all-time high budget. 

That the DEA’s funding would increase in a time of fiscal belttightening 

was a tribute to the outstanding work that DEA 

personnel were performing worldwide and to the DEA’s many 

achievements in 1996. The DEA’s fiscal year (FY) 1997 appropriation 

contained significant resources aimed at restoring the 

agency’s source country drug trafficking programs to FY 1992 

funding levels. The DEA also received $29 million in the 1997 

appropriations for construction of a DEA Training Center at 

the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

Comprehensive 

Methamphetamine 

Control Act of 1996 

The Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996 

was passed unanimously in Congress and signed into law by 

President Clinton on October 3, 1996. This act augmented the 

DEA’s effort to control precursor chemicals and lab equipment 

used to produce methamphetamine. Several provisions of this 

Act had an impact on DEA operations: 

1. Restricting access to precursor chemicals such as iodine, 

red phosphorous, and hydrochloric gas used to make 

methamphetamine, and tightening controls on the sale of 

pseudoephedrine, phenylpropanolamine, and ephedrine 

combination products, all common ingredients found in 

over-the-counter diet pills and cold medicines. 

2. Tracking mail-order purchases of precursor chemicals. 

3. Establishing civil penalties of up to $250,000 for firms that 

distribute laboratory supplies with “reckless disregard” 

for the illegal purposes for which the supplies might be 

used. 

4. Doubling the maximum criminal penalty to 20 years in jail 

for possession of chemicals or equipment used to make 

methamphetamine. 

5. Increasing penalties for trafficking and manufacturing 

methamphetamine or its precursor chemicals. 

6. Directing the Attorney General to coordinate international 

drug enforcement efforts to reduce trafficking in 

methamphetamine and its precursor chemicals. 

7. Making it a crime to manufacture precursor chemicals 

outside the United States with the intent to smuggle them 

into the country. 

8. Allowing courts to order restitution for the extensive 

costs (often as much as $8,000) associated with the 

clean-up of methamphetamine labs and for any person 

injured as a result of the lab’s operation. 

9. Creating the Methamphetamine Interagency Task Force 

to design and implement methamphetamine education, 

prevention, and treatment strategies and establishing an 

advisory board to educate chemical companies to identify 

suspicious transactions. 

25 

Purple Heart 

Awards 

The Hispanic Advisory Committee suggested to the Administrator 

the establishment of an award to honor the “thousands 

of men and women sworn to enforce the drug laws of the 

United States...who deserve the full benefit of our recognition 

of the inherent dangers of our profession.” 

In response to that suggestion, the DEA Purple Heart Award 

was instituted. 

As of January 1, 1996, any DEA Agent wounded in the line 

of duty became eligible to receive the DEA’s new Purple 

Heart Award. Based on the design of the military’s Purple 

Heart Award presented for battle injuries, the DEA emblem 

honors agents who suffered injuries that required medical 

treatment or caused death and were incurred during the 

performance of official duties as the direct result of a hostile 

or criminal action. 

The heart-shaped pendant, with a DEA Special Agent’s 

badge embossed on a purple background, is suspended from 

a red, white, and blue ribbon. The award is presented in a 

glass-front shadowbox and was accompanied by a lapel pin 

in a smaller version of the pendant. With the creation of this 

award, the DEA established an appropriate and significant 

way to recognize those employees who were injured while 

confronting the everyday dangers faced by those in drug law 

enforcement. 

In 1998, the DEA’s SAC Advisory Committee expanded the 

awarding of Purple Hearts to state and local law enforcement 

officers killed or wounded in the line of duty while working 

with the DEA.

Operations Reciprocity and Limelight (1996) 

Two investigations in the late 1990s demonstrated that Mexicobased 

drug traffickers had displaced some of the 

Colombia-based cocaine organizations that had traditionally 

dominated the New York City cocaine traffic. 

During a highway interdiction stop on October 30,1996, near 

Tyler, Texas, two state troopers discovered over $2 million in 

cash concealed in a van heading south. This stop was the first 

seizure linked to Operation Reciprocity. On December 3, 

investigators seized 5.3 tons of cocaine from a Tucson, 

Arizona, warehouse. Evidence linked the warehouse operation 

to a Los Angeles investigation, a New York operation, a 

Michigan transportation group, and a trafficking cell connected 

to the Carrillo-Fuentes organization. On December 13, 

the same state troopers stopped a tractor trailer truck in Tyler, 

Texas, and seized 2,700 pounds of marijuana from a hidden 

compartment in the ceiling of the vehicle. The investigation 

revealed that traffickers were smuggling cocaine to the New 

York City area in concealed compartments in the roofs of 

tractor trailer trucks and in hollowed-out five-foot tall stacks 

of plywood. The same trucks were being used to transport the 

cash in kilo-sized packages of $5, $10, and $20 bills, back to 

Mexico. 

On April 9, 1997, the U.S. Customs Service found $5.6 million 

in street cash hidden in a tractor trailer truck ceiling compartment 

in an Operation Reciprocity seizure in El Paso, Texas. 

Operation Reciprocity investigators discovered packages 

of cocaine hidden in this compartment cut out of a fivefoot 

tall stack of 4x8 sheets of plywood. 

26 

This operation resulted in 41 arrests, as well as the seizure of 

7 tons of cocaine, 2,800 pounds of marijuana, and more than 

$11 million. Meanwhile, an investigation initiated by the 

DEA’s Imperial County, California Resident Office in August 

1996 developed into Operation Limelight, which involved 

several state, local, and U.S. Treasury agencies, including the 

IRS and the U.S. Customs Service. The investigation focused 

on the Alberto Beltran transportation and distribution cell, 

which was part of the Carrillo-Fuentes organization. 

Operation Limelight resulted in the arrest of 48 people and the 

seizure of over 4,000 kilos of cocaine, over 10,800 pounds of 

marijuana, and over $7.3 million. State and federal investigators 

believed this Beltran cell was responsible for the monthly 

smuggling of at least 1.5 tons of cocaine, typically concealed 

in crates of vegetables and fruits and trucked across the 

United States by Mexican nationals. 

In March 1996, the head of the Beltran organization in the 

United States, Gerardo Gonzalez, was arrested by Operation 

Limelight investigators. The arrest was the result of the 

“carrot case,” which also led to the New York seizure of 1,630 

kilograms of cocaine hidden in a 30-ton shipment of chopped 

up carrots used for horse feed. At that time, the New York Drug 

Enforcement Task Force also seized $1.3 million and arrested 

nine organization members. Eight more members of the organization, 

including Gonzalez’s wife, were arrested on August 

1, 1997, in the second phase of this investigation. 

Operation Reciprocity investigators found $5.6 million in 

street money hidden in this ceiling compartment of a truck 

during the El Paso seizure on April 9, 1997.

Legalization in California and Arizona (1996) 

In the early 1990s, as many communities were overrun by crime and violence, a small, but vocal group of people believed that 

the legalization of drugs would reduce drug abuse, lessen the violence, and restore peace to our cities. Because the DEA believed 

that legalization would exacerbate the drug problem, not solve it, the agency sponsored a forum in 1994 on the issue of how 

police chiefs and others could address arguments calling for the legalization of drugs [see Anti-Legalization Forum on page 109]. 

The findings of that conference were published in a manual that police chiefs and others used to speak out against the legalization 

issue. 

In 1996, powerful, wealthy special interest organizations pushed for the legalization of marijuana, and in California and Arizona, 

they were successful in putting the issue before the voters. Through slick advertising media campaigns, voters were led to believe 

that the initiative would simply allow medical doctors to treat terminally ill and suffering patients with marijuana for the relief of 

pain symptoms. In Arizona, voters were led to believe that this proposition included provisions to toughen criminal justice 

systems. 

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) released resolutions that officially expressed the group’s opposition 

to the propositions in Arizona and California to legalize marijuana. In these resolutions the IACP stated the grounds for its 

objections: marijuana is more carcinogenic than tobacco and other Schedule I drugs; it compromises brain functions, the immune 

system, the lungs, and hormonal responses to stress and metabolic changes; and makes diseases such as tuberculosis, asthma, 

and multiple sclerosis worse. The IACP also maintained that marijuana did not prevent blindness due to glaucoma and that no 

national health organization had accepted marijuana as medicine. In addition, the resolutions contained a list of organizations 

that asserted that marijuana had not been scientifically proven to be safe or effective as a medicine. These organizations included: 

the American Medical Association, American Cancer Society, National Multiple Sclerosis Association, American Academy of 

Opthamology, National Eye Institute, National Cancer Institute, National Institute for Neurological Disorders and Strokes, 

National Institute of Dental Research, and the National Institute on Allergy and Infectious Diseases. 

Unfortunately, despite such widespread objections, the propositions passed in both states. California’s Proposition 215 allowed 

anyone who received a doctor’s recommendation to possess and use marijuana for cancer, AIDS, glaucoma and “any other illness 

for which marijuana provides relief.” It allowed doctors to verbally “recommend” marijuana use to minors, prisoners, individuals 

in sensitive positions, or anyone who claimed to have a medical condition. The proposition, by extension, also allowed individuals 

to smoke and cultivate marijuana openly, on the premise that marijuana had been recommended for the individual’s medical 

condition. 

The Arizona proposition was more restrictive than the California version in that a physician had to cite a study confirming the 

proven medical benefits of the Schedule I drug and provide a written prescription which was kept in the patient’s medical file, and 

the patient was required to obtain a written opinion from a second physician confirming that the prescription for the Schedule 

I substance was “appropriate to treat a disease or to relieve the pain and suffering of a seriously ill patient or terminally ill patient.” 

The Arizona proposition, however, also provided for other actions that erode effective, tough drug policies, including the release 

of prisoners previously convicted of personal possession or use of a controlled substance. 

Despite the differences between the two ballot initiatives, there was an indisputable similarity: both states allowed individuals 

to possess substances that have no legitimate medical use. Both California and Arizona, despite what the proponents claimed, 

had taken the first steps toward the proponents’ ultimate goal of legalizing drugs. Based on the success of legalization proponents 

in California and Arizona, campaigns for legalization began to organize in other states. 

27

Operation Zorro II 

As part of the Southwest Border Initiative that was launched 

in 1994, the Zorro II investigation targeted Mexico-based 

cocaine smuggling and distribution organizations, as well as 

the partnership groups based in Colombia. Working together, 

these organizations were responsible for importing and distributing 

almost six metric tons of cocaine throughout the United 

States. 

Zorro II illustrated the close and efficient partnership that 

existed between the drug organizations from Mexico and 

Colombia. More importantly, this case showed that the international 

drug trade was a seamless continuum, a criminal 

enterprise that stretched, without interruption, from the jungles 

of South America—across transit zones, such as Mexico—to 

the cities and communities of the United States. 

Zorro II was particularly important because, for the first time, 

law enforcement dismantled not only a Colombian organization 

that produced the cocaine, but also the organization in Mexico 

that provided the transportation. During the course of the 8month 

investigation, law enforcement officers coordinated 

and shared information gleaned from more than 90 courtauthorized 

wiretaps. The operation involved 10 federal 

agencies, 42 state and local agencies, and 14 DEA field 

divisions across the country. As a result of the investigation, 

over $17 million and almost 5,600 kilos of cocaine were seized, 

and 156 people were arrested. Zorro II confirmed that Mexicobased 

traffickers were not just transporters, but had their own 

distribution networks throughout the United States. 

Jose Ivan Duarte 

(1997) 

In 1982, Jose Ivan Duarte and his conspirator Rene Benitez 

were hired by Colombian drug traffickers to plan and execute 

the kidnaping of DEA Special Agents Charles Martinez and 

Kelly McCullough. The agents were taken from their hotel in 

Cartagena, Colombia, and were transported by car to a secluded 

area 15 miles away. Agent Martinez was shot for the 

first time while still within city limits. Then Duarte and Benitez 

stopped the car and shot Martinez again. At that point Agent 

McCullough fled. He was shot as he ran into the jungle. SA 

Martinez escaped when his captors’ gun jammed as they 

attempted to shoot him for a third time. Both SA Martinez and 

SA McCullough managed to escape despite their wounds. 

They reached Cartagena the next day and phoned the U.S. 

Embassy for assistance. They were airlifted out of the country 

by a U.S. Air Force plane from Panama. 

Both Duarte and Benitez eluded capture. Warrants for their 

arrests were issued in June 1982. Benetez was eventually 

captured in Colombia, extradited, and imprisoned in Miami in 

1995. Duarte continued to evade authorities until August 

28 

1997, when he was detained in Ecuador. The Ecuadorian 

government expelled the fugitive and he was then transported 

to the United States to stand trial. His capture marked the end 

of a 15 year investigation and search. According to Administrator 

Constantine, “Duarte’s expulsion by the Ecuadorian 

government shows great courage and commitment to battling 

drugs. 

DEA/Wal-Mart Partnership 

(1997) 

As part of the nation’s continuing efforts against the production 

of methamphetamine, on April 9, 1997, the DEA and 

Wal-Mart formed a partnership to control large-scale purchases 

of three over-the-counter products— 

pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine— 

used in clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine and 

amphetamine. Wal-Mart, one of the nation’s largest employers, 

implemented a chain-wide policy limiting sales of these 

allergy, cold, and diet products. The cash registers of Wal- 

Mart stores across the country were programmed to limit sales 

to 3-6 packages of these items per customer. In addition, they 

discontinued the 100-count bottle of their brand of pseudoephedrine 

tablets that had been found at illegal labs and 

replaced them with small-count blister packs. Wal-Mart’s 

initiative also limited the sale of blister packs, which were 

generally exempt from federal regulations. Wal-Mart’s initiative 

dovetailed with federal regulations stipulated under the 

second phase of the Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996. 

Wal-Mart’s counter-diversion display informed customers 

about the store’s partnership with the DEA.

DEA Heroin 

Conference (1997) 

The use of heroin increased significantly in the United 

States in the mid-1990s. The Drug Abuse Warning Network 

(DAWN) statistics for 1995 reported heroin to be 

second only to cocaine in terms of hospital incidents. 

DAWN statistics showed the annual number of 

heroin-related emergency room mentions increased from 

33,384 in 1990 to 76,023 in 1995. In addition, the number 

of heroin overdose deaths nationally rose from 4,188 in 

1994, to 4,625 in 1995. Purity levels also rose from 7 

percent in 1985 to 40 percent in 1995. In some areas, 

particularly the Northeast, 80-90 percent purity was reported. 

The heroin problem grew worse as South America began 

to play a bigger role in heroin trafficking. Soon, heroin 

from South America dominated the East Coast and accounted 

for the majority of heroin seized by the DEA. 

Another reason why heroin use increased was that drug 

dealers were actively marketing their product. In order to 

increase demand for heroin, drug traffickers began to 

include free samples of heroin in shipments of cocaine. 

This marketing scheme introduced heroin to cocaine 

dealers and abusers. 

In response to this growing problem, Administrator Constantine 

held a National Heroin Conference in February 

1997 in Reston, Virginia. In attendance were more than 

300 federal, state, local, and international law enforcement 

officials, as well as demand reduction/prevention experts. 

The conferees gathered to assess the heroin threat to the 

United States and share effective strategies for addressing 

the problem. 

. Included in the submitted 26 recommendations were the 

following: 

1. Develop a national media campaign against heroin use; 

2. Support the development of community-based 

educational/awareness drug campaigns; 

3. Increase law enforcement and interdiction training 

regarding heroin concealment and transportation; 

4. Enhance the Heroin Signature Program and Domestic 

Monitor Program; 

5. Bolster interagency intelligence sharing; and 

6. Identify a national heroin strategy. 

29 

National Drug Pointer Index 

(1997) 

For many years, state and local law enforcement envisioned a 

drug pointer system that would allow them to determine if 

other law enforcement organizations were investigating the 

same drug suspect. Despite the existence of some statewide 

and regional drug pointer systems, none extended to national 

participation. At the direction of the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy, the DEA took the lead in the development of a 

national drug pointer system to assist federal, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies in investigating drug trafficking 

organizations. 

. 

The DEA Survivors’ Benefit 

Fund (1998) 

In April 1998, Administrator Constantine announced the creation 

of the DEA Survivors’ Benefit Fund. The fund was 

established to assist the surviving family members of DEA 

employees and task force officers killed in the line of duty. The 

fund also supported programs that preserved the memory of 

those killed in the line of duty. In addition, the benefit fund 

provided financial assistance for family members of employees 

who died as a result of non-job-related causes. The 

Survivors’ Benefit Fund was created by combining existing 

organizations, namely, the Enrique Camarena Fund in Miami; 

the Seema/Montoya Fund in Los Angeles; the Rick Finley 

Memorial Foundation in Detroit, the Richard Fass Foundation 

in Phoenix; and the New York Drug Enforcement Agents 

Scholarship Foundation. Respectively, these foundations 

had been established to honor Enrique Camarena, who was 

kidnapped and murdered by drug traffickers in Mexico in 1985; 

Special Agents Paul S. Seema and George M. Montoya, who 

were both killed while performing an undercover operation in 

Los Angeles in 1988; Special Agent Rick Finley, who was killed 

in a plane crash in 1989 while returning from a DEA operation 

in Peru; and Special Agent Richard Fass, who was killed while 

performing an undercover methamphetamine investigation in 

1994. Many of these organizations held annual events to raise 

funds to support the families of DEA agents killed in the line 

of duty. Representatives of these various funds agreed to 

come together to support one national fund, realizing that this 

would enable them to assist more people. Each fund was also 

able to maintain a separate identity by continuing to hold 

individual annual fund raisers. Financial support for the 

Survivors’ Benefit Fund came from donations by the general 

public, as well as profits from the various fund rasing events 

held across the country.

Justice Training Center 

Since 1985, the DEA and FBI had shared training facilities at 

the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. With the expansion 

of both agencies and with increasingly complex training 

requirements for DEA special agents, the need for additional 

space became critical. In May 1991, a study was completed by 

the Department of Justice that indicated that the best and 

most efficient way to satisfy the training needs of both the 

DEA and FBI was to pursue an expansion at Quantico. The 

securing of necessary funding to construct a new training 

center became a major priority of Mr. Constantine when he 

was appointed Administrator. Congress provided funding 

for a new training academy in the FY 1997 appropriations. The 

$29 million academy, called the Justice Training Center, was 

constructed on land made available to the DEA by the Marine 

Corps and located within the FBI complex. The new center will 

enable the DEA to provide state-of-the-art training for DEA 

basic agents, state and local law enforcement officials, and 

international law enforcement counterparts. It was designed 

to house a 250-bed, double occupancy dormitory, classrooms, 

office space for staff, a cafeteria, and an international 

training room equipped for simultaneous translations. Adjacent 

to the new academy is a special facility for clandestine 

laboratory training. Special purpose facilities—ranges, a driver 

training course, a swimming pool, a gymnasium, and an 

auditorium—will continue to be shared with the FBI. Construction 

on the new center began in April 1997 and was 

completed in April 1999. 

A new curriculum was planned for all training courses. In 

March 1998, Administrator Constantine commissioned the 

Office of Training to conduct a review of all DEA training 

programs, from entry-level basic agent training to specialized 

and supervisory/management training. This review was 

requested in anticipation of the completion and subsequent 

opening of the Justice Training Center in order to ensure that 

each training program was current and state-of-the-art. This 

review was conducted by a team of selected supervisory and 

special agents from the field, diversion investigators, chemists, 

DEA headquarters personnel, and members of the training 

staff. This team completed the training review and offered its 

suggestions in June 1998. 

30 

Digging the first shovelful of earth on 

April 21, 1997, for DEA’s new 

training academy were, from left: 

Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Kelley, Lt. Gen. 

Paul K. Van Riper, Mr. Benjamin F. 

Burrell, SAC David Westrate, 

Administrator Thomas A. 

Constantine, FBI Director Louis J. 

Freeh, Mr. Steven S. Honigman, Rear 

Adm. David J. Nash, Mr. Harold J. 

Parmelee, and Mr. Everett Medling.

Training 

Upon taking office in 1994, DEA Administrator Constantine 

requested a review of DEA’s training curriculum to ensure that 

state-of-the-art procedures and techniques were being provided 

in all DEA training. The goal was to have every DEA 

employee fully trained and prepared to operate successfully 

in the ever-changing environment of drug law enforcement. 

As a result of the re-evaluation of training procedures, a 

number of significant changes were instituted: 

• Training programs for basic agents, diversion 

investigators, intelligence analysts, and chemists were 

required to devote more time to legal issues, integrity, 

and personal responsibility. 

• Basic agent training was extended to 16 weeks. Also, in 

order to support the increased emphasis on personal 

responsibility, the DEA structured 25 hours of formal 

ethics and integrity sessions into the basic agent 

training program. These “life training” sessions 

emphasized the positive aspects of integrity 

and police ethics and equipped new agents 

with the moral tools needed to successfully 

tackle ethical dilemmas. 

31 

• The Field Training Agent Program was instituted to 

provide continuous training and direction to 

probationary agents after completing basic agent 

training. 

• An in-service training course, to be held every 18 

months, was developed for all core series employees. 

The program stressed reviews of internal regulations, 

oral and written communication skills, legal issues, 

case law, operational and tactical procedures, 

integrity, and personnel issues, such as sexual 

harassment. The course also included an ethics 

curriculum similar to that used for basic agent 

training. 

• A Training Advisory Committee, which met twice a 

year, was established to assess the training 

curriculum and increase field input into specific 

training programs. 

From 1995 to September 1998, the DEA trained 1,586 basic 

agents, and from 1994 to September 1998, over 110,000 state 

and local law enforcement officers.

Aviation Technology 

Compared with its 1971 aviation budget of $58,000, the Air In late 1995, the DEA replaced its aging office automation 

Wing’s 1998 operating budget of $24,400,000 covered a fleet system (UNISYS BTOS) with a network of Pentium-grade 

of 98 aircraft and 108 special agents/pilots. On a daily basis, personal computers. This system, known as “Firebird,” repre- 

Air Wing personnel work in close support of domestic offices 

and provide sophisticated electronic, air-based surveillance. 

