Fire in the West - Western Forestry Leadership Coalition

Fire in the West, the Series 

The first edition of Fire in the West was published in 1998. It was intended to 

be a report to the Council of Western State Foresters on the status of wildland fires 

in the West. For the first time, a person could find information on the authorities, 

responsibilities and fire protection systems for each of the seventeen western state 

forestry agencies as well as the numbers of fires and acres burned in the western 

states. 

In the spring of 2000, the Western State Fire Managers commissioned a special 

study on the extent of the Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Problem in the West. The 

third edition of Fire in the West was published in September of that year. This 

report could not have been more timely, because that year the West burned and the 

wildland/urban interface problem “smacked” us in the face. 

The fourth in the series of Fire in the West documented the 2000 fire season. 

In this edition the federal agency statistics were added, thus really presenting the full 

impacts of fire in the West. 

Fire in the West will never be a “best seller,” but it has become the document 

of choice when you want to know something about the extent that wildland fires 

play a key roles in the Western environment. 

Additional Copies 

Copies of Fire in the West can be purchased from Deer Valley Press. Write or 

call Deer Valley Press, 5125 Deer Valley Road, Rescue, CA 95672 or telephone 

(530) 676-7401. You can also find them on the “web” at www.deervalleypress.com.

TO: Council of Western State Foresters 

FROM: Western State Fire Managers, 

May 15, 2003 

It is an honor to again provide the Council of Western 

State Foresters with the most complete look at the extent and 

complexity of the wildland fire protection in the West. In this, 

the 5 th edition of Fire in the West, there is special focus on the 

implementation of the National Fire Plan in the West and a 

review of the disastrous 2002 fire season. 

Some of the key points that will be highlighted and 

supported with facts are: 

• The number of fires and acres burned is on the increase. 

• There will be bigger, more damaging and costlier fires. 

• The National Fire Plan is providing much needed funding, 

but it will not last forever, and most of the funds are not 

being expended on long-term or permanent fixes to the 

fuel buildup, the wildland/urban interface fire problem 

and to forest health. 

Your fire managers hope this edition of Fire in the West is 

of value to you and they want to extend their thanks for the 

continuing support you give them. 

Sincerely, 

Wayne F. Ching, Chair 

Western State Fire Managers 

1

Executive Summary 

• Fire is an integral part of the natural environment in the West. In Fire Season 2002, 

nearly 40,000 wildfires burned nearly seven million acres in the seventeen western states, 

destroyed hundreds of structures, and killed 21 firefighters in the West. 

• All levels of government – federal, state, and local – are either directly, or indirectly, 

involved in mitigating the wildfire problem, especially in the wildland/urban interface. 

Here, where human improvements are mixed with flammable natural vegetation, lives, 

natural resources and property are threatened by increasingly severe wildfires. 

• A variety of federal, state, and local government agencies (as well as forest protective 

associations) provide wildland fire protection in the West. A variety of protection systems 

are provided by the 17 western states, ranging from full-scale sophisticated wildland fire 

departments to inadequate attempts to provide fire prevention education and interagency 

coordination with staffing and funding. Most states are somewhere in between, with not 

enough funding to do the job effectively. Funding mechanisms for the state forestry agencies 

vary, with many of the rural states nearly totally dependent on State Fire Assistance 

funds from the federal government. Local government fire departments rely primarily on 

property taxes, benefit assessment fees, or in the rural all-volunteer fire departments, 

donations. There are nearly 6,500 local government fire departments in the West. These 

departments are frequently the initial attack force on many wildfires and the primary 

source of resources for structure protection during major wildfires. 

• The major federal wildland fire agencies have a variety of management goals that influence 

decisions made during managing wildfires on the lands they control. State and local 

fire protection agencies charged with the protection of small parcels in multiple ownerships 

must be committed to immediate control and extinguishment (i.e. suppression) of 

wildfires. As wildfires do not respect jurisdictional or property ownership boundaries, 

there are times when administrative and operational conflicts can arise between agencies. 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary 

Wildland Fire Protection 

Levels of Government (9) 

Areas of Responsibility (10) 

Protection Schemes (11) 

Funding Sources and Levels (12) 

Local Fire Departments (13) 

Wildland/Urban Interface (14) 

Roles and Responsibilities (17) 

Suppression Policies (41) 

Fire Environment (45) 

National Fire Plan 

Competitive Grants (68) 

Communities at Risk (70) 

Urban Watershed at Risk (80) 

Healthy Forests Initiative (97) 

Drought and Fire Season 2002 

Drought and Forest Fires (101) 

The 2002 Fire Season (105) 

Safety and Stategy (114) 

Why Fires Will Get Bigger (117) 

Major Fires (121) 

2002 Statistics (149) 

Appendices 

Wildland/Urban Interface (190) 

Federal Land Ownership (195) 

WUI Fire History (205) 

• Interagency cooperation using the Incident Command System (ICS), Unified Command, 

and Multi-Agency Coordinating System (MACS) are the key tools for successful 

mitigation of major wildfire emergencies. Potential conflicts need to be addressed prior to 

3

the fire with clear, comprehensive interagency agreements and operating plans. Joint 

training, exercises, and command teams involving all fire agencies provide economy of 

scale and assure jurisdictional agency input. 

Many factors have been involved in 

“creating” the unhealthy forest 

condition in the West. 

Homeowners must accept the 

responsibility to provide protection 

for their homes. 

• Long-term drought, logging, the exclusion of fire, human development, and a variety of 

other factors have created a situation where most western forests are overstocked, unhealthy, 

and at greater risk of catastrophic wildfire than ever before. Wildfires now burn 

more intensely, are more resistant to control, and cause greater damage, especially during 

drought conditions. Extensive preparation and follow-up are necessary to effectively 

reintroduce (prescribed) fire to the ecosystem to improve forest health or reduce fire 

danger. These include large scale tree thinning, brush crushing, and control line construction, 

followed by treatment of emergent undesirable species and planting of desirable 

species. Air quality regulations and the threat of civil liability are also hindrances to expanded 

use of prescribed fire to restore ecosystem health. To be of strategic value, most 

fuel reduction projects need to be cooperative, involving multiple agencies and 

landowners. 

• The primary values at risk from wildfire, in order of priority, are: (1) human health and 

safety; (2) critical watersheds/resources (urban water supply, community infrastructure, 

community economic stability, communities themselves); and, (3) natural resources and 

individual homes. An area of contention between all levels of government has been who is 

responsible for protecting structures from encroaching wildfires There is only one correct 

answer: everybody; federal, state, and local governments, property owners, and communities 

(both urban and rural) all have an important stake in wildfire prevention and control. 

Homeowners in the wildland have to accept the responsibility to use ignition-resistant 

roofing and provide defensible space so that fire suppression forces have a greater chance 

of success. Whole communities need to assume responsibility for improving their own 

protection by providing fuelbreaks, adding fire defense improvements, and funding adequate 

fire protection. Local governments need to adopt planning and development regulations 

that will reduce the exposure of improvements in the wildland/urban interface to 

wildfire and to provide an adequate level of fire protection. State governments need to take 

the lead in providing an appropriate level of wildfire protection on non-federal lands, 

especially in the wildland/urban interface. The federal agencies need to provide an adequate 

level of protection on federal lands, especially those adjoining the wildland/urban 

interface. 

4

• The National Fire Plan (NFP) is a coordinated federal response to the devastating fire 

season of 2000 that seeks to augment federal wildfire protection capability and provide 

increased funding to state and local government agencies to reduce fire hazard and risk, 

and to improve wildfire protection capabilities, especially in the wildland/urban interface 

(WUI). The Healthy Forests Initiative attempts to more efficiently employ commercial and 

non-commercial harvest methods that can reduce fire danger, improve forest health, and 

contribute to local economic growth. FireWise helps communities organize for large-scale 

hazard reduction projects in the wildland/urban interface. All seventeen western States 

have received NFP funding for a wide variety of projects. The most popular types of 

projects are public education, 

fuelbreaks, and mechanical 

thinning. Many of the projects 

are cooperative, involving 

multiple government agencies, 

community groups, property 

owners, public utilities, etc. 

Communities-at-risk like Bend 

(OR), Spokane (WA), Flagstaff 

(AZ), and Oakhurst (CA) 

have leveraged federal grant 

money with private grants, 

cooperate sponsorships, and 

volunteer peoplepower to 

achieve a common end. 

• There is a need for a collaborative 

process for identifying 

and prioritizing communities-at-risk 

and a standard 

methodology for assessing risk 

of communities in order to 

achieve maximum benefit 

from limited resources available 

under the National Fire 

Plan. Flagstaff, AZ is probably 

National Fire Plan Funding, by State 

Base Funding (Formula) 

State Fire Assistance 

5 

Federal Grants for Fiscal Year 2002 

The National Fire Plan is the federal 

response to Fire Season 2000. 

Alaska $335,609 3.4% $895,391 3.9% $283,657 5.1% $96,628 1.2% $1,611,285 3.5% 

Arizona* $897,000 9.1% $2,221,500 9.7% $376,000 6.8% $455,750 5.7% $3,950,250 8.6% 

California* $1,000,210 10.1% $937,770 4.1% $954,072 17.3% $662,000 8.3% $3,554,052 7.7% 

Colorado* $994,304 10.1% $3,630,435 15.9% $669,643 12.2% $544,000 6.9% $5,838,382 12.7% 

Hawaii* $380,651 3.9% $115,480 0.5% $200,599 3.6% $15,000 0.2% $711,730 1.5% 

Idaho* $486,800 4.9% $3,530,700 15.5% $184,400 3.3% $935,575 11.8% $5,137,475 11.1% 

Kansas $495,000 5.0% $60,000 0.3% $181,000 3.3% $33,537 0.4% $769,537 1.7% 

Montana* $603,700 6.1% $1,140,067 5.0% $378,713 6.9% $854,030 10.8% $2,976,510 6.5% 

Nebraska* $467,100 4.7% $28,000 0.1% $143,000 2.6% $101,416 1.3% $739,516 1.6% 

Nevada* $307,000 3.1% $1,999,936 8.8% $157,681 2.9% $873,928 11.0% $3,338,545 7.2% 

New Mexico $72,500 0.7% $2,110,500 9.3% $193,300 3.5% $484,517 6.1% $2,860,817 6.2% 

North Dakota* $195,500 2.0% $0 0.0% $407,900 7.4% $228,597 2.9% $831,997 1.8% 

Oregon $1,041,395 10.6% $2,953,209 12.9% $416,390 7.6% $816,939 10.3% $5,227,933 11.3% 

South Dakota* $584,100 5.9% $346,000 1.5% $197,000 3.6% $222,000 2.8% $1,349,100 2.9% 

Utah* $381,134 3.9% $427,000 1.9% $229,229 4.2% $760,000 9.6% $1,797,363 3.9% 

Washington $383,395 3.9% $1,490,000 6.5% $384,221 7.0% $385,226 4.9% $2,642,842 5.7% 

Wyoming* $463,000 4.7% $846,602 3.7% $151,300 2.7% $466,456 5.9% $1,927,358 4.2% 

Other(1) $766,300 $80,000 0.4% $0 $0 $846,300 

Total $9,854,698 $22,812,590 $5,508,105 $7,935,599 $46,110,992 

$32,667,288 

Competitive Grants 

Volunteer Fire Assistance Rural Fire Assistance TOTAL (2) 

National Total $51,727,402 

$10,419,113 $9,942,744 $72,089,259 

Source: FY 2002 Performance Report - National Fire Plan, January 2003; * individual state records; (1) Guam and American Samoa, CNMI and other Pacific 

Islands; (2) Not all of these funds are administered by the State Forester.

The damages to watersheds impact 

urban areas miles from the fire. 

Major fires were the result of 

decadent forest health and drought. 

a model community for the combined issues of forest health and fire hazard reduction in 

the wildland/urban interface. Here overstocked, decadent pine forests surround a thriving 

city with normal high fire danger exacerbated by continuing drought. A strong coalition of 

government agencies, corporate sponsors, and community associations is making excellent 

progress in its attempt to restore forest health and reduce fire hazard in the metropolitan 

area. 

• One of the most important values at risk from wildfire, urban watershed, was highlighted 

in 2002 when the Hayman Fire burned much of the Denver watershed on the South Platte 

River. Many millions of dollars must be invested to reduce erosion and siltation and to 

protect the municipal water system from potential damage. A severe storm and flood could 

incapacitate the water system for millions of people. The same potential exists in hundreds 

of western communities. Everybody benefits from watershed fire protection or suffers from 

lack of it. 

• Fire Season 2002 was busy, intense, and difficult throughout the West, and punctuated by 

record-sized fires in Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon. Major fires were the result of decadent 

forest health and 

drought. Despite the severity 

of the fire season and the 

scope of damages, there were 

some success stories. Often 

crown fires were controlled 

when they reached a completed 

thinning projects, 

proving the effectiveness of 

the concept of fuel reduction; 

much of the NFP project 

work is targeted at wildland/ 

urban interface communities 

that are at greatest risk from 

wildfire; and cooperative 

efforts improved the level of 

fire protection in many areas. 

6

• Firefighter safety should continue to be emphasized, but not to the extent of employing 

avoidance strategies. Fire Order #1: “Fight fire aggressively, but provide for safety first” 

needs to be reemphasized. 

• Fires will continue to get 

bigger, costlier, and more 

damaging due to existing 

and worsening weather and 

fuel conditions, wildland/ 

urban interface spread, 

inadequate pre-suppression, 

failed suppression actions, 

strategic and tactical limitations, 

legal constraints, 

philosophical differences, 

and human factors. 

• Fire Season 2003 and 

years ahead, may be as bad 

or worse, depending on variable weather conditions, especially if, as is predicted, the 

drought continues in the West. Structure loss will continue to be high, as the wildland/ 

urban interface continues to expand. 

Wildland fires in the West will get 

bigger, costlier and be more 

damaging. 

Structure loss will continue to be 

high! 

7

Acknowledgments 

Western State Fire Managers 

Joe Stam, AK 

David Behrens, AZ 

Jim Wright, CA 

Rich Homann, CO 

Wayne Ching, HI 

Brian Shiplett, ID 

Casey McCoy, KS 

Tim Murphy, MT 

Don Westover, NE 

Bob Ashworth, NV 

Frank Smith, NM 

Mike Santucci, ND 

Bill Lafferty, OR 

Steve Hasenohrl, SD 

David Dalrymple, UT 

Skip Simmons, WA 

Ray Weidenhaft, WY 

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of the Western State Fire Managers; 

without their help this report would not be possible. We would also like to thank the following 

individuals who graciously contributed their time, knowledge and experience to this report: 

Arizona: 

Kevin Boness and Russ Shumate, ASLD Fire Management Division 

Ken Butler and George Leech, BIA Ft. Apache Agency 

Brian Cottam, Greater Flagstaff Forests Partnership 

Colorado: 

Jim Hubbard and Chuck Dennis, Colorado State Forest Service 

Idaho: 

Mike Tennery, Idaho Department of Lands 

Larry Isenberg and Lori Barnes, FireSmart Kootenai County 

Roberta Black, Kootenai County Local Emergency Planning Committee 

Peggy Polichio, Idaho Department of Lands and Idaho National Forest 

Montana: 

Paula Rosenthal, Montana Department of Natural Resources Conservation 

Sherry Devlin, the Missoulian. 

Oregon: 

Dan Thorpe, Oregon Department of Forestry 

Chief Bret Fillis, Applegate Valley Rural Fire Protection District No. 9 

Greg Chandler and Brian Keating, BLM Medford District. 

Council of Western State Foresters 

Jeff Jahnke, Liaison with the Western State Foresters 

Jim Lawrence, Western Forestry Coordination Center 

8

Introduction 

Before we begin discussing the National Fire Plan and the extent of the 2002 fire season, 

we need to present some background on the fire problem in the West and how each of the 

wildland firefighting agencies is organized. 

Fire in the West was first published to document the extent and nature of wildfire in the 

Western United States. It for the first time documented the numbers of fires, by size class and 

type, for the 17 western states. It also described the authorities and responsibilities of each of 

the state forestry organizations. The first edition of Fire in the West was published in 1998, and 

within it there was also the first attempt to define levels of wildland fire protection. 

Fire in the West is a report to the 

Council of Western State Foresters 

on the status of fire in the West. 

Wildland Fire Protection in the West 

Fire is an integral part of the natural environment of the Western United States. Each year 

thousands of fires damage or destroy hundreds of thousands of acres of grass, brush, and timber. 

More and more frequently, structures are destroyed and lives put at risk by wildfire throughout 

the West. Fire respects no governmental boundaries, so it crosses them regularly. The following 

definitions will give the reader a basic understanding of the complications involved with wildland 

fire protection. 

Fire is an important part of the natural 

environment. 

Levels of Government 

In the United States, there are three basic levels of government: local, state and federal. 

Each level of government has different authorities and responsibilities. 

• Local government is defined as incorporated cities, counties, boroughs, or special districts. 

There are thousands of local entities in the West, most of which have their own fire authority 

or agency. The protection of life and property is the primary function of a local government 

fire department. The vast majority of local fire agencies are not adequately trained or 

equipped to fight wildland fires. 

9

• State governments address the wildfire issue in varying ways. Several states have adopted 

laws that direct the State Forester to provide wildland fire protection and provide funding, 

personnel, and equipment to deliver services. Other states give the responsibility of providing 

wildland fire protection to the State Forester, but do not provide funding for such protection. 

Only Nevada has given it’s State Forester the responsibility to provide protection to the same 

level as traditional local government fire departments. In most states, there may be more than 

one state agency that has some role to play in wildland fire protection. There are the State 

Forester, the State Emergency Services agency, the National Guard, and the State Fire Marshal, 

to name a few. 

Sharing protection responsibilities 

between agencies is common. 

• Federal land management agencies provide differing levels of wildland fire protection depending 

on their authorities and responsibilities. The levels of fire protection provided by the 

USDA Forest Service and the USDI Bureau of Land Management differ from that provided 

by the USDI National Park Service, simply because their missions are different. 

In some cases, the various authorities and responsibilities between federal, state and local 

agencies may be overlapping and in conflict. This can lead to confusion and frustration. The 

wildland fire protection problem is further compounded by the fact that these types of fires 

know no boundaries. 

Areas of Responsibility 

There are many different areas of responsibility. The area of responsibility for a city or 

special district is easily defined; it is the area within the city limits or district. The area of 

responsibility for a federal agency is the land they administer. The area of responsibility for a 

State is usually most complex. This area, called state responsibility area, is defined in a piece 

of legislation that places “qualifiers” on the land. It may be land owned by the State, or all 

forested lands within the State that are not within an incorporated city or owned by the federal 

government, or all privately owned forested lands. 

A direct protection area is that area of the State where State forces provide direct fire 

protection. The direct protection area usually includes state responsibility area, but it also may 

include lands of another agency that it protects under the authority of a cooperative agreement. 

The best example of this type of protection is when a state protects federal lands that are adjacent 

to state protected lands, or when the Forest Service protects private lands within the national 

forest. 

10

A local protection area is an area where the State has not 

declared it has a direct responsibility. This may be nonforested 

areas within a city or fire district. The primary fire 

protection responsibility in these areas lies with a local governmental 

entity, or there may be no protection at all. 

Protection Schemes (State Forestry Agencies) 

To fully understand the extent of the wildland fire protection 

in the West, there has to be a discussion of the various 

types of protection provided by the States. As mentioned, there 

is a vast difference in the authorities, responsibilities, and the 

levels of protection provided (Figure 1). There are three general 

types of wildland fire protection provided by the States: 

• Direct Protection – A State is providing direct protection 

when it provides funding for personnel and equipment to 

protect it’s state responsibility area. There is a command 

authority and direct employment of firefighting personnel 

designated to provide protection. Examples: Alaska, California, 

Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. 

Area Protected (in acres) 

Direct Cooperative Coordination Total 

Alaska 151,695,898 151,695,898 

Arizona 22,200,000 22,200,000 

California 31,174,492 11,000,000 42,174,492 

Colorado 25,958,109 15,474,870 41,432,979 

Hawaii 850,000 3,306,300 4,156,300 

Idaho 6,025,690 6,025,690 

Kansas 46,400,000 46,400,000 

Montana 5,164,927 45,309,480 50,474,407 

Nebraska 49,083,520 49,083,520 

Nevada 11,999,791 20,919,540 32,919,331 

New Mexico 42,500,000 42,500,000 

North Dakota 31,878,661 31,878,661 

Oregon 11,300,000 2,300,000 13,600,000 

South Dakota 949,117 47,000,000 47,949,117 

Utah 15,000,000 15,000,000 

Washington 12,637,000 12,637,000 

Wyoming 4,237,000 24,863,000 29,100,000 

• Cooperative Protection – A state is providing cooperative 

protection when it provides funding for the protection of it’s 

state responsibility area, but provides the protection using 

other agencies’ forces under a cooperative agreement. There 

is a command authority and limited firefighting forces, but 

the primary firefighting forces are another agency’s employees. 

Examples: Arizona, New Mexico and Utah. 

• Coordinated Protection – A State is providing coordinated 

protection when it does not have funding to provide suppression activities, but provides coordination of 

wildland fire prevention activities and suppression efforts throughout the State. Fire protection of 

privately owned lands is the responsibility of local agencies. Examples: North Dakota, Kansas, and 

Nebraska. 

11 

261,992,024 138,309,480 238,925,891 639,227,395 

Figure 1. Each State defines its responsibility differently. If the State establishes 

a direct protection area and provides funding and resources to protect it, this is 

direct protection. Other States may take the responsibility to assist in protection, 

but use forces from other agencies to protect the area...this is considered 

cooperative protection. The third type of protection is coordinated protection. 

This is when the State has given the State Forester broad responsibilities, but 

limited funding to provide the protection.

The States use various sources to 

fund fire protection. 

There may be hybrids of these three types of protection. An example is Montana. They 

provide direct protection to 5 million acres of privately or State owned lands, but they also 

provide cooperative protection on 45 million acres of non-forested private lands in the eastern 

part of the State. 

Funding Sources and Levels of Protection 

The States use various sources to fund fire protection (Figure 2). Some use general fund 

revenues, others use fees collected specifically for wildland fire protection. California is unique 

in that it contracts with local entities to provide municipal type fire protection services, but can 

use these forces to supplement it’s wildland fire protection operations. Nevada is unique also in 

that they have the responsibility to provide full service fire protection in specific areas, just as 

any municipal fire department would. 

The federal government also provides State and 

local entities with funds. There are two USDA 

Forest Service grant programs, State Fire Assistance 

(previously know as the Rural Fire Prevention and 

Control Program) used to fund certain State fire 

programs, and Volunteer Fire Assistance (previously 

know as the Rural Community Fire Protection 

Program) used to fund rural fire protection programs. 

Volunteer Fire Assistance and State Fire 

Assistance are matching grant programs administered 

by the various State Foresters. There is also a 

new USDI grant program, Rural Fire Assistance, 

that is available. 

Figure 2. Wildland fire protection can be very complicated. There may be areas where the protection 

responsibilities overlap and may even be in conflict. Local authority is usually the simplest. State 

responsibilities differ with each State and usually overlay local government. Federal protection 

responsibilities differ between the agencies, and the federal government provides some funding to the 

States and volunteer organizations in the West. 

Funding Levels 

The funding of the various State forestry organizations 

varies as widely as their authorities. California 

has by far the largest program. The millions 

they are budgeted covers the cost of one of the 

largest fire protection programs in the world. 

12

Federal funding is a significant source of funding for several States. The loss of this 

money to the States would jeopardize their programs. Each year the Western States receive 

several million dollars under the State Fire Assistance 

program. Also, the federal government funds a limited 

number of volunteer fire operations. 

Local Government Fire Departments 

Every State forestry organization attempts to maintain 

good working relationships with the fire departments 

within their State. The number of fire departments varies 

greatly in the West. Hawaii has only seven to deal with 

where California has over 900 fire departments in the 

State. There are over 6,000 local fire departments in the 

Western States (Figure 3). The actual number of fire 

departments is actually decreasing, due to consolidations. 

Several States rely totally on local departments to 

suppress wildland fires within the State. In the remaining 

States, the local fire departments are used for initial attack, 

and when the situation becomes critical the fire departments 

are called upon to provide depth to the fire attack. 

Local fire departments often play a major role in 

protecting structures that are being threatened by a wildland/urban 

interface fire. None of the western States can 

adequately deal with a wildland/urban interface fire situation 

without the assistance of local fire departments and 

the cooperation of the Federal land management agencies. 

In some parts of the West, rural fire departments are not 

supported by taxing authorities. 

Number of Local 

Fire Departments 

Alaska 288 

Arizona 252 

California 927 

Colorado 398 

Hawaii 7 

Idaho 170 

Kansas 673 

Montana 412 

Nebraska 490 

Nevada 211 

New Mexico 359 

North Dakota 396 

Oregon 438 

South Dakota 364 

Utah 230 

Washington 560 

Wyoming 235 

6,410 

Figure 3. Local fire departments play a 

vital role in the protection of each state’s 

wildland resources. They especially come 

into play for structure protection during a 

wildland/urban interface fire. 

Local fire departments are key 

resources for initial attack and 

structure protection. 

13

The Wildland/Urban Interface 

The wildland/urban interface fire 

problem is not just a problem in 

California...it is a problem in the West. 

The wildland/urban interface fire problem has existed for hundreds of years. As early as 

1793 the Governor of Upper and Lower California issued a proclamation that “prohibited all 

kinds of burning, not only in the vicinity of towns, …which cause some 

detriment…”. In the last 50 years the problem has become more complex 

as the population has grown and more development has moved 

into the wildlands. Starting with the Bel Air Fire in 1961, 

California became a focal point for this new fire problem, 

where forest or brush fires moved into, and 

sometimes through, residential subdivisions, 

destroying large numbers of homes. In the last 20 

years of the Twentieth Century, the wildland/urban 

interface fire problem began to appear in such 

geographically diverse areas as central Florida, 

eastern Washington, central Colorado, and even 

Long Island, New York. Now, each fire season 

seems to produce several major wildfires somewhere 

in the United States, and especially in the 

West, that destroy large numbers of homes or 

other buildings. 

Definitions 

The wildland/urban interface is any area where humans and their developments meet or 

are intermixed with wildland fuels. These locations can be as different as the pine forests of 

Flagstaff, the brush fields of San Bernardino, the palmetto thickets of Orlando, or the maple 

forests of Boston. Anywhere that buildings are erected in the woods, sooner or later, wildfire 

will be a threat to those buildings. 

In recent years, fire professionals have developed standardized terminology to describe 

four different wildland/urban interface conditions: Interface, Intermix, Occluded, and Rural 

(See Appendix for complete definitions). These common descriptors allow for interchange of 

data and ideas among fire professionals from different regions on how to mitigate this growing 

wildland/urban interface fire problem. 

14

Responsibilities 

Historically, protecting structures (especially houses) from fire has 

been a function of local government, either through volunteer fire 

departments in small towns, or full-time paid firefighters in large 

cities. In the post WWII period of expansion of wildland fire 

protection in the US, wildland firefighting became a separate 

distinct specialty fire profession. After all, fighting fire in 

the forest was very different than fighting a fire in a 

house. Thus, municipal firefighters learned how to fight 

house fires and wildland firefighters learned how to 

fight wildfires, and seldom did the two meet. 

Wildfires destroy homes every year. 

As the houses spread into the wildlands, 

however, conflicts arose over whose responsibility it was (both physically 

and financially) to protect structures from encroaching wildfires. 

The federal wildland fire agencies did not want to bear the rapidly 

increasing costs of structure protection in the wildland/urban interface, 

and local government did not want to have to bear the costs of saving 

houses from fires managed, and sometimes created, by the feds. Neither 

side wanted to absorb the cost of the specialized training and 

equipment necessary to allow their firefighters to fight the other kind 

of fire. State wildfire agencies were frequently caught in the middle, 

trying to broker deals for enough structural fire resources to save a 

community with no assurance if and by whom these resource would be 

paid. Frequently Federal Emergency Management Agency funds have been 

used to pay the cost of trying to save a house from a wildfire as well as the 

cost of rebuilding the house when that effort failed. 

As the wildland/urban interface fire problem continues to spread, fire 

professionals from all agencies have found it necessary to better prepare to 

jointly participate in the protection of structures and communities from wildfires. 

Federal wildland fire management teams have learned to call upon 

municipal fire officers for the expertise and resources needed to prepare and 

execute effective structure protection plans during major wildfires. In some 

15

states, interagency agreements have decided in advance who will have not only the physical 

responsibility for structure protection, but also the financial responsibility. 

Adequate clearance is key! 

Solutions 

The key to successful fire operations in the wildland/urban interface is for all jurisdictional 

agencies to agree in advance to their specific roles and levels of financial commitment in 

the event of a wildfire. The most promising solutions to the wildland/urban interface fire problem 

in the West are coming from communities where federal, state, and local government fire 

agencies have banded together with community associations, local business, and service organizations 

to educate homeowners about the issue, sponsor projects to reduce fire hazards in the 

interface, and preplan a joint response to wildfires. 

The FireWise project has provided hundreds of 

community leaders the tools to undertake wildfire 

mitigation projects. State forestry agencies are using 

grant funding from a variety of sources to educate 

individual property owners on the importance of 

creating and maintaining defensible space around 

their homes, and to underwrite local community 

efforts in fire hazard reduction, especially the creation 

of community fuelbreaks and thinning of 

forests in and near communities. 

The wildland/urban interface fire problem is 

widespread and complex, and the local solutions 

will be successful only when all of the parties 

assume their fair share of the responsibility. 

16

Roles and Responsibilities 

Fire is part of the West. It is a good friend when used properly. It is an enemy when it kills, 

destroys property, watersheds, soils and livelihoods. Each of the states have developed fire 

protection systems that match their need. Each of the wildland fire agencies in the West has 

different roles and responsibilities, as determined by legislation and administrative regulations 

at both the federal and state levels. 

Federal Wildland Agencies 

The five federal land management agencies have different missions for stewardship of 

the public lands under their jurisdiction, some aspects of which may hinder traditional fire 

control methods or treat fire differently than adjacent/affected neighbors. These agencies and 

their fire missions are: 

• USDA Forest Service (FS): Administers National Forest System Lands with objectives 

ranging from intensive specific uses (e.g. recreation, timber production) to wilderness 

preservation, to protection of rare and endangered species. Fire is sometimes 

viewed as a management tool to help meet planned resource management objectives. 

Personnel are trained as wildland (not structural) firefighters and an extensive fire 

protection infrastructure exists in the West. 

The federal wildland agencies 

administer over 650 million acres in 

the West. 

• USDI Bureau of Land Management (BLM): Administers public domain lands, 

which in many cases in the West are lands unsuitable for growing commercial timber 

and are grass, sage, and brush-covered rangelands used historically primarily for livestock 

grazing. Land use objectives range from intensive special use (e.g. mining, oil 

production, recreation) to protection of endangered species. Fire is viewed as a management 

tool to help meet preplanned natural resource objectives. Personnel are trained as 

wildland (not structural) firefighters and a significant fire protection infrastructure exists 

in geographically separated areas of significant landholdings. Much BLM land receives 

primary wildland fire protection from state or local government fire agencies due to its 

being scattered, small parcels. 

• USDI National Park Service (NPS): Administers national parks, monuments, and 

recreation areas with a primary mission of preservation of natural resources or historic 

artifacts. Fire is viewed as a natural part of the ecosystem and human intervention is 

17

discouraged, except to protect lives and valuable improvements on the land. Because it often 

has “exclusive jurisdiction”, most NPS firefighters are trained and properly equipped to 

provide both wildland and structural fire protection services, as well as emergency medical 

care. Its fire protection infrastructure varies with the size and public use of the specific 

location and is widely scattered. 

The federal wildland agencies are not 

responsible for the protection of 

structures. 

• USDI Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS): Administers National Wildlife Refuges with a 

primary mission to protect habitat for wildlife. Fire is seen as a habitat management tool in 

some ecosystems, but because of the small size of most refuges, wildfire from outside 

sources can be a significant threat to the whole refuge and is aggressively controlled. With 

the exception of a few very large refuges, the FWS has few trained wildland fire personnel 

and a minimal amount of fire protection equipment, relying for most fire protection on 

neighboring state or local government fire agencies. 

Federal Land Ownership Data 

Forest Service 

Bur of Land 

Management 

Bur of Indian 

Affairs 

Fish and 

Wildlife 

Service 

• USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA): Administers Indian Reservations with the primary 

goal of protecting and providing resources that contribute to the social and economic 

well being of numerous tribes of Native Americans. Fire is used as a management tool to 

meet specific planned resource management objectives and wildfire is controlled as a public 

Areas, in acres. 

National 

Park Service 

Dept of 

Defense 

18 

Other 

Federal 

TOTAL 

Alaska 22,004,745 86,908,060 1,140,410 76,321,037 52,891,681 1,677,718 22,851 240,966,502 

Arizona 11,250,693 14,252,778 20,718,207 1,716,858 2,629,633 1,219,717 2,751 51,790,637 

California 20,627,691 14,556,074 191,020 323,642 4,615,013 1,753,493 434,695 42,501,628 

Colorado 14,501,592 8,296,512 32,835 81,574 574,689 415,473 358,175 24,260,850 

Hawaii 1 0 0 288,511 220,410 127,734 1,627 638,283 

Idaho 20,442,651 11,847,328 55,700 76,068 86,866 14,402 1,067,840 33,590,855 

Kansas 108,175 0 40,234 58,332 698 143,447 97,088 447,974 

Montana 16,872,610 8,060,382 1,074,907 1,153,013 1,221,314 2,540 316,204 28,700,970 

Nebraska 352,133 6,580 66,469 172,360 5,863 18,703 119,139 741,247 

Nevada 5,815,856 47,844,391 1,233,000 2,318,069 165,500 484,965 1,699,739 59,561,520 

New Mexico 9,326,599 12,770,569 8,349,148 384,251 371,827 3,180,226 453,865 34,836,485 

North Dakota 1,105,779 59,717 866,896 487,654 71,640 2,112 1,273,320 3,867,118 

Oregon 15,664,078 16,223,739 796,588 557,479 194,859 31,072 133,625 33,601,440 

South Dakota 2,013,628 279,869 5,002,056 198,086 263,629 890 60,455 7,818,613 

Utah 8,112,462 22,877,713 2,331,094 419,169 2,015,426 939,973 660,613 37,356,450 

Washington 9,174,956 370,110 2,602,254 186,369 1,932,401 433,251 752,979 15,452,320 

Wyoming 9,258,281 18,383,926 1,889,532 86,486 2,393,198 9,512 815,841 32,836,776 

TOTAL 166,631,930 262,737,748 46,390,350 84,828,958 69,654,647 10,455,228 8,270,807 648,969,668 

nuisance. Only the largest reservations 

have trained fire personnel and fire 

protection equipment. Many small 

reservations receive primary fire protection 

from state or local government fire 

agencies. A recent development is the 

increased economic vigor of those tribes 

that have developed casinos, which 

provide enough revenue that several 

tribal governments have developed their 

own independent fire departments. 

The roles and responsibilities of the 

wildland fire (state forestry) agencies in 

each of the 17 western states are outlined 

in the next section of this report.

State Forestry Agency 

Responsibilities and Protection Systems 

19

Alaska Division of Forestry - The Alaska Division of Forestry is a 

division within the Department of Natural Resources. 

Responsibility 

The Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources is charged with ...the protection 

of forested land in the State from fire and other destructive agents …commensurate with 

the value of the resources at risk, for the natural resources and watersheds on land that is 

owned privately, by the State, or by a municipality. 

The Commissioner has directed that...the Division of Forestry will provide for the protection 

of the natural surface resources, man-made improvements and human life from the threat 

of wildland fire for all lands under State and private ownership, with the exception of: (A.) 

Private land protected by the Federal government as enacted by law; (B.) Any land within a 

borough or municipality whose organized fire department has accepted protection responsibility. 

Protection System 

The Alaska Division of Forestry is responsible for the protection of 151.7 million acres. 

The USDI, Bureau of Land Management through it’s Alaska Fire Service, protects 192 million 

acres and the USDA, Forest Service protects the 26 million acres of federal lands within the 

national forests. 

The Division employs 22 full-time employees and hires over 160 temporary or seasonal 

firefighters. During the peak fire season period, the Division staffs 37 engine companies and 

operates or contracts for 2 airtankers, 2 air attacks, 4 fixed wing aircraft, and 7 helicopters. 

In an effort to improve efficiency and effectiveness, the Division of Forestry entered into a 

cooperative agreement with the USDI, Bureau of Land Management to divide the State into two 

direct protection areas. The Bureau provides wildland fire protection to all of the federal, state, 

and private lands in the north part of the State and the Division provides protection in the south. 

The Forest Service continues to protect their own land. 

20

State statutes provide that cities and boroughs may provide structural fire protection within 

their jurisdiction or within specifically formed service areas. Even though the Division’s area of 

responsibility overlaps with local jurisdictional areas, the protection services provided by both 

governmental entities do not normally conflict with each other except when a wildland fire (the 

State’s responsibility) threatens a structure (the local jurisdiction’s responsibility). 

To enhance the wildland fire protection within the Division’s direct protection area, they 

have entered into cooperative fire protection agreements with 56 city and borough fire agencies. 

The main purpose of these agreements is to provide assistance to the Division when a fire 

occurs in the area or to provide protection during the “non-fire season” periods when the Division 

does not staff it’s fire equipment. There are 288 organized fire departments in the State. 

Fire Activity 

Alaska averages just over 300 wildland fires and burns just under 227,000 acres a year. 

The annual acreage burned varies significantly from 16,585 acres in 1995 to over a million 

acres in 1997. Debris burning is the single most frequent cause at 33 percent, with miscellaneous 

as the second highest causal rate at 24 percent. An average of 91 percent of fires were 

contained at under 10 acres with an average fire size of 0.51 acres. The average size of fires 

over 10 acres was 7,058 acres. Alaska is unique in it’s size in that it constitutes over 25 percent 

of the total acres in all of the 17 Western States. 

During Fire Season 2002, Alaska had 399 fires that burned 802,515 acres, well above the 

10-year average for both numbers and acres. 

21

Arizona Fire Management Division - The Arizona Fire Management 

Division is a division of the Arizona State Land Department. 


The State of Arizona has declared ...The State Forester shall have the authority to prevent 

and suppress any wildfires on State and private lands located outside incorporated municipalities 

and, if subject to cooperative agreements, on other lands located in this State or in other 

States, Mexico and Canada (Arizona revised Statute 37-623). The Division has the responsibility 

to protect 22,447,000 acres of the State. 


The Arizona Fire Management Division maintains Cooperative Intergovernmental Agreements 

or Joint Powers Agreements with various local, state and federal agencies for the response 

of over 1,000 engine companies to suppress fires under the State’s jurisdiction. There are 

approximately 250 organized fire departments in the State. 


Arizona averages just over 450 wildland fires and burns about 14,000 acres a year. The ten 

year statistics show that the number of fires have declined over the last ten years. In 1995, they 

had 796 fires, whereas in 1998, they had about a 50 percent reduction to 396 fires. The annual 

acreage burned varies from 3,057 acres in 1997 to 630,075 acres in 1995. Miscellaneous is the 

single most frequent cause at 51 percent of fires, with lightning as the second highest causal rate 

at 16 percent. An average of 83 percent of fires were contained at under 10 acres with an average 

size of 1.1 acres. The average size of fires over 10 acres was just under 439 acres. 

In Fire Season 2002, Arizona had 530 fires that burned 46,645 acres, well above the 5-year 

average. Lightning fires were about average and “miscellaneous” continued to be the leading 

fire cause. The Rodeo-Chediski Fire (468,638 acres) which started on the BIA’s Fort Apache 

Agency, was the largest fire in Arizona’s recorded history. 

22

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection - The 

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection is part of the State’s Resources 

Agency. 


The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) is required to protect 

State and privately owned watershed lands as designated by the State’s Board of Forestry. The 

law defines watershed lands as...lands covered wholly or in part by forests or by trees producing 

or capable of producing forest products. Lands covered wholly or in part by timber, brush, 

undergrowth, or grass, whether of commercial value or not, which protect the soil from excessive 

erosion, retard runoff of water or accelerate water percolation... Lands in areas which are 

principally used or useful for range or forage purposes, which are contiguous to the lands 

described (above) (PRC 4126). The following lands are excluded from State protection...Lands 

owned or controlled by the federal government or any agency of the federal government. Lands 

within the exterior boundaries of any city...(PRC 4127). Roughly one-third of the State is 

classed as “state responsibility area,” or about 31.3 million acres. 

