National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

CIHM 

Commissione internazionale di storia militare 

international Commission of military History 

Commission internationale d’Histoire militaire 

Airpower in 20 th Century 

Doctrines and Employment 

National Experiences 

rivista internazionale di storia militare • international review of military 

89 

history • revue internationale d d’histoire 

histoire • internationale zeitschrift 

für militärgeschichte • revista 

de historia militar 

89militaire 

89internacional 

89internacional 

Commissione 

Italiana 

Storia 

Militare 

Ministero della difesa

Commissione internazionale di storia militare 

international Commission of military History 

Commission internationale d’Histoire militaire 

Airpower in 20 th Century 

Doctrines and Employment 

National Experiences 

rivista internazionale di storia militare 

international review of military History 

revue internationale d’Histoire militaire 

internationale zeitsCHrift für militärgesCHiCHte 

revista internaCional de Historia militar 

89 

N° 89 - Roma - 2011

© 2011 

ICMH International Commission of Military History 

CIHM Commission Internationale d’Histoire Militaire 

All rights reserved. 

This book is published under the initiative of 

CISM - Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare 

Joint forces and general Coordinator: Col. Dr. Matteo Paesano 

Scientific supervisor: Prof. Dr. Massimo de Leonardis 

Armed forces Coordinator: Col. Dr. Angelo Piccillo 

Edited: Stato Maggiore Aeronautica - Ufficio Storico 

(Lt. Col. Dr. Giancarlo Montinaro - 

M.llo Gaetano Pasqua, Ph. D. - Dr. Marina Salvetti) 

Contribution: SMD C.F. Fabio Serra 

Graphic design, printing and typeset: Litos Roma 

ICMH 

International Commission of Military History 

C/o Netherlands Institute of Military History 

Alexanderkazerne, geb. 203 

PO Box 90701 

2509 LS The Hague 

The Netherlands 

Telephone: +31 70 316 58 36 

Fax: +31 70 316 58 51

ivista i n t e r n a z i o n a l e d i s t o r i a militare, n. 89 

in t e r n at i o n a l r e v i e w o f m i l i ta ry H i s t o ry, n° 89 

re v u e i n t e r n at i o n a l e d’H i s t o i r e militaire, n° 89 

in d i C e / in d e x 

Presentazioni • Presentations 

Matteo Paesano p. 7 

Vincenzo Camporini p. 11 

Introduzione • Introduction 

Massimo de Leonardis 

Aviazione e superiorità tecnologica tra nuovi conflitti e diplomazia p. 17 

Aviation and Technological Superiority between New Conflicts 

and Diplomacy p. 25 

Georg Hoffmann - Nicole Melanie Goll - Austria 

Neutraler Luftraum. Die Entwicklung und Zäsuren der Österreichischen 

Luftstreitkräfte in der Zeit des Kalten Krieges (1955 - 1990) p. 33 

Manuel Cambeses Júnior - Brasile 

As forças armadas brasileiras e a política de defesa nacional p. 55 

Petteri Jouko - Finlandia 

Inconclusive Experiment 

British Air Power and the Suez Crisis, 1956. 

The Allied Air Campaign reassessed p. 59 

Patrick Facon - Francia 

L’Armée de l’Air française face aux armistices de juin 1940 p. 79 

Reiner Pommerin - Germania 

Between “Douhetism” and “Close Air Support” 

The German Air War Doctrine in World War II p. 89 

John Peaty - Gran Bretagna 

The Place of Douhet: A Reassessment p. 105 

Triantafyllia Kaisarou - Pantazopoulou - Grecia 

Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) during 

World War II. Organization and Operations p. 121

Joseph Abboudi - Israele 

The military doctrine of the Israeli Air Force p. 143 

David Ivry - Israele 

The Air Arm during the Lebanon War 1982 p. 167 

Oded Erez - Israele 

The IAF and the UAV Era p. 175 

Basilio Di Martino - Italia 

Una storia incompiuta. 

Potere aereo e dottrina d’impiego in Italia dal 1923 ad oggi p. 181 

Rolf de Winter - Paesi Bassi 

A Century of Military Aviation in the Netherlands, 1911 - 2011 p. 207 

Antonio de Jesus Bispo - Portogallo 

Doctrine, Capacities, Technology and Operational 

Environment on the Employment of the Air Power; 

the Case of Guerrilla Warfare p. 229 

Jaime de Montoto y de Simón - Spagna 

La Doctrina Aérea del Ejército del Aire hasta 

su integración en la OTAN p. 249 

Thean Potgieter - Dermot Moore - Sudafrica 

The South African Air Force: 

Historical Notes and Involvement in the Korean War p. 271 

Lars Ericson Wolke - Svezia 

Douhet or not Douhet. 

Swedish Air Power Doctrine in the 1930´s and 1940´s p. 291 

Julien Grand - Svizzera 

La doctrine d’emploi des troupes 

d’aviation suisses durant le XXème siècle p. 301 

F. Rezzan Ünalp - Turchia 

Turkish Air Campaigns during the 

Battles of Çanakkale March 1915 - January 1916 p. 319 

James S. Corum - U.S.A. 

U.S. Air Force Doctrine: 

The Search for Decisive Effect p. 335

Presentazioni / Présentations 

Mat t e o Pa e s a n o 1 * 

G 

iusto cento anni fa, nel corso del conflitto che la oppose all’Impero ottomano 

e che avrebbe portato alla conquista della Libia, l’Italia sperimentava, 

primo Paese al mondo, l’impiego bellico dell’aeroplano. Non erano 

trascorsi neanche otto anni dal volo di Kitty Hawk, che già l’invenzione dei fratelli 

Wright entrava nella guerra moderna, apprestandosi a rivoluzionarla, come del resto 

confermarono, di lì a pochi anni, le vicende della prima guerra mondiale. Spetta 

inoltre a un italiano, il Generale Giulio Douhet, aver per primo intuito e solidamente 

teorizzato, già agli inizi del XX secolo, il ruolo strategico, e determinante, che l’arma 

aerea avrebbe avuto nei conflitti futuri. 

In virtù di questa sorta di doppio primato italiano, è apparso quasi naturale alla 

Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare (CIHM) affidare alla Commissione 

Italiana di Storia Militare (CISM) la realizzazione di un numero monografico della 

propria Rivista da dedicare al potere aereo nel ’900. La pronta e convinta adesione 

delle singole Commissioni nazionali, cui va il mio più vivo ringraziamento per 

la collaborazione accordata, oltre ad essere testimonianza di quanto proficua sia la 

collaborazione in ambito internazionale nello studio ed analisi della storia militare, 

ha permesso di riunire studiosi altamente qualificati che con i loro saggi hanno delineato 

una vasta panoramica su esperienze e concezioni del potere aereo così come 

si sono andati declinando, nell’ambito delle singole realtà nazionali, per un lungo 

tratto del secolo appena trascorso. Ed è con viva soddisfazione che voglio, inoltre, 

sottolineare come più di uno di loro abbia riconosciuto, già nel titolo, la centralità 

rivestita da Giulio Douhet nel pensiero militare moderno. 

In tale prospettiva la CISM ha avuto la possibilità e l’onore di coordinare la realizzazione 

della pubblicazione, in collaborazione con l’Ufficio Storico dello Stato 

Maggiore dell’Aeronautica, che con il suo personale ha curato encomiabilmente 

l’opera, e con il Prof. Massimo de Leonardis, in qualità di supervisore, realizzando 

così un testo di analisi completa e ad ampio respiro, che traccia una descrizione globale 

di un fenomeno storico-militare di rilevante importanza: l’impiego operativo 

del potere aereo. 

Ormai consegnato alla storia il quadro strategico caratterizzato dalla rigida con- 

*1 Col. E.I., Presidente CISM. 

7

8 

ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s 

trapposizione Est-Ovest, il potere aereo ha infatti conosciuto, per adattarsi ai nuovi 

ambienti operativi (Golfo, ex Jugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, ecc.), nuove e più articolate 

formulazioni, allargando i propri orizzonti, tanto da doversi parlare oggi, più 

correttamente, di “potere aerospaziale”. Sono sicuro che questo numero della Rivista 

internazionale di storia militare non dia solo la possibilità di conoscere pagine significative 

della storia del XX secolo, ma costituisca anche un utile strumento per 

meglio comprendere gli sviluppi degli attuali scenari strategici. 

Il volume, impreziosito dalla presentazione del Gen. Vincenzo Camporini, Capo 

di Stato Maggiore della Difesa nel periodo in cui fu dato mandato alla CISM di 

sviluppare questo progetto, valorizzato scientificamente dall’introduzione del Prof. 

Massimo de Leonardis, Vice Presidente della ICHM e Segretario Generale della 

CISM, arricchito graficamente da una sovra copertina che ritrae il dipinto di A. G. 

Ambrosi “Guerra nel cielo” del 1942 custodito presso il Museo dell’Aeronautica 

Gianni Caproni di Trento, rappresenta un valido esempio di efficace collaborazione 

internazionale in ambito interforze ed interuniversitario nel realizzare un’opera su un 

tema di grande interesse come il potere aereo.

Mat t e o Pa e s a n o 1 * 

A 

irplanes were first used in an actual war just one hundred years ago, during 

the conflict that opposed Italy to the Ottoman Empire ending with the 

conquest of Libya. 

Not even eight years after the historic first flight at Kitty Hawk, the invention of 

the Wright Brothers was introduced into modern warfare, bringing about a dramatic 

change, as confirmed by the subsequent events of World War I. In addiction to this, 

the Italian General Giulio Douhet was the first to understand and theorize, at the 

beginning of the XX Century, the strategic and fundamental role of Air force would 

play in the coming wars. 

Given this kind of double Italian primacy it was quite obvious for the International 

Commission of Military History (ICMH) to task the Italian Commission of Military 

History (CISM) with publishing a monographic issue of its Review completely devoted 

to air power in the XX century. The prompt and eager support expressed by 

individual National Commissions, that I would like to thank most warmly for their 

cooperation, besides being a clear evidence of the fruitful international cooperation 

in the study and analysis of military history, gave us the opportunity to bring together 

quite a number of high ranking scholars. In their essays they have illustrated various 

experiences and concepts on the matter of air power, as they took place and developed 

in individual countries during the last century. To this regard, it is a great pleasure 

for me to stress how various scholars have recognised the pivotal role played by 

Giulio Douhet in the development of modern military thought. 

In this context the Italian Commission of Military History, in cooperation with 

the Air Force Historical Studies Branch, whose personnel have commendably edited 

this work, and under the supervision of Professor Massimo de Leonardis, has now 

the opportunity and the honour to issue a deep and extensive work on this subject, 

drawing a comprehensive analysis of a very important historical and military event, 

i.e. the operational employment of air power. 

Now that the unyielding confrontation between the Eastern and the Western 

blocks is part of history, in order to adapt itself to new operational environments 

(Gulf, former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), air power had to change accordingly 

and extend its scope to a point that, today, it would be more correct to identify 

it as “aerospace power”. I am convinced that this issue of the International Review 

of Military History is not only an opportunity to know some important events of the 

*1 Col. E.I., President CISM. 

9

10 


XX century but it is also a useful tool to better understand the developments of current 

strategic scenarios. 

The presentation by General Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of Defence Staff in the 

period when CISM was tasked with developing this project, adds further value to this 

volume, whose scientific content is also corroborated by the introduction of Professor 

Massimo de Leonardis, ICMH Vice President and CISM Secretary General. The 

beautiful book jacket is a reproduction of the painting by A.G. Ambrosi “Guerra nel 

Cielo” (War in the sky), painted in 1942 and kept in the Air Force Museum “Gianni 

Caproni”, Trento. In sum, this volume is a valid example of an effective international 

cooperation, at a joint and inter-academic level, for the production of a work on such 

an important subject as air power.

Vi n c e n z o ca M P o r i n i 1 * 

N 

on potrebbe esserci momento migliore per offrire al pubblico questa raccolta 

di saggi che analizzano da varie angolazioni nazionali (e quindi da varie 

angolazioni culturali) e con riferimento a periodi storici diversi, ma parte di 

un continuum pienamente coerente, la tematica del potere aereo e del suo indispensabile 

contributo all’utilizzo ottimale nella gestione degli affari internazionali dello 

strumento militare, sia in potenza che in atto: l’attualità della pubblicazione deriva 

proprio dalle vicende degli ultimi venti anni, che hanno visto le più diverse modalità 

di impiego delle forze armate con l’applicazione di dottrine quanto mai varie e a volte 

contrastanti, dando modo ai commentatori ed agli analisti di sostenere ciascuno la 

propria tesi, spesso in contraddizione l’uno con l’altro. 

Così la prima guerra del Golfo, condotta se si vuole in modo del tutto tradizionale, 

ha visto un impiego massiccio e pressoché esclusivo del potere aereo nella prima 

fase, che ha, di fatto, annichilito le capacità delle pur poderose forze terrestri di Saddam; 

queste, all’avvio della campagna di superficie, non hanno potuto che opporre 

una debole resistenza, di fatto concretizzatasi in un unico ed infruttuoso tentativo di 

controffensiva, ma erano state così fiaccate dal martellamento aereo da non costituire 

più un reale ostacolo per l’avanzata delle forze della coalizione, che sono state 

fermate prima di arrivare a Bagdad dalla specifica volontà politica di non causare il 

collasso delle strutture istituzionali irakene. 

Con le campagne balcaniche si è assistito invece ad un impiego più politico delle 

forze aeree, con finalità che, accanto a quelle più propriamente operative (il diniego 

per Belgrado di utilizzare mezzi aerei a sostegno delle proprie operazioni terrestri), 

si qualificavano come mezzo di pressione per indurre Milosevic a sottostare alle 

condizioni volute dalla NATO; proprio così si spiega l’efficacia della pur limitata e 

breve campagna di bombardamenti effettuata, anche dai nostri Tornado, nel 1995, 

che indusse i serbi a sedersi al tavolo delle trattative che si conclusero con gli accordi 

di Dayton: un conflitto, dunque, risolto dal solo impiego del mezzo aereo. 

Pochi anni dopo, per la crisi del Kosovo, in un contesto, tutto sommato, analogo, 

ci si illuse di riproporre lo stesso schema: si disse che sarebbero bastati pochi giorni 

di bombardamenti ben calibrati per giungere ad una soluzione politica. Invece per 

piegare la volontà di Milosevic ci vollero quasi tre mesi, nonostante sul terreno la 

guerriglia condotta dalle milizie Kosovare avesse un soddisfacente livello di efficacia; 

vennero quindi gli accordi di Kumanovo e le truppe della coalizione poterono 

fare il loro ingresso in Kosovo in un quadro permissivo, ma il livello di tensione era 

tale da rendere necessaria la loro presenza sul terreno ben oltre il prevedibile, dando 

*1 Generale A.M., già Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa. 

11

12 


così evidenza che, nella situazione politica generatasi dopo la caduta del muro di 

Berlino, gli obiettivi politici di una missione militare si potevano conseguire solo 

con il concorso delle varie componenti dello strumento militare, in tempi e con modalità 

diverse, ma in forma assolutamente coordinata e convergente. 

Venne poi l’Afghanistan, ambiente operativo assai peculiare, in cui le cose si sono 

andate complicando con il passare del tempo, dopo il fulmineo successo iniziale che 

ha permesso di spazzare il governo del Mullah Omar, senza sforzi eccessivi. Le operazioni, 

prima nel solo quadro di Enduring Freedom e poi con l’intervento NATO e 

l’avvio di ISAF, si sono sviluppate in un quadro essenzialmente, per non dire quasi 

esclusivamente terrestre, con interventi delle forze aeree in un ruolo quasi esclusivo 

di trasporto logistico, di ricognizione e di close air support, condotto anche con mezzi 

non concepiti per tale ruolo, come il B1-B, e spesso solo nella modalità ‘show the 

presence’, al fine di minimizzare i rischi di colpire civili innocenti. Qualcuno ne ha 

tratto la deduzione che nell’attuale quadro strategico, caratterizzato prevalentemente 

da operazioni di peace keeping/enforcement, il ruolo delle forze terrestri sia diventato 

assolutamente dominante, con le altre componenti ridotte ad un ruolo di mero 

supporto, ma dimenticando che anche in Afghanistan le truppe di terra godono di 

libertà di movimento solo perché la coalizione gode di un dominio dell’aria assoluto, 

dominio che può essere conseguito e mantenuto solo dalla disponibilità di un’adeguata, 

per qualità e quantità, disponibilità di mezzi aerei delle varie tipologie. 

E siamo oggi alla Libia. La coalizione ha deciso fin dall’inizio che sarebbe intervenuta 

solo con mezzi aerei e che non avrebbe messo ‘boots on the ground’, convinta 

di riprodurre la fase iniziale della vicenda kosovara, confidando che le forze ribelli 

avrebbero svolto agevolmente il ruolo sostenuto a suo tempo dalle milizie kosovaroalbanesi 

e che, visti gli sviluppi delle pressoché contemporanee vicende in Egitto 

e in Tunisia, i tempi sarebbero stati assai rapidi. Ci sono stati evidentemente degli 

errori di valutazione, sia circa le peculiarità della situazione libica rispetto a quelle 

dei paesi confinanti, sia soprattutto circa le effettive capacità degli insorti: questi, 

lungi dal costituire una reale minaccia per le forze regolari lealiste, hanno evidenziato 

un’iniziale assoluta incapacità operativa, il che ha reso necessario un prolungarsi 

della campagna aerea, che peraltro non è mai stata martellante, al fine di dare tempo 

alle forze dell’insorgenza di costituirsi, organizzarsi, addestrarsi al fine di dare consistenza 

alla propria azione. 

Quali conclusioni possiamo trarre da tutte queste vicende? Molto semplicemente 

che nessun obiettivo politico potrà essere conseguito da un’azione militare, qualsiasi 

tipo di quadro strategico si voglia considerare, se non si dispone di un complesso 

armonico ed equilibrato di capacità in tutte le dimensioni operative. Non solo, ma la 

varietà delle situazioni può essere tale da richiedere la disponibilità pronta ed efficace 

di unità atte ad operare in tutto il possibile spettro delle operazioni: per rimanere 

sul terreno, nessuno si illuda di potere rinunciare alle componenti corazzate e di artiglieria 

pesante senza correre rischi inaccettabili di constatare la propria impotenza 

di fronte a situazioni che ne richiedono l’impiego.

pr e s e n ta z i o n i / pr é s e n tat i o n s 13 

Quest’opera può dunque rappresentare un utilissimo stimolo a riflettere in modo 

documentato e realistico sull’evoluzione del pensiero militare aeronautico, dai primordi 

ai giorni più recenti e, nella varietà dei toni e delle visioni, dà piena consapevolezza 

della poliedricità di questo tema vitale, che nessuno può sentirsi autorizzato 

a trascurare, soprattutto ora che l’orizzonte non è affatto sgombero di nubi, in un 

mondo in cui le potenze emergenti non nascondono le proprie ambizioni, comprese 

quelle militari.

pr e s e n ta z i o n i / pr é s e n tat i o n s 15 

Vi n c e n z o ca M P o r i n i 1 * 

T 

here couldn’t be a better time to present the public with this collection 

of essays which analyse, from different National points of view 

(and therefore from different cultural points of view), air power and 

its essential contribution, both in theory and in action, to the employment of 

the military instrument in international affairs management, through different 

historical moments linked in a fully coherent continuum. The topical interest 

of this issue is due to the events of the last twenty years, when different modes 

of employment of the armed forces and very different and sometimes opposed 

doctrines have been applied, thus allowing observers and analysts to support 

each his own, often contrasting, thesis. 

Thus, the first Gulf War, conducted in a very traditional way, witnessed a massive 

and almost exclusive use of air power in the first phase, which actually destroyed the 

capabilities of Saddam’s strong land forces. At the beginning of the land campaign, 

the latter could only oppose a weak resistance, carried out in a single and fruitless 

attempt at counter-offensive: they had been so worn out by air raids that they didn’t 

actually represent an obstacle for the coalition forces, who stopped before reaching 

Baghdad due to the political will to prevent the collapse of Iraqi institutions. 

In the Balkans campaigns there was a more political use of air forces which, besides 

operational aims (the denial for Belgrade to use air force in support of their 

own land operations), were meant to put pressure on Milosevic to make him accept 

NATO conditions. That explains the effectiveness of the 1995 short raid campaign, 

which saw the participation of our Tornados and brought the Serbians to the negotiation 

table, leading to the Dayton agreement. The conflict was thus solved by the use 

of the air force. 

A few years later, during the crisis in Kosovo, in a similar context, we thought 

the same strategy could be applied, and that a few days of calibrated raids would 

be enough to bring about a political solution. On the contrary, it took almost three 

months to bend Milosevic’s will, despite the effective guerilla conducted on the terrain 

by Kosovo militia. Then, the Kumanovo agreement was signed and coalition 

troops could enter Kosovo in a permissive environment: but the level of tension was 

such that their presence on the terrain had to be extended well beyond plans. It was 

thus proved that, in the political context that followed the fall of the Berlin wall, the 

political goals of a military mission could only be achieved by the various components 

of the military instrument working together in a coordinated and consistent way. 

Then, there was Afghanistan, a very peculiar operational environment where, 

*1 General A.M., former Chief of Defence Staff.

16 ai r p o w e r in 20 t H Ce n t u ry do C t r i n e s a n d em p l o y m e n t - nat i o n a l ex p e r i e n C e s 

after the sudden initial success and the obliteration, without great effort, of Mullah 

Omar’s government, things got worse as time went by. Operations, at first strictly 

within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom, followed by NATO intervention 

and ISAF, developed mainly, not to say almost exclusively, as land operations, 

limiting the role of air force to logistic transport, surveillance and close air support, 

implemented by means that were not designed for those purposes (the B1-B, for example), 

and often only in a “show the presence” mode, in order to minimize the risk 

of harming innocent civilians. Someone inferred that, in the current strategic scenario 

characterized mainly by peace keeping/enforcement operations, land forces have assumed 

a predominant position, with the other components playing merely a supporting 

role. This point of view, however, does not take into consideration the fact that, in 

Afghanistan as in other areas, freedom of movement of the land forces is provided by 

the Coalition’s absolute air supremacy, obtained and maintained thanks to the availability 

of appropriate, in terms of both quality and quantity, air capabilities. 

And now, Libya. From the very beginning the Coalition decided to intervene only 

with air assets, and that there would be no “boots on the ground”, in the conviction 

that it was possible to re-enact the initial phase of the Kosovo operation, in the belief 

that the rebels would effortlessly play the same role as the Kosovo-Albanian Militia 

and that, based on the developments of the almost concurrent events in Egypt and 

Tunisia, the whole operation would only take a short time. It is now clear that this 

was a mistaken evaluation, both as regards the peculiarities of the Libyan situation as 

compared to its neighboring countries, and the real capabilities of the insurgents. The 

latter, far from representing an actual threat for the loyalists, proved to have no operational 

capabilities. As a consequence the air campaign, never a relentless one, had 

to be extended in order to give them time to set up, organize and train their forces 

and be effective in their action. 

Which conclusions can we draw out of all these events? Very simply, that no political 

aim can be reached by military action, regardless of the strategic framework 

under consideration, if no coordinated and balanced capabilities are available in all 

operational dimensions. Moreover, a vast variety of situations can occur that may 

require the prompt and effective presence of units able to cover the full spectrum of 

operations: for example, as regards land operations, no one should linger under the 

delusion that we could give up our armored and heavy artillery components without 

running the unacceptable risk to witness our own lack of power when confronted 

with situations that require their employment. 

This volume can therefore serve as a useful encouragement to analyze the evolution 

of Air Force military thinking, from the very beginning to the current time. Its 

variety of registers and visions makes us fully aware of the multiple implications of 

this vital theme, which none of us can afford to neglect, especially now, when the 

horizon is all but cloudless, in a world where emerging powers do not hide their ambitions, 

military ones included.

Introduzione / Introduction 

MassiMo d e Le o n a r d i s * 

Aviazione e superiorità tecnologica 

tra nuovi conflitti e diplomazia 

I 

contributi raccolti in questo numero della Rivista internazionale di storia militare 

testimoniano l’importanza del tema del Potere aereo e l’interesse da esso 

riscosso presso molti degli studiosi che, attraverso le Commissioni Nazionali, 

fanno parte della International Commission of Military History/Commission 

Internationale d’Histoire militaire. Una parte dei saggi affronta il tema dal punto 

di vista generale delle dottrine del potere aereo, altri esaminano alcune specifiche 

campagne militari particolarmente significative. 

Accogliendo il cortese invito a scrivere una breve presentazione, nella mia duplice 

qualità di Vice Presidente Internazionale e di Segretario Generale della Commissione 

Italiana, che ha promosso questo numero, ritengo opportuno, piuttosto che tentare 

un’ardua sintesi degli argomenti trattati, soffermarmi su alcuni aspetti di specifico 

interesse per gli storici delle relazioni internazionali, come chi scrive, particolarmente 

attenti ai rapporti tra politica estera e politica militare, tra diplomazia e strategia. 

Aeronautica e superiorità tecnologica nei “nuovi conflitti” 

Le relazioni internazionali sono sempre «all’ombra della guerra»: nel sistema 

westfaliano, gli Stati, non accettando più alcuna autorità sopra di loro (superiorem 

non recognoscentes), nei casi estremi (l’ultima ratio regum) regolano i loro rapporti 

con il ricorso alle armi; la «più alta prerogativa» dello Stato «consiste nel dirittodovere 

di stabilire chi siano i ‘nemici’: coloro contro i quali soltanto vi sarà guerra 

legittima» 1 . Come osserva Raymond Aron, «il “diplomatico” e il “soldato” sono le 

due figure-simbolo che operano sulla scena internazionale, quelli che rappresentano 

lo Stato nei due momenti cruciali della negoziazione e dello scontro armato» 2 . La 

diplomazia «dispone di tre strumenti: la persuasione, il compromesso e la minaccia 

* 

Vice presidente ICMH, Professore ordinario di Storia delle Relazioni e delle Istituzioni Internazionali 

e Direttore del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano. 

1 

G. Miglio, Le regolarità della politica. Scritti scelti raccolti e pubblicati dagli allievi, vol. II, Milano, 

1988, pp. 766-67. 

2 

R. Aron, La politica, la guerra, la storia, Bologna, 1992, p. 72. 

17


dell’uso della forza» 3 ; secondo l’immagine efficace del Re Federico II di Prussia «i 

negoziati senza le armi fanno poca impressione, come gli spartiti senza gli strumenti». 

Le Forze Armate servono quindi a combattere le guerre, ma anche come strumento 

di pressione per evitarne lo scoppio, attraverso la dissuasione, la deterrenza o 

l’uso minimo della forza. 

Riguardo al primo compito, gli strateghi seguaci del «metodo realista», enfatizzano 

l’importanza del progresso tecnologico e sottovalutano i fattori storici ed 

etico-politici, ricercando la silver bullet che offra la «soluzione finale» delle guerre 4 . 

Tale convinzione è particolarmente diffusa negli Stati Uniti. Come osserva qui nel 

suo saggio il Prof. Corum, «from the very beginning of American military aviation, 

the central idea behind American airpower doctrine and theory has been to employ 

airpower with decisive, war-winning effect. For almost a century, the U. S. Air Force 

has maintained its strategic focus and has built a force with a strong common belief 

that decisive victory in war could be achieved by airpower, with a minimal contribution 

by other forces. While the technologies and tactics have changed, the core 

doctrinal principles have remained constant». 