Creation of the 

22nd Field Division: El Paso 

(1998) 

Because of its proximity to the Southwest Border, the El Paso, 

Texas, region was an area that experienced a great deal of drug 

trafficking. For this reason, The FBI and the U.S. Customs 

Service established field divisions in the El Paso region. In 

order to focus on the drug problem on the U.S.-Mexican 

border and to better cooperate with other federal law enforcement 

efforts in that area, Administrator Constantine requested 

the creation of an El Paso Field Division. This request became 

a reality in June 1998, and the El Paso Field Division became 

the DEA’s 22nd field division. The reorganization realigned 

the former El Paso District Office from the Houston Division; 

the Alpine, Texas, Resident Office from the Dallas Division; 

the Albuquerque, New Mexico, District Office from the Denver 

Division. It also realigned the Las Cruces, New Mexico, 

Resident Office from the Denver Division to the new El Paso 

Division. In addition, the reorganization transferred the 

responsibility for the Billings, Montana, Resident Office from 

the Seattle Division to the Denver Division. By establishing 

the El Paso Division, adjoining geographical areas facing a 

common drug threat were combined under a single authority. 

With a separate field division to manage the El Paso region, 

the DEA focused directly on the significant drug threat facing 

the West Texas and New Mexico areas, thereby enhancing 

the agency’s effectiveness along the entire Southwest Border. 

32 

sented a major effort to improve the DEA’s automated 

infrastructure ($150 million) through establishment of a secure, 

centralized computer network that standardized the DEA’s 

investigative reporting system, case file inventories, administrative 

functions, and electronic communications. Firebird was 

made available at DEA headquarters and all 22 division offices, 

and allowed access to the electronic headquarters file-room, 

easy access to the DEA community through electronic mail and 

bulletin boards, and use of a common suite of office automation 

functions. These capabilities increased user productivity and 

provided improved access to many automated tools essential 

to investigative activities. Plans were also made to install 

Firebird in the 180 DEA field offices, El Paso Intelligence Center, 

Air Wing, Laboratories, and several overseas offices. 

Two of the major on-line resources available to DEA employees 

were Webster and IMPACT. Webster was the familiar name for 

the DEA Electronic Library project. As the core of the DEA’s 

“intranet,” its objectives included building an electronic library 

for distributing official, up-to-date documents and news, providing 

secure access to DEA users worldwide via Firebird and 

Department of Justice mainframe/Teleview that allowed full-text 

search and retrieval and assisted DEA in expanding its presence 

on the public internet. The second on-line resource was 

the Investigative Management Program and Case Tracking 

(IMPACT) system, which was initiated in 1996. This program 

was a mission-oriented, field-led initiative that focused on the 

collection, use, and dissemination of case-related information 

at the field level with the emphasis on the group supervisor and 

agent. 

In 1988, the DEA awarded a contract to investigate and 

evaluate a preliminary Intelligence Analyst Workstation that 

would assist intelligence analysts in developing their reports. 

This project evolved into the third on-line resource, Merlin— 

a system that supports the classified processing needs of 

intelligence analysts and special agents. Merlin was deployed 

to DEA headquarters, the Special Operations Division, and 

the Houston, San Diego, and the Los Angeles Field Divisions. 

The Merlin project plan calls for seven additional divisions 

and one foreign office to be completed by the end of fiscal year 

2000.

Laboratories 

DEA laboratories continued to use the latest in forensic 

science technology to aid DEA investigations. Beginning in 

the 1980s, technology used by the DEA saw a quantum leap 

in microprocessor and computer technology. DEA laboratories 

engaged in extensive programs to convert to 

state-of-the-art instrumentation. For example, the outdated 

vacuum sweep apparatus that was used to collect traces of 

material for later laboratory analysis was replaced by the 

Ionscan. The Ionscan unit was a portable instrument that was 

used to both collect trace materials and provided preliminary 

on-the-spot identification. In 1994 alone, the Ionscan unit 

was used to develop evidence in cases that led to the seizure 

of 22 vehicles, 19 buildings, two aircraft, and over $350,000 in 

cash. 

In 1995, the Department of Justice Inspector General conducted 

a study of the DEA Laboratory System. In a survey 

of all DEA and FBI field offices, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, and 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, 96 percent 

of the respondents expressed their overall satisfaction with 

the DEA’s laboratory services. “The DEA is justifiably proud 

of the contributions made by all laboratory system employees 

to maintain such a high level of accomplishment,” stated 

Aaron Hatcher, Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office 

of Forensic Science. 

The DEA continued to upgrade and expand its laboratory 

facilities. In 1994, a new lab, the North Central Laboratory, was 

built in Chicago. In 1998, the DEA planned to build new 

replacement labs to update the Mid-Atlantic Lab in Washington, 

D.C., the Southeast Lab in Miami, the Southwest Lab in 

San Diego, the Western Lab in San Francisco, and the Special 

Testing and Research Lab in McLean, Virginia. These expansions 

were necessary to accommodate staffing increases. 

The new Special Testing and Research, Mid-Atlantic and 

Southeast labs were scheduled to begin operation during the 

last quarter of 2000; while a schedule for the openings of the 

new Western, Southwest, and South Central labs had not yet 

been established. Funding for such expansions was provided 

by Congress. 

The DEA further expanded its laboratory capabilities by 

developing mobile labs. Mobile labs, small laboratories that 

were driven from site to site, enabled DEA forensic chemists 

to conduct on-the-spot analysis of seized drugs. Analyzing 

drugs at the scene of the seizure accelerated the prosecution 

of drug traffickers and provided intelligence that identified 

other drug activity in the local area. 

33 

Pictured above is Chicago’s North Central Lab, which 

opened in 1994. Senior forensic chemist Robert Krefft is 

shown in the state-of-the-art facility among various 

instruments used in the analysis of drug evidence. 

Julie Town, a forensic chemist at the Mid-Atlantic 

laboratory in Washington, D.C. is pictured above 

examining a vial containing material that had been 

processed by a lab robotics workstation.


Richard E. Fass 

Died on June 30, 1994 

DEA Special Agent Fass was fatally shot 

during an undercover methamphetamine 

investigation in Glendale, Arizona. 

Juan C. Vars 


Juan C. Vars was one of five DEA special 

agents killed in a plane crash during 

a reconnaissance mission near 

Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation 

Snowcap. 

Jay W. Seale 


Jay W. Seale was one of five DEA Special 

Agents killed in a plane crash during 

a reconnaissance mission near 

Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of Operation 

Snowcap. 

Meredith Thompson 


Meredith Thompson was one of five 

DEA Special Agents killed in a plane 

crash during a reconnaissance mission 

near Santa Lucia, Peru, as part of 

Operation Snowcap. 

Frank S. Wallace, Jr. 


Frank S. Wallace, Jr. was one of five 





Frank Fernandez, Jr. 


Frank Fernandez, Jr. was one of five 





34 

Kenneth G. McCullough 


DEA Special Agent McCullough was killed 

when a car bomb exploded outside the 

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma. 

Carrol June Fields 


Carrol June Fields, a DEA Office Assistant, 

was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. 

Rona L. Chafey 


Cleveland County Sheriff’s Office Secretary 

Rona L. Chafey, who worked in a DEA, 

State, and Local Task Force, was killed in 

the Oklahoma City bombing. 

Shelly D. Bland 


DynCorp Legal Technician Shelly D. Bland, 

who was working under contract to the 

DEA, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. 

Carrie A. Lenz 


DynCorp Legal Technician Carrie A. Lenz 

and her unborn son, Michael James Lenz 

III, were killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. 

Shaun E. Curl 


Special Agent Curl was killed in the line of 

duty while assigned to the Miami Division.


35 

Seized motorcycle gas tanks depicting the 

death of DEA Agents

DEA 

Donnie R. Marshall 

Administrator 

2000-2001 

Following Administrator Thomas A. Constantine’s retirement 

on July 2, 1999, Mr. Donnie R. Marshall was named 

DEA Acting Administrator. Marshall was formally nominated 

by President Clinton to serve as DEA Administrator 

on February 9, 2000, and was sworn in on June 19, 2000, 

by Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr., the U.S. District Judge for 

the Eastern District of New York, and a former DEA Executive 

Liaison Officer. During Administrator Marshall’s swearing 

in, Attorney General Janet Reno described him as a 

strong, yet personable leader. “I have watched him. He 

gets very firm and very quiet when he needs to and he acts 

with great strength.” Mr. Marshall was the first DEA Special 

Agent ever to be named as Administrator. 

Donnie Marshall’s career in law enforcement began in 1969 

when he became a Special Agent for the Bureau of Narcotics 

and Dangerous Drugs. Mr. Marshall served DEA as a 

Resident Agent in Charge in Texas, Country Attache in Brazil, 

Deputy Regional Director of the Latin America Region, 

Senior Inspector of the Office of Professional Responsibility, 

Chief of the Statistical Services Section, ASAC of the 

Dallas Division, SAC of the Aviation Division, Chief of Domestic 

Operations, and Chief of Operations. Mr. Marshall 

served as Acting Deputy Administrator from February 23, 

1998, to September 24, 1998, when President Clinton nominated 

him as Deputy Administrator. 

Mr. Marshall’s confidence in DEA’s future was evident in a 

statement he released the day of his swearing in ceremony, 

“As DEA Administrator, I plan to direct all of our resources 

against those criminal groups degrading the quality of life 

in our country…the DEA remains committed to bringing to 

justice those who violate our nation’s drug laws. We accept 

this challenge and pledge to promote a safer and drug-free 

country for all citizens.” 

Mr. Marshall retired on June 30, 2001, and became the 

Executive Vice President for Homeland Defense at SAIC, 

one of the world’s leading providers of information technology 

services. 

36 

The most significant development 

in U.S. drug trafficking and abuse 

in the period 1999-2003 was the array 

of synthetic drugs that became 

popular, particularly among young 

people. 

The most significant development in U.S. drug trafficking 

and abuse in the period 1999-2003 was the array of synthetic 

drugs that became popular, particularly among young people. 

Foremost among these laboratory-produced drugs was Ecstasy, 

a combination stimulant and hallucinogen sold in tablet 

form. It was touted as a “feel good” drug with an undeserved 

reputation for safety. In 2000, it was estimated that 

about two million tablets were smuggled into the United 

States every week. Other synthetic drugs like methamphetamine 

remained popular and continued to hit small-town, 

rural America particularly hard. Still other synthetic drugs 

with chemical sounding names like GHB, Rohypnol, GBL, 

and 1,4 BD were used both voluntarily as a way to get high, 

but even more tragically, concentrated doses of the drugs 

were slipped into the drinks of unsuspecting people, who 

then became victims of sexual assault. 

Another challenge drug law enforcement faced in the late 

1990s was the growing diversion of legal prescription drugs 

into the illegal market. In 1998, 2.5 million Americans admitted 

abuse of prescription drugs. By 2001, that had almost 

doubled to 4.8 million. OxyContin, a powerful prescription 

analgesic, became heavily abused. DEA implemented a National 

Action Plan to combat diversion and abuse of that 

drug. 

More traditional drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, 

which are produced from agricultural products, continued 

on the drug scene as well. Marijuana remained the 


1999..... 4,535 

2003..... 4,841 

DEA Budget 

1999..... $1,477.0 million 

2003..... $1,897.3

most popular drug of choice across the country, and cocaine—while 

use was down significantly since its peak in 

the mid-1980s—was the second most commonly used illicit 

drug in the United States. Heroin saw a surge in trafficking 

and use, particularly on the East Coast, where high-purity 

Colombian heroin dominated the market. According to the 

2001 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, during the 

1990s heroin incidence rates rose to a level not reached since 

the 1970s. By 2000, there were 146,000 new heroin users in 

the country. 

DEA worked in partnership with its international counterparts 

to target the most significant drug trafficking organizations 

to disrupt supply. Colombian drug trafficking organizations 

continued to dominate the international cocaine trade. 

However, unlike their cartel predecessors, the Colombian 

cocaine trafficking groups of the late 1990s and early 2000s 

typically specialized in one aspect of the cocaine industry, 

with no one group of traffickers dominating all aspects of 

the illicit trade. DEA continued its productive working relationship 

with the Colombian National Police and dismantled 

several major cocaine and heroin trafficking groups based in 

Colombia. 

In Mexico, with the election of President Vicente Fox in 2000 

and his administration’s unprecedented commitment to ending 

the unchallenged reign of drug trafficking cartels there, 

DEA’s relationship improved greatly with its Mexican counterparts, 

and inroads were made into Mexico-based cartels. 

Likewise, DEA forged productive relationships with European 

law enforcement to deal with the smuggling of Ecstasy since 

that drug was produced almost exclusively in Europe. 

DEA took on additional responsibilities in the aftermath of 

the September 11 th , 2001, terrorist attacks on America. The 

FBI reassigned hundreds of agents from narcotics investigations 

to counterterrorism activities. As a result, DEA reallocated 

resources to meet changing needs. 

DEA joined the fight against terror by continuing conspiracy 

drug investigations and cutting off a funding source for terrorists 

through drug profits. The Office of National Drug Control 

Policy launched a major ad campaign to make Americans 

aware of the connection between drugs and terror. 

In addition to its drug interdiction activities, DEA strengthened 

prevention, education, and treatment initiatives at the 

local level through DEA’s Demand Reduction program and 

other initiatives. DEA instituted a number of programs like 

the Mobile Enforcement Team II (MET) program and the Integrated 

Drug Enforcement Assistance (IDEA) program to offer 

comprehensive help to local communities in establishing 

strong, coordinated anti-drug strategies. 

While the vast majority of Americans supported DEA’s efforts 

and the national anti-drug strategy, a well-financed and 

vocal legalization lobby spent huge amounts of money to 

37 

. 

encourage a greater tolerance for drug use. A number of 

states passed referendums to permit their residents to use 

drugs for a variety of reasons, particularly the use of marijuana 

for supposed medicinal purposes. The citizens who 

voted in these referenda often relied on the misinformation 

presented by the sponsors of expensive campaigns to legalize 

drugs. DEA initiated an anti-legalization campaign as a 

way to counter that information and publicize the many successes 

of current drug policy. 

National Conference on 

Drugs, Crime, and Violence 

in Mid-Sized Communities 

(1999) 

DEA hosted the National Conference on Drugs, Crime, and 

Violence in Mid-Sized Communities on February 23, 1999. The 

focus of the Conference was to seek solutions and draw attention 

to the drug crisis that had rapidly permeated midsized 

communities nationwide. Survey results from delegates 

showed that cocaine and marijuana were the two most prevalent 

drugs affecting small cities and rural areas. However, one 

quarter of the participants noted that methamphetamine was 

a major concern. The conference allowed participants to share 

information and learn from the experiences of other cities and 

communities that had faced the problems of drug trafficking 

and drug-related violence. 

DEA Opens New Justice 

Training Center (1999) 

First envisioned in the mid-1970s, the new Justice Training 

Center (JTC) opened on April 28, 1999, at the FBI Academy in 

Quantico, Virginia. The JTC is a 185,000 square foot building 

that contains a 250-bed, double occupancy dormitory, an 

assortment of classrooms (including practical training areas 

for fingerprinting, interviewing, and wiretap capabilities) and 

offices, a cafeteria, and an international training room equipped 

with simultaneous translation equipment. Prior to the opening 

of the JTC, DEA shared facilities with FBI. (See 1998 JTC 

entry for full history of the center.) 

The JTC is used for DEA Basic Agent training, Basic Diversion 

Investigator training, Basic Intelligence Research Specialist 

training, Basic Forensic Chemist training, In-Service 

training, Certification training, specialized training, and supervisory, 

management, and executive level training. The JTC 

is also used to conduct drug training seminars for state and 

local law enforcement personnel, and through the use of specially 

equipped classrooms, conduct international drug training 

seminars for foreign law enforcement officials.

The Jay Leno Show honors Members from the Hispanic American 

Police Command Officers AssociationAnnual 

Conference 

Opening of the DEA Museum 

(1999) 

On May 11, 1999, the DEA 

Museum and Visitors 

Center officially opened 

at DEA headquarters 

in Arlington, 

Vi rginia. 

Occupying 

2,200 

square 

feet, the 

museum 

features a 

unique exhibit entitled “Illegal 

Drugs in America: A Modern History” 

that traces the history of 

illegal drugs in the United States 

from opium dens in the mid-1800s to the international 

drug mafias of the late 20 th century. The exhibit 

includes historical photos, artifacts, text, and interactive computer 

displays that show the effects of drugs on American 

society and the efforts by federal law enforcement to combat 

the drug problem. The exhibit highlights major trends in illegal 

drug use as well as milestones and accomplishments of DEA 

and its predecessor agencies. 

Many of the museum’s artifacts were 

donated by 

former and 

active Special 

Agents, and members 

of the Association of 

Former Federal Narcotics Agents 

volunteered to give tours. In its 

first year, the museum drew 5,000 

visitors and by 2003, that number 

was expected to reach 10,000. Visitors 

include student groups, law enforcement 

officials, international visitors, and tourists 

to Washington, D.C. 

38 

Regional Enforcement 

Teams 

Early in 1999, DEA created the Regional Enforcement Team 

(RET) program to address the threat of drug trafficking 

groups using established networks of compartmentalized 

cells to facilitate their illegal activity. While in the past these 

organizations had typically maintained their operations in 

larger cities, pressure from law enforcement led to their movement 

into smaller locations throughout the United States. 

The RET Program consists of four teams of agents, analysts, 

and support staff that are responsible for addressing 

increased rates of drug abuse, trafficking, and violent crime 

in these smaller locations. 

There were 18 RET deployments from 1999 to early 2003. In 

that time, 36 drug trafficking organizations were dismantled, 

more than 500 people were arrested and more than 22,000 

pounds of drugs were seized. 

Mobile Enforcement Teams 

Since its inception in 1995, the Mobile Enforcement Team 

(MET) program continued to fight drug-related violent crime 

in communities throughout the United States. The MET 

Program consists of 21 Teams based in 20 DEA Field Divisions 

across the country. Working with local law enforcement 

organizations who lack manpower and resources, 

DEA’s MET Teams combat violent drug organizations in 

specific neighborhoods and restore safer environments for 

the residents. 

From 1999 to 2003, DEA deployed MET Teams to 380 locations 

nationwide. Communities across the country felt a 

significant impact in areas where MET Teams were deployed. 

As of 2003, MET Teams arrested more than 15,000 people 

and took more than 10,000 pounds of illegal drugs off the 

streets. 

In Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley, the MET Team targeted 

two trafficking organizations. One group was responsible 

bringing wholesale quantities of methamphetamine from 

Mexico for delivery to distributors throughout the 

Shenandoah Valley for distribution, while the other brought 

in crack cocaine from New York City. Both organizations 

were dismantled, and the work of the MET Team is likely to 

impede future drug trafficking in the area.

In Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley, the MET Team targeted 

two trafficking organizations. One group was responsible 

bringing wholesale quantities of methamphetamine from 

Mexico for delivery to distributors throughout the 

Shenandoah Valley for distribution, while the other brought 

in crack cocaine from New York City. Both organizations 

were dismantled, and the work of the MET Team is likely to 

impede future drug trafficking in the area. 

Mobile Enforcement Team 

II Program (1999) 

In 1999, DEA initiated the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) 

II program as a follow-up program to communities where 

DEA’s MET teams had deployed. MET teams were groups 

of specially trained DEA agents sent to communities at the 

request of law enforcement to help remove violent drug 

trafficking organizations. The MET II program’s goal was 

to ensure that successful law enforcement operations were 

reinforced by a vigorous community effort to prevent the 

reemergence of drug-related violent crime. 

DEA, with financial assistance from the Bureau of Justice 

Assistance and technical support from the National Crime 

Prevention Council, provided cutting-edge regional training 

to communities where MET teams had been deployed. 

Each community sent a team of up to five members that 

included local and state elected officials; judicial and law 

enforcement officers; city, school, and program administrators; 

community activists; representatives of the business 

and faith communities; and other key decision makers. 

In 1999, the program was piloted in three regional 

sessions to leaders of 40 MET communities. In 2000, DEA 

held four regional sessions to 42 community teams and 

another four sessions to 37 MET communities in 2001. 

The program’s goals were met by community leaders committing 

to developing and employing broad-based strategies 

for improving citizen safety and equipping these leaders 

to plan and implement prevention programs. majority 

of communities trained through the MET II program conducted 

far more prevention activities than prior to the training. 

By 2001, the MET II program evolved into the Integrated 

Drug Enforcement Assistance (IDEA) program. 

Operation Ramp Rats I and 

II (1999) 

In August and September 1999, DEA’s Miami Division concluded 

two successful airport-based investigations of ramp 

workers (“ramp rats”) who used their positions relating to 

baggage handling, cleaning, fueling and servicing airplanes 

39 

to smuggle drugs. The investigations disrupted large-scale 

smuggling of heroin and cocaine into the United States along 

with the distribution of drugs, weapons, and explosives throughout 

the country. In addition, Miami Dade County instituted immediate 

security measures at Miami International Airport, making 

it more difficult to smuggle contraband through the area. 

Operation Juno (1999) 

Operation Juno was a significant and innovative investigation 

targeting money laundering operations. It began after the seizure 

of approximately 386 kilograms of liquid cocaine, which had 

been found concealed and shipped in frozen fish from Cartagena, 

Colombia in July 1995. It had been shipped under the name of 

Colapia S.A., a Colombian company whose U.S. distribution 

center was based in Atlanta. During the investigation of Colapia, 

it was revealed that the Atlanta owner was a partner with a 

prominent Cali, Colombia, narcotics trafficker. In 1996, DEA and 

the Internal Revenue Service began a pro-active undercover 

money laundering “sting” investigation named Operation Juno. 