The Department directly protects about 27.7 million acres. Some of this acreage includes 

land managed by the USDA Forest Service, and the USDI Bureau of Land Management. The 

“state responsibility area” that is not protected by CDF is either protected by various federal 

agencies or several local fire agencies know as “contract counties.” 

The Department has the authority via cooperative agreements, to provide full-service fire 

protection to cities, counties, and fire districts. Such contracts add an additional 11 million acres 

to CDF’s direct protection responsibilities. 


The Department fields a force of close to 17,000 firefighters (3,800 full-time fire professionals, 

foresters, and administrative personnel; 1,400 seasonal firefighters; 5,500 local agency 

volunteers under CDF control; 2,600 State Volunteers in Prevention; and over 3,800 inmate and 

ward firefighters). This force of firefighters operate 1,025 engine companies (336 funded by the 

23

State, and 689 locally funded and controlled by CDF), 21 airtankers, 10 helicopters, 13 air 

attack aircraft, 58 initial attack bulldozer companies, and 195 Type 1 fire crews. 


California averages just about 6,000 wildland fires and burns about 128,000 acres a year. 

The five year statistics show that the number of fires in California are fairly consistent from 

year-to-year.. The annual acreage burned varies from 57,788 acres in 1997 to 277,750 acres in 

1999. Equipment use is the single most frequent cause at 37 percent, with miscellaneous as the 

second highest causal rate at 33 percent. An average of 95 percent of fires are contained at 

under 10 acres with an average size of 0.47 acres. The average size of fires over 10 acres was 

1,250 acres. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection responds to over 

290,000 calls for help each year with the vast majority of these calls (51 percent) being for 

medical assistance. 

In Fire Season 2002, California had 5,759 wildfires that burned 112,810 acres, slightly 

below the 5-year average. That total included five Class G fires, which averaged about 16,000 

acres. 

The worst fires in California in 2002 were the McNally Fire (150,696 acres) on the Sequoia 

National Forest and the Pines Fire (61,690 acres) in the CDF’s San Diego Unit. 

24

Colorado State Forest Service - The Colorado State Forest Service is 

a State agency within the Colorado State University System 


State of Colorado statutes declare ...It is State policy of this State to prevent and control 

forest fires on or threatening the forest land of the State (public or private) in order to preserve 

forest and other natural resources....and prevent loss of life and damage to property from 

wildfires and other conflagrations (23-30-301). The actual fire suppression action is provided 

by over 400 fire protection districts, rural fire departments, and sheriff departments. 

The responsibility for the suppression of wildland fires is assigned to the Sheriff of each 

Colorado County. The Sheriff ... in case of any forest or prairie fire, is to assume charge thereof 

or to assist other governmental authorities in such emergencies for controlling or extinguishing 

such fires...The State forester may assume the duty with concurrence of the Sheriff (30-10-513). 


The Colorado State Forest Service protects cooperatively with the County Sheriffs approximately 

41 million acres of the State. Initial calls go directly to the Sheriff’s Office or an 

interagency dispatch center. The Colorado State Forest Service may respond with a line officer 

and may assume control upon mutual agreement of the County Sheriff and the State Forester. 

The Colorado State Forest Service provides 140 federal excess property engines to local 

fire departments and county sheriffs for use in fighting wildland fires. In addition, 16 stateowned 

engines are available and over 1720 fire department engines are listed on resource 

forms. The state maintains cooperative agreements with various federal wildland fire agencies, 

county sheriff departments, and fire departments. The State also maintains a seasonal contract 

for single engine airtanker(s) that can be used by local firefighters. 


Colorado averages just over 2,300 wildland fires that burn just under 82,000 acres a year 

on State and private land. The five-year statistics show that the number of fires in Colorado has 

25

increased since 1999. The annual acreage burned varies significantly from 10,282 acres in 1998 

to over 244,000 in 2002. The single most frequent cause of fires reported falls within the 

miscellaneous category at 52 percent, with debris burning as the second highest causal rate at 17 

percent. Containment is reached on average at fewer than 10 acres on 93 percent of the fires, 

with 0.61 acres being the average size of fires in this category. Fires that grow beyond 10 acres 

reach an average size of 627 acres. 

In Fire Season 2002, Colorado had 3,409 wildfires that burned a total of 244,252 acres, 

well above the 5-year average. The two largest fires burned a total of over 207,000 acres. There 

were significantly more lightning fires than normal. 

The Hayman Fire (137,760 acres) which started on the Pike National Forest in June 2002 

is the largest fire in Colorado’s recorded history. 

26

Hawaii Division of Forestry and Wildlife - The Hawaii Division of 

Forestry and Wildlife is one of nine divisions within the Department of Land and 

Natural Resources. 


The Hawaii Division of Forestry and Wildlife is responsible to...provide direct fire protection 

to forest reserves, natural area reserves, public hunting areas, wildlife and plant sanctuaries 

and other lands under the jurisdiction of the Division of Forestry and Wildlife. This encompasses 

approximately 850,000 acres. The Division has a secondary protection responsibility on 

3.3 million acres of other state-owned lands. 


Cooperative agreements are maintained with four local government fire agencies, one on 

each of the islands (Kauai, Oahu, Maui, and Hawaii). These resources are the first responders 

and are relied upon for direct fire suppression activities. Cooperative agreements also exist 

between the U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii, the National Park Service, the Pacific 

Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands, Kauai and the Nature Conservancy of Hawaii. 


Hawaii averages just over 150 wildland fires and burns about 12,000 acres a year. The ten 

year statistics show that the number of fires in Hawaii is “level,” although the numbers vary 

considerably. They had only 67 fires in 1997, but over 230 in 1995. The annual acreage burned 

varies significantly from only 377 acres in 1997 to over 37,000 in 1998. Miscellaneous is the 

single most frequent cause at 48 percent with arson as the second highest causal rate at 16 

percent. An average of 80 percent of fires were contained at under 10 acres with an average size 

of 1.2 acres. The average size of fires over 10 acres was 694 acres. 

This past year, Hawaii had 188 fires that burned 2,377 acres. This is well below the average 

acres burned. 

27

28 

Idaho Department of Lands, Bureau of Fire 

Management - The IDL Bureau of Fire Management is 

part of the Department of Lands. 


The Department of Lands is required to protect State and private forests. The Idaho 

Forestry Act States; “Any forest or range fire burning out of control...is hereby declared a 

public nuisance, by reason of its menace to life and/or property. ...The director of the Department 

of Lands or any fire warden may summarily abate the nuisance thus constituted by 

controlling or extinguishing such fire...” (38-107). The Act also states ...every owner of forest 

land will: (a) provide their own forest fire protection, or (b) join an association of forest 

landowners to provide forest fire protection, or failing either of the first two options; (c) the 

director of the Department of Lands will provide the protection (38-111). 


The Department is divided into eleven districts and operates 57 engine companies to 

protect just over 6 million acres. Staffing is provided with full-time and seasonal employees. 

There are 170 local government fire departments in Idaho. 


Idaho averages about 500 wildland fires and burns about 62,000 acres a year. The ten 

year statistics show that the number of fires in Idaho is increasing. However, 2000 was an 

exceptional year when the number of lightning fires were up about 60% and debris burning 

fires were nearly double the average. The annual acreage burned varies significantly from 533 

acres in 1995 to over 142,000 in 2000. Lightning is the single most frequent cause at 49 

percent with debris burning as the second highest causal rate at 15 percent. An average of 95 

percent of fires were contained at under 10 acres, with an average size of 0.549 acres. The 

average size of fires over 10 acres was 2,445 acres. 

Fire Season 2002 was below average for Idaho, with 386 wildfires burning only 7,972 

acres, well below the 5-year average.

Kansas Forest Service - The Kansas Forest Service is a state agency 

within the Kansas State University. 


The Kansas Forest Service is responsible for ...providing assistance for the prevention and 

suppression of forest, brush or grassland fires in non-federal areas of the State except on lands 

within the exterior boundaries of incorporated cities (KSA 76-425A through 76-425F, as 

amended). This area is approximately 46.4 million acres. 


All of the fire protection on these lands is provided by various rural fire departments and 

districts. There are 673 fire departments or districts in the State. The Kansas Forest Service 

maintains cooperative agreements with 506 of them, providing equipment, training and assistance 

with funding, prevention and planning. 


Kansas averages just over 4,700 wildland fires and burns just under 56,000 acres a year. 

The five year statistics show that the number of fires in Kansas are on a slight rise. The annual 

acreage burned varied from 31,676 acres in 1998 to over 93,000 acres in 2002. Debris burning 

is the single most frequent cause at 36 percent. An average of 75 percent of the fires were 

contained at under 10 acres with an average size of 1.48 acres. The average size of fires over 10 

acres was 759 acres. 

Fire Season 2002 was about the same as 2000 in Kansas, but not nearly as bad as 1996, 

when more than 430,000 acres burned. The State had 50 large fires (>300 acres) in 2002. Ten 

fires burned over 1,000 acres each. The largest, burning 12,000 acres in Greenwood County in 

April, was the result of improper disposal of hot ashes. 

29

Montana DNRC Fire and Aviation Program - The Montana 

DNRC Fire and Aviation Program is within the Montana Department 

of Natural Resources and Conservation, Forestry Division. 


The State of Montana has declared ...That the Department shall protect the natural resources 

of the State from fire and that the Department is responsible for fire protection on all 

forest lands within this State that are officially classified by the Department as forest lands... 

(MCA 76-13-101 and 103). The Department has declared 5.1 million acres of State and private 

lands as forested and under their jurisdiction. This includes privately owned forested lands 

within the boundaries of an incorporated city. Priority is given to the protection of forested lands 

owned by the State. The State has given the Department a secondary protection for 45.3 million 

acres of State and privately owned non-forested lands in the State. These lands are predominately 

found in eastern Montana. 


The Montana DNRC Fire and Aviation Program staffs 65 engine (and water tender) companies 

and five helicopters to protect the 5.1 million acres. Montana DNRC also loans over 350 

engines to local fire agencies, primarily in the eastern part of the State. DNRC is also given the 

responsibility to coordinate all mutual aid responses of fire department resources that cross 

county lines. 


Montana averages just over 450 wildland fires and burns just under 72,000 acres a year. 

The five year statistics show that the number of fires in Montana are about level. The annual 

acreage burned varied from 3,430 acres in 1997 to over 168,744 acres in 2000. Lightning is the 

single most frequent cause of fires at 48 percent with debris burning as the second highest causal 

rate at 14 percent. 

For Fire Season 2002, Montana had 471 fires that burned 28,811 acres. While the number 

of fires is even with the 5-year average, the acres burned are less than half. 

30

Nebraska Forest Service - The Nebraska Forest Service is part of 

the University of Nebraska system. 


The State of Nebraska has given the State Forester powers to “develop and implement 

plans for the prevention and suppression of forest, brush, and grassland fires on both public 

and private lands.” This means the Nebraska Forest Service has a secondary protection responsibility 

for 49,083,520 acres—the entire State. 


Local government provides the protection for the State. The Nebraska Forest Service 

coordinates training and grant distribution. There are 476 rural fire districts in Nebraska. 


Nebraska averages just over 1,300 wildland fires and burns just over 110,000 acres a year. 

The five year statistics show that the number of fires in Nebraska are on a slight increase. The 

annual acreage burned varied from 17,230 acres in 2001 to over 252,000 acres in 2000. Debris 

burning is the second most frequent cause at 26 percent with miscellaneous as the highest 

causal rate at 30 percent. An average of 77 percent of fires were contained at under 10 acres 

with an average size of 1.34 acres. The average size of fires over 10 acres was 694 acres. 

In Fire Season 2002, Nebraska had 1,835 fires that burned 90,562 acres. This is a high 

level of occurrence, but the acreage burned was below average despite five Class G fires. 

31

Nevada Division of Forestry - The Nevada Division of Forestry 

is a division of the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural 

Resources. 


Nevada statute mandates the State Forester Firewarden to ...administer all fire control laws 

and all forestry laws in Nevada outside of township boundaries. In addition to providing fire 

protection to State and privately owned lands, “the State Forester Firewarden is also mandated 

to “assist and encourage county or local fire protection districts to create legally constituted 

fire protection districts where they are needed and offer guidance and advice in their operation. 

A change in the boundaries of a fire protection district, including withdrawals of any portion, 

may be denied by the State Forester Firewarden if he determines such change will impair or 

affect it’s organization, or affect, impair, or discharge any contract, obligation, lien, or charge 

on which it might be liable or chargeable had such change of boundaries not been made.” 

Since the Division derives some of it’s funding from property taxes, the level of protection it is 

obligated to provide is the same as that of a municipal fire department. The Division has direct 

protection responsibility for 9,501,784 acres of the State, and coordination responsibilities for 

an additional 17,433,631 acres. The Division responds to over 3,000 calls for help each year, 

with over half of them being medical aids or assistance to other agencies. 


The Nevada Division of Forestry employees approximately 230 full-time personnel including 

123 personnel within the fire program and an additional 40 seasonal employees. There are 

approximately 600 volunteer fire department members for which the Division pays industrial 

insurance coverage. The Division also cooperates closely with the 1,511 volunteer/career and 

volunteer fire departments throughout the State. The Division has a close working arrangement 

with the Department of Corrections to operate 77 twelve-person conservations crews plus one 

conservation crew specifically assigned to helitack. The Division maintains an insured fleet of 

nearly 600 vehicles. This fleet includes 185 engines, 39 water tenders and five bulldozers. The 

Division operates two helicopters, as well as one fixed wing aircraft. 

32


Nevada averages just under 230 wildland fires and burns over 23,000 acres a year. The five 

year statistics show that the number of fires in Nevada are fairly constant. The annual acreage 

burned varied from 418 acres in 1997 to over 87,000 acres in 2000. Debris burning is the most 

frequent cause at 30 percent, with miscellaneous second at 29 percent. An average of 90 percent 

of the fires were contained at under 10 acres with an average size of 1.0 acres. The average size 

of fires over 10 acres was 1,580 acres. 

For Fire Season 2002, Nevada had 269 fires that burned only 2,833 acres, well below their 

5-year average. 

33

New Mexico State Forestry Division - The New Mexico 

State Forestry Division is a division of the New Mexico Department of 

Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources. 


The State of New Mexico has declared ...The State shall have the responsibility for prevention 

and suppression of forest fires on all non-federal, non-municipal lands in the State (68-2- 

8). The Division has the responsibility to protect 42.5 million acres of the State. 


The Division maintains Cooperative Intergovernmental Agreements or Joint Powers 

Agreements with 230 county fire departments and 60 municipal fire departments and reimburses 

them for wildland fire suppression services. There are approximately 359 organized fire 

departments in the State. The Division maintains numerous Joint Powers Agreements with 

various state and federal agencies 


New Mexico averages about 800 wildland fires and burns just over 160,000 acres a year. 

The five year statistics show that the number of fires in New Mexico is highly variable. The 

annual acreage burned varied from 39,849 acres in 2001 to over 376,000 acres in 2000. Lightning 

is the single most frequent cause at 36 percent and miscellaneous is the second highest 

causal rate at 30 percent. An average of 69 percent of the fires were contained at under 10 acres 

with the average size of 1.5 acres. The average size of fires over 10 acres was 146 acres. 

New Mexico had 794 fires that burned 226,492 acres in Fire Season 2002. This is about 

average for number of fires and about 40% more than the average acres. Six Class G fires 

burned 100,876 acres. 

34

North Dakota Forest Service - The North Dakota Forest Service is 

a division of North Dakota State University. 


The State of North Dakota has declared ...The State Forester is specifically authorized to 

apply for, receive, and expend federal grants-in-aid and matching funds for fire protection 

services, and generally aid rural fire departments and rural fire protection districts with all 

activities customary in the prevention and suppression of forest, brush, and grassland fires. The 

State Forester has the responsibility to coordinate the wildland fire protection in North Dakota. 


There are 388 fire departments or fire districts in the State. They are responsible for the 

suppression of all fires on State or privately owned lands. The North Dakota Forest Service 

maintains cooperative agreements with 384 fire departments and fire districts. 


North Dakota averages over 500 wildland fires and burns nearly 66,000 acres a year. The 

five year statistics show that the number of fires in North Dakota are on the rise. The annual 

acreage burned varied from nearly 167,000 acres in 2002 to a low of 6,504 acres in 2001. 

Miscellaneous is the second most frequent cause at 21 percent with debris burning as the highest 

causal rate at 40 percent. An average of 83 percent of the fires were contained at less than 10 

acres with an average fire size of 1.59 acres. The average size of fires over 10 acres was 398 

acres. 

For Fire Season 2002, North Dakota had 325 fires that burned 29,565 acres. This is below 

the 5-year average, and less than one-half the acreage burned in 1999. 

35

Oregon Department of Forestry - The Oregon Department of Forestry 

works under the direction of the State Board of Forestry whose members are 

appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. The State Forester in 

turn is appointed by a seven person Board. 


The State of Oregon has declared that it is the responsibility of the individual forest landowners 

to protect their land from wildland fires. The landowner has three alternative ways of providing this 

protection: (1) they can provide for the direct protection themselves; (2) they can join a nonprofit 

association that will provide for the protection; or (3) they can allow the State to provide the 

protection. In all cases, the Board of Forestry must approve of the method of protection. 

There are about 13.6 million acres of private and state-owned forested lands in the State. No 

landowner has elected to protect their own lands, but many have joined one of the three protection 

associations. These associations protect about 2.3 million acres of the 13.6 million acres of private 

forest and State lands. Each landowner is assessed a fee to provide protection. 


The Department of Forestry and the three associations employ 162 permanent and 500 seasonal 

personnel to provide fire protection. They operate 228 engines, 14 initial attack bulldozer units, 19 

ten-person handcrews (inmates), 2 aircraft and contract for 2 single engine airtankers. 


Oregon has averaged over the last five years about 1,079 fires that burn about 35,169 acres. The 

5-year statistics show that the number of fires is very slowly increasing, however, the number of 

human caused fires, on a per capita basis, is falling. The leading cause is lighting (29%), with debris 

burning second (21%). 

For Fire Season 2002, Oregon had 1,175 fires that burned 99,047 acres. The number of fires is 

slightly above average and the number of acres burned is significantly above average. There were 

fewer lightning fires and more debris burning fires in 2002. The Biscut Fire (499,570 acres) on the 

Siskiyou National Forest burned nearly the entire Kamiopsis Wilderness and was one of the largest 

fires in recent Oregon history. 

36

South Dakota Wildland Fire Suppression Division - The South 

Dakota Wildland Fire Suppression Division is a division of the State’s Department 

of Agriculture. 


“The State of South Dakota has declared under 41-20-1.1. Employment of state wildland 

fire coordinator — Qualifications and general authority: The Department of Agriculture may 

employ a state wildland fire coordinator who shall be qualified for and authorized to carry out 

all wildfire suppression activities.” 

The Division is directly responsible for the protection of 949,117 acres of State and 

privately owned forested lands and has secondary protection of over 47 million acres of nonforested 

lands. 


The South Dakota Wildland Fire Suppression Division employs 19 full-time employees 

and 18 seasonal firefighters who operate 18 state-owned engines and water tenders. The State 

maintains cooperative agreements with various local, State, and federal agencies to work 

cooperatively to suppress wildland fires regardless of land ownership. The Division has signed 

agreements with various rural fire departments covering the dispatch of 440 engine companies 

located primarily in the Black Hills area. There are 364 organized rural fire departments in the 

State. 


South Dakota averages 674 wildland fires and burns just over 140,000 acres a year. The 

five-year statistics show that the number of fires in South Dakota is increasing. The majority of 

the fires reported occurred in the Black Hills area of western South Dakota. Lightning is the 

single most frequent cause of fires at 24 percent with debris burning as the second highest 

causal rate at 23 percent. An average of 67 percent of fires were contained at less than 10 acres. 

In Fire Season 2002, South Dakota had 725 fires that burned 166,928 acres. They had 5 

Class G fires that burned more than 94,000 acres. 

37

Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands - The 

Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands is part of the Department 

of Natural Resources. 


The Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands is responsible to determine and execute 

the best methods for protecting private and public lands by preventing and suppressing 

fires on non-federally owned forest, range, and watershed lands in unincorporated areas of the 

state. There are approximately 15 million acres of private, State and other lands which fall in 

the State’s area of responsibility. 


The Division employs district fire wardens who manage initial attack throughout the State. 

Rural fire departments are used extensively in the initial attack role, along with State and 

federal resources in closest forces system. The State, through a number of agencies, maintains 

suppression resources and management personnel to manage suppression operations that escape 

initial attack. They utilize suppression tactics and strategies that match the suppression effort 

with the values at risk. Where and when possible, fire is allowed to play its natural role in the 

environment commiserate with public and firefighter safety, property and resource values. Close 

cooperative relations exist with all counties, other State agencies and the federal fire agencies to 

provide suppression resources for use inside and outside the State. 


Utah averages over 700 wildland/urban interface fires and burns approximately 68,000 

acres of private and State lands each year. Acres burned varies from a low of 12,000 to over 

178,000 in a single season. On average, 50 percent of fires are human-caused. In the 2002 Fire 

Season, Utah had 613 fires that burned about 68,524 acres of private and State lands. Statistically, 

Utah had an average season; however, due to several large fires in remote parts of the 

State, 2002 was the most expensive fire season in history. Over $19 million was spent to 

suppress fire on private and State land. 

38

Washington Department of Natural Resources, Resource 

Protection Division - The Washington DNR Forest Fire Control Program 

is under the Commissioner of Public Lands, an elected official. 


The Washington DNR Forest Fire Control Program is responsible for the protection of all 

private and state forest lands. It also provides protection for lands that are adjacent to or intermingled 

with forest lands in eastern Washington. Responsibility is authorized under Washington 

RCW 76.04. Under cooperative agreement the Department also protects 15,000 acres of USDI 

Fish and Wildlife Service lands, 7,000 acres of USDI Bureau of Land Management lands, and 

226,000 acres for the USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs. Total area protected is approximately 12.5 

million acres. 


The Department staffs 114 initial attack engine companies, two 20-person crews, and 3 

helicopters. Of the 1,200 permanent personnel, 350 are fireline rated. An additional 350 seasonal 

firefighters are hired yearly. In addition, the Department contracts for one airtanker to 

supplement it’s initial attack suppression forces, and during critical periods, they can utilize up 

to 400 inmates from the State correctional system in handcrews. Mutual aid agreements are 

maintained with over 350 local government fire departments to supplement initial attack operations. 

There are 560 local government fire departments in Washington. 


Washington averages 850 wildland fires and burns an average of 13,000 acres a year. The 

five-year statistics show that the number of fires in Washington are declining just slightly. 

Annual acreage burned varied from 4,650 acres in 1997 to 23,511 acres in 1998. Miscellaneous 

is the single most frequent cause at 27 percent with debris burning as the second highest causal 

rate at 25 percent. An average of 95 percent of the fires were contained at under 10 acres with 

an average fire size of 0.62 acres. The average size of fires over 10 acres was 584 acres. 

In Fire Season 2002, Washington had 889 fires that burned 10,063 acres; above average for 

number of fires, but below for numbers of acres. 

39

Wyoming State Forestry Division - The Wyoming State Forestry 

Division is a division under the Director of the Office of State Lands 

and Investments. 


The State of Wyoming has declared ...The State Forester shall take such action as may be 

deemed necessary by the State Board of Land Commissioners, to protect forest, range, and other 

rural resources from fire. This responsibility shall in no way diminish the responsibility or authority 

of local fire protection districts (State statute 36-2-108(b)(i). The Division has the responsibility to 

protect 3.6 million acres of State owned lands. Most of the State lands are scattered (checkerboard) 

throughout the State. The Division also has the coordinating responsibility on an additional 27.1 

million acres of privately owned rural lands. 


The Division maintains the Wyoming Interagency Cooperative Fire Protection Agreement with 

all 23 counties in the State and the various federal land management agencies, for the response of 

over 4,000 volunteer firefighters and over 1,000 engine companies to suppress fires under the State’s 

jurisdiction. Approximately 425 of the locally operated engines have been obtained through the 

Federal Excess Property Program. The agreement authorizes the exchange of resources, dollars and 

other pre-suppression activities. There are approximately 172 organized fire departments in Wyoming. 


Wyoming averages 647 (State and private) wildland fires and burns an average of 129,000 

acres a year. The five year statistics show that the number of fires in Wyoming are on the increase. 

The annual acreage burned varied from 18,414 acres in 2001 to 358,648 acres in 2000. Lightning is 

the single most frequent cause at 30 percent with miscellaneous as the second highest causal rate at 

23 percent. An average of 83 percent of fires were contained at under 10 acres with an average fire 

size of 1.15 acres. The average size of fires over 10 acres was 2,741 acres. 

In Fire Season 2002, Wyoming had 815 fires that burned 163,226 acres, above the 5-year 

average. Fire Season 2002 saw only half as many Class G fires and half as many acres burned in 

Wyoming as in 2000. 

40

Suppression Policies - Fire Management vs. Fire Control 

Wildland fire protection in the West can be undertaken with any one of a variety of suppression 

policies, depending on the location and burning conditions of the fire, the mission of 

the fire protection jurisdiction responsible for suppression, and the land management policies of 

the landowner. 

Much of the wildland in the West is managed by one of the five big federal land management 

agencies. Usually, but not always, the federal agency that manages the land also is the 

agency with fire protection jurisdiction. In this situation, wildland fires are frequently managed 

(not necessarily suppressed) to achieve results in support of the agency’s land management 

plan. Three examples best illustrate the most common of these situations: 

Most wildfires are suppressed; some 

are managed. 

• A lightning fire in the high country of a national park burning under normal weather 

conditions may be allowed to burn while only being monitored by NPS personnel, as fire is 

a natural part of the landscape and NPS seeks to avoid human intervention (and damages) 

in the natural environment. If the fire grows too large, burns too intensely, or threatens 

improvements, the Park Service may decide to take suppression action. Otherwise, the fire 

may be allowed to burn itself out. 

• An unplanned ignition in a part of a national forest where hazard reduction, type conversion, 

etc. is part of an approved management plan may be managed to achieve specific land 

management objectives. Forest Service personnel may use indirect attack methods and 

back off to natural or man-made barriers some distance from the fire, achieving containment 

of the wildfire, but allowing it to burn at appropriate intensity in a watershed, cut 

block, or other land management unit where fire is an integral part of the approved management 

plan. 

• A fire burning on a military firing range may not be suppressed, but allowed to burn 

itself out to preplanned firebreaks, as entry into an area containing unexpended munitions 

would be hazardous to firefighters. 

41

Other fires on federal lands during the normal fire season will usually be suppressed by the 

agency with direct protection responsibility, as they usually start in the wrong place, burn with 

too much intensity or speed to meet land management criteria, or threaten improvements or 

other properties. 

Most wildland fire protection in the 

West is provided by either a state or 

federal agency. 

Most other wildland fire protection in the West is provided either by state forestry agencies, 

forest protective associations or by local government fire protection districts. In most cases 

these agencies are providing fire protection to lands owned or managed by someone else, so 

they lack the authority to make a decision about the use of fire on the landscape and operate 

under a policy of immediate, direct suppression of all wildfires. These same agencies may very 

well assist landowners in conducting prescribed burns for hazard reduction and land management 

purposes, but an unplanned wildfire is treated as a public nuisance and controlled as soon 

as practicable. In some cases, upon consultation with a landowner and a determination that the 

risks and cost-benefit ratios are appropriate, these wildland agencies may manage a fire to help 

the landowner (and the agency) achieve a specific goal, especially when this may reduce suppression 

costs. In some cases, a contained wildfire may be turned over to the landowner to 

monitor or extinguish, especially on large properties where the owner (e.g. rancher, timber 

company) has adequate private resources to maintain control of the fire. 

Complications 

A complicating factor arises when fire protection duties are delegated by the 

agency or jurisdiction to another agency for economic or operational reasons. For 

example, in some parts of the West, portions of a national forest may receive direct 

fire protection service from the state forestry agency, while the FS may protect 

private lands within the forest, saving each agency money. In Southwestern Oregon, 

BLM manages a great deal of timberland broken up into one section blocks 

intermixed with private property protected by the Oregon Department of Forestry 

(ODF). Since BLM does not wish to provide fire protection to private lands and it 

would be impractical for BLM to duplicate the existing ODF protection system, 

BLM contracts with ODF to provide fire protection to the public lands. BLM 

personnel still manage the land, plan and execute prescribed burns, serve on fire 

management teams, etc., but ODF is the primary provider of wildland fire protection 

services to the public, as well as the adjacent private lands (Figure 4). 

Figure 4. Thinning in Ponderosa Pine plantaion in Oregon. 

42

Figure 5. Rural interface condition; regrowth of brush in thinned pine 

plantation in Oregon. Note houses on slope in background. 

In recent years, in more and 

more parts of the West, the 

opportunity to manage a wildfire 

using an indirect suppression 

strategy has disappeared due to 

increased development and 

population growth in the wildlands. 

A thousand acres of forest 

near any metropolitan area may 

well have a hundred or more 

landowners, each with his/her 

own values, priorities, and plans 

for the land. The fire agencies 

cannot put themselves in the 

position of refereeing conflicts 

between landowners or other 

special interest groups, and 

therefore put the fire out first, 

and “ask questions later”. Any wildfire may soon threaten somebody else’s property, structures, 

water rights, viewshed, etc. and thus needs to be contained or controlled on the property of 

origin whenever possible (Figure 5). 

Unified command gives each agency a 

voice in the fire suppression 

operation. 

This is where conflicts between the values, missions, policies, and procedures of the 

various wildland fire agencies can get in the way of true interagency cooperation. When fire 

management personnel from an area where jurisdiction always means suppression responsibility 

go to a fire in an area with interagency protection agreements and operating plans, they need to 

take the time to understand the roles of the various players. 

Opportunities 

Frequently in the West, it may be appropriate for a state/local team to manage a federal 

fire, or for a federal team to manage a state fire. In either case, the teams have to forget about 

their parent agency’s policies and procedures, and adopt the policies and procedures of the 

agency they are working for. When a major fire involves more than one jurisdiction, the fire 

management team must involve the administrators and chief officers of all the other jurisdictional 

agencies in a true Unified Command. On a large fire, it may well be that the FS, BLM, 

43

State forestry agency, and one or more local fire protection districts all need to be directly 

involved in both planning and executing the suppression strategy. When multiple large fires 

occur, the Multi-Agency Coordinating System (MACS) needs to be used; with decision 

makers from all involved protection agencies jointly establishing priorities and allocating scarce 

resources. 

MACS should set priorities and 

allocate scarce resources. 

Sometimes agency administrators (line officers) who are not fully cognizant of the applicable 

interagency agreements and operating plans, lack experience and/or understand their responsibilities 

in fire operations. Fire management teams need to work closely with administrators to assure that 

conflicting policies, missions, or values do not get in the way of taking appropriate suppression 

action in a timely manner. It may 

be appropriate for a district ranger 

to mull over the potential to scoop 

up rare and endangered trout in a 

fire helicopter’s water bucket, but 

not at the moment that the fire is 

threatening to burn “Joe 

Taxpayer’s” ranch (Figure 6). 

Conflicting policies, missions, 

and values will always 

exist in the wildlands. It is 

incumbent upon the fire management 

personnel of all agencies to 

recognize and mitigate these 

conflicts before, not during, the 

fire. Clear, comprehensive 

interagency agreements and 

operating plans, and adequate 

Figure 6. Selective logging, slash treated, ready for broadcast burning 

in Oregon. 

training for appropriate decision-makers can help insure that fires get managed or controlled in 

the most effective way, rather than burn unchecked while turf battles rage. 

44

The Fire Environment 

Every one of us must be concerned with the state of our natural environment. In any 

discussion about impacts on the environment, we need also to factor in what the economic and 

social factors are. You can never hope for success if this is not done. If these three very important 

factors in our society are discussed as stand alone issues, there will never be a solution to 

our problems. 

Warming Trends 

For some years now, scientists, naturalists, politicians, and other alarmists have been 

worrying aloud about the phenomenon of global warming and its possible consequences for 

humankind. The thinking is that “greenhouse gases”, especially carbon dioxide produced from 

fossil fuels combustion, are modifying our atmosphere in such a way that the average temperature 

of the whole world is increasing. Various studies show that this warming (up to 2 degrees 

F) of average temperatures can lead to significant changes in our ecosystems, some of which 

could be disastrous. 

Environmental ecology includes 

economic and social factors, not just 

flora and fauna. 

For example, some predict the melting of the polar icecaps and mountain glaciers could 

raise sea level enough to permanently flood coastal cities worldwide that are home to millions 

of people. Meteorologists predict that “normal” weather patterns will change, transforming rain 

forests to deserts and tundra to tropical forest. Scientists claim that boreal forests are marching 

northward, deserts are expanding, rivers and lakes are shrinking, and this is only the beginning 

of even greater change. 

Whether directly related to global warming, or just an anomaly of our statistical data base, 

it seems like severe drought conditions are becoming more common in recent years. Some 

blame “El Nino”, the warm water pool, or “La Nina”, the cold water pool, in the central Pacific 

Ocean, for disrupting normal storm tracking patterns into the U.S. Three consecutive “El Nino” 

winters have pushed the jet stream to the north, with fewer wet storms reaching the U.S. Whatever 

the cause, widespread drought conditions have contributed to greatly increased fire danger 

throughout the country in the last several years. 

45

Major wildfires have occurred in places like New York, New Jersey, and Florida in recent 

years. These places normally have enough moisture year round to keep fire danger relatively 

low, compared to normal summer conditions in much of the arid West. 

In 2002, almost half of the USA 

suffered moderate to extreme 

drought conditions. 

In 2002, almost half of the USA suffered moderate to extreme drought conditions. Much 

of the eastern seaboard, from Maryland to Alabama suffered drought that withered crops and 

depleted local domestic water supplies. The southwestern U.S. was particularly hard hit, as the 

extreme drought centered on the “Four Corners” region continued into its fifth year. This spring 

was the driest on record (107 years) in Colorado and the second driest in Arizona and Southern 

California. 

Some of the effects of this severe drought in the West are easy to spot: “bathtub” rings 

around major reservoirs, increased insect and disease outbreaks in forests, streams reduced to 

trickles, and brush going dormant or dying back. In Arizona, bark beetle infestations have killed 

25-30% of the Ponderosa Pine forest in the Flagstaff area. In the surrounding lower elevations 

covered with Pinyon-Juniper forest, nearly all of the Pinyon Pine has died. 

Some of the effects are less obvious: reduced food and water sources stress many species 

of wildlife, but won’t be apparent until winter die off counts are in. The migration of everything 

from deer and elk to butterflies can be disrupted when food sources whither. Golden Trout gasp 

in stagnant pools of warm water. Then things get worse. 

Forest Health 

The huge wildfires that ravaged the West in 2000 were thought to be the result of an 

unusual set of circumstances (drought + weather + lightning) that would not be repeated for 

many years. Fire season 2002 proved that theory held as little water as some western lakes. 

The forests of the West today are overstocked compared to pre-settlement forests. Many 

more individual trees compete for sunlight, nutrients, water, and growing space on each acre of 

ground. The trees are smaller, closer together, and slower growing than they should be. When 

conditions turn marginal, the weaker trees die as nature tries to balance the population with the 

carrying capacity of the forest (Figure 7). 

The extended drought, global warming, and years of exclusion of fire from the forests have 

created unusually high fuel volumes that allow wildfires to burn with great intensity, frequently 

46

well beyond the capabilities of fire 

suppression forces. The fuel 

available to today’s wildfires 

consists of years of accumulated 

logging slash, dead trees killed by 

insects and disease, highly flammable 

brush species that provide 

“ladder fuels” for fire to travel 

into the crowns of the trees, and 

non-native grasses that are highly 

flammable and promote the easy 

ignition and rapid spread of new 

fires. 

Most brush species have 

adapted to drought conditions by Figure 7. Untreated Ponderosa Pine Forest in Arizona. 

decreasing the ratio of live to dead 

material in each plant, which makes them more flammable. Additionally, many brush species go 

into a dormant condition during times of heat or drought stress, decreasing the plant’s live fuel 

moisture to the critical level. 

Overstocked, decadent forests mean 

larger, more intensive wildfires. 

In the pre-settlement era, frequent small, low intensity fires, usually caused by lightning, 

but some ignited by Native Americans, created forests of larger trees, spread farther apart, 

eliminated dead and dying trees, reduced the population of insects, and kept down the invasive 

of brush. That forest was open and park like, with many open spaces, facilitating travel for man 

and beast alike. Beginning in the mid 1800’s intense logging activity created large accumulations 

of dead and down woody materials. Random burning of logging slash without regard for 

fire intensity and post fire effects allowed increased invasion of brush and weed species, many 

non-native virulent pests capable of out competing native vegetation. This cut and burn mentality 

lasted up until “The Big Blow Up of 1910”, when massive wildfires destroyed more than 10 

million acres, dozens of towns, and killed hundreds of people. 

Prescribed Fire 

Following the fires of 1910, public policy changed to require immediate suppression of 

wildfires and to severely curtail controlled burns. In the fifty years that followed, federal and 

47

state forestry agencies developed fire suppression capabilities that have largely excluded fire 

from most of our forest lands. While some blame a “Smokey Bear Mentality” for excluding 

fire from the forests, other factors are also responsible. Foresters have long recognized the 

need for fire to reduce fuel loading, recycle nutrients, and reduce competition from undesirable 

species. The problem has been that society has placed restraints on the use of controlled burns 

(AKA prescribed fire). The backlash of public opinion against commercial logging has made 

thinning of the forest for hazard reduction very difficult to accomplish. Air pollution concerns 

limit the amount of burning that can be accomplished in a given area within a given timeframe 

to uneconomical project sizes. Lastly, and probably most importantly, the fear of liability (i.e. 

tort claims and civil suits) coinciding with the proliferation of trial lawyers, has made it very 

risky for most landowners to attempt to use fire to restore forest health. 

The situation we now face is that we need to reintroduce frequent, low intensity fires into 

the forest ecosystems, but are prevented from doing so by the accumulation of fuel, the tangle 

of red tape, and the fear of liability and conflicting public opinion. 

Restoration Recipes 

Because of the increased stand density, the accumulation of fuels, the presence 

of highly flammable brush species that serve as ladder fuels promoting 

crown fires, the effects of drought, and the exposure of neighboring properties it 

is not possible to control burn the modern forest without extensive preparation. 

Thinning of overstocked timber stands is the first step in the process of 

restoring forest health. In most cases, logging and the sale of the wood products is 

the only way to make forest health restoration projects even marginally costeffective. 

Following a thinning cut, the slash needs to be treated to reduce its 

height and surface-to-volume ratio to make it safe to burn. This can be done 

mechanically with machines such as the Slashbuster or Hydroaxe, or manually by 

crews that lop and pile the slash for burning under benign conditions. Only when 

the stand has been thinned, the slash treated, the brush crushed, control lines 

established, permits obtained, and forces organized can prescribed fire projects be 

safely conducted (Figures 8, 9, and 10). 

Figure 8. Commercial thinning cut with slash piled and burned in 

Arizona. 

48

Restoring 

forest health is a 

complicated issue 

with many potential 

roadblocks on 

the path to success. 

Only with 

public understanding 

and support, 

interagency cooperation, 

appropriate 

funding levels, 

and protection 

from liability can 

fire be used effectively 

in its appropriate 

environmental 

role. Only with 

prescribed fire can 

forest health be 

reasonably restored 

on a landscape 

scale to the 

forests of the West 

(Figures 11 and 

12). 

Figure 9. Creating openings in pine forest in Arizona. Note slash piled 

for burning in background. 

Figure 10. Low intensity fires like this are very beneficial to the 

health of the forests. 

Figure 11. Treated pine slash ready for burning in Arizona. 

Figure 12. Pine trees thinned, slash piled for burning in Arizona. 

49

Values at Risk 

Fire management priorities: 

1. Human health and safety; 

2. Critical Watersheds/Resources/ 

Communities; 

3. Natural Resources/Individual 

Homes 

The federal land agencies are adamant that it is not their responsibility to pay for protection 

of structures threatened by encroaching wildfires originating on federal lands, because the 

responsibility for protecting structures falls to the state or local governments.Compounding the 

problem are conflicting federal policies: FireWise guidelines advise against building homes in 

high fire hazard wildland areas; FEMA provides low-interest loans to homeowners whose 

houses have been destroyed by wildfire so they can rebuild in the same area. Local governments 

are reluctant to adopt stringent FireSafe regulations that would reduce fire threats to 

structures, but look to the state and federal governments to provide, or at least fund, structure 

protection during wildfires. 