Tuttavia la superiorità tecnologica non può essere risolutiva nelle guerre irregolari 

5 . Riguardo a queste ultime, i francesi distinguono tra asymmétrie e dyssimétrie. 

La dyssimétrie è descritta come uno squilibrio tra gli antagonisti riguardante il livello 

della posta in gioco e dei mezzi impiegati, ma non tanto il loro tipo ed il comportamento 

dei belligeranti. Da questo punto di vista, l’antagonista per il quale la posta è 

meno importante è svantaggiato, poiché non è disposto a pagare un prezzo alto per 

conseguire la vittoria. In una “guerra di liberazione”, i “combattenti per la libertà” 

sacrificano tutto, perché la loro posta è più alta rispetto a quella della Potenza straniera 

che controlla il loro territorio, che ha altri interessi altrove. Si ha asymmétrie quando il 

comportamento, l’etica, le modalità di azione e gli strumenti impiegati dai belligeranti 

sono radicalmente differenti 6 . La superiorità tecnologica può avere un ruolo chiave 

nel caso della dyssimétrie, ma non è risolutiva in quello della asymmétrie. 

Nella guerra del Vietnam si vide la combinazione tra “illusione tecnologica” e 

debolezza etico-politica che portò gli Stati Uniti alla sconfitta. La guerra già allora 

iper-tecnologica combattuta dagli americani spesso contrastava con l’obiettivo di 

“vincere i cuori e le menti”: un villaggio distrutto dal napalm difficilmente era un 

buon viatico a tal fine. Commentando quel conflitto, uno storico ha scritto: «Il pensiero 

militare dell’Occidente è giunto addirittura a concepire l’utopia di una guerra 

in cui sia possibile far combattere, in pratica, solo le macchine, con appena qualche 

3 H. J. Morgenthau, Politica tra le nazioni: la lotta per il potere e la pace, Bologna, 1997, p. 506. 

4 Cfr. F. Sanfelice di Monteforte (a cura di), La strategia. Antologia sul dibattito strategico per argomenti, 

Soveria Mannelli, 2010, pp. 165-68 e 254. 

5 Cfr. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars. Their Principles & Practise, Lincoln (NE), 1996 [I ed., 1906], p. 

XI. Sul tema cfr., in questo numero, il saggio del Gen. Antonio de Jesus Bispo. 

6 Cfr. J. Baud, La guerre asymétrique. Ou la défaite du vainqueur, Parigi, 2003.

In t r o d u z I o n e • Av I A z I o n e e s u p e r I o r I t à t e c n o l o g I c A t r A n u o v I conflIttI e d I p l o m A z I A 19 

decina di uomini al loro servizio». Già in Algeria e Indocina, negli anni ’50 e ’60 

si era vista la «crescente incapacità dei popoli dell’Occidente di fare i conti con la 

dimensione della fatica fisica, del sacrificio ed infine della morte, che invece è propria 

delle società pre-industriali» 7 . In Vietnam, soldati americani ipernutriti e super 

equipaggiati, bombardamenti al napalm, sensori lanciati nelle foreste, non riuscirono 

ad eliminare i vietcong, che vivevano con un pugno di riso, s’infiltravano attraverso 

il «sentiero di Ho Chi Minh» e, a differenza degli americani, erano convinti della 

giustezza della loro causa. Si era già allora manifestata la dicotomia tra la guerra 

tecnologica dell’Occidente, che vuole minimizzare i rischi per i propri uomini in 

divisa, e le guerre «sporche» delle tribù, delle etnie e dei gruppi politici e religiosi 

dell’«altro mondo» (che può essere anche in Europa, vedi Bosnia e Kosovo!), dove 

la vita umana conta poco e viene spesa con facilità al servizio dei propri valori o 

interessi, la mina antiuomo, il kalashnikov o persino il machete dominano ancora il 

campo di battaglia. 

La prima guerra del Golfo (1991), gli interventi della NATO in Bosnia (1994), 

Kosovo (1999) e Libia (2011) hanno riproposto il problema, già dibattuto dopo la 

Seconda Guerra Mondiale 8 , se un conflitto possa essere vinto solo con l’aviazione. 

Valutando ad esempio la campagna per il Kosovo, storici militari (come John 

Keegan), esperti di studi strategici (come John Chipman) e lo stesso Generale 

Michael Short, comandante delle forze aeree dell’Alleanza, dibatterono sugli insegnamenti 

di un’operazione condotta senza impiego di truppe di terra e senza caduti 

tra le forze della NATO. Vi fu chi sottolineò l’aiuto dato sul terreno dai guerriglieri 

dell’UÇK, che forzavano i serbi ad uscire allo scoperto e ad essere così colpiti, e 

dalle forze speciali della NATO infiltrate sul territorio e che la decisione della Serbia 

di arrendersi fu fortemente influenzata dalle sempre più insistenti minacce di un’invasione 

da terra. 

I vantaggi, ma anche alcuni possibili rischi dell’uso esclusivo del potere aereo 

7 E. Galli della Loggia, Il mondo contemporaneo (1945-1980), Bologna, 1982, pp. 266-68. Il soldato 

occidentale, grazie ai moderni sistemi d’arma, cerca di «non venire a contatto con gli spargimenti 

di sangue» (Qiao Liang-Wang Xiangsui, Guerra senza limiti. L’arte della guerra asimmetrica fra 

terrorismo e globalizzazione, Gorizia, 2001, p. 75). 

8 Al dibattito sull’importanza del potere aereo nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale partecipò anche la 

Rivista Aeronautica, pubblicando, tra l’altro un articolo del Generale Carl Spaatz, comandante 

dell’aviazione dell’Esercito statunitense (come è noto, la U. S. Air Force autonoma nacque solo nel 

1947), che sostenne la tesi del potere aereo come unico strumento di proiezione globale della forza 

e l’«offensiva aerea studiata e pronta» come «sola reale difesa» nell’era atomica, mentre per il suo 

connazionale Ammiraglio Ernest J. King, Capo delle operazioni navali durante la guerra, era invece 

ancora il potere marittimo a giocare un ruolo determinante: solo la Marina aveva infatti garantito il 

possesso delle basi per l’impiego dell’arma atomica contro il Giappone. Un altro tema di dibattito 

fu la valutazione dell’impatto, più o meno importante, dei bombardamenti alleati sulla Germania 

(cfr. M. de Leonardis, The Debate in the Military Press and in the Public Opinion on the Lessons 

Learned and the Recorganization of the Italian Armed Forces after the Second World War, in War, 

Military and Media from Gutenberg to Today, Atti del XXVIII th International Congress of Military 

History, Bucarest, 2004, pp.492-502).


sono indicati nelle seguenti considerazioni: «The most publicized advantage of air 

power in restricting adversary countermoves is the relative invulnerability of U. S. 

aircrews compared with that of engaged ground forces. By reducing force vulnerability, 

reliance on air power can help sustain robust domestic support by lowering 

the likelihood of U. S. casualties. At the same time, air power’s ability to conduct 

precision operations can reduce concerns about adversary civilian suffering (though 

efforts to keep air forces relatively safe may create moral and legal concerns if doing 

so places civilians at much greater risk)» 9 . 

L’uso dell’aviazione consente di ridurre le proprie perdite ed il progresso tecnologico 

(sistemi di puntamento, bombe “intelligenti”, aerei senza pilota) dovrebbe 

altresì permettere di evitare il più possibile di colpire obiettivi civili e provocare 

vittime tra la popolazione. Tuttavia il raggiungimento del primo obiettivo può essere 

inversamente proporzionale al conseguimento del secondo: la maggiore altitudine 

di volo salvaguarda di più gli equipaggi, ma aumenta il rischio di errori (i “danni 

collaterali”). 

La riduzione delle perdite tra i propri militari viene incontro alle esigenze di quella 

che Edward Luttwak ha definito la «guerra post-eroica», tipica oggi di tutte le nazioni 

post-industriali, con un tasso zero di crescita demografica, che sono «in effetti demilitarizzate 

o quasi» 10 . Le vittime civili possono tuttavia creare reazioni politicamente 

pericolose presso le opinioni pubbliche. All’epoca della guerra del Kosovo l’ex segretario 

di Stato Zbigniew Brzezinski ammise che per il resto del mondo «la guerra 

all’americana sa di razzismo high tech. La sua premessa occulta è che la vita di un 

solo nostro soldato vale di più di quella di migliaia di kosovari» 11 ed un politologo 

francese rilevò una «asimmetria insopportabile tra i militari protetti dell’Alleanza e i 

civili infinitamente vulnerabili che i militari sono venuti a salvare» 12 . 

Nel corso del secolo XX si è progressivamente ribaltata la proporzione tra vittime 

civili e militari nei conflitti armati. All’inizio del ‘900 la proporzione tra vittime militari 

e civili era di otto ad uno; già nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale vi era parità; oggi 

muore un militare ogni otto civili. Il dato va raffrontato all’altro secondo il quale nel 

XX secolo 119 milioni di vittime sono stati causati da conflitti infrastatali e 36 da 

9 

d. l. Byman-M. C. Waxman, Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate, in International Security, 

vol. 24, n. 4, Spring 2000, p. 35. 

10 

Cfr. E. N. Luttwak, Where Are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids, e Id., Toward Post-Heroic 

Warfare, in Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, pp. 23-28, May/June 1995, pp. 109-22. 

11 

Cit. in Corriere della Sera, 16-6-99, p. 2. 

12 Alan Finkielkraut, intervistato in Corriere della Sera, 29-5-99.


conflitti interstatali 13 . Questi ultimi sono in calo e coinvolgono per lo più piccole e 

medie Potenze fuori dell’Occidente (ma India e Pakistan sono tutt’altro che piccoli). 

È ovvio che la prevalenza di conflitti infrastatali porti ad un aumento delle vittime 

civili, ma certamente ad esso ha contribuito anche l’avvento dell’aviazione. 

Le operazioni militari in Libia, anch’esse motivate ufficialmente da ragioni “umanitarie”, 

hanno riproposto gli stessi problemi del precedente intervento in Kosovo, 

del quale hanno già superato la durata con risultati scarsi e controversi (al momento 

in cui scriviamo, metà luglio 2011). Le bombe sono ancora più “intelligenti”, ma non 

tanto da evitare le vittime civili e da permettere una rapida vittoria. 

Gli ultimi più importanti conflitti ingaggiati dagli Stati Uniti e dai loro alleati 

occidentali, nel quadro della NATO o di coalitions of the willing e con un parziale e 

successivo avallo dell’ONU, contro la Serbia per il Kosovo, in Afghanistan (2001), 

in Iraq (2003) ed in Libia (2011), hanno mirato, più o meno esplicitamente, al regime 

change ed allo State building. Nell’intervento per il Kosovo l’obiettivo del mutamento 

di regime a Belgrado non era apertamente dichiarato, anche se implicito; comunque 

si voleva imporre una diversa amministrazione per la provincia del Kosovo. 

Il regime change, ancor più un vero e proprio State building, è stato invece lo scopo 

proclamato degli interventi in Afghanistan ed Iraq, in questo secondo caso con una 

differenza rispetto al 1991, quando la prima guerra ebbe l’obiettivo più classico di 

imporre il ritiro dal Kuwait degli invasori iracheni ed il presidente George Bush Sr. 

non volle marciare su Bagdad per abbattere il regime di Saddam Hussein. In Libia 

il mandato dell’ONU autorizza varie misure per l’ottenimento di una tregua e la 

protezione dei civili. Diversi membri della coalizione lo hanno tuttavia forzato fino a 

dichiarare apertamente di mirare alla sconfitta di Gheddafi, obiettivo ormai accettato 

pressoché da tutti. All’epoca del Kosovo l’obiettivo della destituzione di Milosevic 

non fu mai proclamato, ma emerse solo sulla lunga distanza. 

È certo condivisibile la conclusione del già citato saggio del Prof. Corum: «Yet, 

in the ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq 

since 2003, the technological advantage does not play the same central role as it 

might in conventional war. Current conflicts against non state forces offer no strategic 

target set or industrial nodes whose destruction will cripple the enemy forces. 

If unconventional wars are the norm for the coming decades, American airmen will 

have a frustrating future». 

La “frustrazione”, se si vuole usare questo termine, comunque riguarda l’intera 

questione dell’uso della forza militare. Se è vero che «il potere aereo può devastare, 

punire e distruggere, ma non può dominare, mantenere e controllare aree terrestri o 

13 Cfr. J.-J. Roche, Le relazioni internazionali. Teorie a confronto, Bologna, 2000, p. 140. Secondo altri 

calcoli le vittime civili furono il 10% nella Prima Guerra Mondiale, il 52% nella Seconda, il 90% 

nei conflitti successivi al 1945 (R. Toscano, Il volto del nemico. La sfida dell’etica nelle relazioni 

internazionali, Milano, 2000, p. 150, n. 49). Sul tema cfr. Aa. Vv., Conflitti militari e popolazioni 

civili. Guerre totali, guerre limitate, guerre asimmetriche, Atti del XXXIV Congresso della Commissione 

Internazionale di Storia Militare, Roma, 2009, tomi I-II.


di superficie» 14 è altrettanto vero che «non esistono soluzioni militari ad un conflitto 

etnico o ad una guerra civile. La forza può solo creare i presupposti che rendano possibile 

una soluzione politica. Può poi fare talune cose, ma non altre. Può ad esempio 

separare due etnie ... ma non può obbligarle a vivere insieme» 15 . 

Nelle ultime guerre «gli obiettivi politici da perseguire – cambio di regime, risoluzione 

dei conflitti, stabilizzazione, democratizzazione, pacificazione, ecc. – non 

sono conseguibili con una vittoria militare … Mentre per il primo tipo di operazioni 

– quelle ad alta intensità – le forze occidentali devono essere network-centriche, 

secondo i principi cui si ispira la Trasformation delle Forze Armate degli Stati Uniti, 

per il secondo tipo devono essere systemic-centriche, data l’importanza che assumono 

gli aspetti umani, sociali e culturali … l’approccio sistemico è coerente con 

la complessità in cui si deve operare. Infatti, con le Forze Armate agiscono quelle di 

polizia, le ONG, le imprese per la ricostruzione, le agenzie civili internazionali, le 

compagnie militari private ... in un contesto umano e fisico diverso da quello ipotizzato 

dalla RMA e dalla network centric warfare. Esse devono fronteggiare terroristi, 

criminali, insorti, guerrieri etnici e religiosi, gruppi rivali, ecc., frammischiati con la 

popolazione civile e generalmente in ambienti urbanizzati, che limitano l’efficacia 

delle nuove tecnologie» 16 . 

In conclusione, per vincere le “nuove guerre”, il potere aereo, e più in generale 

la superiorità tecnologica delle Forze Armate occidentali, sono importanti, ma non 

sufficienti. 

Potere aereo e diplomazia 

Passando al secondo compito delle Forze Armate, si è dibattuta la questione se il 

potere aereo abbia sostituito il potere marittimo come sostegno privilegiato della diplomazia 

17 . La Marina è sempre stata tradizionalmente considerata la Forza Armata 

più “diplomatica”, quella maggiormente in grado di essere strumento flessibile della 

politica estera; non a caso è nata l’espressione «diplomazia delle cannoniere» 18 . 

Secondo i suoi sostenitori, ad essa «non vi sono altri succedanei di appoggio militare, 

né aerei, né terrestri, perché il loro impiego condurrebbe sempre alla violazione 

delle regole internazionali sulla sovranità degli spazi, a un manifesto gesto di ostilità 

14 

H. W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow, cit. in Sanfelice di Monteforte, op. cit., p. 50. 

15 

C. Jean, Alleanza Atlantica. Gestione delle crisi e dei conflitti, in Rivista Militare, 1995, n. 3, pp. 

37-43. 

16 

C. Jean, Nuove Forze Armate per nuovi interventi militari, in M. de Leonardis-G. Pastori (a cura 

di), Le nuove sfide per la forza militare e la diplomazia: il ruolo della NATO, Bologna, 2007, pp. 

70-71. 

17 

Va rilevato comunque che, a rigor di logica, il potere aereo ha natura esclusivamente militare ed il 

suo equivalente è semmai il potere navale, poiché il potere marittimo si basa, oltre che su una potente 

flotta militare, anche su numerosi altri fattori di carattere non militare, a cominciare da una forte 

marina mercantile. 

18 

V. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, London, 1971.


e, quindi, al peggioramento di crisi e tensioni» 19 . Nell’attuale momento delle relazioni 

internazionali, «passate dal congelato e congelante clima della guerra fredda a 

quello assai più complesso della pace violenta», «le Marine offrono ai governi mezzi 

senza eguali nel campo delle relazioni internazionali» 20 . Altri hanno però sostenuto 

che il potere aereo ha largamente sostituito il potere marittimo come strumento della 

politica estera, in particolare «della deterrenza e della compellenza, quindi della “diplomazia 

coercitiva”», e che «la politica “dei cacciabombardieri” ... ha parzialmente 

sostituito quella “delle cannoniere”» 21 . 

I vantaggi del potere aereo sono «la rapidità d’intervento, l’ampio raggio d’azione, 

…, la “verticalità”, che svincola gli attacchi aerei dai condizionamenti morfologici 

del terreno, la possibilità di graduazione della violenza a seconda delle esigenze 

della politica e delle reazioni dell’avversario, la sottrazione degli attacchi aerei 

all’influenza pervasiva dei media prima che siano effettuati … gli aerei garantiscono 

una potenza virtuale, senza schieramento di forze sul terreno o nei mari viciniori al 

teatro di operazioni» 22 . Lo stesso autore appena citato rileva comunque che «la superiorità 

marittima, grazie alla sua ubiquità, mobilità, flessibilità e ora grazie anche 

alla capacità di colpire in profondità obiettivi terrestri con aerei, missili cruise imbarcati 

e azioni anfibie, costituisce indubbiamente uno strumento assai rilevante della 

diplomazia della violenza per interventi chirurgici su scala planetaria. In tale ruolo 

le forze navali hanno caratteristiche competitive rispetto a quelle aeree» 23 . Una flotta 

navigante in acque internazionali può consentire ad esempio all’aviazione imbarcata 

di colpire i propri obiettivi senza dover ricorrere a basi in territori stranieri amici e 

senza richiedere ad altri Stati l’uso del loro spazio aereo 24 . 

Gli aerei, ed i missili, possono essere impiegati per eliminare “chirurgicamente” 

terroristi e dittatori “pazzi”, anche se nel caso di Osama Bin Laden l’operazione è 

stata portata a termine da un commando sbarcato a terra. Le operazioni d’interdizione 

aerea, imponendo no flight zones, condotte nei Balcani, in Iraq ed in Libia, costituiscono 

un complemento dei blocchi navali e sono più efficaci nei casi in cui si deb- 

19 

G. Giorgerini, L’Unione Europea e la strategia marittima, in Affari Esteri, a. XXVII, n. 107 (estate 

1995), p. 586. 

20 

P. P. Ramoino, in Rivista Marittima, a. CXXXI, novembre 1998, p. 245; cfr. Id., Fondamenti di strategia 

navale, Roma, 1999, cap. III, Esiste ancora un ruolo politico per le marine militari? e Guerre 

limitate e strategia marittima, in Rivista Marittima, a. CXXXI, maggio 1998, pp. 23-29. 

21 

C. M. Santoro, Potere aereo, deterrenza e compellenza e C. Jean, Osservazioni sul potere aereo, in 

C. M. Santoro (a cura di), Italo Balbo: aviazione e potere aereo, Roma, 1998, pp. 229-50 (243 e 248 

per le citazioni). 

22 

C. Jean, Guerra, Strategia e Sicurezza, Roma-Bari, 1997, pp. 148-49. 

23 

Ibi, p. 143. 

24 

Nel 1973 in occasione della guerra delloYom Kippur, comunque gli Stati Uniti, intervenendo in 

appoggio ad Israele, non chiesero agli alleati europei, tranne il Portogallo, l’uso dello spazio aereo e 

delle basi, forse temendo un rifiuto. L’impiego delle basi in Germania Occidentale, le uniche utilizzate 

oltre a quelle portoghesi, provocò il vivo risentimento del governo di Bonn, che non ne era stato 

informato.

24 


bano impedire le repressioni violente di gruppi di insorti e di minoranze etniche. 

Potere aereo e potere marittimo avranno sempre i loro sostenitori, convinti della 

maggiore importanza dell’uno o dell’altro; come si è poi rilevato, interventi militari 

per promuovere stabili soluzioni politiche richiedono solitamente l’uso di truppe di 

terra. L’uso della forza militare richiede sempre più un’ottica joint and combined ed 

è anche preferibile goda di un ampio consenso della comunità internazionale, poiché 

nessuno Stato (almeno dell’Occidente) ha più da solo le risorse materiali ed eticopolitiche 

per interventi solitari.

MassiMo d e Le o n a r d i s * 

Aviation and Technological Superiority 

between New Conflicts and Diplomacy 

T 

he essays collected in this issue of the International review of military history/Revue 

internationale d’histoire militaire testify the importance of the 

subject of Airpower and the interest it raised among many of the scholars 

who, through the National Commissions, belong to the International Commission of 

Military History/Commission Internationale d’Histoire militaire. Some of these essays 

deal with the subject from the general point of view of the doctrines of Airpower; 

others consider some specific military campaign of particular significance. 

Accepting the kind invitation to write a short presentation, as Vice President of 

the ICMH and Secretary General of the Italian Commission, which edits this issue, 

rather than try a difficult synthesis of the various topics, I consider more opportune 

to dwell upon some aspects which are of specific interest for the Historians of 

International Relations, as the present writer, who are particularly attentive to the 

links between foreign and military policy and between diplomacy and strategy. 

Aviation and Technological Superiority in the “New Conflicts” 

International relations are always under «the shadow of war»: in the Westphalian 

system the States, which no longer accept any superior authority (superiorem non 

recognoscentes), as a means of last resort (ultima ratio regum) settle their disputes 

appealing to arms; the State’s highest prerogative «is the right and duty to determine 

who are the “enemies”: those against whom only there will be a legitimate war» 1 . As 

Raymond Aron points out, «the “diplomat” and the “soldier” are the two symbolic 

figures acting on the international scene, representing the State in the two crucial 

moments of negotiation and armed struggle» 2 . Diplomacy has three instruments: 

* Vice President ICMH, Professor of History of International Relations and Institutions and Director 

of the Department of Political Sciences, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan. 

1 

G. Miglio, Le regolarità della politica. Scritti scelti raccolti e pubblicati dagli allievi, vol. II, Milano, 

1988, pp. 766-67. 

2 

R. Aron, La politica, la guerra, la storia, Bologna, 1992, p. 72. 

25


«persuasion, negotiations, and threat of force» 3 ; according to a telling metaphor of 

Frederic II King of Prussia «negotiations without weapons have little impact, as 

scores without instruments». Therefore Armed Forces have the task to fight wars, 

but are also means of pressure to avoid their outbreak, through dissuasion, deterrence 

and a limited use of force. 

Considering the first task, strategists following the «realist model», stress the importance 

of technological progress and underrate historical, ethic and political factors, 

and look for the silver bullet providing the «ultimate solution» to wars 4 . This 

attitude is particularly dominant in the United States. As Prof. Corum remarks here 

in his essay, «from the very beginning of American military aviation, the central 

idea behind American airpower doctrine and theory has been to employ airpower 

with decisive, war-winning effect. For almost a century, the U. S. Air Force has 

maintained its strategic focus and has built a force with a strong common belief that 

decisive victory in war could be achieved by airpower, with a minimal contribution 

by other forces. While the technologies and tactics have changed, the core doctrinal 

principles have remained constant». 

Nevertheless technological superiority may not be decisive in irregular wars 5 . 

Considering these, the French make a distinction between asymmétrie and dyssimétrie. 

Dyssimétrie is described as an unbalance between the level of the stakes 

and of the means employed, but not so much their type and the belligerents’ behaviour. 

From this point of view, the antagonist for whom the stake is less important is 

disadvanteged, because he is not prepared to pay a high price to obtain victory. In a 

“war of liberation”, the “freedom fighters” sacrifice everything, because their stake 

is higher than that of the foreign Power which controls their territory and has other 

interests elsewhere. We have asymmétrie when belligerents’ behaviour, ethics, rules 

of engagement and means employed are radically different 6 . Technological superiority 

may have a key role in the instance of dyssimétrie, but it’s not decisive in that 

of asymmétrie. 

In the Vietnam War we saw a combination between “technological illusion” and 

moral and political weakness which provoked American defeat. The already supertechnological 

war fought by the Americans often was in contrast with the purpose 

of “winning the hearts and minds”: a village destroyed by napalm certainly was 

hardly a good encouragement for that. Commenting that conflict an historian wrote: 

«Western military doctrine actually conceived the utopia of a war in which, practically, 

only machines fight, serviced by only some dozens of men». Already in 

3 

H. J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, 1950, p. 

424. 

4 

See F. Sanfelice di Monteforte (ed.), La strategia. Antologia sul dibattito strategico per argomenti, 

Soveria Mannelli, 2010, pp. 165-68 and 254. 

5 st See. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars. Their Principles & Practise, Lincoln (NE), 1996 [1 ed., 1906], p. 

XI. On this subject see, in this issue, the essay by Gen. Antonio de Jesus Bispo. 

6 

See J. Baud, La guerre asymétrique. Ou la défaite du vainqueur, Parigi, 2003.

In t r o d u c t I o n • Av I At I o n A n d te c h n o l o g I c A l su p e r I o r I t y between new co n f l I c t s A n d dI p l o m A c y 27 

Algeria and Indochina, in the’50s and ’60s we had witnessed the «growing inability 

of Western peoples to allow for the dimension of physical fatigue, sacrifice and finally 

death, which on the contrary is typical of pre-industrial societies» 7 . 

In Vietnam, overfed and over equipped American soldiers, bombardments with 

napalm, sensors dropped in the forests, didn’t manage to eliminate the Vietcong, who 

survived with an handful of rice, penetrated through the «Ho Chi Minh’s path» and, 

unlike the Americans, were convinced of the righteousness of their cause. Already 

at that time the dichotomy was evident between the Western-type technological war, 

which aimed to minimize the risks for its soldiers, and the “dirty” wars of the tribes, 

the ethic, political and religious groups of the “other world” (which may be located 

also in Europe, as in Bosnia and Kosovo!), where human life has little value and may 

be spent easily for one’s values and interests, anti-personnel mines, the Kalashnikov 

or even the machete still dominate the battlefield. 

The first Gulf War (1991), NATO interventions in Bosnia (1994), Kosovo (1999) 

and Libya (2011) reproposed the question, already debated after the Second World 

War 8 , if Aviation alone may win a conflict. Evaluating for example the Kosovo campaign, 

military historians (as John Keegan), scholars of strategy (as John Chipman) 

and General Michael Short himself, commander of the Alliance’s air forces, discussed 

the lessons learned form an operation performed without employing land 

troops and without casualties for NATO forces. Some stressed the support given in 

the field by UÇK guerrillas, who forced the Serbs to come into the open and then 

be hit and by NATO, and by special forces infiltrated in the territory and also that 

Serbia’s decision to surrender was heavily influenced by the increasing threat of a 

land invasion. 