Based in suburban Atlanta, with a company called “Airmark”, 

DEA and the IRS gained permission from the Attorney General 

to oprn a legitimate stockbrokerage firm that served to validate 

the undercover money laundering operation. 

The owner of Colapia S.A. referred the Operation Juno stockbrokerage 

firm to other drug trafficking organizations in need of 

financial and money laundering services. Operation Juno targeted 

those drug trafficking organizations by offering financial 

services to launder their drug proceeds. Those proceeds, which 

were in U.S. dollars, were sold on the Colombian black market 

peso exchange market via a third-party money exchanger in Colombia. 

Once the Colombian pesos were deposited into the 

designated bank accounts, the money laundering contract with 

the narcotics traffickers was fulfilled. A total of 55 arrests were 

made in the U. S. during the investigation. Civil seizure warrants 

were also brought against 59 domestic bank accounts worldwide 

and approximately $26 million in drug proceeds were targeted 

for seizure. Additionally five Colombian nationals were 

indicted. 

Attempted Cop Murder-Drug 

Ring Investigation (1999) 

In 1999, DEA, Fairfax County, Virginia Police, and the Maryland 

State Police completed a 3-year investigation of a drug trafficking, 

money laundering, and “cop killing” criminal group. Since 

at least 1994, Sergio Barrios and Gregory McCorkle were involved 

in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in the Washington, 

D.C. area. In December 1995, McCorkle was driving his frequent 

route from New York to DC, when Maryland State Police Trooper 

David Hughes arrested him for possession of one kilogram of 

cocaine. 

Shortly after his arrest, McCorkle plotted to kill Trooper Hughes 

in an attempt to have the case dismissed. On August 27, 1996, an

associate of McCorkle’s shot a trooper as he drove his car 

into the Hughes’ family driveway. The person he shot and 

wounded was Trooper Michael Hughes, the brother of the 

trooper who arrested McCorkle, who was also a Maryland 

State Trooper. Through a complex investigation supported 

by the DEA-supervised Intelligence Group of the Washington-Baltimore 

HIDTA, the task force was able to successfully 

link Barrios and McCorkle to the attempted murder. 

In May 1997, they and nearly twenty others were incarcerated 

for a variety of drug charges, and several were convicted 

of attempted murder. The investigation continued 

until the arrest of McCorkle’s drug supplier in 1999. The 

task force that investigated the murder-drug ring, including 

three DEA agents, later received the nation’s prestigious 

Top Cop award and were recognized at a White House 

ceremony with President Clinton and Attorney General 

Reno. David Hughes later became a DEA Special Agent. 

Mexico 

Between 1999 and 2003, Mexico remained the key transit 

country for cocaine en route to U.S. markets, as well as a 

significant source country for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine 

destined for the United States. 

Among the most important changes that occurred in Mexico 

between 1999 and 2003 was the July 2000 election of President 

Vicente Fox-Quesada, ending the 70-year rule of a 

single political party in Mexico. President Fox ran on a 

platform of restoring public security and putting an end to 

corruption. The Fox administration made some significant 

progress towards those extremely ambitious goals by restructuring 

the Attorney General’s office to reduce corruption 

and taking action against leaders of significant drug 

trafficking organizations. Mexican police and the military 

had effected the arrests of significant drug traffickers within 

virtually every major drug trafficking organization operating 

in Mexico. 

As a result of this renewed dedication to fight drug trafficking, 

the level of cooperation in the counterdrug area reached 

unprecedented levels. Information sharing between DEA 

and the Government of Mexico was extremely productive 

and brought about very positive results in joint enforcement 

operations. By 2003, DEA’s relationship with its counterparts 

in the Government of Mexico was better than ever. 

. 

Operation Impunity I and II 

(1999-2000) 

In September 1999, the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes drug trafficking 

organization suffered a big hit when DEA and its counterparts 

arrested three of its major cell heads and 90 of its members. The 

arrests disabled all facets of their organization—the group’s 

headquarters in Mexico, the U.S. cell heads, the drug and money 

transportation systems, and the local distribution groups. As a 

result of Operation Impunity, 12,434 kilos of cocaine and more 

than 4,800 pounds of marijuana were seized, along with $19 

million in U.S. currency and another $7 million in assets. The 

Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization had operated without fear 

of capture or prosecution in the United States, believing that 

only their low-level operatives were at risk. Operation Impunity 

effectively demonstrated that even the highest level drug traffickers 

based in foreign countries could not conduct drug operations 

inside the U.S. with impunity. 

Operation Impunity II continued to target the Amado Carrillo- 

Fuentes organization and concluded in December 2000 with the 

arrest of 155 individuals, the seizure of 5,490 kilograms of cocaine, 

9,526 pounds of marijuana, and $11 million in U.S. currency. 

Those arrested faced a variety of federal charges for 

their involvement in smuggling thousands of pounds of cocaine 

and marijuana from Mexico across the Southwest Border 

into Texas. Some of the defendants arrested during Operation 

Impunity II were organization leaders who replaced those arrested 

in the previous investigations. The three phases (Operation 

Limelight in 1996 was the first phase) clearly demonstrate 

the tenacity of some trafficking organizations and the need for 

law enforcement to continuously investigate groups that are 

large and well-established. 

Colombia 

By the mid-1990s, Colombian law enforcement began targeting 

leaders of the Cali cartel based on extensive investigation by 

DEA. The arrests or surrenders of six top Cali leaders during 

the summer of 1995 marked the beginning of the decline of the 

Cali cartel. 

40 

Although some elements of the Cali cartel continued to play an 

important role in the world’s wholesale cocaine market, they no 

longer dominated the international cocaine trade. 

Following the dismantling of the Cali cartel, experienced traffickers 

who had been active for years, but who worked in the 

shadow of the Cali drug lords, seized the opportunity and increased 

their role in the drug trade. However, unlike their cartel 

predecessors, the Colombian cocaine trafficking groups of the 

late 1990s and early 2000s were decentralized and typically specialized 

in one aspect of the cocaine industry. No one group of

traffickers dominated all aspects of the trade because, with 

the reintroduction of extradition in Colombia in December 

1997, the major Colombian traffickers were increasingly willing 

to allow their foreign criminal associates (in particular, 

Mexican and Dominican transportation groups) to play an 

expanded international role in the cocaine trade. The strategic 

objective of these Colombian drug lords was to further 

conceal their own overt criminal acts in the United States or 

Europe that would be the basis for extradition. 

The main Colombian trafficking groups primarily were based 

in two regions in Colombia. One was the Northern Valle del 

Cauca region located near Colombia’s west coast. The second 

area was Colombia’s north coast. While traffickers in 

these regions operated more independently than the Medellin 

and Cali cartels, they nevertheless remained very powerful. 

By working with their counterparts in Mexico, these drug 

traffickers were responsible for most of the world’s cocaine 

production and wholesale distribution. 

Operation Millennium (1999) 

In October 1999, a major joint DEA-Colombian National Police 

(CNP) investigation called Operation Millennium resulted 

in the arrest of two of the most powerful drug traffickers in 

the world—Alejandro Bernal-Madrigal, also known as 

Juvenal, and Fabio Ochoa. Bernal-Madrigal was the head of 

the most significant Colombian narcotics transportation organization 

and had taken the cocaine transportation function 

to unprecedented heights. Evidence obtained during 

this investigation demonstrated that Bernal-Madrigal’s organization 

was responsible for transporting between 20-30 

tons of cocaine per month from Colombia to the United States 

via Mexico, primarily in containerized cargo. Fabio Ochoa 

was one of the top leaders of the Medellin cartel. He was 

imprisoned in 1991, released in 1996, and continued his trafficking 

operations with Bernal-Madrigal and others after his 

release. 

Beginning in May 1998, DEA worked with CNP to investigate 

the drug trafficking activities of Bernal-Madrigal. The 

investigation focused on authorized electronic intercepts of 

Bernal-Madrigal and the leaders of other Colombian drug 

trafficking organizations. At one point during the investigation, 

CNP in conjunction with DEA was managing 66 simultaneous 

authorized electronic intercepts on principal targets. 

These intercepts revealed the inner workings of the cocaine 

industry and focused on the most significant drug traffickers 

and their respective organizations in both Colombia and 

Mexico. 

In Operation Millennium, Bernal-Madrigal and 30 of his top 

criminal associates, including Ochoa, were arrested. In September 

2001, Ochoa was extradited to the United States after 

41 

a long battle to remain in Colombia. He was the 30 th Colombian 

national and 13 th Operation Millennium defendant to be 

extradited to the United states since the reintroduction of 

extradition in 1997. More than 1,500 Colombian prosecutors 

and CNP officials participated in Operation Millennium, 

which, according to the CNP, was one of the largest law 

enforcement actions undertaken by the Government of Colombia 

against drug trafficking. 

Extradition of Caracol 

(2000) 

Alberto Orlandez- 

Gamboa, aka Caracol (the 

Snail), headed a major 

cocaine trafficking organization 

based in 

Barranquilla, Colombia. 

The organization transshipped 

significant 

amounts of cocaine to 

the United States and 

Europe via the smuggling 

routes it controlled 

from Colombia’s North 

Coast through the Caribbean. 

As head of the organization, 

Caracol depended 

on his close associates to conduct the organization’s 

operations and to insulate himself. As is typical with many 

Colombia-based organizations, Caracol compartmentalized his 

business dealings. In addition, the success of Caracol’s 

Barranquilla-based drug trafficking organization was attributed, 

in part, to the respect the drug organization received 

from other traffickers operating on Colombia’s North Coast. 

Intelligence indicated that traffickers paid taxes to Caracol’s 

organization in order to be allowed to ship drugs out of the 

North Coast. His influence in this region was so strong that 

traffickers even asked him for permission before conducting 

assassinations. 

On June 6, 1998, Caracol was arrested in Barranquilla, as a 

result of an ongoing joint investigation between DEA’s 

Barranquilla Resident Office and the CNP. After his arrest, 

Caracol immediately was flown to Bogota, Colombia, where 

he was held on murder, kidnapping, and terrorism charges. 

He was extradited to the United States in August 2000. 

On March 13, 2003, Caracol pleaded guilty to participating in 

a narcotics trafficking conspiracy that smuggled tens of thousands 

of kilograms of cocaine into New York and other cities. 

His plea was announced on the morning he was to go on trial 

in Federal District Court in Manhattan after losing a crucial 

appellate ruling.

Retiring CNP 

Director 

Serrano 

Honored 

(2000) 

DEA presented retired Colombian National Police (CNP) Director 

General Rosso Serrano with the first-ever honorary 

Special Agent badge at a ceremony at DEA headquarters on 

July 19, 2000. It is the DEA’s highest award, and is presented 

only in exceptional cases to individuals outside DEA who 

have had a monumental impact on drug law enforcement nationally 

or internationally. “I can think of no one who so 

embodies the spirit of this award but General Serrano. He has 

put service to his country, his people, and the world before 

his personal safety, ” stated Administrator Donnie Marshall 

.at the ceremony. 

Drug Submarine Seized in 

Colombia (2000) 

On September 7, 2000, the CNP seized a partially constructed, 

steel double-hulled submarine from a warehouse outside 

Bogota, Colombia. Once assembled, it would have been nearly 

100 feet long. All information suggested the submarine could 

have been used to transport up to 10 metric tons of illicit 

drugs from Colombia to remote off-load sites in Latin America 

and the Caribbean. The seizure of this high-tech submarine 

demonstrated the vast resources and ingenuity of Colombian 

drug traffickers and the lengths they were willing to go 

to transport their product. 

42 

General Serrano joined the CNP in 1963 as a second lieutenant 

and advanced steadily through the ranks until becoming 

Director in 1995. The accomplishments of CNP under 

General Serrano debilitated major international drug traffickers 

and affected the drug trade worldwide. Under his 

command, the CNP declared war on drug cartels and joined 

forces with the DEA in dismantling the infamous Cali organization. 

Other CNP accomplishments under Serrano include 

the arrests of Jose Santacruz-Londono, Pacho Herrara, Henry 

Loaiza-Ceballos, and Juan Carlos Ramirez-Abadia. Cooperation 

between DEA and CNP continued as new independent 

drug organizations were created. One of the most significant 

was Operation Millennium, in October 1999, that 

dismantled the “Juvenal” transportation organization, which 

had been supplying between 20 and 30 tons of cocaine per 

month to the United States and Europe.

Operations Odessa/ 

Atlantico/Journey (2000) 

Maritime illicit drug smuggling organizations were the target 

of Operations Odessa, Atlantico and Journey. Operation 

Odessa/Atlantico involved multiple cocaine and money seizures 

from organized maritime Greek drug smugglers who 

worked closely with Colombian traffickers. These operations 

took place from 1998-2000. Operation Odessa was an 

investigation of many initiatives launched by the Hellenic 

Republic. Thanks to cooperation from the Greek Government, 

assets worth $7 million were seized, as was the M/V 

Bulk Princess. 

Operation Journey also targeted maritime smuggling operations 

in Colombia that moved their operations to Venezuela 

as a result of Operation Odessa. Thanks to the sharing of 

information between various law enforcement authorities, 

Operation Journey seized more than nine tons of cocaine 

hidden by the De La Vega drug trafficking organization. 

DEA Support to United States 

Government Drug Production 

Estimates 

Any reality-based illicit drug production estimate must start 

with the most accurate information available on crop yields 

and clandestine laboratory operations. Accordingly, since 

1993, DEA intelligence analysts and forensic chemists have 

collected and analyzed unique science-based data on coca 

43 

and opium poppy cultivation as well as cocaine and heroin 

production in the Andean Region of South America. This 

research revolutionized U.S. Government cocaine and heroin 

production estimates. In 1999, for example, the U.S. Government 

more than doubled the previous estimates of Colombia’s 

potential cocaine base production due to DEA’s coca yield 

and cocaine laboratory studies. Likewise, in 2002, again as a 

result of new data from DEA, the U.S. Government slashed by 

more than fifty percent the previous estimates of Colombia’s 

potential heroin production. As of 2003, this program had 

conducted crop yield and clandestine laboratory efficiency 

studies only in the Andean Region. 

Operation New Generation 

(2000) 

A significant international drug trafficking and money laundering 

organization was dismantled in November 2000. Since 

November 1998, DEA had been investigating the drug trafficking 

and money laundering activities of the Colombia-based 

Carlos Mario Castro-Arias cocaine transportation organization. 

Castro-Arias was a significant drug trafficker responsible 

for smuggling large quantities of cocaine concealed in 

Although Castro-Arias evaded authorities, the investigation 

yielded 102 arrests, 2,110 kilograms of cocaine, 1,400 grams of 

heroin, six tons of miscellaneous chemicals, and $2.3 million in 

U.S. currency. 

DEA Special Agent Richard 

Fass’s Killer Apprehended 

(2000) 

On June 30, 1994, DEA Special Agent Richard Fass and his 

partner Special Agent Michael Pelonero were working an undercover 

investigation targeting a large-scale methamphetamine 

trafficking organization in the Phoenix area. The organization 

was headed by Agustin Vasquez- Mendoza, a Mexican 

national, with whom Special Agent Fass had been arranging 

the sale of ten kilograms of methamphetamine. At the time 

of the sale, however, Vasquez- Mendoza’s colleagues, Rafael 

Rubio-Mendez and Juan Vasquez -Rubio, shot and killed Special 

Agent Fass in an apparent robbery attempt. Both men 

were arrested near the scene while attempting to flee and later 

received life sentences for the murder. Vasquez -Mendoza— 

the leader and mastermind of Fass’ killing—fled to Mexico, 

and the manhunt for him became one of the most intense in 

recent U.S.-Mexico history, lasting more than six years. 

A Fass Task Force was formed in the Phoenix Division, dedicated 

to locating Vasquez-Mendoza. The task force worked 

closely with U.S. and Mexico law enforcement entities, including 

the Mexican Military. For several years, the pursuit 

of the fugitive concentrated in a remote mountainous region 

in Michoacan where residents lived in wooden shacks with

out telephones or electricity. Mexican law enforcement was 

reluctant to enter the region because of the dangerous drug 

traffickers who protected these areas. The Fass Task Force 

used more than 30 confidential sources to infiltrate these areas. 

The task force also conducted a media blitz, participating in 

three “America’s Most Wanted” shows, two “Unsolved 

Mystery” programs, and one Latin television show called 

“Placas.” By 1998, the reward for Vasquez-Mendoza had 

reached $2.25 million, and he had been placed on the FBI’s 

Ten Most Wanted list. In addition, the task force created a tip 

hotline, which was manned around the clock to follow leads. 

DEA’s Mexico office also conducted a media blitz in Mexico, 

and Mexican law enforcement conducted road blocks of highways 

leaving the mountainous area where Vasquez-Mendoza 

was believed to be hiding. The Fass Task Force eventually 

arrested more than 40 fugitives wanted by other jurisdictions. 

By 2000, investigators narrowed their search to the town of 

Puebla, Mexico. Mexican law enforcement lead the search 

there and learned that Vasquez-Mendoza had married and 

assumed a new identity. Investigators located a pay phone 

his wife frequently used to call her parents, and on July 9, 

2000, the Mexican police surrounded Vasquez-Mendoza walking 

away from the phone and arrested him without incident. 

Phoenix SAC Tom Raffanello stated that, “This investigation 

has helped strengthen and build a stronger relationship with 

Mexican law enforcement officials. During this entire operation, 

they were constantly amazed that DEA was so relentless 

in tracking this fugitive.” As of 2003, Vasquez-Mendoza 

remained in custody in Mexican prison pending extradition 

to the United States. 

Operation Green Air (2000) 

In April of 2000, DEA’s Special Operations Division successfully 

concluded an 18-month investigation of a Jamaicanbased 

marijuana trafficking organization that used Federal 

Express (FedEx) as it exclusive method of transportation. 

FedEx cooperated with DEA to uncover drivers, a security 

official, and several customer service representatives who 

were receiving substantial bribes from the traffickers. It is 

estimated that more than 4,000 packages of marijuana, supplied 

by the Mexico-based Arellano Felix organization, were 

smuggled into FedEx hubs including Atlanta, New York, Boston, 

Connecticut, Fort Lauderdale, Orlando, Philadelphia and 

Newark. Operation Green Air resulted in the arrests of more 

than 100 individuals including 25 FedEx employees. 

LSD Laboratory Seizure (2000) 

When DEA seized an LSD manufacturing laboratory in November 

2000 in an abandoned nuclear missile silo in Wamego, 

Kansas, containing approximately 3.9 million dosage units of 

LSD, it had a huge impact on LSD manufacturing in the United 

44 

States. According to DEA’s Special Testing and Research 

Laboratory, the Wamego lab had the capacity to produce 

258 million dosage units of LSD. In Fiscal Year 2000, DEA 

projected that the worldwide LSD demand was 100 million 

dosage units. Following the Wamego lab seizure, there was 

a tremendous 98% decline in LSD submissions for source 

determination analysis during FY 2001. In FY 2002, there 

were no LSD exhibits submitted to DEA laboratories for analysis. 

In March 2003, the two men arrested for operating the 

LSD lab were convicted on charges of conspiracy and possession 

of LSD with intent to distribute. 

Operation Tar Pit (2000) 

In March 2000, a concluded Operation Tar Pit, an investigation 

targeting black tar heroin trafficking group based in 

Mexico. This joint DEA/FBI investigation, conducted exclusively 

within the United States, linked the Nayarit, Mexico, 

based organization to transportation and distribution cells 

throughout the United States from San Diego, California to 

Steubenville, Ohio. Further, the investigation linked the highpurity 

black tar heroin to numerous heroin overdose deaths 

in the small town of Chimayo, New Mexico. DEA, FBI, and 

state and local law enforcement agents arrested nearly 200 

individuals in 12 cities. 

DEA Participation in Making 

of Award-Winning Movie 

Traffic (2000) 

In December 2000, the movie Traffic opened to critical acclaim 

and was a box office hit across the country. Featuring 

Michael Douglas, Catherine Zeta-Jones, Benicio del Toro, 

Michael Cheadle, Erika Christensen, and Dennis Quaid and 

directed by Steven Soderbergh, the movie showed intertwining 

vignettes to tell the modern day story of fighting 

drugs. The winner of four Academy Awards, the movie focused 

a great deal of media and public attention on DEA and 

the problems of illicit drugs in America. Parts of the movie 

were filmed on location at DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center, 

and several DEA agents had small roles in the film. DEA 

offered considerable input into the movie’s portrayals of the 

drug situation, and most believed it accurately depicted the 

challenges law enforcement faced.

Ecstasy and Predatory Drugs 

By the late 1990s, a drug called MDMA (3,4- 

Methylenedioxymethamphetamine)— more often known as 

Ecstasy—emerged in full force in American youth culture. A 

hallucinogen sold in a small ingestible pill form, often imprinted 

with colorful logos and designs, Ecstasy gained popularity 

initially at raves. Raves are all-night dance 

events, generally operating from approximately 

10:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the 

following morning and characterized 

by loud, rapid, tempo 

(“techno music”), light and 

laser shows, smoke or fog, 

and psychedelic screen images. 

Ecstasy use by 12 th 

graders nearly doubled in 5 

years from 1996 to 2001. By 2002, 

there was a slight decrease in that 

usage, possibly signaling a leveling off. 

Other drugs like Gamma Hydroxybutyric Acid (GHB) and 

Ketamine are also used at raves, and they all came to be 

known as club drugs. However, by 2002, DEA began calling 

this subset of drugs “predatory drugs” because many of them, 

particularly GHB and Rohypnol, could be slipped into a 

victim’s drink. The drugs are odorless and tasteless and render 

the victim unconscious. Criminal predators use these 

drugs to commit rape and sexual assault. 