There are three significant categories of values at risk during a wildfire: 

• Human health and safety - Human health and safety are threatened by wildfires, both 

directly (being burned) and indirectly (air pollution), and since wildfires can threaten large 

numbers of people, this is also an issue of broad public concern. Because poor forest 

health means more fuel available, wildfires have been growing more intense, difficult to 

control, and dangerous to firefighters. In recent years, there have been more firefighter 

deaths and injuries, resulting in a trend to put firefighter safety above all other values at 

risk, with sometimes unintended consequences. 

• Natural resources - The natural resources on public lands belong to all citizens and are 

therefore of broad public concern. Some of the natural resource values at risk during a 

wildfire are timber, forage, wildlife, soil, water, and recreation. The natural resources on 

private lands have public as well as private value and are also of broad public concern. 

Some public values at risk of wildfire on private lands are timber, wildlife, soil, water, and 

recreation. In other words, the public at large reaps benefits from healthy forests in private 

ownership. This concept has been the basis for some states to take an active role in wildfire 

protection. Unfortunately, due to several factors, the forests of America are overcrowded, 

decadent, and capable of supporting unusually intense forest fires that do even 

greater damage to the natural resources. Forest health should be a concern to everyone. 

50

• Property - Property includes land and human improvements upon the land, which may 

be in both public and private ownership. The loss of a single home in a forest fire is a 

matter primarily of concern to the property owner and the insurance company. The loss of 

many houses in a single community is a matter of concern to the whole community; as 

such losses have psychological, physical, emotional, and economic effects on all residents. 

If a large number of structures are lost, it will have an impact on the community’s infrastructure. 

A classic example of a public value at risk and inadvertent damages occurred this 

year in Colorado, where the Hayman Fire wiped out hundreds of homes. In one local fire 

district so many homes were lost that the district lost 75-80% of its assessed valuation and 

had to lay off firefighters and medics. The remaining residents have suffered a reduction in 

fire protection and emergency medical services as a result of a wildfire originating on 

federal land. This reduction in service will also discourage more burned out residents from 

rebuilding. This small community may never recover. The loss of hundreds of homes in a 

single wildfire, or thousands of homes in the nation each fire season, should be a matter of 

concern to all Americans due to the direct costs of fire suppression and disaster reimbursement, 

plus the indirect costs of air pollution, economic disruption, post-fire flood events, 

water quality degradation, etc. 

The loss of a single home is a tragedy 

for the homeowner; the loss of 

hundreds of homes is a loss for the 

community. 

Until very recently these values at risk from wildfires were not given the same priorities by 

the different levels of government. The federal wildfire agencies, being also land management 

agencies, put natural resource protection as their first priority. Local governments, being funded 

in large measure by property taxes, put structure protection as their first priority. State forestry 

and emergency management agencies frequently found themselves in the middle, being concerned 

about public safety, property (e.g. tax base) loss, natural resource degradation (especially 

on state lands), and the cost of post-fire rehabilitation and damage control (floods, etc.). 

As the population has grown and people have acquired the fiscal and physical ability to 

commute to their work, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of homes being built 

in or adjacent to the wildlands. These homes in the woods have created what has come to be 

termed the wildland/urban interface. Here the fire problem is compounded, as homes are at risk 

from wildfires and forests are at risk from human activity in and near their residences. The 

wildland/urban interface fire problem, once confined to southern California, is now significant 

in almost every western state and getting worse each year. This year, wildfires in Colorado 

threatened more than 140 subdivisions and forced the evacuation of more than 80,000 residents. 

51

These improvements and human activities in/near the wildland have changed the nature of 

fire fighting. When wildland was uninhabited, firefighters could choose their place to battle a 

fire, usually at a ridge top, stream, road, or other existing barrier to fire spread where conditions 

favored firefighting operations. Frequently, there was room to back off until burning conditions 

moderated and it was easier to control the fire. Increasingly these days, firefighters must go after 

a wildfire immediately, under all conditions, as there are probably homes or other improvements 

nearby that are immediately in danger. This need to fight fire on the fire’s terms makes firefighting 

more dangerous and more expensive. 

FireSafe homes have ignition-resistant 

roofs and adequate clearance. 

As the wildland/urban interface has grown, the cost of fighting wildfires has risen dramatically. 

Much of this cost increase is due to the additional fire engines, aircraft, and overhead that 

are needed to protect improvements in front of the fire, often far in front of the fire, and often 

for days on end. This dramatic increase in cost has concerned government officials, leading to 

such counterproductive federal actions as failing to take appropriate structure protection measures, 

refusing to pay for the costs of structure protection, etc. The high point of irresponsibility 

on the structure protection issue was probably reached in 2002, when the Office of Management 

and Budget noted that it was “cheaper to let the houses burn and pay the cost of rebuilding than 

to protect them from wildfire.” Only a “bean counter” could ignore the fact that the most important 

things to most families cannot be replaced when their home burns. 

Taking Responsibility 

Who then is really responsible for protecting structures in the wildland/urban interface 

from encroaching wildfires The answer is nearly everybody. 

First, property owners in the wildland/urban interface 

must assume responsibility to provide an appropriate measure 

of built-in fire protection for their improvements. The two most 

important features to the survival of a structure threatened by a 

wildfire are ignition-resistant construction and defensible 

space. Roofing materials that are ignition-resistant prevent 

falling firebrands from igniting a structure and help prevent fire 

spread from structure to structure, which is a major cause of 

fire transmission in large structure loss wildfires. 

52

Defensible space or clearance provides an area around each 

structure where vegetation has been managed to decrease fire 

intensity enough to prevent spread to the structure and to provide 

an area safe for firefighters to work in. These two measures, 

tailored to the local fire danger, could dramatically reduce 

structure loss. 

Second, the community as a whole must 

assume responsibility for protecting itself. This 

includes applying peer pressure to property 

owners who fail to make their properties 

FireSafe. It means taking voluntary joint action 

to mitigate what one property owner is not able 

to do. It means taking actions to improve fire safety by adopting appropriate regulations on 

development, building and maintaining fire defense improvements, forming, joining, and 

supporting local fire departments, and teaching FireSafe principles to the next generation. 

Individuals, communities, and all levels 

of government need to be responsible 

for wildland fire safety. 

Third, local government needs to assume responsibility for appropriate fire prevention and 

suppression measures. This means adopting planning and development regulations that promote 

fire safety, requiring built-in fire protection measures in the wildland/urban interface, and 

providing an appropriate level of fire protection service. It includes developing a system of fire 

defense improvements such as water systems, helispots, fuelbreaks, firebreaks, access roads, 

and safety zones. It means adopting strict street sign and house addressing regulations. It means 

properly equipping and training the local fire department to safely and efficiently fight wildfires 

and protect structures in the wildland/urban interface. It means developing automatic aid and 

mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions. 

Fourth, state governments need to assume responsibility for an appropriate level of fire 

protection on non-federal wildlands, especially in the wildland/urban interface. This can be 

done in a variety of ways, on both state and private lands. The state can manage its own lands in 

a manner that will assure healthy forests with lower fire danger. Properly managed State lands 

can serve as demonstration areas for FireSafe and forest health improvement measures. The 

State can assume a coordination role to facilitate joint cooperative FireWise/FireSafe projects 

between all levels of government and the private sector. The State can sponsor FireSafe education 

programs and provide model ordinances or regulations to assure an appropriate minimum 

53

level of fire safety statewide. States can support and coordinate an efficient statewide mutual aid 

system and can assume full responsibility for primary fire protection on non-federal wildlands, 

thus reducing jurisdictional problems and avoiding widely variant levels of fire protection. 

Improved forest health is key to the 

survivability of our forests. 

Last, the federal government needs to assume responsibility for an appropriate level of fire 

protection on federal lands. This includes improving forest health and reducing fire hazards, 

especially in the wildland/urban interface. It means providing leadership and funding to support 

the efforts of state and local governments to reduce fire danger and improve fire protection in 

the wildland/urban interface, especially near federal wildlands. It means eliminating conflicting 

federal policies like subsidizing rebuilding structures already lost to fire in high hazard areas. It 

means giving due consideration to values at risk from wildfire, both public and private, on lands 

adjacent to federal wildlands. It means adopting land management and fire protection policies 

and procedures that appropriately prioritize wildfire threats to natural resources, human health 

and safety, and property. It means training its administrators and fire managers to recognize offforest 

values at risk from wildfire and to take actions appropriate to the best overall public 

interest rather than to their particular agency program. 

Because wildfires are a threat to a broad range of public values and interests, it is imperative 

that the broadest possible range of publics assume an appropriate level of responsibility for 

wildfire prevention, control, and mitigation. 

54

National Fire Plan 

Fire Season 2000 in the West saw more than 8 million 

acres and hundreds of structures burn as wildfires roamed from 

the backcountry of the National Forests to the main streets of 

cities like Los Alamos, and fire suppression costs soared. 

Following this landmark season, a special report to the President, 

entitled Managing the Impact of Wildfires on Communities 

and the Environment became the focal point for the federal 

government to take broad and far reaching actions to both 

reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire and improve fire prevention 

and suppression capabilities, especially in the Wildland/ 

Urban Interface. 

The National Fire Plan infused much 

needed funding into the federal 

wildland fire agencies. 

Starting in 2001, a new federal wildland fire policy was issued 

that was aimed at ensuring consistency, coordination, and integration of 

wildland fire management programs throughout all agencies of the federal 

government. The new policy focused on principles such as giving firefighter and public 

safety first priority, recognizing the role of wildfire in natural ecosystems, integrating 

fire management and other land management programs, improving the economic 

viability of fire protection systems, using appropriate science as the 

basis for planning, and coordinating with other levels of government. 

Seventeen basic policy statements were to be incorporated 

into the directives, manuals, and training systems of every federal 

agency involved in wildland fire protection. 

That same year, Congress appropriated an additional $1.6 

billion to begin implementation of the new fire policy and directed 

the secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to develop a longterm 

strategy (National Fire Plan) to deal with wildland fires and 

mitigate hazardous fuel situations. This strategy, A Collaborative 

Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and 

the Environment; 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy (often shortened 

to “The Strategy”), was completed in August 2001. 

55

The goals of The Strategy are: 

• Improve Fire Prevention and Suppression 

• Reduce Hazardous Fuels 

• Restore Fire-Adapted Ecosystems 

A ten-year plan has been developed. 

• Promote Community Assistance 

An Implementation Plan for The Strategy was completed in 

May of 2002 and endorsed by the federal agencies and their partners, 

including state forestry agencies and tribal governments. The 

plan should improve cooperation and communication among all 

parties at all levels and help insure that key project planning decisions 

are made at the local level. It also establishes responsibility 

among the participants for planning, prioritizing, and accomplishing 

tasks in a timely and cost-effective manner consistent with 

changing conditions and relevant science. See the Appendix for a 

more detailed look at the components of the National Fire Plan, including state funding data. 

One of the significant outcomes of the new effort was the FireWise program. Sponsored by 

a consortium of federal agencies with a good deal of cooperator involvement, this program was 

focused on increasing awareness of the Wildland/Urban Interface fire problem at the local level. 

A series of seminars has been held around the country to provide local planning and fire officials 

with the knowledge and tools, including educational materials, to better prepare their 

communities to cope with the threat of wildfire. 

Under the National Fire Plan, funding was made 

available to the federal wildfire agencies to increase 

their fire suppression forces and to expand the scope of 

their fuel reductions projects. State Fire Assistance funds 

help state wildfire agencies improve their protection 

systems and are funneled to local communities as grants 

to support hazard reduction projects. Volunteer Fire 

56

Assistance funds are routed to rural fire 

departments in the WUI to assist them in 

acquiring equipment, safety gear, and 

training to more effectively suppress 

wildfires and provide structure protection 

from encroaching wildfires. Unfortunately, 

unless Congress acts to pass a supplemental 

appropriation, much of this funding may 

be siphoned off to pay for the high suppression 

costs incurred by the federal fire 

agencies during Fire Season 2002. 

The National Fire Plan reflects the 

views of a broad cross-section of government 

and non-government interests. The 

participants recognize that the problem is 

complex and will not be solved soon. The hope is that the risks from wildland fire to our communities 

and environment can be diminished over time as we make progress in achieving 

defined objectives in a collaborative manner, as funding is made available from as many 

sources as possible. 

National Fire Plan Funding 

In order to get a full perspective of the National Fire Plan, you have to look at it from 

several points of view. From the national point of view, it is a very big plan; a plan that has 

infused much needed funding into the federal wildland firefighting agencies. From the state’s 

viewpoint, the level of funding is significant, because it allows some activities that have never 

been funded before (Figure 13). 

The vast majority of the NFP dollars 

are for the federal agencies. 

Only three states noted significant 

improvement in the initial attack 

capabilities of the federal agencies in 

2002. 

It was known, right from the beginning, that the funds would not last forever. In fact, the 

funding was based on the 10-year plan. The estimated appropriation for FY 2003 is 29 percent 

less than the FY 2001 appropriation (Figure 14). 

57


(in thousands) 

Agency FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 

FY 2003 

President's Budget 

FY 2004 

Request 

USDA Forest Service $1,035,125 $1,910,192 $1,590,712 $1,399,531 $1,572,203 

Deparment of Interior $490,957 $977,099 $678,421 $653,754 $698,725 

Total $1,526,082 $2,887,291 $2,269,133 $2,053,285 $2,270,928 

Figure 13. The National Fire Plan has infused considerable funding in the federal wildland firefighting 

agencies. Most of this funding will be expended by the federal agencies. 

There are several program areas within the plan: preparedness, operations, emergency 

contingency, etc. Figure 15 provides a broad overview of how funds have been allocated to 

these various programs. Note that the funding for the state programs falls under operations 

(highlighted and in bold italic print). 

The state forestry agencies are 

allocated funds from the Community 

Assistant program. 

The percentage of the total National Fire Plan funding in the State Fire Assistance, Volunteer 

Fire Assistance and Rural Fire Assistance programs (for all 50 of the states) is less than 5 

percent of the total. 

In FY 2002 the federal 

$3,500,000 

agencies “chalked up” some very 

$3,000,000 

$2,500,000 

impressive accomplishments 

$2,000,000 

$1,500,000 

using the National Fire Plan 

$1,000,000 

$500,000 

allocations. Even though the 

$0 

states do not administer these 

funds, they do benefit the states in 

the long run. Not directly, but 

there is considerable benefit. For 

a complete report on the status of 

the National Fire Plan, review FY 

2002 Performance Report - National Fire Plan. 



FY 2000 

FY 2001 

FY 2002 

FY 2003 

President's 

Budget 

FY 2004 

Request 

Deparment of 

Interior 

USDA Forest 

Service 

Figure 14. The funding for the National Fire Plan is already 

showing a decline. The appropriation for FY 2003 is 29% less 

than the peak. 

58

National Fire Plan Funding by Program 


FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 

DOI FS Total DOI FS Total DOI FS Total 

Prepardedness $165,849 $408,768 $574,617 $314,712 $611,143 $925,855 $280,807 $622,618 $903,425 

Operations 

Suppression $58,068 $139,188 $197,256 $191,109 $319,324 $510,433 $161,424 $321,321 $482,745 

Hazardous Fuels Reduction $47,040 $70,000 $117,040 $194,971 $205,158 $400,129 $186,190 $209,010 $395,200 

Emergency Stabilization and 

Rehabilitation 

$20,000 $20,000 $66,769 $141,688 $208,457 $40,000 $62,668 $102,668 

Fire Facilities Backlog $43,903 $43,903 $20,376 $20,376 

Research and Development $15,965 $15,965 $27,265 $27,265 

Joint Fire Science $8,000 $8,000 

State Fire Assistance $23,929 $23,929 $77,828 $77,828 $81,693 $81,693 

Volunteer Fire Assistance $3,240 $3,240 $13,251 $13,251 $13,313 $13,315 

Rural Fire Assistance $9,978 $9,978 $10,000 $10,000 

Forest Health Management $11,974 $11,974 $11,974 $11,974 

Economic Action Program $12,472 $12,472 $12,472 $12,472 

Community and Private Lands 

Assistance 

$34,923 $34,923 

Subtotal Operations $125,108 $236,357 $361,465 $462,827 $876,486 $1,339,313 $397,614 $768,094 $1,165,708 

Total Non-Emergency $290,957 $936,082 $777,539 $1,487,629 $2,265,168 $678,421 $1,390,712 $2,069,133 

Emergency Contingency $200,000 $590,000 $199,560 $425,063 $624,623 $200,000 $200,000 

Agency Total $490,957 $1,526,082 $977,099 $1,912,692 $2,889,791 $678,421 $1,590,712 $2,269,133 

Figure 15. This is the breakdown of the funding levels for the various programs. The three highlighted programs in the middle of the chart are the programs for state and 

local fire agencies. 

Some of these programs need a little explanation, because the heading alone does not fully 

explain its depth or true meaning: 

• Firefighting - This is a major part of the National Fire Plan. It covers fire preparedness, 

work force planning and improvements, training, facilities and equipment. It now also 

includes funds for “fire facilities backlog.” 

• Rehabilitation - This program involves post-fire rehabilitation work after a wildfire that 

is unlikely to recover naturally. Some examples involve reforestation, road and trail reha- 

59

ilitation, fence replacement, fish and wildlife habitat restoration, invasive plant treatments, 

and replanting and reseeding with native or other desirable vegetation. 

State Fire Assistance is for the 

states to use for preparedness and 

other programs. 

• Hazardous Fuels Reduction - There has been considerable reporting on how 100-years 

of “successful” fire suppression has not allowed natural fire to keep our forests clean. The 

funds provided are part of a long-term strategy to reduce the heavy fuel buildups on federal 

and adjacent lands. Some of the treatment methods used are prescribed fire, mechanical 

thinning, herbicides, grazing, or a combination of them. 

Under this heading you will also find funding for planning biomass utilization and forest 

health protection. 

• Community Assistance - Under this heading, we find State Fire Assistance, Volunteer 

Fire Assistance, Rural Fire Assistance, FireWise Community Program, and Economic 

Action Programs. (See the next section in this report for a more complete explanation of 

these very important programs.) 

• Research - Under this heading, there is full range of research projects that provide 

support for all of the programs listed before. 

Community Assistance Programs 

The states and rural volunteer fire departments have been the recipients of federal assistance 

for years. In some of the larger states, the amount has been a small percentage of their 

operating dollars, but in the smaller states, the federal grants are vital to the existence of the 

“state forestry” operation. 

Under the National Fire Plan, the western states received over $74 million in FY 2002 

(Figure 16). All of these funds come from the Community Assistance area of the USDA Forest 

Service budget and the Rural Fire Assistance budget for the Department of Interior. 

60

National Fire Plan Funding, by State 

Federal Grants for Fiscal Year 2002 

Base Funding (Formula) 

State Fire Assistance 


Volunteer Fire Assistance Rural Fire Assistance TOTAL (2) 

Alaska $335,609 3.4% $895,391 3.9% $283,657 5.1% $96,628 1.2% $1,611,285 3.5% 

Arizona* $897,000 9.1% $2,221,500 9.7% $376,000 6.8% $455,750 5.7% $3,950,250 8.6% 

California* $1,000,210 10.1% $937,770 4.1% $954,072 17.3% $662,000 8.3% $3,554,052 7.7% 

Colorado* $994,304 10.1% $3,630,435 15.9% $669,643 12.2% $544,000 6.9% $5,838,382 12.7% 

Hawaii* $380,651 3.9% $115,480 0.5% $200,599 3.6% $15,000 0.2% $711,730 1.5% 

Idaho* $486,800 4.9% $3,530,700 15.5% $184,400 3.3% $935,575 11.8% $5,137,475 11.1% 

Kansas $495,000 5.0% $60,000 0.3% $181,000 3.3% $33,537 0.4% $769,537 1.7% 

Montana* $603,700 6.1% $1,140,067 5.0% $378,713 6.9% $854,030 10.8% $2,976,510 6.5% 

Nebraska* $467,100 4.7% $28,000 0.1% $143,000 2.6% $101,416 1.3% $739,516 1.6% 

Nevada* $307,000 3.1% $1,999,936 8.8% $157,681 2.9% $873,928 11.0% $3,338,545 7.2% 

New Mexico $72,500 0.7% $2,110,500 9.3% $193,300 3.5% $484,517 6.1% $2,860,817 6.2% 

North Dakota* $195,500 2.0% $0 0.0% $407,900 7.4% $228,597 2.9% $831,997 1.8% 

Oregon $1,041,395 10.6% $2,953,209 12.9% $416,390 7.6% $816,939 10.3% $5,227,933 11.3% 

South Dakota* $584,100 5.9% $346,000 1.5% $197,000 3.6% $222,000 2.8% $1,349,100 2.9% 

Utah* $381,134 3.9% $427,000 1.9% $229,229 4.2% $760,000 9.6% $1,797,363 3.9% 

Washington $383,395 3.9% $1,490,000 6.5% $384,221 7.0% $385,226 4.9% $2,642,842 5.7% 

Wyoming* $463,000 4.7% $846,602 3.7% $151,300 2.7% $466,456 5.9% $1,927,358 4.2% 

Other(1) $766,300 $80,000 0.4% $0 $0 $846,300 

Total $9,854,698 $22,812,590 $5,508,105 $7,935,599 $46,110,992 

$32,667,288 

National Total $51,727,402 

$10,419,113 $9,942,744 $72,089,259 

Source: FY 2002 Performance Report - National Fire Plan, January 2003; * individual state records; (1) Guam and American Samoa, CNMI and other Pacific 

Islands; (2) Not all of these funds are administered by the State Forester. 

Figure 16. This is a breakdown by state, of the amounts given in 2002 from the National Fire Plan. 

61

State Fire Assistance - USDA Forest Service funding will provide for technical and 

financial assistance to the states to enhance firefighting capacity at the state and local levels. 

This funding also supports fire hazard mitigation projects in the wildland/urban interface and 

will facilitate an expanded series of FireWise workshops to help communities across the country 

implement FireWise practices that reduce fire hazard. It will also support an expanded 

national public service fire prevention program (Figure 17). 

• Preparedness - Increases the ability of local, rural, and state organizations to provide 

coordinated fire protection and mobilization for fire suppression on both federal and nonfederal 

lands. 

The big jump in State Fire Assistance 

is due to the infusion of funds under 

the National Fire Plan competitive 

grants program. 

• Hazard Mitigation - Supports 

state-led hazard mitigation 

activities in the wildland/ 

urban interface, focused on 

reducing property loss, decreasing 

fuels hazards, and increasing 

public awareness and 

citizen-driven solutions in rural 

communities. 

• Fire Prevention - Delivers a 

nationwide fire prevention 

program through public service 

advertising, educational activities, 

product licensing, and 

corporate partnerships. The 

Smokey Bear program is part 

of this component, and Fire- 

Wise is another prevention 

component. FireWise is a 

program that promotes wildland 

fire safety in the interface 

and fosters community-based 

responsibility through adult 

State Fire Assistance Grants 


FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 Total 

Alaska $407 $367 $4,132 $11,881 $1,231 $18,018 21% 

Arizona $158 $174 $174 $1,584 $1,315 $3,405 4% 

California $309 $312 $487 $2,864 $1,923 $5,895 7% 

Colorado $448 $403 $442 $2,836 $4,625 $8,754 10% 

Hawaii $235 $235 $280 $451 $797 $1,998 2% 

Idaho $300 $314 $328 $2,540 $4,018 $7,500 9% 

Kansas $200 $200 $245 $515 $555 $1,715 2% 

Montana $378 $400 $424 $1,410 $1,869 $4,481 5% 

Nebraska $242 $242 $219 $446 $495 $1,644 2% 

Nevada $178 $185 $202 $1,058 $1,828 $3,451 4% 

New Mexico $165 $180 $231 $2,076 $2,183 $4,835 6% 

North Dakota $91 $95 $99 $281 $196 $762 1% 

Oregon $464 $507 $560 $2,072 $1,044 $4,647 5% 

South Dakota $270 $320 $313 $984 $930 $2,817 3% 

Utah $178 $185 $219 $3,130 $1,318 $5,030 6% 

Washington $464 $507 $594 $3,518 $1,873 $6,956 8% 

Wyoming $202 $209 $233 $1,335 $1,310 $3,289 4% 

Total $4,689 $4,835 $9,182 $38,981 $27,510 $85,197 

Source: USDA, Forest Service, WO 

Figure 17. The 5-year history of State Fire Assistance Grants to the states in the West. 

62

education, community action planning, fuel treatments, and landscaping. Twenty-four 

FireWise workshops for community and business leaders have been conducted over the 

last three-years. Participants will work to establish local FireWise standards to ensure a 

safer place for people to live. The first twelve workshops trained 953 participants from 

425 communities and 45 states. 

Volunteer Fire Assistance - The Volunteer Fire Assistance Program, funded by the USDA 

Forest Service, provides funds through States to volunteer fire departments serving communities 

to improve communication capabilities, provide critical wildland fire management training, 

Volunteer Fire Assistant Grants are 

administered by the various State 

Foresters. 

Volunteer Fire Assistance Grants 


FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 Total 

Alaska $31 $44 $77 $394 $284 $830 7% 

Arizona $30 $30 $30 $335 $337 $762 6% 

California $70 $70 $70 $118 $959 $1,287 10% 

Colorado $38 $37 $61 $664 $648 $1,448 12% 

Hawaii $37 $37 $55 $200 $200 $529 4% 

Idaho $23 $23 $38 $345 $184 $613 5% 

Kansas $44 $44 $112 $180 $181 $561 4% 

Montana $40 $40 $65 $286 $379 $810 6% 

Nebraska $51 $51 $83 $142 $143 $470 4% 

Nevada $20 $20 $20 $193 $110 $363 3% 

New Mexico $23 $23 $45 $326 $190 $607 5% 

North Dakota $64 $64 $104 $336 $408 $976 8% 

Oregon $33 $33 $54 $407 $415 $942 8% 

South Dakota $35 $49 $79 $199 $181 $543 4% 

Utah $21 $21 $39 $194 $209 $484 4% 

Washington $33 $33 $53 $407 $384 $910 7% 

Wyoming $16 $16 $25 $140 $151 $348 3% 

Total $609 $635 $1,010 $4,866 $5,363 $12,483 

Source: USDA, Forest Service, WO 

Figure 18. The 5-year history of Volunteer Fire Assistance Grants for the states in the West. These grants are 

administered by the State Foresters. 

63

and purchase protective fire 

clothing and equipment. 

These departments provide, at 

no cost, wildfire and emergency 

protection service to 

communities with populations 

of under 10,000. Volunteer 

Fire Departments provide 

services that reach 43% of the 

population, at an estimated 

value of $36 billion per year 

(Figure 18). 

Rural Fire Assistance - 

Department of the Interior 

funding will be used to provide 

technical assistance, 

training, supplies, equipment, 

and public education support 

to rural fire departments, thus 

enhancing firefighter safety 

and strengthening wildland 

fire protection capabilities 

(Figure 19). 

Federal Excess Property 

Program - Under the Federal 

Excess Personal Property 

Rural Fire Assistance Grants 


FY2001 FY2002 Total 

Alaska $75,867 $109,800 $185,667 1% 

Arizona $503,871 $509,000 $1,012,871 6% 

California $455,097 $662,000 $1,117,097 7% 

Colorado $684,254 $544,000 $1,228,254 8% 

Hawaii $25,389 $15,000 $40,389 0% 

Idaho $875,085 $867,000 $1,742,085 11% 

Kansas $23,364 $0 $23,364 0% 

Montana $861,556 $844,000 $1,705,556 11% 

Nebraska $102,985 $267,000 $369,985 2% 

Nevada $875,429 $865,000 $1,740,429 11% 

New Mexico $367,594 $499,000 $866,594 5% 

North Dakota $256,317 $0 $256,317 2% 

Oregon $751,238 $1,035,000 $1,786,238 11% 

South Dakota $296,411 $222,000 $518,411 3% 

Utah $765,620 $790,000 $1,555,620 10% 

Washington $304,226 $790,000 $1,094,226 7% 

Wyoming $433,284 $434,000 $867,284 5% 

Other $0 $0 0% 

Total $7,657,587 $8,452,800 $16,110,387 

Figure 19. The Rural Fire Assistance Grant program is under the 

various agencies in the Department of the Interior. Some of the grants 

are administered by the agencies directly; some in coordination with 

the State Foresters. 

(FEPP) program, Federal property, originally purchased for use by a Federal agency, but no 

longer needed by that entity, is acquired by the USDA Forest Service for loan to one of the 50 

States for use in the State’s rural or wildland fire protection program. As a result, the equipment 

stays in service to America, protecting lives and property across the nation. 

64

The “personal” part of the FEPP program simply refers to any tangible property that is not 

real estate. This can include trucks, aircraft, personal protective equipment, motor oil, nuts, 

bolts, fire hose, et cetera, but not buildings. 

The State Forester makes the initial decision that an FEPP item is appropriate for use, and 

the USDA Forest Service must concur. The property is then loaned to the State Forester, who 

may then place it with local departments to improve local fire programs. Approximately 70% of 

the property involved in the Forest Service FEPP program is sub-loaned to local fire departments 

(Figure 20). 

FireWise - The National Fire Plan has dedicated $5 million (FY 2001-2003) for development 

and delivery of the FireWise Program. Actually a suite of complementary programs, 

The Federal Excess Property Program 

has been invaluable for the states and 

rural fire departments. 

Federal Excess Property Program Acquisition, by State 

State FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 5-year Total 5-year Average 

Alaska $472,689 $1,132,986 $1,804,555 $1,176,223 $4,586,454 $917,291 

Arizona $306,676 $541,210 $231,693 $479,612 $1,559,191 $311,838 

California $29,740,724 $10,103,896 $26,425,137 $19,104,371 $7,527,042 $92,901,169 $18,580,234 

Colorado $770,471 $570,910 $350,224 $1,505,652 $104,561 $3,301,818 $660,364 

Hawaii $77,717 $489,785 $684,193 $1,251,695 $250,339 

Idaho $1,395,417 $2,115,519 $897,966 $373,926 $1,828,383 $6,611,212 $1,322,242 

Kansas $1,983,801 $1,353,692 $181,622 $450,728 $5,585,378 $9,555,221 $1,911,044 

Montana $1,433,422 $7,256,509 $2,081,025 $476,441 $4,448,824 $15,696,221 $3,139,244 

Nebraska $896,080 $680,035 $217,002 $1,972,794 $3,765,911 $753,182 

Nevada $1,725,782 $542,918 $1,292,185 $162,466 $3,723,352 $744,670 

New Mexico $465,902 $362,556 $763,884 $695,499 $377,019 $2,664,861 $532,972 

North Dakota $559,836 $178,682 $660,359 $94,825 $118,727 $1,612,429 $322,486 

Oregon $3,414,282 $4,406,797 $3,883,436 $1,649,154 $1,098,415 $14,452,084 $2,890,417 

South Dakota $30,888 $1,116,019 $2,910,912 $78,033 $100,753 $4,236,605 $847,321 

Utah $1,641,095 $623,966 $662,857 $1,249,855 $523,243 $4,701,017 $940,203 

Washington $4,016,167 $5,849,680 $6,528,742 $3,150,722 $2,715,446 $22,260,757 $4,452,151 

Wyoming $500 $686,280 $342,712 $247,679 $625,158 $1,902,329 $380,466 

Guam and other 

Pacific Islands $241,833 $62,835 $124,168 $37,664 $466,500 $93,300 

Total $49,173,282 $37,584,493 $49,017,309 $31,246,530 $28,227,212 $195,248,825 $39,049,765 

Figure 20. The value of FEPP to the states and rural fire departments cannot really be measured. This is a 

historical picture of the value of the materials loaned to the states in the West. 

65

FireWise is aimed at informing the community spectrum - homeowners, firefighters and builders 

to landscapers, insurance agents and public officials - about the concept of FireWise living. 

Program components include the following: 

• FireWise Website (www.FireWise.org): Representing a successful partnership of private 

and government agencies, this site averages 150,000 hits a month. 

FireWise is one of the National Fire 

Plan programs that has the potential 

for long-term impacts. 

• Communication Tools such as publications and videos: FireWise concepts on landscaping, 

building, firefighter safety and other topics are available online as well as through 

other outlets. The latest project is a television documentary called “Keepers of the Flame,” 

which puts America’s fire history and wildland/urban interface fire problem in context. 

• Workshops, Training Sessions and Demonstration Events: These activities are focused 

on reducing fire risk to property and lives through better community design and retrofit, 

and preparedness planning. 

• Technical Assistance to Communities: As FireWise spreads across 

the country, more communities are looking to program organizers for 

help. This component includes ArcView mapping technology. 

• FireWise Communities USA Recognition Program: Communities 

can earn national status for their work to improve planning for mitigation 

of fire hazards. Currently, there are 11 geographically diverse pilot 

communities in the recognition program, which will be officially 

unveiled in late 2003. Nationwide, there are thousands of communities 

with wildland/urban interface areas. 

FireWise Communities Workshop Series - Launched in the fall of 1999, 

the FireWise Communities Workshop Series is an integral part of the FireWise Program. With 

more than 30 stakeholder groups – federal agencies, national organizations and private companies 

as sponsors – the series offers more than two-dozen national workshops across the country 

through 2003. Invited to each are the people who can truly influence the way an area is planned, 

built, maintained and protected. To date, 953 community stakeholders from 425 communities 

in 45 states have attended these regionally based workshops. By project’s end, more than 2,000 

community leaders will have participated. Another 2,500 are expected to attend the spin-off 

66

workshops that are occurring (50+ to date) in the states hosting national workshops. National 

participants are provided with a wealth of FireWise material, including the computer-aided 

workshop exercise that allows these leaders to talk in small groups about the complexities of 

creating a FireWise Community. For more information about the series, visit the FireWise 

Communities website at www.FireWise.org/communities. 

Thousands of people have a better 

understanding of the wildland/urban 

interface fire problem after attending 

a FireWise workshop. 

67


The National Fire Plan funded fuel reduction programs for areas that were classified as 

being in the wildland/urban interface. As a means to get these funds to the states, the USDA 

Forest Service decided to use an existing mechanism, that of the State Fire Assistance grants. 

The competitive grants program has 

been an important step at reducing 

the wildland/urban interface problem. 

At least in the short term. 

Historically, the USDA Forest Service used a formula to allocate the funds to the states, so 

as the annual allocation moved up or down, each of the states was treated equally. Every once in 

a while, a member of Congress was able to place special rules that dictated a special allocation; 

the most recent one was an augmentation to the State of Alaska related to bug kill on the Kenni 

Peninsula. 

to: 

To facilitate the allocation for the wildland/urban interface grants, the rules were changed 

• Allocate 25% of the State Fire Assistance allocation to the states using the formula. This 

provided funds at a similar level as in the past. It should be noted here, that the percentage 

for the formula allocations will jump to 35% in federal fiscal year 2003. This was done to 

allow the states to have more discretionary authority on how the funds could be used. 

• The remaining funds were then allocated on a competitive basis. Each state would 

provide a list of projects that they would like to conduct, using these funds. 

The Council of Western State Foresters gave the responsibility of developing the list of 

qualifying projects to their fire managers. A subcommittee of the Western State Fire Managers 

then would meet, reviewing the hundreds of applications to determine if they met the requirements, 

their completeness, etc. A list of projects was then prepared and submitted to the Council 

for approval and submission to the USDA Forest Service. 

The legislation allowed funds to be expended on several types of projects. They included: 

• Hazardous Fuel Reduction - Fuel reduction projects and vegetation treatments have 

been identified as a means of mitigating wildfire hazards. Projects of this type included 

fuel breaks, thinning, pruning, landscape modifications, etc. 

68

• Information and Education - In the wildland/urban interface homeowners and local 

government should bear much of the responsibility for improving the defensibility of 

homes and other buildings. The plan was to develop programs that would help educate the 

general public and local government officials on what has to be done to provide a permanent 

“fix” to this problem. Some qualifying projects would include FireWise or similar 

projects, defensible space around homes and structures, shaded fuel breaks, fuels reduction 

beyond defensible space, etc. 

• Homeowner and Community Actions - Creating conditions in and round individual 

structures and communities that would limit the “transmission” of fire between the wildland 

and the structures. These types of projects could include safety inspections, demonstration 

projects, training and education for homeowners, planners and fire service personnel, 

etc. 

• Planning and/or Assessment Projects - These projects identify values in the wildland/ 

urban interface that are important to protect. Qualifying projects could include county or 

community planning, hazard fuel mapping projects, etc. 

• Monitoring - These projects generally would document the status of the projects listed 

above. 

There were several projects that were submitted, but automatically rejected. Some of the 

more common examples are: the purchase of fire equipment and apparatus, start up funding of a 

small business, research and development, and fire preparedness and suppression capacity 

building. 

Information and education has the 

greatest long-term impacts. 

The most common NFP projects: 

• Public Education 

• Fuel Breaks 

• Mechanical Thinning 

• Defensible Space 

As with most competitive grant programs, the final success is based on several factions. In 

this case, these were some of the influences: 

• Availability of Funds - Congress did not appropriate the funds needed to complete all of 

the desired projects. 

• Application was rejected because it was not complete, not on time or for a project that 

did not qualify. 

• Higher priority projects available. 

69

Communities at Risk 

Since the National Fire Plan sets a priority for action on the protection of communities, 

such communities have to be identified. 

At least 22,000 communities in the 

nation are considered to be in the 

wildland/urban interface. 

The wildland/urban interface occurs where human structures (e.g., homes, businesses, 

agricultural buildings, recreational facilities) meet or intermix with wildland vegetation. At 

times the wildland vegetation may pose a fire hazard because of its flammability or an unusually 

high accumulation of plant material or fuel. The accumulation of wildland fuel around and 

within communities in the wildland/urban interface poses a significant fire hazard. 

Most states completed the standardized process or a comparable 

process for identifying communities at risk, and 11,376 communities 

were identified in the vicinity of federal lands. The first attempt to 

identify the communities at risk was published in the Federal Register in 

August 2001. 

States and tribes submitted names of 22,127 communities, which 

included communities in the vicinity of lands managed by the Departments 

of Agriculture and the Interior and communities in the vicinity of 

state and other lands. For those in the vicinity of federal lands, 1,864 

communities have projects planned near them. Additional funding is 

necessary to make an impact on the remaining communities. Most communities submitted by 

the states and tribes are eligible for funds appropriated to State & Private Forestry programs 

within the Forest Service, regardless of the communities’ relationship to federal lands. 

The revised list offers several insights into the national scope of the wildland/urban interface 

communities. This information better illustrates the relationship between federal lands and 

the interface problem in the United States. This list will provide an important tool for use at the 

state level to focus attention on vulnerable areas, and to aid state and federal agencies in collaborative 

efforts to work in areas of local importance and where opportunities are most conducive 

to reducing risks on a meaningful scale. Because a number of communities submitted by 

the states are not published here, it must NOT be assumed that the list portrays a complete 

national picture of the wildland/urban interface areas at risk for all land ownerships. 

70

The information contained in the revised list helps interagency groups of land managers at 

the state and/or tribal level to collaboratively identify priority areas within their jurisdictions 

that would benefit from hazard reduction projects. The revised list offered an opportunity to 

partner with states and tribes, which is a central feature of the National Fire Plan. 

Developing relationships with partners has resulted in more comprehensive information 

that better reflects the relationship between federal lands and the interface problem in the 

United States. This collaborative effort to identify communities at risk from wildfire has more 

clearly demonstrated the wildland/urban interface problem across the United States. In many 

states, this process fostered important steps in federal, state, and local cooperation to identify 

areas of concern and planned actions. Many states will continue the collaborative process with 

federal agencies and tribes, to better focus hazard mitigation efforts and set priorities for communities 

at the state and local level. Working together is a long-term investment, and the listing 

process was just one of many joint projects. Project implementation will involve federal land 

management agencies, state foresters, tribes, and communities in planning and implementing 

wildfire hazard/risk reduction projects, carrying out FireWise projects, and identifying local 

contractors for thinning, reforestation, or other National Fire Plan projects. 