The advantages, but also some possible risks of the exclusive employment of 

Airpower are indicated in the following remarks: «The most publicized advantage of 

air power in restricting adversary countermoves is the relative invulnerability of U. 

7 E. Galli della Loggia, Il mondo contemporaneo (1945-1980), Bologna, 1982, pp. 266-68. The Western 

soldiers, through modern weapons, try «not to contact bloodshed» (Qiao Liang-Wang Xiangsui, 

Guerra senza limiti. L’arte della guerra asimmetrica fra terrorismo e globalizzazione, Gorizia, 

2001, p. 75). 

8 Also the Italian magazine Rivista Aeronautica entered the debate on the importance of Airpower in 

the Second World War, publishing, among others, an article by General Carl Spaatz, Commander of 

the United States Army Air Force (as we know, the U. S. Air Force was created as an autonomous 

service only in 1947), who supported the thesis of Airpower as only instrument of global power 

projection and the «planned and ready air offensive» as the «only real defence» in the atomic age, 

while according to his compatriot Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations during the 

war, maritime power still played a determinant role, since only the Navy had actually guaranteed 

the control of the bases to launch the atomic attack against Japan. Another subject debated was the 

evaluation of the impact, more or less important, of allied bombardments against Germany (see M. 

de Leonardis, The Debate in the Military Press and in the Public Opinion on the Lessons Learned 

and the Recorganization of the Italian Armed Forces after the Second World War, in Aa. Vv., War, 

Military and Media from Gutenberg to Today, Acta of the XXVIII th International Congress of Military 

History, Bucarest, 2004, pp. 492-502).


S. aircrews compared with that of engaged ground forces. By reducing force vulnerability, 

reliance on air power can help sustain robust domestic support by lowering 

the likelihood of U. S. casualties. At the same time, air power’s ability to conduct 

precision operations can reduce concerns about adversary civilian suffering (though 

efforts to keep air forces relatively safe may create moral and legal concerns if doing 

so places civilians at much greater risk)» 9 . 

The employment of aviation allows reducing one’s own casualties and technological 

progress (aiming systems, “intelligent” bombs, and drones) should also allow 

avoiding as much as possible striking civilian targets and provoking victims among 

the population. Yet the attainment of the former objective may be inversely proportional 

to the achievement of the latter: a higher flight altitude makes the crews safer, 

but increases the risk of mistakes (the “collateral damages”). 

The reduction of casualties among one’s own military meets the requirements of 

what Edward Luttwak labelled «post-heroic warfare», which nowadays is typical 

of all post-industrial societies, with a low rate of demographic growth, which are 

«actually demilitarized or almost» 10 . However civilian victims may generate politically 

dangerous reactions among public opinions. During the Kosovo War, former 

secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted that for the rest of the world «the 

American way of war has the flavour of high tech racism. Its hidden presupposition 

if that the life of a single soldier of ours has more value than that of thousands of 

Kosovars» 11 and a French scholars remarked «an intolerable asymmetry between the 

Alliance’s protected soldiers and the extremely vulnerable civilians that the military 

had come to rescue» 12 . 

During XX th century the proportion between civilian and military casualties in 

armed conflicts was gradually upset. At the beginning of the century one civilian 

died every eight soldiers; already during the Second World War casualties were 

equal; today we have eight civilian casualties for every military fallen. These figures 

must be compared to the datum that during the XX th century 119 millions victims 

were provoked by conflicts within States and 36 by wars among States 13 . The latter 

are decreasing and involve almost little and medium States outside the Western 

9 

d. l. Byman-M. C. Waxman, Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate, International Security, vol. 

24, n° 4, Spring 2000, p. 35. 

10 

See E. N. Luttwak, Where Are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids, and Id., Toward Post- 

Heroic Warfare, in Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, pp. 23-28, May/June 1995, pp. 109-22. 

11 

Quoted in Corriere della Sera, 16-6-99, p. 2. 

12 

Alan Finkielkraut, interviewed in Corriere della Sera, 29-5-99. 

13 

See J.-J. Roche, Le relazioni internazionali. Teorie a confronto, Bologna, 2000, p. 140. According to 

other calculations, civilian victims amounted to 10% in the First World War, to 52% in the Second, 

to 90% in the conflicts after 1945 (R. Toscano, Il volto del nemico. La sfida dell’etica nelle relazioni 

internazionali, Milano, 2000, p. 150, n. 49). On this subject see Aa. Vv., Military conflicts and civil 

populations. Total wars, limited wars, asymmetric wars, Acta of the XXXIVth Congress of the International 

Commission of Military History, Roma, 2009, vols. I-II.


world (but India and Pakistan certainly are not small). Obviously the prevalence of 

conflicts within States brings to an increase of civilian casualties, but certainly the 

advent of aviation also contributed to this. 

The military operations in Libya, also officially motivated by “humanitarian” 

reasons, reproposed the same issues of the previous intervention in Kosovo; operations 

in Libya already lasted longer than the campaign of 1999 and brought poor and 

controversial results (at this moment, July 2011). Bombs are even more “intelligent”, 

but not enough to avoid civilian casualties and obtain a quick victory. 

The most important last conflicts engaged by the United States and by their 

Western allies, in the framework of NATO or as coalitions of the willing, and with 

a partial and subsequent UNO mandate, against Serbia for the benefit of Kosovo, 

in Afghanistan (2001), in Iraq (2003) and in Libya (2011), aimed, more or less explicitly, 

to regime change and State building. For the intervention against Serbia the 

purpose of regime change in Beograd was not stated openly, but it was implicit; in 

any case NATO wished to impose a different kind of administration for the Kosovo 

province. Regime change, actually a real State building, was instead the declared 

purpose of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, in this latter case with a difference 

in respect to 1991, when the first war had the more traditional scope of evicting 

Iraqi invaders from Kuwait and President George Bush Sr. didn’t want to conquer 

Baghdad and overturn Saddam Hussein’s regime. In Libya the UN mandate authorizes 

various measures to obtain a truce and to protect civilians. Yet various members 

of the coalition strained the mandate declaring openly their willingness to defeat 

Kaddafi and to force him out of power, a goal now accepted almost by everybody. 

At the time of Kosovo, the goal of Milosevic’s removal was never proclaimed, but 

emerged in the long distance. 

We may certainly agree with the conclusion of Prof. Corum’s above mentioned 

essay: «Yet, in the ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan since 2001 

and in Iraq since 2003, the technological advantage does not play the same central 

role as it might in conventional war. Current conflicts against non state forces offer 

no strategic target set or industrial nodes whose destruction will cripple the enemy 

forces. If unconventional wars are the norm for the coming decades, American airmen 

will have a frustrating future». 

However «frustration», if we want to use this word, affects the entire issue of using 

military force. If it’s true that «airpower may devastate, punish and destroy, but 

cannot, dominate, keep and control land or territories» 14 , it’s as truer that «there are 

no military solutions to an ethnic conflict or to a civil war. Force may only create 

the pre-conditions for an eventual political solution. [Force] may do some things, 

but not other ones. For example may separate two ethnic groups … but cannot com- 

14 H. W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow, quoted in Sanfelice di Monteforte, op. cit., p. 50.


pel them to live together» 15 . In the last wars, «the political goals pursued – regime 

change, conflict resolution, stabilization, democratization, pacification, etc. – cannot 

be obtained through a military victory … While for the first type of operations 

– those of high intensity – Western forces must be network-centric, following the 

principles of the U. S. Armed Forces’ Trasformation, for this second type they must 

be systemic-centric, given the importance of the human, social and cultural aspects 

… the systemic approach is coherent with the complexity of the operational field. In 

fact, Armed Forces operate together with police, NGO, companies for reconstruction, 

international civil agencies, private military contractors … in a human and 

physical context different from that envisaged by the RMA [Revolution in Military 

Affairs] and from the network centric warfare. They must face terrorists, criminals, 

insurgents, ethnic and religious warriors, rival groups, etc., intermingled with the 

civil population and normally in urban areas, which limit the effectiveness of the 

new technologies» 16 . 

In conclusion, to win the “new wars”, Airpower, and more in general Western 

Armed Forces’ technological superiority are important but not sufficient. 

Airpower and Diplomacy 

Considering the second task of the Armed Forces, it has been discussed if Airpower 

has replaced Maritime Power 17 as foreign policy’s main support. Traditionally the 

Navy has always been considered the most “diplomatic” among the Services, the 

best equipped to be a flexible tool of foreign policy; it’s not like so that the expression 

«gunboat diplomacy» was created 18 . According to its supporters, gunboat diplomacy 

«has no substitute as a military tool, nor the air or land forces, because their 

employment would always lead to the violation of the international rules governing 

sovereignty, to an open gesture of hostility and, therefore, to the worsening of crises 

and tensions» 19 . In the current phase of international relations, «in the transition from 

the frozen and freezing climate of the Cold War to that much more complex of the 

violent peace», «the Navies offer to the governments unequalled means in the field 

of international relations» 20 . Yet others maintain that Airpower has largely replaced 

15 

C. Jean, Alleanza Atlantica. Gestione delle crisi e dei conflitti, in Rivista Militare, 1995, n° 3, pp. 

37-43. 

16 

C. Jean, Nuove Forze Armate per nuovi interventi militari, in M. de Leonardis-G. Pastori (eds.), Le 

nuove sfide per la forza militare e la diplomazia: il ruolo della NATO, Bologna, 2007, pp. 70-71. 

17 

However it must be stressed that, logically speaking, Airpower has a strict military character and its 

counterpart is in any case naval power, because maritime power is based, besides a powerful battle 

fleet, also on various other non military factors, first of all a strong merchant navy. 

18 

V. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, London, 1971. 

19 

G. Giorgerini, L’Unione Europea e la strategia marittima, in Affari Esteri, a. XXVII, n° 107 (estate 

1995), p. 586. 

20 

P. P. Ramoino, in Rivista Marittima, a. CXXXI, novembre 1998, p. 245; see Id., Fondamenti di 

strategia navale, Roma, 1999, cap. III, Esiste ancora un ruolo politico per le marine militari? e 

Guerre limitate e strategia marittima, in Rivista Marittima, a. CXXXI, maggio 1998, pp. 23-29.


maritime power as a foreign policy’s instrument, in particular in the field «of deterrence 

and compellence, therefore of “coercive diplomacy”», and that «the politics 

“of bombers” … has largely replaced that “of gunboats”» 21 . 

Airpower’s advantages are «rapidity of intervention, the wide range of action, 

…, the “verticality”, which frees air attacks from the territory’s morphological constraints, 

the possibility of graduating violence according to the political needs and 

the enemy’s reactions, the freeing of air attacks from the media’s pervasive influence 

before they take place … aircrafts guarantee a virtual power, without deploying 

forces in the field or in the seas near the theatre of operation» 22 . Yet this same author 

remarks that «maritime superiority, thanks to its ubiquity, mobility, flexibility and 

now thanks also to cruise missiles aboard and amphibious operations, is certainly 

a very relevant tool of the diplomacy of violence for surgical interventions worldwide. 

In this role naval forces have competitive assets in respects to air forces» 23 . 

Fleets cruising international waters for example may allow naval aviation to strike 

its targets without recurring to bases in friendly foreign territories and without asking 

other States to use their airspace 24 . 

Aircrafts and missiles may be employed for the “surgical” elimination of terrorists 

and “mad” dictators, even if in Osama Bin Laden’s case the operation was performed 

by a landed commando. The operations of aerial interdiction, imposing no 

flight zones, staged in the Balkans, in Iraq and in Libya, are a complement of naval 

blockades and are more effective when it’s necessary to prevent the violent repression 

of insurgents and ethnic minorities. 

Airpower and maritime power will always have their supporters, convinced that 

the former or the latter is the most important; as already remarked, military interventions 

to foster stable political solutions usually require land troops. The employment 

of military force more than ever requires a joint and combined approach and is also 

preferable that it enjoys a wide consensus by the international community, since no 

State (at least in the West) still possesses alone the material, ethic and political resources 

for solitary interventions. 

21 

C. M. Santoro, Potere aereo, deterrenza e compellenza e C. Jean, Osservazioni sul potere aereo, in 

C. M. Santoro (ed.), Italo Balbo: aviazione e potere aereo, Roma, 1998, pp. 229-50 (243 and 248 

for the quotations). 

22 

C. Jean, Guerra, Strategia e Sicurezza, Roma-Bari, 1997, pp. 148-49. 

23 

Ibi, p. 143. 

24 

In 1973 during the Yom Kippur war, in any case the United States, for their intervention in support 

of Israel, didn’t ask their European allies, with the exception of Portugal, the use of airspace and 

bases, maybe fearing a refusal. The use of bases in Western Germany, the only employed besides the 

Portuguese ones, aroused the annoyance of the Bonn government, which had not been informed.

Ge o r G Ho f f M a n n * - ni c o L e Me L a n i e Go L L * 

Austria 

Neutraler Luftraum. Die Entwicklung und Zäsuren 

der Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte in der Zeit 

des Kalten Krieges (1955-1990) 

Im Jahr 2007 landete der erste Eurofighter „Typhoon“ in Österreich, das bisher 

modernste Kampfflugzeug der Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte und leitete damit 

eine neue Ära ein. Der Ankauf dieses Flugzeuges sowie dessen Implementierung 

sorgten in Österreich für eine sehr kontrovers geführte öffentliche Debatte, die im 

Wesentlichen die Rolle beziehungsweise die Aufgabenfelder der Österreichischen 

Luftstreitkräfte im Fokus hatte. 1 Die Fragen, die dabei aufgeworfen wurden, thematisierten 

vor allem die Landesverteidigung im Luftraum und deren Sinnhaftigkeit in 

einer Zeit, in der die Bedrohungen des Kalten Krieges nicht mehr existent waren. 

Der Blick der Öffentlichkeit glitt dabei vielfach in die Vergangenheit zurück; zu 

ähnlich stark diskutierten Rüstungskäufen, nicht bewältigten Kriseneinsätzen und 

reformbedingten sich verändernden Strukturen. In dieser Betrachtung trat dabei ein 

sehr wesentlicher Punkt zutage: Die Existenz von Luftstreitkräften und deren Aufgaben 

im Luftraum sind in Österreich keineswegs selbstverständlich, sondern benötigen 

den jeweiligen Gegebenheiten „angepasste“ Definitionen und Rechtfertigungen. 

Dieser Umstand machte sich auch bei Ankauf und Einführung des Eurofighters bemerkbar, 

der von politischer Seite sehr bald den Beinamen „Neutralitätsfighter“ bekam. 

Es sollte dies wohl eine rhetorische Anspielung auf die Kernaufgaben sein, die 

dem Flugzeug zugedacht waren – die letztlich aber eine, zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch 

stärker geführte Neutralitätsdiskussion anfachte. 2 Dennoch war mit der Verbindung 

von Neutralität und Luftraum ein Bereich thematisiert worden, der grundsätzlich 

seit 1955 keiner zufriedenstellenden Lösung zugeführt worden war, denn: Schützt 

die Neutralität nun den Luftraum oder muss die Neutralität im Luftraum geschützt 

werden? Für diese sehr zentrale Fragestellung gab es in der Zweiten Republik wohl 

* Mag. phil., geboren 1979 in Graz (Österreich) ist wissenschaftlicher Projektmitarbeiter am Institut 

für Geschichte (Zeitgeschichte) der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz sowie Mitglied des Doktorandenkollegs 

der Andrássy Universität Budapest. Mag. Hoffmann ist Milizoffizier der Österreichischen 

Luftstreitkräfte. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte sind: Luftkriegsforschung, Militärgeschichte 

des 20. Jahrhunderts, NS-Täterforschung. 

** Mag a . phil., geboren 1982 in Graz (Österreich) ist wissenschaftliche Projektmitarbeiterin am Institut 

für Geschichte (Zeitgeschichte) der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz sowie Mitglied des Doktorandenkollegs 

der Andrássy Universität Budapest. Ihre Forschungsschwerpunkte sind: Luftkrieg 

(Erster/Zweiter Weltkrieg), Erster Weltkrieg (Südwestfront), Tradition. 

1 Zur Debatte rund um den Wahlkampfslogan der SPÖ „Neutralitätsfighter statt ÖVP-Kampfbomber“ 

vgl. u.a. Standard-Interview: Molterer will Steuersystem umbauen, Der Standard vom 24.08.2007. 

2 Vgl. u.a. Neutralität ist nur noch ein Mythos, Der Standard vom 01.09.2007.


immer neue Lösungsansätze, die jedoch gerade während des Kalten Krieges innerhalb 

und außerhalb Österreichs sehr unterschiedlich wahrgenommen, jedoch kaum 

umgesetzt wurden. 3 Letztlich prägte aber genau diese Entwicklung in diesem Zeitabschnitt, 

in dem eine Bedrohung für die Bevölkerung sehr unmittelbar spür- und 

damit wahrnehmbar war, das Bild des Luftraumes, dessen Einordnung sowie die 

Entwicklung der Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte ab 1955 äußerst nachhaltig und 

machte sie zu dem was sie noch heute sind. Das Verständnis für die heutige Situation 

ist so nur durch den Blick zurück in die Zeit des Kalten Krieges ergründbar, die den 

Ausgangspunkt für die nachgeordneten Entwicklungen bildet. 

Im vorliegenden Artikel soll daher schwerpunktmäßig auf die Ära des Kalten 

Krieges eingegangen werden. Die dargestellte Zeitspanne reicht dabei von 1955 und 

der „Wiedergeburt eines unabhängigen Österreichs“ mit dem Abschluss des Staatsvertrages 

bis in das Jahr 1990. Es wird dabei untersucht, wie sich die Wahrnehmung 

des österreichischen Luftraumes über einzelne Zäsuren hinweg veränderte und welche 

Auswirkungen diese auf die Entwicklung der Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte 

hatten. Die entscheidende Fragen, die hier aufgeworfen werden, sind: was prägte die 

Luftstreitkräfte und was formte sie strukturell aus? Welchen Zäsuren war der Luftraum 

unterworfen, die einen spezifischen „Austrian way“ erzeugten? 

Um diese Fragestellungen beantworten zu können, wurde der vorliegende Artikel 

in drei Bereiche unterteilt. Im ersten Teil werden strukturelle Gliederungen und operative 

Aufgabenstellungen in den Fokus genommen, um dadurch einerseits die Basis 

darzustellen und andererseits auch Zäsuren in der Entwicklung herauszuschälen. 

An letzterem ausrichtend, erfolgt im zweiten Kapitel die Analyse der Einsätze der 

Luftstreitkräfte im genannten Untersuchungszeitraum. Es werden dabei kurzfristige, 

aber in der Öffentlichkeit besonders stark wahrgenommene Elemente beleuchtet und 

hinsichtlich ihrer Wirkung untersucht. Im letzten Kapitel erfolgt schließlich die Betrachtung 

langfristiger Aspekte, die Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der Luftstreitkräfte 

hatten, wie das Beispiel der Ausrüstung und der daraus resultierenden Rüstungsdiskussionen 

aufzeigen wird. Es wird dabei auf die Diskrepanz zwischen politisch/ 

militärischer Willensbildung einerseits und einer konkreten Umsetzung andererseits 

eingegangen und schließlich die entsprechende Wahrnehmung in der Öffentlichkeit 

thematisiert. 

1. Die strukturelle Entwicklung der Luftstreitkräfte 

Als am 15. Mai 1955 der Staatsvertrag unterzeichnet wurde, war der Weg zur 

Aufstellung eines Österreichischen Bundesheeres in der Zweiten Republik geebnet, 

dem mit der Fixierung der Neutralität als Bundesverfassungsgesetz am 26. Okto- 

3 Vgl. u.a. Róbert Széles, Die strategischen Überlegungen des Warschauer Paktes für Mitteleuropa 

in den 70er Jahren und die Rolle der Neutralen, in: Manfried Rauchensteiner/Wolfgang Etschmann/ 

Josef Rausch (Hrsg.), Tausend Nadelstiche. Das österreichische Bundesheer in der Reformzeit 

1970–1978, Wien 1994, S. 25ff.

ne u t r a l e r lu f t r a u m. die en t w i C k l u n g u n d zä s u r e n d e r Ös t e r r e i C H i s C H e n lu f t s t r e i t k r ä f t e ... 35 

ber 1955, ein grundsätzlicher sicherheitspolitischer Rahmen respektive Spielraum 

vorgegeben wurde. 4 Trotz unterschiedlicher politischer Auffassungen der regierenden 

Parteien über die Struktur und den Umfang des Bundesheeres5 war zumindest 

in einer internen Planung eine Luftkomponente angedacht, wenngleich zunächst 

unklar war, in welcher Form diese tatsächlich umgesetzt werden könnte. 6 Es gab 

dabei im Wesentlichen zwei Stoßrichtungen, die zum einen den Aufbau einer eigenständigen 

und zum anderen einer abhängigen, den Landstreitkräften zugeordneten 

Struktur, vorsahen. Entscheidender Faktor hierbei waren die operativen Aufgaben, 

die man den künftigen Luftstreitkräften übertragen wollte und die sich sehr bald in 

zwei Schwerpunkten ausformten: der Luftverteidigung und der Luftunterstützung. 

Beide Bereiche standen von Beginn an in einer Art Konkurrenzverhältnis, da sich 

sehr schnell abzuzeichnen begann, dass die vorhandenen finanziellen Mitteln eine 

gesamte Abdeckung nicht möglich machen würden. Erschwerend kamen noch die 

militärischen Einschränkungen des Staatsvertrages, wie etwa das „Raketenverbot“ 

des Artikels 13, 7 hinzu, die vonseiten der Politik bereits bei den Verhandlungen als 

gegeben hingenommen und trotz der weitreichenden Auswirkungen auf die eigene 

Verteidigungspolitik nie zur Diskussion gestellt worden waren. 8 

Als im Juli 1955 das britische Foreign Office die österreichischen Planungen 

bezüglich eines Aufbaus eines Heeres respektive von Luftstreitkräften beobachtete, 

kam es zu folgendem Schluss: “So far as is known, no attempt has been made to do 

any serious planning for a future Austrian Air Force […] neither the Austrian Government 

nor the people are yet in a mood to take their defence responsibilities with 

real seriousness“. 9 So war es also vor allem die fehlende politische Willensbildung, 

welche die Frühphase der Luftreitkräfte und deren sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitische 

Einordnung prägte. Besonders stark zeigte sich dieser Umstand anhand eines 

fehlenden Verteidigungskonzeptes, wodurch weitreichende Zielsetzungen nicht 

vorhanden waren – wie auch das britische Foreign Office bemerkte: „[…] there is no 

information that Austrian Ministers have attempted to think out what Austria’s future 

posture of defence should be […].” 10 Der Luftraum geriet nicht zuletzt dadurch, aber 

4 

Vgl. Gerald Stourzh, Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945 – 1955. Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität, 

Wien 1985, S. 255ff. 

5 

Vgl. Friedrich W. Korkisch, Die Luftstreitkräfte der Republik Österreich 1955 bis 2005. Von der 

irrelevanten Waffengattung zur Teilstreitkraft: Aus der Sicht der oberen Führung, in: Wolfgang 

Etschmann/Hubert Speckner (Hrsg.), Zum Schutz der Republik Österreich… 50 Jahre Sicherheit, 

gestern – heute – morgen, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Bundesheeres, Wien 2005, 

S. 286. 

6 

Vgl. Manfried Rauchensteiner, Staatsvertrag und bewaffnete Macht. Politik um Österreichs Heer 

1945 – 1955, ÖMZ 3/1980, S. 186. 

7 

Vgl. Stourzh, Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945 – 1955, S. 255ff. 

8 

Vgl. Rudolf Hecht, Militärische Bestimmungen in den Friedensverträgen von 1947, in: ÖMZ 

5/1979, Wien 1979, S. 382. 

9 

The National Archives Kew Gardens (TNA), Foreign Office (FO) 371/117835. 

10 

TNA, FO 371/117835.


auch durch das ständige Verschieben von operativen Schwerpunkten, je nach politischer 

Notwendigkeit, in eine jahrzehntelange Diskussion, die sich immer wieder 

aufs Neue entzünden sollte. 

1.1. Phase 1: Aller Anfang ist schwer… (1955-1960) 

Der erste Schritt der Entwicklung manifestierte sich in dem Versuch der Luftstreitkräfte, 

innerhalb des neu entstehenden Bundesheeres einen Platz zu finden. Mangels 

klarer Zielvorgaben versuchte man jedoch gerade in den ersten Planungen, möglichst 

das gesamte „Luftkriegsspektrum“ abzudecken und daher einen sehr umfangreichen 

strukturellen Rahmen zu fordern. 11 Genau dieser alle Teil- und Aufgabenbereiche 

überspannende Ansatz sollte sich letztendlich als verheerend herausstellen, da dieser 

kleinere Planungsschritte verhinderte. So mussten diese hochtrabenden Pläne aus 

dem Jahr 1955, nur ein Jahr später der Realität weichen. Österreich hatte weder Material, 

geschultes Personal 12 noch finanzielle Mittel, war solchermaßen im Luftraum 

handlungsunfähig und auf Hilfe von außen angewiesen. Diese kam aus den USA, in 

Form des „Military Assistance Programs“ (MAP), das gleichermaßen dem gesamten 

im Aufbau befindlichen österreichischen Heer zuteil wurde. Für den Luftraum sah 

die amerikanische Hilfestellung ursprünglich einen durchwegs großen und kampfkräftigen 

Rahmen, in Form von „[…] rund drei Staffeln (54 Maschinen) F-86F [Sabre] 

und 30 bis 40 F-84F [Thunderstreak] […]“ 13 , vor. Mit Blick auf die UdSSR 

und deren Befürchtung, dass Österreich einen allzu prowestlichen Kurs einschlagen 

könnte, wurde dieses Angebot jedoch von politischer Seite ausgeschlagen respektive 

von den USA nicht mehr weiter forciert. So waren die einzigen luftspezifischen Geräte, 

die in den späten 1950er Jahren Österreich erreichten, sowohl sowjetische als 

auch amerikanische Schulflugzeuge, 14 teilweise erheblich veraltete leichte und mittlere 

Fliegerabwehrgeschütze sowie Radaranlagen. Bis in die 1960er Jahre war man 

damit im Aufbau begriffen und konnte daher die luftspezifischen Aufgaben in keiner 

Weise erfüllen. Zudem machte den Luftstreitkräften die Typenvielfalt, die sich durch 

das regelrecht „Sammeln“ von Geräten und Ausrüstungen ergeben hatte, zu schaffen. 

Allein der fliegerische Bereich umfasste vierzehn verschiedene Flugzeug- und 

11 Vgl. Wolfgang Hainzl, Die Fliegerkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, Linz 1986, S. 20f. Es ist dies 

der erste Entwurf einer möglichen Organisation der Luftstreitkräfte aus dem Jahr 1955 (BKA-LV, 

III/L-geh. 55), der sehr stark auf dem Konzept der Luftstreitkräfte aus dem Jahr 1936 basierte. 

12 Österreich war im Zeitraum von 1945 bis 1945 mit der B-Gendarmerie lediglich am Boden, nicht 

jedoch im Luftraum präsent gewesen, was sich besonders im Verlust von spezifischem Wissen noch 

aus der Zeit des Zweiten Weltkrieges manifestierte. Vgl. Walter Blasi, Die B-Gendarmerie. Die 

Vorläuferorganisation des Österreichischen Bundesheeres, in: Etschmann/Speckner (Hrsg.), Zum 

Schutz der Republik Österreich…, S. 59ff. 