Another measure of these drugs’ popularity is emergency 

room mention of the drugs. In 1998, there were 1,282 mentions 

of GHB in hospital emergency rooms. That number 

rose almost three-fold to 3,340 in 2001. DEA seizures are also 

a good indicator of the level of abuse. For instance, in 1999 

DEA seized 4,552 dosage units of Ketamine, and by 2001, that 

had risen to 7,020,317. DEA took a number of enforcement, 

prevention, and legislative measures to combat Ecstasy and 

predatory drugs. 

DEA’s Legislative Response 

to the Problem of Club Drugs 

GHB is a central nervous system depressant that was originally 

marketed as a releasing agent for growth hormones 

that stimulates muscle growth. It generates feelings of euphoria 

and intoxication and is often used with alcohol, which 

enhances its effect and increases the potential for respiratory 

distress. GHB is also used in the commission of sexual 

assaults because it renders the victim incapable of resisting 

and causes memory problems that complicate case prosecution. 

In response to the increasing abuse of GHB, DEA’s Office of 

Diversion Control initiated a scheduling review incorporating 

data on the abuse, diversion, and trafficking of GHB sent 

45 

to the Department of Health and Human Services for its review 

in 1997. In the late 1990s, DEA provided abuse, diversion, 

and trafficking data to Congress in support of legislative 

action. In early 2000, the “Hillary Farias and Samantha 

Reed Date-Rape Prohibition Act of 1999” (Public Law 106 

172) became law, placing GHB in Schedule I, as well as the 

related chemical GBL. GHB is now subject to Federal regulatory 

controls and the criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions 

specified in the Controlled Substance Act. 

Ecstasy-like substances, touted as “legal” substitutes, had 

been found in clubs and advertised over the Internet. In 

September 2002, DEA published a final rule in the Federal 

Register temporarily placing pharmacologically related and 

chemically similarly structured chemicals like BZP, TFMPP, 

and 2C-T-7 in Schedule I pursuant to the Controlled Substances 

Act emergency scheduling provision, due to imminent 

hazard to public safety. In early 2003, DEA’s Diversion 

Control office continued to gather information regarding the 

abuse, diversion, and trafficking of these substances to place 

them permanently in Schedule I. In January 2003, DEA published 

a proposal in the Federal Register temporarily placing 

AMT and 5-MeO-DIPT as well into Schedule I, pursuant to 

the emergency scheduling provision of the Controlled Substances 

Act. Finalization of this order was expected later in 

2003. 

DEA’s Ecstasy & Club Drugs 

Conferences (2000-2001) 

To focus national attention on the Ecstasy threat, DEA hosted 

the International Conference on Ecstasy and Club Drugs in 

partnership with about 300 officials from the domestic and 

foreign law enforcement, judicial, chemical, prevention, and 

treatment communities. The conference was held in Arlington, 

Virginia, from July 31 to August 2, 2000, and centered on 

the growing threat of Ecstasy, GHB, Rohypnol, and Ketamine. 

By hosting this conference, DEA took the lead on identifying 

the gravity of the issue and the efforts to combat the club 

drugs problem in the country. Medical experts provided 

information on the harmful physical effects of club drug 

abuse, and media representatives offered their perspectives 

on the club drug epidemic. During the conference, a working 

group developed several objectives that were adapted into 

DEA’s Demand Reduction plan. These goals included advancing 

drug education and prevention, enhancing parental 

knowledge of raves and club drugs, and educating high 

school and college students about the realities of raves and 

the dangers of club drugs. 

As a follow-up to the International Club Drugs Conference, 

DEA held three regional club drugs conferences during 2001. 

These were held in Atlantic City, New Jersey; Oak Brook, 

Illinois; and San Diego, California. All three gathered 200-250 

participants from regional law enforcement, education, pre

vention, treatment, medical, and the health areas to develop 

area-wide plans to address the problem. In addition, each 

domestic DEA division held numerous club drug seminars 

and training in their areas. 

Arrest of Salvatore Gravano 

(2000) 

In December 1999, DEA’s Phoenix Division and the Phoenix 

Police Department initiated a joint Title III investigation of a 

major international Ecstasy organization headed by former 

mob underboss Salvatore “Sammy the Bull” Gravano and his 

son. This three-month investigation resulted in the arrest of 

Gravano, his son, and 38 co-defendants, the confiscation of 

tens of thousands of Ecstasy pills, and approximately $500,000 

in asset seizures. The Gravano organization was importing 

large quantities of Ecstasy directly from Europe and is believed 

to be the largest Ecstasy organization ever dismantled 

in Arizona. 

In the 1990s, the former underboss of the New York Gambino 

crime family had admitted killing 19 people but received leniency 

in exchange for his testimony against mob boss John 

Gotti and others. He served five years in prison, then moved 

to Phoenix under the witness protection program. He pled 

guilty to both Arizona and New York federal drug charges 

and is currently serving a 20-year concurrent sentence. 

Operation Rave Review (2000) 

DEA’s New Orleans Field Division Office initiated OCDETF 

Operation “Rave Review” in January 2000, in cooperation 

with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the New Orleans Police 

Department. The investigation centered on raves held at the 

State Palace Theater in New Orleans and was prompted by 

the large number of drug overdose incidents among 

clubgoers reported by local emergency rooms. More than 

500 teenagers and young adults had been treated in a two- 

46 

year period, and all had attended raves at the State Palace 

Theater. A 17-year-old girl had also died after overdosing at 

a rave event at the State Palace Theater. The investigation 

further determined that most of the Ecstasy distribution in 

the city of New Orleans was being conducted at the raves, 

which were attended by as many as 4,000 teenagers and 

young adults. DEA agents worked in an undercover capacity 

at these raves and made numerous purchases of illegal 

drugs. Undercover agents observed that 50% to 60% of the 

rave patrons were under the influence of club drugs. 

Based on DEA’s investigation, a federal grand jury returned 

indictments against the three managers of the rave promotion 

company for federal narcotics violations in January 2001. 

The indictment marked the first time a rave promoter and/or 

manager had ever been charged in violation of Title 21 United 

States Code, Section 856(a)(2) establishment of manufacturing 

operations, otherwise known as the “crackhouse statute.” 

The impact of this investigation was observed immediately 

in New Orleans as the number of club drug related overdoses 

dropped by a phenomenal 90%. In addition, the State 

Palace Theater Corporation, “Barbecue of New Orleans,” pled 

guilty to all charges in the indictment and was fined 

$100,000.00. Furthermore, this case inspired Senator Joe 

Biden, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and author 

of the 1980’s federal “crack house” laws, to expand the 

“crack house” statutes to include any businessman, club 

owner, or promoter on whose premises or at whose events 

illicit drugs are used or sold. Under the legislation’s provisions, 

property owners, promoters, and event managers could 

be fined up to $250,000 and face up to 20 years in prison on 

Federal criminal charges. 

Operation Red Tide (2001) 

Operation Red Tide began as a result of the largest single 

seizure of Ecstasy—2.1 million tablets in July 2000 in Los 

Angeles. An 18-month investigation ensued that targeted a 

multi-ethnic, transnational Ecstasy and cocaine distribution 

organization. It came to a climax when Dutch National Police 

arrested seven co-conspirators, executed search warrants at 

17 locations, and seized several hundred thousand U.S. dol

lars, as well as several hundred thousand Dutch guilders. 

More than 22 suspects in four U.S. cities and four European 

countries were arrested. 

Approximately 3.3 million tablets linked to the syndicate were 

seized during this effort. Administrator Marshall stated, “The 

success of Operation Red Tide has ensured that a large volume 

of Ecstasy that would have made it into the hands of our 

youth never hit the streets.” 

Would-Be Killers of Special 

Agents Charles Martinez and 

Kelly McCullough Convicted 

and Sentenced (2001) 

In February and March 2001, Jose Ivan Duarte Acero and 

Rene Benitez were each convicted in Southern Florida courts 

in separate trials for the 1982 kidnapping and attempted murder 

of DEA Special Agents Charles Martinez and Kelly 

McCullough. On June 8, 2001, Duarte and Benitez received 

life sentences. 

The sentencing marked the end of DEA’s longest-running 

investigation—a 19-year effort to track, capture, try, and convict 

in American courts the men who kidnapped and nearly 

killed Martinez and McCullough in Colombia. “This case, 

once again, sends a clear message to violent drug traffickers 

who attempt to harm DEA agents: DEA will never waiver, not 

for a second, in its efforts to commitment to bring you to 

justice,” said Administrator Marshall at the time. 

In 1982, Duarte and his conspirator Benitez were hired by 

Colombian drug traffickers to kidnap the DEA Special Agents. 

The two agents, who were assigned on temporary duty to 

Colombia as pilots, were abducted from their hotel in Cartagena 

and transported by car to a secluded area 15 miles away. 

Agent Martinez was shot while they were still within city 

limits. Then Duarte and Benitez stopped the car and shot 

Martinez again. At that point, McCullough fled. He was 

shot as he ran into the jungle. Martinez escaped when his 

captor’s gun jammed as they attempted to shoot him for the 

third time. 

Even though Martinez and McCullough each suffered multiple 

gunshot wounds, both had the courage and the presence 

of mind to elude their captors and escape into the night. 

They separately reached Cartagena the next day and phoned 

the U.S. Embassy for assistance. The physician who examined 

them after the shootings were amazed that the bullets 

had not struck any vital organs. Shortly thereafter, both 

agents were airlifted out of the country by a U.S. Air Force 

plane from Panama. Meanwhile, Duarte and Benitez became 

fugitives, with warrants issued for their arrest in June 1982. 

47 

Benitez was eventually captured in Colombia, extradited, and 

imprisoned in Miami in 1995. Duarte continued to evade authorities 

until August 1997, when he was detained in Ecuador. 

The Ecuadorian Government ultimately expelled the fugitive, 

and he was then transported to the United States to stand 

trial. Agents Martinez and McCullough both returned to duty 

after recovering from their wounds and continued to serve 

with DEA until retiring in the late 1990s. 

Operation White Horse (2001) 

In January 2001, DEA, along with FBI, IRS, and the US Customs 

Service, concluded a 10-month investigation to dismantle 

an organization responsible for placing high-purity Colombian 

heroin on America’s streets. Operation Whitehorse, an 

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) 

operation, brought together the previously mentioned federal 

agencies, the Colombian National Police (CNP), and state 

and local law enforcement in an effort that netted 96 arrests 

and the seizure of approximately $1.3 million in U.S. Currency. 

In essence, Operation Whitehorse wiped out an entire international 

heroin trafficking organization from its headquarters 

in Colombia to its street-level dealers in Philadelphia. 

U.S. Supreme Court Decision 

on Marijuana as Medicine 

(2001) 

In November 1996, California voters enacted a medical marijuana 

initiative measure entitled the Compassionate Use Act 

of 1996. The measure provided Californians with the right to 

obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes. The measure 

created an exception to California laws prohibiting the possession 

and growing of marijuana by a patient or his primary 

care giver who for the 

patient’s medical purposes 

upon the recommendation 

or approval of a physician. 

Several groups, 

including the Cannabis 

Buyers’ Cooperative(Cooperative),organized 

medical 

cannabis dispensaries 

to grow 

and distribute 

marijuana to qualified 

patients. 

Under the measure, 

a person was 

required to pro

vide a written statement from a treating physician assenting 

to marijuana therapy and submitting to a screening interview. 

If accepted by the Cooperative, the patient received an identification 

card entitling him to obtain marijuana from the Cooperative. 

In January 1998, the United States sued the Cooperative 

in the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of California to prevent it from distributing and manufacturing 

marijuana. The United States argued that, while the 

Cooperative’s activities were legal under California law, they 

violated the Federal Controlled Substances Act. The District 

Court issued an order that prohibited the Cooperative from 

possessing, manufacturing, and distributing marijuana. The 

Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana and claimed 

that the distributions were medically necessary. The District 

Court held the Cooperative in contempt and authorized the 

U.S. Marshal to seize the Cooperative’s premises. The Cooperative 

appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

The Court of Appeals held that medical necessity is a legally 

cognizable defense to violations of the Controlled Substances 

Act. 

The Government appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 

The Cooperative claimed that it was entitled to a medical 

necessity defense. On May 4, 2001, the Supreme Court rejected 

the medical necessity defense and held that marijuana has no 

accepted medical use under Federal law and stated that the 

Controlled Substances Act reflects a determination that marijuana 

has no medical benefits worthy of an exception outside 

the confines of a Government-approved research project. 

Operation Marquis (2001) 

Operation Marquis, an 18-month nationwide investigation, 

brought together agents from DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Customs 

Service, as well as state and local law enforcement officers. 

The operation targeted a Mexico-based drug trafficking 

organization responsible for putting tens of millions of dol 

48 

lars worth of cocaine and marijuana on the streets of at least a 

dozen U.S. cities. The organization was alleged to have 

brought the drugs into the United States from Mexico into 

Southern Texas where they were warehoused before being 

transported to established distribution cells throughout the 

United States. Operation Marquis brought about the arrest of 

more than 300 individuals and the seizure of over $13 million 

U.S. currency, 8,645 kilograms of cocaine, 23,096 pounds of 

marijuana, and 50 pounds of methamphetamine. 

Operations Caribe and 

Wirecutter (2001) 

These two related investigations, which took place in 2001, 

focused on money laundering and the Colombian black market 

peso exchange. Caribe, spearheaded by DEA’s Caribbean 

Division, led to the seizure of more than a million dollars in 

cash, 347 kilograms of cocaine, 3.8 kilos of heroin, and 

15 arrests. Wirecutter, a joint US Customs and DEA Bogota 

case, also targeted both drug traffickers and the black market 

peso exchange in Bogota. Wirecutter resulted in 10 arrests, 

the seizure of approximately 4000 kilos of cocaine, 5.5 kilos of 

heroin, and $2,304,843 in currency. 

The Cancun Case (2001) 

DEA’s Merida, Mexico, office played a significant role in arresting 

Mario Ernesto Villanueva, Mexico’s most wanted fugitive 

for more than two years. As the former Governor of 

Quintana Roo, one of the wealthiest states in Mexico, 

Villanueva had created Mexico’s first “narco-state,” a government 

that worked for, and with, some of the world’s largest 

drug traffickers. The television show 60 Minutes dedicated 

an entire episode to his corruption and his belief that 

he was untouchable. 

For three years, DEA’s Merida office conducted an intense, 

focused investigation that eventually put an end to the narcostate 

of Quintana Roo and the men who ran it. The two main 

goals of the investigation were to arrest Villanueva and dismantle 

the cell of the Juarez Cartel operating in the Yucatan 

Peninsula and being run by Alcides Ramon, aka El Metro. 

Ramon corrupted Mexican officials at all levels throughout the 

Yucatan peninsula to include Quintana Roo Governor 

Villanueva. Ramon paid the Governor $400,000 to $500,000 for 

each shipment of cocaine that was smuggled through the state 

of Quintana Roo. Between 1994 and 1997, the Juarez Cartel 

allegedly transported between 17 and 27 tons of cocaine 

monthly through Quintana Roo. 

In 1998, after a number of failed attempts to significantly 

disrupt the Ramon organization, the dedication and determi

. 

nation of Mexican law enforcement and DEA agents began to 

pay off. Between October 31 and November 11, 1998, more than 

300 million dollars worth of luxurious water front properties, 

yachts, jet skis, boats, cars and motorcycles were seized by the 

Mexican Government. In addition, over 115 arrests and/or 

indictments took place during the course of this investigation. 

eral law enforcement between the Governments of 

Mexico and the United States. 

Less than a month later on June 12, 2001, Alcides Ramon was 

arrested by elements of the Mexican military in Villahermosa, 

Tabasco, Mexico. The two bosses of Cancun, Ramon and 

Villanueva, remained in custody at the maximum-security prison 

“La Palma” in Almoloya, Mexico, as of early 2003. 

Caribbean 

Initiative/UNICORN 

The transit of illegal drugs throughout the Caribbean created 

unique challenges to law enforcement. One of those 

was an intelligence void about trafficking organizations operating 

out of the region and a lack of cooperation among 

law enforcement agencies. As a result, DEA’s Caribbean 

Field Division created the UNICORN system (Unified Caribbean 

On-Line Regional Network) in 1998 to establish a communications 

network among Caribbean law enforcement agencies 

to share information and establish better cooperation 

and communication regarding drug trafficking activity in the 

area. This operation was the first step in developing a systematic 

regional strategy in narcotics investigations. Operation 

UNICORN led to the development of Regional Intelligence 

Centers throughout Mexico, Colombia, and the Dominican 

Republic. This concept and the global exchange of 

information eventually spread to 36 countries, including 

those in Eastern and Western Europe. Using the groundwork 

laid in UNICORN, at least four major drug trafficking 

organizations targeted by the international law enforcement 

community were dismantled. 

The first operation to employ the UNICORN system was 

Operation Genesis, a bi-national initiative to foster and maintain 

cooperation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 

Conducted in late 1998, Genesis resulted in 126 arrests 

throughout Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Prior to this, 

these two countries had never before coordinated their antidrug 

efforts. DEA assisted the exchange of information 

through the UNICORN system. 

49 

Operations Conquistador 

and Colombus 

Operation Conquistador and its preceding operation, 

Colombus, both used UNICORN to facilitate the exchange of 

information among counterdrug agencies in the Caribbean 

area and source countries. Conquistador combined the efforts 

of 26 countries and embodied the overall objective of 

developing effective regional strategies to disrupt drug trafficking 

organizations and criminal organizations. Executed 

by the DEA’s Caribbean Field Division with assistance from 

the U.S. Coast Guard and ATF in March 2000, the operation 

resulted in the arrest of over 2,000 people and the seizure of 

almost 5,000 kilograms of cocaine, 362 metric tons of marijuana, 

and 3,370 dosage units of dangerous drugs. 

Operation Colombus, was a multi-national regional enforcement 

effort focused on air, land and maritime interdiction; 

eradication; and airstrip denial. The operation, targeting the 

operations of Caribbean-based drug trafficking groups, had 

unprecedented arrest and seizure statistics for the region. 

Involving Colombia, Venezuela, Panama and the island nations 

of the Caribbean, the investigation brought about over 

1,000 arrests and the seizure of 900 kilograms of cocaine and 

nine kilograms of heroin. 

A press conference of recent maritime seizure where 15 

countries, DEA, U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs participated. 

Operation UNICORN led to the development of Regional Intelligence 

Centers throughout Mexico, Colombia, and the 

Dominican Republic. This concept and the global exchange 

of information eventually spread to 36 countries, including 

those in Eastern and Western Europe. Using the groundwork 

laid in UNICORN, at least four major drug trafficking organizations 

targeted by the international law enforcement community 

were dismantled.

A press conference to announce the successes of joint operations 

with the Caribbean, Mexico, Central and South 

America. 

DEA and Explorers 

Since 1980, DEA Demand Reduction Coordinators (DRCs) 

have worked with Law Enforcement Explorers throughout the 

country to assist youth interested in “exploring” law 

enforcement as a profession. This partnership continued 

through the late 1990s and early 2000s. In some cases, DEA 

sponsored the Explorer Post. DRCs provided training in the 

area of narcotics enforcement, community involvement, and 

general drug abuse issues. The Demand Reduction Section 

participated in the bi-annual Law Enforcement Explorer 

Conference as well as in Explorer Leadership Training sessions 

held at both the DEA and FBI Academies during the summer. 

The Law Enforcement Explorer Program was additionally a 

recruitment program, since many Explorers become either 

police officers or federal agents. 

50 

Operation Liberator 

In November 2000, DEA concluded Operation Liberator, a multinational 

regional operation focused in the Caribbean and South 

America that also achieved success due to UNICORN. The 

operation, consisting of three weeks of raids, was intended to 

disrupt trafficking in the Caribbean and South America region, 

consolidate counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean transit zone, 

continue development of a regional strategy, and develop a 

cohesive environment among source and transit countries in 

the area. The effort, which was led by DEA with the collaboration 

of 36 countries, brought about the arrest of several 

leaders of drug trafficking organizations, one of whom was 

thought to ship two tons of Colombian cocaine into the United 

States each month. 

Above: Patrick Hurley mans exhibit at Georgia Tech in 

Atlanta explaining DEA careers and efforts to reduce the 

demand for drugs. 

Below: DEA Explorer Post 9910 sponsored by the New York 

Division shows off t-shirts designed for the event.

DEA 

Asa Hutchinson 

August 2001 

January 2003 

When Donnie Marshall retired on June 30, 2001, William 

Simpkins, a career DEA agent, was named Acting Administrator. 

In June 2001, President George W. Bush nominated 

Asa Hutchinson, a 3rd term Congressman and former U.S. 

Attorney from Arkansas, as Administrator. He was confirmed 

by the Senate on August 1 and sworn in as the DEA’s eighth 

Administrator on August 8, 2001. 

Before coming to DEA, Mr. Hutchinson represented the third 

district of Arkansas in Congress. As a Congressman, he was a 

stalwart supporter of the fight against drugs. He was a member 

of the Speaker’s Task Force for a Drug-Free America; 

supported tougher penalties for trafficking in illegal drugs, 

particularly methamphetamine; voted to increase penalties 

for possessing club drugs, such as Ecstasy and GHB; supported 

Plan Colombia; and championed drug courts. He 

gained national recognition as one of the House managers 

during the Senate impeachment trail of President Bill Clinton. 

From 1982 to 1985, Mr. Hutchinson served as U.S. Attorney 

for the Western District of Arkansas. He was, at age 31, the 

youngest federal prosecutor in the country at the time. 

At his swearing-in ceremony, Mr. Hutchinson explained his 

dedication to the fight against drugs. He said, “I have seen 

the drug war from all sides—as a member of Congress, as a 

federal prosecutor, and as a parent—and I know the importance 

of fighting this battle on all fronts…[but] More than 

experience, I will bring my heart to this great crusade. My 

heart will reflect a passion for the law; a compassion for those 

families struggling with this nightmare; and a devotion to 

helping young people act upon the strength and not the weaknesses 

of their character.” 