During the listing process, there were several concerns raised by the states about the 

process. The FY 2001 Appropriations Act for the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 

requires only the listing of communities in the vicinity of federal lands. Listing only those 

communities does not adequately portray the extent and complexity of the issue. Wildland/ 

urban interface issues need to be dealt with on a state level basis, not just in the vicinity of 

federal lands. Great concern has been noted on how the list will be used. There are concerns 

that the list will be used to allocate funds and firefighting resources without regard to other 

factors – this is untrue. There is a perception that completing a project in the vicinity of a 

community at risk will fully mitigate the hazard. Hazard mitigation for many communities will 

require significant effort through multiple projects, and must be an ongoing multi-year process. 

Identifying and prioritizing 

communities at risk is a collaborative 

process. 

Six states had NFP projects that 

were impacted by wildfire in 2002. 

During the 2000 fire season wildfires burned millions of acres throughout the United 

States. These fires dramatically illustrated the threat to human lives and development. Under 

Executive Order, the National Fire Plan was created as a cooperative, long-term effort of the 

USDA Forest Service, Department of the Interior, and the National Association of State Foresters, 

to protect communities and restore ecological health on Federal lands. 

71

A major component of the National Fire Plan was funding for projects designed to 

reduce fire risks to people and their property. A fundamental step in realizing this goal was the 

identification of areas that are at high risk of damage from wildfire. Federal fire managers 

authorized State Foresters to determine which communities were under significant risk from 

wildland fire on Federal lands. 

Identifying the communities at risk is 

a state responsibility. 

A Better Definition 

The Fire Committee of the National Association of State Foresters did not like the 

process of how communities at risk were identified. They started to develop a new and more 

meaningful definition of what a community at risk really was. Since California has been dealing 

with this issue for over 40 years, they asked the State Forester to work on this issue. 

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) undertook the task of 

generating the state’s list of communities at risk. With California’s extensive wildland-urban 

interface situation the list of communities extends well beyond just those on federal lands. 

Three main factors were used to determine wildland fire threat areas of California: 

11 states undertook cooperative 

projects with other agencies. 

• Ranking Fuel Hazards - ranking vegetation types by their potential fire behavior during 

a wildfire. The fuels are what brings the fire to the structure. Some are more hazardous 

than others. 

• Assessing the Probability of Fire - the annual likelihood that a large damaging wildfire 

would occur in a particular vegetation type. There are places in the nation where homes 

have existed in the wildlands and have never been threatened by a wildland fire. Conversely, 

there are homes in some areas, like Southern California, where certain home sites 

have been destroyed several times in the last twenty years. 

• Defining Areas of Suitable Housing Density that Would Create Wildland/Urban 

Interface Fire Protection Strategy Situations - areas of intermingled wildland fuels and 

urban environments that are in the vicinity of fire threats. 

The Fire-Threatened Communities in California list includes a total of 1,283 communities. Of 

those, 843 are adjacent to federal lands (USDA Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, 

72

Department of Defense, etc.) and are indicated as such 

with an “F” in the Fed. Threat column. The Hazard 

Level Code included on the list designates a 

community’s fire threat 

level with three indicating 

the highest threat. The 

adoption of a meaningful 

definition of “communities 

at risk” is paramount. 

Unless all of the states 

adopt a uniform definition, 

they run the risk of losing 

funding from the National 

level. 

One of the problems confronting the various state and federal 

agencies is that, once identified, how do you go about taking a 

community “off the list.” The reality is that very few communities at 

risk will ever be “protected” to the point that they are no longer at 

risk. The actions taken to date are short term fixes at best. Fuel 

reduction work is only as good as the 

continued maintenance. Solutions to 

the problem are long term and require 

that homes being constructed 

be resistant to ignition. “Steel 

homes” like this one are not practical, 

but there are things that can be 

done to decrease the odds of a house 

becoming a statistic. FireWise and 

building code regulations are the long 

term solution. 

73

A Community at Risk - Flagstaff, Arizona 

One of the features of the National Fire Plan process has been the creation of a list of all 

the “communities at risk” in the wildland/urban interface adjacent to federal lands. This list 

now totals some 11,376 communities, many of which are political additions where wildfire risk 

is really minimal. If there ever was a large community that meets the original intent of compiling 

such a list, Flagstaff is it. 

Located at an elevation of almost 7,000 feet, Flagstaff sits at the base of the scenic San 

Francisco Peaks, which tower more than a mile above the city skyline. With a population of 

53,000 Flagstaff is a growing, vibrant community that sits at the intersection of Interstates 40 

and 17, close enough to the Grand Canyon to reap the economic benefits of the tourist traffic, as 

well as the urban conundrum of too much traffic. Home to Northern Arizona University, which 

has a strong forestry school and is home to Ecological Restoration Institute, the community has 

a strong environmental conscience and great appreciation for the natural beauty and resources 

surrounding it. This community 

already had several significant 

forest stewardship and fire 

hazard reduction projects going, 

and was well positioned to take 

full advantage of new funding 

available from the National Fire 

Plan. 

Flagstaff is a classic wildland/urban 

interface community. 

Fire History 

Nestled in the Ponderosa 

Pine forest, Flagstaff is practically 

surrounded by wildlands. 

The drought and bugs have killed 

a high percentage of the forests 

in this area (Figure 21). The 

Kaibab National Forest to the 

north and west spreads toward 

the Grand Canyon. The 

Figure 21. 25 to 30 percent of the pine trees around Flagstaff are dead 

due to drought and bugs. 

75

Coconino National Forest surrounds the city. Several parcels of state forest lands border the 

southwest side of town, intermixed with Forest Service and private lands in the familiar checkerboard 

pattern so common in the West. These public lands, which constitute a fire-dependent 

ecosystem, have a long and colorful fire history which has been well documented and studied. 

The Radio Fire burned in June 1977. 

For many residents of Flagstaff, modern fire history began with the Radio Fire in June of 

1977, which burned across the south face of Mount Elden, just to the north of the City, leaving 

many residents with a viewshed composed primarily of white tree skeletons. Started by a 

runaway teenager’s escaped campfire, the Radio Fire frustrated the efforts of the initial attack 

fire forces by leaping into the tops of the pine trees and roaring up the mountain in a matter of a 

few minutes as a nearly continuous crown fire. The FS lookout tower on Mount Elden was 

hastily abandoned, and the fire burned down the telephone lines to the mountaintop radio 

facilities, creating communications problems for the fire suppression forces. Some homes were 

threatened and there were some precautionary evacuations. A similar fire today would threaten 

many more homes. 

The Radio Fire burned so hot that it completely transformed the landscape from pine with 

oak on the south and east slopes to only brush and scrub oak today. Soil damage and microclimate 

changes have prevented the ponderosa pine from coming back on much of that fire site. 

Both the forest that burned, and the brush fields that have replaced it are very different from the 

historical pine forest of the Southwest. The presettlement ponderosa pine forest probably had 

10-12 very large trees per acre, many 500 years old or older. The forest that burned in 1977, 

following years of logging and fire suppression, probably had 150-200 trees per acre, with a 

heavy component of dead litter on the forest floor. 

This condition is typical of today, and the result is that fires now burn more intensely, are 

harder to put out, and do more damage than the fires of old. In the 1950’s the average annual 

burn in the Forest Service’s Southwest Region was about 38,000 acres. By the 1990’s the 

annual average had increased to 112,000 acres. In 2002, one wildfire burned four times that 

much acreage. Around Flagstaff, the major fires have gotten bigger each decade also. In the 

1950’s, the biggest fire was less than 2,000 acres. By the 1970’s, fires were ranging from 3,500 

to 7,000 acres. In the 1990’s, fires of 8,000 to 16,000 acres had become the norm. 

76

The Wildland/Urban Interface 

Arizona is one of the fastest growing states in the nation, as many refugees from the snow 

country move to the desert for their retirement years. Increasing home values allow more 

residents of the desert to move to or build summer homes in the mountains, where summer 

days, and especially nights, are cooler. As Flagstaff continues to grow, with new subdivisions 

winding through the trees in every direction, the wildland/urban interface continues to grow 

(180,000 acres), and to become 

more complex (Figure 22). 

This interface does not just 

extend 60 or 100 feet from the 

last house, but really extends for 

miles across jurisdictional and 

property boundaries, making the 

“values at risk” from wildfire 

values that are shared by the 

entire community. Some of the 

values that could be affected by a 

major fire in the Flagstaff area 

include: public health, recreation, 

water, wildlife, real estate 

and personal property, scenic and 

economic values, as well as the 

emotional and spiritual health of 

the entire community. A serious 

wildfire could destroy the vitality 

and strangle the growth of this 

vibrant community. 

Community Partnership Seeks 

Forest Health 

The Greater Flagstaff 

Forests Partnership 

(www.gffp.org) is an alliance of 

23 academic, environmental, 

Figure 22. This map shows partnership areas in the Flagstaff, 

Arizona area. 

77 

Community Partnerships are 

important. 

www.gffp.org

usiness, and government organizations in the community that is dedicated to testing and 

adapting new approaches to restoring forest ecosystem health in the Flagstaff area. Its goals 

include restoring natural ecosystem composition, structure, and function to the ponderosa pine 

forests; managing forest fuels to reduce the potential for catastrophic wildfire; and to study and 

document the key ecological, economic, and social dimensions of forest health restoration 

efforts. 

Flagstaff facts: 

180,000 acres in wildland/urban 

interface; 

5,400 acres thinned; 

2,250 acres burned; 

7,000 acres planned; 

11,000 acres under study; and 

68 research projects. 

Key elements of the Greater Flagstaff Forest Partnership include: 

• A framework for restoring forest ecosystems 

• A strong scientific foundation for all activities 

• Testing a variety of approaches 

• Extensive research and monitoring 

The partnership has seven 

major forest restoration projects 

underway in the greater Flagstaff 

area following a nineteen-month 

delay as the result of litigation 

(Figure 23). Thinning of trees in 

the overstocked wildland/urban 

interface is one of the top fire 

hazard reduction priorities, with 

11 different types of treatment 

being utilized. By 2002, some 

1,900 acres of FS land and 3,500 

acres of city and state lands have 

been thinned. Prescribed burning 

has been accomplished on 1,750 

acres of city, state, and private 

lands, as well as another 500 

acres of FS land. Some 7,000 

Figure 23. The National Fire Plan funded this cooperative operation 

to reduce the fire hazard. 

78

acres in the community are being intensively managed for forest health restoration. Environmental 

analysis on an additional 24,000 acres has identified about 11,000 acres of additional 

potential treatment area. There are 68 different research projects underway within the partnership, 

many under the umbrella of the Ecological Restoration Institute. The partnership has 

recently published a reference guide to all the various research projects to encourage information 

sharing among various disciplines. 

The projects cover a wide range of topics and ideas in addition to just fire hazard reduction. 

Included are such activities as determining the economic feasibility of utilizing the small 

diameter pines trees that must be harvested for such things as elk exclusion fences to protect 

springs and streams while riparian vegetation regrows, or, as fuel for a biomass electric power 

plant. 

A State Fire Assistance Grant got 

Flagstaff started. 

Federal Funds Helpful 

The Greater Flagstaff Forests Partnership received a $45,000 grant of State Fire Assistance 

funds from the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) for the planning and public education 

parts of the start-up process that were so critical to developing a framework for forest health 

restoration that enjoys broad public support. 

State Fire Assistance funds have also enabled the ASLD Fire Management Division to 

continue to be an important contributor to the success of the forest health restoration efforts in 

Flagstaff, despite the current climate of state budget cuts and hiring freezes. 

National Fire Plan funds enable the funding of hazard reduction and prescribed fire crews 

of the ASLD, Coconino NF, and Flagstaff Fire Department (FFD) which work cooperatively to 

accomplish projects that link across ownership boundaries to achieve strategic fire hazard 

reduction goals. NFP funds enable hazard reduction projects to take place on private ownerships 

that may not otherwise be able to afford to do the work and which could become weak links in 

the chain of fire hazard reduction projects. 

Grant funds enabled the acquisition of the pole peeler used to make thinned small diameter 

pine trees into poles for the elk exclusion fence that protects a restored spring at Fort Tuthill 

County Park, one of the cooperators in the partnership and a useful public education demonstration 

area (Figure 24). 

79

Corporate and community service 

clubs can provide valuable assistance. 

Corporate sponsorships, 

community service club donations, 

public donations, and 

private property landowner 

efforts have all been leveraged to 

accomplish much more than any 

one agency could ever undertake. 

Throughout the community, 

significant progress is being 

made to restore forest health, 

reduce the potential for catastrophic 

fires, and make the 

greater Flagstaff area a better 

place to live, now and in the 

future. 

Figure 24. Federal matching funds were used to reduce the fuel 

loading hazard and construct this elk fence. 

Urban Watershed at Risk – Denver 

The Hayman Fire, a man-caused forest fire, ravaged much of the critical South Platte River 

watershed, the source of as much as 80% of the water for the rapidly growing Denver metropolitan 

area. Combined with a continuing serious drought in the Rocky Mountain Front Range, 

the loss of thousands of acres of forest could force major water conservation measures, especially 

if high intensity rains cause heavy siltation in Cheesman Reservoir. 

Cheesman Reserve is a critical watershed southwest of Denver that includes Cheesman 

and Strontia Springs reservoirs on the South Platte River. Besides being a primary water source 

for a major urban area, the forests of the reserve were also an important recreation resource for 

many urban residents. The South Platte River is a blue-ribbon trout stream and the reservoirs 

are magnets for fisherman. Hikers, hunters, and others have used the forests of the reserve for 

decades (Figure 25). 

80

Denver Water, in cooperation 

with the Colorado State Forest 

Service (CSFS) has managed the 

land as a multiple use forest, with 

water production and quality being 

the primary concern. The agencies 

had developed a comprehensive 

plan to treat the watershed to 

reduce fuel loading and improve 

forest health. Several areas had 

been treated and more projects 

were on the schedule. 

Unfortunately, the Hayman 

Fire burned under conditions of 

severe drought, heavy fuel loading, 

and high fire danger sweeping 

Figure 25. Thinned and burned pine forest in Colorado. 

across most of the watershed as a crown fire, resulting in severe fire damage to the forest. For miles 

upon end, no tree, bush, or blade of grass survived the conflagration of 2002. In the critical 

Cheesman Reservoir area, the only green pine trees left after the passage of the wildfire across 

thousands of acres of pine forest were in a narrow band around the edge of the reservoir where 

vegetation had been thinned to enhance recreation, in the area burned by a previous forest fire in the 

60’s, and in the area of a fuel reduction project funded in part by a NFP grant. The vast majority of 

the forest looks like a nuclear wasteland (Figure 26). 

The Hayman Fire damaged the Denver 

watershed for years. 

The predominant soil type in the area is decomposed granite, which is very coarse and unstable. 

On steep slopes denuded of vegetative cover this soil erodes readily. Even after light summer rain 

showers, ash flows choked intermittent streams and mud flows overran temporary erosion barriers 

hastily placed by Denver Water. The agency has spent millions of dollars in post fire rehabilitation 

efforts to try to minimize erosion and subsequent sedimentation of the reservoirs, but much of this 

effort could be ineffective in the face of an intense winter/spring rainstorm. The potential exists for 

mudflows to cause so much silt to flow in to Cheesman Reservoir that the intakes for the water 

system could be covered over and the water system rendered inoperable. Even without heavy rains 

this first winter, fire damage to the soil surface is so severe in many areas and so few seed sources 

remain that effectively reforesting this critical watershed will take many years and be very 

expensive (Figure 27). 

81

Many communities rely on surface 

water supplies. 

Seven states reported major fires in 

critial urban watersheds in 2002. 

This is but one of hundreds 

of urban water supplies that are 

at risk in the wildland-urban 

interface, especially in the West. 

Many communities rely on 

surface storage in reservoirs 

located in nearby watersheds for 

most of their domestic water. 

During drought conditions, 

inflow to the reservoirs is reduced 

while at the same time the 

fire danger in the surrounding 

watershed increases. Wildfires 

can destroy the vegetative cover 

in whole watersheds, producing a 

fire-flood sequence of events that 

result in increased siltation of the 

reservoirs, pollution of the water 

supply, and in severe cases, the 

destruction of the whole water 

system. 

The Hayman Fire and its 

impact on the Denver water 

system are worth looking at as 

harbingers of what many communities 

may face as the wildfire 

problem in the wildland-urban 

interface escalates and water 

shortages proliferate in the West. 

Figure 26. The Hayman Fire burn area. 

82 

Figure 27. Straw bale check dams in Hayman Fire above reservoir.

The Hayman Fire 

Fire conditions along the Rocky Mountain Front Range in Colorado in the summer of 2002 

were as bad as or worse than at any time in recorded climatological data. A meager winter snow 

pack in the mountains was followed by the failure of the summer “monsoon” rain pattern to 

develop over the Southwest. By summer, the drought conditions were fifty percent worse than 

the historic worst drought conditions, which occurred in 1851. The fuel moisture in hundredhour 

fuels on the Pike-San Isabel National Forests was measured at 9 percent. At this stage of 

drought, even large old trees have lost their ability to resist fire and whole forests are subject to 

stand-replacing wildfires. 

The Hayman Fire started on June 8, 2002 at 1600 hours near a campground on the Pike 

National Forest. It was a human-caused fire, set by a U.S. Forest Service employee using a 

paper torch. The fire spread immediately and rapidly out of the campground, despite early 

detection and reporting, and despite an aggressive initial attack (Figure 28). 

By now a raging inferno, the Hayman Fire raced through five miles of the Cheesman 

Reserve in less than 1½ hours, 

sometimes reaching speeds of up 

to 85 miles per hour. Of the 

8,200 acres burned on the reserve, 

more than half (4,594 

acres) burned at high intensity, 

killing all vegetative cover and 

severely damaging the surface 

soil layer. Only 206 acres of the 

reserve escaped the effects of the 

fire. 

Hayman Fire facts: 

137,760 acres; 

133 homes lost; 

466 other structures lost; 

$40 million to suppress; and 

$36 million rehab costs. 

The fire was not contained 

until July 2, 2002 after burning 

137,760 acres of Ponderosa Pine 

and mixed conifer forest in four 

Colorado counties. It was not 

declared under control until July 

18, 2002. The Hayman Fire, the 

Figure 28. The Hayman Fire burned over 137,000 acres in four 

counties of Colorado. 

83

Figure 29. The rehabilitation cost $36 million. Note that the greatest burn severity was in the north, 

in the Denver watershed. 

largest wildfire in Colorado history, destroyed 133 residences, 466 outbuildings, and one commercial 

building and cost more than $40 million to suppress. Additional millions have and are 

being spent on burned area emergency rehabilitation and to prevent damage to Denver’s water 

system facilities (Figures 29 and 30). 

84 

The Ponderosa Pine Forest 

The ecosystems and landscape of the Front 

Range have changed considerably over the last 150 

years, as the influences of a variety of human activities 

have taken effect. Large wildfires and epidemics 

of insect and disease damages are becoming more 

common. Logging, overgrazing, and fire exclusion 

have resulted in younger, denser forests with thick 

undergrowth which makes the forest more susceptible 

to catastrophic wildfires. 

The forest is a living community of species 

where trees are dominant. Ponderosa is the most 

widely distributed pine in the US and can adapt to a 

wide range of ecological conditions. It frequently 

starts to appear at the transition from hotter, drier 

grass and brush lands to cooler, moisture climates 

and ranges from California to the Dakotas. Ponderosa 

Pine communities exist throughout the Colorado 

Front Range at elevations from 5,000 to 9,000 feet. 

At lower elevations Ponderosa is frequently the only 

conifer present, but at higher elevations or in moist 

canyons other species such as Lodgepole Pine, 

Douglas Fir, and Quaking Aspen may be found 

intermixed with the Ponderosa Pines. The Ponderosa Pine forest supports a great variety of 

plant and animal species, some of which are now classified as rare, threatened, or endangered. 

The Ponderosa Pine forests of the mid 1800’s consisted of fewer, larger trees spaced some 

distance apart. Recent research suggests that the crown closure in the mature forest was only 

about 30 percent and that 25-40 percent of the forest was open meadows. Fairly frequent low-

intensity forest fires reduced ground litter build-up, released soil 

nutrients bound in vegetation, destroyed competing vegetation, prevented 

intrusion by undesirable species, and lessened the chance of 

epidemic disease and insect outbreaks. Fires occurred regularly, but 

were not able to climb into the crowns due to lack of ladder fuels in 

the understory. Due to the lack of crown closure, fires seldom spread 

across whole stands of trees as crown fires. 

The Ponderosa Pine forests began to be heavily logged in the late 

1800’s, with the majority of the large, mature pines being taken for 

lumber. Remaining slash was broadcast burned, adding to the site 

disturbance created by logging. During the early 1900’s (and especially 

in 1910 during the “Big Blow-up”), vast areas of western forests 

were ravaged by catastrophic wildfires feeding on the slash left by 

indiscriminate logging. These conflagrations created a demand for 

increased fire protection, leading eventually to the 10 a.m. containment 

policy that dominated fire protection philosophy for much of the 

1900’s. Fewer fires were allowed to burn in the forests, and the 

forests grew denser. 

In the pre-settlement forest, fires 

seldom spread across whole stands 

as crown fires. 

Much forest land in the West is 

overcrowded, undermanaged, and 

overprotected. 

These sites disturbed by logging or fire became seedbeds that 

supported large numbers of new pine seedlings. In areas where not 

enough seed trees were left, the soil also was ready to support large 

numbers of other species, frequently brush and less-desirable hardwood 

tree species. The second generation forest that grew back was 

more diverse and much more crowded. This second generation forest 

was also little managed until the supply of old growth timber began to 

run low. By the 1980’s much of the forest land in the West was 

overcrowded, undermanaged, and overprotected. 

At the same time the forest was getting thicker, so were people. 

The population of the West continued to increase dramatically, with 

new homes and communities pushing constantly onto what used to be 

forest lands. This juxtaposition of man’s structures and the forest has 

come to be known as the “Wildland/Urban Interface” and it is the 

85

primary concern of fire protection experts in the new millennium. Each 

year, somewhere in the West, large wildfires threaten or destroy hundreds 

of structures, and sometimes even whole towns. The increasing population 

has also generated greater demands for protection of the environment, 

resulting in a sharp decline in logging and greatly increased costs for 

lumber. Today, many competing, and frequently conflicting, special 

interest groups make managing the wildlands extremely complicated. Our 

litigious society has made it more difficult to use prescribed fire without 

some form of protection from liability, limiting our capability to restore 

the forest to a healthy condition. Too many voices clamor for the protection 

of a favorite species at the expense of the health of the total ecosystem. 

Much work is needed to restore forest health, a condition which will 

benefit most species, including human beings, in the long run. A healthy 

forest provides wood, water, wildlife, and recreation. A decadent forest 

provides increased opportunity for devastating wildfires. 

Protecting Watersheds 

The Colorado State Forest Service (CSFS), Denver Water Board, and 

the U.S. Forest Service have formed a partnership to protect and restore 

threatened forest watersheds along the South Platte River. Several locations 

have been identified as being at high risk for catastrophic losses from 

fire, insects, or disease. Projects have been designed and funded to restore 

forest health, including a demonstration site at Trumbull. This area was 

carefully harvested (logged) during the winter of 2000/2001 to achieve 

several objectives: recreate natural openings, encourage new plant growth 

in browse species for deer and elk, create grassy meadows with wildflowers 

used by a R&E butterfly, create uneven-aged timber stands that are 

more resistant to insect and disease epidemics, increase the diversity of 

plant species, and reduce the potential for high intensity wildfires (Figure 

31). 

Figure 30. The Hayman Fire burned over 137,000 acres; most of it in the Denver 

watershed. 

This effort is a start toward reducing the potential for large, damaging 

wildfires such as the Buffalo Creek Fire of 1996, which although it only 

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urned 12,000 acres and only destroyed about a dozen homes, had disastrous consequences for 

the watershed. In the two years following this fire, the watershed experienced 13 so-called 

“100-year flood” events, resulting in massive erosion, siltation of streams, and recurring damage 

to water system facilities costing federal, state, and local taxpayers millions of dollars to 

repair. 

Unfortunately, the Hayman Fire occurred before very much of the landscape at risk could 

receive treatment. The Hayman Fire did burn into the area of the Polhemus prescribed burn 

conducted in the fall of 2001. 

Unfortunately, the prescribed fire 

did not burn hot enough to 

substantially reduce the presence 

of ladder fuels, and thus did not 

significantly reduce the intensity 

of the Hayman Fire. The 

Hayman Fire also ran into the 

area burned by the Schoonover 

Fire the previous month, which 

split the head of the fire, compounding 

suppression difficulties. 

These events reinforce the 

need to assure that fuel modification 

projects are properly designed, 

situated, and executed to 

achieve strategic goals. 

Figure 31. Thinned and burned pine forest in Colorado. 

The Forest Service and 

Denver Water have already spent millions of dollars in rehabilitation of the burned area and in 

measures designed to minimize erosion and siltation of the reservoir. Much more money will 

have to be spent to reforest the watershed, with salvage logging of the burned timber providing 

little cost offset. Even without a major flood situation, the cost of the Hayman Fire to the 

people of the Denver area will continue to increase in the coming years. In the event a major 

(or multiple serious) flood occurs, a significant portion of the Denver water system is at risk of 

damage or destruction. 

87

Who Really Benefits From Watershed Fire Protection 

In the arid West, water is a valuable commodity. So valuable that local, state, and federal 

governments all heavily subsidize the development, transportation, distribution, and treatment 

of water. A variety of users benefit from the complex system of reservoirs, canals, and pipelines 

that move water from the mountain watersheds to developed areas. 

Nearly everybody benefits from 

watershed fire protection. 

The majority of the water in the West is used by agriculture for the production of food and 

fiber. Vast areas of arid land grow multiple crops during long growing seasons, using 137 

billion gallons of water a day. Farm animals and aquaculture (fish farming) account for only 

about 3% of the total agricultural water demand. Power plants use 130 billion gallons a day, not 

counting the billions more gallons used by hydroelectric plants, then returned to streams. Industry 

uses 36 billion gallons a day; commercial users account for another 8 billion gallons. A 

typical U.S. household uses about one hundred gallons of water a day – per person, another 25 

billion gallons. 

All of these downstream water users benefit from watershed fire protection in addition to 

the direct users of the watersheds such as hikers, boaters, hunters, and fishermen. Adequate 

supplies of good quality water are critical to the success of most of mankind’s endeavors. 

Properly managed forest lands produce more and better quality water than overstocked decadent 

forests or than severely burned forest lands. 

Some of the characteristics of the current generation of overstocked, decadent forests 

include: 

• Individual trees and shrubs are more easily stressed due to lack of water in dry years due 

to the effects of over competition for water on crowded sites. 

• The dead to live fuel ratio is higher, making the forest subject to higher intensity 

wildfires.During drought years, heavy die-back adds more dead fuel. 

• Stand density (fuel loading) is so high that prescribed fire cannot be safely used. 

• There is greater risk of insect and disease epidemics. 

88

• Water production is lower, as more trees use more water. 

• Marginal streams are more likely to go dry, endangering aquatic life. 

• There is greater risk of flooding and erosion after high intensity fires have killed the 

majority of the vegetation in any watershed. 

After a high intensity forest fire, the potential exists for major flooding and serious erosion 

which can damage roads, bridges, reservoirs, water and sewage systems as well as homes and 

businesses far downstream. Because we are all taxpayers, we all pay for both the direct costs of 

putting out large, damaging forest fires and the indirect costs of repairing and replacing the 

infrastructure damaged by post-fire floods, erosion, and landslides. Therefore, we would all 

benefit from efforts to restore forest health, reduce the potential for high intensity wildfires, and 

improve the volume and quality of water produced by our forests. 

All taxpayers benefit from healthy 

forests. 

The National Fire Plan – A Coordinated Approach 

Kootenai County, Idaho 

As the National Fire Plan began to take shape, Idaho Department of Lands, Bureau of 

Fire Management personnel recognized an opportunity to help Idaho avoid more disastrous fire 

seasons like that of 2000. Already engaged in a significant cooperative effort with the federal 

wildland fire agencies to mitigate fire risk, especially in the wildland/urban interface, they 

focused a good deal of effort on bringing other possible players to the plate and in developing 

political support for large scale fire mitigation projects. 

When the National Fire Plan 10-Year Strategy Implementation Plan was signed by Idaho 

Governor Dirk Kempthorne in May, 2002, Idaho fire officials were ready to develop a statewide 

process for implementing the National Fire Plan in Idaho. Their efforts have lead to a model 

program for effectively implementing the full potential of the National Fire Plan. 

The Idaho Strategy 

As a result of seven meetings held with State, federal, and local fire and emergency 

services personnel around the State, Idaho Department of Lands fire managers noted several 

problems that needed to be overcome to effectively implement the National Fire Plan: 

89

• There was a lack of coordinated effort between agencies in some areas. 

• There was a lack of understanding of roles and responsibilities between agencies and 

among the public. 

• There was a lack of information sharing among different interdependent programs. 

• Local fire and emergency services personnel were overwhelmed by all the programs and 

paperwork. 

During this exploration process, they also discovered an opportunity to combine efforts at 

wildland fire mitigation planning with the new Federal Emergency Management Agency required 

Community Mitigation Plans for natural disasters. Accordingly, the Idaho Bureau of 

Disaster Services was invited to join the statewide planning group. 

The Idaho Strategy is based on the following key assumptions that guided the State level 

planning group. To achieve the objective of mitigating the danger of wildland fire to the citizens, 

improvements, and natural resources of Idaho: 

• Local leadership and local knowledge are key; 

• Local decision-making should be facilitated and respected; 

• Previous work should not be neglected or negated by the new process. 

A wide range of state and federal agencies pooled their efforts to draft the Idaho National 

Fire Plan Strategy, including: 

Idaho Association of Counties 

Idaho Resource Conservation and Development Council 

Idaho Fire Chiefs Association 

Idaho State Fire Marshal 

Idaho Bureau of Disaster Services 

Idaho Department of Lands 

Idaho Governor’s Office 

90

USDA Forest Service 

USDI Bureau of Land Management 

USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs 

The Idaho Strategy was approved on July 26 th , 2002 and calls for a three-tier approach to 

implementing the National Fire Plan statewide. At the local level is the county-based group 

which will conduct risk analysis, prioritize implementation project lists, facilitate implementation 

among agencies and local interest groups, and provide continuity for mitigation efforts 

(Figure 32). Typical participants in the county-level groups include: 

• Federal agency fire management officials 

• State fire management officials (both the Department of 

Lands and the State Fire Marshal) 

• Local fire chiefs 

• County Commissioners 

• Local and State disaster preparedness officials 

• Resource Conservation and Development Councils 

• Citizen groups (homeowners associations, service clubs, 

etc.) 

• Special interest groups. 

At the State level, the statewide group will provide coordination and oversight, prioritize 

projects, provide advice and counsel to the county-level groups, provide long-term direction, 

and explore opportunities to make mitigation projects financially self-sustaining. Members of 

the statewide group include: 

91

• State and Federal fire officials 

• Idaho Association of Counties 

• Idaho Fire Chiefs’ Association 

• Idaho Department of Commerce 

• Idaho Governor’s Office 

The Department of Commerce provides another possible funding source with grants for 

community development and risk assessment, which can include fire protection planning. 

Wildfires frequently have significant impacts on local economies, initially good by spurring 

local purchases of goods and services during wildfire suppression and rehabilitation, but often 

bad in the long-term as tourism, recreation, and logging 

decline in post-fire periods. 

The third component of the 

Idaho Strategy for National Fire 

Plan implementation is a web-based 

statewide information sharing and 

coordination method, under the 

guidance of the statewide group. 

This information is currently available 

on the Idaho Department of 

Lands website (http// 

www2.state.id.us/lands/news.htm). 

It allows all participating agencies 

and any interested individuals to 

keep up-to-date on National Fire 

Plan projects statewide, and greatly 

facilitates the annual reporting 

requirements to the federal sponsor 

agencies. 

As mentioned earlier, it was discovered 

that there was an opportunity to combine 

wildland fire hazard mitigation planning 

under the National Fire Plan with the Commu- 

Figure 32. The implantation of the National Fire Plan 

in Idaho was a statewide effort. 

92

nity Mitigation Plans for natural disasters now being required by Federal Emergency Management 

Agency before local agencies can be eligible for the Federal Hazard Mitigation Grant 

Program. Many communities were unaware of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

requirement and now will be able to position themselves for that funding source as well as 

National Fire Plan grants. Funds from various sources were used to fund complementary efforts 

(Figure 33) 

State-level Efforts 

The Idaho Department of Lands, in cooperation with the federal agencies administers 

much of the pass-through funding available to local agencies under the National Fire Plan. Two 

of the oldest aid programs are State Fire Assistance, which provides federal funds to state 

wildland fire agencies, and Volunteer Fire Assistance, which is directed at local government fire 

agencies. Under the National Fire Plan, this funding level has been dramatically increased, 

allowing the Department of Lands not only to improve its own protection system, but to increase 

its support to local government fire agencies, which are frequently the first responders to 

wildland fires. Such assistance helps local fire protection districts meet needs ranging from 

wildland fire safety clothing, to newer, more reliable fire apparatus, to better public education 

programs. Most of the available funding is prioritized for agencies serving the wildland/urban 

interface, where homes and people are at greatest risk. 

FEMA grant funds can be used for 

wildfire protection plans. 

A newer state-level funding source is Rural Fire Assistance monies from the US Department 

on Interior 

agencies, which are 

targeted at rural fire 

protection districts 

to help them improve 

their capabilities 

to fight wildland 

fires more efficiently 

and safely. 

These rural fire 

departments provide 

critical initial attack 

fire protection to 

millions of acres of 

Figure 33. Funds from various sources were used to fund the complementary 

programs in Kootenai County. 

93

public domain lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management, and, when 

properly equipped and trained, can be an important resource for large wildland 

fires. 

Under the National Fire Plan, the Idaho Department of Lands has been 

able to provide funding for wildfire mitigation projects on more than 13,000 acres 

of private forest lands in the State. Most of these efforts are aimed at reducing 

dangerous fuel levels in the woods, frequently by mechanical harvesting or treatment 

methods, but also with prescribed fire. Usually, fuel loading is so high that 

some form of fuel treatment is needed before fire can be reintroduced to the 

woods, especially in the wildland/urban interface. 

Figure 34. National Fire Plan money was matched 

with funds from the State parks to construct this fuel 

break. 

An example of a cooperative state-level hazard 

reduction program is the project at Heyburn State Park in 

the northern Idaho panhandle, where some 70 summer 

cabins were at serious risk from wildfire in an overcrowded, 

decadent forest setting. Idaho Department of 

Lands, in cooperation with the Idaho Department of Parks 

and Recreation, designed a 100-foot wide fuelbreak to 

protect the park and the cabins from encroaching wildfire 

(Figure 34). The 1.5 mile fuelbreak was created by a 

commercial thinning logging operation, followed by 

mechanical reduction of slash by a contractor. Funding 

was provided by a $26,000 grant from Idaho Department 

of Lands, with Idaho Department of Parks and Recreation 

matching that grant. Almost 75% of the funding that Idaho 

Department of Parks and Recreation was able to contribute 

was derived from the sale of the harvested timber. 

Idaho Department of Lands will also be sponsoring a FireWise Communities Workshop in 

Coeur D’Alene on May 21-22, 2003 which will provide an opportunity for local government, 

fire, emergency services, and planning officials to learn more about protecting communities 

from encroaching wildfires. 

94

Kootenai County FireSmart 

The county-level planning group in Kootenai County, which encompasses the valuable 

and desirable Coeur D’Alene Lake recreation area, chose to operate with a centralized, countywide 

approach to implementing the National Fire Plan. Organizing under the moniker Kootenai 

County FireSmart, they obtained a grant from IDOC to do fire planning, and another grant from 

the Bureau of Land Management Communities at Risk program to do risk assessment for all 

communities in the county. The risk assessment becomes the basis for both wildland fire mitigation 

project planning under the National Fire Plan, and also assists communities in developing 

their Community Mitigation Plans for Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Having completed the risk assessment and fire planning, Kootenai County FireSmart was 

then able to establish its project priorities. With solid local support generated during the planning 

and risk assessment efforts, they decided to try to undertake an ambitious large-scale 

hazard fuel treatment that, over three years, would create defensible space around more than 

2,000 structures in targeted high risk areas of the county. Under the FireSmart hazard reduction 

project, homeowners in 

the high risk areas can 

get defensible space 

established on their 

properties for free, 

provided they agree to 

properly maintain the 

premises for at least ten 

years (Figure 35 and 36). 

The program began by 

utilizing the Fire Education 

Corps of the Student 

Conservation Association 

to begin educating 

owners about the 

FireSmart project and on 

the need for defensible 

space around their 

homes. The Fire Education 

Corps also created 

Figure 35. Kootenai County FireSmart coordinated the development of 

“defensible space” around hundreds of homes. 

FireSmart is working hard to reduce 

the wildland/urban interface fire 

problem in Kootenai County, Idaho. 

95

model defensible space demonstration sites to help people 

appreciate the “clean and green” outcome of properly executed 

fuel hazard reduction projects. With its act together, 

its assessment completed, and its priorities established, 

Kootenai County FireSmart was able to land a National Fire 

Plan grant for $1,816,905 in Fiscal Year 2002 to fund its 

project. 

Meanwhile, Idaho Department of Lands was able to 

also route SFA, VFA, and RFA funds to eight rural fire 

departments in Kootenai County, allowing them to not only 

improve their suppression capability, but to begin to sponsor 

wildland/urban interface education programs in their communities 

that should help generate more homeowner interest 

in the FireSmart hazard reduction project. In total, Kootenai 

County received nearly $2 million in National Fire Plan 

funding. 

Figure 36. Before and after pictures 

of a home in Kootenai County. 

With a good plan, solid initial funding, and the opportunity to leverage additional funding 

from corporate sponsors and community service organizations, Kootenai County FireSmart 

is poised to make a serious difference in the fire risk to people and homes in the wildland/urban 

interface of northern Idaho. 

96

The Healthy Forests Initiative 

Wildfire Prevention and Stronger Communities 

In August of 2002, President George W. Bush used the Squires Peak Fire in southwest 

Oregon as the backdrop for the introduction of a White House-sponsored initiative to improve 

fire prevention and forge stronger communities by speeding up the approval process for forest 

thinning and health improvement projects on federal lands. 

Standing at a point where the Squires Peak Fire had crowned over a ridge top in dense 

timber, destroying an on-going logging operation for fuel reduction, the President noted that the 

2002 fire season was already one of the worst in modern history, with fires affecting hundreds 

of communities, necessitating the evacuation of thousands of residents, destroying millions of 

dollars worth of timber, and causing great damage to municipal watersheds. 

190 million acres of federal forest 

land at risk of catastrophic wildfire. 

The initiative stated that catastrophic fires are caused by deteriorating forest and rangeland 

health due to suppression of fires and lack of active forest and range management practices. It 

identified 190 million acres of unnaturally dense forests on public land as being at risk of 

catastrophic wildfires. The report noted that these deteriorated forest and rangelands significantly 

affect people, property, and ecosystem health and that “enhanced measures are needed to 

restore forest and rangeland health to reduce the risk of these catastrophic wildfires”. It pointed 

to “needless” red tape and lawsuits that delay effective implementation of forest health projects, 

citing several examples in the West. 

The initiative includes direction to the secretaries of Agriculture and Interior, and the 

chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to improve regulatory processes to 

ensure more timely decisions, greater efficiency, and better results in reducing fire danger and 

restoring forest health. Key measures include: 

• Improving procedures for developing and implementing fuel treatment and forest 

restoration projects. 

• Reducing the number of overlapping environmental reviews. 

97

• Developing guidance for weighing the short-term risks against the long-term benefits 

of treatment projects. 

• Developing guidance to ensure consistent NEPA procedures for fuel treatment and 

forest health projects. 

The report also stated that the President would work with Congress on legislation to: 

• Authorize federal agencies to enter into long-term stewardship contracts with the 

private sector, and state and local governments. 

• Expedite implementation of fuel reduction and forest health improvement projects. 

• Ensure that federal judges consider long-terms risks of harm to people, property, and 

the environment in deciding challenges to projects. 

• Remove a rider that imposed extraordinary procedural requirements on the Forest 

Service appeal process. 

• Fully implement the promises of the 1994 Northwest Forest Plan by removing needless 

administrative obstacles and renewing the commitment to a balanced conservation 

strategy. 