13 Korkisch, Die Luftstreitkräfte der Republik Österreich 1955 bis 2005, S. 287. 

14 Es handelte sich dabei neben anderen vor allem um 29 Cessna L-19 „Bird Dog“, sechs De Havilland 

Canada L-20 „Beaver“, zehn North American LT-6G „Texan“, 17 Bell H-13H „Sioux“ amerikanischer 

sowie vier Yak-18 und vier Yak 11 sowjetischer Provenienz.


vier Hubschraubertypen, die unter dem Begriff „Schmetterlingssammlung“ 15 subsumiert 

wurden. 

Die eben beschriebenen Entwicklungen hatten nun zur Folge, dass die Luftstreitkräfte 

sich vor allem in der Frühphase in keinem spezifischen Bereich etablieren 

konnten, sondern stattdessen auf ein äußerst niedriges Niveau beschränkt worden 

waren, dem zusätzlich jede langfristige Planung fehlte. Hier kam außerdem der oftmals 

angestrengte Begriff des MAP als „Danaer-Geschenk“ zum Tragen, da Österreich 

von Anfang an minimale finanzielle Mittel für das Bundesheer im Allgemeinen 

und den Luftraum sowie die Luftstreitkräfte im Besonderen aufwendete. All diese 

Umstände erzeugten jedoch noch eine viel weitreichendere Auswirkung: Der Luftraum 

blieb nicht nur mangels Mittel, sondern vor allem wegen des Fehlens eines 

umfassenden Verteidigungskonzeptes, in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung fremdbestimmt 

und integrierte sich nicht in den Neutralitätsraum. 16 Dieser Umstand zeigte 

sich besonders anhand der Suez-Krise 1956, der Ungarnkrise im selben Jahr und der 

Libanonkrise 1958, als militärische Luftfahrzeuge ungehindert den österreichischen 

Luftraum verletzen ja sogar passieren konnten. 17 Dass dies im Lichte der jungen 

Neutralität und der zugespitzten internationalen Spannungen, außenpolitisch nicht 

mit Wohlwollen aufgenommen wurde, versteht sich von selbst. So stand am Ende der 

Aufbauphase die sichtlich stärker werdende politische Einflussnahme, die sich vor 

allem in der Verschiebung der operativen Schwerpunkte bemerkbar machen sollte. 

1.1. Phase 2: Einbettungen und Teilungen (1960-1972) 

Hatte sich in der ersten Phase vor allem die Frage nach dem Aufbau, der Beschaffung 

von Ausrüstung und der Ausbildung von Kaderpersonal gestellt, so rückten 

nun die Strukturen und, gemessen an den ersten Einsätzen im Luftraum, konkrete 

operative Fragestellungen in den Vordergrund. Alle Bereiche der im Entstehen 

begriffenen Luftstreitkräfte, also Flieger, Fliegerabwehr, Fliegerbodendienste und 

Fliegertel (als Keimzelle der späteren Luftraumüberwachung) waren seit den Jahren 

1956 und 1957 dem Kommando Luftstreitkräfte unterstellt und damit zentral organisiert. 

Dieser Umstand begann sich ab den 1960er Jahren aufgrund sicherheitspolitischer 

Diskussionen langsam zu wandeln und entwickelte sich für die Luftstreitkräfte 

letztlich zu einer Zerreißprobe. Die Ursachen hierfür waren mannigfaltig und lagen 

zum einen in der gestiegenen nationalen sicherheitspolitischen Bedeutung des Luftraumes, 

wie etwa die Libanon-Krise 1958 gezeigt hatte, 18 der, international gesehen, 

starken Abstützung der Kriegsführung auf die Luftstreitkräfte und nicht zuletzt auch 

15 

Wolfgang Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, Linz 1999, S. 128ff. 

16 

Vgl. Die Presse vom 20.07.1958. 

17 

Vgl. Friedrich W. Korkisch, Die Luftstreitkräfte der Republik Österreich bis 1978, in: Rauchensteiner/Etschmann/Rausch 

(Hrsg.), Tausend Nadelstiche, S. 226. 

18 

Vgl. Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 38ff.


am sich entwickelnden Verteidigungskonzept des „Schild und Schwert“, 19 in dem 

die Luftstreitkräfte ihre Rolle zu finden hatten. „Schild“ und „Schwert“, summarische 

Begriffe für eine Verteidigung mit einem statischen territorialen und einem beweglichen 

Element in der Tiefe, 20 thematisierten die grenznahe beziehungsweise die 

grenzunmittelbare Verteidigung im Ernstfall. Dieser Ansatz, wenngleich nie in einer 

Verteidigungsdoktrin festgehalten, musste Auswirkungen auf den Luftraum vor allem 

hinsichtlich des operativen Schwerpunktes haben. Allenfalls hatten ab diesem 

Zeitpunkt all jene Aufwind, die Luftstreitkräfte mit Luftunterstützungsaufgaben, wie 

etwa Lufttransport- oder Erdkampfkapazitäten, favorisierten. Daneben entwickelte 

sich die spezifisch österreichische Form der Luftraumverteidigung, deren Schwerpunkt 

eher bei der Überwachung denn der militärischen Verteidigung des Luftraumes 

zu suchen war – eine politische Schwerpunktsetzung infolge der krisenhaften 

Ereignisse der späten 1950er Jahre. 21 Die Luftstreitkräfte unternahmen Anfang der 

1960er Jahre einen letzten Versuch, einen strukturellen Rahmen zu fordern, der alle 

Aufgabenaspekte – und damit auch die Luftraumverteidigung – umfassen sollte. 22 

Das führte neben anderen Überlegungen zu einer ersten „Abfangjägerdiskussion“ 23 , 

die eine aktive Variante des Luftraumverteidigungsansatzes darstellte. Kurioserweise 

wurde dies nicht von einer Bewaffnungsdiskussion begleitet, die konsequenterweise 

das „Raketenverbot“ thematisieren hätte müssen. 24 

Die weitere Entwicklung lief sukzessive in einzelnen rasch aufeinanderfolgenden 

Schritten ab. So wurde zunächst nach mehrfachen Anläufen die „Kampfflugzeug- 

Frage“ der Luftstreitkräfte scheinbar geklärt. Ab 1961 waren Flugzeuge des Typs 

Saab J-29F „Tunnan“, in Österreich als „Fliegende Tonnen“ bezeichnet, im Zulauf. 

Doch bereits 1959 hatte man sich politisch festgelegt, dass mit diesen lediglich 

„zwei Staffeln“ gebildet werden sollten, deren Kernaufgabe vor allem im Neutralitätsschutz 

liegen sollte. Von einer Luftraumverteidigung im Einsatzfall war in diesem 

Zusammenhang nicht mehr die Rede. Jedoch waren auch für den sogenannten 

„Abfangeinsatz“ die Grundbedingungen nicht besonders günstig. Den Maschinen 

fehlten neben der hierfür notwendigen Geschwindigkeit, in erster Linie die entsprechende 

Bewaffnung (Raketen) sowie ein Bordradar zur Abdeckung des Luftraumes 

19 Horst Pleiner, Die Entwicklung der militärstrategischen Konzeptionen des österreichischen Bundesheeres 

von 1955 bis 2005, in: ÖMZ 3/2005, Wien 2005, S. 329. 

20 Das statische Element (Schild) sollte im Einsatzfall der Grenzschutz direkt an der Grenze bilden, 

während hingegen das bewegliche Element (Schwert), vor allem aus mechanisierten Kräften bestehend, 

als operative Reserve Gegenangriffe an bedrohten Abschnitten zu führen hatte. Vgl. ebenda. 

21 Vgl. Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 44ff sowie Korkisch, Die Luftstreitkräfte 

der Republik Österreich bis 1978, S. 228. 

22 In diesem Konzept plante man bis 1970 u.a. 30 Jagdflugzeuge und 180 Jagdbomber zur Verfügung 

zu haben. Vgl. Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 46. 

23 Der Begriff „Abfangjäger“ oder „Interzeptor“ stellt das aktive Werkzeug der Luftraumverteidigung 

beziehungsweise der späteren Luftraumüberwachung dar, analog zum „Jagdflugzeug“ in der 

Luftverteidigung. 

24 Vgl. Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 41f.


außerhalb des optischen Bereiches des Piloten. Von einer Schnittstelle zu Radarstationen 

am Boden war man technologisch noch weit entfernt. Die wesentlichen 

Aufgaben, welche die J-29F nun im Rahmen der operativen Aufgaben der Luftstreitkräfte 

provisorisch übernahmen, waren jene von Aufklärern und Jagdbombern. Hierzu 

wurden sie in Jagdbombereinheiten beziehungsweise einem Jagdbomberverband 

zusammengefasst. 25 Das beinhaltete nun Elemente, die sich grundsätzlich auch für 

die Unterstützung von Landstreitkräften eigneten. 

1964 wurde nicht zuletzt aufgrund dieser Entwicklung, eine „Luftraumverteidigungskommission“ 

im Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung ins Leben gerufen, 

die über die zukünftige Gestaltung der Luftstreitkräfte beraten und das immer 

wieder offensichtliche Manko der Luftraumverteidigung bearbeiten sollte. 26 Offiziere 

der Luftstreitkräfte waren in dieser nur mehr in der Minderheit vertreten. Das Ergebnis 

dieser Kommission war – wenig überraschend –, dass die Luftstreitkräfte nicht 

über die qualitativen, vor allem aber quantitativen Möglichkeiten einer wirkungsvollen 

Luftraumverteidigung verfügten. 27 Die Aufteilung der Luftstreitkräfte sowohl 

in aufgabenmäßiger Hinsicht, als auch in struktureller Hinsicht war damit nur mehr 

eine Frage der Zeit. Das erste Element, das den Luftstreitkräften entfernt wurde, war 

die Fliegerabwehr. In einem Prozess, der bei der Heeresreform 1962 (Umsetzung 

1963) seinen Anfang fand, 1963 mit der Beschaffung von Fliegerabwehrpanzern 

zum Begleitschutz fortgeführt wurde und schließlich 1966 mit der Ausgliederung 

der Fliegerabwehr aus der Struktur der Luftstreitkräfte endete, wurden die Fliegerabwehrverbände 

im Wesentlichen auf die mechanisierten Truppen verteilt. Dabei fand 

nicht nur eine, in Zeiten von Reformen nicht seltene Umstrukturierung statt, sondern 

eine aufgabenmäßige Neuausrichtung. Im Vordergrund stand nun der bewegliche 

Begleitschutz von Erdtruppen, mit gänzlich neuen Einsatzverfahren. Das bisherige 

Kommando Luftstreitkräfte wurde im selben Jahr auf ein Truppenkommando, im 

Range eines Gruppenkommandos reduziert und die Luftabteilung in das Verteidigungsministerium 

ausgegliedert. 28 

Trotz aller Umgliederungen und Reduzierungen ging das Interesse an der Luftraumverteidigung 

nicht gänzlich verloren. In einem relativ kleinen Rahmen versuchte 

man, unter der Bezeichnung „Luftabwehrbrigade“, einen Luftraumverteidigungsverband 

aufzustellen, der neben den Resten der Fliegerabwehr – im Bereich der 

Luftstreitkräfte nun als „Luftabwehr“ bezeichnet – auch das Flugmelderegiment aus 

dem Bereich der passiven Luftraumüberwachung beinhaltete. Man ging hier hinsichtlich 

eines zielführenden Objektschutzes auch soweit, die Lenkwaffendiskussion 

anzufachen29 – neuerlich ohne Ergebnis. Die Luftabwehrbrigade blieb höchst um- 

25 Vgl. Ebenda, S. 173ff. 

26 Vgl. Korkisch, Die Luftstreitkräfte der Republik Österreich bis 1978, S. 229. 

27 Vgl. Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 50f. 

28 Vgl. Ebenda, S. 58f. 

29 Vgl. Ebenda, S. 46.


stritten sowie ineffizient und wurde schließlich 1973, im Gedächtnis ihres ehemaligen 

Kaders als „Gespensterbrigade“ 30 haften bleibend, wieder aufgelöst. 

Den Höhepunkt dieser, für die Luftstreitkräfte negativen Entwicklung stellte wohl 

das Jahr 1968 und der Einsatz des Bundesheeres während der ČSSR-Krise dar. Die 

Krise wurde vor allem im Luftraum, durch zahlreiche Luftraumverletzungen wahrgenommen, 

denen die Luftstreitkräfte, aufgrund ihrer unzureichenden technischen 

Ausrüstung nichts entgegenzusetzen hatten. Besonders drastisch wirkte sich jedoch 

der fehlende politische Wille zu einer Luftraumverteidigung in einem Krisenfall, vor 

allem aber einem Neutralitätsschutz – für den es keine Planungen, sondern lediglich 

Vorstellungen gab – aus. Dem nun schlagartig, vor allem in der Öffentlichkeit, erwachten 

Interesse am Neutralitätsraum Luftraum konnte so keine militärisch wirksame 

Komponente zugeordnet werden, was entweder zu einer massiven Verbesserung 

oder aber zu einer endgültigen Zerschlagung dieses Systems führen musste. Letzteres 

war schließlich auch der Fall. 

1.1. Phase 3: Raumverteidigung (1970-1989) 

Das Jahr 1968, das als allgemeine Zäsur gesehen werden muss, leitete nicht 

nur einen Wandlungsprozess in der österreichischen Neutralitätspolitik hin zu einer 

stärker akzentuierten Außenpolitik ein, sondern beendete auch das Festhalten 

am ungeschriebenen Verteidigungskonzept „Schild und Schwert“ mit seiner starren 

Verteidigung des Grenzraumes. Wesentlich stärker trat nun die bewegliche, 

tiefgestaffelte Verteidigung in den Vordergrund, die viel eher den österreichischen 

geografischen Gegebenheiten und militärischen Ressourcen angepasst erschien. 

Diese neue Doktrin fand ihre Umsetzung ab dem Jahr 1970 unter der Bezeichnung 

„Raumverteidigung“. 31 Dass einer der wesentlichen Faktoren für den Übergang zur 

Raumverteidigung die grundsätzliche Ansicht war, „(…) daß bei einem Angriff auf 

Österreich, der Aggressor die absolute Luftüberlegenheit, ja die Luftherrschaft besitzen 

würde (…)“ 32 , zeigt den mittlerweile unbedeutenden Status der Luftstreitkräfte. 

Dieser Umstand wurde grundsätzlich angereichert durch die neue bewegliche 

Verteidigungsform, die im Verteidigungsfalle keine starre Grenzverteidigung mehr 

verlangte, sondern die Möglichkeit zur Preisgabe von nicht zu verteidigendem Gelände 

vorsah. 33 Damit war auch der Luftraum hinsichtlich seiner Rolle in neuerliche 

Diskussion geraten, wenngleich selbigem als Neutralitätsraum (im klar definierten 

Neutralitätsfall) durchwegs eine Existenzberechtigung eingeräumt wurde. Das führ- 

30 

Georg Hoffmann/Hermann Schulz/Nicole-Melanie Goll (Hrsg.), Österreichische Luftstreitkräfte 

1955 – 2005, Gröbming 2005, S. 268. 

31 

Pleiner, Die Entwicklung der militärstrategischen Konzeptionen des österreichischen Bundesheeres 

von 1955 bis 2005, S. 329. 

32 

Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 73. 

33 

Vgl. Walter Mayer, Das neue Konzept, in: Rauchensteiner/Etschmann/Rausch (Hrsg.), Tausend 

Nadelstiche, S. 105ff.


te zu diametralen Entwicklungen in der luftspezifischen Struktur. Zum einen wurde 

die passive Luftraumüberwachungskomponente, die vor allem im Neutralitätsfall 

zum Zuge kommen sollte, weiter gestärkt, jedoch die Interzeptordiskussion als zugehörige 

aktive Komponente schlagartig beendet. 34 Österreich hatte bereits vor der 

ČSSR-Krise als Nachfolger der J-29F keinen klassischen Abfangjäger, wie es lange 

Zeit gefordert war, angekauft, sondern hatte sich mit der Saab 105 XT (österreichische 

Bezeichnung: Saab 105 OE) für einen Unterschall-Düsentrainer entschieden, 35 

der nun sowohl mit der Abfangjäger- als auch mit der Jagdbomberrolle völlig überfordert 

war. 36 Die Rolle der Luftstreitkräfte und damit des Luftraumes war damit 

weiter im Abstieg begriffen, was sich hinsichtlich der Aufgaben in einem Planungsdokument 

der „Gesamtraumverteidigung“ im Jahr 1971 manifestierte, in welchem 

die Luftraumverteidigung keine Kategorie mehr zu sein schien: 

Im Rahmen der Gesamtraumverteidigung kommt auch den LStrKr [Anm.: Luftstreitkräfte] 

eine entsprechende Rolle zu. Der Einsatz der LStrKr wird in mancher Hinsicht von 

den bisherigen Planvorstellungen abweichen und daher zu überdenken sein. Grundlagen 

dafür wären in einem neuen Lufteinsatzkonzept festzuhalten, das vor allem die Unterstützung 

der Erdstreit- und Kleinkriegskräfte in den Mittelpunkt zu stellen haben wird. 37 

Mit der nächsten Heeresgliederung im Jahr 1972 wurde das Ende dann endgültig 

besiegelt. 38 Das Kommando Luftstreitkräfte wurde aufgelöst, ein Großteil des 

Kaders übersiedelte in das Armeekommando, nur ein kleiner Teil verblieb in der 

übriggebliebenen Fliegerbrigade. Sämtliche Führungs- und Kompetenzaufgaben 

hinsichtlich des Luftraumes wurden nun vom Armeekommando übernommen, die 

restlichen Teile der Flieger wurden ab diesem Zeitpunkt als „Heeresfliegerkräfte“ 39 

bezeichnet. Mit der gleichzeitigen Auflösung der Luftabwehrbrigade wurden die 

Komponenten der passiven Luftraumüberwachung und der Luftabwehr in die Fliegerbrigade 

übernommen, die 1975 zur Fliegerdivision aufgewertet wurde. 40 Diese 

Änderung konnte jedoch nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass der Luftraum in den 

militärischen Planungen bis zum Ende der 1980er Jahre keine Rolle mehr spielte 

und allenfalls aufgrund der eklatanten Schwäche in die Planungen einbezogen 

34 

Vgl. Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 62ff. 

35 

Vgl. Archiv der Republik (AdR)/Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Information an den Herrn 

Bundesminister, 19.03.1969, o. Zl., BMfLV, Grp Org. 

36 

Vor allem der Ankauf einer weiteren Tranche von Saab 105 XT als provisorischer Ersatz für die 

Interzeptionsspitze hatte weitreichende Folgen für die Luftstreitkräfte, weil so die finanziellen Mittel 

für den Ankauf möglicher Abfangjäger gebunden blieben. Vgl. Korkisch, Die Luftstreitkräfte der 

Republik Österreich bis 1978, S. 249ff. 

37 


38 

Vgl. Franz Sailler, Die Bundesheerreformkommission, in: Rauchensteiner/Etschmann/Rausch 

(Hrsg.), Tausend Nadelstiche, S. 73ff. 

39 


40 

Vgl. Ebenda, S. 77ff.


wurde. Einzelne Komponenten wie etwa die passive Luftraumüberwachung, für die 

der politische Wille gegeben war, erfuhren nach wie vor eine Aufwertung. Aber sowohl 

die zwischenzeitlich wieder erwachte Lenkwaffendiskussion, wie die Frage 

nach Überschall-Abfangjägern wurde vorerst auf Eis gelegt. Eine Sonderrolle spielte 

die Fliegerabwehr respektive die Luftabwehr, die größtenteils nach wie vor bei den 

mechanisierten Verbänden organisiert war. Nach und nach wurden über die Fliegerdivision 

einzelne Luftabwehrbataillone aufgebaut, welche die Kernaufgabe des 

Objektschutzes erhielten. Damit war die Fliegerabwehr definitiv nicht nur in ihrer 

grundsätzlichen Aufgabe, sondern auch in ihrer Struktur vollständig zweigeteilt, was 

zu einem Hemmnis in der Entwicklung der Waffengattung und einem Tauziehen bei 

Rüstungsbeschaffungen führte. 41 

Das Luftkriegswesen war Ende der 1970er Jahre auf einem so geringen Niveau, 

dass ein neuerlicher Aufbau kaum mehr möglich erschien. Über mehrere sogenannte 

„Arbeitsgemeinschaften Luftraumverteidigung“ (AG-LRV) 42 versuchte man dennoch 

eine generelle Bearbeitung und Neupositionierung zu erreichen. Jedoch auch 

im Landesverteidigungsplan, der 1978 erstellt und 1983 verfügt wurde, fehlte die 

Luftraumverteidigung völlig: „Man beschränkte sich auf die [Wahrung der] Lufthoheit 

im Neutralitätsfall ohne zu erklären, wie Letzteres ohne Luftverteidigungskräfte 

möglich sein würde.“ 43 Damit hatte man den Luftraum aus dem letzten, im 

Landesverteidigungsplan prioritär gereihten Einsatzfall, dem Verteidigungsfall, herausgenommen, 

gestand aber zumindest für den Krisen- und den Neutralitätsfall eine 

gewisse Relevanz der Bereiche Luftraumbeobachtung und Identifikation von Luftfahrzeugen 

ein. 44 Diese Definition war auf die Aufgaben der Luftraumüberwachung 

zugeschnitten. 1983 wurde das Flugmelderegiment zum Kommando Luftraumüberwachung 

(LRÜ), womit zumindest die passive Komponente vorhanden und im weiteren 

Aufbau begriffen war. Diese musste jedoch wirkungslos bleiben, da man auf 

keine aktiven Komponenten zurückgreifen konnte. Letztlich brachte dieser Umstand 

die erneute Abfangjägerdiskussion ins Rollen, die 1985 zur Beschaffung von Saab 

35 OE „Draken“ führte, deren möglicher Ankauf bereits bei vorherigen Abfangjägerdiskussionen 

Gesprächsthema gewesen waren. 45 Die Frage nach einer den Aufgaben 

angepassten Bewaffnung blieb freilich ungeklärt. Das die Begrüßung der ersten 

Überschalljagdflugzeuge in Österreich sowohl vonseiten der Bevölkerung als auch 

der Politik mehr als frostig verlief, legt ein Zeugnis über die allgemeine, beinahe in 

41 

Im Bereich der Rüstungsbeschaffungen ergab sich im Bereich der Fliegerabwehr vor allem die 

Konkurrenz zwischen Fliegerabwehrpanzer- und Lenkwaffenankauf, ausgerichtet an den jeweiligen 

Aufgaben. Vgl. Georg Hoffmann, Von Radar Raketen und Neutralität… Auswirkungen und 

Lösungen von politischen Aufgabenstellungen auf der militärischen Ebene der Waffengattung 

Fliegerabwehr, mit dem Schwerpunkt der Zweiten Republik von 1955 bis 2006, unveröffentlichtes 

Manuskript, Graz 2007, S. 58ff. 

42 

Vgl. Korkisch, Die Luftstreitkräfte der Republik Österreich bis 1978, S. 230f. 

43 

Hoffmann/Schulz/Goll (Hrsg.), Österreichische Luftstreitkräfte 1955 – 2005, S. 26. 

44 

Vgl. Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 80. 

45 

Vgl. Ebenda, S. 187ff.


die Bedeutungslosigkeit abgesunkene Auffassung der Wichtigkeit des Luftraumes 

ab. Um diese Einstellung zu ändern benötigte es einen erneuten Ernstfall, in welchem 

dem Luftraum eine augenscheinliche Bedeutung beigemessen werden sollte. 

Als im Jahr 1991 im südlichen Nachbarland Slowenien Kampfhandlungen ausbrachen, 

war eine weitere Zäsur in der österreichischen Sicherheitspolitik erreicht. 

Der Ostblock war zerfallen und die klassische, über Jahrzehnte aufrechterhaltene 

Bedrohung aus dem Osten nicht mehr existent. Sie wurde durch regionale Konflikte, 

die sich aus der destabilisierenden Wirkung des Umbruchs ergeben hatten, verdrängt. 

Die verschiedenen Einsatzfälle der „Raumverteidigung“ griffen in diesen Szenarien 

nicht mehr, weshalb Reformen und eine völlige Neuausrichtung des Verteidigungsressorts 

bald im Raum standen. In der gesteigerten Bedeutung und Wahrscheinlichkeit 

von, nach Diktion des Landesverteidigungsplanes, regional begrenzten Krisen- 

und Neutralitätsfällen, konnten sich die Luftstreitkräfte und da allen voran die 

Luftraumüberwachung gut festsetzen, da sie auch mit den vorhandenen geringen 

Mitteln zu bewältigen war. So führte der Einsatz des Jahres 1991 zu einem auffallenden 

Meinungsumschwung innerhalb des Militärs und der Öffentlichkeit, der letztlich 

die Luftstreitkräfte erheblich aufwertete und die Beschaffung einer Lenkwaffenbewaffnung 

sowohl für die Abfangjäger als auch für die Fliegerabwehr ermöglichte. 

Darüber hinaus hatte der Einsatz gezeigt wie wichtig ein integriertes, alle Teile der 

luftspezifischen militärischen Struktur umfassendes System unter einem Kommando 

war. Es war dies die Geburtsstunde einer über mehrere Zwischenstufen schließlich 

doch erreichten, ersten „True Austrian Air Force“. 46 

2. Die Einsätze im Luftraum am Beispiel des 

ČSSR-Kriseneinsatzes 1968 

Betrachtet man die Entwicklung und die Bedeutung des österreichischen Luftraumes 

in der Zweiten Republik, so sticht vor allem dessen Wahrnehmung während 

der verschiedenen Einsätze der Luftstreitkräfte hervor. Einerseits wurden durch diese 

Mängel und Fehlentwicklungen aufgezeigt, andererseits aber auch Vorgänge und 

Bedrohungen im Luftraum der österreichischen Öffentlichkeit vor Augen geführt. 

Es wundert also nicht, dass die größten strukturellen und aufgabenbezogenen Veränderungen 

häufig innerhalb kürzester Zeit nach den Einsätzen erfolgten, da hier 

die politischen Willensbildungen am ehesten von der Öffentlichkeit wahrgenommen 

wurden. 

Die Krisen der 1950er Jahre – allen voran der Ungarn-Aufstand 1956 47 – trafen 


47 Zum Ungarnaufstand siehe u.a.: Géza Alföldy, Ungarn 1956. Aufstand, Revolution, Freiheitskampf, 

Heidelberg 1997; Eva Haraszti-Taylor (Hrsg.), The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A Collection 

of Documents from the British Foreign Office, Nottingham 1995; Andreas Gémes, Austria and the 

1956 Hungarian revolution, Pisa 2008.


Österreich sehr früh und damit gleichzeitig ein Bundesheer, das sich noch im Aufbau 

befand und eigentlich noch über keine Einsatzkapazitäten verfügte. 48 Dennoch 

galt es zumindest pro forma den militärischen Schutz der staatlichen Souveränität 

zu demonstrieren, auch wenn dieser nur provisorischer Natur sein konnte. 49 Dieser 

Umstand traf jedoch nicht auf den Luftraum zu, da die Luftstreitkräfte zu diesem 

Zeitpunkt über keine adäquate Ausrüstung und lediglich über ein Ausbildungskader 

verfügten, dass allenfalls infanteristisch eingesetzt werden konnte. Der Luftraum 

etablierte sich so in der Wahrnehmung von Anfang an nicht als Bedrohungsraum und 

integrierte sich daher nicht in das Neutralitätsverständnis. Gerade die USA, die im 

Jahr 1956 aufgrund der Tatsache, dass „[…] der [österreichische] Luftraum laufend 

von Flugzeugen unbekannter Nationalität überflogen […]“ 50 wurde, besorgt reagierten, 

zeigten wie wichtig letzteres gerade im Luftraum in geopolitischer Hinsicht war. 