In January 2003, Mr. Hutchinson left DEA to serve as 

Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security at the 

new Department of Homeland Security. 

Foreign Offices Opened 1999-2003 

Beijing, China— 1999 

Hanoi, Vietnam—2000 

Tashkent, Uzbekistan—2002 

Kabul, Afghanistan—2003 

51 

Operation Green Clover 

(2001) 

Operation Green Clover was a one-year investigation of an 

Ecstasy trafficking organization that was a primary source of 

the drug in Colorado that concluded in August 

2001. Named after the green clover logo 

on their Ecstasy pills, DEA and its 

law enforcement 

partners arrested 

55 individuals in Colorado 

and California 

and seized 85,000 Ecstasy 

tablets as well 

as significant amounts of 

other drugs. Operation Green Clover was an 

important investigation not only because it 

dismantled a significant trafficking organization, 

but also because it was one of the first to call pub 

lic attention to the dangers of Ecstasy use. The investigation 

had been sparked by the death of Brittney Chambers, 

who died on her 16th birthday in Colorado after taking one 

Ecstasy pill that had been distributed by the organization. 

Brittney’s mother participated in the Operation Green Clover 

press conference and later opened a teen center to promote 

drug awareness and alternatives to drug use for teens in Colorado. 

Operation Triple X (2001) 

In October 2001, DEA dismantled a major methamphetamine 

and Ecstasy drug laboratory in Escondido, California. This 

takedown, dubbed Operation Triple X for the logo on the 

organization’s Ecstasy tablets, resulted in 20 arrests and seizures 

of 48,000 Ecstasy tablets, 1 pound of methamphetamine, 

48 kilos of 3,4-Propene (which produce 500,000 Ecstasy tablets) 

700 pounds of Camphor oil (which produce one million 

Ecstasy tablets), 45 gallons of GBL (used to produce GHB), 

other precursor chemicals and laboratory equipment, and 

$429,000 in U.S. currency. This case was important because 

the vast majority of Ecstasy in the United States was produced 

in labs in Europe; the lab seized in Operation Triple X 

was one of the most significant Ecstasy labs ever dismantled 

in this country.

Operation Landslide (2001) 

Operation Landslide, an organized Crime Drug Enforcement 

Task Force (OCDETF) investigation, resulted in 38 U.S. arrests 

and five Mexican arrests in November, 2001. Drug seizures 

from this operation totaled over 770 pounds of heroin, 

34 pounds of methamphetamine and three kilograms of cocaine. 

Thanks to Operation Landslide, U.S.-based drug trafficking 

cells operating in San Francisco, San Jose, and Los 

Angeles were revealed. 

September 11 th Terrorist 

Attack and DEA (2001) 

On Tuesday, September 11 th , 2001, America was attacked by 

terrorists who hijacked commercial airplanes and crashed them 

into both towers of the World Trade Center in New York City 

and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. A third hijacked 

plane—believed to be headed for either the White House or 

the Capitol—crashed in rural Pennsylvania. More than 3,000 

Americans died in the attack. The terrorists were part of Osama 

bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network, based in Afghanistan. 

The DEA Headquarters building—which directly overlooks 

the Pentagon—was immediately impacted. Many employees 

witnessed the plane hitting the Pentagon, and the headquarters 

building shook from the impact. The building was secured, 

and employees were immediately evacuated. The Washington 

Division office maintained a command center. Agents 

and Intelligence Research Specialists were detailed to the 

FBI to assist in following up on investigative leads, and other 

agents were detailed to support the FBI’s efforts at the Pentagon 

crash site and help with evidence collection. Testing 

was also conducted to verify the safety of the headquarters 

building. 

In New York, DEA’s office, approximately 40 blocks from the 

World Trade Center, was secured, and it was determined that 

all employees were safe. Some agents were immediately deployed 

to the FBI Command Center, and the enforcement 

group located at conjunction with Customs, established perimeter 

security at the airport’s Building 75, which housed 

various Federal agencies. The New York office also helped 

with the apprehension and detainment of five individuals 

suspected to have participated in the attack as they attempted 

to travel outbound from JFK. The office also supplied technical 

equipment to help in the search and rescue operation as 

well as telephone lines to assist in Title III interceptions. 

DEA further assisted in intelligence gathering, translation of 

52 

Operation Perfect Storm 

(2001) 

Initially targeted toward lower distribution cells in the greater 

Boston area, Operation Perfect Storm identified sources of 

supply for the Boston trafficking cells. These groups were 

operating out of New York, New Jersey, and Florida and were 

already being targeted by federal authorities on unrelated 

investigations. This multi-agency law enforcement effort resulted 

in the arrests of at least 144 defendants, the seizure of 

over 2,700 kilograms of cocaine, 17 kilograms of heroin, and 

$3 million in cash.

foreign documents, execution of search warrants, and provision 

of temporary office space. 

DEA’s Aviation Division also significantly contributed to rescue 

and recovery efforts. From September through January, 

the Aviation Division completed a variety of missions, which 

included transporting personnel, equipment, and critical 

blood supplies, as well and providing airborne video and 

Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera systems. 

This equipment included technology to detect signals given 

off by electronic devices such as cell phones. The FLIR 

camera systems were used to assist the New York City 

Fire Department by providing thermal imaging technology to 

determine “hot spots” within the World Trade Center buildings 

so they could determine where to deploy fire fighting 

equipment and extinguish underground fires located near 

subterranean fuel storage tanks. 

When Attorney General Ashcroft asked for volunteers from 

Department of Justice agencies to serve as Air Marshals, 

over 1,000 DEA Special Agents offered their help within hours 

of the request. More than 250 DEA Special Agents served as 

Air Marshals. For 7 months following the attack to increase 

in-flight security. 

As a result of the terrorist attacks, increased security measures 

were put into place at DEA facilities, such as x-ray 

screening of visitors, restrictions on vehicles entering the 

property, and revised occupant emergency plans. Overseas, 

DEA’s office in Peshawar, Pakistan, was evacuated, and DEA’s 

Islamabad, Pakistan, office was reduced to essential staff. 

Security measures at all overseas DEA facilities were upgraded. 

Shortly following the 9/11 attacks, there were anthrax exposures 

throughout the country, which prompted more security 

measures in DEA, particularly with mail handling operations. 

Fortunately, no DEA facilities tested positive for anthrax 

exposure. 

Narco-Terrorism 

The drug trade and terrorists have been connected for centuries 

as various rulers and terrorist organizations have used 

the vast profits from the drug trade to arm, equip, and train 

members of their violent groups. However, it was the terrorist 

attacks on September 11 th , 2001, that brought that connection 

to the attention of the American public. Drug money contributed 

in part to the ability of the al Qaeda organization to carry 

out the 9/11 attacks. 

DEA defines narco-terrorism as a subset of terrorism, in which 

terrorist groups participated directly or indirectly in the cultivation, 

manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled 

substances and the monies derived from these activities. 

A third of the international terrorist organizations identi 

53 

fied by the State Department are linked to illicit drug activities. 

For example, in South America, Colombia’s two major 

insurgent groups—the FARC and the ELN—as well as the 

right wing AUC, are linked to drug trafficking. In Peru, the 

Shining Path—a terrorist organization—most likely extracts 

a revolutionary tax from the cocaine base operators. 

While DEA does not specifically target terrorists, the agency 

targets and tracks down drug traffickers and drug trafficking 

organizations involved in terrorist acts. For example, 

in January 2002, DEA announced the successful conclusion 

of Operation Mountain Express III, which targeted suppliers 

of pseudoephedrine, the chemical essential to making methamphetamine. 

The operation yielded the seizure of more than 

30 tons of pseudoephedrine and arrests of more than 370 

people in 12 cities. Many arrested were citizens of Middle 

Eastern countries who were sending their sizable drug profits 

back to the Middle East. The DEA investigated the flow 

of money, and there were indications that some of the money 

funded terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. 

Drugs and 

Osama bin Laden 

In Afghanistan, the former ruling Taliban built its financial 

base from heroin trafficking. They used it as a major source 

of funding by taxing opium production, lab operations, and 

the movement of drugs. U.S. intelligence confirmed a connection 

between the Taliban and international terrorist Osama 

bin Laden and the al Qaeda organization. In addition, DEA’s 

intelligence indicated that bin Laden was involved in the 

financing and facilitation of heroin trafficking activities. Afghanistan 

was a major source country for the cultivation, 

processing, and trafficking of opiate products, producing 

over 70 percent of the world’s supply of illicit opium in 2000. 

Narco-Terrorism 

Symposium (2001) 

On December 4, 2001, DEA hosted a ground-breaking symposium 

entitled “Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists, and 

Your Kids” to call attention to the link between drug trafficking 

and terrorism. The symposium, held at DEA Headquarters, 

was moderated by Robert Novak, the long-time syndicated 

columnist and TV political commentator. Hosted by 

the AFFNA DEA Museum Foundation , a 6-member panel of 

experts discussed the significant and complex relationships 

between terrorism and drug trafficking before a full house of 

invited guests—including Members of Congress and their 

staff representatives—and DEA employees. Following the 

event, Mr. Novak wrote a column featuring the event and 

DEA’s important role in the war against terrorism.

Operation Containment 

Operation Containment is an intensive, multi-national, law enforcement initiative that was congressionally mandated and is led 

by DEA. It began in 2002 and was ongoing in 2003. It involves 19 countries from Central Asia, the Caucases, Europe, and 

Russia. The goal is to implement a coordinated post-Taliban heroin counternarcotics strategy to deprive international terrorist 

groups of some of their financial basis for their activities. While each country had unilaterally or jointly conducted similar 

interdiction operations in the past targeting Afghanistan heroin transporters, Operation Containment is the first coordinated, 

large-scale operation. 

Working to diminish the availability of heroin and morphine base along the Balkan and Silk Road trafficking routes, the operation 

focuses on interdiction at specific land, air, and sea border checkpoints, intelligence sharing, database connectivity, and 

collective targeting of drug traffickers and organizations. The operation eliminates duplication of efforts and effectively 

allocates limited counterdrug law enforcement resources throughout the region. The operation also targets other illicit commodities 

such as precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunitions, and currency that could be used by terrorist organizations to 

finance their operations. 

Operation Containment also included re-opening the DEA office in Kabul, Afghanistan (which had been closed for security 

reasons in 1980) and expanding existing offices in Asian and European cities. DEA’s communications intercept and intelligence 

capabilities also grew in support of agencies conducting counterterrorism investigations in the United States. 

Operation Containment continued into 2003, and has proven to be one of the most successful drug interdiction initiatives to be 

undertaken on a multi-regional basis. During a mid-2002 blitz operation, 1,705 kilos of heroin were seized, with an estimated 

value between US $28 million and US $51 million. Also seized were 5,329 kilos of marijuana, 355 kilos of opium, 2,013 poppy 

plants, as well as significant amounts of cocaine, weapons, cigarettes, and amphetamines. The operation was responsible for 

collecting much information on terrorist activities in the region. 

Just as important, Operation Containment laid the groundwork for closer cooperation among the countries for future operations—the 

mutual participation of 19 countries in a common operational and intelligence sharing action had not been undertaken 

before. It is significant that the Russians and Chinese traveled to Turkey for operational planning, the Pakistanis and 

Indians who were at conflict with one another put their differences aside, as did the Turks, Macedonians, and Greeks to achieve 

the common goal of depriving violent terrorists of drug-derived funds. 

54 

Left: Destruction of seized drugs 

Above right: Concealed Heroin 

Above left: Concealed marijuana 

Below: Kyrgyz Customs checkpoint

New 

Museum 

Exhibit on 

Narco- 

Terrorism 

(2002) 

As a continuation of the 

effort to educate Ameri 

cans about the historic 

and strong link between 

terrorists and drug trafficking, 

DEA opened a new 

exhibit at the Headquarters Museum 

called “Target America: Traf- 

fickers, Terrorists, and You.” The exhibit is housed 

in a new 1,500 square foot addition to the DEA Museum. 

Administrator Hutchinson opened the exhibit at a ceremony 

on September 3, 2002, and was joined by former New York 

City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, Attorney General John Ashcroft, 

and ONDCP Director John Walters. 

The exhibit opens with a sculpture composed of rubble and 

artifacts from the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and it 

uses the events of September 11th as a starting point for the 

historic story of the connection between the violent drug trade 

and terror from the Silk Road in the 11th century to the present. 

Interactive kiosks allow visitors to follow the trafficking of 

drugs, the movement of money, and the use of terrorism worldwide. 

Photo essays and artifacts detail the impact of drugs 

and terrorism, show individuals and groups responsible for 

terrorist acts, examine America’s response to drugs and terrorism, 

and present visitors information on getting active with an 

anti-drug message in their communities to allow them to deny 

funding to terrorists. 

DEA Turkey Seizes 

Worldwide Record 7.4 Tons 

of Morphine Base (2002) 

On March 31, 2002, Turkish Jandarma officials, accompanied 

by Istanbul Resident Office personnel, arrested15 individuals 

and seized 7.4 tons of morphine base. The morphine base was 

discovered beneath piles of hay during the search of a warehouse 

located in Hendick, Turkey, approximately 120 miles 

east of Istanbul. This seizure marked the culmination of five 

days of arrests and searches executed by the Jandarma in 

conjunction with DEA, targeting a multifaceted organization 

led by Attila Ozyildirim. This organization was involved in the 

production, transportation, and distribution of multi-hundred 

55 

The exhibit stayed at the DEA Museum 

through August 2003, then began a nationwide 

tour with planned stops in New York, 

Chicago, Detroit, Dallas, and Los Angeles. 

Sean Fearns, DEA Museum Director, envisioned 

the exhibit as one that will travel to museums all over 

the United States. The first stop will be the Dallas Science 

Museum, with an opening in September 2003, then to Chicago, 

Detroit, and New York with other cities to follow. 

kilograms quantities of morphine base and heroin. Intelligence 

indicated that Ozyildirim and his associates maintained 

strong connections with other significant Turkish traffickers 

as well as sources of supply in Afghanistan and Iran. 

Although large shipments of morphine base and heroin are 

common in Turkey, according to the Jandarma, this was the 

largest seizure of morphine base ever in the country. In addition, 

it was one of the largest seizures of opiates in Europe. 

During all of 2000, according to the U.S. Department of State, 

Turkish authorities seized approximately 1.7 metric tons of 

morphine base. This single seizure is almost six metric tons 

larger than the annual total for 2000. Given the 1:1 ratio for the 

conversion of heroin from morphine base, this amount of 

morphine base would have provided a significant amount of 

heroin to the European market.

FARC Indictments and 

Arrest (2002) 

In March 2002, the Department of Justice indicted for the first 

time members of a known terrorist organization on drug trafficking 

charges. Three members of the Colombian narco-terrorist 

group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia 

(FARC), were indicted on charges of conspiracy to manufacture 

cocaine, then transport and distribute it in the United 

States. The FARC is a Colombian Marxist terrorist organization 

whose stated goal is to overthrow the Colombian Government. 

The U.S. State Department called the FARC the 

most dangerous international terrorist group based in the 

Western hemisphere. The organization is heavily engaged in 


In December 2000, DEA’s Bogota office opened an investigation 

of Tomas Molina-Caracas, the commander of the FARC’s 

16 th Front. He was using territory in a sparsely populated area 

in eastern Colombia controlled by the 16 th Front to manufacture 

and export multi-ton quantities of cocaine. Molina and 

the 16 th Front completely controlled a small village and its 

airstrip as a center for the collection and exportation of cocaine. 

By 2000, Molina was manufacturing and exporting between 

one and three tons of cocaine per month, the majority 

of which was shipped to the United States and Europe. 

During 1999 and 2000, Molina began purchasing large quantities 

of weapons and military equipment for the FARC. Some 

AUC Indictments and 

Arrests (2002) 

Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the indictment 

of leaders of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), 

also known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, 

on Sept 24, 2002, on charges of trafficking over 17 tons of 

cocaine into the United States and Europe beginning in early 

1997. The indictment was based on a 2 ½- year DEA investigation 

that gathered witness testimony as well as evidence 

from Colombia, Spain, Portugal, Chile, and Puerto Rico. 

The AUC is a right-wing paramilitary group in Colombia listed 

on the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization List. 

The AUC operates in most regions of Colombia and is principally 

funded by drug trafficking. The organization is estimated 

to have more than 8,000 paramilitary fighters with operations 

that vary from multi-ton cocaine distributions to the 

U.S. and Europe, to assassinations, and involvement in guerrilla 

combat units. According to the Colombian authorities, in 

2002, the AUC was responsible for 2,601 deaths and 182 

kidnappings and is considered by international human rights 

groups and the U.S. Department of State to be responsible 

for 70 percent of the human rights violations in Colombia. 

56 

of the transactions were direct trades of weapons for cocaine, 

and at other times, arms were purchased with cash derived 

from the sale of drugs. By early 2002, DEA had enough evidence 

to seek an indictment against key members of the Molina 

organization. In March 2002, the indictment was unsealed 

charging Molina, two other members of the FARC, a Colombian 

cocaine lab operator, and three Brazilian traffickers with 

conspiracy to produce and export cocaine knowing and intending 

that it be smuggled into the United States. 

In June 2002, Carlos Bolas—one of those FARC members indicted 

in March on drug charges—was arrested by Surinamese 

authorities using a false Peruvian passport. Bolas appeared 

before a magistrate in Suriname, and knowing that he was 

wanted in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges, Surinamese 

authorities expelled him and turned him over to U.S. authorities. 

On June 19, Bolas was transported to the Washington 

D.C. area where he was arraigned in U.S. District Court. 

Administrator Hutchinson explained the significance of Bolas’ 

arrest by saying, “This arrest takes our fight against narcoterrorism 

to a new level. For the first time we have not only 

indicted a member of a terrorist organization involved in drug 

trafficking, but we have also arrested him. This means that 

narco-terrorists will be held accountable to the justice system 

and to the rule of law in both United States and Colombia.” 

Carlos Castano-Gil was Commander in Chief of the AUC until 

he resigned in May 2001 to become a member of the AUC’s 

Political and Military Directorate. However, he retained the 

title of Commandante of the Autodefensas Campesinas de 

Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), the largest paramilitary group 

that fell under the AUC umbrella. For several years, multiple 

sources of information cited Castano as one of the most 

powerful drug traffickers in Colombia. 

During an interview broadcast on September 8, 2002, 

Castano expressed his willingness to surrender to Colombian 

and United States authorities should he be indicted on 

narco-trafficking charges by the United States. After the 

announcement of the indictment on September 24, Castano 

reiterated this stance and said that he planned to surrender 

to authorities pending the further review of the charges by 

his lawyer in the United States Castano also stated that he 

could no longer remain in a position of authority in the AUC 

and the ACCU because of the damage that these charges 

would do the organization’s credibility. As of early 2003, 

Castano had neither surrendered to authorities nor given 

up his leadership position.

In a separate DEA/FBI investigation, two other commandants 

of the AUC were arrested in Costa Rica on November 

6, 2002, for their involvement in a multi-million dollar cocaine-for-arms 

deal. In March 2003, DEA and Colombian 

authorities conducted the takedown of Operation Pegasus 

II. This case targeted a large drug trafficking organization 

with close ties to the AUC Bloque Libertadores del Sur. 

Legalization 

The small, but vocal minority of drug legalization advocates 

who had been pushing for decriminalization and outright 

legalization of drugs for a number of years continued unabated 

in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These groups, such 

as the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana 

Laws, focused on the state ballot initiative process as a way 

to achieve their goals. These organizations are financially 

backed by several multi-millionaire sponsors and have the 

means to launch all-out, ill-informed publicity campaigns. 

While they were successful in a number of states, by 2002, 

community coalitions across the country were beginning to 

make marked gains in opposing these legalization initiatives. 

Administrator 

HutchinsonDebates 

Legalization 

Advocates 

(2001-2002) 

During his tenure at DEA, Administrator 

Hutchinson engaged in three public 

debates about drug legalization. He 

viewed them as important opportunities 

to deliver a positive, anti-drug message 

and help educate Americans about 

the dangers of drug legalization and drug 

use. His first debate was one month after 

taking office when he was pitted against New 

Mexico Governor Gary Johnson—a proponent of legalized 

drugs. It was the first time a DEA Administrator 

formally debated the issue of drug legalization in a public 

forum. National Public Radio (NPR) hosted the event entitled 

“Directing America’s Drug War: Which Way to a 

Safer Society” on September 10, 2001, at the University of 

New Mexico in Albuquerque. 

Before a packed house of hundreds of students and citizens 

as well as numerous protesters, Administrator 

Hutchinson and Governor Johnson debated the issue and 

took questions from the audience for 2 hours. Mr. 

Hutchinson emphasized a balanced anti-drug strategy that 

encompasses education and treatment in addition to law 

enforcement. He pointed out the many successes in the 

57 

fight against drugs and offered areas where the country could 

do better. The debate was broadcast at a later date on NPR. 

Administrator Hutchinson and Governor Johnson continued 

the debate in November 2001 at Yale University’s Law School. 

Mr. Hutchinson discussed the history of illegal drugs, pointing 

out that the country had legalization in the 19 th century, and 

it was a failure. He also discussed the connection between 

drugs and terrorism. 

In April 2002, Fordham University’s School of Law hosted a 

debate entitled “America’s Oldest War: The Efficacy of United 

States Drug Policy.” This time, Administrator Hutchinson debated 

Graham Boyd, a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties 

Union. The debate focused largely on the issue of marijuana 

as medicine, with Mr. Hutchinson arguing that safe and effective 

medicines must be determined by science and the regulatory 

process, not by referenda sponsored by the legalization 

lobby. 