Key reasons that catastrophic wildfires harm people, property, and the environment were 

cited as: 

• Risk to firefighters 

• Increased air pollution 

• Community evacuations 

• Property damage 

• Disruption to local economies 

- Reduced tourism 

- Damage to municipal watersheds 

98

• Environmental damage 

- Damaged fisheries 

- Destroyed endangered species habitat 

- Soil sterilization and erosion 

- Spread of invasive plant species 

- Disease and insect infestations 

The initiative paper notes that progress has been made in improving fire protection and 

forest health with recent increases in funding for hazardous fuels treatment projects and additional 

suppression resources (+ 377 fire engines, 4,900 fire personnel, aircraft, bulldozers, etc.). 

It identified 1.9 million acres as already treated with thinning or prescribed burning, with 

another 2.5 million acres slated to be completed by the end of the year. 

In referring to the 10-year Comprehensive Strategy Implementation Plan between federal 

wildfire agencies, affected states, tribal, and local governments, the initiative notes that a key 

priority of this plan is more active forest and rangeland management to reduce the accumulation 

of fuels and to restore ecosystem health. This plan also establishes 23 priority tasks for 

federal, state, and local governments, most importantly: 

• Developing and implementing a process for all levels of government to collaborate on 

fuel treatment and burned area rehabilitation projects. 

• Developing and implementing consistent and effective contracting, procurement, and 

grant processes for fuel treatment projects. 

• Assessing federal regulatory processes and identifying measures to improve timely 

decision-making. 

The document also identifies significant actions the administration is taking to improve the 

effectiveness of its fuels treatment and forest health improvement programs, including: 

• Making procedural improvements 

• Increasing management effectiveness 

• Sponsoring critical research 

• Restoring record amounts of burned forests (BAER) 

99

• Providing grants to communities for hazard mitigation plans and projects, market 

utilization of small-diameter wood materials projects, and cost reimbursement for 

firefighting efforts 

• Increasing grants to improve local rural and volunteer fire departments 

• Enlisting Student Conservation Association (SCA) volunteers 

Procedural delays (“red tape”) stall 

critical forest health restoration 

projects. 

The initiative contends that procedural delays are stalling critical forest and rangeland 

management projects, citing a FS study, The Process Predicament, with three factors contributing 

the most to project delays: 

• Excessive analysis 

• Ineffective public involvement 

• Management inefficiencies 

Several examples are cited where the decision-making and appeals processes are so long 

that by the time the project is finally approved, it is no longer viable. Reasons include running 

out of funds, salvage timber deterioration, insect infestations, and wildfires that burn the forest 

before it can be thinned. 

The Healthy Forests Initiative uses the Squires Peak Fire in Oregon as a case study of how 

properly planned and executed fuel reduction projects can reduce potential wildfire damages, 

despite the current obstacle course of analysis paralysis. 

Finally, the initiative calls for actions to identify ways to put the Northwest Forest Plan, 

which has yet to come anywhere near its projected level of action, back on track toward restoring 

a sustainable forest economy in the Pacific Northwest. 

The Healthy Forests Initiative is an attempt by the Administration to overcome some of the 

current obstacles to effective fuels reduction and forest health improvement projects. Unfortunately, 

vocal critics say the Administration is only chipping away at environmental safeguards 

to speed up logging of old-growth forests. There is a pressing need to find a middle ground 

where land managers and environmentalists can agree that timely and properly executed fuel 

reduction projects, including commercial thinning logging operations, can reduce the threat of 

catastrophic wildfire and improve forest health, to the benefit not only of humans, but of all 

elements of the ecosystem. 

100

The Drought and 2002 Fire Season 

Fire Season 2002 in the West can be characterized as busy, intense, and difficult, punctuated 

by record-sized major conflagrations. Nearly 40,000 wildfires burned nearly 7 million 

acres, not quite as much as in 2000, but far above average. 

Record sized major fires occurred in Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon. Major fires occurred 

throughout the West, from San Diego to Wenatche, and from Gold Beach to the Black Hills. 

There are two primary reasons for the widespread, high intensity, destructive major fires of 

2002: 

• Drought 

• Decadent forest health 

Fire in the West 2002: 

40,000 wildfires; 

7 million acres burned. 

We have already discussed the forest health issue, and now need to take a look at the 

extent of the drought conditions in the West. 

Drought and Forest Fires in the West 

Drought is no stranger to southwest United States. Repeated extended dry cycles over 

thousands of years have lead to the development of desert landscapes composed of species able 

to withstand extended periods without rain. 

Across much of the SW there are only three basic types of forests, each dependent on the 

amount of water available in the soil annually. At the mid-elevations, above the scrub brush and 

cactus of the desert floor, where more rainfall occurs due to orographic lifting of the clouds, the 

Pinyon-Juniper (P-J) forest struggles to survive. P-J forest is characterized by widely spaced to 

scattered trees, interspersed with the desert scrub and brush species. Only along seasonal watercourses 

or just below the snowline are you likely to find relatively dense stands of P-J. 

Ponderosa Pine is the most common conifer forest type in the SW, occurring at higher 

elevations where the winter snow pack banks water that the trees can draw on to sustain growth 

throughout much of the year. 

101

In the higher mountains, and along cool, moister canyon walls above the pine belt, a true 

mixed conifer forest may be found, with Douglas Fir, true firs, incense cedar, etc. mixing with 

or supplanting Ponderosa Pine. 

Long periods of drought are becoming 

more common in the Southwest. 

In recent years, there have been increasing numbers of large, damaging forest fires in the 

SW. Although to some degree this is the result of forest management practices such as logging 

and fire suppression that have lead to an increase in fuels, a major contributor to this flammable 

situation has been climate variability. Indications are that the climate in much of the 

West is changing, becoming more variable, with greater extremes than we have experienced 

throughout much of the last hundred or so years. One of the facets of the “new climate” is 

increased periods of prolonged drought, which leave the forests tinder dry and more susceptible 

to serious epidemics of insects, diseases, and intense forest fires. 

Drought and Forest Fires 

Long periods of drought are becoming more common in the SW and can be linked to 

major fire occurrence. The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is a long-term measure of 

dryness or wetness, not affected by single precipitation events, using a scale ranging from 

extreme drought (4.0). In a 50-year composite of the PDSI for the 

US, the southwest region scores 

the driest in the US (Figure 37). 

According to Mark W. 

Patterson of the University of 

Arizona, in his paper Forest 

Fires and Drought in the U.S. 

Southwest, drought conditions 

influence the occurrence of forest 

fires in the SW. Fire history data 

collected from tree-ring analyses 

was compared to the PDSI, 

showing that “larger forest fires 

tend to occur when the PDSI is 

lower.” 

Figure 37. The heart of the Nation has historically been in a drought 

condition...it isn’t anything new. 

102

In drought conditions, fire management practices are disrupted, as it is harder to conduct 

prescribed burns to reduce forest fuel accumulations, and it is harder to make successful initial 

attack on wildfires. Larger, more intense forest fires frequently result in the loss of homes, 

wildlife, and recreational opportunities. Even without the fires, drought conditions may diminish 

recreation by restricting campfires or necessitating closures. 

Large, intense forest fires can radically alter significant areas of wildlife habitat, which 

may adversely impact animal populations, especially endangered species. 

Currently, the natural resource agencies of the West are attempting to reintroduce frequent, 

low-intensity fires to the ecosystem, to try to restore forest health. One of the problems 

with implementing this policy change in an effective way is that, even in normal precipitation 

years, the fuel accumulations are too heavy to use fire without first reducing stand density and 

eliminating ladder fuels which contribute to crown fires. Some environmentalists resist thinning 

projects, viewing them as logging in disguise. This makes it more expensive to conduct 

hazard reduction, meaning that fewer acres can be treated with available funds. In drought 

years, it is nearly impossible to achieve proper fire danger conditions to conduct prescribed 

burns, even in thinned/treated forests. 

Drought conditions make it harder to 

use prescribed fire. 

Efforts to return forests to pre-fire suppression natural conditions are likely to be compounded 

by several conditions: 

• Increased fuel loading, which makes fires burn more intensely. 

• Increased presence of brushy understory vegetation (“ladder fuels”), which lead surface 

fires into the crowns of trees. 

• Increased stand density, with closed canopy forests more susceptible to crown fires. 

• Different climatic conditions, resulting in greater fire danger much of the time. 

• Different climatic conditions may also affect the succession of species following fire 

and the survival of various species, both desirable and unwanted. 

103

The Four Corners region was experiencing 

“exceptional drought” in the 

spring of 2002. 

At the start of the 2002, 

drought was widespread in the 

U.S. and was especially serious 

in the SW. Fire season started 

early, and large fires were common 

in the spring months, 

especially in New Mexico, 

Arizona, and Colorado (Figure 

38). 

Meteorologists had predicted 

the drought and its accompanying 

heat wave would persist 

through the summer from New 

Mexico north to Montana and 

Idaho. As predicted, the drought 

grew worse, especially for the 

Four Corners and eastern Rocky 

Mountain areas, with much of 

the West being in severe to 

exceptional drought conditions 

by September (Figure 39). 

Rainfall in October finally 

brought an end to the occurrence 

of large wildfires in the West, but 

the drought persists. It is unlikely 

that enough precipitation 

will occur during a forecast “El 

Nino” winter to ameliorate the 

drought conditions in the entire 

Western US before fire season 

2003. 

104 

Figure 38. The drought monitor map for June 4 shows the 

Southwest and Northern Rockies in a severe drought. 

Figure 39. The drought monitor map for September 4 still shows the 

Southwest and Northern Rockies in a severe drought.

The 2002 Fire Season 

The continuing drought in the West made fire season 2002 the fifth year of severe drought 

in the last six years. Even in May, the countryside in most states was sere and withered as 

August in California. The southern Rocky Mountains were the focus of the worst of the 

drought, with the Four Corners area rated as suffering “exceptional drought”, and rain and 

snowfall at less than 65% of the annual average (Figure 40). 

Colorado suffered the 

driest spring in its 107-year 

history of weather records, and 

Arizona it’s second driest. 

Testament to the drought was 

not difficult to find, as Pinyon 

Pines in Arizona’s P-J forests 

withered and died across huge 

areas. In the mountains, 30% of 

the water-stressed Ponderosa 

Pines in the Flagstaff/Williams 

area had succumbed to bark 

beetle attacks, leaving the green 

forest canopy splotched with 

brown treetops. Reservoirs 

sported brown bathtub rings, 

and stocks ponds turned into 

dust bowls. 

Figure 40. The Drought Monitor map for May 7, 2002 didn’t look 

good. The Rocky Mountain and South Western states were in extreme 

drought conditions. 

Colorado had the driest spring in 

weather records history. 

The drought covered 40% of the country, with the southeast (except Florida this time) also 

hard hit. In the West, drought conditions ranged from Southern California to Montana, and as 

far east as western Nebraska and Kansas. Corn crops shriveled. Birds abandoned their nests. 

Wildflowers failed to bloom. Streams stopped flowing, trapping fish in oxygen-depleted hot 

tubs; 33,000 salmon and steelhead suffocated in California’s Klamath River. Cities and counties 

imposed water rationing regulations. 

105

Wildland fire officials geared up for an early and severe fire season, and sought budget 

augmentations to help cope with extreme fire danger in overstocked, decadent forests increasingly 

crowded with new homes. 

The Indian Fire threatened 2,000 

homes in Prescott. 

Monster Fires Spring Up 

The best indicator of how a drought-aided spring fire season might shake out could have 

been the Indian Fire, which started on May 15 th in the middle of the afternoon in the Prescott 

National Forest just south of Prescott, Arizona. Upon arrival of the initial attack resources, the 

fire was already 10-15 acres in size and beginning to crown and spot in heavy Ponderosa Pine 

forest. Headed uphill in front of a prevailing southwest wind, the Indian fire was charging right 

at the city. The interagency command teams quickly ordered many engine strike teams for 

structure protection assignments ahead of the fire, and initiated a heavy air show to try to keep 

the fire out of town. A tricky firing operation in a fuel reduction project, aided by air support 

and lessening winds, resulted in containment the first night at 1,365 acres, with only 5 homes 

lost. 80% of the Indian Fire burned at high intensity, and more than 2,000 homes in Prescott 

were directly in the path of the fire. Suppression costs were calculated at $1.2 million with $1.8 

million in damages. 

Near the end of May, three major fires in three different western States hinted at what 

might be in store for the rest of the summer. On May 21 st , the Bullock Fire started in Arizona’s 

Coronado National Forest, burning 30,563 acres of the Gila River watershed until controlled on 

June 14 th , before the official start of summer. The Borrego Fire in New Mexico’s Santa Fe 

National Forest started the next day and burned 12,995 acres, racking up nearly $8 million in 

suppression costs. On the 31 st of May in Utah, the human-caused Sanford fire began its march 

across 64,909 acres of the Dixie National Forest. 

June started off with a bang with the Wolf Fire on California’s Los Padres National Forest, 

which would burn 21,645 acres before being controlled on June 30 th , and rack up an incredible 

(for its size) $18 million in suppression costs. The Ponil Fire in New Mexico started the next 

day, and cost $14 million to control more than three weeks later, having burned 92,194 acres. 

On June 5 th , two new major fires started, with the Copper Fire on the Angeles National Forest in 

Southern California burning 23,407 acres and the Big Wash fire in Utah burning 5,400 acres. 

The first week of June ended with the start of the Hensel Fire in Wyoming, which burned 

14,730 acres. 

106

Figure 41. The drought picture is worsening in the western states. 

Even the south is beginning to get behind in rain. 

In Colorado, by the second 

week of June, fuel conditions 

were unprecedented with 1000- 

hour fuels at historic low levels, 

the brush fuels already below 

critical live fuel moisture, and 

the meager grass crop fully cured 

(Figure 41). Summer weather 

had arrived a month early, with 

temperatures in the 90’s, and 

relative humidity of 12 percent. 

All of the ingredients for a 

conflagration were all in place on 

June 8 th , when a FS employee 

deliberately started the Hayman 

Fire on the Pike National Forest 

southwest of Denver. Hayman 

would grow to be the largest fire 

in recorded Colorado history, burning 137,760 acres in four counties. By the time it was finally 

controlled more than a month later, the Hayman Fire would burn 600 structures, cost $45 

million to suppress, and devastate a major portion of the South Platte River watershed, source 

of much of Denver’s water supply. 

The Hayman Fire is the largest fire in 

Colorado history. 

About 81,000 people evacuated...just 

in Colorado. 

That same day, the Coal Seam Fire started near Glenwood Springs, Colorado and burned 

12,209 acres in the next month. As if firefighters needed more work, the next day saw the start 

of the Missionary Ridge Fire (70,485 acres) on the San Juan NF in southwestern Colorado. The 

Missionary Ridge Fire would threaten multiple communities in its three-week life span, spawn 

a fire tornado, and cost an astounding $41 million dollars to control. In the months of June and 

July, 2002, major fires in Colorado would threaten at least 140 subdivisions all over the State, 

necessitating the evacuation of about 81,000 people. 

Just to keep the few uncommitted fire crews on their toes, the Blue Cut Fire on Southern 

California’s San Bernardino National Forest started its rampage across 6,864 acres on June 16 th . 

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The Rodeo-Chediski Fire burned more 

than 100,000 acres in one day! 

While great numbers of suppression resources were being committed to the Hayman and 

other Colorado fires, Arizona was about to break back into the big fire spotlight. The Bureau of 

Indian Affairs (BIA) Fort Apache Agency, with fire protection jurisdiction for the 1.6 million 

acre White Mountain Apache Indian Reservation had sent crews, engines, and overhead to 

Colorado, and was painfully aware of the shortage of air tankers, helicopters, and Type 1 crews. 

On June 18 th , at about 1600 hours, the Rodeo Fire started about 2 miles northeast of the town of 

Cibecue, in the northwest corner of the reservation. With record low fuel moisture and humidity 

(2%), the fire, set by an Indian fire crew member in hopes of employment, burned 15 acres 

in the first 13 minutes and established a good lead over the initial attack resources. Two days 

later, with a major fire at hand and scarce resources finally starting to arrive in staging areas, the 

Fort Apache Agency received a report of a new fire, this one started by a lost hiker. BIA immediately 

diverted air resources from the Rodeo Fire and heavily augmented the initial attack 

dispatch with ground resources from staging, nearly containing the Chediski fire at about 40 

acres. But the wind kicked up, the fire spotted across shaky containment lines, hit the extra dry 

timber, and quickly spread to more than 10,000 acres by nightfall. Both fires were plume 

dominated forest fires, with frequent collapses of the thunderheads atop the convection columns 

spreading fire in all directions each afternoon. Once the two fires merged on June 23 rd , not even 

the bare rock face of the Mogollon Rim could keep them from spreading north and threatening 

a dozen resort and summer home communities at the edge of the Apache-Sitgreaves National 

Forest. In the end, the Rodeo-Chediski Fire would become the largest in Arizona history and 

easily the biggest fire in the West in many decades (at least for about a month). The final toll 

was 468,863 acres, with 466 structures and 400 million board feet of timber destroyed. In one 

day (June 23 rd ), the fire burned more than 100,000 acres! Suppression costs were estimated at 

$60 to 70 million, but damages are still being calculated. Arizona was certainly back in the fire 

news. 

But June’s fire legacy was not over yet over for Colorado. On June 19 th , the undervalued 

Million Fire ($9,400,000 suppression cost) was started on the Rio Grande National Forest and 

burned 9,346 acres before being controlled. Three days later, the Spring Creek Complex of 

lightning fires broke out on the White River National Forest in west central Colorado, burning 

13,490 acres in the next month. During this same period, major fires started in New Mexico, 

with the Roybal Complex of lightning fires burning 5,666 acres by the end of June, and in Utah, 

where the Rattle Complex burned until August, covering 94,519 acres. The last of the major 

fires to start in June was the Grizzly Gulch Fire in South Dakota, which burned 10,771 acres 

between June 29 th and July 23 rd . 

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While these major fires continued to burn, the first week in July brought progress. The 

situation report for Monday, July 8 th noted that although 244 new fires had been reported the 

previous day, only seven of them became large fires, and six existing large fires had been 

controlled. All of this activity occurred on a day when 25 major fires were still burning in the 

West. Windy, hot, and dry weather was forecast to continue, with Wyoming targeted for highest 

fire danger. But on July 9 th , the appropriately named Burn Canyon Fire (31,300 acres) on the 

Grand Mesa National Forest in west central Colorado and the Eyerly Complex of lightning fires 

(23,573 acres) in Oregon started, edging the stubborn Mule Fire (3,932 acres), which started in 

Wyoming the next day, out of the headlines. 

July 12 th brought dry thunderstorms to central and southern Oregon, touching off hundreds 

of new fires (Figure 42). The largest of these would be the Toolbox Complex on the Fremont 

National Forest in south-central Oregon, which would burn more than 120,000 acres before 

being finally controlled nearly two months later. The Monument-Malheur Complex (44,062 

acres) on the Malheur National Forest, the North Umpqua Complex (1,663 acres) and the Tiller 

Complex (69,000 acres) on the Umpqua National Forest, and the Winter Fire (35,779 acres) in 

the jurisdiction of the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) also started on that day. The next 

day brought the discovery of 

many new fires, three of which 

would grow to become major 

fires. The 747 Complex, on the 

O & C timberlands of the BLM, 

with fire protection contracted to 

the ODF, would grow to 16,856 

acres before being controlled on 

August 5 th . The Sour Biscuit 

Complex on the Siskiyou National 

Forest in southwestern 

Oregon would burn 41,897 acres 

and cost $8 million to suppress. 

But the “mother of all fires” for 

the 2002 fire season was also 

discovered on the Siskiyou 

National Forest. Renamed the 

Biscuit Fire after smaller fires 

Figure 42. The situation isn’t changing in the west. Colorado, 

Arizona and New Mexico are ripe for major fires. 

On a typical day in the middle of fire 

season, 25-30 major fires were 

burning. 

Dry lightning hit Oregon hard! 

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Giant sequoia groves threatened by 

McNally Fire. 

Pine Fire destroys 153 structures. 

merged, this monster would burn nearly one half million acres, including nearly all of the 

Kalmiopsis Wilderness Area, threaten several towns (only 13 structures were lost), and burn 

into California’s Smith River National Recreation Area before being finally controlled on 

September 30 th following wetting rains. Suppression costs for the Biscuit Fire were estimated at 

an unbelievable $149 million. 

While Oregon bore the brunt of the new major fire business for much of July, significant 

new large fires cropped up elsewhere. On July 12 th , the Gate Complex of lightning fires near 

Carson City on the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest started, eventually burning 9,900 acres 

and getting Nevada on the charts. On July 15 th , the Deer Point Fire started in Washington’s 

Wenatchee National Forest, spreading across more than 42,000 acres, and running up $15 

million in suppression costs. Far to the south, the McNally Fire started in the Kern River 

watershed of the Sequoia National Forest in California on July 21 st . In its 64-day life, the 

McNally Fire would become the biggest fire in the history of the Sequoia National Forest (well 

known for major fires) at 150,000 acres, threaten some of the largest stands of Giant Sequoia 

trees, and provide lots of photo ops for the Southern California news media. This fire, which 

cost $59 million to suppress, also was set by an irrational human being. The next day, the 

lightning-caused Stanza Fire on the Klamath National Forest in far northern California began 

burning 2,880 acres. Also on July 22 nd , the Garden Valley Complex of lightning fires started on 

the Boise National Forest in Idaho, eventually burning only 1,131 acres, but costing over $8 

million to suppress. 

The last two major fires to start in July were the East Fork in Utah on the Wasatch-Cache 

National Forest on the 28 th , and the Pines Fire in the California Department of Forestry and Fire 

Protection’s San Diego Unit on the 29 th . The Pines Fire would cover 61,690 acres of rugged 

chaparral mountains and destroy 153 structures before being controlled on August 22 nd at a cost 

of $27 million. The situation report for July 30, 2002 noted 32 major fires burning in the West, 

and forecast a warning for dry lightning and gusty winds in Montana. 

The first two weeks of August brought a break in new major fire occurrence, but things 

began to pick up around the middle of the month. On August 12 th , the Mount Zirkel Complex 

of lightning fires started, burning 31,016 acres on the Routt National Forest in north-central 

Colorado. On the 16 th , the Apple Fire started on the Umpqua National Forest in Oregon, burning 

17,600 acres with more than $18 million in suppression costs. 

110

Also on the 16 th of August, the Battle Creek Fire in South Dakota started its run across 13,700 

acres. August wound down with only one more new major fire, the Commissary Ridge Fire, which 

burned 3,500 acres in Wyoming. 

September started off with a bang, with the Curve Fire on Southern California’s Angeles 

National Forest burning 20,857 acres (and 73 structures), with suppression costs totaling more than 

$14 million. Comparative peace and quiet reigned for most of the rest of September, with major fires 

all over the West being brought under control and many weary fire crews finally returning to their 

home bases. A series of fires in California near the end of the month rounded out the 2002 Fire 

Season. The Williams Fire on the Angeles National Forest burned 36,530 acres and 76 structures 

starting on the 22 nd of September. The Croy Fire in CDF’s Santa Clara Unit burned 3,127 acres and 

34 structures on the 23 rd . The Cone Fire on the Lassen National Forest in northeastern California was 

the last major fire of the season, burning 2,006 acres starting on the 26 th . 

Lightning was again the primary 

cause of major fires, but several were 

arson. 

Summary 

The 2002 Fire Season, while not quite as big as the 2000 Fire Season, will nevertheless go 

down in the record books: 

· Federal Fires 17,000 for 4.5 million acres. 

· State Fires 67,000 for 2.6 million acres. 

· Total Fires 87,000 for 7.3 million acres. 

Observations and Success Stories 

As happened in the 2000 Fire Season, this year the primary cause of the major fires in the west 

was lightning, and most originated on federal land. Given that the National Forest and Public Domain 

lands in the West contain some of the highest mountains and most remote, unpopulated area, it 

is to be expected that these areas would receive the biggest share of lightning. Given that: 

• The Federal lands, especially the National Forests, have gone nearly unmanaged during the 

“analysis paralysis” of the past decade, it is reasonable to expect that it will be more difficult to 

control multiple fires in these decadent forest and brush lands; 

• The West was in a state of severe to extreme drought this summer, it is reasonable to expect 

that fires would burn with increased intensity and be more resistant to control; 

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• There were 25-35 major fires burning at any time during the fire season (Figures 43), it is 

reasonable to expect that there would be significant shortages of scarce suppression resources, 

especially air tankers and helicopters; 

• The wildland/urban interface in the West continues to expand, it is reasonable to expect that 

large numbers of structures may be threatened by any major fire; 

• Few states have stringent FireSafe regulations and a large proportion of property owners in 

the wildland/urban interface are still resistant to creating and maintaining defensible space 

around their homes, it is reasonable to expect that large numbers of structures will be lost in 

major fires; 

Shortages of limited resources (e.g., 

airtankers, helicopters) persisted 

throughout the fire season. 

• Fires under these conditions will burn erratically, it is to be expected that firefighters and 

civilians will be endangered, injured, and killed fighting wildfires; 

• Some agencies are still reluctant to enter into closest resource cooperative agreements, and 

fail to do advance strategic and operational planning and joint training with adjacent agencies, it 

is to be expected that some fires will be mismanaged, escape initial attack, and grow too large 

to handle until the weather moderates; 

• Many local rural fire departments are under staffed, under trained, and under equipped, it is 

reasonable to expect that many fires will escape initial attack suppression efforts; 

• Many local governments think that hazard reduction is not their responsibility, it is reasonable 

to expect that the WUI problem will continue to worsen; and 

• These larger, more intense fires are more difficult to suppress and threaten more structures 

each year, it is reasonable to expect that suppression costs will be horrendous. 

Fire Season 2002 certainly met all of these expectations. While the total acreage burned may 

not exceed that of 2000, the fires were every bit as bad, and the toll on our forests, soils, watersheds, 

wildlife, scenery, homes, and local economies were just as devastating. 

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Despite the bad news, there are success 

stories and important lessons hidden by the 

smoke from the fires of 2002: 

• Crown fires generally dropped down to 

the surface wherever they encountered fuel 

reduction projects or old burns, proving that 

such projects make wildfires easier to 

contain. 

• Much of the hazard reduction work being 

funded by the National Fire Plan is being 

done in strategic locations that will help 

protect communities from wildfires. 

• Efforts by agencies to work cooperatively 

pay off when time comes to operate under 

Area Command teams or MACS groups, 

because the players know each other, the 

rules of the game, and what to expect from 

each agency involved. 

• Wildland fire training provided to local 

fire agencies makes them a useful part of fire 

control efforts, rather than a pain in the rear. 

• When agencies cooperate, limited funds 

can be leveraged with other funding sources 

and volunteer efforts to accomplish larger 

projects. 

• Preplanning, joint training, hazard reduction, 

closest resource interagency response, 

and interagency local incident management 

teams pay off in fires in the wildland/urban 

interface contained early, with minimal 

structure loss. 

Large and Damaging Fires 2002 Fire Season 

Arizona 

California 

Colorado 

Idaho 

New Mexico 

Nevada 

Oregon 

South Dakota 

Utah 

Washington 

Wyoming 

May June July August September October 

21 Bullock, 30,563 ac, 7 structures 

21 Rodeo/Chediski Complex, 468,638 ac, 496 structures 

15 Pack Rat Complex, 3,470 ac 

1 Wolf, 21,645 ac 

5 Cooper, 23,407 ac. 26 structures 

16 Bluecut, 6,864 ac 

13 Mussolini, 3,260 ac 

21 McNally, 150,696 ac 

22 Stanza, 2,880ac 

29 Pines, 61,690 ac, 153 structures 

1 Curve, 20,857 ac, 73 structures 

22 Williams, 36,530 ac, 76 structures 

23 Croy, 3,127 ac, 34 structures 

26 Cone, 2,006 ac 

21 Schoonover, 3860 ac. 13 structures 

8 Coal Seam, 12,209 ac, 43 structures 

8 Hayman, 137,760 ac, 600 structures 

9 Missionary Ridge, 70,662 ac, 77 structures 

19 Million, 9,346 ac, 13 structures 

22 Spring Creek Complex, 13,490 ac 

9 Burn Canyon, 31,300 ac 

14 Green Creek, 4,400 ac 

17 Big Elk, 4,413 ac, 3 deaths 

12 Mt Zirkel, 31,016 ac 

22 Borrego, 12,995 ac, 1 structure 

2 Ponil, 9,194 ac 

13 Roybal, 5,666 ac 

Figure 43. There were over 40 major fires in the West. 

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Month 

22 Garden Valley Complex, 1,131 ac 

12 Gate Complex, 9,900 ac, 2 structures 

9 Eyerly Complex, 23,573 ac, 37 structures 

12 North Umpqua Complex, 1,663 ac 

12 Tool Box Complex, 120,085 ac 

12 Monument-Malheur Complex, 44,062 ac 

12 Winter, 35,894 ac, 5 structures 

12 Tiller Complex, 69,000 ac 

13 Biscuit (Florence) 499,945 ac, 13 structures 

13 Sour Biscuit, 41,897 ac 

13 747 Complex, 16,856 

23 Cache Mountain, 4,200 ac 

29 Grizzly Gulch, 10,771 ac, 22 structures 

16 Battle Creek, 13,700 ac, 4 structures 

31 Sanford, 64,909 ac 

5 Big Wash, 5,400 ac 

20 Rattle Complex, 94,519 ac, 2 structures 

28 East Fork, 14,208 ac, 55 structures 

15 Deer Point, 42,674 ac, 5 structures 

7 Hensel, 14,730 ac, 7 structures 

11 Mule, 3,932 ac 

29 Commissary Ridge, 3,500 ac, 2 structures

Safety and Wildland Firefighting Strategy 

When in offensive mode, you go after 

the fire. 

When in defensive mode, you protect 

valuable property. 

When in avoidance, you avoid risk at 

all cost. 

A strategy is a consciously selected approach to achieving a goal. In wildland firefighting, 

the goal is frequently to first contain (stop the spread) and then control (extinguish) the fire. 

Sometimes the goal may be modified with qualifiers such as time constraints, administrative 

restraints, or fiscal limitations, thus complicating the fire manager’s mission. Selection of an 

appropriate strategy early in the game is one of the keys to successful firefighting. 

Offensive Strategy 

An offensive strategy is one in which the fire manager elects to use his resources to go 

after the fire “here and now”; i.e. under the conditions as they currently exist in the place the 

fire is now located. This is not necessarily direct attack in which suppression resources must 

work directly on the fire edge, but more a philosophical choice about which has the upper hand 

at the moment, the fire or the suppression force. An offensive strategy is the correct choice 

when the current and expected fire behavior is within parameters that allow available suppression 

resources to be effective and the location of the fire is readily accessible to the suppression 

force. A roadside grass fire on a normal summer afternoon is an example of a situation where an 

offensive strategy is appropriate. 

Defensive Strategy 

A defensive strategy is one in which the fire manager decides that direct attack on the 

fire under current conditions or in its present location is not practical and it is prudent to back 

off to a more advantageous location or wait for conditions to change. A defensive strategy is the 

correct choice when fire behavior exceeds the capabilities of the available suppression resources, 

or the fire is not immediately accessible to the suppression force. A running brush fire 

on a steep slope with no road access for ground resources is an example of a situation where a 

defensive strategy, such as backing off to a ridgetop road for a firing operation well in advance 

of the fire head, may be appropriate. 

Avoidance Strategy 

Avoidance strategy is where the fire manager decides not to confront the fire at all, thus 

avoiding the risk of selecting an inappropriate strategy. This situation occurs not because a fire 

manager has “chickened out”, but because an agency has created a set of constraints on the fire 

manager that are so onerous as to preclude any chance of success. 

114

The fire manager is forced to withdraw the suppression force completely and retreat to the 

relative safety of an administrative facility to await a change in conditions that would invalidate 

the constraints. An example of avoidance strategy would be the current “disengagement criteria” 

foisted on the Forest Service by OSHA in the aftermath of the unnecessary firefighter 

fatalities on the Thirty Mile Fire. 

Recently there has been considerable debate, mostly initiated by the inexperienced and 

subscribed to by the uniformed, that Fire Order #1: “Fight fire aggressively, but provide for 

safety first” is an oxymoron. That is to say that aggressive firefighting is inherently unsafe. This 

erroneous hypothesis has lead to the new vision of firefighter safety espoused in the Thirty Mile 

Fire OSHA report that firefighters should be removed from exposure to heat and smoke when a 

wildfire is active enough to be “dangerous”. This has resulted in the totally new concept of 

“disengagement criteria” under which, when the fire acts up, everybody goes home. 

Fire Order #1: Fight fire aggressivley, 

but provide for safety first. 

The problem with the concept of disengagement is that it assumes wildfires are homogenous 

masses of light source energy that can be measured and compared to a set of arbitrary 

criteria, resulting in a scientifically correct answer to an unanswerable question. Fires are not 

homogeneous, and even in the worst fire behavior conditions, there are places and circumstances 

on nearly every fire where effective fire control work can be done in relative safety. On 

a wind-driven fire, this means starting at the heel and working the flanks, avoiding the dangerous 

head of the fire until the wind dies down. On a high intensity timber fire it means backing 

off and constructing indirect control lines well in advance of the fire front. It means staying out 

of chimneys above chaparral brush fields where fires can quickly flare up. It means making a 

concentrated control effort in those places that are relatively safe at those times when fire 

intensity is least (e.g. night). 

Total disengagement from a wildfire is not a safety enhancement, it is a dereliction of 

duty. While there may be times in the worst of fire behavior situations where the most prudent 

course of action is to fall back, retreat should never become surrender. When forced to leave a 

section of line, firefighters should regroup, reassess, redeploy, gain additional suppression 

resources, and recommit at another location where they can effectively employ productive 

tactics. 

115

Disengagement allows a fire to grow larger, burn more intensely, and threaten more resources, 

property, and people. Disengagement is inaction rather than action. Disengagement is 

admitting you don’t know what you are doing. 

Failure to fight fire strategically and aggressively actually increases the level of danger 

to which firefighters and civilians may be exposed by allowing fires to become larger, more 

intense, and longer lived. Disengagement is not a solution to firefighter injuries and deaths; it is 

only an avoidance strategy. 

Failure to fight fire aggressively actually 

increases the level of danger. 

Effectively implementing Fire Order #1 should be the first priority of all wildland fire 

agencies. Firefighter safety can be enhanced by: 

• Improving the level of training and experience of fireline supervisors; 

• Improving the level of fire behavior training made available to all firefighters; 

• Equipping each firefighter with a portable radio and a smoke mask; 

• Establishing defensible space around structures worth protecting; 

• Providing appropriate command and control of suppression forces; 

• Obtaining more reliable and efficient fire apparatus; 

• Establishing automatic/mutual aid agreements to improve the availability of scarce 

resources; 

• Reducing the reliance on contract fire crews; 

• Utilizing air tankers for initial attack. 

Avoiding the avoidance strategy situations should become a mantra for fire managers, for 

avoidance strategy robs you of choices and commits you to a predetermined, and probably 

inappropriate, action. 

116

Why Fires Will Get Bigger, Costlier and more Damaging 

In our investigation of major fires in recent years, several major factors are frequently 

identified that can explain why fires continue to get bigger and more expensive to control. In 

most major fires, two or more of these factors combine to result in a fire that is beyond the 

capability of the suppression system to control until one or more of these factors is reduced or 

eliminated. The concept is similar to accident investigation theory, where usually several “little” 

factors add up to serious consequences. 

Contributing Factors 

To illustrate this concept, we developed a sidebar graphic, Why fires will get bigger!, to 

highlight the presence or absence of these contributing factors in any given fire story. 

Following is a more detailed explanation of the components of each 

of these significant factors: 

Weather Conditions 

• Drought includes warmer, drier 

weather making fire danger higher; 

• Wind has greater influence on high 

intensity fires; 

• More ignitions are likely in warm, 

dry weather; 

• Hot weather reduces firefighter 

effectiveness; 

• Vegetation is drier and more flammable; 

• The dead-live fuel ratio in most 

species is higher; 

117

• Drier fuels are easier to ignite; 

• Drier fuels burn with greater intensity and 

are more difficult to extinguish; 

• Water sources may be less available. 

Fuel Conditions 

• The high fuel volumes in 

decadent forests; 

• There are more dead fuels 

which are highly flammable; 

• Heavy fuels burn with 

greater intensity; 

• Heavy fuels are more resistant to control 

efforts. 

Wildland/Urban Interface 

• More people mean more fires; 

• Structure protection workload detracts from perimeter control effort; 

• More complex strategy situations are likely. 

Inadequate Pre-suppression 

• Lack of fuelbreaks/firebreaks makes containment more difficult; 

• Lack of thinning/slash treatment makes more fuel available; 

• Inability to control regrowth reduces effective life span of treatment projects; 

118

119 

• Lack of prescribed burning 

means more available fuel. 

Failed Suppression Action 

• Lack of immediate, aggressive 

initial attack; 

• Not using the “closest available 

resources” regardless of agency; 

• Lack of interagency cooperation 

reduces efficiency; 

• Administrative constraints (e.g. 

wilderness areas, ESA, etc.) limit 

suppression force effectiveness. 

Suppression Costs and 

Damages 

In most instances, these factors 

also contribute to the final cost of 

suppression. Not only is there a 

relationship between fire size and 

suppression cost, there is a relationship 

between fire complexity and 

suppression cost. Any time that a 

wildfire occurs in the WUI, more 

resources will be needed on Initial 

Attack to protect the structures that 

will immediately be threatened. Fires 

in the WUI will require more air 

tankers and helicopters than fires in the wilderness, just to protect improvements. Frequently 

these additional forces will be from outside agencies under some type of agreement for hire, 

driving up suppression costs.

Higher intensity fires will require more people to control and take longer to extinguish, 

resulting in more overtime and higher costs. 

As more improvements are added in the wildland/urban interface, more structures will be 

lost, and damages will increase. Higher intensity fires will do more damage to timber, water, 

recreation, and soil, all of which are of increasing economic importance. 

Thus, without mitigation of as many of these factors as possible, fires will continue to get 

more costly, not just because they are larger, but also because they are more damaging and more 

complex to manage. 

120

Major Fires 

Space does not permit any worthwhile discussion of all the major fires of the 2002 fire 

season. The authors selected as examples two major fires in two states that we thought were 

especially important to understanding the severity of the 2002 fire season. We also selected two 

fires in two states that did not become large, damaging fires as worthy examples of how effective 

interagency presuppression and suppression efforts can stop fires at reasonable sizes and 

costs, despite severe fire danger. 

We did not prepare a biography of the biggest fire (Biscuit – OR) because it originated in 

and burned mostly FS wilderness, a scenario covered in detail in the Fire Season 2000 report. 

We selected the Hayman Fire (CO) because it was multi-jurisdictional, impacted multiple 

NFP-funded projects, threatened and destroyed a lot of structures, and placed in jeopardy a 

major portion of the South Platte River watershed that is so critical to the water supply for 

Denver. 

Eight states had fires that qualified 

for FEMA reimbursement in 2002. 

We selected the Rodeo-Chediski Fire (AZ) because the starts were human-caused, the fire 

agency was affected by reduced availability of IA resources due to other major fires, fire behavior 

was dominated by drought conditions, and the fire simultaneously threatened multiple 

communities, some of which had NFP-funded projects. 

We selected the Squires Peak Fire (OR) because it occurred in an area where interagency 

cooperation is good, multiple hazard reduction projects are being strategically coordinated, and 

the area is representative of the rural wildland/urban interface condition. 

We selected the Indian Fire (AZ) because it is a classic wildland/urban interface fire 

problem that had a successful outcome due to effective interagency cooperation. 

We hope the biographies of these four fires contain lessons that are important to the improvement 

of the wildland fire protection system in the West. 

121

The Squires Peak Fire – Oregon 

The Applegate River watershed of southwestern Oregon is an interior basin west of 

Medford that carries runoff from the Siskiyou Mountains northwest into the Rogue River. The 

area is characterized by rugged mountains with many small valleys along feeder streams. Cover 

type is primarily mixed conifer forest with scattered, but significant, patches of oak woodland. 

The area is bordered to the south and the southwest by the Siskiyou National Forest, on the 

south by the Rogue River National Forest, and on the east by private lands, mostly timber 

company holdings and large ranches. 

Checkerboard ownership patterns 

complicate fire protection projects. 