Die Politik lehnte jedoch alle Versuche, der eigenen Überwachung des Luftraumes 

Impulse zu geben, rigoros ab. 51 

Dieser Faktor änderte sich bemerkenswerterweise nicht durch die Erkenntnis 

eines Mangels, sondern durch eine von außen erzeugte Drucksituation: Zwischen 

16. und 17. August 1958 überflogen mehrere amerikanische Transportmaschinen 

während der Libanonkrise, den österreichischen Luftraum. 52 Nach den sofortigen 

Reaktionen der UdSSR auf diese amerikanischen Verletzungen des österreichischen 

Luftraums, entschloss sich die Politik, den ersten Einsatz im Luftraum einzuleiten, 

der dann freilich mit der Verlegung von fünf Schulmaschinen nach Innsbruck und 

der Aufstellung eines Beobachtertrupps, der unter dem Kommando eines Fähnrichs 

den Luftraum optisch absuchte, nicht besonders effizient ausfiel. 53 Wesentlich 

48 

Zum Aufbau und Einsatz des Bundesheeres siehe: Manfried Rauchensteiner, Die Performance 

war perfekt, in: Erwin A. Schmidl (Hrsg.), Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich, Wien u.a. 2003, 

S. 235-253; ders. Spätherbst 1956: Die Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand, Wien 1981; Reiner Eger, 

Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen. Das Verhalten Österreichs während des Ungarnaufstandes 1956 

und der tschechoslowakischen Krise 1968, Wien u.a. 1981; Norbert Sinn, Schutz der Grenzen. Der 

Sicherungseinsatz des Österreichischen Bundesheeres an der Staatsgrenze zu Ungarn im Oktober 

und November 1956, Graz 1996 sowie Erwin A. Schmidl, Erste Bewährung: Das Österreichische 

Bundesheer im Einsatz an der ungarischen Grenze 1956, in: ders. (Hrsg.), Die Ungarnkrise 1956 

und Österreich, Wien u.a. 2003, S. 253-275. 

49 

Vgl. Siegbert Kreuter, Die Sicherungseinsätze des Bundesheeres der Zweiten Republik – 

1956/1968/1991, in: Etschmann/Speckner (Hrsg.), Zum Schutz der Republik Österreich…, S. 

651ff. 

50 


51 

Vgl. Ebenda, S. 30f. 

52 

Vgl. Korkisch, Die Luftstreitkräfte der Republik Österreich 1955 bis 2005, S. 308 bzw. Walter Blasi, 

Die Libanonkrise 1958 und die US-Überflüge, in: Erwin A. Schmidl (Hrsg.), Österreich im frühen 

Kalten Krieg 1945–1958, Wien u.a. 2000, S. 239-261. 

53 

Zu diesem Zeitpunkt verfügten die Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte nur über zweisitzige Düsentrainer 

DE Havilland D.H. 115 Mk 55 „Vampire“ sowie Yak-11 und Yak-18 Propellermaschinen. 

Vgl. Blasi, Die Libanonkrise, S. 258 sowie Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, 

S. 39.


stärker waren jedoch die Folgewirkungen, die diese Krise für die Österreichischen 

Luftstreitkräfte mit sich brachte. Zum einen nahm die österreichische Öffentlichkeit 

diese bemerkenswerte Sorg-, gefolgt von Machtlosigkeit im Luftraum wahr und 

diskutierte diese auch breit, 54 und zum anderen bot der sowjetische Verteidigungsminister 

Malinowski nach diesen Vorfällen an, „[…] gerne mit der Überwachung 

und Sicherung des Luftraumes [zu] helfen.“ 55 Diese beinahe als Drohung formulierte 

Aussage, verfehlte ihre Wirkung nicht und erzeugte eine spezifische Sensibilität für 

die Überwachung des Luftraumes, die ab diesem Zeitpunkt aufgebaut, auch zu einer 

besonderen operativen Aufgabe der Luftstreitkräfte wurde. 56 

In den 1960er befanden sich die Luftstreitkräfte bereits in einer Umbruchphase, 

die sich in erster Linie in Umstrukturierungen, in denen einzelne Teilbereiche 

den Luftstreitkräften entzogen wurden, manifestierte. Die Luftraumüberwachung – 

wenngleich noch im Aufbau befindlich – und die damit zusammenhängende Luftraumverteidigung 

waren zum Schwerpunkt der operativen Aufgaben geworden. In 

diesem Sinne war auch die politische Entscheidung getroffen worden, mit den J-29F 

„Tunnan“ die ersten Kampfflugzeuge anzukaufen, die jedoch keine adäquate Bewaffnung 

erhielten. Dennoch fühlte man sich zu Beginn des Jahres 1968, als sich 

mit den Ereignissen des „Prager Frühlings“ in der ČSSR eine Krise anzukündigen 

begann, gut vorbereitet. Dieser Eindruck entstand jedoch vor allem deshalb, weil 

man einen möglicherweise kommenden militärischen Einsatz von Truppen des Warschauer 

Paktes nur am Boden erwartete. Die militärischen Vorausplanungen und die 

Einsatzpläne sahen so etwa die Luftstreitkräfte zunächst nicht im Verteiler vor. 57 

Als am 21. August 1968 Truppen des Warschauer Paktes die Grenze zur ČSSR 

überschritten, war die Bedrohung sofort auch in Österreich spürbar und zunächst 

durch sowjetische Panzer, die an den Grenzübergängen zu den österreichischen Bundesländern 

Oberösterreich und Niederösterreich innerhalb kürzester Zeit Stellung 

bezogen, dann vor allem aber durch teilweise gravierende Luftraumverletzungen, 

erkennbar. 58 Die Krise traf Österreich trotz der lange Zeit sichtbaren Genese dennoch 

unvorbereitet. Zwar wurden das Bundesheer gemäß den Einsatzplänen sofort 

54 Vgl. Die Presse vom 20.07.1958. 

55 Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 40. 

56 Die große Zahl an US-amerikanischen Überflügen im Zuge der Libanonkrise hatten nicht nur die 

österreichische Souveränität verletzt und zu Verstimmungen zwischen Wien und Washington geführt, 

sondern auch zu einer strengeren Auslegung der Neutralität. Gleichzeitig wurden auch die 

beschränkten Möglichkeiten des Österreichischen Bundesheeres, Luftraumverletzungen zu verhindern, 

sichtbar. Vgl. Blasi, Die Libanonkrise 1958, S. 239f und 256ff. 

57 Vgl. Georg Hoffmann, Luftraum in der Krise. Österreichische Sicherheitspolitik am Beispiel des 

ČSSR-Einsatzes 1968, in: Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (JIPSS) 1/2009, 

S. 101. 

58 Vgl. Georg Hoffmann, Der Luftraum als Krisenraum. Luftraumverletzungen und Reaktionen (21. 

August – 17. September 1968), in: Horst Pleiner/Hubert Speckner (Hrsg.), Zur Verstärkung der nördlichen 

Garnisonen… Der „Einsatz“ des Österreichischen Bundesheeres während der Tschechenkrise 

im Jahr 1968, Wien 2008, S. 366ff.


alarmiert, konnte jedoch durch das Zögern der Politik nicht in die Einsatzräume 

abrücken. 59 Als nach stundenlangen Beratungen schlussendlich eine Definition der 

gesamten Situation gefunden wurde und die alarmierten Heeresteile die Kasernen 

verließen, hatte sich die Bedrohung bereits offensichtlich entfaltet. Dieser Umstand 

traf in besonderer Weise auf die Luftstreitkräfte zu, da sich in deren Einflussbereich 

die sichtbarste Bedrohung manifestiert hatte. Auch hier zögerte die politische Seite 

eine konkrete Reaktion, nämlich den Einsatz der J-29F „Tunnans“, anzuordnen. Man 

tat dies erst, als sowjetische Flugzeuge in offensichtlicher Aufklärungsmission sogar 

die Hauptstadt Wien überflogen 60 und die Regierung aufgrund der Wirkung auf 

die Öffentlichkeit eine Reaktion setzen musste. 61 Doch verband man diesen Einsatz 

mit etlichen Auflagen und Einschränkungen: die Piloten dürften im Ernstfall nur 

auf Anweisung des Bundesministers für Landesverteidigung schießen und zudem 

war ihnen das Überfliegen der sogenannten „30km-Zone“ untersagt. 62 Diese war zu 

Beginn des Einsatzes von Regierungsseite als Verbotszone für alle Bundesheerteile 

gebildet worden, dass heißt das Bundesheer hatte einen Abstand von 30km zur eigenen 

Staatsgrenze einzuhalten, um offiziell die UdSSR nicht zu „provozieren“. 63 

Der J-29F-Einsatz, derart reglementiert, zeigte nun schonungslos die Schwächen der 

österreichischen Rüstungspolitik, vor allem aber der bisherigen Auffassung der Luftraumverteidigung 

auf. Die J-29F stiegen von ihren Stützpunkten erst auf, als sowjetische 

Maschinen den österreichischen Luftraum bereits verlassen hatten. Sie hatten 

zudem weder ein Bordradar noch eine Verbindung zu den militärischen Radarstationen 

am Boden, womit der Pilot den Himmel optisch absuchen musste. Schließlich 

untersagte man eine für Patrouillenflüge adäquate Bewaffnung der J-29F. 64 Wie die 

Wahrnehmung des Luftraums in der Krise stattfand, verdeutlicht auch der Umstand, 

dass man sich trotz der Luftraumverletzungen nicht dazu durchringen konnte, den 

zivilen Flugverkehr vor allem in Wien-Schwechat einzustellen. Stattdessen ordnete 

man die militärischen Patrouillenflüge diesem unter. Die J-29F wurden bereits nach 

wenigen Tagen wieder aus dem Einsatz abgezogen. 65 

59 

Vgl. Horst Pleiner/Hubert Speckner (Hrsg.), Zur Verstärkung der nördlichen Garnisonen…, S. 

127f. 

60 

Vgl. Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsabteilung des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums Wien (MG- 

FA)/Bestand Sicherungseinsatz 1968 (SiE 1968), Tagesmeldung, Kommando Luftstreitkräfte, Zl. 

1548-geh/EZ/68, 23.08.1968. 

61 

Zu den diplomatischen Protesten bezüglich der sowjetischen Luftraumverletzungen siehe Peter 

Ruggenthaler, Der Neutralität verpflichtet: die sowjetisch-österreichischen Beziehungen 1968, in: 

Karner/u.a. (Hrsg.), Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968. Beiträge, Graz 2008, S. 

999ff. 

62 

Vgl. Hoffmann, Luftraum in der Krise, S. 105. 

63 

Vgl. MGFA/Bestand SiE 1968, Vortrag, Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, StbAbt, o. Zl., 

23.08.1968. 

64 

Vgl. MGFA/Bestand SiE 1968, Gedächtnisprotokoll über die am 21. August 1968 stattgefundene 

Besprechung. Zeitablauf, o. Zl., 21.08.1968. 

65 

Vgl. Hoffmann, Luftraum in der Krise, S. 106.


Als sich am 7. September 1968 die Lage für Österreich nochmals zuzuspitzen 

schien, wurde eine neuerliche Alarmierung befohlen. 66 Obwohl sich nun die Bedrohungswahrnehmung 

direkt auf den Luftraum richtete, erfolgte kein Kampfflugzeug- 

Einsatz mehr. Stattdessen band man das, was von der Luftraumverteidigung noch 

übrig war, am Boden, indem man Fliegerabwehr- und Panzerverbänden „[…] nicht 

die Bekämpfung anlandender sondern bereits angelandeter Feindteile“ 67 befahl. 

Insgesamt war es in der Zeit von 21. August bis 17. September laut Meldungen zu 

55 Luftraumverletzungen durch insgesamt 68 Luftfahrzeuge gekommen, die Dunkelziffer 

dürfte jedoch weit höher liegen. 68 Diese zahlreichen Verletzungen der österreichischen 

Souveränität machten jedoch auch die Hilflosigkeit beziehungsweise 

die Ohnmacht der österreichischen Luftraumverteidigung sichtbar, denn weder 

Fliegerabwehr als auch Kampfflugzeuge konnten der Vielzahl an Einflügen etwas 

entgegenstellen. 69 So erscheint folgende Aussage des Bundesministers Georg Prader 

als fern jeglicher Realität: 

Wir hätten sie jederzeit herunterholen können. Allerdings schießen wir nicht gleich, da 

sich hier sehr ernste Konsequenzen ergeben. Nur wenn trotz Protests diese Einflüge kein 

Ende genommen hätten, dann hätte sich die Regierung über weitere Maßnahmen Gedanken 

machen müssen. 70 

Die Folgen des Einsatzes waren sehr weitreichend, vor allem da das bisherige 

Konzept der Landesverteidigung als gescheitert erschien. Obwohl der Einsatz des 

Bundesheeres 1968 in erster Linie auf die zögerliche, nahezu als verantwortungslos 

zu bezeichnende Haltung der Regierung zurückzuführen war, erhielt das Bundesheer 

in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung die Schuld dafür. Für die Luftstreitkräfte traf dies 

in besonderer Art und Weise zu, da hier der offensichtlichsten Bedrohung am wenigsten 

entgegengesetzt werden konnte. Das Jahr 1968 stellte so in vielerlei Hinsicht 

einen Wendepunkt dar. Der mangelhaft durchgeführte Einsatz prägte, von politischer 

Seite unterstützt, die Einstellung der Bevölkerung gegenüber dem eigenen Heer äußerst 

negativ; man fühlte sich im Stich gelassen, der Gefahr schutzlos ausgesetzt. 

Diese von den damaligen Ereignissen stark geprägte Grundhaltung ist noch heute 

spürbar. 71 Es zeigte zudem, dass die militärische Neutralität alleine keine Sicherheit 

bot, weshalb sich diese zumindest in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung wandeln musste. 

66 

Vgl. Pleiner/Speckner (Hrsg.), Zur Verstärkung der nördlichen Garnisonen…, S. 326ff. 

67 

Aussage von Brigadier in Ruhe Erich Kober am 24. August 2006 gegenüber den Autoren. 

68 

Vgl. Hoffmann, Der Luftraum als Krisenraum, S. 371. 

69 

Vgl. Ebenda. 

70 

Hainzl, Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S.69. 

71 

Zur Einstellung der österreichischen Bevölkerung zu Fragen der Landesverteidigung siehe Erich 

Reiter, Die Österreicher und ihr Bundesheer. Analyse einer Untersuchung über die Einstellung zu 

Fragen der Landesverteidigung, Wien 1987.


Dieser Umstand musste auch auf die Verteidigungspolitik Rückwirkungen haben. 72 

Für die Luftstreitkräfte bedeutete dies den Anfang vom Ende in der Ära des Kalten 

Krieges. Man versank in einen nahezu als bedeutungslos zu bezeichnenden Status, 

wurde strukturell zerschlagen und auf ein kleineres operatives Aufgabenspektrum 

reduziert. Es benötigte das Ende des Kalten Krieges und eine neuerliche Krise in 

Gestalt des Jugoslawienkrieges 1991 um diesen Umstand wieder zu ändern. 

Betrachtet man die aufgezeigten Krisen in einer Rückschau, so bildeten sich entlang 

der entsprechenden Einsätze zahlreiche Probleme ab. Diese waren nun nicht nur 

in den strukturellen Bedingungen oder den jeweiligen operativen Schwerpunkten 

gegeben, sondern vor allem in der Abwicklung rüstungspolitischer Entscheidungen. 

Derartige Problemstellungen entwickelten sich nicht erst anhand der Krisen selbst, 

sondern waren Teil einer oft jahrzehntelangen Diskussion, deren Betrachtung tiefen 

Einblick in die österreichische Verteidigungspolitik zulässt. 

3. Rüstungsdiskussionen am Beispiel der 

Raketen-Lenkwaffen-Frage 

Rüstungs- und Materialbeschaffung sind besondere Bereiche der Landesverteidigungspolitik. 

Sie sind Ausdruck einer politischen wie auch gesellschaftlichen Willensbildung, 

dem Militär für die jeweils zugeschriebene Rolle sowie die operativen 

Aufgaben entsprechende Mittel in die Hände zu geben. Folglich waren und sind 

diese immer wieder Kristallisationspunkt einer öffentlichen Beschäftigung mit der 

Landesverteidigung und mündeten nicht selten in eine Diskussion über den Sinn und 

den Zweck derselben. In Österreich kam es gerade im Verlauf des Kalten Krieges 

immer wieder zu derartigen öffentlichen aber auch militärinternen Diskussionen, die 

meist auch Wendepunkte in der Wahrnehmung der Landesverteidigung markierten. 

Eine Diskussion hielt sich dabei jedoch besonders hartnäckig über vier Jahrzehnte 

hinweg, wo sie in unterschiedlicher Intensität immer wieder sehr kontrovers debattiert 

wurde: die Frage nach der Ausrüstung des Bundesheeres und hier vor allem der 

Luftstreitkräfte mit Raketen respektive Lenkwaffen. 

Ausgelöst wurde dies durch ein offizielles Lenkwaffenverbot, festgeschrieben 

im Artikel 13 des Österreichischen Staatsvertrages, welches den Besitz „[…] 

irgendeine[r] Art von selbstgetriebenen oder gelenkten Geschossen […]“ 73 untersagte. 

Dies sorgte innerhalb des Österreichischen Bundesheeres und hier vor allem 

innerhalb der Luftstreitkräfte für Unmut, da dieser zu einem Zeitpunkt formuliert 

worden war, als Lenkwaffen vor allem eine offensive Ausrichtung hatten. 74 Gerade 

72 Vgl. Oliver Rathkolb, Bruno Kreisky und die Heeresreformdiskussion 1970/1971, in: Rauchensteiner/Etschmann/Rausch 

(Hrsg.), Tausend Nadelstiche, S. 47ff. 

73 Stourzh, Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945–1955, S.257f. 

74 Das Verbot von Lenkwaffen basierte im Wesentlichen auf den britischen Erfahrungen mit den sogenannten 

deutschen Vergeltungswaffen V1 und V2 im Zweiten Weltkrieg.


in den späten 1940er und frühen 1950er Jahren hatte sich der defensive Sektor, vor 

allem im Gebiet der Fliegerabwehr, aber rasant weiterentwickelt, sodass man etwa 

im Bereich des luftspezifischen Objektschutzes von einer effektiven Verteidigung 

ohne Lenkwaffen nicht mehr sprechen konnte. So muss diese im österreichischen 

Staatsvertrag verankerte Klausel im Lichte des globalen Wettrüstens der beiden 

Machtblöcke im beginnenden Kalten Krieg und des sich damit zunehmend entfaltenden 

Bedrohungspotentials aus der Luft gesehen werden. Im Gegensatz zu Österreich 

hatte Italien, dessen Friedensvertragsentwurf zunächst eine ähnliche Klausel 

enthielt, mit dem Argument, dass man damit „(…) nicht mehr in der Lage [sei], sich 

zu verteidigen“ 75 eine erhebliche Abschwächung der Formulierung, die nun die Defensivlenkwaffen 

aus dem Verbot ausnahm, erreichen können. Ein ähnlicher Schritt 

wurde in Österreich von militärischer Seite zwar gefordert, jedoch von der Politik 

kategorisch abgelehnt: Die einzelnen Bestimmungen des Staatsvertrages sollten eingehalten 

und nicht interpretiert werden. Es sollte schließlich bis 1990 dauern, bis 

man den Artikel 13 im Zuge einer Obsoleterklärung 76 auch tatsächlich aufhob. 

Die Diskussion um die Anschaffung von Lenkwaffen zog sich über einen Zeitraum 

von 35 Jahren über mehrere Phasen hinweg. Durch die strikte Ablehnung vonseiten 

der Politik, sich mit diesem Thema überhaupt zu beschäftigen, war die erste Phase 

vor allem militärisch geprägt und wurde in der Öffentlichkeit kaum wahrgenommen. 

Es war gerade die Fliegerabwehr, die sich im Ernstfall einem gänzlich übermächtigen 

Luftgegner entgegenzustellen hatte, und daher vehement auf eine Nachrüstung 

mit Lenkwaffen drängte. 77 Da in der Anfangsphase der Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte 

auch keine Jagdflugzeuge zur Verfügung standen, musste letztlich das gesamte 

obere Spektrum des Luftraumes ungesichert bleiben. Welch erhebliche Probleme 

diese Aufgabe des österreichischen Luftraumes aufwarf, zeigten etwa die Geschehnisse 

des Jahres 1958. Obwohl zu diesem Zeitpunkt Know-how am Sektor der Raketen- 

und Lenkwaffentechnologie 78 innerhalb der Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte 

vorhanden war, konnte dieses nicht nutzbringend umgesetzt werden, weshalb man 

sich Anfang der 1960er Jahre vonseiten der Luftstreitkräfte eingestehen musste, den 

Anschluss an diese sich ständig weiterentwickelnde Technologie verloren zu haben. 

Als 1959 tschechoslowakische Raketenwerfer 79 für die Artillerie beschafft und 

ein Jahr später auch der Ankauf von schweizerischen Panzerabwehrlenkwaffen vom 

Typ „Mosquito“ für die Panzerabwehr erwogen wurde, erwartete man sich Ähnliches 

auch am Luftsektor. Diese Vorstellungen wurden bitter enttäuscht, stattdessen 

wurden strukturelle Veränderungen im Aufbau der Luftstreitkräfte eingeleitet. Die 

75 Hecht, Militärische Bestimmungen in den Friedensverträgen von 1947, S.382. 

76 Vgl. Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, Wien 1998, S. 776ff. 

77 Vgl. Roland Rabenstein, Die Fliegerabwehrtruppe, in: Austroflug 4/1957, S. 11. 

78 In Person von Dr. Friedrich Halder, der im Zweiten Weltkrieg innerhalb des Reichsluftfahrtministerium 

für die Fliegerabwehrraketenforschung zuständig gewesen war. 

79 Vgl. Axel Alber, An Sankt Barbaras gnädiger Hand… Die Geschichte der Artillerie im Österreichischen 

Bundesheer der Zweiten Republik, Wien 2005, S. 30 sowie S. 94f.


zunehmende Akzentuierung der Luftunterstützung ließ die bisherige Argumentation 

ins Leere laufen. Für die Fliegerabwehr und ihrer nun aufgewerteten, primären 

Aufgabe des Begleitschutzes, erschienen Lenkwaffen nicht mehr zielführend, im 

Gegensatz zu Feuerleitgeräten und Kanonen. 80 Im Bereich der Flieger standen lediglich 

7,5cm-Raketen, die vor allem zur Erdzielbekämpfung zu verwenden waren, 

zur Verfügung. Die Lenkwaffenfrage verstummte unter Einfluss der neuen Aufgabenstellung 

so zusehends; vor allem als die Fliegerabwehr den Luftstreitkräften endgültig 

entzogen und den jeweiligen Gruppenkommanden unterstellt wurde. Nur im 

Umfeld der Großraumradarstationen, 81 die 1966 der neu geschaffenen Luftabwehrbrigade 

eingegliedert wurden, blieben Teile der Fliegerabwehr, deren Hauptaufgabe 

der Objektschutz wurde, erhalten. Zwischen 1966 und 1969 wurden zahlreiche Versuche 

unternommen, wieder Anschluss an die internationale Lenkwaffentechnologie 

zu finden. 82 Doch der für die Luftstreitkräfte äußerst negativ verlaufende Einsatz im 

Zuge der ČSSR-Krise 1968 sowie die kurz danach erfolgenden Umstrukturierungen 

und Umorientierungen hin zur „Gesamtraumverteidigung“ und die geringen finanziellen 

Mittel, die den Luftstreitkräften zur Verfügung standen, ließen auch diese 

Vorhaben scheitern. 

Mit der neuen Verteidigungsdoktrin der „Raumverteidigung“ trat die Lenkwaffendiskussion 

in eine neue Phase ein. Die Forderungen, die noch in der ersten 

Phase aus der Truppe heraus entstanden waren, schienen mit der Zerschlagung der 

Luftstreitkräfte keinerlei Relevanz mehr zu besitzen. Lediglich als in den 1970er 

Jahren die „Arbeitsgemeinschaft Luftraumverteidigung“ ins Leben gerufen wurde, 

entflammte für kurze Zeit wieder eine Diskussion um die Beschaffung von Lenkwaffen, 

die jedoch sehr bald durch die immer geringer werdenden finanziellen Mittel 

wieder verstummte. In den späten 1970er Jahren wurde zudem immer klarer, dass 

es in Hinblick auf den Luftraum zu einer Prioritätenverschiebung hin zu einer „[…] 

kampfkräftige[n] Luftraumüberwachung (LRÜ) – statt Luftraumverteidigung (…)“ 83 

kommen würde. Die Rüstungsfragen der Fliegerabwehr wurden so massiv zurückgedrängt 

und die Lenkwaffenfrage auf diesem Sektor in Richtung einer Fliegerabwehrpanzerfrage 

verschoben. 

Mitte der 1980er Jahre entstand mit dem Kauf der ersten Überschall-Abfangjäger 

Saab 35 OE „Draken“, eine neuerliche Debatte, dieses Mal um die Bewaffnung dieser 

Flugzeuge. 84 Da Lenkwaffen als die einzig sinnvolle Variante erschienen, wurde 

80 Vgl. AdR/ÖStA, Beschaffungsunterlagen Mittelkaliber-Fliegerabwehrwaffensystem 65, 19.03.1965, 

BMfLV/Amt für Wehrtechnik/Abt. Waffen und Munition, Zl.: 506.983-WT/WM/65. 

81 Zur Geschichte der Großraumradarstationen vor allem am Kolomannsberg (GRSK) siehe Hainzl, 

Die Luftstreitkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 211ff. 

82 Vgl. Hainzl, Die Fliegerkräfte Österreichs 1955 bis heute, S. 51. 


84 Vgl. Roland Schaffer, Diskussionspunkt „Draken“. Die Beschaffung von Abfangjägern für das Österreichische 

Bundesheer, in: Etschmann/Speckner (Hrsg.), Zum Schutz der Republik Österreich…, 

S. 601ff.


diese alte Diskussion – zunächst aus den Reihen des Heeres – wieder neu aufgeworfen. 

Sehr schnell schlossen sich andere Bereiche wie die Fliegerabwehr und letztlich 

die Panzerabwehr, an. Ab 1985 erlangte dieses Thema offensichtlich im Zuge der 

vorherigen „Draken“-Diskussion und der starken Verquickung mit Fragen der österreichischen 

Sicherheitspolitik, eine erhebliche Präsenz in der nationalen Medienlandschaft. 