Marijuana Research 

Repeated attempts by proponents of marjiuana legalization 

in the late 1990s to remove marijuana from 

Schedule I of the CSA, thereby 

effectively legalizing the drug, were 

definitively curtailed with the April 

2001 publication in the Federal 

Register of DEA’s denial of the Jon 

Gettman/High Times magazine 

petition to reschedule 

marijuana. In January 2001, the 

Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) 

returned a scientific and 

medical evaluation on this 

petition and recommended that 

marijuana and THC continue to 

be subject to control under 

Schedule I of the CSA. In its 

decision, HHS clearly reaffirmed that 

marijuana has a high abuse potential 

and is not approved for medical use. 

However, in response to national interest 

in the potential therapeutic use of 

marijuana for treating the symptoms of a variety of illnesses, 

DEA registered eight researchers to study the effects of smoked 

marijuana. These registrations were granted upon close and 

thorough review of study protocols by an independent review 

board and panels from HHS and the Food and Drug Administration. 

By early 2003, neither the medical community nor the 

scientific community had found sufficient data to conclude that 

smoked marijuana was the best approach to dealing with these 

important medical issues. The most comprehensive, scientifi

Above: Special Agent Lowell J. Maxey and 

Special Agent/Pilot Brian D. Winnell. 

cally rigorous review of studies of smoked marijuana was 

conducted by the Institute of Medicine, an organization 

chartered by the National Academy of Sciences. In a report 

released in 1999, the Institute did not recommend the use of 

smoked marijuana, but did conclude that active ingredients in 

marijuana could be isolated and developed into a variety of 

pharmaceuticals. 

One of those was Marinol, which was brought to market in the 

1980s after DEA granted researchers authorization to work 

with marijuana. Marinol is a prescription drug containing 

synthetic THC, which has been found to relieve the nausea 

and vomiting associated with chemotherapy for cancer patients 

and to assist with loss of appetite with AIDS patients. 

Unlike smoked marijuana—which contains more than 400 

different chemicals, including most of the hazardous chemicals 

found in tobacco smoke—Marinol was proven safe, and 

its therapeutic value was supported by clinical evidence. 

San Francisco Marijuana 

Raids/Protests (2002) 

On February 12th, 2002, DEAAgents confiscated more than 

8,000 marijuana plants and made several arrests at a San Francisco 

cannabis club, known as the Harm Reduction Center. 

The operator, Kenneth Hayes, was cultivating large quantities 

of marijuana in San Francisco and Sonoma County and 

was also participating in smuggling of high-grade Canadian 

marijuana into the Bay Area. 

The arrests received considerable publicity and press coverage 

in relation to California’s medical marijuana law. The 

cannabis club was affiliated with the City and County of San 

58 

Francisco to provide “medical” marijuana to 

“patients.” Additionally, one of the arrestees 

was Edward Rosenthal, longtime contributing 

editor of High Times and Cannabis Culture 

magazines and the author of several “how 

to” books on marijuana cultivation. 

The investigation determined that the cannabis 

club was engaged in marijuana trafficking 

in violation of federal law. While the club 

claimed to distribute marijuana to sick people, 

it was in fact selling marijuana to anyone. 

Four operators were charged federally with 

cultivation, conspiracy, and maintaining a location 

for drug manufacturing. 

Two pled guilty, and as of early 2003, are awaiting sentencing. 

The third defendant, Rosenthal, went to trial, and his 

case resulted in a guilty conviction. The fourth, Hayes, sought 

asylum in Canada. 

Coincidentally, on the same day of the cannabis club raids, 

Administrator Hutchinson spoke before a sold-out audience 

at San Francisco’s Commonwealth Club, a prestigious public 

affairs speech forum. San Francisco, caught between conflicting 

state and federal laws concerning medical marijuana 

had long been home to intense debate regarding drug laws. 

Mr. Hutchinson’s visit and the cannabis club arrests prompted 

public protests from San Francisco residents and elected officials.

When Administrator Hutchinson arrived to deliver his speech, 

over 200 protestors had gathered outside the Commonwealth 

Club. Chanting “DEA, go away,” and waving banners, protestors 

expressed their disapproval of the marijuana arrests. 

Simultaneously, protest groups launched a “web attack” 

against the DEA website. They attempted to shut down the 

DEA site by visiting it repeatedly. The site received 30,000 

hits at once, but service was not disrupted. “In many ways, 

this debate is a good thing,” said Administrator Hutchinson 

of his not-so-warm welcome. “If nothing else, it shows everyone 

how important this issue is and it helps the DEA get 

our message across. DEA must follow the law-we don’t judge 

what is use and what is abuse. We judge what is legal and 

what is illegal.” 

Speaking Out Booklet and 

Grass Roots Movement 

To get DEA’s message out about why drug legalization would 

be a catastrophic failure and why marijuana should not be 

legalized for medicinal or recreational use, DEA’s Public Affairs 

office initiated an informational campaign. An entire 

section on anti-legalization was created on the website, which 

included many materials about the subject. One of the most 

comprehensive was “Speaking Out Against Drug Legalization,” 

a 25-page booklet that logically laid out the top ten 

facts on legalization. It detailed national, international, and 

local statistics and examples of failed prior legalization experiments 

and also discussed the many successes of current 

drug policy. 

DEA’s Demand Reduction section also began a new, proactive 

emphasis on outreach and coalition-building. The 

agency reached out to other anti-drug and pro-law enforcement 

organizations already organized and on the ground— 

those who interacted with the media and public on a regular 

basis and those who were intimately involved in their communities. 

The Demand Reduction section’s mission was to 

pro-actively engage the support of these coalitions. The number 

of neighborhood anti-drug coalitions in this country was 

huge, but largely unorganized. DEA made it a goal to help 

those groups develop a better network of communication to 

both build local, state, and national support for the fight 

against drugs, and build local, state, and national support for 

the DEA. 

2002 Election Results on 

Legalization Initiatives 

The results of the grass roots movement supporting current 

drug policy paid immediate dividends. In the fall of 2002, 

drug decriminalization or legalization initiatives were on the 

ballot in several states. The legalization lobby was behind 

59 

these initiatives and had greatly assisted with funding, signatures, 

and wording of the initiatives. Widespread passage 

was expected, but because of a strong grass roots movement 

by parents, anti-drug coalitions, and law enforcement, four of 

the six initiatives failed—showing the American public’s support 

for drug enforcement. The results were: 

· Arizona: 57% of voters killed a plan (Proposition 203) 

that would have made state law enforcement the broker 

for medicinal marijuana. 

· Nevada: 61% of voters opposed a proposal that would 

have allowed anyone to possess up to 3 ounces of marijuana. 

· Ohio: 67% opposed a proposal (Issue 1) that would have 

allowed nonviolent drug offenders to seek treatment instead 

of serve jail time. 

· South Dakota: 62% of voters defeated an industrial hemp 

initiative. 

· Washinton DC: 78% of voters approved an initiative 

that would offer drug rehabilitation instead of prison for 

some nonviolent offenders. 

· San Francisco: 63% approved a measure to have the city 

study growing and dispensing marijuana for medical purposes. 

Methamphetamine 

From 1999 to 2003, methamphetamine abuse had become a 

national problem as this drug epidemic spread eastward. Its 

use was initially mainly confined to the West and Midwest, 

but has now surfaced in other areas, especially the Southeast. 

Florida in particular has seen an increase in abuse and 

clandestine laboratory production. In 1999, law enforcement 

seized 22 methamphetamine labs in Florida, but by 2002, that 

had increased to 109. Similarly, 30 meth labs were seized in 

Alabama in 1999; by 2002, that had risen to 198. 

In last five years, there has been a dramatic increase in then 

number of small, toxic methamphetamine labs in rural communities. 

While the meth trade is still dominated by Mexico– 

based traffickers producing the drug in larger “super labs” 

on the West Coast, the increase in small labs has been significant. 

The growing numbers of small, dangerous clandestine 

laboratories has strained communities and state and local 

police forces. Effective and safe clean-up of these labs is 

very costly and drains community resources and manpower. 

In response to this new pressure on local law enforcement, 

DEA is working with the COPS program to provide state and 

local clan lab clean-up training to increasing numbers of police 

officers.

Traffickers’ methods of producing methamphetamine and 

obtaining pseudoephedrine, a chemical necessary to make 

meth, have changed in recent years. The growing numbers 

of small labs led to an increase in the use of the over-thecounter 

“blister packs” of cold and allergy medication as a 

source of pseudoephedrine. The medications are packaged 

in such a way that they would be impractical as a source of 

supply for a super labs where massive quantities of the drug 

are made. But they have been used more and more by small 

lab operators. 

Canada emerged as a source of supply for pseudoephedrine 

after DEA’s Operation Mountain Express I & II effectively 

stopped the illegal pseudo trade within the United States. 

Discussions between the United States and Canada led to 

Operation Mountain Express 

I, II, and III (2000-2002) 

In August 2000, DEA Special Agents stunned the methamphetamine 

production underworld, arresting more than 140 

individuals in eight cities with a promise of more arrests to 

follow. The arrests marked the first of three phases of Operation 

Mountain Express. The operation combated the production of 

methamphetamine by targeting those who produced and illegally 

distributed pseudoephedrine, a chemical essential to the 

manufacture of methamphetamine. 

Phase One of the operation yielded arrests in Los Angeles, 

Denver, Fort Lauderdale, Orlando, San Diego, Portland, Houston, 

and Lodi, California. In addition, DEA suspended chemical 

60 

tighter restrictions on pseudo production and transportation 

in Canada. 

In 2002, a new meth threat began to emerge – meth in tablet 

form, called “yaba,” that comes from Southeast Asia. Yaba 

accounted for only a small percentage of meth used in the 

United States by 2003, but law enforcement is concerned about 

its increasing potential for abuse since its appearance is similar 

to the popular drug Ecstasy. 

registrations of 10 companies, 770 chemical registrations were 

surrendered, and 29 wholesale chemical companies closed. 

The arrested defendants faced federal charges for their involvement 

in a loosely structured national network that 

trafficked in pseudoephedrine. In the late 1990s, pseudoephedrine 

(pseudo) had become widely used in the production of 

methamphetamine because of its ready availability in over-thecounter 

cold and allergy medications. The operation focused 

on the transfer of pseudo produced for legal purposes to those 

who used it illegally to produce meth.

IA Melissa Conway and SA Sean Stephen King examine 

more of the Mt. Express seizures. 

Operation Mountain Express continued with phase two, using 

information gained in phase one of the operation to identify 

registrants (physicians or pharmacists who are authorized to 

handle controlled substances) who were involved in the illegal 

diversion of pusedo and to cancel their registrations. The 

rogue registrants were not subject to criminal prosecution, but 

were prohibited from working with controlled substances. 

Operations Mountain Express I & II effectively shut down the 

illegal pusedo trade within the United States. Traffickers 

began to look for sources of supply in Canada and the illegal 

trade and transport between Canada, and the U.S. grew. 

Operation Mountain Express III was created when DEA 

pursued this new pseudo trafficking market in Canada. Intelligence 

indicated that traffickers were purchasing large amounts 

of pseudo in Canada and then returning to the U.S. with the 

product, often via the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. As a 

result, Detroit and nearby Chicago became hubs of pusedo 

distribution. From these points, pusedo was transported to 

California and distributed to meth “super labs” where it was 

converted to methamphetamine by Mexico-based drug traffickers. 

The successful conclusion of Operation Express III was 

announced by DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson, U.S. 

Customs Commissioner (and former DEA Administrator) Robert 

Bonner, and IRS Deputy Commissioner Bob Wenzel. 

Operation Mountain Express III ended on January 10, 2002, 

when DEA Special Agents, assisted by the U.S. Customs 

Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police arrested 54 traffickers, in addition to the 67 

previously arrested as part of the investigations. 

61 

SA Efren G. Lapuz and INS Pat Comey at the Carlesbad 

Resident Office. 

Operation Mountain Express did unprecedented damage to 

the methamphetamine trade. In 2001, there were a total of 6,000 

pounds of meth seized by the DEA; the three phases of 

Operation Mountain Express resulted in the seizure of nearly 

30 tons of pseudoephedrine, which could produce 37,000 

pounds of meth. The operations also yielded 371 arrests and 

the seizure of 269 pounds of meth, 151 vehicles, 13 weapons, 

and nearly $17.5 million. DEA also tightened regulatory 

controls over DEA-registered chemical handlers. Legislative 

initiatives were also undertaken to address weaknesses in the 

regulatory framework. Additionally, the investigation traced 

large amounts of profit being sent to individuals in the Middle 

East, who had possible ties to terrorist organizations.

Methamphetamine Summits (2000-2002) 

In the early 2000s, DEA co-sponsored methamphetamine summits across the country in partnership with the National Crime 

Prevention Council and local communities. These summits were training conferences at which a state, county, or city developed 

a strategic plan for reducing methamphetamine use and trafficking in the area. The summits brought together hundreds of people 

from the community who were involved in different aspects of the methamphetamine problem: law enforcement, social workers, 

school officials, local officials, prevention experts, treatment providers, parents, and environmental firms. The goal was to 

coordinate these various groups and mobilize resources to prevent and reduce the proliferation of meth and meth labs. Meth 

summits were held in Sacramento, California in 2000; in Bellevue, Washington in 2001; and in Indianapolis, Indiana; Little Rock, 

Arkansas; Lexington, Kentucky; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Hawaii County, Hawaii in 2002. 

Meth in America Tour (2002) 

In the spring of 2002, Administrator Hutchinson launched a nationwide tour to call attention to the country’s growing 

methamphetamine problem. The campaign, called “Meth in America: Not in Our Town” began in May and continued through 

July 2000. DEA took the tour to 32 states over the course of the 3 months. Many of the stops were smaller states that were struggling 

with the social and financial impact of the drug. 

At each site, Administrator Hutchinson held press conferences in conjunction with state and local officials, and often the tour 

was combined with scheduled meth summits. The focus was the meth problem in that community and the resources and options 

available to help combat the problem. Administrator Hutchinson emphasized the federal response to methamphetamine 

trafficking, but also cited the many innovative actions communities were taking to combat the problem. He also cited the many 

community coalitions that were impacting the meth problem. The tour received much national and local attention and raised overall 

awareness of the meth problem and sparked discussions on solutions. 

Hazardous Waste Cleanup 

Program 

Since 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency’s hazardous 

waste regulations have required generators of hazardous 

waste to properly manage their waste. DEA along with 

state and local law enforcement agencies, become the “generator” 

of hazardous waste when clandestine drug laboratories—which 

are generally methamphetamine labs—are seized. 

As the generator, law enforcement bears the responsibility 

for ensuring that the wastes from clandestine laboratories 

are managed in compliance with all applicable health, safety, 

transportation, and environmental requirements. 

The DEA Laboratory System established a program in 1990 

to address environmental concerns from the clean up of clandestine 

drug laboratories. The amount of waste material and 

chemicals from a clandestine drug laboratory varies from a 

few pounds to several tons, depending on the size of the 

laboratory and its manufacturing capabilities. Wastes can be 

highly toxic, flammable, corrosive, reactive and, in some cases, 

radioactive. These wastes can cause injury and death to 

laboratory operators, and can cause fires and explosions that 

can contaminate the interior of homes, apartments, motels,etc. 

62

In some instances, these wastes have been indiscriminately 

dumped into pits, streams, lakes, septic tanks, and along the 

roadside. 

Cleaning up a seized clandestine drug laboratory can be a 

complex, dangerous, and expensive undertaking. The DEA 

hazardous waste program has been successful, however, in 

promoting the safety of law enforcement personnel and the 

public, protecting the environment, and minimizing the 

agency’s liability. Through the use of nation-wide contracts, 

DEA’s program promoted the safety of law enforcement personnel 

and the public by using highly qualified companies 

with specialized training and equipment to perform the removal 

of the wastes at the seized laboratory. Using these 

contractors reduces the risk of injury to law enforcement personnel 

and the public from the clean up of the seized laboratory. 

The program has become increasingly more efficient as DEA 

gained more experience in cleaning up clandestine drug laboratories. 

The average cost per cleanup in the FY1991-1992 

time frame was $17,000. While the number of clandestine 

drug laboratory cleanups rose, the average cost per cleanup 

continued to go down. Through contract improvements and 

DEA’s contract management experience, the costs of a removal 

were subsequently reduced to approximately $4,000 in 

FY2000 and to less than $3,300 in FY2002. 

New hazardous waste contracts became effective in FY2003. 

The new contracts include many time and cost saving tools 

to help address the field’s concerns and the dramatic increase 

in workload. The new contracts are expected to significantly 

improve the response time by increasing the number of Contract 

Areas from 29 to 44 and requiring response facilities in 

each. The greater competition created by smaller Contract 

Areas and new cost reduction factors should result in additional 

cost savings for the government, while maintaining 

strict environmental compliance standards. In addition, the 

new contracts contain provisions for weekly pickups from 

containers in states that establish a container storage program 

and have entered into a Letter of Agreement with DEA 

to provide this service. DEA began discussions regarding a 

pilot container program with several states in FY2002 to determine 

the feasibility and degree of cost savings associated 

with the approach. 

63 

Targeting the Arellano-Felix 

Trafficking Organization 

(2000-2002) 

The Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), often referred to as 

the Tijuana Cartel, was considered one of the most powerful 

and violent drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. At the 

height of its power, the AFO was responsible for the transportation, 

importation, and distribution of multi-ton quantities 

of cocaine, marijuana, and large quantities of heroin and 

methamphetamine into the United States from Mexico—primarily 

from Tijuana into San Diego and Los Angeles. 

DEA offices in Mexico and the United States, most notably 

Tijuana, San Diego, and Los Angeles, relentlessly pursued 

the principal members of this organization in an effort to 

bring about their downfall. The most prominent members of 

the AFO were brothers Benjamin, Eduardo, Ramon, and Francisco 

Javier Arellano Felix; Ismael Higuera Guerrero; Jesus 

Labra Aviles; Manuel Aguirre Galindo; and Ismael Higuera- 

Guerrero. Jesus Labra Aviles, long considered the financial 

mastermind of the organization, was arrested in Mexico City 

in March 2000 by the Government of Mexico with the support 

of DEA’s Tijuana office. This was followed by the arrest 

of major AFO Lieutenant Ismael Higuera-Guerrero two months 

later in May 2000. He, too, was arrested by the Mexican 

Government in coordination with DEA’s Tijuana 

office.

Higuero-Guerrero had been the most blatant member of the 

AFO directing operations in Tijuana for years. 

At the beginning of 2002, AFO was dealt two huge blows: 

First, its infamous and brutal enforcer and assassin Ramon 

Arellano Felix was killed in a street fight with drug trafficking 

competitors and Mexican police, then, a month later, the AFO’s 

overall Chief of Operations, Benjamin Arellano-Felix, was arrested 

in Puebla, Mexico, by the Mexican Military. 

Operation Crossfire (2002) 

On April 10, 2002, Operation Crossfire, a bi-lateral anti-corruption 

investigation conducted in collaboration with federal 

Mexican Government officials, resulted in the arrest of 42 active 

federal, state, and local law enforcement officers from 

Mexicali, Tijuana, and Ensenada. These arrests included the 

Tijuana Chief of Police, heads of the State Judicial Police in 

Tijuana, Tecate, and Mexicali; and the Assistant State Attorney 

General. All of them were assisting the Arellano-Felix 

Organization. 

Drug Smuggling Tunnels 

64 

Reports of drug smuggling tunnels increased significantly in 

late 2002 and early 2003. Traffickers may have increased their 

use of subterranean smuggling in light of increased border 

security, either real or perceived. Mexican drug trafficking 

organizations had used tunnels as a smuggling method since 

at least 1990. All of the narco-tunnels seized were in California 

(in the San Diego-Tijuana area) and Arizona (Douglas, 

Naco, and Nogales). At least 13 tunnels were discovered. 

Narco-tunnels ranged in sophistication from a 16-inch PVC 

pipe; to tunnels dug off of drainage systems; to well-engineered 

tunnels equipped with electricity, ventilation, and rails. 

DEA, in cooperation with Mexico’s Policia Federal Preventiva, 

discovered one of the most significant drug smuggling tunnels 

on February 27, 2002. It was approximately 4 feet by 4 

feet, more than 800 feet long, and 20 feet underground. It was 

equipped with its own ventilation system, lighting, and rails 

on which an electronic cart moved drugs. The Mexican entrance 

was hidden behind a fireplace in a home near Tecate, 

Mexico, and the U.S. exit was concealed under a stairway in a 

home in Boulevard, California. About 300 pounds of marjuana 

were seized from inside the tunnel. Ownership of the tunnel 

was attributed to the Jose Albino Quintero-Meraz organization.

Technology has created new methods to locate tunnels. 

65 

San Ysidro U.S. Border Patrol agents investigating a lead 

found a cargo truck with 3,3337.7 pounds of marijuana 

which led to the discovery of a tunnel leading to a manhole 

and a storm drain located behind the parked truck. 

The tunnel was one foot underground and led to a small 

window on the side wall of the manhole. The window was 

sealed with the cement block that braced a 2 X 4 stud from 

inside to prevent discovery. The 20-30 foot tunnel led to a 

wood structure where the direction changed and headed 

toward Mexico. 

DEA S/A Darren Lee, DEA G/S Pedro Pena, U.S.B.P. Agent 

Greg Torres, and U.S. Customs Agent Taekuk Cho.

Integrated Drug Enforcement 

Assistance program (2001) 

In late 2001, Administrator Hutchinson launched a new initiative 

that grew out of the MET II program called the Integrated 

Drug Enforcement Assistance (IDEA) program. IDEA 

combined law enforcement action with strong community 

efforts to find solutions to the problems that often cause 

drug abuse and create a welcoming environment for drug 

traffickers. IDEA was considered innovative because, while 

many programs focused only on law enforcement or only on 

treatment, IDEA brought diverse community groups together 

to work out problems. Instead of MET II’s regional approach, 

it focused on one community at a time. IDEA addressed not 

only drug problems, but also the underlying issues that are 

the root of drug use and trafficking. 