Much of the Applegate River watershed is a checkerboard pattern of public domain lands 

and private lands. Towns are small and scattered, but much of the private land is developed and 

occupied. The population is increasing and the Wildland/Urban Interface problem is growing. 

As the lumber industry has declined in the area and unemployment increased, many local 

landowners have subdivided and sold off part of their holdings to make enough money to stay 

in the area. The newcomers (primarily retirees) are building larger homes on smaller parcels, 

and the growth appears to be sustained. 

The Medford District is the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) largest administrative 

unit, with large blocks of commercial timberland of increasing value. There is a large staff 

dedicated to managing the forest resources on the public lands, which are capable of providing 

significant revenue, and are managed for sustained timber yield under the O and C Act of 1937. 

Fire Hazard and Risk 

The area is mixed conifer forest and oak woodland, with interspersed patches of brush and 

frequent large meadows (Figures 44 and 45). Much of the forest has been logged, and is second 

or third generation regrowth. The climate is on the dry side, with long hot summers, and cool, 

moist winters. Much of the rainfall is intercepted by the Coast Range Mountains to the west, 

although the Siskiyou Mountains are high enough to receive substantial amounts of rain and 

snow at the higher elevations. From May through October there is little rainfall, except from 

scattered thunderstorms that form over the mountains. Summer temperatures are frequently in 

the 90’s and relative humidity is low. High fire danger is normal in the summer, and in normal 

years extreme fire danger is present for at least 30 days, longer in drought years. 

122

Because of the checkerboard 

ownership patterns, there 

may be a wide variety of land 

management strategies in a 

relatively small geographic area. 

Little of the public land is in 

large enough blocks to be 

managed on a strategic scale, 

and there are not many large 

landowners on the private side. 

Much of the undeveloped land 

is in absentee ownership and 

held for speculation, with little 

direct intensive management. 

As a result, there has been a 

significant build up of fuels and 

much of the area is overstocked 

with trees and thick with brush 

undergrowth. Canopy closure is 

common and ladder fuels are 

abundant. 

Most wildfires in the 

Applegate River watershed are 

human-caused, although lightning 

from thunderstorms that 

build up over the higher mountains 

can become a significant 

risk factor at times. Major 

lightning busts occurred in this 

area in 1987, 1995, and 2000. 

The Applegate River watershed 

is a fire-dependent ecosystem 

with numerous fire-adapted 

Bureau of Land Management 


Figure 44. Untreated oak/pine forest in SW Oregon. 

Figure 45. Site after thinning and slash treatment. 

Projects on multiple ownerships must 

be linked to achieve strategic goals. 

123

species of plants and animals dependent on fire to recycle nutrients, regulate plant succession 

and wildlife habitat, maintain biological diversity, reduce biomass, and control insects and 

diseases. Unfortunately, wildfires are becoming larger, more intense, and more difficult to 

control. 

Use of “closest available resources” 

strengthens initial attack. 

Fire Protection 

Wildland fire protection is provided by the U.S. Forest Service (FS) for national forest 

system lands and by the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) for private lands. To avoid 

duplication of services in the checkerboard ownerships, BLM has contracted fire protection for 

the public lands it manages to ODF. 

Private property structural fire protection is provided by a number of Fire Protection 

Districts (FPDs), funded by a combination of property taxes, special assessments and bonds, 

and donations. Typical of these districts is the Applegate Valley Rural Fire Protection District 

No. 9 (AVRFD9) which has six stations, but only a small paid staff, with mostly volunteer 

firefighters. 

The fire protection agencies have a high level of cooperation, with joint training and 

interagency fire management teams (Type 2) being the norm. Use of “the closest available 

resources” for initial attack is practiced, regardless of jurisdiction. A typical response to a 

wildfire in the Applegate River watershed would include ODF, FS, and FPD resources in the 

initial attack dispatch. During critical fire weather additional contract dozers and water tenders 

may be put on standby. 

Preparedness 

Several years ago, concerned citizens in the Applegate River Valley formed a non-profit, 

tax-exempt, charitable organization called the Applegate Partnership to address critical watershed 

and forest health issues in their area. One of the major focuses was to restore and improve 

river conditions for migrating salmon and steelhead. To this end, the Applegate River Watershed 

Council (ARWC) was formed and was successful in obtaining grant funds from a variety 

of sources for several river restoration projects. 

In undertaking these projects, it soon became apparent to the participants that watershed 

conditions, and indeed the health of the entire ecosystem, was directly related to forest health 

issues that were directly related to fire protection and fuel management issues. The scope of the 

124

partnership has expanded to become a community-based resource conservation and management 

project involving the federal and state natural resources agencies, conservation and environmental 

groups, the timber industry, and local citizens. It facilitates cooperation in the use of 

land and resource management practices that promote ecosystem health and diversity. (For 

more information, see www.ARWC.org). 

The partnership has come to recognize the roles (both helpful and harmful) of fire in their 

watershed and the importance of managing fires (both prescribed and wild) to maximize beneficial 

effects and minimize damages to the ecosystem. Its newspaper, Applegator, has become an 

important and effective tool in educating local residents about the importance of hazard reduction 

and preparedness for wildfires. The partnership continues to be a broad-based coalition of 

players making effective contributions to significant improvements in fire protection. 

The National Fire Plan in Action 

The Applegate Partnership and it participating agencies were in excellent position to take 

full advantage of grant funding opportunities that became available under the National Fire Plan 

(NFP). In 2001, the Applegate Partnership received a NFP grant to prepare a comprehensive 

fire protection strategy for the communities in the Applegate River watershed. The plan is not a 

detailed tactical plan, but a compilation of collaborative concepts, strategies, and goals that can 

be used to effectively plan specific land management projects and activities that will contribute 

to ecosystem health. 

Commonly known as the Applegate Fire Plan, the document 

establishes the following primary goals: 

1. To improve community awareness of the concept of 

land stewardship, and foster respect for ecosystems and the 

processes that maintain them; 

2. To develop a wide array of strategies for fuel reduction 

and fire suppression that residents can accept as sensible 

precautions against catastrophic fire and that the land 

managers can incorporate into their management practices; 

125

3. To develop a system of emergency communications for the Applegate neighborhoods; 

and 

4. To restore fire-adapted species in the ecosystem, encouraging more fire-resilient forests. 

Applegate Fire Plan: 

Awareness 

Strategies 

Communications 

Restoration 

The plan identifies the fire regimes and condition classes that define fire hazard in the 500,000- 

acre watershed. It talks about the risk of fire from a variety of human activities, and the increase in 

fire occurrence that comes with increased population. It defines 19 Strategic Planning Areas (SPAs) 

based on combinations of small watersheds. It covers the effects of fire on vegetation, soils, water, 

air, and animals, as well as scenic and property values. 

The Applegate Fire Plan suggests hazard reduction strategies that begin at the Wildland/Urban 

Interface in high hazards zones (“communities at risk”), then the lands immediately adjacent to 

homes and roads, then all lands in high fire hazard areas, and finally any areas where fire can contribute 

to or detract from ecosystem health. It focuses on the concept of “hazard reduction without 

borders,” where all agencies and 

landowners cooperate to achieve 

strategic goals of hazard reduction 

of general benefit to the community 

as a whole. Specific hazard 

reduction recommendations were 

developed for each of the 19 SPAs. 

It describes a variety of methodologies 

for fuel reduction, and the 

sites to which each is most suited 

(Figures 46, 47 and 48). The plan 

defines various levels of defensible 

space for various combinations of 

slope and fuel loading, as well as 

providing guidelines for fire 

resistant plantings. 

The Applegate Fire Plan 

summarizes existing policies, 

statutes, and regulations at the 


Figure 46. BLM fuel reduction block adjacent to a subdivision in the 

Applegate River Valley, OR. 

126

Bureau of Land Management Bureau of Land Management 

Figure 47. “Slash Buster” at work in oak woodland in SW Oregon. 

Figure 48. Southwest Oregon oak woodland after treatment. 

federal, state, and local levels that 

relate to fire protection. Interestingly, 

the Jackson and Josephine 

County fire safety requirements 

are stricter than the new Oregon 

state requirements which do not 

take effect until 2004. 

The Plan proposes a strategy 

for emergency communications 

planning at the neighborhood 

level to insure better fire 

reporting, neighborhood notification, 

and receiving and disseminating 

fire information from the 

fire agencies. It provides information 

on escape routes, safety 

zones, and evacuation routes, and 

checklists for home fire safety 

measures. It provides resource 

information for land management 

planning and fire protection 

planning, including possible 

funding sources for projects and 

guidelines for hiring contractors. 

To measure accomplishments, 

the Plan establishes a 

monitoring team to track projects 

and gather data on project effectiveness 

5 and 10 years after 

completion. Finally, the Plan 

identifies an even dozen specific 

things that agency personnel and 

127


Figure 49. Untreated pine forest near Squires Peak Fire. 

residents can do to make the plan a viable, efficient, and effective way to reduce 

fire hazard, increase fire preparedness, and improve forest health in the Applegate 

community. 

Other National Fire Plan Projects 

Applegate Valley Rural Fire Protection District No. 9, in cooperation with 

ODF, has obtained two grants with total funding of $250,000 for fuel reduction 

efforts in the district. The money will be used to reimburse costs to property 

owners who complete projects to achieve defensible space around their homes 

according to the standards established in the Applegate Fire Plan. 

BLM’s Medford District has received additional funding which will allow it 

to expand its fire management activities and complete more of the thinning and 

fuel reduction projects it has had planned for some time. Staffing has doubled, and 

project funds should support an increase in treated area from 8,000-9,000 acres per 

year to 10,000-13,000 acres per year. BLM awarded a five-year, $20 million 

contract to two 

contractors to do fuels treatment 

work on the public lands in the 

Medford District (Figures 49 and 

50). Because fuel loading is too 

high to use prescribed fire in 

initial applications, much of the 

area will be thinned and mechanically 

treated (e.g. 

Slashbuster, etc.), then burned at 

a later date. 

The Medford District 

received $8.6 million in NFP 

funds for federal fiscal year 

2002, which allows it to increase 

its fuel reduction acreage target 

to 23,000 acres. NFP funding 

allows BLM to do more hazard 


Figure 50. Pine forest after commercial thinning cut with slash ready 

for winter burning. 

128

eduction work outside the commercial timber belt and adjacent to communities at risk (Figures 

51 and 52). Cost estimates for post-logging hazard reduction work in southwest Oregon are 

listed as: 

• Mechanical slash treatment 

• Manual slash treatment 

• Prescribed burn 

$300-400/acre 

$800-1200/acre 

$200-300/acre 

ODF has established cost-share fuel treatment programs to assist landowners in 18 of the 

26 designated communities at risk in southwestern Oregon. Nineteen communities and nonprofit 

organizations have received 29 grants totaling $4.3 million in the last two years. ODF has 

received an additional $2.25 million which it has used to assist 640 landowners to achieve 

defensible space. 

Southwest Oregon has 26 

communities-at-risk. 

ODF and BLM work cooperatively with each other and with private landowners to achieve 

fuel reduction projects that are linked across property lines to achieve pre-planned strategic 

hazard reduction goals. 



Figure 51. Direct attack dozer line contained the Squires Peak Fire in 

areas that had been thinned. 

Figure 52. Backing surface fire in thinned pine/fir/oak stand. 

129

The Squires Peak Fire 

The Squires Peak Fire began from a lightning strike during a typical summer afternoon 

thunderstorm in the vicinity of Squires Peak, about 17 miles west of Ashland, Oregon on Saturday, 

July 13, 2002 at about 1700 hours. 

There was little rainfall with the thunderstorm, and the 

conditions were just right for the fire to burn aggressively in 

heavy fuels all through the first night. On Sunday, the fire continued 

to spread, with suppression efforts being frustrated by inaccessible 

terrain, erratic winds, and spot fires. On Monday and 

Tuesday, suppression efforts started to pay off, and where fuel 

treatment projects (logging, thinning, burns, etc.) had taken 

place, the fire remained a surface fire vulnerable to direct attack 

(Figure 52). Crews were able to construct direct dozer and hand 

lines in many areas, and go indirect with follow-up burning out 

in other areas. Containment appeared not far off. 

On Tuesday evening, 

strong down-slope winds of up 

to 20 mph caused spotting 

outside containment lines and 

the fire began to make significant 

runs down and across 

drainages, with sustained runs 


Figure 53. Crown fire in unthinned pine forest; Squires Peak Fire, 

Oregon. 

130

in the crowns of the trees. More 

spot fires spread fire into multiple 

drainages, and the fire 

moved off of Squires Peak into 

several populated drainages. The 

fire behavior pattern became one 

of backing fires under thinned 

timber stands and moving down 

slope without the effect of wind, 

but making strong runs in 

unthinned timber stands (Figures 

53 and 54) and uphill on south 

slopes, with torching, crowning, 

and multiple spot fires (Figures 

55). Numerous homes and 

outbuildings in the rural interface 

were threatened, and many 

families evacuated. Most families 

were well prepared, thanks to 

their understanding of the issues 

identified in the Applegate Fire 

Plan. 


Figure 54. Stand in Figure 10 after Squires Peak Fire. 

Sustained crown fires swept whole 

slopes in unthinned timber stands. 

On Wednesday, erratic 

winds continued to fan the fire 

across containment lines and to 

drive spot fires into new terrain. 

On Thursday, ODF fire managers 

drew “a line in the sand” at 

Sterling Creek Road. Taking 

advantage of the terrain, an area 

where fuels had been treated, and 

more favorable winds, the fire 

was contained without crossing 

the road. 


Figure 55. Home with defensible space survived the Squire Peaks 

Fire. 

131

The Squires Peak Fire was contained at 3,000 acres 

with no homes lost and nobody seriously injured. Cooperation 

between the responsible agencies and open dialogue 

with the local residents contributed materially to a 

successful suppression effort. 

On August 22, 2002, following another siege of 

lightning fires in southwest Oregon, and during the height 

of the massive Biscuit Fire some thirty miles to the west, President George W. Bush stood at a 

spot inside the Squires Peak Fire where the fire had burned intensely through a heavy stand of 

timber scheduled to be logged, followed by slash treatment and prescribed burning. Against a 

background of blackened trees, the President called for changes in federal policy and regulations 

that would make it easier for the FS and BLM to conduct thinning, slash treatment, and 

prescribed burns that would reduce fire hazard and contribute to improved forest health. He 

also called on Congress to provide funding to implement the 1994 Northwest Forest Plan, 

which could yield up to a billion board feet of lumber and 100,000 jobs while reducing fire 

hazard and improving forest health. 

The Squires Peak Fire certainly was not large, especially in a year with two 

fires approaching half a million acres, but it may have a significant impact as the 

icon for expanded efforts to thin our forests and reduce fire hazards. 

The Indian Fire, Prescott, Arizona 

Prescott, Arizona is a rapidly growing community situated in the pine forested 

mountains of central Arizona, adjacent to the Prescott National Forest. Nearly 

50,000 people live in the Prescott metropolitan area and major growth has been the 

hallmark of the last decade, with many of the new arrivals being retirees intent on 

escaping the stress of large cities or the brutal winters of the Great Lakes region. 

At an elevation of 5,350 feet, Prescott offers attractive scenery, cool summers, and 

mild winters to its residents. It also offers the opportunity for high intensity, large, 

damaging wildfires (Figure 56). 

Figure 56. Wildland/urban interface in Prescott, Arizona. 

At lower elevations of the Prescott Basin the vegetation consists of mixed 

brush species such as manzanita, mountain mahogany, scrub oak and cliff rose, 

132

with scattered pinyon pine and 

juniper trees. As elevation 

increases, so does the density of 

Ponderosa Pine. In many parts of 

the metropolitan area, the brush 

is high, thick, and decadent. 

Over the last 50 years, the Ponderosa 

Pine forest has changed 

significantly in character, primarily 

as a result of logging and fire 

exclusion. Much of the existing 

forest, especially on the state and 

private lands, but also on the 

national forest, is overstocked 

with heavy undergrowth of brush 

fuels. During the last few years, 

a lingering drought in the Southwest 

U.S. has resulted in high 

mortality of all forest plant 

species. The brush species have 

reacted to water stress by increasing 

their dead/live fuel ratios, 

some of which were already high 

due to the advanced age of the 

brush fields. In many parts of 

Prescott, the scenery looks 

remarkably similar to Southern 

California fuel types. The 

Ponderosa Pine forest has suffered 

increased epidemics of 

disease and insects, and many of 

the trees are dead or dying. 

Aerial fuels are abundant, allowing 

surface fires plenty of opportunity 

to climb into the crowns of 

Figure 57. Prescribed fire in Ponderosa Pine, Arizona. 

Figure 58. Fuel wood cut and stacked; slash lopped, ready for 

broadcast burning. 

133

the pine trees. Without normal summer “monsoon” rainstorms, the hot, dry desert climate 

provides the perfect weather conditions for high intensity wildfires. Normal summer monsoons 

have occurred only once in the last six years. 

Prescott, AZ is a community-at-risk. 

Homes are being built at an increasing pace, with subdivisions creeping up the mountains 

on the outskirts of town. Early subdivisions were built without fire protection water systems 

and with narrow, winding roads, frequently with only one way in and out. No statewide fire 

defense regulations are in place. Many people, alarmed how many trees are already dead, are 

reluctant to support additional thinning. There are no legal requirements or financial incentives 

to establish defensible space around homes. When you add increasing numbers of homes to 

this volatile wildland setting, you have successfully created the recipe for a large, damaging 

wildfire to sweep through the wildland/urban interface with great risks to people and their 

homes. 

Pre-suppression Activities 

The primary public land management agencies in the Prescott metropolitan area are the 

U.S.D.A. Forest Service (FS), Prescott National Forest and the Arizona State Land Department 

(ASLD). Other than Arizona Public Services (APS), an electric utility, there are few major 

landowners in the private sector, so the private lands tend to be in small ownerships, usually 

less than an acre in size. 

The Prescott National Forest (PNF) has an active fuel management program, with additional 

funding from the National Fire Plan providing increased opportunities for hazard reduction 

projects of cost-effective scale. The forest staff recognizes the necessity of protecting the 

adjacent private lands from wildfires originating on the forest, as well as the need to protect 

forest resources from the increased fire risks posed by urbanization of the neighboring wildlands. 

Considerable effort has been directed at fuel management projects on the windward edge 

of the forest southwest of town (Figure 59). 

The State lands tend to be in scattered, one section (640 acres) blocks, although there are 

some patches of contiguous blocks in the Prescott area that provide opportunity for macro-land 

management projects. The ASLD Fire Management Division has less than thirty full time 

permanent employees for the whole state, so it must leverage its meager resources by entering 

into cooperative arrangements with private landowners and other public agencies in order to 

accomplish integrated fuel hazard reduction in strategic blocks. 

134

Arizona Public Services 

(APS) is fully cognizant of both 

the risk of wildfire originating 

from its electrical utility operations 

and the risk of wildfire to 

its electric utility infrastructure. 

For example, APS is currently 

building the world’s largest solar 

power plant (450KW) on a 50- 

acre site near the Prescott airport. 

Not wanting to find out what 

effect the smoke and soot from a 

major forest fire could do to this 

facility, the utility has become a 

major player in hazard reduction 

efforts in the Prescott area. 

Figure 59. Thinning with fuel wood removal; slash piled for burning. 

Formed to address the threat of large, damaging wildfires in the wildland-urban interface, 

the Prescott Area Wildland/Urban Interface Commission (PAWUIC) consists of civic leaders 

and interested citizens with advisors from the land management and fire protection agencies. 

Born a dozen years ago under the leadership of the Prescott City Manager, the chairman of the 

Yavapai County Board of Supervisors and the supervisor of the Prescott N.F., the PAWUIC, 

with initial funding from APS, has been successfully pursuing various grant funds for hazard 

reduction projects in the Prescott interface. 

Key players: 

Arizona State Lands Dept. 

Prescott National Forest 

Prescott Fire Department 

Central Yavapai Fire District 

Arizona Public Services 

In addition to creation of an interagency operating and evacuation plan for wildfires, one 

tangible example of their efforts is the creation of two brush fire crews operated jointly by the 

Prescott Fire Department (PFD) and the Central Yavapai Fire District (CYFD). These fullytrained 

fire crews are equipped with trucks, chippers, and tools, and perform hazard reduction 

work on private lands in targeted high hazard areas of the wildland/urban interface. In one 

target subdivision in a high hazard area, more than half of all the lots have already been treated. 

While local politics still make stiff fire regulations unpopular, the commission has greatly 

increased public awareness of the defensible space concept. 

135

ASLD, using funding from NFP grants and the Prescott brush crew, has been able to 

pretreat blocks of state lands within the metropolitan area in preparation for prescribed burns 

aimed at reducing fuel volumes and lowering age class in the brush species. This type of 

project has the potential to decrease fire hazard, improve scenic value, and improve forage 

value for wildlife, an important part of the living in the woods experience. 

The Prescott National Forest conducts several prescribed burn operations each year, as 

well as brush crushing and tree thinning operations, both for fire hazard reduction and insect 

control purposes. 

Defensible space is being created with 

National Fire Plan grant funds. 

Fire Suppression Organization 

The primary providers of fire protection services in the Prescott Basin are the Prescott Fire 

Department (PFD), the Central Yavapai Fire District (CYFD), and the Prescott National Forest 

(PNF). 

The Prescott Fire Department has five stations and operates two wildland engines in 

addition to its regular structure engines. PFD has a Wildland/Urban Interface Hazard Fuels 

Reduction Team, operates an interagency central dispatch, and has an automatic aid agreement 

with the CYFD. 

The Central Yavapai Fire District has four stations housing 3 engines, one quint, 2 water 

tenders, and one patrol rig and is a combination paid/volunteer department serving the area 

outside the City of Prescott. 

The Prescott National Forest currently staffs six engines, one helicopter (Type 3) with fly 

crew, six lookouts, and fields 10 fire prevention technicians. It also has available one hotshot 

crew and one heavy air tanker, both considered national resources and subject to frequent offforest 

dispatches. Initial attack capability during the current drought has been increased by the 

addition of one medium air tanker. 

The Forest Service engines are stationed in the PFD and CYFD stations during the wildland 

fire season and the personnel from all three agencies, train, work and respond together, 

using the “closest resource” dispatch philosophy. Aircraft respond on initial attack dispatches 

in the wildland/urban interface during high fire danger periods. 

136

The ASLD Fire Management Division provides coordination of interagency response to 

multi-jurisdictional wildfires and pays for local government fire apparatus responding to wildfires 

outside their own jurisdiction. 

The Indian Fire 

It was a warm, sunny, day with a normal southwest breeze in Prescott on Wednesday, May 

15, 2002. At about 1455 hours personnel at both Prescott Fire Stations 71 and 72 observed a 

building column of smoke to the south of town. Soon 9-1-1 calls confirmed a wildfire on 

Indian Creek Road near the 

campground. Units from the 

PFD, CYFD, and PNF responded 

simultaneously. Upon arrival of 

the first units at the scene, seven 

minutes later, the fire was already 

10-15 acres burning intensely 

and crowning in pine timber. It 

appears the fire had been burning 

for some time before being 

noticed. 

Delayed report gives fire a head start. 

The fire spread quickly 

toward Highway 89 and was 

already 100 acres with long range 

spotting occurring within the first 

30 minutes. Utilizing the strategy 

identified in the local pre-plan, a 

command post was established at the Indian Creek Campground and arriving chief officers 

immediately given division assignments, including the formation of a Structure Protection 

Group, as the fire was headed directly for the Ponderosa Park subdivision. Residents of the 

area crowded the roadways trying to reach their homes. Significant resources were ordered for 

structure protection assignments early on. 

As the fire increased in size and intensity, it was apparent that evacuation of the Ponderosa 

Park and Timberridge subdivisions, if not a much larger area, would be necessary. The Yavapai 

137

County Office of Emergency Management 

(YCOEM) began mobilizing 

additional resources according to the 

interagency operating plan. Before 

nightfall, some 3,000 people would 

be evacuated from their homes and 

report to evacuation centers established 

by the Red Cross and other 

relief agencies. 

3,000 people evacuated. 

By 1700 hours, the fire had 

crossed Highway 89 near the summit, 

destroying a historic forest service 

station on the way, and was more 

than 500 acres and running hard 

toward town. A total of six air 

tankers and one heavy-lift helicopter 

were now operating on the fire. 

Within one half hour of the opening 

of the Prescott Emergency Operations 

Center (EOC), three subdivisions 

were being evacuated and buses had 

been ordered to evacuate the campers 

from Chapel Rock Camp. The fire 

had reached 900 acres (Figure 60). 

At this time it was apparent that 

a stand would have to be made at the 

head of the fire to keep it from 

burning directly into the City. Timing 

and circumstances dictated that 

the stand would be made at the edge 

Figure 60. The Indian Fire headed for the City of Prescott. 

of the Cathedral Pines subdivision, directly bordering the Prescott NF. Structure protection 

forces were put in to place, residents were evacuated, residences were triaged, and wildland 

crews began a burnout around the structures at the edge of the subdivision in an area that had 

138

previously been mechanically 

thinned and burned by the Forest 

Service in anticipation of just 

such a fire event. 

As the head of the fire entered 

the fuel treatment area, fire 

intensity diminished so that air 

drops became effective, and the 

wind died down enough that the 

firing operation was manageable. 

There was still plenty of excitement, 

as a spot fire hidden by the 

heavy smoke ran through a brush 

patch below a house, igniting it. 

An adjacent house ignited from 

radiant heat from the first structure, 

and two more houses up the hill 

had spot fires start on the roofs before suppression forces could knock the heat out of the head. 

Figure 61. High intensity wildfire; salvage logged and slash chipped 

in foreground. 

Fire spread from first house to 

three others. 

By nightfall, the combination of aggressive fire fighting, 

close air support, reduced wind, cooler temperatures, 

and higher humidity gave firefighters the upper hand. The 

fire was contained the next day at 1,360 acres, with 4 structures 

lost and one heavily damaged. Fifteen houses that 

were within the perimeter of the fire had been saved. 

Nearly 80% of the area burned by the Indian Fire 

suffered a high intensity burn; with nearly 100% kill of the 

second growth Ponderosa Pine forest. Arson is suspected as 

the fire cause and a reward has been offered for information leading to the arrest and conviction of 

the responsible party (Figure 61). 

139

While the Indian Fire was certainly one of the most serious fires in recent history in the Prescott 

area, it had the potential to be a disaster of major proportions. More than 2,000 homes were in the 

immediate path of the fire, nestled in woods made decadent by insects and disease and made tinder 

dry by years of drought. Preplanning, hazard reduction, interagency cooperation, effective suppression 

actions, and a little luck kept the Indian Fire from becoming a conflagration. 

The Rodeo-Chediski Fire, Arizona 

The Mogollon Rim cleaves the mountains of eastern Arizona as dramatically as the Great 

Wall once isolated China. The vertical rock face of the rim, reaching more than 1,000 vertical 

feet, makes travel difficult at best. From a distance, the vast expanse of bare rock wall would 

appear to be a formidable firebreak, but it proved no great obstacle for the Rodeo-Chediski Fire, 

the largest wildfire in Arizona history. 

North of the rim the country 

tilts gently toward the north, 

falling from the cool pine forests 

of the Pinetop-Lakeside resort 

communities at 7,000 feet to the 

high desert scrub on the Colorado 

Plateau south of the Colorado 

River and the Interstate 40 

corridor between Winslow and 

Holbrook, around 5,000 feet in 

elevation (Figure 62). The transition 

from desert to conifer forest 

is dramatic as you head south 

from Holbrook and climb toward 

the luxuriant green forests along 

the rim (Figure 63). Along the 

north side of the rim are nestled a 

dozen resort and summer home 

communities, where residents 

and visitors alike are somewhat 

protected from the oppressive 

heat of the desert summers. 

Figure 62. Unthinned Ponderosa Pine forest near Rodeo, Arizona. 

140

South of the rim, the Fort Apache and San Carlos Indian Reservations cover 2.6 million 

acres of high desert and forest punctuated by scattered rugged mountains and deep river canyons. 

Two major watersheds, the White River and the Black River, flow out of the reservations, 

join to form the Salt River and flow down toward the Valley of the Sun and the Phoenix metropolitan 

area. Elevations range from the 11, 560 foot Mount Baldy in the White Mountains on 

the east side down to the 3,000 

foot level on the west and south 

ends of the reservations. Vegetation 

varies from high desert 

brush and scrub through dense 

Ponderosa Pine forest to mixed 

conifer forest on the shoulders of 

the high peaks. The forest 

supports two sawmills that are a 

significant source of income for 

the White Mountain Apache 

tribe. Several small towns are 

scattered across the reservations, 

but much of the country is open 

and undeveloped wildland. Only 

two major highways cross the 

reservations, and much of the 

land area is inaccessible beyond 

a network of gravel and dirt Figure 63. The fire is torching in pines. 

logging roads. 

Live fuel moistures were at record low 

levels. 

The area is dry, with much of the precipitation from sporadic scattered thunderstorms that 

occur frequently during the summer “monsoon” rain period. Winter snows at the higher elevations 

bank much of the moisture required to support the pine forest and keep the small streams 

trickling down through the desert towards the cities. For six of the last seven years, the area has 

experienced a severe drought. At the lower elevations, much of the pinyon pine in the pinyonjuniper 

cover type of the desert highlands has died. In the pine forests, insect and disease epidemics 

have killed 20-30% of the Ponderosa Pine. The forests in the spring of 2002 looked 

gray-brown and tired instead of lush green. Live fuel moisture readings in the brush and timber 

were at record low levels. 

141

Fort Apache Agency: 

1.7 million acres 

400 fires per year 

10 fire engines 

2 bulldozers 

1 helicopter 

5 lookouts 

Wildland Fire Protection 

Fire protection for the Fort Apache Indian Reservation is provided by the USDI Bureau of 

Indian Affairs (BIA), Fort Apache Agency. To cover the 400 or so fires each year on the 1.7 

million acres in its jurisdiction, the agency fields a suppression force including ten engines 

(Type 3), two bulldozers, one helicopter (Type 3), and five lookouts. Several well-trained and 

experienced Southwest Fire Fighter (SWFF) crews are also based on the reservation. Unfortunately, 

under the BIA’s Fire Management Program Analysis (FMPA) processes, the Fort Apache 

Agency has been targeted for an 18% budget cut in the 2003 federal fiscal year, even as the 

drought continues. 

At the north edge of the reservations, on top of the Mogollon Rim, wildland fire protection 

is provided by the USDA Forest Service, Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest. A small proportion 

of the fire also burned on the Tonto National Forest. Fire management operations are under 

the Southwest Area Coordinating Group via the Southwest Coordination Center (SWCC) in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. This group coordinates fire response for the federal agencies in 

Arizona, New Mexico, and west Texas. The Apache-Sitgreaves forest has six fire engines 

spread across the top of the Mogollon Rim. 

The dozen or so small communities scattered along the top of the Mogollon Rim are 

protected by individual fire protection districts. These districts are mostly all volunteer, with 

only a few paid personnel. While most have wildland engines, the training and experience 

levels vary greatly, and wildfire capabilities suffer in the summer as many volunteer firefighters 

take seasonal positions with the federal agencies. 

The Arizona State Land Department (ASLD), Fire Management Division is responsible for 

fire protection on the blocks of state land in the area, and coordinates the response of local fire 

agencies to wildland fires throughout the state. ASLD has limited staff and only a few engines. 

Fuel Management Projects 

The federal land management agencies (FS, BIA, and BLM) and the ASLD Fire Management 

Division have long recognized that a major fire on the reservations, driven by prevailing 

southwest winds, could crest the Mogollon Rim and threaten any of the small towns on top. To 

attempt to cope with this threat, they have for many years engaged in a series of fuel reduction 

and fuel break projects on top of the rim. These projects are intended to reduce the intensity of 

wildfires approaching the developed areas and provide defensible space in which suppression 

142

actions can be safely undertaken. Unfortunately, these projects have not been coordinated 

between the federal, state, and local agencies to tie together into an interconnected strategic 

barrier that ignores jurisdictional boundaries the way wildfires do. 

Mechanical clearing and prescribed fires are used frequently to reduce fuel accumulations, 

especially slash following logging operations. While increased funding for several of the agencies 

through the National Fire Plan (NFP) has made it possible to undertake more and larger 

projects in the last few years, the area of concern and the amount of work needed to reverse 50 

years of fire exclusion is immense. 

The Fire Story 

The fire situation at the 

Fort Apache Agency and on the 

neighboring Apache-Sitgreaves 

National Forest could not have 

been much worse in June of 

2002. Another dry winter, 

followed by a warm, dry spring 

had reduced fuel moisture 

levels in both brush and timber 

fuel types to record lows (100 

hour fuels = 2%). The second 

week in June was so dry that 

several area weather stations 

were recording new record low 

relative humidity readings. 

100-hour fuel moisture 

was 2 percent 

On the afternoon on June 

18, 2002 a new fire was reported near the town of Cibeque in the northwest corner of the 

Fort Apache Indian Reservation. Set by an arsonist at the bottom of a slope in flashy fuels, 

the Rodeo fire was already 15 acres and spreading rapidly uphill on the arrival of the first 

air tanker only 13 minutes after the first report of the fire. Despite a heavy commitment of 

suppression resources, the fire raged unchecked. On June 19 th , the fire went from about 

1,000 acres to 50,000 + acres in less than nine hours (Figures 64 and 65). 

143

By the morning of June 20 th , the Rodeo fire was more than 55,000 acres, and equipment 

and personnel from outside the area were reporting to staging in large numbers. Then 

“the other shoe dropped”. At about 0700 hours a lost hiker set a signal fire in hopes of 

attracting rescuers. It worked. An immediate heavy response of resources from the staging 

area was diverted to the new fire, which was nearly contained by the initial attack crews at 

about 46 acres. But the daytime southwest winds picked up, driving the fire upslope into 

the timber on a sustained run that burned 10,000 acres in the first day. 

Figure 64. The Chedisk-Rodeo Fire burned over 460 thousand acres. 

144

The Rodeo-Chediski Fire threatened 

half a dozen communities 

simultaneously! 

These two 

major fires 

continued to 

grow for the 

next several days. They were driven by 

moderate SW winds (15-30 mph) in the 

initial stages. When the wind wasn’t blowing, 

the fires burned with such intensity in 

the heavy, dry fuels that they become plume 

dominated. In the late afternoon, when the 

icecaps on top of the convection columns 

collapsed, the fires spread rapidly in all 

directions, defying the containment strategies 

each day. 

Figure 65. The Rodeo-Chediski Fire threatened 

half a dozen communities simultaneously! 

On June 23 rd , the two fires merged into one giant 

conflagration that burned over 100,000 acres in that 

single day, probably a record sustained run for a wildland 

fire. On most days, the only places that crown 

fires were not sustained were in the small patches of 

forest where hazard reduction projects had been completed 

within the last 5-7 years. 

145

Thousands of residents evacuated. 

The conflagration continued its march northward, and barely hesitated at the formidable 

Mogollon Rim, spotting across a wide front into the pine forest outside the rim 

communities. The strategic fire planning for the Mogollon Rim had predicted a wildfire 

impacting a town on the rim, but not six communities at once. In the rim communities, hit 

and run aggressive fire fighting became the norm as the fire swirled, danced, skipped, and 

spotted across the forest, between houses and over roads. Here, the fuel loading was extremely 

heavy, as few residents had bought in to the concept of defensible space or thinning 

the forest in their yards. The largest of the rim communities, the town of Show Low 

(pop. 7,700, plus 5,000+ tourists in summer) was being threatened by a crown fire more 

than two miles wide advancing at a sustained rate of spread of 2-3 miles per hour. Thousands 

of residents fled to the north (Figure 66). 

A change in wind direction saved Show Low itself, and the weather began to moderate, 

with less wind and higher humidity giving firefighters a fighting chance. Even with a 

massive response of fire suppression resources from all over the West, parts of the Rodeo- 

Chedeski Fire were not contained until they spread out into the light fuels of the high 

desert. 

The Rodeo-Chedeski Fire 

became one for the record 

books, burning 468,863 acres, 

and 446 structures (including 

200+ homes) in seven towns. 

Nearly 30,000 people were 

evacuated, some for more than 

a week. The fire consumed 

nearly 400 million board feet of 

timber on just the Fort Apache 

Reservation, probably another 

250+ million on the national 

forests. Salvage logging of the 

burned area will keep the two 

White Mountain Apache Tribe 

sawmills busy for a couple of 

Figure 66. Structure survived despite intense burn. 

146

years, but after that many jobs 

and much income will be lost 

for a long time. 

The fire cost at least $60 

million to control, $30 million 

in burned area rehabilitation 

efforts, and caused nearly a 

billion dollars in direct damages, 

including $42 million in 

structure (and property tax 

revenue) losses. The tributaries 

of the Salt River, an important 

part of the water supply for the 

2.8 million people of the Phoenix 

metropolitan area, will 

remain at risk from the fireflood 

cycle for several years. 

The forests of the White 

Mountains will eventually 

recover, most of the burned 

homes will be rebuilt, the 

streams will run clear again, 

and eventually things will 

return to “normal”. But 

eventually is a long time if 

you’ve sunk your life savings 

into a retirement home in the 

forest or your job depends on 

logging, recreation, or tourism 

(Figure 67). 

Figure 67. Several of these cabins were destroyed by the fire; 

rebuilding started immediately. 

147

148

Wildland Fire Activities 

Numbers of Fires and Acres Burned 

by 

Agency 

for the 

2002 Fire Season 

149

Western United States 

Wildland Fire Activity Summary 

Wildland Fires Prescribed Fires Wildland Fire Use TOTAL 

No. Fires 

No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agencies 25,097 2,198,083 1,867 75,314 1 1 26,965 2,273,398 

Federal Land Management Agencies 

Forest Service 7,824 2,171,407 3,106 254,384 269 39,974 11,199 2,465,765 

Bureau of Land Management 2,403 1,131,787 319 98,772 26 9,157 2,748 1,239,716 

National Park Service 342 169,356 102 22,004 103 7,725 547 199,085 

Fish and Wildlife Service 226 355,836 348 77,739 574 433,575 

Bureau of Indian Affairs 3,593 415,527 88 50,804 3,681 466,331 

TOTAL 14,388 4,243,913 3,963 503,703 398 56,856 18,749 4,804,472 

Other Fire Agencies 3,031 252,121 14 3,727 2,957 219,357 

TOTAL 42,516 6,694,117 5,844 582,744 399 56,857 48,759 7,333,718 

Data Source : The data for these charts was taken from the Detailed Situation Reports of the various Geographic Area Coordination Centers and the data reporting systems of 

the various states. 

150

Alaska 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agency* 399 802,515 399 802,515 


Forest Service 21 17 21 17 

Alaska Fire Service(BLM)** 37 702,783 37 702,783 

National Park Service** 10 133,810 10 133,810 

Fish and Wildlife Service** 32 341,451 1 1,085 33 342,536 

Bureau of Indian Affairs** 1 4 1 4 

TOTAL 101 1,178,065 1 1,085 102 1,179,150 

Other Fire Agencies 53 118,443 53 118,443 

TOTAL 553 2,099,023 1 1,085 554 2,100,108 

Data Source : The data for these charts was taken from the Detailed Situation Reports of the various Geographic Area Coordination Centers. 

* State provided statistics were used in the caculations. 

**The Alaska Fire Service provides wildland fire protection for the US Department of Interior agencies in Alaska. 

151

Arizona 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 



Forest Service 1,197 330,056 1,164 34,222 2,361 364,278 

Bureau of Land Management 153 8,475 14 15,706 167 24,181 

National Park Service 37 1,887 4 3,997 1 12 42 5,896 

Fish and Wildlife Service 23 6,785 1 145 24 6,930 

Bureau of Indian Affairs 1,038 297,321 18 41,506 1,056 338,827 

TOTAL 2,448 644,524 1,201 95,576 1 12 3,650 740,112 

Other Fire Agencies 52 48 52 48 

TOTAL 3,030 691,217 1,201 95,576 1 12 4,232 786,805 



152

California 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agency* 5,759 112,810 5,759 112,810 


Forest Service 1,610 365,945 565 54,922 195 1 2,370 420,868 


National Park Service 55 923 47 6,938 86 4,137 188 11,998 

Fish and Wildlife Service 26 956 23 24,684 49 25,640 

Bureau of Indian Affairs 318 11,014 13 272 331 11,286 

TOTAL 2,127 411,605 667 88,362 281 4,138 3,075 504,105 

Other Fire Agencies 

TOTAL 7,886 524,415 667 88,362 281 4,138 8,834 616,915 



153

Colorado 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agency* 3,409 244,252 17 467 1 1 3,427 244,720 


Forest Service 517 299,927 26 5,718 3 22,592 546 328,237 

Bureau of Land Management 419 27,909 13 2,421 14 619 446 30,949 

National Park Service 34 7,707 5 191 39 7,898 

Fish and Wildlife Service 3 18 1 6 4 24 


TOTAL 1,099 337,747 48 8,352 17 23,211 1,164 369,310 

Other Fire Agencies 75 13,817 8 1,920 83 15,737 

TOTAL 4,583 595,816 73 10,739 18 23,212 4,674 629,767 

Data Source : The data for these charts was taken from the RMACC 2002 Annual Report. 