85 So bekräftigten die Befürworter der Lenkwaffen deren Notwendigkeit 

für den Schutz der Neutralität im Luftraum, während die Gegner einen Bruch mit den 

Richtlinien des Staatsvertrages sahen. 86 Damit nahm die Diskussion in dieser Phase 

eine ganz neue Qualität an, die sie erheblich von jener in den 1950er und 1960er 

Jahren geführten Debatte unterschied. 1987, kurz nach der Ernennung von Robert 

Lichal zum Bundesminister für Landesverteidigung, wurde eine Beschaffungskommission 

eingesetzt, die für alle Bereiche einen Lenkwaffenkauf planen sollte. Lichal, 

ein Befürworter des Ankaufs, argumentierte damit, dass „[…] Lenkwaffen […] für 

das Überleben unserer Soldaten von entscheidender Bedeutung [sind], ohne sie wären 

unsere Söhne schutzloses Kanonenfutter.“ 87 Mit dieser Diktion und der allgemeinen 

Wortschöpfung „Abwehrlenkwaffe“ 88 sollte die neutralitätspolitische Bedeutung 

zusätzlich unterstrichen werden. Doch auch im endlich einsetzenden Beschaffungsvorgang 

kam es, nachdem bekannt wurde, dass nicht für alle Bereiche ausreichend 

finanzielle Mittel vorhanden waren, sehr schnell zu einem Tauziehen zwischen Heer 

und Luftstreitkräften, welches die Panzerabwehr für sich entscheiden konnte. Noch 

1989 wurde die schwedische Panzerabwehrlenkwaffe RBS-56 „Bill“ unter der österreichischen 

Bezeichnung PAL 2000 beschafft; die beiden anderen Lenkwaffenbereiche 

gingen leer aus. Nur ein Jahr später wurde das Lenkwaffenverbot des Staatsvertrages 

für obsolet erklärt. 89 Die Luftstreitkräfte erschienen zu diesem Zeitpunkt als 

der große Verlierer, bis die Slowenienkrise 1991 die Karten neu verteilte. Mit einer 

zwar neuartigen, aber dafür unmittelbar greifbaren Bedrohung an der österreichischen 

Grenze und auch im Luftraum änderte sich die zuvor eher negative Haltung 

der Öffentlichkeit, die vor allem in der medialen Berichterstattung spürbar wurde. 90 

Zudem deckte die Krise die erheblichen ausrüstungstechnischen Mängel auf: Die 

Fliegerabwehr hatte Objektschutz zu betreiben, es fehlten dazu aber die geeigneten 

und modernen Waffensysteme, die „Draken“ waren zwar im Luftraum präsent, je- 

85 

Vgl. Hoffmann, Von Radar Raketen und Neutralität…, S. 96ff. 

86 

In den Medien wurde fälschlicherweise immer wieder vom Bruch der Neutralität gesprochen, in 

der selbstverständlich nie ein Lenkwaffenverbot verankert war, was aber auch in Nachfolge der 

Drakenbeschaffung wesentlich emotionaler aufgefasst wurde als etwa eine Staatsvertragsdebatte. 

Exemplarisch vgl. Hans Saringer, Gefasel von Raketen, in: Neue Zeit, 18.06.1986. 

87 

Minister Robert Lichal in Tirol: Brauchen Lenkwaffen für die Sicherheit unserer Soldaten, in: Tiroler 

Tageszeitung, 31.03.1987. 

88 

Hannes Haas, Konflikt statt Konsens? Die Abwehrlenkwaffen-Diskussion in den österreichischen 

Printmedien, unveröffentlichtes Manuskript, Wien 1989, S. 17. 

89 

Vgl. Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, S. 776ff. 

90 

Vgl. Der Star heißt PAL 2000, wiegt 47 Kilogramm, kann Panzer knacken, Der Standard vom 

03.07.1991.


doch, lediglich mit 30mm-Kanonen bewaffnet, kaum als gefechtsfähig zu bezeichnen. 

Die öffentliche Meinung schlug in einem erheblichen Ausmaß um, sodass noch 

1991 – wohlweislich nach Ende des Kalten Krieges – innerhalb sehr kurzer Zeit 

der Ankauf von Luft-Luft- und Boden-Luft-Lenkwaffen beschlossen und budgetiert 

werden konnte. 91 

Mit diesem Ankauf war eine über lange Zeit hinweg, hitzig von allen Seiten geführte 

Rüstungsdiskussion nach 35 Jahren abgeschlossen. Sie zeigt wohl wie kein 

anderer Beschaffungsvorgang den Wertewandel des Luftraumes im Kalten Krieg. 

4. Zusammenfassung und Ausblick 

„Austrian security will be precarious both in the short and the long-term.” 92 Dieser 

Satz, formuliert im Jahr 1955 im Hinblick auf die anfänglichen Anstrengungen 

Österreichs, eine eigene Luftstreitkraft aufzubauen, findet sich in den Akten des 

britischen Foreign Office wieder. Als Begründung für diese Einschätzung wird dabei 

angegeben, dass sich die militärischen Planungen, die durchwegs mit jenen der 

Westmächte korrelierten, nicht mit den politischen Vorstellungen des Landes deckten, 

und dies wohl in der Zukunft auch nicht tun würden: „[…] the responsible Austrian 

leaders are not prepared to face the real issues in the military field which are 

the concomitant of their new political responsibilities.“ 93 

Tatsächlich stellt genau dieser Punkt das Grundproblem in der Entwicklung der 

Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte in allen Bereichen dar, das sich letztlich bis zum 

Ende des Kalten Krieges ziehen sollte. Die Luftstreitkräfte, die 1955 auf minimaler 

Basis gleichsam aus dem Nichts aufgebaut werden mussten, fanden innerhalb des neu 

entstehenden Bundesheeres sowie der langsam entstehenden Verteidigungspolitik, 

denkbar schlechte Grundvoraussetzungen vor, die zunächst nur durch ausländische 

Hilfslieferungen ausgeglichen werden konnten. Die jungen Luftstreitkräfte wurden 

von Anfang an finanziell und daraus abgeleitet strukturell derart beschränkt, dass 

durchwegs vorhandenen Planungen nicht umgesetzt und die operativen Kernaufgaben 

der Luftverteidigung und Luftunterstützung bereits im Ansatz nicht abgedeckt 

werden konnten. Wesentlich schwerer wog jedoch der daraus abgeleitete Umstand, 

dass sich der Luftraum damit nicht in die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik des 

Landes und damit in den Neutralitätsraum integrieren konnte. Das politische Interesse 

an einer Stärkung der Luftstreitkräfte beziehungsweise einer Integration des Luftraumes 

war zudem deshalb so minimal, da letzterer keiner gesteigerten öffentlichen 

Wahrnehmung unterlag. Dies änderte sich erst als Krisen und äußere Einflussnahmen 

auftraten und ein gewisses Bedrohungsgefühl auch im Luftraum spürbar wurde. 

91 

Es waren das die Luft-Luft-Lenkwaffe „Sidewinder“ und die leichte Fliegerabwehrlenkwaffe „Mistral“. 

Vgl. Hoffmann, Von Radar Raketen und Neutralität…, S. 107. 

92 

TNA, FO 371/117835. 

93 

TNA, FO 371/117835.


Die Krisen wurden so zu den markanten Zäsuren in der weiteren Entwicklung der 

Luftstreitkräfte, da auf diese mit strukturellen und aufgabenbezogenen Veränderungen 

unmittelbar und vor allem öffentlichkeitswirksam reagiert wurde. So änderte 

sich etwa noch 1958 – anlässlich der durch die Libanonkrise im österreichischen 

Luftraum hervorgerufenen Vorkommnisse – die Integration des Luftraumes in die 

Neutralität. Die von den Luftstreitkräften nicht umsetzbare operative Aufgabe der 

Luftverteidigung wurde vonseiten der Politik in eine Luftraumverteidigung uminterpretiert 

und die Strukturen danach ausgerichtet. In dieser wurde nun dem Schutz und 

der Wahrung der Neutralität gegenüber der Verteidigung der staatlichen Souveränität 

der Vorzug gegeben. Die Luftstreitkräfte sollten nun die Neutralität im Luftraum 

sichtbar, sie dokumentierbar machen, um so Sicherheit zu suggerieren, ohne diese 

jedoch im Einsatzfall auch verteidigen zu können. 

Diese nicht vorhandene Verteidigungskomponente gepaart mit einer fehlenden 

eindeutigen Definition des „Neutralitätsfalles“, machte sich dann vor allem 1968, im 

Rahmen der nächsten Krise, bemerkbar und veränderte nicht nur den Zugang zur 

Neutralität, sondern auch die Luftstreitkräfte neuerlich äußerst nachhaltig. In einer 

Ära, in der nun die Landesverteidigung in eine Doktrin gebettet wurde, hatten die 

Luftstreitkräfte kaum mehr Bedeutung. Die fehlende Luftverteidigung sowie die 

Luftraumverteidigung wurden als Manko akzeptiert und als solches in den Verteidigungsplanungen 

als Basis vorausgesetzt. Dieser Umstand, der bis zum Ende des Kalten 

Krieges aufrechterhalten wurde, marginalisierte die Luftstreitkräfte, zerteilte ihre 

Strukturen und band sie beinahe ausschließlich in der Luftunterstützungsaufgabe. 

Dieser Wandel vor allem der politischen Willensbildung rund um die Luftstreitkräfte, 

zeigte sich markant auch entlang langfristiger Elemente, wie etwa der Rüstungsplanung. 

Alles war letztlich geprägt von einer, vor allem nach außen wahrnehmbaren, 

neutralen Haltung, ohne Rücksicht auf die eigene Verteidigungsfähigkeit. So 

besaßen die Luftstreitkräfte bis zum Ende des Kalten Krieges weder ein geeignetes 

Interzeptionsflugzeug – „Abfangjäger“ genannt –, noch eine adäquate, moderne Bewaffnung, 

wie etwa Lenkwaffen. Diese Umstände änderten sich erst, als das Ende 

des Kalten Krieges erreicht, die äußeren Bedrohungen andere geworden waren und 

rüstungspolitische sowie strukturelle Anpassungen anderen Deutungsmustern unterlagen. 

Für einen kurzen Zeitraum entwickelten sich daraus über mehrere Zwischenschritte 

tatsächliche österreichische Luftstreitkräfte, die auch als solche mit eigenen 

Aufgaben versehen, wahrgenommen wurden. Das neue Jahrtausend, mit seinen 

neuen Bedrohungs- und Einsatzszenarien, verursachte jedoch wieder ein Umdenken 

in der politisch-militärischen Willensbildung, welches neuerlich Umstrukturierungen 

einleitete. So bestehen die Luftstreitkräfte heute aus keinem zentralen Verband 

mehr, sondern aus zwei brigadeäquivalenten Teilen, die gleichzeitig die Kernaufgaben 

markieren: Luftunterstützung (Kommando LuU) und Luftraumüberwachung 

(Kommando LRÜ). Im Licht all dieser Entwicklungen nimmt es kein wunder, dass 

die verschiedenen Teile der Österreichischen Luftstreitkräfte, trotz neuester Ausrüstung, 

wie etwa dem Eurofighter, auf eine ungewisse Zukunft zusteuern.

Ma n u e L ca M b e s e s Jú n i o r * 

As Forças Armadas brasileiras e 

a Política de Defesa Nacional 

Brasile 

O 

Brasil é um país guiado por um sentimento de paz. Não abriga nenhuma 

ambição territorial, não possui litígios em suas fronteiras e, tampouco, inimigos 

declarados. Toda ação por ele empreendida nas esferas diplomática 

e militar, busca, sistematicamente, a manutenção da paz. Porém, tem interesses a 

defender, responsabilidades a assumir, e um papel a desempenhar, no tocante à Segurança 

e Defesa, em níveis hemisférico e mundial, em face de sua estatura políticoestratégica 

no concerto das nações. O primeiro objetivo de nossa Política de Defesa, 

portanto, deve ser a de assegurar a defesa dos interesses vitais da Nação contra qualquer 

ameaça forânea. Não se pode precisar, a priori, a fronteira entre os interesses 

vitais e os interesses estratégicos. Os dois devem ser defendidos com ênfase e determinação. 

Essencialmente, os interesses estratégicos residem na manutenção da paz 

no continente sul-americano e nas regiões que o conformam e o rodeiam, bem como 

os espaços essenciais para a atividade econômica e para o livre comércio (Setentrião 

Oriental, Costão Andino, Cone Sul e Atlântico Sul). 

Fora deste âmbito, o Brasil tem interesses que correspondem às responsabilidades 

assumidas nos Fóruns Internacionais e Organismos Multilaterais e ao seu status 

na ordem mundial. Este é conformado por uma combinação de fatores históricos, 

políticos, estratégicos, militares, econômicos, científicos, tecnológicos e culturais. 

Sem uma Defesa adequada, a Segurança Nacional e a perenidade desses interesses 

estarão seriamente comprometidos e, consequentemente, não poderão ser assegurados. 

Daí, ressalta-se a imperiosa necessidade de contarmos com Forças Armadas 

preparadas, suficientemente poderosas e aptas ao emprego imediato, capazes de desencorajar 

qualquer intenção de agressão militar ao país, pela capacidade de revide 

que representam. Esta estratégia é enfatizada para evitar a guerra e exige, como 

corolário, o fortalecimento da Expressão Militar do Poder Nacional, além de impor 

um excelente grau de aprestamento e prontificação das Forças Armadas, desde o 

tempo de paz, através da realização de treinamentos, exercícios operacionais dentro 

de cada Força Singular, não sendo excluída a necessidade de Planejamento e do 

treinamento de Operações Conjuntas e Combinadas no âmbito das FFAA. O estudo 

da História, particularmente da História Militar de uma nação, conduz a conclusões 

* O autor é Coronel-Aviador da Reserva da Força Aérea; conferencista especial da Escola Superior 

de Guerra, membro do Instituto de Geografia e História Militar do Brasil e vice-diretor do Instituto 

Histórico-Cultural da Aeronáutica.


e realça aspectos capazes de influir na Expressão Militar de seu Poder Nacional. O 

estudo das campanhas militares, com seus erros e acertos, o respeito às tradições, o 

culto aos heróis, etc, trazem reflexos à formulação da doutrina, ao moral e à estrutura 

militares. 

As tradições históricas e militares constituem, ainda, fatores de influência sobre 

a Expressão Militar. Essas tradições, que cumpre cultuar e manter, não devem, por 

outro lado, apresentar obstáculos intransponíveis à evolução, ao desenvolvimento e à 

tecnologia militares. No equilíbrio entre essas idéias, às vezes opostas, está o acerto 

que revigora a Expressão Militar. Assumem, também, papel de destaque, os aspectos 

qualitativos dos recursos humanos; o apoio em maior ou menor grau da opinião 

pública nacional e mesmo internacional; a coesão interna e a vontade nacional. E, 

nesse contexto, ressalta a fundamental importância do Povo - expressão máxima das 

forças vivas da Nação -, como verdadeiro esteio das Forças Armadas, quando a elas 

se une, nelas se apóia e com elas se confunde. A população traduz sua indispensável 

solidariedade à Expressão Militar, através da opinião pública, que deve constituir, 

sem dúvida, preocupação constante quando se pretende manter em alto nível aquela 

Expressão do Poder Nacional. Nesse sentido, é imperioso o esforço para conservar 

integrados o homem militar e o homem civil, sem discriminações de qualquer natureza, 

sem privilégios, embora respeitadas suas diversas, mas naturais destinações. 

O papel que caberá às Forças Armadas brasileiras, nas próximas décadas, é multifacetado 

e deve estar calcado em amplo debate, cujo resultado deverá ser tão satisfatório 

quanto maior for o desenvolvimento da sociedade. O esboço de qualquer 

arranjo de Defesa, em um Estado democrático, para que possa contar com recursos, 

deve estar respaldado por uma base de legitimidade. Entendemos que, para a consecução 

desses objetivos, devem ser consultadas personalidades representativas de 

diferentes espectros de opinião: ministros de estado, acadêmicos, analistas políticos, 

economistas, diplomatas, militares, jornalistas, todos com reconhecida competência 

na área de Defesa e alguns críticos do atual sistema de Defesa Nacional. Evidentemente, 

que não se trata de deixar em mãos destes pensadores a formulação de 

políticas e estratégias militares. Trata-se, tão-somente, de ouví-los e de reunir novos 

conceitos e ideias, que permitam oxigenar antigos preceitos e identificar referenciais 

para a defesa do país, os quais estejam mais em sintonia com os desafios dos novos 

tempos e consentâneos com a realidade nacional. 

Tais contribuições, depois de avaliadas, por setores competentes do Ministério 

da Defesa, poderão ou não ser incorporadas no planejamento estratégico. Indubitavelmente, 

para a consecução dessa tarefa, mister se faz uma conjunção de esforços. 

Nesse sentido, somam-se, num processo sinérgico, o imprescindível apoio do Presidente 

da República, a compreensão do Congresso Nacional, a efetiva colaboração 

do Ministério da Defesa e de outras áreas do Governo, a confiança e o respaldo dos 

Comandantes de Forças e a ativa participação de todas as forças vivas da Nação. Te-

As f o r ç A s A r m A d A s b r A s I l e I r A s e A polítIcA d e defesA n A c I o n A l 57 

mos plena consciência de que não se pode justificar a hipertrofia das Forças Armadas 

em prejuízo do processo de desenvolvimento da Nação, mas não se pode admitir, 

por ilógico e temerário, que a Expressão Militar do Poder Nacional seja colocada em 

plano inferior - vivenciando um processo gradual de sucateamento e de desmantelamento, 

devido à crônica insuficiência de recursos financeiros -, na falsa concepção 

de que a prioridade absoluta deve ser dada ao Desenvolvimento. Não existem nações 

desarmadas, porque nenhuma delas seria capaz de desfazer-se de sua Expressão Militar 

para merecer, por esse ato ingênuo, o respeito e a simpatia de todos os países. 

Não há fórmula miraculosa capaz de manter a paz sem ameaças de conflitos internos 

ou de guerra entre os povos. 

Torna-se imperativo conferir mais prestígio às Forças Armadas e racionalizar, 

modernizar e fortalecer o aparato defensivo brasileiro. Lembremo-nos das sábias 

palavras do insigne Barão do Rio Branco - o Chanceler da Paz - que, de modo contumaz, 

enfatizava a imperiosa necessidade de possuirmos um bom sistema de armas 

para respaldar as nossas proposições no concerto das nações.

Pe t t e r i Jo u k o * 

Inconclusive Experiment – British Air Power and 

the Suez Crisis, 1956. The Allied Air Campaign 

reassessed 

Finlandia 

Introduction 

(The overall concept of Operation Musketeer Revise, Author) was dictated 

to the Force Commanders as a result of political limitations and was never 

“It 

considered by them to be a sound military operation.” 1 The quotation from 

the report of Air Marshall Dennis Barnett, the Air Task Commander of Operation 

Musketeer, the Anglo-French operation designed to capture the Suez Canal in 

November 1956 is revealing. The military planning of Operation Musketeer was 

truly coloured by political manoeuvring and indecisiveness, constant change of plans 

and inter-service rivalry added by the French co-operation with Israel from the very 

beginning of the crisis. It is also widely recognised that the operation was a political 

disaster for Britain. The United States took advantage of the situation to wipe out 

the British influence in the Middle East. Yet, the military execution of the operation 

cannot be judged as a total fiasco. The tactical tasks were carried out with accordance 

to the plans and the encountered Egyptian forces were defeated. 

This article deals with one aspect of military planning: the use of air forces. 2 The 

concept of using air power3 is among the most fascinating aspects of the military 

planning during the crisis. The use of Anglo-French air forces established the core of 

the whole operational concept at one stage of the planning. In the end, however, the 

concept of an extensive and decisive air campaign was almost totally watered. This 

article seeks to explain the role of the air forces and the concept of air operations 

during the planning stage of the operation in the light of the contemporary Royal 

Air Force doctrine. So often are military operations judged without realising that 

the armed forces are products of their era. The military thinking is expressed in 

* Lt. Col. Ph. D., The head of research section at the Department of Tactics, National Defence University 

of Finland. Finalised his doctoral dissertation about British military planning during the Suez 

Crisis in the Helsinki University in 2007 he has written several articles on the Finnish Cold War 

defence planning and evolution of Finnish tactics and operational art since the Second World War. 

1 TNA AIR 24/2426, Air Task Force/TS 287/56, 27 November 1956, Report on Operation Musketeer. 

2 For a comprehensive analysis of the military planning, see Petteri Jouko, Strike Hard, Strike Sure – 

Operation Musketeer. British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956 (diss.) (Helsinki: Edita 

Prima Oy, 2007). 

3 The term “air power” was quite certainly understood differently in the 1950s than today. The term, 

however, was used already in the Royal Air Force Manual in the late 1920’s, see Royal Air Force 

War Manual, Operations (AP 1300, 1928), Chapter VII.


the contemporary doctrine linking the operational peacetime principles of peacetime 

training and wartime action, as the Royal Air Force War Manual published in 1950, 

the contemporary doctrine of the Royal Air Force, put the matter. 4 

The article focuses almost entirely on the British part of the operation. The French 

participation is consciously left on the sidetrack, but not because their participation 

is uninteresting. On the contrary, the French possessed some extremely exiting 

and modern concepts worth of further research such as airborne and psychological 

operations or tactical employment of ultra modern 7 Division Mécanique Rapide. 

However, L’Armée de l’Air did not have a doctrine or the resources to conduct 

strategic air operations that are the main focus of this article. 

Strike Hard, Strike Sure – the Principles of British Air Power 

“Allied Air Power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight inevitably 

suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. 

Nevertheless it was decisive” 5 

It is no coincidence that John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, a former 

Chief of Air Staff and a well known protagonist of air power, quoted the United 

States Strategic Bombing Survey in his 1954 book Strategy for the West. In the 

absence of missiles, Britain’s forthcoming nuclear deterrence was to be based on the 

Royal Air Force. The RAF was to become the primary arm since it was to deliver 

Britain’s nuclear inventory if deterrence failed. 

During the Suez Crisis, air power was to play a predominant role in the Allied 

attack plans. To understand the background for the decisions made in these plans, it is 

relevant to review the ideas of aerial warfare that prevailed at the time in the United 

Kingdom. The tactics introduced during the Second World War still prevailed in the 

British Army. But did the lessons of the war provide an empirical basis also for the 

Royal Air Force in the mid-1950s? Had the role of air forces changed since the Second 

World War? What were the principles of applying air power in a Limited War? 

The basic foundations of the air force doctrine originated from a holistic 

understanding of a country’s capacity to wage war. According to the Royal Air Force 

War Manual, the war potential of the enemy consisted of various factors such as 

the armed forces, morale, industrial and economic capacity, scientific research and 

manpower. Most of the physical manifestations of these factors were located inside 

enemy territory. This led to the logical conclusion that “the basic weapon of the air 

force is the bomber and the basic strategy of Air Power must be offensive”. 6 

4 Royal Air Force War Manual, Operations (AP 1300, 1950), introduction. 

5 John Slessor, Strategy for the West (London: Cassell & Co, 1954), p. 96. Originally quoted in the 

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report (European War), September 30, 1945, 

(Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 107. 

6 Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations (Air Ministry, 1950), pp. 2-5, 19.

In c o n c l u s I v e e x p e r I m e n t – brItIsh AIr po w e r A n d t h e su e z crIsIs, 1956. th e Al l I e d AIr cA m pA I g n reAssessed 61 

The ten principles of war were based on those introduced by Fuller in the army in 

the 1920s. 7 The air doctrine followed the “Douhuetic” principle of massive air power 

by calling for the concentration of the greatest possible force as “THE (sic) cardinal 

principle of war”. 8 

Bomber Command had suffered horrifying casualties in the skies over Germany. 

When German air defences were still capable of offering resolute resistance in 1943 

and early 1944, the attrition rate had risen to intolerable levels. The main cause 

for the losses was the German fighter defence, which had not been paralysed. The 

fighter defence was properly addressed only after the introduction of long-range 

fighter escorts. 9 The logical conclusion of this experience was that a large-scale 

bomber offensive was impractical without air superiority. 10 The bomber formations 

were not, after all, able to defend themselves from the determined defenders pressing 

their attacks home vigorously. The requirement for air superiority was not limited to 

bomber operations. Its importance was well expressed by Lord Tedder in 1947 when 

he defined it as “a prerequisite for all war-winning operations, whether at sea, on land 

or in the air”. 11 This was particularly true for amphibious operations as expressed in 

the Manual of Combined Operations. 12 

The necessity for air superiority and the principle of the offensive were, of course, 

closely interlinked. Air operations were to be extended over the hostile airspace 

at the earliest possible moment. In the Second World War, the Allies had won air 

superiority through attrition. The campaign had been a costly and time-consuming 

affair due to the size and skill of the German Air Force. Another solution, suggested 

in the Royal Air Force Manual, was to attempt an early aerial coup de main by 

destroying the enemy air force in its bases, especially if the opponent was weaker. 13 

There was a tempting and well-known example from the Second World War since 

the Luftwaffe annihilated the Polish Air Force in a matter of days in the opening 

phase of the invasion of Poland in 1939. 14 

The bomber force could be used in achieving air superiority, but the main aim of 

a bomber offensive would be the annihilation of a country’s overall capacity to wage 

7 

See, e.g. Field Service Regulations, Operations (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1929), 

pp. 8-9. 

8 

Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations, p. 16. 

9 

The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945, Vol. II: Endeavour, by Charles Webster 

and Noble Frankland (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), pp. 87-88. 

10 

Air superiority was defined as “a state in which we (the British, author), are able to make use of the 

air for our own purposes and the enemy air forces are unable to operate effectively against us”, see 

Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations, p. 21. 

11 

Andrew Vallance, The Air Weapon. Doctrines of Air Power Strategy and Operational Art (London: 

Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 15. 

12 

The Manual of Combined Operations, (1950), p. 3 and Conduct of War, p. 13. 

13 

Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations, pp. 22-24. 

14 

James Corum, The Luftwaffe. Creating Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (Lawrence: University 

Press of Kansas, 1997), pp. 271-273.


war. The idea of bombing an enemy into submission came from the period between 

the world wars when strategies for air offensives were slowly taking shape in the form 

of the concept of strategic bombing. There was no proper doctrine however, as Scot 

Robertson notes in his analysis on the development of strategic bombing. 15 Early in the 

war, the British had conducted daylight bombing raids against German military targets 

with unpromising results16 . During the course of the war, the British bomber offensive 

targeted the war potential of the German cities through nightly aerial bombing. As 

described in a directive following the Casablanca conference, the objective was 

“the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and 

economic systems, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to the 

point where their capacity for armed resistance was fatally weakened”. 17 

German morale did not collapse even though the population was subjected to 

heavy bombing which caused severe casualties. Actually, the result was quite the 

opposite of the original objective. As Albert Speer, the Minister of Armaments and 

War Production put the subject in a post-war interrogation “the powers of resistance 

of the German people were underestimated and no account was taken of the fatalistic 

frame of mind which a civil population finally acquires after numerous air raids”. 18 

Instead of reducing German morale, the bombings increased the German resolution 

to stand firm as the killing of innocent civilians by the Allies offered excellent 

propaganda opportunities for the regime that had total control over domestic radio 

and press. 19 The same trend occurred in the bombing of industry. After re-organising 

its production, German industry was actually able to increase its output. It is a wellknown 

fact that German industrial production reached its peak in 1944, which was 

the year of the heaviest bombing in the war. 20 

Throughout the bombing campaign, the British retained a cynical attitude towards 

precision bombing. This view was held by the Commander-in-Chief of Bomber 

Command, Air Marshall Arthur Harris in particular. Nevertheless, the official report 

by the British Bombing Survey Unit reveals that the British realised the importance 

of selecting key target categories in their post-war studies. According to the report, 

the oil and communications facilities were the two “target systems whose attack 

yielded major strategic gains.” However, the same report acknowledged that the 

destruction of the oil system did not paralyse the German fighting capacity due to the 

15 Scot Robertson, The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine 1919-1939 (Praeger, 1995), 

pp. 158-159. 