DEA and state and local law enforcement identified drug trafficking 

targets and executed enforcement operations. Concurrent 

to drug enforcement action in a community, the IDEA 

program provided communities with long-term support in 

developing and implementing prevention and treatment programs. 

The goal was to partner law enforcement with community 

coalitions. Summits were held at each site to bring 

together large numbers of community-based organizations, 

businesses, faith-based organizations, parks and recreation 

departments, schools, drug courts, law enforcement, and community 

leaders to form new and lasting partnerships and identify 

problems and long-term solutions. Once enforcement efforts 

were complete, IDEA encouraged that 15% of law enforcement 

seized assets be directed to community prevention, 

education, and treatment programs. 

In 2001 and 2002, three sites piloted the program. They were: 

North Charleston, South Carolina, Allentown, Pennsylvania, 

and Portsmouth, Virginia. Three additional sites were added 

later in 2002 and 2003: Springfield, Missouri, Mobile/Prichard, 

Alabama, and Pueblo, Colorado. DEA provided a full-time 

Special Agent to each site to work with experts in crime prevention, 

alternative judicial systems such as drug courts, 

restorative justice initiatives, drug testing, and law enforcement 

training. Administrator Hutchinson established an IDEA 

National Advisory Council comprising law enforcement, judiciary, 

government officials, substance abuse, and crime 

prevention experts to consult with DEA on program design, 

implementation, and evaluation. To support the IDEA program 

and emphasize demand reduction activities on the whole, 

Administrator Hutchinson committed to doubling the number 

of Demand Reduction Coordinators across the country. 

The IDEA program was ongoing at all six sites in 2003, and all 

reported significant arrests and seizures from law enforcement 

efforts and encouraging results in the prevention, education, 

and treatment areas. IDEA communities reported increased 

participation in community drug programs, better 

66 

identification of funding sources for anti-drug efforts, stronger 

and better organized community coalitions, greater awareness 

of the community’s drug problems, and more enthusiasm 

in solving the drug problems. While IDEA’s funding was 

eliminated in DEA’s 2003 budget due to tightening fiscal concerns 

relating to national security, DEA continued to provide 

non-monetary support to IDEA communities through its Demand 

Reduction Coordinators and local offices so that successes 

could continue. 

Drug Treatment Courts 

Drug treatment courts are specialized community courts 

designed to help stop the abuse of drugs, alcohol, and related 

criminal activity. Non-violent offenders who have been charged 

with simple possession of drugs are given the option to receive 

treatment instead of a jail sentence. A judge oversees each 

case from the beginning and traces progressions and lapses 

through random drug testing and monitoring attendance to 

treatment sessions. If a participant fails to meet the minimum 

requirements set forth by the court, immediate sanctions are 

imposed. For determined individuals, completion of the 

program might bring about dismissal of charges, a reduced 

sentence, a lesser penalty, or a combination of these. 

Drug courts have seen rapid growth since their inception in 

1989—by 2003, there were about 700 nationwide. Administrator 

Hutchinson was a champion of drug courts during his tenure 

at DEA. He visited several drug courts across the country to 

encourage and support participants and spoke at many 

graduation ceremonies. Drug courts were a centerpiece of his 

message that, to make progress in the fight against drugs, 

it was necessary to heal the addicted—to restore their lives 

and make them productive citizens again and help reduce 

the demand for drugs in this country. 

Israeli Ecstasy Traffickers 

Extradited (2002) 

Two Israeli Ecstasy traffickers were extradited to Miami in 

August 2002, marking the first time that Israeli citizens were 

extradited to the United States on drug charges. The two men, 

Meir Ben David and Josef Levi, were indicted in October 2000 

in Miami for conspiracy to import Ecstasy and possession with 

intent to distribute Ecstasy into the Southern District of 

Florida. The investigation, initiated by DEA’s Fort Lauderdale 

office in 1998, revealed that Ben David and Levi were part of 

an Israeli organized crime syndicate responsible for smuggling 

large quantities of Ecstasy from Europe into the United States. 

Ben David coordinated shipments of Ecstasy from Europe into 

the United States using body couriers and parcel couriers. Levi 

assisted the organization by distributing Ecstasy at various 

nightclubs throughout South Florida as well as to other Israeli

Ecstasy traffickers. During the course of the investigation, 

hundreds of kilograms of Ecstasy were documented as being 

imported into the United States by this organization. 

Operation X-Out (2002-2003) 

In late 2002, DEA began Operation X-Out, a multi-faceted, 12month 

initiative that focused on identifying and dismantling 

organizations that were producing and distributing Ecstasy 

and predatory drugs in the United States and abroad. DEA 

committed to invest more resources in Ecstasy and predatory 

drug investigations and increase these kind of investigations 

from 5% of DEA’s total cases to at least 10%. Airport 

interdiction task forces were increased at certain airports and 

new tasks forces were created in cities like New York and 

Miami that were primary entryways for the drugs. Also 

created within DEA was a task force that focused on Internet 


Operation X-Out also included an awareness campaign to 

educate students, parents, educators, and the health and law 

enforcement communities about the dangers of Ecstasy and 

predatory drugs. DEA held press conferences and town hall 

meetings across the country that focused on enforcement 

and prevention efforts at the local level. The first was held 

in November 2002 in San Diego, where Administrator 

Hutchinson launched Operation X-Out and called attention 

to the growing problem of Ecstasy and predatory drug abuse. 

The press conference was followed by a town hall meeting 

attended by about 300 educators, health experts, students, 

rape crisis centers, and concerned citizens who discussed 

solutions to the problem in their community. Similar events 

were held during 2003 throughout the country, with a particular 

emphasis on college campuses. 

Three Largest Ecstasy Seizures 

As of early 2003, the following seizures were the largest made 

in the country. The millions of tablets involved showed the 

huge extent to which Ecstasy was being smuggled into the 

country by international drug trafficking organizations and 

the drug’s tremendous popularity in the United States. 

1. In July 2000, DEA and the U.S. Customs Service seized 

approximately 2.1 million Ecstasy tablets at the Los 

Angeles International Airport. The tablets, labeled as 

clothing, arrived on an Air France flight from Paris 

concealed in an airfreight shipment. Several individuals, 

who were responsible for overseeing and coordinating 

this shipment, were arrested. DEA later connected these 

individuals to a significant Israeli trafficking organization 

that was responsible for importing multi-kilogram 

quantities of Ecstasy into the United States. (seeOperation 

Red Tide) 

. 

67 

2. The second largest seizure was made by the New York 

Police Department when they seized 1.6 million Ecstasy 

tablets from two Israeli nationals at a Manhattan apartment. 

The pills had an estimated street value of $40 million 

and were sold in 100,000 tablet quantities to mid-level 

distributors in the area. 

3. The third largest Ecstasy seizure occurred in conjunction 

with arrests made in October 2002 by DEA New York. 

DEA arrested three Israeli nationals in connection with a 

seizure of 1.4 million Ecstasy tablets with an estimated 

value of $42 million. The investigation began by DEA’s 

Belgium office where they received information from 

Belgian law enforcement about the tablets, which were 

bound for New York. It was the second largest seizure in 

Europe. 

1.2 million ecstasy tablets seized in New York inside a 

diamond cutting apparatus.

DEA Website Reaches 

Millions 

In DEA’s early years, the concept of internet communications 

would have seemed like a sci-fi fantasy. But by 2003, in 

an age when websites are the main sources for finding or 

providing information, DEA kept up with the demand for a 

thorough and informative webpage. When DEA’s website, 

www.dea.gov first went on-line in 1996, it contained just a 

few web files of information—in 2003, the website contained 

2,500 files that addressed every aspect of the agency and its 

mission. The website featured: recent news stories that 

changed almost daily, current drug facts and statistics, recruiting 

and training information, and photos of major fugitives. 

In late 2002, the website expanded to include webpages 

for each of DEA’s divisions. Individual divisions used their 

sites to promote local drug news and reach out to their communities. 

DEA became adept at using the DEA.gov as a way to reach 

out to the public, to community, schools, the media, and our 

law enforcement partners. When the site was first created, it 

had one million visitors. By 1998, the number of visitors had 

grown to 18 million. In 2002, after a major over-haul of the 

site and increased efforts to publicize it, the DEA.gov received 

100 million visitors. This staggering growth represented 

continued increase in public interest in the DEA and 

the agency’s improved capability to provide important information 

to the American people. 

DEA World Goes Hi-Tech 

(2001) 

In September 2001, the popular DEA in-house publication, 

DEA World, was distributed electronically for the first time. 

Switching to an electronic format allowed for quicker and 

much more frequent publication of the news-magazine and 

ensured that everyone in DEA would have easy access to it. 

The new publication featured many of the same types of 

stories as the older print version but was much more timely 

and current. DEA World was published on Webster, the 

internal computer network, and each issue had the appearance 

of a miniature website. Soon after the first electronic 

newsletter was released, entries for the new publication 

poured in from all over the field. Employees were eager to 

share their local news with the global DEA community. Stories 

in a typical issue featured successful cases, awards 

won by employees, community service events, and information 

about employee services. 

This new communication tool serves as a way for employees 

around the world to stay in touch with each other and to share 

the agency’s news and accomplishments. 

68 

Operation Webslinger (2002) 

In a first-of-its kind investigation, Operation Webslinger 

targeted predatory drugs such as GHB and its derivatives, 

GBL and 1,4 Butanediol (1,4 BD), sold over the Internet. This 

operation was also groundbreaking because e-mail addresses 

and web page communications of Internet drug traffickers 

were identified for Title III interceptions. While not the first 

time this method of intercept was used, Operation Webslinger 

was one of the earliest to use Internet intercepts on a national 

and international scale. These Internet intercepts revealed key 

information about the traffickers’ operations, including their 

sources of supply and the amount of drugs they were selling. 

Perhaps most important was these intercepted Internet communications 

proved the sites were selling the chemicals not as 

the industrial solvent as advertised, but for human consumption—which 

is key to prosecuting traffickers under the drug 

analog statutes. 

In September 2002, DEA successfully concluded this operation 

with the eventual arrest of 175 individuals in more than 100 

cities across the United States and Canada. Those arrested 

were sources of supply, midlevel brokers, and users. DEA and 

law enforcement partners dismantled four nationwide distribution 

rings of these drugs, which are used both to induce a 

high and in the commission of sexual assault. DEA seized 

approximately 25 million dosage units of predatory drugs and 

more than $1 million in assets. The operation had an immediate 

impact on Internet drug sales, with users complaining in chat 

rooms they were no longer able to purchase these drugs. 

Operation Arctic Heat (2002) 

A savvy, flexible drug operation involving Alaskan traffickers 

was the target of Operation Arctic Heat. These traffickers 

did business all over the United States, including New York 

and Los Angeles. In November 2002, DEA Agents arrested 

more than 60 individuals and seized more than 160 kilograms 

of cocaine, $2 million in cash, and $35,000 in counterfeit money. 

Seizures also took place in Anchorage, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 

Salt Lake City, Chicago, and Grand Junction. This drug 

operation also targeted money laundering and movement of 

drug proceeds and worked on an extensive embezzlement 

scheme designed to “smurf” money out of the United States 

and into the Dominican Republic. 

Lebanese Opium and 

Marijuana Eradication 

Program Resumes (2002) 

With urging and support from DEA and other international 

drug liaison officers, Lebanon re-engaged their opium poppy 

and cannabis eradication initiatives in 2002. In February 2002,

the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, assisted by the Lebanese 

military and the Syrian military, eradicated approximately 

7 million square meters of opium poppy in the Bekaa Valley. 

In August 2002, approximately 9 million square meters of cannabis 

were eradicated in the Bekaa. DEA Specials Agents, 

along with other drug enforcement liaison officers, were in 

Operations Pipedreams/ 

HeadHunter (2003) 

On February 24, 2003, DEA successfully completed 

Operations Pipedreams and Head Hunter, a nationwide 

sweep of major drug paraphernalia distributors 

and businesses.The coordinated operations 

netted 55 individuals across the country and seized 

$150,000 cash. As a result of this operation, 11 

Internet sites were taken offline and redirected. Targeted 

companies sold half of the nation’s supply 

of drug paraphernalia and accounted for more than 

a quarter of a billion dollars in retail drug paraphernalia 

sales annually. Using both traditional retail 

stores and Internet websites, the distributors were 

one-stop shops for drug dealers and users, selling 

everything from miniature scales, pipes, bongs, 

cocaine freebase kits, and cutting agents to dilute 

processed drugs in their raw form. Approximately 

115 tons of drug paraphernalia with an estimated 

wholesale value of $15-20 million were removed 

from the sites as well. 

Critical to the success of Operation 

Pipedreams was the use of Internet intercepts 

on e-commerce sites and e-mail accounts to 

track the money and domestic and international 

shipments of drug paraphernalia. 

Operation Pipedreams was conducted by 

DEA offices in Des Moines, Iowa; Boise, 

Idaho; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 

69 

vited to witness the eradication initiatives. Being in the Bekaa 

Valley for a DEAAgent was likened to finding the Holy Grail 

for an archeologist. This eradication initiative was expected 

to have a significant impact on the availability of heroin and 

marijuana in Western Europe in 2003. 

Arrest of Osiel Cardenas- 

Guillen in Mexico (2003) 

On March 14, 2003, Mexican officials brought the reign of 

Osiel Cardenas-Guillen to an end. He was arrested at a residence 

in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico, following a fierce 

firefight with Mexican police. Before his arrest, Cardenas 

was the head of a drug trafficking organization that controlled 

large-scale marijuana and cocaine trafficking through 

the smuggling corridor between Matamoros, Mexico and 

Brownsville, Texas. Cardenas had numerous resources that 

enabled him to maintain 15 to 25 heavily armed bodyguards 

at all times, protection and support from all levels of Mexican 

law enforcement, and technical assistance from the Mexican 

phone company. 

Through the combined efforts with the Government of Mexico, 

the DEA, FBI, and U.S. Customs, the Cardenas reign on the 

Northeastern Mexico corridor came to a halt. This investigation, 

called “Operation Golden Grips” was an important arrest 

because it sent a message to traffickers that violence and 

intimidation did not protect them from law enforcement. 

The catalyst of this operation was the November 1999 assault 

and attempted kidnapping of 2 U.S. Federal agents and 

a confidential source. During the assault, Cardenas and 12 to 

15 members of his organization, armed with assault rifles, 

surrounded a vehicle occupied by the agents and attempted 

to kidnap them and a confidential source who was in the car. 

Only after an extensive discussion between one of the agents 

and Cardenas were the agents allowed to leave the scene and 

travel directly to the border. The agents were followed to the 

border by members of the Cardenas organization.

Hemp rule (2003) 

On March 21, 2003, DEA announced two final rules that address 

the legal status of products derived from the cannabis 

plant. These cannabis products, also known as “hemp” prode 

ucts, often contain the hallucinogenic substance tetrahydrocannabinols 

(THC). THC is the primary psychoactive chemical 

found in the cannabis (marijuana) plant. 

These rules set forth what products may contain “hemp.” 

Under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), THC is a Schedule 

I controlled substance. Schedule I consists of those controlled 

substances that have not been approved as medicine 

by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The CSA provides 

that anything that contains “any quantity” of a Schedule 

I hallucinogenic controlled substance is, itself, a Schedule 

I controlled substance, unless it is an FDA-approved drug 

product. Thus, the CSA prohibits human consumption of any 

non-FDA-approved product that contains any amount of 

THC. 

In some cases, a Schedule I controlled substance may have a 

legitimate industrial use. The CSA allows for industrial use of 

Schedule I controlled substances, but only under highly controlled 

circumstances. The rules announced by DEA create 

an exemption in the law that removes all CSA regulatory restrictions 

for legitimate industrial products made from cannabis 

plants. Exempted industrial products include paper, 

rope, and clothing (which contain fiber made from the cannabis 

plant), animal feed mixtures, soaps, and shampoos 

(which contain sterilized cannabis seeds or oils extracted from 

the seeds). DEA is exempting these types of industrial cannabis 

products from control because they are not intended 

for human consumption and do not cause THC to enter the 

human body. 

The rules prohibit cannabis products containing THC that 

are intended or used for human consumption (foods and beverages). 

This approach is consistent with the long-standing 

rule under federal law disallowing human consumption of 

Schedule I controlled substances outside of FDA-approved 

research. The rules became effective April 21, 2003. 

International Drug 

Enforcement Conference 

The International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) was 

established in 1983 in an effort to institutionalize regional 

cooperation among executive-level drug law enforcement officials 

from South, Central, and North America, as well as the 

Caribbean. IDEC is an “operationally oriented conference.” 

In the earlier years, IDEC served as a forum to discuss country-specific 

enforcement problems and programs, and later to 

70 

topical- related issues. The principal purpose of the yearly 

conference was to share drug-related intelligence and develop 

an operational strategy to successfully attack trafficking organizations 

at every link in the drug chain. IDEC XX was the 

first conference that included new members as well as observers 

from Asia, Europe, and Russia. 

IDEC XVII: 1999, Washington, D.C., United States “Identifying 

and Attacking Major Trafficking Organizations” 

IDEC XVIII: 2000, Buenos Aires, Argentina “Multi-Regional 

Investigations and Operations Targeting Major Traffickers” 

IDEC XIX: 2001, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic “Multi- 

Regional Investigations and Operations Targeting Major Traffickers 

and Their Organizations” 

IDEC XX: 2002, Santa Cruz, Bolivia “Combating Major International 

Drug Trafficking Organizations Through Global Cooperation 

and Partnership” 

IDEC XXI: 2003, Panama, Panama City “International 

Counternarcotics and Terrorism” 

Diversion 

Many problems associated with drug abuse are the result of 

legitimately manufactured controlled substances being diverted 

from their lawful purpose into illicit drug traffic. By 

2003, the number of people who abuse prescription drugs each 

year roughly equals the number who abuse cocaine—about 2 

to 4 percent of the population. In the late 1990s and early 

2000s, abuse of prescription drugs was a growing problem. 

In 1998, 2.5 million Americans admitted abuse of prescription 

drugs. By 2001, that had almost doubled to 4.8 million.

OxyContin Abuse 

The problem of prescription drug diversion was brought to the attention of many Americans because of the abuse of OxyContin 

that began in the late 1990s. OxyContin is a twelve-hour controlled release formulation of the Schedule II drug oxycodone, a 

powerful analgesic. The drug was introduced in 1996 and experienced exponential growth, becoming the number one controlled 

pharmaceutical in terms of sales by the year 2000. This rapid growth was accompanied by similar increases in diversion and 

abuse. The number of people reporting use of OxyContin for non-medical purposes at least once in their lifetime increased from 

221,000 in 1999 to 399,000 in 2000 to 957,000 in 2001. 

OxyContin was being diverted through fraudulent prescriptions, over-prescribing, theft and illegal sales, and “doctor shopping”—the 

practice of going to different doctors until one prescribes the narcotic the patient seeks. The drug had become a 

target for diverters and abusers due to the large amounts of active ingredients and the ability of abusers to easily compromise the 

controlled release mechanism. Simply crushing a tablet negates the timed effect of the drug, enabling abusers to swallow, inhale 

or inject the drug for a powerful morphine-like high. The Drug Abuse Warning Network reported that emergency room mentions 

for oxycodone, the active ingredient in OxyContin, were more than 100 percent higher in 2000 than in 1998. 

OxyContin abuse appears to have begun in rural areas of the eastern United States, then spread to suburban and urban areas in 

many parts of the country. Numerous communities experienced an upswing in crime as a direct result of the OxyContin problem. 

Additionally, medical examiners reported overdose deaths associated with the abuse of oxycodone, the active ingredient in 

OxyContin. 

In response to this escalating abuse and diversion, DEA embarked on a comprehensive OxyContin Action Plan that was 

implemented in FY 2001. This was the first DEA plan to target a specific brand of controlled substance. It focused on 

enforcement and regulatory investigations targeting key points of diversion. This plan brought the problem of diversion and 

abuse of OxyContin to the attention of numerous federal, state and local agencies; advisory committees; and to the general 

public through meetings, presentations, interviews, Demand Reduction and Internet sites. 

The Action Plan had a significant impact. There was a four-fold increase in DEA OxyContin cases opened in FY 2001 over FY 

2000. Arrests made in conjunction with OxyContin investigations rose seven fold from FY 2000 to FY 2001. OxyContin cases 

opened in FY 2001 and 2002 totaled 305, and arrests for the same period totaled 351. 

Pain Management Initiative 

For years, the issue of adequate pain management was a source of controversy in the medical community. DEA’s role enforcing 

the Controlled Substances Act and regulating the most powerful narcotics used in the treatment of pain was viewed by some as 

inhibiting pain medication availability, when, in fact, both diversion control and pain management constitute health issues. 

Recognizing the need to reconcile differences and work together to ensure optimum pain treatment as well as drug diversion control 

and drug abuse prevention, the Office of Diversion Control developed consensus on the issue with 21 prominent health 

organizations. The result was a joint statement entitled “Promoting Pain Relief and Preventing Abuse of Pain Medications: A 

Critical Balancing Act.” Emphasizing that patients’ ability to receive proper care, including pain management, should not be 

hindered by drug abuse prevention efforts, the statement pledges cooperation between the health care community and law 

enforcement, and states: “The roles of both health professionals and law enforcement personnel in maintaining this essential 

balance between patient care and diversion prevention are critical.” 

The Office of Diversion Control continues with its efforts to strike a balance regarding the use of narcotics to effectively treat 

pain. On-going relationships have been developed with renowned pain specialists and medical groups to develop educational 

materials for physicians and investigators concerning both diversion and acceptable medical practices. These efforts were 

essential and continued into 2003 as DEA confronted complex drug policy issues. 