154

Guam 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

Forestry Agency 491 2,434 491 2,434 




National Park Service 

Fish and Wildlife Service 

Bureau of Indian Affairs 

TOTAL 


TOTAL 491 2,434 491 2,434 



155

Hawaii 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 





National Park Service 1 3,660 1 3,660 

Fish and Wildlife Service 


TOTAL 1 3,660 1 3,660 


TOTAL 189 6,037 189 6,037 



156

Idaho 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agency* 386 7,972 46 3,901 432 11,873 


Forest Service 930 17,077 374 28,871 35 7,688 1,339 53,636 


National Park Service 1 1 1 1 


Bureau of Indian Affairs 8 10 8 10 

TOTAL 1,145 61,413 390 41,718 35 7,688 1,570 110,819 


TOTAL 1,558 90,121 436 45,619 35 7,688 2,029 143,428 



157

Kansas 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 



Forest Service 10 1,422 10 1,422 


National Park Service 


Bureau of Indian Affairs 4 106 5 500 9 606 

TOTAL 22 1,832 50 5,365 72 7,197 


TOTAL 6,046 94,849 50 5,365 6,096 100,214 


* State provided statistics were used in the caculations. Special Note:This is for approximately the first nine months of 2002 only. 

158

Montana 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agency* 471 28,811 8 254 479 29,065 


Forest Service 656 77,859 336 15,407 18 1,156 1,010 94,422 


National Park Service 10 1 1 65 8 34 19 100 

Fish and Wildlife Service 15 807 15 807 


TOTAL 1,092 94,172 361 22,117 26 1,190 1,479 117,479 

Other Fire Agencies* 2,520 10,288 4 1,693 2,524 11,981 

TOTAL 4,083 133,271 373 24,064 26 1,190 4,482 158,525 



159

Nebraska 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 



Forest Service 11 136 11 136 


National Park Service 4 9 1 618 5 627 



TOTAL 45 427 51 8,434 96 8,861 


TOTAL 1,880 90,989 51 8,434 1,931 99,423 



160

Nevada 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 



Forest Service 152 42,066 5 172 157 42,238 

Bureau of Land Management 499 34,149 49 14,567 12 8,528 560 57,244 



Bureau of Indian Affairs 10 316 10 316 

TOTAL 682 76,993 64 16,033 12 8,528 758 101,554 


TOTAL 965 80,644 64 16,033 12 8,528 1,041 105,205 



161

New Mexico 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 





National Park Service 8 11,012 1 380 9 11,392 



TOTAL 1,005 129,678 70 22,426 9 5,940 1,084 158,044 


TOTAL 1,799 356,170 70 22,426 9 5,940 1,878 384,536 



162

North Dakota 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agency* 325 29,565 13 2,434 338 31,999 


Forest Service 4 761 9 1,769 13 2,530 


National Park Service 1 1 10 2,417 11 2,418 


Bureau of Indian Affairs 658 27,067 658 27,067 

TOTAL 683 29,247 153 23,527 836 52,774 


TOTAL 1,008 58,812 168 26,075 1,176 84,887 



163

Oregon 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agency* 1,175 99,047 1,754 67,220 2,929 166,267 


Forest Service 1,127 752,782 324 50,891 2 1 1,453 803,674 




Bureau of Indian Affairs 81 2,829 17 4,316 98 7,145 

TOTAL 1,562 911,342 513 98,559 2 1 2,077 1,009,902 


TOTAL 2,737 1,010,389 2,267 165,779 2 1 5,006 1,176,169 



164

South Dakota 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 



Forest Service 170 1,822 10 2,977 180 4,799 


National Park Service 14 1,072 3 1,469 17 2,541 



TOTAL 517 18,715 55 10,097 572 28,812 


TOTAL 1,349 198,505 56 10,247 1,405 208,752 



165

Utah 




No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 

State Forestry Agency 613 68,534 21 595 634 69,129 


Forest Service 342 101,135 23 27,501 2 345 367 128,981 


National Park Service 29 35 7 1,209 36 1,244 

Fish and Wildlife Service 5 1 425 6 425 


TOTAL 812 176,508 50 34,197 2 345 864 211,050 


TOTAL 1,431 245,169 71 34,792 2 345 1,504 280,306 



166





No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 



Forest Service 337 58,220 198 10,858 4 11 539 69,089 

Bureau of Land Management 21 5,123 21 5,123 



Bureau of Indian Affairs 195 15,537 18 3,372 213 18,909 

TOTAL 613 79,576 247 16,863 4 11 864 96,450 


TOTAL 1,503 91,639 253 17,155 4 11 1,760 108,805 



167





No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 


No. Acres 

Burned 




Bureau of Land Management 155 32,217 12 1,681 10 167 33,908 

National Park Service 70 9,149 6 4,032 7 3,162 83 16,343 

Fish and Wildlife Service 1 20 1 20 


TOTAL 434 88,409 42 10,992 9 5,792 485 105,193 


TOTAL 1,337 288,126 43 10,993 9 5,792 1,389 304,911 



168

State Fire Statistics 

Numbers of Fires and Acres Burned 

by 

Cause and Size Class 

1998 through 2002 

Number of Fires 

Number of Acres Burned 

No. of Fires 

30,000 

25,000 

20,000 

15,000 

10,000 

5,000 

0 

16,894 

26,439 

25,324 

25,494 25,097 

20,936 19,180 23,301 20,390 

19,577 

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 

Years 

No. of Acres Burned 

3,000,000 

2,500,000 

2,000,000 

1,500,000 

1,000,000 

500,000 

0 

2,612,619 

2,213,124 2,198,083 

1,350,726 

1,430,853 1,309,405 

648,144 

644,237 552,134 

564,356 

1993 

1994 

1995 

1996 

1997 

1998 

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 

Years 

169

Western State Composite Statistics 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 

5-year Average 

No. No. Acres No. No. Acres No. No. Acres No. No. Acres No. No. Acres No. No. Acres 

Fires Burned Fires Burned Fires Burned Fires Burned Fires Burned Fires Burned 

19,180 564,356 23,301 1,309,405 25,494 2,213,124 20,390 648,144 25,097 2,198,083 22,692 1,386,622 

No. 

Fires 

No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% 

Lightning 2,663 264,614 14 2,396 370,301 10 4,051 1,106,661 16 3,270 293,093 16 3,270 1,300,528 13 3,130 667,039 14 

Camper 623 2,411 3 884 6,912 4 851 8,917 3 857 7,345 4 731 15,177 3 789 8,152 3 

Smoker 757 6,191 4 950 23,121 4 1,056 25,202 4 704 4,364 3 1,294 9,318 5 952 13,639 4 

Debris Burning 4,401 47,862 23 5,347 146,606 23 5,168 149,776 20 3,159 23,982 15 4,658 97,948 19 4,547 93,235 20 

Arson 2,014 39,577 11 1,304 81,293 6 2,089 121,566 8 1,987 26,533 10 1,971 115,612 8 1,873 76,916 8 

Equipment 2,935 64,061 15 3,724 186,500 16 3,375 234,618 13 3,539 148,604 17 3,012 183,283 12 3,317 163,413 15 

Railroads 431 6,050 2 653 133,387 3 695 78,188 3 204 3,819 1 335 2,814 1 464 44,852 2 

Children 601 7,090 3 512 2,579 2 546 1,908 2 552 1,539 3 478 6,875 2 538 3,998 2 

Miscellaneous 4,755 139,526 25 7,501 359,185 32 7,663 488,632 30 6,118 141,589 30 9,348 468,899 37 7,077 319,566 31 

No. No. Acres 

% No. No. Acres 




No. Acres 

% No. Fires 

% 

Fires Burned Fires Burned Fires Burned Fires Burned Fires Burned 

Burned 

Class A 9,864 14,430 51 12,601 1,155 54 11,246 7,525 44 11,975 3,975 59 13,341 5,554 53 11,805 6,528 52 

Class B 6,792 9,630 35 7,139 13,182 31 9,529 17,184 37 6,494 11,128 32 7,653 22,469 30 7,521 14,719 33 

Class C 1,951 42,003 10 2,730 49,291 12 3,588 73,534 14 1,485 40,926 7 2,323 69,105 9 2,415 54,972 11 

Class D 308 38,922 2 436 45,400 2 544 77,172 2 228 32,711 1 377 55,582 2 379 49,957 2 

Class E 162 86,407 1 235 95,617 1 332 154,116 1 118 54,736 1 180 88,650 1 205 95,905 1 

Class F 82 154,229 0 108 220,812 0 161 370,400 1 64 121,359 0 121 308,926 0 107 235,145 0 

Class G 21 227,118 0 52 883,948 0 94 1,515,724 0 26 384,184 0 91 1,699,639 0 57 942,123 0 

170

Alaska 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




338 63,708 333 145,806 259 35,197 297 87,127 399 802,515 325 226,871 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 16 62,922 5 31 144,752 9 13 32,892 5 18 868 6 80 584,782 20 32 165,243 10 

Camper 49 43 14 42 9 13 41 643 16 50 262 17 34 1,314 9 43 454 13 

Smoker 9 2 3 8 1 2 6 1,121 2 11 1 4 7 3 2 8 226 3 

Debris Burning 106 87 31 96 748 29 81 50 31 103 916 35 146 26,578 37 106 5,676 33 

Arson 25 6 7 16 5 5 6 7 2 3 1 1 3 4 1 11 5 3 

Equipment 4 1 1 12 3 4 10 440 4 43 84,842 14 27 14 7 19 17,060 6 

Railroads 4 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 

Children 31 9 9 31 108 9 19 3 7 23 10 8 24 105 6 26 47 8 

Miscellaneous 94 637 28 97 180 29 82 40 32 46 227 15 78 189,715 20 79 38,160 24 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 249 27 74 243 27 73 186 21 72 205 23 69 241 28 60 225 25 69 

Class B 71 103 21 70 92 21 61 78 24 78 133 26 114 200 29 79 121 24 

Class C 11 362 3 8 226 2 6 96 2 7 154 2 18 722 5 10 312 3 

Class D 2 415 1 3 455 1 0 0 0 4 590 1 2 378 1 2 368 1 

Class E 1 500 0 3 1,978 1 2 1,039 1 2 1,497 1 2 1,245 1 2 1,252 1 

Class F 1 3,381 0 0 0 3 5,056 1 0 0 0 6 19,371 2 2 5,562 1 

Class G 3 58,920 1 6 143,028 2 1 28,907 0 1 84,730 0 16 780,571 4 5 219,231 2 

171

Arizona 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




396 3,057 438 8,722 481 7,921 406 4,699 530 46,645 450 14,209 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 46 174 12 45 5,123 10 87 2,730 18 99 968 24 80 7,301 15 71 3,259 16 

Camper 8 12 2 6 10 1 6 4 1 8 5 2 20 2,915 4 10 589 2 

Smoker 40 37 10 33 24 8 18 12 4 24 23 6 55 103 10 34 40 8 

Debris Burning 35 62 9 34 620 8 46 857 10 44 590 11 56 11,033 11 43 2,632 10 

Arson 9 291 2 6 45 1 7 31 1 5 864 1 9 9,561 2 7 2,158 2 

Equipment 30 52 8 29 30 7 52 52 11 46 517 11 58 10,665 11 43 2,263 10 

Railroads 9 847 2 9 27 2 4 2 1 3 2 1 10 8 2 7 177 2 

Children 3 5 1 7 6 2 2 5 0 7 27 2 5 11 1 5 11 1 

Miscellaneous 216 1,577 55 269 2,837 61 259 4,228 54 170 1,703 42 237 5,048 45 230 3,079 51 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 208 29 47 230 84 53 248 34 ### 225 32 55 290 40 55 240 44 53 

Class B 151 262 34 167 366 38 174 348 ### 144 283 35 193 702 36 166 392 37 

Class C 28 846 6 32 887 7 45 1,319 ### 26 687 6 26 2,059 5 31 1,160 7 

Class D 7 860 2 3 349 1 5 860 ### 6 993 1 8 1,485 2 6 909 1 

Class E 2 1,060 0 4 2,214 1 8 4,080 ### 5 2,704 1 5 2,972 1 5 2,606 1 

Class F 2 4,822 0 1 1,280 ### 5% 8,726 0 1 2,966 0 

Class G 3 30,661 1 

172

California 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




5,227 92,456 7,296 277,750 5,149 66,684 6,223 90,985 5,759 112,810 5,931 128,137 

137% 137% 137% 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 237 17,396 5 448 70,154 6 154 219 3 341 1,496 5 114 196 2 259 17,892 4 

Camper 225 275 4 319 1,470 4 204 1,498 4 288 6,077 5 157 74 3 239 1,879 4 

Smoker 126 1,144 2 142 373 2 137 269 3 164 2,453 3 144 1,041 3 143 1,056 2 

Debris Burning 508 921 10 711 3,139 10 623 9,486 12 562 1,469 9 633 8,735 11 607 4,750 10 

Arson 372 31,872 7 492 43,280 7 295 4,983 6 403 16,573 6 402 3,831 7 393 20,108 7 

Equipment 2,230 32,970 43 2,636 105,267 36 2,181 44,953 42 2,413 28,599 39 1,518 85,001 26 2,196 59,358 37 

Railroads 17 69 0 28 283 0 34 69 1 27 375 0 14 44 0 24 168 0 

Children 102 121 2 143 366 2 98 130 2 131 271 2 104 43 2 116 186 2 

Miscellaneous 1,410 7,688 27 2,377 53,418 33 1,423 5,077 28 1,894 33,672 30 2,673 13,845 46 1,955 22,740 33 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 3,845 104 74 5,285 156 72 3,657 109 71 4,437 123 71 4,130 1,368 72 4,271 372 72 

Class B 1,134 2,008 22 1,671 2,925 23 1,290 2,174 25 1,494 2,512 24 1,338 2,224 23 1,385 2,369 23 

Class C 184 5,443 4 230 6,127 3 146 4,039 3 229 6,960 4 215 7,445 4 201 6,003 3 

Class D 31 5,412 1 43 6,435 1 32 5,522 1 25 4,189 0 49 8,066 1 36 5,925 1 

Class E 18 9,737 0 34 18,367 0 14 6,939 0 23 11,959 0 15 8,540 0 21 11,108 0 

Class F 11 23,988 0 24 43,108 0 6 13,902 0 10 20,767 0 10 17,714 0 12 23,896 0 

Class G 4 45,764 0 9 200,632 0 4 33,999 0 5 44,475 0 2 67,453 0 5 78,465 0 

173

Colorado 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




1,349 10,282 1,987 33,255 2,043 76,288 2,966 45,816 3,409 244,252 2,351 81,979 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 142 506 11 106 2,193 5 399 27,689 20 521 38,506 18 408 151,922 12 315 44,163 13 

Camper 7 9 1 10 8 1 44 16 2 51 30 2 37 23 1 30 17 1 

Smoker 68 264 5 63 7,937 3 70 722 3 76 205 3 109 2,459 3 77 2,317 3 

Debris Burning 300 6,542 22 402 14,657 20 321 5,167 16 384 1,257 13 583 7,348 17 398 6,994 17 

Arson 81 129 6 108 2,281 5 120 3,564 6 234 345 8 265 3,055 8 162 1,875 7 

Equipment 60 139 4 47 465 2 42 166 2 88 2,014 3 61 309 2 60 619 3 

Railroads 4 60 0 2 3 0 2 300 0 17 10 1 30 272 1 11 129 0 

Children 85 471 6 29 58 1 44 17 2 104 153 4 75 107 2 67 161 3 

Miscellaneous 602 2,162 30 1,220 5,653 36 1,001 38,647 49 1,491 3,296 50 1,841 78,757 54 1,231 25,703 52 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 810 83 60 1,417 122 71 1,293 116 63 2,055 190 69 2,182 136 64 1,551 129 66 

Class B 463 831 34 426 744 21 551 909 27 789 1,173 27 951 1,705 28 636 1,072 27 

Class C 62 1,698 5 91 2,238 5 109 3,402 5 97 2,655 3 199 5,747 6 112 3,148 5 

Class D 7 1,080 1 29 4,489 1 40 5,550 2 13 1,669 0 27 4,083 1 23 3,374 1 

Class E 4 2,090 0 17 7,762 1 36 17,951 2 7 3,129 0 19 9,404 1 17 8,067 1 

Class F 3 4,500 0 5 6,900 0 10 18,260 0 4 7,000 0 17 39,969 0 8 15,326 0 

Class G 2 11,000 ### 4 30,100 0 1 30,000 0 14 183,208 0 4 50,862 0 

174

Guam 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




1,943 13,315 516 485 996 3,409 1,244 2,865 491 2,434 1,038 4,502 

No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

% No. 


No. Acres 

Burned 

Lightning 

Camper 1 1 0 0 0 0 

Smoker 27 65 5 5 13 1 

Debris Burning 733 3,632 38 483 414 94 201 291 20 276 441 22 95 44 19 485 1,682 47 

Arson 1,082 9,394 56 745 3,053 75 891 2,282 72 343 2,327 70 760 4,825 73 

Equipment 

Railroads 6 6 1 1 1 0 

Children 128 289 7 50 65 5 76 141 6 53 63 11 76 157 7 

Miscellaneous 

% 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 415 74 21 218 15 42 259 34 26 429 104 34 110 14 22 347 60 26 

Class B 1,292 3,271 66 293 403 57 668 1,008 67 752 1,640 60 331 750 67 859 1,919 65 

Class C 217 5,038 11 5 67 1 62 1,489 6 56 1,121 5 45 1,048 9 111 2,551 8 

Class D 16 2,312 1 7 878 1 7 1 5 622 1 9 1,100 1 

Class E 2 650 0 1 260 0 

Class F 1 1,970 0 0 788 0 

Class G 

175

Hawaii 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




205 37,315 132 20,376 125 2,931 108 1,080 188 2,377 152 12,816 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 1 20 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 0 

Camper 9 1 4 3 2 2 3 1 2 8 6 7 9 1 5 6 2 4 

Smoker 16 2,259 8 5 84 4 13 9 10 13 16 12 12 28 6 12 479 8 

Debris Burning 28 82 14 14 291 11 22 242 18 7 18 6 23 9 12 19 128 12 

Arson 49 3,290 24 25 14,174 19 18 74 14 13 118 12 16 139 9 24 3,559 16 

Equipment 16 848 8 8 572 6 11 2,197 9 5 61 5 7 1 4 9 736 6 

Railroads 

Children 11 2,474 5 4 7 3 13 13 10 3 12 3 5 2 3 7 502 5 

Miscellaneous 76 28,361 37 72 5,226 55 44 393 35 59 849 55 115 2,197 61 73 7,405 48 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 68 10 33 50 10 38 48 7 38 40 11 37 147 15 78 71 11 47 

Class B 77 149 38 61 223 46 60 146 48 44 133 41 27 57 14 54 142 35 

Class C 36 2,255 18 16 408 12 12 270 10 23 545 21 12 350 6 20 766 13 

Class D 9 1,896 4 1 235 1 2 350 2 1 255 1 3 547 2 

Class E 9 4,895 4 1 500 1 2 1,150 2 1 391 1 3 1,387 2 

Class F 5 15,657 2 1 4,000 1 1 1,008 1 1 1,700 1 2 4,473 1 

Class G 1 12,453 0 2 15,000 2 1 5,491 0 

176

Idaho 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




362 29,041 431 78,641 801 142,195 547 52,728 386 7,972 505 62,115 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 217 23,473 60 215 49,727 50 367 108,333 46 251 11,529 46 189 4,969 49 248 39,606 49 

Camper 19 29 5 33 19 8 66 50 8 47 30 9 30 104 8 39 46 8 

Smoker 7 8 2 15 8 3 29 25 4 4 1 1 5 3 1 12 9 2 


Arson 5 157 1 14 10 3 18 1,604 2 23 1,527 4 12 187 3 14 697 3 

Equipment 17 4,112 5 17 190 4 64 8,679 8 35 3,116 6 38 1,271 10 34 3,474 7 

Railroads 6 4 2 6 15 1 12 29 1 6 14 1 1 1 0 6 13 1 

Children 8 1 2 9 4 2 19 122 2 13 225 2 8 560 2 11 182 2 

Miscellaneous 29 1,089 8 45 27,687 10 98 22,630 12 115 36,059 21 48 341 12 67 17,561 13 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 256 28 71 287 36 67 505 66 63 343 43 63 242 25 63 327 40 65 

Class B 82 137 23 111 211 26 221 467 28 144 325 26 110 214 28 134 271 26 

Class C 17 570 5 17 541 4 45 1,492 6 27 896 5 24 823 6 26 864 5 

Class D 3 694 1 4 642 1 12 2,230 1 15 2,472 3 3 408 1 7 1,289 1 

Class E 2 1,715 1 3 1,685 1 6 3,771 1 10 5,314 2 5 2,298 1 5 2,957 1 

Class F 1 2,958 0 6 15,523 1 7 14,541 1 5 8,101 1 2 4,204 1 4 9,065 1 

Class G 1 22,939 0 3 60,003 1 5 119,628 1 3 35,577 1 2 47,629 0 

177

Kansas 

1998 1999 2000 2001* 2002 




3,238 31,676 4,732 35,699 6,439 83,244 3,101 35,092 6,024 93,017 4,707 55,746 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 239 994 7 152 815 3 382 8,914 6 179 1,514 6 299 3,421 5 250 3,132 5 

Camper 5 205 0 1 41 0 

Smoker 264 929 8 327 2,342 7 461 2,873 7 244 991 8 650 4,046 11 389 2,236 8 

Debris Burning 1,467 15,158 45 1,664 18,199 35 1,869 26,749 29 813 7,999 26 1,473 21,173 24 1,457 17,856 31 

Arson 163 1,179 5 412 2,488 9 524 4,415 8 263 2,546 8 617 5,782 10 396 3,282 8 

Equipment 64 891 2 98 2,525 2 102 1,569 2 374 6,026 12 405 4,937 7 209 3,190 4 

Railroads 119 1,967 4 201 1,508 4 274 8,449 4 58 156 1 130 2,416 3 

Children 62 96 2 64 11 1 106 561 2 28 62 1 48 495 1 62 245 1 

Miscellaneous 860 10,462 27 1,814 7,811 38 2,721 29,714 42 1,200 15,954 39 2,469 52,802 41 1,813 23,349 39 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 861 447 27 1,434 263 30 1,342 492 21 1,325 377 43 2,443 353 41 1,481 386 31 

Class B 1,522 2,141 47 1,556 2,164 33 2,996 3,427 47 1,195 2,833 39 1,550 4,427 26 1,764 2,998 37 

Class C 726 10,515 22 1,481 12,984 31 1,878 23,749 29 497 13,642 16 867 23,917 14 1,090 16,961 23 

Class D 94 7,038 3 189 6,608 4 158 16,844 2 68 10,320 2 108 15,680 2 123 11,298 3 

Class E 30 8,055 1 70 8,180 1 56 20,042 1 15 6,420 0 40 18,240 1 42 12,187 1 

Class F 5 3,480 0 2 5,500 0 9 18,690 0 1 1,500 0 9 18,400 0 5 9,514 0 

Class G 1 12,000 0 0 2,400 0 

178

Montana 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




527 37,866 467 87,356 543 168,744 334 36,986 471 28,811 468 71,953 

No. No. Acres 







% 


Camper 60 1,467 11 55 156 12 40 7 7 45 12 13 68 94 14 54 347 11 

Smoker 12 4 2 8 175 2 4 3,062 1 8 1 2 12 2 3 9 649 2 

Debris Burning 79 692 15 46 2,212 10 50 640 9 64 1,797 19 91 1,115 19 66 1,291 14 

Arson 8 6 2 3 202 1 8 42 1 6 56 2 11 36 2 7 68 2 

Equipment 23 580 4 21 7,751 4 16 81,618 3 9 422 3 8 4 2 15 18,075 3 

Railroads 23 205 4 16 10,958 3 17 9 3 9 32 3 7 2 1 14 2,241 3 

Children 4 1 1 14 308 3 13 90 2 8 1 2 9 1 2 10 80 2 

Miscellaneous 50 8,366 9 55 21,934 12 85 46,046 16 67 368 20 79 8,385 17 67 17,020 14 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 350 26 66 306 25 66 342 22 63 231 23 69 343 26 73 314 24 67 

Class B 140 242 27 110 251 24 128 281 24 80 170 24 97 169 21 111 223 24 

Class C 13 378 2 21 646 4 38 1,483 7 12 358 4 20 571 4 21 687 4 

Class D 12 1,881 2 9 1,544 2 8 1,366 1 3 455 1 2 214 0 7 1,092 1 

Class E 6 3,700 1 7 4,125 1 11 6,038 2 5 3,002 1 3 1,159 1 6 3,605 1 

Class F 3 3,545 1 9 24,137 2 10 21,550 2 2 6,478 1 3 8,277 1 5 12,797 1 

Class G 3 28,094 1 5 56,628 1 6 138,004 1 1 26,500 0 3 18,395 1 4 53,524 1 

179

Nebraska 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




793 34,362 1,350 177,024 1,982 252,249 620 17,230 1,835 90,562 1,316 114,549 

No. No. Acres 







% 


Camper 2 1 0 8 18 1 8 10 0 2 2 0 11 95 1 6 25 0 

Smoker 48 246 6 76 9,138 6 101 1,180 5 25 94 4 80 858 4 66 2,303 5 


Arson 18 64 2 39 551 3 81 8,428 4 10 114 2 64 1,058 3 42 2,043 3 

Equipment 115 5,659 15 229 14,704 17 282 8,507 14 97 683 16 255 31,966 14 196 12,304 15 

Railroads 88 1,047 11 108 36,234 8 135 7,683 7 49 395 8 103 641 6 97 9,200 7 

Children 6 5 1 13 6 1 9 7 0 4 2 1 20 11 1 10 6 1 


No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 254 32 32 394 49 29 557 67 28 165 18 27 467 58 25 367 45 28 

Class B 357 779 45 665 1,391 49 962 2,061 49 339 597 55 937 1,907 51 652 1,347 50 

Class C 133 4,232 17 215 5,737 16 340 10,467 17 102 3,145 16 350 10,503 19 228 6,817 17 

Class D 28 4,220 4 37 5,785 3 61 9,308 3 8 1,310 1 48 7,752 3 36 5,675 3 

Class E 14 8,699 2 20 10,522 1 33 17,047 2 4 2,160 1 20 8,920 1 18 9,470 1 

Class F 7 16,400 1 11 17,620 1 18 43,299 1 1 3,000 0 10 22,422 1 9 20,548 1 

Class G 8 135,920 1 11 170,000 1 1 7,000 0 3 39,000 0 5 70,384 0 

180

Nevada 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




141 1,989 233 2,162 319 87,315 182 22,069 269 2,833 229 23,274 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 25 110 18 36 166 15 67 68,630 21 30 21,294 16 37 2,487 14 39 18,537 17 

Camper 10 5 7 18 2 8 31 13 10 30 13 16 5 12 2 19 9 8 

Smoker 4 1 2 1 2 1 3 4 1 2 1 1 


Arson 16 113 5 3 3 2 4 23 2 

Equipment 4 2 3 11 105 5 30 15,971 9 17 351 9 8 26 3 14 3,291 6 

Railroads 13 5 9 19 15 8 2 2 1 12 82 7 4 9 1 10 23 4 

Children 5 34 4 8 2 3 8 51 3 7 17 4 2 17 1 6 24 3 

Miscellaneous 32 1,827 23 32 1,800 14 79 2,460 25 41 291 23 153 122 57 67 1,300 29 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 116 13 82 184 22 79 209 23 66 109 12 60 117 10 43 147 16 64 

Class B 16 37 11 36 66 15 72 157 23 48 70 26 113 45 42 57 75 25 

Class C 8 157 6 11 292 5 21 504 7 16 350 9 24 93 9 16 279 7 

Class D 1 0 6 1,277 2 3 462 2 12 398 4 4 427 2 

Class E 2 1,250 1 1 69 1 2 333 1 1 330 0 

Class F 1 1,782 1 1 1,782 0 5 5,601 2 3 4,391 2 1 1,954 0 2 3,102 1 

Class G 4 78,503 1 2 16,715 1 1 19,044 1 

181

New Mexico 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




1,117 123,748 469 52,446 1,134 376,475 476 39,849 794 226,492 798 163,802 

No. No. Acres 







% 


Camper 7 37 1 10 10 2 12 1,030 1 7 6 1 16 5,622 2 10 1,341 1 

Smoker 36 1,133 3 40 2,112 9 55 14,066 5 14 275 3 29 396 4 35 3,596 4 

Debris Burning 173 11,766 15 90 12,047 19 165 12,940 15 47 381 10 141 1,611 18 123 7,749 15 

Arson 47 1,484 4 8 142 2 30 9,424 3 12 49 3 24 942 3 24 2,408 3 

Equipment 85 10,283 8 51 5,069 11 63 15,955 6 29 179 6 49 2,025 6 55 6,702 7 

Railroads 8 90 1 14 3,980 3 36 56,361 3 9 27 2 17 41 2 17 12,100 2 

Children 27 58 2 8 419 2 15 339 1 5 2 1 7 850 1 12 334 2 


No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 253 39 23 146 26 31 315 1,456 28 189 30 40 348 92 44 250 329 31 

Class B 478 1,188 43 193 501 41 449 1,083 40 184 374 39 315 736 40 324 776 41 

Class C 248 7,997 22 77 1,927 16 212 6,397 19 78 2,256 16 76 3,711 10 138 4,458 17 

Class D 58 9,376 5 21 3,115 4 65 10,485 6 9 1,522 2 18 4,415 2 34 5,783 4 

Class E 49 23,340 4 18 9,510 4 51 25,273 4 7 3,116 1 17 8,191 2 28 13,886 4 

Class F 29 60,808 3 11 23,867 2 27 57,656 2 7 14,301 1 11 81,842 1 17 47,695 2 

Class G 2 21,000 0 3 13,500 1 15 274,125 1 2 18,250 0 9 177,505 1 6 100,876 1 

182

North Dakota 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




397 7,201 561 83,640 612 64,113 219 6,504 325 29,565 423 38,205 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 52 428 13 22 544 4 73 19,174 12 7 55 3 77 11,779 24 46 6,396 11 

Camper 3 91 1 9 20 2 10 167 2 4 56 1 

Smoker 8 24 2 17 363 3 14 89 2 4 86 2 4 38 1 9 120 2 


Arson 14 4 4 21 321 4 8 222 1 1 25 0 9 114 2 

Equipment 29 2,354 7 90 13,780 16 100 8,339 16 18 1,341 8 50 2,724 15 57 5,708 14 

Railroads 29 762 7 25 186 4 21 354 3 4 23 2 10 108 3 18 287 4 

Children 16 18 4 11 28 2 10 24 2 3 23 1 3 99 1 9 38 2 

Miscellaneous 90 600 23 76 1,559 14 130 22,263 21 54 1,466 25 117 11,508 36 93 7,479 22 

17 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 184 46 46 158 38 28 126 30 21 58 7 26 99 20 30 125 28 30 

Class B 128 270 32 252 602 45 246 614 40 87 215 40 104 263 32 163 393 39 

Class C 76 2,415 19 118 3,205 21 177 5,269 29 59 1,690 27 80 2,179 25 102 2,952 24 

Class D 5 620 1 22 2,975 4 30 4,940 5 10 1,300 5 23 3,253 7 18 2,618 4 

Class E 2 1,150 1 7 3,320 1 21 10,340 3 4 2,292 2 13 5,800 4 9 4,580 2 

Class F 2 2,700 1 2 4,500 0 9 22,420 1 1 1,000 0 4 7,300 1 4 7,584 1 

Class G 2 69,000 0 3 20,500 0 2 10,750 1 1 20,050 0 

183

Oregon 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




938 2,680 1,145 9,605 894 13,247 1,241 51,268 1,175 99,047 1,079 35,169 

No. No. Acres 







% 


Camper 80 395 9 138 1,609 12 91 69 10 107 149 9 125 596 11 137 570 13 

Smoker 57 33 6 82 199 7 71 16 8 65 58 5 82 60 7 144 3,236 13 


Arson 35 34 4 25 543 2 52 46 6 47 167 4 34 86 3 109 309 10 

Equipment 127 388 14 184 1,818 16 177 334 20 170 2,529 14 219 2,487 19 179 1,708 17 

Railroads 14 128 1 8 88 1 10 492 1 15 15 1 9 1 1 33 161 3 

Children 32 8 3 59 242 5 55 41 6 65 118 5 40 86 3 90 109 8 

Miscellaneous 107 753 11 102 128 9 99 24 11 108 195 9 141 1,288 12 469 5,376 43 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 632 32 67 787 58 69 667 48 75 927 77 75 814 65 69 846 214 78 

Class B 268 379 29 305 532 27 202 394 23 253 632 20 272 521 23 265 645 25 

Class C 28 929 3 37 1,173 3 13 384 1 45 1,535 4 53 1,757 5 37 1,353 3 

Class D 8 1,212 1 7 1,300 1 5 494 1 10 1,502 1 13 1,644 1 10 1,650 1 

Class E 1 48 0 6 2,746 1 4 1,050 0 2 753 0 5 2,692 0 4 1,976 0 

Class F 1 80 0 3 3,796 0 1 1,296 0 1 1,323 0 6 7,178 1 3 6,567 0 

Class G 2 9,581 0 3 45,446 0 12 85,190 1 361 33,342 33 

184

South Dakota 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




164 4,604 742 71,989 1,173 404,130 564 55,976 725 166,928 674 140,725 

No. No. Acres 







% 


Camper 16 20 10 2 0 130 4,390 11 41 457 7 4 1 1 39 974 6 

Smoker 3 1 2 18 94 2 20 1,645 2 11 143 2 11 9 2 13 378 2 


Arson 6 19 1 1 83,500 0 1 0 2 16,704 0 

Equipment 22 3,542 13 157 13,185 21 152 44,677 13 115 15,908 20 106 34,749 15 110 22,412 16 

Railroads 1 10 1 11 442 1 22 1,910 2 3 2,601 1 3 120 0 8 1,017 1 

Children 14 46 9 41 251 6 37 85 3 28 105 5 28 4,398 4 30 977 4 

Miscellaneous 38 175 23 171 42,863 23 242 43,701 21 136 16,805 24 167 40,847 23 151 28,878 22 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 75 11 46 194 26 26 182 20 16 141 38 25 151 24 21 149 24 22 

Class B 52 101 32 332 721 45 569 1,281 49 272 601 48 333 7,781 46 312 2,097 46 

Class C 33 682 20 165 5,047 22 278 8,672 24 105 3,237 19 172 5,083 24 151 4,544 22 

Class D 2 260 1 26 4,034 4 58 9,595 5 20 3,180 4 30 4,637 4 27 4,341 4 

Class E 1 450 1 10 4,744 1 41 19,035 3 15 6,970 3 14 10,132 2 16 8,266 2 

Class F 1 3,100 1 11 20,917 1 25 47,472 2 9 17,450 2 20 45,600 3 13 26,908 2 

Class G 4 36,500 1 20 318,055 2 2 24,500 0 5 93,671 1 6 94,545 1 

185

Utah 

` 

1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




495 24,603 735 133,353 855 52,257 834 61,756 613 68,534 706 68,101 

No. No. Acres 







% 


Camper 21 2 4 36 2,930 5 34 67 4 28 12 3 38 3,596 6 31 1,321 4 

Smoker 12 69 2 19 167 3 14 7 2 9 2 1 10 45 2 13 58 2 

Debris Burning 47 758 9 103 5,324 14 42 479 5 54 98 6 54 505 9 60 1,433 8 

Arson 29 64 6 61 16,213 8 50 3,953 6 40 4,065 5 34 638 6 43 4,987 6 

Equipment 37 1,915 7 62 3,792 8 53 454 6 43 1,940 5 44 5,999 7 48 2,820 7 

Railroads 12 568 2 31 61,138 4 20 2,038 2 11 88 1 11 1,263 2 17 13,019 2 

Children 11 11 2 8 215 1 9 9 1 10 7 1 4 16 1 8 52 1 

Miscellaneous 82 6,147 11 126 19,138 21 64 3,402 ### 99 2,158 ### 93 3,314 ### 93 6,832 13 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 251 22 51 305 44 41 498 136 58 515 45 62 385 29 ### 391 55 55 

Class B 153 192 31 288 740 39 256 2,312 30 223 380 27 160 262 ### 216 777 31 

Class C 54 1,207 11 81 3,266 11 52 1,403 6 53 1,181 6 30 825 ### 54 1,576 8 

Class D 12 1,765 2 17 3,266 2 16 1,498 2 18 1,375 2 7 765 ### 14 1,734 2 

Class E 11 1,574 2 25 14,771 3 10 2,588 1 9 2,651 1 8 2,879 ### 13 4,893 2 

Class F 9 6,117 2 16 36,729 2 18 25,383 2 13 17,246 2 13 7,914 ### 14 18,678 2 

Class G 5 13,726 1 3 74,537 0 5 18,937 1 3 38,878 0 10 55,890 ### 5 40,394 1 

186


1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




992 23,511 1,002 6,796 780 18,027 809 17,700 889 10,063 894 15,219 

No. No. Acres 







% 

Lightning 194 19,189 20 120 529 12 81 13,946 10 140 9,542 17 134 462 15 134 8,734 15 

Camper 107 24 11 188 431 19 123 947 16 132 193 16 130 204 15 136 360 15 

Smoker 41 35 4 40 17 4 28 20 4 27 9 3 31 19 3 33 20 4 

Debris Burning 214 545 22 272 1,175 28 190 611 24 173 888 21 197 3,059 22 209 1,256 23 

Arson 48 951 5 35 967 4 40 1,069 5 24 27 3 34 105 4 36 624 4 

Equipment 62 295 6 32 166 3 13 47 2 5 17 1 27 19 3 28 109 3 

Railroads 14 124 1 13 30 1 9 44 1 20 34 2 13 18 1 14 50 2 

Children 45 87 5 47 124 5 28 95 4 26 13 3 43 30 5 38 70 4 


No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 695 73 70 643 67 64 472 56 61 513 54 63 550 800 62 575 210 64 

Class B 255 458 26 308 594 31 263 493 34 249 492 31 287 526 32 272 513 30 

Class C 31 1,000 3 41 1,164 4 35 1,245 4 34 976 4 39 1,013 4 36 1,080 4 

Class D 6 802 1 7 1,192 1 5 930 1 6 1,056 1 8 411 1 6 878 1 

Class E 3 1,582 0 2 1,169 0 3 2,137 0 4 2,005 0 2 942 0 3 1,567 0 

Class F 1 1,162 0 1 2,610 0 2 7,142 0 3 6,371 0 1 3,457 0 

Class G 1 18,434 0 2 13,166 0 1 5,785 0 1 7,477 0 

187


1998 1999 2000 

2001 2002 




558 22,942 732 84,300 909 358,698 219 18,414 815 163,226 647 129,516 

No. No. Acres 







% 


Camper 7 218 1 8 5 1 12 91 5 42 321 5 14 127 2 

Smoker 10 3 1 26 86 4 15 86 2 4 4 2 50 204 6 21 77 3 

Debris Burning 80 160 11 125 1,820 17 130 2,915 14 21 938 10 84 453 10 88 1,257 14 

Arson 29 46 4 33 52 5 70 91 8 10 78 5 101 90,163 12 49 18,086 8 

Equipment 10 30 1 40 17,078 5 27 660 3 32 58 15 132 1,086 16 48 3,782 7 

Railroads 70 163 10 156 18,415 21 96 445 11 19 121 9 45 130 6 77 3,855 12 

Children 11 13 2 16 10 2 11 25 1 11 50 5 10 20 2 


No. No. Acres 







% 

Class A 342 93 47 320 87 44 340 1,413 37 68 7 31 282 31 35 270 326 42 

Class B 153 353 21 295 656 40 361 959 40 119 205 54 421 730 52 270 581 42 

Class C 46 1,317 6 84 3,356 11 119 3,343 13 19 659 9 73 2,307 9 68 2,196 11 

Class D 8 1,391 1 17 2,976 2 34 5,923 4 3 316 1 13 1,738 2 15 2,469 2 

Class E 7 17,738 1 8 4,024 1 32 14,352 4 4 200 2 10 4,889 1 12 8,241 2 

Class F 1 1,300 0 3 5,001 0 11 71,978 1 5 10,020 2 5 9,234 1 5 19,507 1 

Class G 1 750 0 5 68,200 1 12 260,730 1 1 5,207 0 11 144,297 1 6 95,837 1 

188

Appendix 

189

Wildland/Urban Interface 

The Wildland/Urban Interface fire problem has existed for hundreds of years. As early as 

1793, the Governor of Upper and Lower California “prohibited all kinds of burning, not only in the 

vicinity of the towns....which cause some detriment....” In the last 50 years the problem has grown 

more complex as more development has occurred. This section of Fire in the West focuses on the 

common elements of the Wildland/Urban Interface problem, and seeks to better define the 

condition(s) in the West. 