16 John Searby, The Bomber Battle for Berlin (London: Guild Publishing, 1991), p. 18. 

17 Arthur Harris, Despatch on War Operations 23 February, 1942, to 8 May, 1945, ed. Sebastian Cox 

(London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 33. 

18 The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939-1945 ed. Sir James Butler (Naval & Military 

Press, 2006), p. 283. 

19 Max Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 349 

20 David Divine, The Broken Wing. A Study in the British Exercise of Air Power (London: Hutchinson 

& CO, 1966), pp. 259-260.


introduction of strict rationing and reserve stocks. Moreover, German industry was 

able to maintain its production levels owing to the large pool of skilled labour and to 

a relatively adequate amount of raw materiel. 21 

The bombing report endorsed the targeting of the transportation system as the 

most efficient means of causing damage to war potential. The strategic bombing of 

the German transportation system had a two-folded effect. The survey argues that 

it was the main reason for the gradual collapse of the German industry involved in 

military production. The campaign also had a direct effect on military traffic. The 

railway system in France was subjected to heavy bombing for about three months 

before Operation Overlord and it “completely nullified the pre-arranged German 

organization for dealing with troops movements, reinforcements and supplies”. 22 

The lessons were transferred directly to the post-war bombing doctrine. The 

Royal Air Force War Manual identified the goal of paralysing the movement of the 

enemy as a primary objective of a bombing campaign. Attacks on the transportation 

network and the fuel industry would deprive the enemy of the means to move his 

troops and the goods used by the civilian society. 23 

The results of the bombing offensive were revealed only after the war during 

the extensive bombing surveys. It had been most difficult to assess the effects of 

a bombing campaign. This highlights the role of intelligence. Experiences in the 

Second World War had shown that the economic planning conducted in conjunction 

with a bombing campaign was dependant on assumptions. These assumptions could 

not always be verified during the course of the war as the enemy did his best to 

conceal the actual results. 24 

According to the bombing survey, it was not the amount of intelligence material 

but the quality and interpretation of this material that mattered. 25 If hard intelligence 

on enemy capabilities to maintain production, to restore production, or to introduce 

substitutive commodities was incorrect, then the bombing campaign could be aimed 

at the wrong targets. The principles involved in supporting an amphibious operation 

and combat on the ground next to the bridgehead were expressed in an issue of 

the Amphibious Warfare Handbook, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious 

Warfare. Air support for a combined operation was broken up into three phases. 

The preliminary phase would be devoted to creating a favourable air and maritime 

21 The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945. Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit ed. 

Sebastian Cox (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 134, 166-167. 

22 Ibid. pp. 118, 166-167. For the post-war analysis of the effects on the German transport system 

during the Second World War, see also Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Air Vice-Marshall 

Sydney Osborne Bufton, BUFT 1/39, “Lectures on Air Power in Modern War” by Lord Tedder, pp. 

47-50 and diagram no. 7. 

23 Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations, pp. 28-30. 

24 The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945, Vol. II: Endeavour, by Charles Webster 

and Noble Frankland (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), pp. 214-220. 

25 Ibid.


situation in the theatre of war. The principles for using offensive air power would 

be very similar to those mentioned earlier. Interdiction operations, 26 which meant 

constant and concentrated attacks on transportation targets, would be aimed at 

depriving the enemy of his freedom of movement. The intensive air offensive would 

limit the opponent’s options for transferring strategic or tactical reserves into the 

combat zone. During the preparatory phase, while the invasion force was loading and 

at sea, the air force was to concentrate its efforts on the area around the landing area, 

striking targets such as the landing beaches or tactical reserves. In the final phase the 

main task of the air force would be to neutralise the local defences and to isolate the 

beachhead. The role of the air force would be emphasised during the assault phase 

due to the army’s lack of long-range weapon systems. The air force would therefore 

make a general exception to the rule that aircraft should not be assigned to directly 

support the ground forces. In practice, this would mean using ground attack planes in 

close air support tasks such as neutralization of the beach defences, help for assault 

troops involved in close-range fighting for the bridgehead, and transport support by 

dropping or carrying supplies to the bridgehead. 27 

If the landings were to take place outside the effective range of Royal Air 

Force bases as they partially did in 1956, the assault carrier groups would assume 

a more important role. The principles involved in employing carrier-borne aircraft 

were not radically different from those for land-based units. The concentration of 

air effort was the governing principle for employing carrier-borne aircraft as well. 

The combined force of all aircraft carriers belonging to the assault group was to be 

used simultaneously. However, the reason for this mainly stemmed from maritime 

requirements such as the protection of the carrier group, which required complex 

manoeuvres by the destroyers in the anti-submarine screen. 28 

In an ideal scenario, a relatively vulnerable carrier group force would be used 

only after the enemy air force was depleted by a strategic air offensive. Otherwise, 

a Carrier Group Commander would be compelled to allocation a large proportion of 

his air effort to protecting the carrier force from the hostile air force. When this factor 

was combined with unpredictable weather and the requirement to replenish supplies 

approximately every five days, the carrier air effort could be significantly reduced. 29 

The employment of Fleet Air Arm squadrons could not compensate for the 

26 

Interdiction was defined as “the disruption of the enemy’s communication system with the object of 

restricting his powers of movement”, A Precis of Lectures by the Land/Air Warfare Training Team, 

Northern Army Group, 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (Stationary Service RAOC, BAOR, 1953), p. 2. 

27 

Amphibious Warfare Handbook No.8 A, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious Warfare, 

1952. (Admirality No. CB4555, 1952), pp. 2-4. 

28 

Amphibious Warfare Handbook No.8 A, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious Warfare, pp. 

8-9. 

29 

Amphibious Warfare Handbook No.8 A, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious Warfare, pp. 

10-11.


demand to establish Royal Air Force air bases in the bridgehead as soon as the general 

situation permitted because direct support from the carries for a prolonged period 

was not economic use of force. The power of carriers lay in their manoeuvrability. 

As a result, the responsibility for supporting any subsequent land operations was 

generally allocated to the Royal Air Force squadrons. The use of air power in a 

ground campaign did not alter the basic requirements for an air offensive. The 

strategic bombing campaign would still be directed against targets that yielded 

long-term effects, as described earlier in this chapter. The use of bombers for direct 

support was considered an inappropriate diversion of resources. 

The deployment of lighter forces, such as ground attack planes, was also to be 

directed against movement. This kind of operation, called interdiction as mentioned 

earlier, would follow the principle of not deploying aircraft for tasks that could be 

performed by artillery or armour. The firepower of aircraft should be directed at 

targets further from the frontline to cause long-term damage. 30 The principal of 

concentration of effort against movement was again based on empirical experience. 

During the war, the British had used their ground attack planes for two types of 

missions that were still carried out at the time of the Suez Crisis: close air support 

and armed reconnaissance. Both types of missions were conducted during Operation 

Musketeer. 

Armed reconnaissance was a form of interdiction. Planes were given a specific 

area well behind enemy limes where they were to attack any target of tactical value. 31 

Close air support, in turn, was defined as “support given to the ground forces by air 

action against enemy troops actually engaged in the land battle.” 32 The closest form 

of close air support was called CabRank, which was a patrol of ground attack planes 

kept in the air and ready for use against targets specified by ground controllers. 33 

Experience in the Second World War had proven that armed reconnaissance 

was more effective than close air support when considering the number of enemy 

casualties caused. This experience had also shown the value of artillery. If artillery 

was available, it was usually more effective in destroying enemy positions than close 

air support because the main weapon systems of the British ground attack planes 

were rather unsophisticated unguided rockets or bombs. However, ground attack 

planes in a close air support role often had a better effect on morale than artillery. 34 

30 Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations, p. 55. 

31 Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront. Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-1945, (Lon- 

don: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 198-199. 

32 KA (The National Archives of Finland), T 26890/Hla 4, RAC Centre, Tactical Wing, 1956, Tactical 

Note “Air Support”. 

33 Notes from the Theatres of War, No. 20: Italy 1943/1944 (War Office, 1945), pp. 68-69 and Ian 

Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront, pp. XV and 2-3. 

34 Gooderson, pp. 192-193.


A Safe and Familiar Approach – First Plans 

Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 took the British by 

surprise. Although the British had anticipated this option as a possibility in Limited 

War scenarios produced by the Joint Planning Staff only two weeks before the actual 

nationalisation took place, the nationalisation was a genuine coup de main by Nasser. 

The Joint Planning Staff and subsequently the Chiefs of Staff Committee concluded 

that some 20 squadrons of Royal Air Force would be required to neutralise the 

Egyptian Air Force and to support subsequent land operations including an airborne 

operation. A large naval task force including three aircraft carriers and all serviceable 

amphibious vessels would be necessary implement a maritime blockade, to destroy 

the Egyptian Navy and to conduct seaborne landings of sufficient size at Port Said. 

The army would have to concentrate three divisions, a large pool of supporting units 

and the sole parachute brigade group. 35 

The Joint Planning Staff produced the first outline plan within days of the 

nationalisation. According to the plan the Royal Air Force was to execute two of 

its contingency plans to concentrate several light bomber squadrons and air defence 

squadrons to Cyprus. The Mediterranean Fleet was to be reinforced by two carriers 

and a large army element of several formations was to be assembled. Six weeks were 

needed to make the necessary preparations for the attack. 36 

The Joint Planning Staff also briefly considered the feasibility of using air power 

only to suppress the Egyptian defences and to unseat the Egyptian Government as 

tasked by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 37 However, according the Joint Planning 

Staff, “there would be a danger of not achieving the aim by bombing alone and of a 

hiatus occurring therefore other forces could be brought to bear against Egypt”. The 

plan included three phases: 

1. Preliminary move of the attacking forces within striking distance of Egypt, 

mainly Cyprus, Malta and Libya 

2. Maritime blockade and air action 

3. Assault on the northern end of the Suez Canal (Port Said) and a diversionary 

threat against Alexandria. 38 

The first plan did not have time to mature from a concept into a serious plan before 

it was rejected by the Task Force Commanders. They considered that an amphibious 

landing at Port Said, which is at northern entrance of the Canal, was not tactically 

feasible. Instead, the force was to land at Alexandria which had a much better port 

than Port Said. As a result, the land force –equivalent of four divisions – could be 

35 

NA DEFE 6/36, JP (56) 125, 18 July 1956, ”Forces for Limited War”. 

36 

NA DEFE 4/89, JP (56), 29 July 1956 “Availability of Forces for Action Against Egypt”. 

37 th NA DEFE 4/89, COS (56) 74 Meeting, 30 July 1956. 

38 

NA DEFE 6/37, JP (56) 31 July 1956, “Action Against Egypt, Outline Plan”.


concentrated along the Desert Road leading to Cairo relatively quickly. A good port 

would be needed to carry out the vast maintenance plan for some 77,000 men and 

11,000 vehicles. 39 The political advantage, of course, was that Alexandria offered 

an option to strike directly into the seat of Nasser’s power. According to the British 

calculations, the Egyptians would defend their capital. By luring them into fighting 

a repetition of the battle of the Pyramids, the main elements of the Egyptian army 

could be annihilated. 

The concept was refined into a plan by the end of August – the preliminary D-Day 

being in mid-September. The plan – that can be characterised as safe and traditional, 

yet in full harmony with existing amphibious doctrine – included five subsequent 

phases: movements, rapid neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force, amphibious and 

airborne assaults to gain a bridgehead, consolidation of the bridgehead and finally 

operations towards Cairo. 40 

The British were acquainted with the Egyptian base system – they were of course, 

constructed earlier by the British. The Egyptian Air Force was estimated to consist 

of some 300 combat planes including some 80 Mig-15 fighters and 45 IL-28 light 

bombers, most others being more or less obsolete types. 41 According to intelligence 

estimates, the Egyptians were still in a transition phase with their new equipment and 

not able to operate them efficiently until the end of 1956. Even after that operations 

would be hampered because of a primitive ground control system. 42 

Air Marshall Barnett estimated that it would take between 2-3 days to neutralise 

the Egyptian Air Force. Although the idea of a single surprise air attack just prior to 

the landings was considered amongst some planners, it was found not practicable. 

There were not enough planes to destroy the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and to 

execute and support airborne landings simultaneously. 43 Due to the lack of an original 

overall air plan for the Alexandria option, the details of consequent air operations 

can only be guessed. Presumably, they were directed to support the assault forces, to 

isolate the battle area and to destroy Egyptian military targets in depth in accordance 

with the doctrine. 

For the active operations, the Allied order of battle included over 500 aircraft. 

The number of planes fluctuated during the tedious planning process but the 

39 NA WO 32/16320, War Office, QM (3), 17 August 1956, ”Maintenance Plan for Operation Musketeer” 

and SHD 8 S 274, Etat-Major des Forces Armeés, 1618/EMFA/3. B.T.M.A/12 Avril 1957, “Les 

Transports de L’operation 700”. 

40 NA WO 288/91, HQ Allied Task Force, 29 August 1956, “Allied Land Force Operation Order No 1”. 

41 NA AIR 20/9554, HQ Air Task Force, ATF/TS.175/56, October 1956, “Overall Air Plan (Winter) for 

Operation Musketeer”. 

42 NA CAB 158/24, JIC (56) 33, 28 February 1956, “Egyptian Effectiveness in the Use of Soviet Air- 

craft”. 

43 Imperial War Museum, Department of Books and Documents, Papers of Air Chief Marshall Sir 

Denis Barnett (96/10/1), Barnett to the COS-Committee, 9 August 1956 and NA AIR 20/9961, 

Squadron Leader Penred to Senior Air Staff Officer, AHQL 612/TS/Plans, 17 August 1956.


average amount was some 520 aircraft. The Royal Air Force, especially the Bomber 

Command, was to play an important role in the plan. Three squadrons of the state 

of the art Valiant medium bombers along with some 10 squadrons of Canberra light 

bombers were to be deployed. This presented a major proportion of medium and 

light bombers in the Bomber Command’s order of battle. 44 

FORCE TYPE BASE NUMBER 

BOMBER Valiant (UK) 

Canberra B.2 (UK) 

Canberra B.6 (UK) 

Canberra Markers 

(UK) 

RECON. Canberra P.R.7 (UK) 

Meteor F.R.9 (UK) 

R.F. 84.F (Fr) 

GROUND ATTACK Venom 4 (UK) 

F. 84 F (Fr) 

Wyvern (UK) 

Corsair (Fr) 

Sea Venom (UK) 

Sea Hawk (UK) 

MARITIME Shackleton (UK) 

Avenger (Fr) 

Skyraider (UK) 

TRANSPORT Hastings (UK) 

Valetta (UK) 

Noratlas (Fr) 

Helicopters (UK) 

Pembroke (voice) 

(UK) 

Avenger (Fr) 

AIR DEFENCE Hunter 5 (UK) 

Meteor NF. 13 (UK) 

Hunter 4 (UK) 

Malta 

Cyprus 

Malta 

Cyprus 

Cyprus 

Malta 

Cyprus 

Cyprus 

Cyprus 

Carriers 

Carriers 

Carriers 

Carriers 

Malta 

Carriers 

Carriers 

Cyprus 

Cyprus 

Cyprus 

Carriers 

Cyprus 

Carriers 

Cyprus 

Cyprus 

Malta 

Table 1: The Composition of the Allied Air Forces 45 

44 NA AIR 8/2090, Royal Air Force Order of Battle as 1 December 1956 and NA 2081, ACAS (ops), 

21 November 1956, “Deployment of Bomber Forces to the Middle East”. 

45 NA AIR 20/9554, HQ Air Task Force, ATF/TS.175/56, October 1956, “Overall Air Plan (Winter) 

for Operation Musketeer”. The table does not include aircraft of the French Air Force that were 

deployed at Israel for air defence and air transport. 

24 

40 

32 

20 

7 

16 

9 

48 

36 

9 

32 

17 

50 

16 

12 

8 

12 

20 

40 

18 

1 

2 

25 

8 

4


Victory through Air – Musketeer Revise 

The resolute attitude of Prime Minister Eden and his ad hoc war cabinet, the Egypt 

Committee, deteriorate slowly during late August. The public opinion, American 

scepticism and unavoidable involvement of the United Nations obscured the political 

objectives. This, in turn, reflected to military planning. The D-Day was postponed 

and various studies on the consequences of the postponement of operations were 

produced. 46 

The operational plans were also scrutinised in the course of time. The plan to land 

at Alexandria was not without problems. The forecast of heavy civilian casualties 

caused by the aerial and naval bombardment and apparent inflexibility – almost 

a three weeks warning time was needed for the movements – impaired political 

expediencies. This was fully realised by General Charles Keightley, the Commanderin-Chief 

of the operation, who detested the Alexandria plan from the beginning. 

As a result, he introduced a novel idea, Musketeer Revise, probably encouraged 

by the Minister of Defence, Walter Moncton as early as on 17 August. According 

to Keightley’s top secret note to Chief Air Marshall Dickson, the Chairman of the 

COS-committee, “the present plan should be modified by carrying out a prolonged 

and intensive air attack in the hope of making Nasser surrender without an assault.” 

The Egyptian armed forces and oil were the core of the new concept. 47 

The new concept was temporarily withdrawn due to the resistance of the Task 

Force Commanders, responsible for carrying out the tactical plans, but general 

Keightley had an opportunity to re-introduce the concept in the beginning of 

September when the D-day was postponed once more. Keightley, perhaps partially 

realising the new world order better than Task Force Commanders characterised the 

consequences of the bombardment of Alexandria as causing “damage of civilian 

town leaving a scar for many years”. The most appealing quality of the new concept, 

was, however its evident feasibility as it “can be put on a short notice, and it is not 

affected by postponement”. 48 

The new concept, later to be developed in to a plan, was to include three phases: 

1. Neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force. 

2. An air offensive combined with a psychological campaign aimed at destroying 

the Egyptian will to fight. 

49 

3. Occupation of the Canal Zone. 

46 

NA DEFE 6/37, JP (56) 147, 26 August 1956, “Operation Musketeer – Implications of Postponement”. 

47 

NA DEFE 11/137, Keightley to Dickson, 19 August 1956. 

48 

NA DEFE 11/138, An undated note (either 4 or 5 September) by General Keightley on Operation 

Musketeer. 

49 

NA WO 288/91, Headquarters Allied Land Forces, 11 Oct 1956, “Operation Musketeer – the Winter 

Plan”,


The new concept was met with mixed feelings and it divided the opinion of 

planners at all levels. The criticism, which continued until the execution of the 

operations centred on three factors: 

1. How to reliably predict the collapse of the Egyptian will and moral? Would 

the Egyptian people rise against Nasser? 

2. How long should the Allies continue the bombing offensive to achieve the 

breaking point? 

3. 

Would the British and French governments withstand international pressure to 

cease hostilities during a prolonged air offensive? 

In spite of the criticism, the concept was accepted and finally developed into a 

plan. It was supported at least by the Chairman of the COS-committee, Chief Air 

Marshall William Dickson; the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Dermont Boyle and 

by the Minister of Defence, Walter Monckton, who had a sceptical view on the use of 

force throughout the autumn. 50 According to Rhodes James, the change of plan was 

an unpleasant surprise for Prime Minister Anthony Eden. 51 He was not convinced 

of the new concept even after a private conference with General Keightley. Yet, he 

chose not to oppose his senior military advisers and the new concept was accepted 

by the Egypt Committee on 10 September. 52 

The air offensive was based on an assumption that the Egyptian will would to 

collapse. But how to produce a reliable assessment of their morale? The British 

– nor the French – did not have an adequate answer to this fundamental question. 

The views of the service intelligence agencies were not unanimous, though the 

Egyptians were in general thought to be lower category opponents in the face of 

the modern war machine. 53 The Joint Intelligence Committee54 , responsible for the 

co-ordination of the British intelligence community, produced a surprisingly spare 

amount of documents during the crisis and it is not known whether the reports of the 

British ambassador suggesting heavy resistance were delivered to the Task Force 

Commanders. 55 

The overall intelligence arrangements were subjected to criticism after the 

crisis was over. The Task Force Commanders were unsatisfied with the flow of 

50 

On Monckton’s views on the use of force, see, e.g., Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956, A Personal Account 

(London: Book Club Associates, 1978) p. 133 and Anthony Nutting, No End of A Lesson, (London: 

Constable & Company Ltd., 1967), pp. 106-107. 

51 

James Rhodes, Anthony Eden (London: Weidenweld and Nicholson, 1986), pp. 508-509. 

52 

Jonathan Pearson, Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis. Reluctant Gamble (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 

2003), pp. 68-69. 

53 

NA ADM 116/6137, The Director of Naval Intelligence to the First Sea Lord, 25 September 1956 

and WO 288/98, G(Int) HQ 2 Corps, 19 August 1956, “An Estimation of Probable Egyptian Reactions 

to Present Threat”. 

54 

For the composition and tasks of the committee, see NA CAB 158/39, JIC (57) 123, 29 November 

1957. 

55 

NA AIR 20/9229, JIC (ME) “Bi-Weekly Intelligence Review No 10”, 27 September 1956.


information. 56 The far end of the criticism was provided by Douglas Dodds-Parker, 

the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Psychological Warfare. According to 

his testimony, the committee was not able to produce anything useful due to the 

lack of intelligence. 57 The evidence points to secrecy taken to the extremes which 

hampered both political and military preparations. The defection of Guy Burgess 

and Donald McLean that shook the whole British intelligence community was still 

in fresh memory. According to Scott Lucas, perhaps the most renown researcher 

of the Suez intelligence affairs, the situation was even more grim: MI6 was not 

under adequate control of the Foreign Office and pursued its own policies. The claim 

by Lucas might be exaggerated even though ever since the Suez Crisis we have 

seen several examples of the manipulation of information to serve one’s political 

ambitions. 

Targeting 

The over-optimistic concept of winning the war through bombing begun to 

deteriorate as soon as it was accepted. The Task Force Commanders were not 

convinced, not even the Air Task Force Commander, of the probable outcome. As 

a result, the amphibious assault was re-attached to the plan. It included two options 

that were dependent on the results of air offensive. If the bombing proved to break 

the Egyptian resistance, the Canal Zone was to be occupied by rapidly deployable 

airborne forces and an occupation force taking advantage of fast sealift. If the 

Egyptians, however, continued fighting in spite of severe bombing, a traditional 

amphibious assault would be launched at Port Said. 58 

The air plan was divided into three phases which were in harmony with the overall 

concept: 

1. Neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force. 

2. “Attack of objectives which – in combination of psychological warfare – will 

lead to the collapse of the Egyptian will to resist”. 

3. 

Support of land and naval operations leading to the occupation of the Canal 

Zone. 59 

The neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force was to take minimum time – two 

days. Airfields housing IL-28 light bombers were to be primary targets due to their 

56 TNA ADM 116/6209, “Naval Report on Operations Musketeer”, 15 February 1956 and WO 288/78, 

“2 Corps Commander’s Report”, Annex 1, 1 February 1956. 

57 Liddell-Hart Centre for Military Archives, Suez Oral History Project, SUEZOHP 6, interview of Sir 

Douglas Dodds-Parker. 

58 NA ADM 205/132, “Operation Musketeer Revise – Appreciation and Outline Plan” by the Task 

Force Commanders, 14 September 1956. 

59 TNA AIR 24/2426, Air Task Force/TS 287/56, 27 November 1956, “Report on Operation Musket- 

eer”.


potential to attack three congested Allied airfields at Cyprus. Operations of the 

Bomber Command squadrons, aimed at rendering the airfields unusable, would take 

place only during the night. After that ground attack planes attacking at the first light 

would destroy the enemy planes on the ground. The ground attack planes on the 

carriers would operate at maximum rates to take advantage of their relatively short 

distance from the targets and limited endurance of the Carrier Group. 60 

Phase two was the core of the air offensive. The planners realised that “No precise 

estimate can be given as to the length of this phase” but preparations were made for 

30 days. 61 The plan was based on the destruction of oil facilities and communications. 

The Joint Intelligence Bureau, an agency specialised on economic intelligence, 

produced a study on the Egyptian oil facilities and transportation system. According 

to the study, the destruction of the bulk capacity would leave the Egyptians with oil 

only for a few weeks. Attacks on the distribution system would only enhance the 

effect. 62 An earlier study produced in the beginning of August, indicated that an oil 

denial operation was feasible if the storage system was subjected to low level attacks 

by both bombers and ground attack planes. 63 

The infrastructure of communications was well known to the British. It was based 

on the railway network. According to another study by the Joint Intelligence Bureau, 

air attacks against railways, especially against bridges, would paralyse most of the 

domestic cargo as well as passenger traffic. 64 

The targeting was co-ordinated by a special Targets Committee chaired by 

General Keightley himself. By mid-September the amount of bridges in the target 

lists had fallen from twenty to eight. Effort to prevent the Egyptians movement was, 

however, to be boosted by a vigorous interdiction programme. The sites of bridges 

were to be subjected to strafing by ground attack planes and armed reconnaissance 

along major roads would accomplish the interdictions. 65 The amount of transport 

targets decreased and by October only two bridges remained in the target lists – 

eventually both of them were spared. There are at least three reasons for this. Likely, 

the long-term damage was considered to be too extensive. Secondly, the Anglo- 

French land forces advancing along the Canal could face problems if the damage to 

the bridges was too extensive. The third reason is practical. At the time before guided 

munitions, bridges were extremely hard targets to destroy. According to an estimate, 

the destruction of 11 bridges would take some 500 sorties by Canberra light bombers 

with 3-ton bomb loads if the bombing error was some 100 yards. Bombing errors 

60 

TNA AIR 24/2426, Air Task Force/TS 287/56, 27 November 1956, “Report on Operation Musketeer”. 

61 

Ibid. 

62 

NA WO 288/162, JIB, 8 September 1956, “Vulnerability of Egyptian Oil”. 

63 

NA 20/10601, “The Feasibility of Disrupting Egypt’s Oil Supplies by Bombing”, A note by the Air 

Ministry, 3 August 1956. 

64 

NA WO 288/162, JIB, 8 September 1956, “Vulnerability of Egyptian Transportation System”. 

65 

NA AIR 20/9583, SD 12, 24 September 1956, “Operation Musketeer: Outline of Air Plan”.


raising to 200 meters, due to the flak, for example, would multiply the amount of 

sorties by four. 66 

Nasser realised the importance of radio as a means to deliver his message to the 

masses. The propaganda of Radio Cairo had been a nuisance for the British for some 

time. As a result, Radio Cairo and its substations were among primary targets for the 

Allied bomber effort. 