71

On-line Investigations Project 

By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the worldwide web had 

become a ready source of pharmaceuticals including controlled 

substances. Many of these sales are suspect because 

they circumvent the doctor/patient relationship that is necessary 

for the legitimate prescribing of controlled substances. 

Realizing that this easily accessible outlet greatly increased 

the potential for the abuse and diversion of controlled substances, 

DEA needed to combat this problem in its early 

stages of development. However, searching the Internet for 

possible diversion activities was beyond the reach of Diversion 

Investigators, so it was evident that an integrated, 

focused, data-mining activity was necessary to identify, 

collect, and analyze this data. 

To meet this need the Office of Diversion Control initiated the 

On-line Investigations Project. The purpose of the project is 

to develop a state-of-the-art computer system, maintain a data 

warehouse to store data collected from the worldwide web, 

and develop an information management system to manage 

the collection of web site text, image, and other relevant data 

from the worldwide web. The project will correlate information, 

detect patterns through link analysis and uncover trends 

by sifting through large amounts of data stored in the warehouse 

to provide constant and timely leads to the field. The 

On-line Investigations Project is expected to advance the 

investigative tools available to Diversion Investigators and 

have a dramatic impact on the ability to conduct investigations 

on the worldwide web to detect the diversion of controlled 

substances. 

Targeting International Precursor 

Chemical Diversion: 

Operations Purple and Topaz, 

and Project PRISM 

Illicit drug production is dependent upon the availability of 

legally produced, internationally sourced and marketed precursor 

and/or essential chemicals that have widespread 

industrial applications. The responsibility for dealing with 

issues of drug/chemical trafficking is shared by all nations. 

The ability to prevent chemicals from being diverted from 

legitimate commerce to clandestine drug manufacture is a 

powerful weapon in the global struggle against the spread of 

illegal narcotics and synthetic drugs. As a result, and in 

response to a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly 

Special Session, the Office of Diversion Control, 

together with regulatory and enforcement counterparts world 

wide, embarked on several informal, multilateral chemical 

control and enforcement initiatives. These initiatives showed 

marked success in preventing and detecting diversion of key 

72 

chemicals used in the illicit production of cocaine, heroin, and 

amphetamine-type stimulant chemicals. These initiatives 

seek to identify, intercept, and prevent diversion attempts; 

identify criminals; gather intelligence on traffickers’ diversion 

methods; take appropriate administrative, civil and/or 

criminal action; and obtain intelligence on chemical trafficking 

trends and shipping routes. 

The first such initiative, Operation Purple, targets potassium 

permanganate, an oxidizing agent used in the clandestine 

cocaine process. Developed together with Germany, Operation 

Purple brought together the potassium permanganate 

producing, major importing, and illicit cocaine source countries. 

The operation tracked every shipment of potassium 

permanganate from the producing country through any transit 

countries, and ultimately, to the end-user. The success of 

this operation—the prevention of diversion of tons of the 

chemical, identification of “rogue” chemical companies and 

suspect individuals, gathering of intelligence on trafficker 

diversion methods, improved regulatory control of the chemical—led 

to two subsequent chemical targeting initiatives, 

Operation Topaz and Project PRISM. 

Operation Topaz is an international initiative aimed at preventing 

the diversion of AA, a chemical utilized by traffickers 

in the illicit production of heroin. Topaz began on March 1, 

2001, and is a cooperative effort by drug law enforcement and 

regulatory officials from 40 countries and regions, as well as 

the International Narcotics Control Board, ICPO/ Interpol, 

European Commission, and the World Customs Organization. 

Based on the premise that the prevention of the 

diversion of certain industrial chemicals to the clandestine 

production of illicit drugs is a critical element of any drug 

enforcement effort, Operation Topaz was developed as a long 

term monitoring program of AA. 

Project PRISM aimed to assist Governments in developing 

and implementing operating procedures to more effectively 

control and monitor trade in amphetamine-type stimulants 

(ATS) precursors in order to prevent their diversion. Project 

PRISM targets multiple chemicals used in the clandestine 

production of ATS, including ephedrine and pseudoephedrine 

for illicit production of amphetamine and 

methamphetamine, and safrole and methylenedioxyphenyl- 

2-propanone for production of MDMA and its analogs. 

All of these initiatives have resulted in a broad level of 

international agreement regarding the actions that must be 

taken to prevent chemical diversion, thereby impacting clandestine, 

illicit drug production. 

.

Bolivian/DEA Seizure 

Dr. Eddie Sfeir-Byron, Bolivian Drug Czar and Vice Minister 

for Social Defense, along with Bolivian officials witnessing 

destruction of 344 pounds of cocaine and 17 metric tons 

of coca leaf seized by DEA and Bolivan authorities. 

National Forensic Laboratory 

Information System (NFLIS) 

As the nation’s primary agency charged with enforcing the 

controlled substances laws and regulations of the United 

States, DEA invested in strategic and operational information 

sources at the Federal, State, local, and even foreign 

levels. The National Forensic Laboratory Information System 

(NFLIS), a DEA program that systematically collects 

drug analyses results and other associated information from 

state and local forensic laboratories nationwide, is enhancing 

DEA resources for carrying out its core mission. NFLIS 

has proved to be an effective information source for better 

understanding and monitoring our nation’s drug problems. 

It improves DEA’s ability to track national, regional, and 

local drug abuse trends, including providing timely and geographically 

specific information on emerging drug problems. 

NFLIS can also be used to identify specific drug characteristics 

including commonly reported abused drugcombinations. 

73 

Aviation 

During 1998 to 2003, the Aviation Division recognized the 

ever increasing role aviation support was in obtaining DEA 

enforcement objectives. The Division implemented long-term 

strategic plans in order to provide more effective and efficient 

service. A component of these plans was an effort to 

modernize and standardize the fleet. 

Older, maintenance–intensive aircraft were replaced with new 

Cessna 206 surveillance aircraft, Pilatus PC-12 cargo aircraft, 

and Eurocopter A-Star helicopters. Standardization was reflected 

in the acquisition of Beech Super King Air cargo aircraft, 

which replaced other aging turboprops. 

The Aviation Division applied the same upgrade policy to its 

technology by purchasing new day/night video surveillance 

cameras to replace less dependable, less capable equipment. 

In 2003, the Division created a state-of-the–art Aviation Communications 

Center capable of tracking and flight-following 

all OA assets through the use of high frequency radio, very 

high frequency radio, and satellite communications. The 

Center facilitates the maximization of Aviation asset usage 

and produces cost savings by eliminating the requirement 

for contractor-flight following. 

The Division expanded its representation and support assets 

in the Caribbean and poised itself for future mission 

expansion worldwide with the acquisition of a Learjet 60 aircraft. 

This aircraft significantly increased mission profiles 

and represented an asset that is capable of global deployment. 

One of the key advantages of NFLIS is that it collects forensic 

laboratory data verified by chemical analysis that has the 

highest degree of validity. 

Sponsored by the Office of Diversion Control, NFLIS is the 

only database available in the U.S. that provides actual and 

estimate nationwide and regional scientifically validated data 

on drugs associated with law enforcement activity. Initiated 

in 1997 to provide reliable data for drug scheduling, NFLIS 

has grown into a fully operational system with interest from 

other DEA offices and government agencies. By 2003, 32 out 

of 50 state laboratory systems and 48 out of 72 local laboratories 

participated in the NFLIS; over 800,000 drug analyses 

results were collected during 2001. Participation in NFLIS 

was totally voluntary, but the ultimate goal is to enlist all of 

the approximately 300 forensic laboratories.

Training 

From 1999 to 2003, DEA’s Training Division continued its 

mission to ensure that DEA employees were provided the 

technical and professional competencies and ethical and 

leadership skills to accomplish the DEA mission. This training 

took place at DEA’s new Justice Training Center, which 

opened in April of 1999 in Quantico, Virginia. 

One of the most significant developments at the DEA Training 

Academy was the establishment of the new Clandestine 

Laboratory Tactical Training School in Fiscal Year 2000. The 

course is needed because of the increase in the number of 

clandestine laboratory seizures throughout the country, with 

the corresponding escalation of problems confronting state 

and local agencies that are called to the scene of these laboratories. 

Often referred to as “chemical time-bombs,” these 

labs present unique dangers to users, neighbors, law enforcement, 

and the surrounding environment. Often, it is 

state or local police who first encounter these laboratories 

and must ensure that they are investigated, dismantled, and 

disposed of appropriately and safely. 

The class is designed for Special Agents and narcotics officers 

who are involved in clandestine laboratory raids, but 

had limited tactical training and experience. Their training 

included the full use of issued equipment including air purifying 

respirators and self-contained breathing apparatus. 

The DEA Basic Clandestine Laboratory Certification School 

is the most widely recognized law enforcement sponsored 

clandestine lab training course that met OSHA standards. 

The Unit also conducted an Advanced Site Safety Officer 

school for DEA and state and local officers. This school is 

designed to certify attendees as Clandestine laboratory Site 

Safety Officers, an OSHA requirement for every clandestine 

Laboratory site. Advanced assessment and investigative 

techniques are taught at this school. 

74 

From 1999 to 2003, DEA continued its mission to conduct 

and sponsor counternarcotics training to thousands of foreign 

law enforcement counterparts. Since 1969, DEA and its 

predecessor agencies trained officials in more than 243 countries. 

DEA continued its participation at the four International 

Law Enforcement Academies, including one in San Jose, 

Costa Rica, scheduled for opening later in 2003. These academies 

have been successful in increasing the professionalism 

of participants through the exchange of law enforcement 

techniques and investigative strategies and in strengthening 

transnational crime fighting.

Technology 

DEA’s secure, centralized computer network, Firebird, which 

standardizes investigative reporting, case file inventories, 

administrative functions, and electronic communications, was 

successfully deployed to approximately 97% of DEA’s offices 

(domestic and foreign) by 2003. This was accomplished 

in part by the Small Firebird Initiative that provided full Firebird 

functionality to those DEA offices where the installation of 

the Firebird desktop was either cost prohibitive or a security 

issue. Only those offices with security or facilities related 

issues did not have Firebird connectivity. In addition, Firebird 

technical refreshment of all division network and shared servers 

was completed and the replacement of workstations was 

initiated. 

DEA was the first component in the Department of Justice to 

electronically transmit information through the Department’s 

Joint Automated Booking System (JABS) to the FBI’s 

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 

(IAFIS) through the Firebird Booking Station (FBS). FBS 

provides rapid identification of individuals under arrest or 

detention through automation of the booking process and 

electronic access to IAFIS, with an average response time of 

30 minutes; it minimizes duplication of data entry during 

booking; and it promotes data sharing of arrest records among 

Department law enforcement agencies and other authorized 

parties through an interface with the Nationwide JABS. 

Investigative Management Process and Case Tracking 

(IMPACT), an automated case management system, was 

developed to support DEA Special Agents, Intelligence 

Analysts, and Diversion Investigators in their daily case 

75 

management activities. IMPACT was designed to improve 

mission performance and achieve greater operational 

efficiency in the establishment, recording, accessibility, and 

analysis of information pertaining to DEA investigations. In 

2003, IMPACT was deployed as a pilot to the Phoenix and 

Miami Divisions with over 800 field users. 

DEA transitioned to a full, on-line Electronic File Room. All 

Investigative Reports from 2002 forward and millions of earlier 

records are available for full text search from the desktop 

of any DEA office with access to Firebird or SFI. 

Communication capabilities were improved through the use 

of Internet technologies and new trusted dial-up 

communication capabilities. A Web Architecture was 

developed and used to publish the Administrator’s 

Newsletter, providing improved access to information 

available on the DEA Website. In addition, by 2003, DEA 

was using the DOJ/FBI sponsored Law Enforcement Online 

(LEO) secure dial-up network to provide trusted access to 

and among federal and state law enforcement organizations. 

DEA implemented a Centralized Call Data Delivery system 

for intercepted cellular pen register data for the field. This 

system enables each division to obtain cellular call data 

without the need to establish a dedicated connection to 

individual cellular companies, thus generating substantial cost 

savings to DEA. 

Laboratories

Laboratories 

Reaccredidation (1999) 

In 1999, the Office of Forensic Sciences’ laboratory system 

was reaccredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory 

Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/ 

LAB). The first accreditation was completed in 1994. This 

accomplishment was significant because DEA laboratories 

were recognized as conforming to national and international 

technical and operational standards. The areas of forensic 

drug analysis, fingerprint examination and Source Determination 

Program analysis (tablet and capsules toolmark examinations) 

were the technical specialties accredited by 

ASCLD/LAB. 

Strategic Planning 


In 2000, the Office of Forensic Sciences held a Strategic Planning 

Conference at the Justice Training Center in Quantico, 

Virginia. Attendees focused on analyzing the needs and 

expectations of the DEA Laboratory System’s many customers 

and developing ways to meet them. Specific goals, objectives, 

and strategies to improve service, strengthen the 

organizational structure, utilize technology more effectively, 

and to obtain additional facilities and resources were identified. 

The resulting Strategic Plan helped the laboratory system 

position itself over the next five years to meet future 

expected, and unexpected, challenges in the coming decade. 

The International Drug Profiling 


The International Drug Profiling Conference (IDPC) convened 

in December 2002 and was the first-ever forensic science 

conference to bring delegates together to define and standardize 

“drug profiling” to meet the enforcement and intelligence 

requirements of international drug law enforcement. 

The IDPC was comprised of delegates from the United States, 

Australia, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Japan, 

Switzerland, Hong Kong, the United Nations Drug Control 

Program, and The Netherlands. The first IDPC ended with 

an agreement among delegates that they would set realistic 

and achievable goals that could be implemented internationally. 

By consensus, the first two goals the delegates chose 

to pursue were the development of drug profiling databases 

and the development of programs dealing with the profiling 

of heroin and Amphetamine Type Substances. 

76 

New DEA Laboratory 

Construction (2002 and 

2003) 

During 2002 and 2003, DEA replaced four of its aging laboratory 

facilities—three regional laboratories and the Special 

Testing and Research Laboratory. The four new state-ofthe-art 

laboratories are located in Dallas, Texas; Dulles, Virginia; 

Largo, Maryland; and Vista, California. These newly 

constructed multimillion-dollar modern laboratories are capable 

of providing a full line of analytical support to drug law 

enforcement agents.

Laboratory 

SystemReorganization 

(2003) 

In 2003, through the support of DEA’s Executive Management, 

several changes were implemented that were identified 

as critical needs in the Laboratory System’s FY2000-2005 

Strategic Plan. The changes included reorganizing the Office 

of Forensic Sciences to create a Quality Assurance Manager 

position and a second Associate Deputy Assistant Administrator 

position at Headquarters. The reorganization also 

affected the laboratories by creating an Associate Laboratory 

Director position in each laboratory and by creating a new 

Digital Evidence Laboratory for the forensic examination of 

digital evidence. 

Creation of DEA’s Digital 

Evidence Laboratory (2003) 

DEA’s commitment to supporting its drug investigations in 

the 21 st Century achieved a major milestone with the February 

2003 establishment of a Digital Evidence Laboratory 

within its Office of Forensic Sciences. In the short period of 

just nine years, DEA built a world class digital forensic program 

from what first started out as a small engineering pro 

77 

gram, that is capable of handling the full range of digital 

evidence including computers, servers, Personal Digital Assistants, 

Global Positioning System navigational devices, 

satellite phones, two-way pager devices, and cell phones. 

This new laboratory provides needed forensic support at 

the field level to acquire digital evidence from drug investigations 

thereby leaving no stone unturned. The elevation 

of the digital evidence function to a laboratory status organizational 

level reflects the present and future importance 

that this relatively new forensic science plays in DEA investigations 

in the new millennium.

The Scientific Working 

Group for the Analysis of 

Seized Drugs 

The mission of the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis 

of Seized Drugs (SWGDRUG) is to recommend minimum 

standards for the forensic examination of seized drugs and 

seek their international acceptance. SWGDRUG is a cooperative 

effort between the DEA’s Office of Forensic Sciences 

and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to 

address the following: 

¨ Recommend minimum standards for forensic drug analysts’ 

knowledge, skills, and abilities. 

¨ Promote the professional development of forensic drug 

analysts. 

¨ Provide a means of information exchange within the forensic 

drug analyst community. 

¨ Promote the highest ethical standards of practitioners 

in all areas of forensic drug analysis. 

¨ Recommend minimum standards for drug examinations 

and reporting. 

¨ Establish quality assurance recommendations. 

¨ Seek international acceptance of SWGDRUG minimum 

standards. 

The SWGDRUG core committee is comprised of representatives 

from federal laboratories and regional forensic science 

associations in the United States, the European Network 

of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), the United 

Nations Drug Control Program, Australia, Great Britain, Japan, 

Canada and Germany. A forensic science educator and 

a representative from an internationally recognized standards 

writing organization also participate on the committee. 

The SWGDRUG process evolved since 1997 to be recognized 

as one of the most successful scientific working 

groups in the world. 

Sub-Regional Laboratories 

and Mobile Operations 

DEA’s first sub-regional laboratory became operational in FY 

1997 in support of the Midwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking 

Area (HIDTA). This laboratory was established to bring 

78 

analytical and support services closer to the source of illicit 

drug activity—clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine. 

In 1999, the laboratory was relocated from the Food and Drug 

Laboratory in Kansas City, Kansas, to the Kansas City Regional 

Crime Laboratory in Kansas City, Missouri. 

In Fiscal Year 1999, DEA opened a second sub-regional laboratory 

in San Juan, Puerto Rico. This laboratory provides 

analytical and support services to the Caribbean Division as 

well as other federal agencies within the Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico. This laboratory is collocated with the Food and 

Drug Administration Laboratory. 

In Fiscal Year 2000, DEA took delivery of a 38-foot mobile 

laboratory. Equipped with a fume hood, bench space, support 

infrastructure, and appropriate analytical instrumentation, the 

laboratory is capable of operation by either shore-power 

through a 100 amp, 200 volt shore line or an on-board diesel 

generator. In early 2001, the mobile laboratory was deployed 

to Tucson, Arizona, where two chemists provided additional 

forensic support along the Southwest Border of the United 

States. In late 2002, the mobile laboratory was moved to El 

Paso, Texas to provide much needed forensic laboratory support 

in that region. 

Microgram 

The 35 th Anniversary Issue of Microgram was published in 

2002. This periodical has progressed from a sporadically 

published “communication” from the Bureau of Drug Abuse 

Control and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in 

the late 1960s to the dawn of electronic posting by the DEA 

in the 21 st century. By 2003, over 1,400 offices around the 

world received Microgram each month. 

In FY 2002, the Office of Forensic Sciences determined that 

there was a need to convert Microgram into two separate 

publications entitled Microgram Bulletin and Microgram Journal. 

Microgram Bulletin includes all the material previously 

included in Microgram, except scientific articles. Additional 

and/or expanded information was also incorporated into Microgram 

Bulletin. Microgram Journal is a quarterly journal 

dedicated solely to the publication of scientific articles on 

the detection and analysis of suspected controlled substances 

for forensic/law enforcement purposes. It was the intent of 

the Editor and the Office of Forensic Sciences that Microgram 

Journal become a premier scientific journal in this discipline. 

Additionally, starting with the January 2003 issues, the Bulletin 

and the Journal moved from a law enforcement restricted 

status to an open, unclassified status, and both were posted 

on DEA’s Internet website.

Inspections 

DEA’s Inspection Division is responsible for maintaining the integrity of DEA and providing security for its employees. DEA’s 

integrity system is comprised of three primary components within the Inspection Division: the Office of Professional 

Responsibility (OPR), the Office of Inspections, and the Office of Security Programs. 

Technological upgrades and resource enhancements were acquired, enabling the Inspection Division to more effectively and 

efficiently carry out its mandate. The vulnerability of our infrastructure was made evident by the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks. The challenges posed by terrorism and new technology available to criminals were matched by DEA’s security 

apparatus. 

DEA remained committed to ensuring the integrity and professionalism of its employees and thoroughly investigated all 

credible allegations of employee misconduct. In October 2000, OPR opened a field office in Dallas, Texas. DEA’s presence along 

the Southwest Border and the power and influence of drug trafficking organizations that operate in this area necessitated the 

expansion of OPR there. 

The Office of Inspections, through the annual Division Inspection Program (DIP) and the three-year cyclical on-site inspection 

process, ensures that managers maintain the highest-level of operational, financial, and organizational integrity, as well as 

compliance with internal and external controls, policies and procedures, Federal laws, and sound auditing practices. IN investigates 

all shooting incidents related to DEA Special Agents and DEA-sponsored State and Local Task Force Law Enforcement 

personnel to determine the circumstances involved and accountability of an incident. Due to a major IN organizational realignment 

and the establishment of the DIP and cyclical on-site processes, IN assisted managers in identifying issues that improved 

operational and financial efficiency and effectiveness in all DEA program areas and offices. 

The most dramatic changes in the Inspection Division were in the Office of Security Programs (IS). This office experienced 

significant growth in recent years. By the end of 1997, the office had a staff of 28 employees. As of spring 2003, the staff had 

expanded six-fold to 189 employees and contractors. The office is now divided into three sections: Information Security, 

Physical Security, and Personnel Security—each headed by a Supervisory Special Agent. 

IS provides a wide variety of continuing security services and equipment to the entire agency and also inspects and issues 

compliance orders to headquarters, domestic and foreign offices with regard to security and safety. Furthermore, with the 

expansion, IS offers more specialized, technically forward services and operations. 

As of 2003, IS has several initiatives in progress, including an aggressive reinvestigation program and intrusion detection 

system. This system has auditing capabilities to monitor the utilization of computer systems, which enhances early detection 

of integrity-related issues. 


Royce D. Tramel 

Alice Faye Hall-Walton 



DEA Special Agent Tramel was as- 

Diversion Investigator Hall-Walton was 

signed to the Dallas Office. He was 

assigned to the Dallas office. She was 

struck by a car and killed. killed in an automobile accident. 

79

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