Definitions: 

Life and Property Fire Protection – a service with the primary responsibility to protect 

structures AND the people who occupy these structures from injury or death. This fire 

protection service is normally provided by rural and/or local government fire departments, 

with specially trained and equipped personnel. After life safety, the priority is to 

keep the fire from leaving the area of origin. It also means protecting the structure from 

an advancing wildland fire. Local taxpayers fund this service through a variety of taxing 

authorities. (The equipment and training required to conduct life and property protection 

are not normally provided to the wildland firefighter.) 

Structure Protection – to protect structures from the threat of damage from an advancing 

wildland fire. This normally does not include an attack on fire that is inside the structure. 

It involves the use of fire control lines (constructed or natural) and the extinguishment of 

spot fires near or on the structure. This protection can be provided by both the rural and/ 

or local government fire department firefighter and the wildland fire protection firefighter. 

Structural Fire Protection – is defined as interior and exterior actions take to suppress and 

extinguish a burning structure or improvement associated with standard structure fire 

protection, equipment and training. Structural fire suppression is the responsibility of 

local government entities, although there are some locations in the West where there is 

currently no structural fire agency in place. 

190

Wildland Fire Protection – a service with the primary responsibility of protecting natural 

resources and watersheds from damage by wildfires. State and federal forestry or land 

management agencies normally provide wildland fire protection with specially trained 

and equipped personnel. Various taxing authorities and fees fund this service. Some 

wildland fire protection agencies have the responsibilities for intermingled life and property 

protection when they are threatened by a wildland fire...and some do not. It is nearly 

impossible for an incident commander to separate these responsibilities (and the associated 

costs) during a wildland fire. (The equipment and training required to conduct 

wildland fire protection are not normally provided to the local government fire department 

firefighter. If a fire protection agency is routinely called upon to fight wildland fires, 

they are usually trained and equipped to do so. The problem arises when personnel from 

an agency are called upon to fight fires for which they are NOT properly equipped or 

trained.) 

Wildland/Urban Interface – in relation to wildland/urban fire, a set of conditions that 

provides the opportunity for fire to burn from wildland vegetation to the home/structure 

ignition zone. There are four different wildland/urban conditions: 

Interface Condition – is a situation where structures abut wildland fuels. There is a clear line of 

demarcation between the structures and the wildland fuels along roads or back fences 

(Figure 4). Wildland fuels do not continue into the developed area. The development 

density for an interface condition is usually 3+ structures per acre. Fire protection 

is normally provided by a local government fire department with the responsibility 

to protect the structure from both an interior fire and an advancing wildland fire 

(unless the line of demarcation is also a jurisdictional boundary). 

Intermix Condition – is a condition where structures are scattered throughout a wildland 

area (Figure 5). There is no clear line of demarcation; the wildland fuels are continuous 

outside of and within the developed area. The development density in the intermix 

ranges from structures very close together to one structure per 40 acres. Fire 

protection districts funded by various taxing authorities normally provide life and 

property fire protection, and may also have wildland fire protection responsibilities. 

Occluded Condition – is a situation, normally within a city, where structures abut an 

island of wildland fuels (park or open space). There is a clear line of demarcation 

Figure 4. Interface Condition, where there is a clear line 

between the structures and the wildland fuels. 

191

etween the structures and the 

wildland fuels along roads or back 

fences. The development density 

for an occluded condition is 

usually similar to those found in 

the interface condition and the 

occluded area is usually less than 

1,000 acres in size. Fire protection 

is normally provided by a local 

government fire department. The 

trend is for local government to 

require developers to include open 

space in their plans, but not 

include a long-term mechanism 

for their maintenance; thus the 

hazardous fire condition increases 

over time. 

Figure 6. Intermix Condition, where there the structures are 

scattered throughout the wildland fuels. 

Rural Condition – is a situation where scattered small clusters of structures (ranches, 

farms, resorts, or summer cabins) are exposed to wildland fuels (Figure 6). There may be 

miles between these clusters. Structural fire protection service may not be available. 

These types of developments often exceed the capabilities of both the structural and 

wildland fire protection systems. Wildland fire protection agencies have little or no 

control over such development and may be unable to provide protection due to statutory 

barriers. 

Areas of Safe Refuge – an area of safe refuge is like a safety zone, a place where a 

person is safe from a fire. Communities can be designed in such a way to provide a 

place of refuge during a wildland fire. 

Defensible Space - the area immediately around a structure where fuel needs to be 

reduced to allow firefighters to work safely. 

Figure 6. Rural Condition, where the structures or clusters of 

structures are situated in wildland fuels. These structures or 

clusters are often miles apart. 

Dwelling Unit – is a house, home, apartment, etc. where humans reside. A motel or 

hotel room is not a dwelling unit because the length of say is usually short-term. 

192

Fire-resistive Construction - is the use of materials and systems in the design and construction 

of a building or structure to safeguard against the spread of fire within a building or 

structure and the spread of fire to or from buildings or structures to the wildland/urban 

interface area. 

Hazard – the degree of flammability of the fuels once a fire starts. This includes the fuel 

(type, arrangement, volume, condition, etc.), topography and weather. 

Home or House – is usually a privately owned structure in which people live. It does not 

house more than one family. 

Home/Structure Ignition Zone - the area that principally determines the potential for ignition 

of the home/stucture from wildland fire. It includes the home/structure and its immediate 

surroundings within 100 to 200 feet. 

Ignition-Resistant Construction – incorporates the use of materials and design that enables 

a structure to withstand ignition from radiant heat, fire brands or direct flame impingement. 

Risk – the chance of a fire starting from any cause. 

Structural Fire Protection – is defined as interior and exterior actions taken to suppress and 

extinguish a burning structure or improvement utilizing standard building fire protection 

methods, equipment and training . Structural fire suppression is generally the responsibility 

of a local government entity, although there are some locations in the West where there is 

currently no structural fire agency in place. 

Structure – is a building, home, business, barn, etc., that is built within one foundation/ 

framework. An apartment building is a structure with multiple dwelling units. 

Structure Protection – to protect structures from the threat of damage from an advancing 

wildland fire (Figure 11). This normally does not include an attack on fire that is inside the 

structure. It involves the use of fire control lines (constructed or natural) and the extinguishment 

of spot fires near or on the structure. This protection can be provided by the 

193

ural and/or local government fire department firefighter and the wildland fire protection 

firefighter. 

Structures saved – a structure is considered saved if it is within the exterior boundaries of the 

fire or directly adjacent to the fireline, and did not burn down or suffer serious damage as a 

result of the wildfire. 

Structures threatened – a structure is considered threatened if it is within the exterior boundaries 

of the fire, or within ¼-mile of the exterior boundary of the fire, or within the fire 

behavior projection for the next 24-hours. 

Suppression – taking specific actions to control and extinguish an unwanted wildland fire. 

Wildfire Causes – there are three general causes of wildland fires, natural (lightning), accidental 

(debris burning, children with matches, etc.) and intentional (arson). 

Wildland/urban interface fire – is (1) a fire burning primarily in wildland fuels that threatens 

or destroys several structures; (2) That situation where the fuel feeding the fire changes 

from wildland fuel to urban fuel. For this to happen, wildland fire must be close enough for 

flying brands and/or flames to make contact with flammable portion of homes/structures. 

Wildfire Fire Suppression Strategies – There are two general wildfire management 

strategies: 

194

Federal Land Ownership 

The federal government owns or controls 648,969,668 acres or 58 percent of the land in the 

West (Tables 1 and 9). Each of the various federal agencies have different roles, missions, and 

responsibilities. 

USDA Forest Service - The Forest Service manages the 191 million acre National Forest 

System under principles of ecosystem management. The national forests contain 140 million acres of 

forestland, with the remaining acres in grasslands. The Forest Service owns 166.6 million acres in 

the West. There are 184.6 million acres within the various national forests. This includes 18 million 

acres of privately owned land (Table 2). 

USDI Bureau of Land Management - The BLM is responsible for the multiple-use management 

of natural resources on 270 million acres of public land and for supervising mineral leasing 

and operations on an additional 300 million acres of federal mineral estate that underlies other 

surface ownership. BLM manages 262.7 million acres in 12 western states and Alaska (Table 3). 

Under federal regulations, all Public Domain is “owned” by the BLM. Other federal agencies (Fish 

and Wildlife Service, Department of Defense, etc.) manage millions of acres of Public Domain. 

USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs - The BIA manages and protects natural resources on 46.6 

million acres in the West. There are three classifications for the lands they protect: Tribal Lands - 

40.2 million acres; Individually Owned Lands - 6.1 million acres; and BIA owned lands - 288 

thousand acres (Table 4). The BIA provides a wide variety of community and social services, 

maintains law enforcement systems, and assists in agricultural, ranching, forestry, and mining activities 

on reservations, and funds 187 BIA and tribal-operated schools in 24 states. 

USDI Fish and Wildlife Service - The FWS conserves, protects, and enhances fish and 

wildlife and their habitats. Management duties extend over 91 million acres of public land and 

include 494 national wildlife refuges, 32 wetland management districts, 84 fish hatcheries, 23 research 

centers, and 88 associated field stations. In the West, the Fish and Wildlife Service manage 

84.8 million acres, most of which is in Alaska and most of them are in Public Domain (Table 5). The 

FWS is responsible for administering the Endangered Species Act and providing comments and 

consultations on water development and water quality under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act 

and section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 

195

Table 1 Federal Land Ownership Data 


Department of Defense - The Department of Defense manages 25 million acres of public 

lands at 600 major installations in the United States, and 2 million acres abroad. In the West, the 

Department of Defense protects 10.4 million acres, most of this land is owned by the Department of 

the Army (Table 6). The Department is an active steward of these installations, which vary greatly in 

size and use and contain a rich diversity of flora and fauna. Army Corps of Engineers, which manages 

11.7 million acres of land and inland water areas, provides recreation opportunities at 463 

lakes throughout the United States. In the West, the Corps owns 31 thousand acres. 

USDI National Park Service - The National Park Service protects natural and cultural 

resources while promoting outdoor recreation, historic preservation, and environmental awareness. 

The National Park Service owns and protects 69.6 million acres in the West (Table 7). 

Other Federal Agencies - There are several other federal agencies (Bureau of Reclamations, 

Department of Energy, etc.) that own and manage over 8 million acres in the West (Table 8). 

Bur of Land 

Management 

Bur of Indian 

Affairs 

196 

Fish and 

Wildlife 

Service 

Areas, in acres. 

National 

Park Service 

Dept of 

Defense 


Federal 

TOTAL 

Alaska 22,004,745 86,908,060 1,140,410 76,321,037 52,891,681 1,677,718 22,851 240,966,502 

Arizona 11,250,693 14,252,778 20,718,207 1,716,858 2,629,633 1,219,717 2,751 51,790,637 

California 20,627,691 14,556,074 191,020 323,642 4,615,013 1,753,493 434,695 42,501,628 

Colorado 14,501,592 8,296,512 32,835 81,574 574,689 415,473 358,175 24,260,850 

Hawaii 1 0 0 288,511 220,410 127,734 1,627 638,283 

Idaho 20,442,651 11,847,328 55,700 76,068 86,866 14,402 1,067,840 33,590,855 

Kansas 108,175 0 40,234 58,332 698 143,447 97,088 447,974 

Montana 16,872,610 8,060,382 1,074,907 1,153,013 1,221,314 2,540 316,204 28,700,970 

Nebraska 352,133 6,580 66,469 172,360 5,863 18,703 119,139 741,247 

Nevada 5,815,856 47,844,391 1,233,000 2,318,069 165,500 484,965 1,699,739 59,561,520 

New Mexico 9,326,599 12,770,569 8,349,148 384,251 371,827 3,180,226 453,865 34,836,485 

North Dakota 1,105,779 59,717 866,896 487,654 71,640 2,112 1,273,320 3,867,118 

Oregon 15,664,078 16,223,739 796,588 557,479 194,859 31,072 133,625 33,601,440 

South Dakota 2,013,628 279,869 5,002,056 198,086 263,629 890 60,455 7,818,613 

Utah 8,112,462 22,877,713 2,331,094 419,169 2,015,426 939,973 660,613 37,356,450 

Washington 9,174,956 370,110 2,602,254 186,369 1,932,401 433,251 752,979 15,452,320 

Wyoming 9,258,281 18,383,926 1,889,532 86,486 2,393,198 9,512 815,841 32,836,776 

TOTAL 166,631,930 262,737,748 46,390,350 84,828,958 69,654,647 10,455,228 8,270,807 648,969,668

Percent 

Federally 

Owned 

Lands 

Alaska 

Arizona 

California 

Colorado 

Hawaii 

Idaho 

Kansas 

Montana 

Nebraska 

Nevada 

New Mexico 

North Dakota 

Oregon 

South Dakota 

Utah 



65.93% 

71.25% 

42.41% 

36.49% 

15.55% 

63.46% 

0.85% 

30.77% 

1.51% 

84.77% 

44.80% 

8.70% 

54.55% 

15.99% 

70.89% 

36.19% 

52.67% 

197

Table 2 USDA Forest Service Land Ownership Data 

National Forest 

System (2.1) 

Area, in acres. 

Other Lands (2.2) 

Total Gross Area 

(2.3) 

Percent Non- 

Forest Lands 

within Nation 

Forests 

Alaska 22,004,745 2,350,390 24,355,135 9.65% 

Arizona 11,250,693 636,712 11,887,405 5.36% 

California 20,627,691 3,774,754 24,402,445 15.47% 

Colorado 14,501,592 1,550,266 16,051,858 9.66% 

Hawaii 1 1 

Idaho 20,442,651 1,229,036 21,671,687 5.67% 

Kansas 108,175 8,144 116,319 7.00% 

Montana 16,872,610 2,231,103 19,103,713 11.68% 

Nebraska 352,133 90,359 442,492 20.42% 

Nevada 5,815,856 459,457 6,275,313 7.32% 

New Mexico 9,326,599 1,040,110 10,366,709 10.03% 

North Dakota 1,105,779 4 1,105,783 0.00% 

Oregon 15,664,078 1,845,269 17,509,347 10.54% 

South Dakota 2,013,628 350,393 2,364,021 14.82% 

Utah 8,112,462 1,098,147 9,210,609 11.92% 

Washington 9,174,956 894,472 10,069,428 8.88% 

Wyoming 9,258,281 445,267 9,703,548 4.59% 

TOTAL 166,631,930 18,003,883 184,635,813 9.75% 

Source: 

Land Areas of the National Forest System, USDA Forest Service, FS-383, January 1996. 

Notes: 

2.1 - National Forest Service Lands are those lands owned by the Forest Service. This includes 

National Forest Lands, Purchase Units (Weeks Law), National Grasslands, Land Utilization 

Project Lands, Research and Experimental Lands, etc.) 2.2 - Private Lands, State Lands, or 

lands owned by another federal agency. 2.3 - The total gross lands within the exterior boundary 

(the black line on the administrative map) of the National Forest. 

198

Table 3 USDI Bureau of Land Management Land Ownership Data 


Vacant Public 

Lands Outside 

Grazing Districts 

Vacant Public 

Lands Within 

Grazing Districts 

Land Utilization 

Project Lands 

Other Lands 

Managed by BLM 

TOTAL 

Alaska 86,908,060 86,908,060 

Arizona 1,516,765 10,093,234 32,321 2,610,458 14,252,778 

California 7,363,543 1,725,343 5,467,188 14,556,074 

Colorado 480,331 6,781,734 36,206 998,241 8,296,512 

Hawaii 0 

Idaho 422,341 10,733,321 72,276 619,390 11,847,328 

Kansas 0 

Montana 1,148,321 4,940,802 1,801,171 170,088 8,060,382 

Nebraska 6,580 6,580 

Nevada 3,140,726 44,493,239 3,127 207,299 47,844,391 

New Mexico 1,355,577 11,047,165 229,500 138,327 12,770,569 

North Dakota 59,536 181 59,717 

Oregon 585,675 12,455,100 78,124 3,104,840 16,223,739 

South Dakota 272,277 7,592 279,869 

Utah 21,155,026 45,083 1,677,604 22,877,713 

Washington 366,921 3,189 370,110 

Wyoming 3,910,677 11,273,811 10,434 3,189,004 18,383,926 

TOTAL 107,537,330 134,698,775 2,308,242 18,193,401 262,737,748 

Source: Public Land Statistics 1997, USDI Bureau of Land Management, (BLM/BC/ST-98/001+1165), March 1998. 

199

Table 4 USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs Land Ownership Data 

Tribal Lands (4.1) 

Individually 

Owned Lands (4.2) 

Area in acres 

Bur of Indian 

Affairs Lands (4.3) 

TOTAL 

Percent 

Individually 

Owned Lands 

Alaska 83,880 1,056,530 1,140,410 92.64% 

Arizona 20,370,975 256,766 90,466 20,718,207 1.24% 

California 148,535 36,519 5,966 191,020 19.12% 

Colorado 14,882 17,946 7 32,835 54.66% 

Hawaii 254,418 35 91 254,544 0.01% 

Idaho 53,351 2,168 181 55,700 3.89% 

Kansas 10,841 29,357 36 40,234 72.97% 

Montana 822,088 252,060 759 1,074,907 23.45% 

Nebraska 23,174 43,288 7 66,469 65.13% 

Nevada 1,149,492 78,529 4,979 1,233,000 6.37% 

New Mexico 7,500,568 668,840 179,740 8,349,148 8.01% 

North Dakota 245,630 619,338 1,928 866,896 71.44% 

Oregon 666,106 130,466 16 796,588 16.38% 

South Dakota 2,617,895 2,381,516 2,645 5,002,056 47.61% 

Utah 2,297,770 33,237 87 2,331,094 1.43% 

Washington 2,170,346 431,748 160 2,602,254 16.59% 

Wyoming 1,794,589 93,647 1,296 1,889,532 4.96% 

TOTAL 40,224,540 6,131,990 288,364 46,644,894 13.15% 

Source: 

Acreage Recapitulations by State, USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs, December 1996. 

Notes: 

4.1 - Lands granted to the various tribes via treaties. 4.2 - Land owned by various private 

individuals. 4.3 - Land owned by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 

200

Table 5 USDI Fish and Wildlife Service Land Ownership Data 

Reserved from 

Public Domain 

Acquired by other 

Federal Agency 

Devise or Gift 


Purchased 

Agreement 

Easement or 

Lease 

TOTAL 

Percent of Land in 

Public Domain 

Alaska 76,310,177 974 9,886 1,321 76,322,358 99.98% 

Arizona 1,575,940 16,714 1,200 123,004 1,576 1,718,434 91.71% 

California 148,535 36,519 5,966 132,622 104,787 428,429 34.67% 

Colorado 14,882 17,946 7 48,739 2,293 83,867 17.74% 

Hawaii 254,418 35 91 33,967 961 289,472 87.89% 

Idaho 53,351 2,168 181 20,368 13,186 89,254 59.77% 

Kansas 29,357 28,975 6 58,338 0.00% 

Montana 822,088 252,060 759 78,106 96,922 1,249,935 65.77% 

Nebraska 20,660 71,399 2,139 78,162 65,476 237,836 8.69% 

Nevada 2,236,672 4,139 77,258 1,019 2,319,088 96.45% 

New Mexico 72,981 439 220,216 90,615 767 385,018 18.96% 

North Dakota 18,538 150,103 4,175 314,838 916,513 1,404,167 1.32% 

Oregon 272,142 73,376 773 211,188 36,267 593,746 45.83% 

South Dakota 1,848 31,949 6,088 158,201 816,685 1,014,771 0.18% 

Utah 65,781 2,383 4,272 346,733 4,244 423,413 15.54% 

Washington 42,652 75,757 791 67,169 11,161 197,530 21.59% 

Wyoming 32,961 27,474 4,474 21,577 6,634 93,120 35.40% 

TOTAL 81,943,626 787,679 256,245 1,841,408 2,079,818 86,908,776 

Source: Annual Report of Lands Under Control of the USDI Fish and Wildlife Service, September 1997. 

201

Table 6 US Department of Defense Land Ownership Data 


Dept of the Army Dept of the Navy 

Dept of the Air Corps of 

Force Engineers 

TOTAL 

Alaska 1,669,149 8,569 1,677,718 

Arizona 957,874 2,770 259,073 1,219,717 

California 975,018 726,570 46,636 5,269 1,753,493 

Colorado 414,345 1,128 415,473 

Hawaii 106,465 20,824 443 2 127,734 

Idaho 15 11,099 3,288 14,402 

Kansas 125,788 15 3,677 13,967 143,447 

Montana 2,120 420 2,540 

Nebraska 18,294 7 402 18,703 

Nevada 152,275 33,363 299,327 484,965 

New Mexico 3,163,121 1 17,104 3,180,226 

North Dakota 900 1,212 2,112 

Oregon 17,602 10,112 41 3,317 31,072 

South Dakota 12 878 890 

Utah 848,263 518 91,192 939,973 

Washington 404,481 21,824 916 6,030 433,251 

Wyoming 8,897 2 613 9,512 

TOTAL 8,864,619 816,006 742,730 31,873 10,455,228 

Source: 

Federally Owned Property in the United States, by State, Agency and Bureau, US General Service Administration, 

October 1996. 

202

Table 7 USDI National Park Service Land Ownership Data 


Alaska 52,891,681 

Arizona 2,629,633 

California 4,615,013 

Colorado 574,689 

Hawaii 220,410 

Idaho 86,866 

Kansas 698 

Montana 1,221,314 

Nebraska 5,863 

Nevada 165,500 

New Mexico 371,827 

North Dakota 71,640 

Oregon 194,859 

South Dakota 263,629 

Utah 2,015,426 

Washington 1,932,401 

Wyoming 2,393,198 

TOTAL 69,654,647 

Source: Federally Owned Property in the United States, by State, Agency and 

Bureau, US General Service Administration, October 1996. 

Table 8 Other Federal Agency Land Ownership Data 


Alaska 22,851 

Arizona 2,751 

California 434,695 

Colorado 358,175 

Hawaii 1,627 

Idaho 1,067,840 

Kansas 97,088 

Montana 316,204 

Nebraska 119,139 

Nevada 1,699,739 

New Mexico 453,865 

North Dakota 1,273,320 

Oregon 133,625 

South Dakota 60,455 

Utah 660,613 

Washington 752,979 

Wyoming 815,841 

TOTAL 8,270,807 

Source: Federally Owned Property in the United States, by State, Agency and 

Bureau, US General Service Administration, October 1996. 

203

Table 9 Percentage of State in Federal Land Ownership 

Forest 

Service 

Bur of Land 

Management 

Bur of 

Indian 

Affairs 

Fish and 

Wildlife 

Service 

National 

Park 

Service 

Dept of 

Defense 


Federal 

Percent of 

State in 

Federal 

Ownership 

Total Land in 

State, in acres. 

Alaska 6.0% 23.8% 0.3% 20.9% 14.5% 0.5% 0.0% 65.93% 365,481,600 

Arizona 15.5% 19.6% 28.5% 2.4% 3.6% 1.7% 0.0% 71.25% 72,688,000 

California 20.6% 14.5% 0.2% 0.4% 4.6% 1.7% 0.4% 42.41% 100,206,720 

Colorado 21.8% 12.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.9% 0.6% 0.5% 36.49% 66,485,760 

Hawaii 0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 7.1% 5.4% 3.1% 0.0% 15.55% 4,105,600 

Idaho 38.6% 22.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 2.0% 63.46% 52,933,120 

Kansas 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.85% 52,510,720 

Montana 18.1% 8.6% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 0.0% 0.3% 30.77% 93,271,040 

Nebraska 0.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.51% 49,031,680 

Nevada 8.3% 68.1% 1.8% 3.3% 0.2% 0.7% 2.4% 84.77% 70,264,320 

New Mexico 12.0% 16.4% 10.7% 0.5% 0.5% 4.1% 0.6% 44.80% 77,766,400 

North Dakota 2.5% 0.1% 2.0% 3.2% 0.2% 0.0% 2.9% 8.70% 44,452,480 

Oregon 25.4% 26.3% 1.3% 1.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 54.55% 61,598,720 

South Dakota 4.1% 0.6% 10.2% 2.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 15.99% 48,881,920 

Utah 15.4% 43.4% 4.4% 0.8% 3.8% 1.8% 1.3% 70.89% 52,696,960 

Washington 21.5% 0.9% 6.1% 0.5% 4.5% 1.0% 1.8% 36.19% 42,693,760 

Wyoming 14.9% 29.5% 3.0% 0.1% 3.8% 0.0% 1.3% 52.67% 62,343,040 

TOTAL 1,317,411,840 

Source: Federally Owned Property in the United States, by State, Agency and Bureau, US 

General Service Administration, October 1996. 

204

Wildland/Urban Interface Fire History 

(A wildland/urban interface fire is defined as one that destroyed at least three structures and 

burned over 25 acres of wildland.) 

State Year Fire Name 

Alaska 

Arizona 

California 

Acres 

Burned 

Structures 

Lost 

1996 Prator Lake 120 3 

Miller's Reach #2 37,336 454 

2001 Red Fox 150 8 

2002 West Fork Chena 22,251 3 

Deaths 

1983 Pretzer 200 3 

1990 Dude 25,000 30 6 

1995 Oldt 100 14 

Bagdad 200 4 

1996 Points 26 3 

1997 Kuyhendall 410 6 

2002 Bullock 30,563 7 

Rodeo/Chediski 468,638 496 

1955 Humboldt/Siskiyou 152,245 13 

Refugio 84,770 20 

1956 East Highlands 15,330 5 1 

Sherwood 9,428 8 

Newton 26,169 50 

Hume 1,940 9 

1960 Homstake 10,948 10 

1961 Harlow 41,200 106 2 

Bel Air 6,090 484 

1964 Hanley/Series 71,601 174 

Weldon/Series 11,650 20 

Coyote 67,000 94 1 

1965 Northern Cal Series 113,766 41 

Suncrest 1,260 7 

1967 Sence Ranch 17,431 5 

Santa Susanna 25,000 10 

Paseo Grande 48,639 61 

Baliff 23,929 8 1 

Woodson 17,560 30 

1968 Louis 1,327 5 

1969 Walker 17,000 8 

1970 Statewide Series 567,508 722 19 

Reche 4,168 3 

Bear 53,100 54 

1972 Swasey 1,933 8 

Bradford 1,760 4 

1973 Boulder 8,478 17 

1975 Grundy 1,710 3 

Pendleton 2,400 10 

1976 Quarry 38,346 8 

Jacksonville 5,307 3 

Honey 1,482 3 

1977 Sycamore 804 234 

1978 Creighton Ridge 11,405 64 

Mandeville Canyon 5,500 18 

1979 Hesperia 1,525 25 1 

Northern Cal Series 3,200 7 

Laurel Canyon 150 24 

Bernardo 9,000 10 

1980 Tower House 2,349 3 

Riverside 500 5 

Dry Flat 28,655 6 

Turner 28,000 7 

Indian 28,200 7 

Lakeland 8,400 4 

Stable 5,482 65 

Summit/Series 41,472 355 

205

Panorama 23,600 7 

Kiowa 2,440 11 

1981 Thunder 11,500 29 

Atlas Peak 22,000 69 

Flat 1,500 3 

Rieche/Series 29,704 6 

Swall 1,900 3 

Oat Mountain 17,500 9 

Cow Mountain 25,534 4 

1982 Gypsum 16,800 14 

Daydon Haul 57,000 65 

Dulzura 5,019 7 

1983 Porta Costa Series 325 10 

1985 Hidden Valley 1,250 20 

Eight-Mile 462 13 

Seco 1,954 3 

Gorda Rat 55,889 8 

Cherry 40,231 17 

Las Pilitas 74,640 41 

Pala 325 3 

Wheeler 120,000 26 

Miller 8,000 3 

Deer 520 8 

Delta 1,620 3 

Lafayette 100 3 

Lehr 200 64 

Page Mill 100 13 

1987 Dog Bar 362 9 

Stanislaus Complex 144,762 28 

Clark 37,530 4 

Gulch 6,800 6 

Yellow Complex 47,770 3 

Glasgow 13,370 3 

Salmon/St. Clair 8,600 35 1 

Post 546 3 

Baldwin Hills 500 21 2 

Morse (Pebble Beach) 160 37 

1988 Amador 600 3 

Railroad 10,750 15 

Mason 4,072 5 

Orinda 15 7 

Lake 10 4 

Miller 38,600 7 

49er 33,700 312 

State 1807 4,738 5 

Stagecoach 15 

Rosa 4 

Yucca 931 3 

Fern 7,790 58 

Preston 1,000 7 

Geysers 352 7 

PG E #19 8,648 3 

Miller 10,000 18 

1989 Kelly Ridge 4 

Highway 26 400 9 

Calaveras 425 4 

Powerhouse 11,680 22 

Olivas 813 3 

Eagle 4,600 3 

Poppet 1,328 3 

Ortega 6,100 13 

San Benito 52 7 

Joshua 690 6 

San Martin 375 17 

Two Rock 161 7 

Greenwood Series 159 

Tuttletown 740 8 

1990 Monterey 18 8 

Paint 4,900 641 1 

Carbon Canyon 6,640 14 

206

Bedford 490 20 

Glendale 75 50 

Cottonwood 5 

A Rock 12,136 66 

Pine 125,892 27 

Long Gulch 2,100 3 

Knoll 300 7 

1991 Fiddle 20 3 

Tunnel 1,600 2900 25 

1992 Borax 1,920 15 

Jay 550 3 

Maidu 675 10 

Villa 6,700 19 

Fawn 350 13 

Fountain 63,960 636 

Cleveland 24,580 26 2 

Moccasin 8,370 6 

Clear 190 5 

Idaho 50 4 

1993 Greenmeadow 40,051 66 

Kinneloa 5,715 149 1 

Stagecoach 546 8 

Mill Creek 4,680 6 

California 25,100 107 

Ortega 21,392 15 

Guejito 20,722 9 

Laguna Canyon 14,808 366 

Topanga 16,885 300 3 

Reppier 5,956 15 

Old Coach 2,139 36 

1994 Kelsey 860 33 

Raulson 1,000 13 

Bailey 7,000 8 

Broens 1,650 4 

Creek 442 3 

Highway 41 48,531 37 

Lakeland 2,400 8 

Scout 3,023 9 

Lucas 8,464 40 

Hemet Complex 19,200 14 

1995 Jenny 420 6 

Sycamore 10,000 3 

Warners 2,400 20 

Riverside 5,000 6 

Bluff 2,624 3 

Vision 12,354 45 

Lopez 1,985 4 

1996 Ellis 43 6 

State 837 653 5 

Weber 360 4 

State 165 3 

Dove 930 3 

Riverside 40 3 

Pechanga 1,336 3 

Gifford 31 3 

PGE #8 80 5 

Stumpfield 3,000 43 

Lightning #29 7,000 20 

Peachland 25 4 

Highway 58 33,094 13 

Riverside 1,210 6 

Harmoney 8,592 110 

Rincon 1,800 6 

Calabasas 13,010 6 

1997 Riverside 320 3 

Grove 1,235 3 

Calimesa 377 9 

Priest 250 10 

Wohlford 457 8 

Pamela 25 3 

207

Pauba 7,800 10 

Wildwood 940 6 

Poppet 1,500 5 

William 5,810 85 

1998 Juniper 6,000 89 

Edna 28,164 5 1 

Taylor 2,160 5 1 

Bitterwater Valley 420 5 

1999 Lowen 2,000 23 

Dunstone 268 3 

Bloomer #3 2,590 9 

Musty #3 7 

Willow 21,900 60 

Canyon #4 2,580 230 

Rumsey 3,015 6 

Shockey 3,885 3 

Oregon 280 5 

Jones 26,202 264 

2000 Manter 72,750 16 

Berryessa 1,731 15 

Morgan 3,316 3 

Happy 5,500 3 

Union 350 5 

2001 Viejas 2,300 16 

Stimpson 100 4 

Jackson 2,240 15 

Creek 11,095 43 

Leonard 5,167 22 

North Fork 475 3 

Bus 242 12 

Oregon 1,680 33 

Poe 8,333 170 

Bell 1,204 5 

Trough 24,970 30 

Highway 4,125 8 

Colorado 

Star 16,761 4 

Stables 6,544 4 

2002 Galvilan 5,763 43 

Troy 1,180 3 

Loza 60 3 

Hwy 58 1,380 6 

Pines 61,690 160 

Croy 3,127 34 

Pine 1,200 7 

Arrowhead 2,688 7 

Wolf 21,645 6 

Copper 23,407 26 

Borel 3,430 19 

Copo 1,460 3 

Louisiana 6,574 7 

Deer 1,800 94 

McNally 150,696 17 

Curve 20,857 73 

Leona 5,124 16 

Sierra 594 21 

Williams 38,094 77 

1989 Black Tiger 2,000 44 

1990 Old Stage 2,000 10 

1994 Hour Glass 1,275 13 

Wake 3,846 3 

1996 Buffalo Creek 10,000 10 

1999 Monument 100 9 

2000 Bobcat 10,600 22 

High Meadow 10,927 51 

Pony 5,240 4 

2002 Big Fish 17,056 8 

Coal Seam 12,209 43 

Hayman 137,760 600 

208

Hawaii 

Idaho 

Kansas 

Iron Mountain 4,439 201 

Lincoln Co Complex 10,000 17 

Long Mesa 2,601 7 

Million 9,346 13 

Missionary Ridge 70,662 77 

Valley 393 6 

Panorama 1,700 6 

Schoonover Gulch 3,860 13 

2000 Puu Kapu 4,500 3 

1989 Lowman 46,000 25 

1991 Hauser Lk Complex 1,700 5 1 

2000 Clear Creek 126,000 10 

Burgdorf Junction 64,666 19 

Fisher Springs 22,000 4 

Lookout Point 4,000 3 

Trail Creek 34,759 30 

SCF Wilderness 171,560 22 

North Fork Wilderness 14,506 5 

Indian/Prospect 11,100 3 

Morse 4,275 3 

Information is not available. 

Montana 

1977 Pattee Canyon 1,200 7 

1983 Baney Coulee 2,500 3 

1984 Houghton Creek 12,061 3 

Hawk Creek 180,508 44 1 

1988 Red Bench 14,000 24 

Storm Creek 30,000 12 

Canyon Creek 120,000 6 

Nebraska 

Nevada 

New Mexico 

Whitehall 1,630 3 

1991 Holter Lake 125 3 2 

1998 Shepard Mountain 30,000 34 

1999 NE Corner 3,917 10 

Fishel Creek 28,155 5 

Anelope 7,240 20 

Outlook 6,952 10 

2000 Canyon Ferry 43,922 50 

Fort Howes 55800 4 

Average Bad Day 1,310 11 

Monture/Spread Ridge 21,800 4 

Hell Creek 750 3 

Valley Complex 173,563 227 

Thursday 750 3 

Blodget Trailhead 10,764 8 

Gilger 640 3 

Maloney Creek 72,000 12 

Boulder Complex 12,604 9 

Skalkaho Complex 64,794 4 

2002 Piskun 5,000 4 

1999 Thedford 75,000 15 

1994 Crystal Peak 7,310 3 

1996 Autumn Hills 3,800 4 

1999 Spring Creek 200 2 

2000 Coyote 15,000 3 

South Cricket 65,000 5 

1974 Spring 14,500 45 

1993 Burgett 5,350 8 

1996 Hondo 7,651 32 

209

North Dakota 

Oregon 

2000 Cree 6,488 3 

Scott Able 16,034 64 

Manuelitas 1,410 4 

Cerro Grande 47,650 350 

Viveash 28,283 4 

2002 Kokopelli 986 29 

Penasco 15,904 12 

Lakes Complex 4,096 4 

1999 Gap 69,000 16 

2002 Manvel 5,750 7 

Kraft Complex 35,100 17 

1975 Ten Mile Valley 232 4 

1987 Bland Mountain 9,593 35 

1988 Milepost 70 160 4 

1990 Awbrey Hall 3,353 26 

1992 East Evans Creek 10,135 5 

Sage Flat 1,095 6 

1994 Blackwell Road 65 14 

Hull Mountain 7,990 44 

1996 Wheeler Point 14,960 11 

Skeleton 17,736 36 

1998 Lone Pine 5,290 3 

2000 East Complex 45,000 3 

2001 Middle Fork 50 3 

Quartz 6,102 5 

2002 Flagtail 8,000 3 

Winter 33,894 5 

Squire 2,804 6 

Shelton Ridge 12,681 6 

Biscut 499,945 13 

Eyerly 23,573 37 

South Dakota 

Utah 



1959 Deadwood 2,500 60 

1988 Westberry Trails 3,840 57 

2000 Flagpole Mountain 7,800 4 

Jasper 82,600 3 

2002 Grizzly Gulch 11,589 7 

Battle Creek 12,450 3 

1990 Wasatch 43 2 

2000 Box Canyon 200 3 

2002 East Fork 14,208 55 

1985 Barker Mountain 60,000 4 

1987 Hangman Hills 1,500 24 

1988 Dinkleman 50,000 3 

1991 Firestorm 91 350,000 191 1 

1992 Castle Rock Canyon 5,400 24 

1994 Chelan/Leavenworth 58,000 54 1 

1996 Bowie Road 3,020 7 

1997 Red Lake 1,151 5 

1998 Cleveland 118,500 14 

2000 Rocky Hill 9,404 37 

Goodnoe 4,800 3 

Mule Dry 76,800 25 

Eastside Complex 5,924 3 

2002 Deer Point 42,674 5 

1988 Clover-Mist 319,575 14 

North Fork 531,182 7 

2002 Hensel 14,730 7 

210

About the Authors 

William C. Teie retired from the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) 

after a successful 34-year career. He worked up through the ranks from seasonal firefighter to Deputy 

Director for Fire Protection. In this position, he was responsible for all of the fire protection programs 

within CDF. 

Chief Teie was very active in the California fire service. He was on several statewide boards and 

committees and was elected President of the California Fire Chiefs Association in 1986. He is a member 

of the National Fire Protection Association and the Institute of Fire Engineers, an international organization 

based in the United Kingdom. 

He is the author of the Wildland Firefighting Fundamentals, Firefighter’s Handbook on Wildland 

Firefighting, and Fire Officer’s Handbook on Wildland Firefighting and has developed several 

other training and operational aids for the firefighter. He has just completed the adaptations of several of these handbooks 

for use in the Republic of South Africa. 

Brian F. Weatherford retired from CDF after a 35-year career that included fighting fires from 

Alaska to Mexico and from Montana to California. He rose through the ranks from firefighter to fire 

chief and at the time of his retirement commanded an organization including three county fire departments 

and two city fire departments with 62 fire stations, 88 engine companies and nearly 900 paid and 

volunteer firefighters. 

He currently provides consulting services to local government agencies in the areas of fire protection 

planning, budget development, organizational theory, and management audits for specialized services, 

but only to the extent that these projects do not interfere with his primary avocation of fishing.

Deer Valley Press 

5125 Deer Valley Road, Rescue, CA 95672 

(530) 676-7401 Fax (530) 676-7418 

www.deervalleypress.com

Fire in the West - Western Forestry Leadership Coalition

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