The final phase of air operations was designed to support the landing and 

occupation of the Canal Zone. Majority of the efforts by ground attack planes would 

be directed to isolate the battle area, to suppress AA-defences and to provide direct 

support to the landing force, including an airborne landing in co-ordination with the 

Joint Fire Support Plan. 67 

The targeting list produced by the Targeting Committee in mid-October is 

revealing. The amount of transportation targets had fallen to two, as mentioned 

previously. As a result, oil targets establish the core of the campaign designed to 

break the will of the Egyptians. 68 

DAY Target Category 

D – D+1 Egyptian Airfields 

Radio Cairo 

Block ships (2) 

Egyptian Navy 

D+2 Egyptian Airfields 

Army Concentrations (3) 

Radio Cairo (3) 

Oil targets (17) 

Transport targets (2) 

D+3 Egyptian Airfields 

Military targets (4) 

Oil targets (26) 

Coastal defences 

Table 2: Target categories, 11 October 1956 

If required 

If required 

66 

NA AIR 20 /10217, An Appreciation by the Bomber Command, 11 October 1956. 

67 

TNA AIR 24/2426, Air Task Force/TS 287/56, 27 November 1956, “Report on Operation Musketeer”. 

68 th NA AIR 20/10215, Minutes of the 5 Meeting of the Targets Committee, 11 October 1956.


The Air Campaign that did not Take Place 

The formal decision to launch Operation Musketeer took place on 25 October 

1956. The decision to use force, had, however, been decided earlier – probably 

on 14 October when a high level French delegation paid a visit to Prime Minister 

Eden. Things began to happen rapidly after the visit. On 18 October the Air Ministry 

ordered execution of Operation Challenger, the re-deployment of Bomber Command 

squadrons to the Middle East (Malta and Cyprus). 69 On the next day, the French 

commenced the loading of transport vessels in Algiers and Marseille and the French 

fighter squadrons flew from Metropolitan France to Cyprus on 22 October. 70 

The Royal Air Force finished the deployment of its bomber squadrons to 

Malta and Cyprus by 30 October. 71 The first phase of air operations began on the 

evening of 31 October and continued for two days. The results of night bombing 

were ineffective. According to the report by the Operational Research Branch of 

the Bomber Command, there was a lot to improve especially in the high level night 

bombing techniques: “The bombing accuracy of the Valiant was about 1,000 yards, 

Malta Canberras 800 yards and the Cyprus Canberras 500 yards.” The low-lever 

attacks in daylight, however, annihilated the bulk of the Egyptian Air Force during 

the first two days as planned. 72 

The next phase of the plan was cancelled before it was put into a practice. The 

Egypt Committee decided against the destruction of the Egyptian oil installations 

because repercussions in other Arab countries could damage the United Kingdom’s 

own oil interests. 73 According to the instructions, the bombing campaign should 

concentrate only on military targets. 74 

The hectic timetable and the decision to abandon the destruction of the Egyptian 

oil installations dropped the bottom from the psychological operations. Not even 

Radio Cairo was silenced at the first phase of the operation despite General Keightley 

having placed this radio station on the list of targets that were to be attacked first. 75 

The attack took place only on 2 November, but a raid by twenty Canberra-bombers 

69 

AIR 20/10203 Air Ministry to Bomber Command, 2445/ACAS (ops)/TS/Oct 18 1956, “Operation 

Challenger”. 

70 

SHD 8 S 274, Etat-Major des Forces Armeés, 1618/EMFA/3. B.T.M.A/12 Avril 1957, “Les Transports 

de L’operation 700 » and Imperial War Museum, 96/10/1, papers of Air Chief Marshal Denis 

Barnett, Groupement Mixte No 1, 320/GM1/OPS/TS/27 Novembre 1956, “Rapport du General De 

Brigade Aerienne Brohon sur la Creation, L’ installation et L’activite du Groupment Mixte No 1 a 

Chypre”. 

71 

AIR 8/2090, A note by Wing Commander Hughes, 12 Nov 1956, “Deployment of Bomber Forces to 

the Middle East”. 

72 

NA AIR 14/4441, Bomber Command, Operational Research Branch, Report number 355: “Bombing 

and Ground Attack Operations during Operation Musketeer” and AIR 8/2111, Air Ministry, D.D. 

(Ops), TS 301/III, 17 February 1957, “Operation Musketeer”. 

73 th NA CAB 134/1216, EC (56) 37 Meeting, 1 November 1956. 

74 

NA AIR 8/1940, COSKEY 20, 2 November 1956. 

75 

Papers of General Sir Charles Keightley, Transcripts: rear link communications Episkopi-London.


failed to destroy it. Further missions by ground attack planes were not carried out 

owing to the possibility of causing civilian casualties and the leaflet missions were 

cancelled as well. 76 

Due to the abandonment of the initial timetable, there was no concentrated air 

effort against the Egyptian Army installations. They were subjected to bombing 

from 2 November. Large targets, such as Huckstep Camp and Almaza Barracks, 

were subjected to aerial attacks. In addition, the air campaign included an extensive 

number of battlefield interdiction sorties aimed at preventing reinforcements from 

reaching Port Said from the morning of 3 November. 77 

On 4 November, the air effort was redirected because the landing sequence had 

been altered. According to the Air Task Force’s overall plan, most of the attack sorties 

were directed against the defences of Port Said. 78 Most of the sorties near Port Said 

were flown by naval aircraft that strafed the coastal and anti-aircraft positions and 

other static defences throughout the day. The land-based ground attack planes were 

still used for interdiction. 79 The bomber force, the role of which diminished after the 

Egyptian Air Force was destroyed, made to raids against Huckstep Barracks and as 

a diversion against coastal defences near Alexandria. 80 

PERIOD PROPORTION OF TOTAL EFFORT 

Day 1 

Day 2 

Day 3 

Day 4 

Day 5 

Day 6 

Airfields Barracks Armed 

Reconnaissance 

96% 

68% 

34% 

22% 

19% 

11% 

- 

25% 

16% 

8% 

15% 

- 

- 

- 

33% 

8% 

15% 

25% 

Table 3: Allocation of air effort against different target categories 

Defences Others 

- 

- 

- 

39% 

47% 

60% 

4% 

7% 

17% 

22% 

10% 

4% 

76 

See Brian Cull with David Nicolle and Shlomo Aloni, Wings Over Suez, pp. 237-239. For a description 

of the raid from the time, see NA AIR 20/9967, Bomber Wing Cyprus, “Report on Operation 

Musketeer, annex D”, 30 December 1956. 

77 

NA AIR 14/4030, Admiralty, Department of Operational Research, August 1957, Report No.34: 

“Carrier Operations in Support of Operation Musketeer” and Brian Cull with David Nicolle and 

Shlomo Aloni, Wings Over Suez, pp. 248-262. 

78 

NA AIR 20/10206, Air Task Force Headquarters, 3 November 1956, “Operation Telescope, Overall 

Air Plan”. 

79 

ADM 116/6104, Office of the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers, 14 December 1956, “Operation Musketeer 

– Reports of Proceedings – Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers”, pp. 23-24. 

80 


and Ground Attack Operations during Operation Musketeer”.


Due to international pressure to bring the hostilities to a quick end, the landings at 

Port Said were decided to be carried out on an accelerated timetable. The main assault 

force was not available as it was still sailing in several convoys from Malta. It was 

decided to push up the parachute landings. They were to take place on the morning 

of 5 November, about 24 hours before the amphibious assault was to take place. 81 

The parachute landings took place in accordance with the plans. The emphasis of the 

air campaign shifted to from indirect support to direct support of the land campaign. 

The naval aircraft took the main burden for this phase by carrying out most of the 

several hundred sorties against local defences and by providing successful CabRank 

for the parachute force and the seaborne assault force landing on 6 November. 82 It 

was not the lack of air support, but the lack of political support – feared by the Joint 

Planning Staff from the beginning – that halted the campaign during the same day 

the successful seaborne attack was carried out. 

Conclusions 

The concept, and subsequent plan, of destroying the Egyptian will to fight through 

air action creates mixed feelings. The targeting of the air offensive was done in 

accordance with the experiences of the Second World War. Communications and oil 

were found to be what would today be called “centres of gravity”. It is safe to presume 

that the destruction of the communications and oil would have caused severe troubles 

for the Egyptians. But were they the real centre of gravity? Would the mechanical 

destruction of means to move cause the collapse of the entire Egyptian morale? Were 

the fundamentals of presuming a rapid collapse of the Egyptian resistance sound? 

We shall never know the exact answer because the prolonged air campaign was not 

carried out in accordance with the original concept. Yet, the British were very well 

aware of the facts because of their experiences during the Second World War. The 

German will was never crushed by aerial bombardment and neither was the British 

moral destroyed during the Blitz. Was the poor performance of the Egyptian Armed 

Forces in the 1948 war against Israel one of the facts that lead to underestimainge the 

Egyptians? Perhaps so, but there were also voices stressing the unity of the Egyptian 

people. Apparently – as this has taken place several times since the Suez Crisis – it 

is very easy to underestimate the morale of your opponent, especially if he does not 

possess your technology or way of life. 

It is also apparent, that the British overestimated the capabilities of the Bomber 

Command. Bombing techniques as well as equipment did not enable the precision 

bombing required to destroy the targets, especially in the darkness. The need to 

81 

NA WO 288/91, Headquarters Allied Task Force, 4 November 1956, “Allied Land Force Operation 

Instruction No 7”. 

82 


and Ground Attack Operations during Operation Musketeer”.


minimise civilian casualties and the rather small amount of aircraft put the Bomber 

Command into a totally different situation than what it had faced during the massive 

areal bombings of the Second World War. On the other hand, the bomber operations, 

as well as the overall nature of the warfare, were in a transition phase. The role 

of nuclear weapons and the future of conventional bomber operations were in the 

melting pot both technically and doctrinally. Air Marshall Slessor, the Chief of Air 

Staff at the time when the Royal Air Force War Manual was produced, warned in his 

introductory note that the new technology, including nuclear weapons “may radically 

change the face of war in a way that no one can now forecast with any assurance”. 

The failure of bombing operations was rectified by a very traditional employment 

of tactical air forces. In spite of the unsuccessful bomber employment, the Egyptian 

Air Force was annihilated in two days, the parachute landing was carried out and 

supported successfully and no large-scale Egyptian reinforcement arrived at Port 

Said to prevent or even hamper the landings. But in the end it did not matter. Unsound 

strategy can seldom be mended by sound tactics.

Pat r i c k fa c o n * 

Francia 

L’Armée de l’Air française face aux armistices de juin 

1940 

La croisée des chemins 

plus d’un mois de bataille ininterrompue, contre un adversaire 

disposant de moyens très supérieurs aux nôtres, vous avez, en toutes 

«Après 

circonstances, fait preuve des plus belles qualités militaires, accompli 

héroïquement votre devoir. Par votre courage, votre dévouement, votre esprit de 

sacrifice, votre foi dans les destinées de la Patrie, l’armée de l’Air est devenue le 

symbole des plus belles qualités de l’âme française. Votre effort n’a pas été vain. 

Les pertes considérables que vous avez infligées à l’ennemi l’ont obligé à engager à 

fond toutes ses forces aériennes; vos interventions dans la lutte ont souvent ralenti 

ses colonnes et brisé leur élan. Je suis fier d’être à votre tête. Sans cesse en contact 

avec vous, partageant vos joies et vos peines de combattants, je sais que je puis 

entièrement compter sur vous. Je vous demande de rester pour tous un exemple. 

Souvenez-vous que vous n’avez pas été vaincus ». 1 C’est en ces termes que, à la 

fin du mois de juin 1940, son commandant en chef, le général Vuillemin, s’adresse 

à l’armée de l’Air pour saluer le rôle qu’elle a joué dans l’épuisante et dure bataille 

qui vient de s’achever. 

Le bilan d’une bataille 

A la date du 25 juin 1940, l’armée de l’Air compte en effet 541 tués, 364 blessés 

et 105 disparus, soit 40 % de ses officiers et 20 % de ses sous-officiers et hommes 

de troupe navigants. Les unités de chasse engagées au combat ont subi une véritable 

saignée. Pour un effectif moyen d’une vingtaine de pilotes, les groupes de cette spécialité 

perdent, pour nombre d’entre eux, presque tout leur personnel : 6 tués et 11 

blessés au I/1, 8 tués et 9 blessés au II/1, 5 tués,13 blessés et 3 prisonniers au III/2, 

11 tués, 6 blessés et 2 prisonniers au I/3, 10 tués, 8 blessés et 2 prisonniers au III/3, 

10 tués, 14 blessés et 1 prisonnier au II/4, 12 tués, 13 blessés et 3 prisonniers au I/6, 

9 tués, 23 blessés et 1 prisonnier au III/7, 8 tués et 6 blessés au I/8, 9 tués, 10 blessés 

et 6 prisonniers à la 2/13. Bon nombre de ces blessés, plus ou moins remis, regagnent 

même leurs formations afin d’y reprendre la lutte avant l’arrêt des hostilités. 

Le bombardement n’est guère mieux loti. Un rapport de fin de campagne consigne : 

« Dans l’ensemble, nos formations de bombardement furent très éprouvées : certai- 

* Chargé de mission au Centre d'études stratégiques aérospatiales (CESA). 

1 

Ordre général du général Vuillemin aux officiers, sous-officiers et soldats des forces aériennes, 16 

juin 1940, SHD/DAA 1D2.


nes perdirent plus de la moitié de leurs effectifs, dans l’impossibilité où se trouvait le 

commandement (…) d’assurer une protection suffisante aux expéditions ». 2 

Les pertes en avions sont elles aussi très importantes. Si les statistiques varient 

d’une source à l’autre et qu’il n’est guère possible d’en évaluer précisément le chiffre, 

entre 850 et 900 appareils ont été détruits, toutes causes confondues. La ventilation 

des dommages subis par l’aviation française est révélatrice d’un certain nombre de 

particularités de la lutte menée en mai-juin. Près de 400 appareils (la moitié environ 

du total) ont été détruits au combat, sous les coups des chasseurs et des mitrailleurs 

des bombardiers ennemis ou encore d’une Flak omniprésente jusqu’au bout, sans 

compter 240 autres dans des accidents ; mais au moins 230 (plus d’un quart) ont été 

écrasés sur leurs terrains mêmes par les chasseurs et les bombardiers ennemis. Ce 

dernier chiffre rend bien compte de la pression extrême et constante qu’ont exercée 

les forces aériennes allemandes sur les aérodromes alliés. Si on compare les pertes 

subies en six semaines avec les effectifs déployés en métropole au commencement 

de la bataille (1 972), ce sont 45 % des appareils français qui disparaissent dans la 

grande tourmente de mai-juin 1940 – et près de 70 % si on ne prend en compte que 

les seuls avions disponibles (1 286). 3 

Les forces aériennes françaises ne se sont pas pour autant évaporées lorsque survient 

le cessez-le-feu du 25 juin. Les pertes qu’elles ont subies ont été en partie 

compensées par des appareils sortis d’usine, ou encore venus tout droit de l’entrepôt 

de Châteaudun ou bien pris en compte par les groupes de chasse ou de bombardement 

sur les terrains mêmes des avionneurs. A la fin des opérations, l’armée de l’Air 

compte 29 groupes de chasse, 33 groupes de bombardement et 15 groupes de reconnaissance, 

ce qui représente des moyens non négligeables dont une partie importante 

est stationnée en Afrique du Nord, où elle n’a rien à redouter de la part de l’adversaire, 

au moins dans l’immédiat. Mieux encore, elle dispose d’imposantes réserves 

encore jamais utilisées. En juillet 1940, le général Redempt, directeur des services 

du matériel, comptabilise 4 238 avions dont 1 739 en ligne, sans compter ceux que 

l’entrepôt de Châteaudun a dépêchés en Algérie, au Maroc et en Tunisie. A la même 

époque, les éléments de première ligne sous les ordres de Vuillemin disposent de 

575 chasseurs modernes, 300 bombardiers, dont 250 modernes, et 200 appareils de 

renseignement. Deux mois plus tard, les Allemands et les Italiens recensent plus de 

2 800 chasseurs, bombardiers et avions de tous types entreposés sous leur contrôle, 

en zone non occupée. 

De tels chiffres relativisent à l’évidence la thèse d’une armée de l’Air qui aurait 

purement et simplement disparu dans la tourmente de ce printemps tragique. Ce 

n’est pas pour autant que l’aviation française forme un ensemble vraiment cohérent, 

2 Historique de l’aviation de bombardement pendant la campagne de 1940, s. d., SHD/DAA 3D498. 

3 Voir, à ce propos, Patrick Facon, L’armée de l’Air dans la tourmente, La bataille de France, Paris, 

Economica, 1997 et, du même auteur, Batailles dans le ciel de France, mai-juin 1940, Saint-Malo, 

Editions Pascal Galodé, 2010.

l’ar m é e d e l’air f r a n ç a i s e fa C e a u x a r m i s t i C e s d e j u i n 1940 81 

capable d’être engagé sur le champ au combat. La cohésion opérationnelle s’est largement 

diluée, les liens tactiques sont presque inexistants et les centaines d’avions 

entreposés en Afrique du Nord n’ont ni la logistique, ni la maintenance, ni les réserves 

qui leur permettraient de durer en cas de reprise des hostilités. Hormis quelques 

ateliers industriels de l’Air ou centres de montage d’avions achetés aux Etats-Unis, 

cette partie de l’empire ne dispose d’aucune structure industrielle aéronautique. La 

situation de l’aviation de chasse illustre parfaitement cette problématique et fait de 

l’idée selon laquelle la guerre pouvait être poursuivie depuis l’autre rive de la Méditerranée 

une pure spéculation de l’esprit. Certes, les groupes de cette spécialité sont 

théoriquement capables de prendre part à des opérations contre le territoire italien 

ou d’assurer la couverture des territoires sur lesquels ils stationnent. « Mais, pratiquement, 

sur ces quatorze groupes, dix sont très éprouvés par les pertes en personnel 

et en matériel subies pendant la campagne de France, explique un rapport. (…) Les 

pilotes survivants ont besoin d’un long repos pour se remettre des fatigues surhumaines 

qui leur ont été imposées pendant ces six semaines. L’effectif pilote doit être 

complété, en particulier par le personnel encore en traitement dans les hôpitaux. Le 

matériel avion a besoin d’une révision très sérieuse des moteurs et des cellules : 

opérations longues pour lesquelles les groupes armés de Curtiss, de Dewoitine 520 

et de Bloch 152 ne disposent à peu près que des seules ressources de leur échelon 

roulant… » 4 Les formations aériennes qui ont franchi la Méditerranée pour gagner 

l’Afrique du Nord à partir du 17 juin 1940 ont dû laisser sur place leurs échelons 

roulants et perdre, de ce fait, une bonne partie de leur autonomie opérationnelle. 

Le rapport des forces avec l’Italie, sur laquelle Vuillemin entend engager ses 

forces, dans le cadre d’une vaste offensive, jusque dans les dernières heures de la bataille, 

est d’autant plus défavorable que les éléments de la Royal Air Force déployés 

en Méditerranée disposent de moyens presque inexistants, de l’ordre de 400 appareils. 

La Regia Aeronautica, l’aviation indépendante, en aligne entre 2 500 et 3 000 

dont plus de la moitié de première ligne (ses chasseurs sont quelque peu dépassés 

mais ses bombardiers sont modernes), tandis que la Regia Marina (l’aéronautique 

navale) ne constitue guère une menace. 

La grande migration en Afrique du Nord 

Dès le début de la bataille de France, Vuilllemin n’a cessé de redouter l’ouverture 

d’un second front au sud-est. Face à l’adversaire potentiel que constitue l’Italie, le 

commandant en chef des forces aériennes est partisan d’une politique prudente et 

défensive. Il n’envisage de bombardements sur le territoire ennemi que dans le seul 

cas où les Italiens prenaient l’initiative d’attaques aériennes contre des objectifs militaires 

ou civils, en précisant que la riposte devant être proportionnée à l’agression. 

Si la Regia Aeronautica venait à bombarder des agglomérations, l’aviation française 

4 Historique de l’aviation de chasse pendant la campagne de 1940, s. d., SHD/DAA 3D497.


répondrait par l’attaque d’objectifs de la même catégorie, mais aussi des ports utilisés 

comme bases navales et des usines situées en environnement urbain. « Aucune 

action de riposte contre les objectifs autres que les objectifs militaires, navals et les 

bases aériennes ne sera entreprise sans ordre formel du général commandant en chef 

des forces aériennes », fait savoir le commandant en chef des forces aériennes au 

commencement de juin 1940. 5 

Lorsque, le 10 juin, les Italiens prennent l’initiative des hostilités, le grand quartier 

général aérien interdit de prendre une quelconque attitude offensive contre les 

Italiens, tout en demandant au commandant des forces aériennes d’AFN et d’Orient- 

Méditerranée de se tenir prêts à déclencher « une riposte soit sur ses ordres, soit de 

leur propre chef en cas d’agression aérienne ». 6 Moins d’une semaine plus tard, la 

situation étant sans issue, Vuillemin décide d’agir pour sauver ce qui peut encore 

l’être. La concentration d’importants moyens aériens dans la partie méridionale du 

pays ne va pas sans poser de problèmes aigus. Ce sont ainsi des centaines d’avions, 

parfois 250 à 300 par terrain, impossibles à disperser, qui sont confinés sur 

un nombre d’aérodromes très réduit sur lesquels la Luftwaffe peut fondre à n’importe 

quel moment et entraîner un désastre sans précédent (Ussel, Avord, Rochefort, 

Ozon, Saint-Symphorien). Redoutant la désorganisation qui ne cesse de grandir et 

pourrait fort bien l’empêcher d’exercer à brève échéance son contrôle sur les unités 

aériennes, le commandant en chef des forces aériennes est également préoccupé 

par le destin tragique qui attendrait ces centaines d’appareils si une capitulation ou 

un armistice venait à les surprendre dans de telles circonstances. Aussi, animé par 

le souci fondamental de sauvegarder un capital précieux pour l’armée de l’Air, se 

résout-il à ordonner le passage en Afrique du Nord des avions qui se montreraient 

capables de franchir la Méditerranée. Le 16 juin, peu avant de quitter Châtelguyon et 

de gagner Agen, il signe une instruction qui prévoit le transfert en Algérie, au Maroc 

et en Tunisie de 16 groupes de chasse et de 18 groupes de bombardement, le presque 

totalité des moyens en appareils modernes. Dans le même temps, il informe le général 

Pennès, commandant les forces aériennes d’Afrique du Nord, d’avoir à préparer 

l’arrivée de ces formations. Les échelons roulants reçoivent pout instruction de gagner 

Bordeaux et Marseille afin d’y être embarqués. Des doutes ne s’en produisent 

pas moins dans les unités dont les avions disposent d’un rayon d’action insuffisant: 

«Nos pilotes, explique l’historique de l’aviation de chasse, surtout des unités armées 

de Morane-Saulnier et de Bloch 152, n’envisagent pas sans une appréhension justifiée 

l’éventualité d’une traversée de 900 km avec des appareils dont le rayon d’action 

n’excède pas 800 km. Devront-ils donc se résoudre à incendier ceux de leurs avions 

qui ne pourraient échapper à l’ennemi ? » 7 Le 18, le mouvement de repli vers le sud 

5 

Instruction particulière du général Vuillemin au commandant de la zone d’opérations aériennes Alpes, 

16 mai 1940, SHD/DAA 1D2. 

6 

Ordre particulier du général commandant en chef les forces aériennes, 10 juin 1940, SHD/DAA 

1D2. 

7 

Historique de l’aviation de chasse pendant la campagne de 1940, s. d., SHD/DAA 3D497.


s’étend à toutes les unités non indispensables à la poursuite de la bataille. Il concerne 

aussi de nombreux avions modernes jamais engagés sur le front, mais capables de 

voler, même s’ils n’ont pas d’armement ou doivent subir d’importantes opérations 

de transformation. 

L’exode dans lequel s’engagent les formations aériennes ne va pas sans poser de 

difficultés : « La préparation de ce départ, analyse le chef d’un groupe de chasse, est 

laborieuse et réduite d’ailleurs, faute de moyens, à sa plus simple expression. Des 

réservoirs d’ailes supplémentaires sont fixés aux plans des avions. Il n’existe, pour 

préparer cette navigation risquée que des documents assez sommaires : cartes aéronautiques 

à très petite échelle, cartes d’indicateurs des chemins de fer ou même atlas 

des écoliers du village de Saint-Laurent-la-Salanque. Les pilotes s’inspirent de ces 

éléments pour établir, à leur usage personnel, les croquis rudimentaires où sont reportés 

tant bien que mal les caps successifs de navigation. Les décollages des terrains 

de la Salanque s’effectuent dans des conditions très difficiles : la piste est encombrée 

par une quantité considérable d’avions de toute provenance, dont beaucoup sont en 

panne ou détruits. Un Bloch 174 qui doit servir d’avion-guide à un détachement (…) 

entre en collision, en roulant au sol, avec un bombardier (…) et prend feu ». 8 Audessus 

de la Méditerranée, le guidage est assuré par des MB.174, des DB-7 ou encore 

des Potez 63.11 : « Mais les conditions atmosphériques, au voisinage des côtes 

de France, dans un rayon de 200 km environ, sont mauvaises : brume, vent violent, 

ou même orages locaux avec grains de pluie et de grêle. Certaines patrouilles sont 

déportées vers l’ouest et n’atterrissent, en Afrique, qu’assez loin de leur destination 

prévue. Les derniers éléments ne traverseront la mer que le 22. Plusieurs pilotes sont 

contraints d’atterrir, en panne sèche, au voisinage immédiat de la côte. L’un d’eux 

même, dont l’avion a pris feu, se pose en mer, à 50 m du rivage… ». 9 

Dans l’intervalle, la nouvelle d’une demande d’armistice s’est répandue, provoquant 

les réactions les plus diverses ; mais elle est accueillie « d’une manière 

générale avec une stupeur mélangée d’indignation, explique un officier supérieur 

d’aviation. Si, en effet, notre aviation de chasse a été contrainte de replier de plus en 

plus vers le sud ses bases de départ, ses pilotes par contre n’ont pas cessé de remplir 

leurs missions dans toute la mesure où les conditions atmosphériques détestables le 

leur permettaient, de survoler le territoire occupé par les unités terrestres ennemies 

et de courir (…) sus aux formations de la Luftwaffe, si nombreuses qu’elles fussent, 

partout où ils les rencontraient. Le moral du personnel est mis à une épreuve 

d’autant plus rude qu’en cette période de désarroi généralisé, les rumeurs les plus 

fantaisistes et les plus alarmantes circulent, bientôt démenties par les faits ou le bon 

sens, mais aussitôt renaissantes… ». 10 Si le transfert des forces vives de l’armée de 

l’Air en Afrique du Nord rassérène une partie des navigants, certains envisagent déjà 

8 Ibidem. 

9 Ibidem. 

10 Ibidem.


de rejoindre les Britanniques afin de poursuivre la guerre à leurs côtés. D’autant que 

les négociations qui ont été engagées avec les Allemands brouillent les cartes. Si 

Vuillemin a fait passer près d’un millier d’avions de l’autre côté de la Méditerranée, 

c’est certainement pour empêcher leur destruction et leur capture, mais aussi avec 

l’intention bien arrêtée de poursuivre le combat. Le 17 juin, le commandant en chef 

des forces aériennes envisage en effet « une offensive brutale et puissante sur le 

sud de la péninsule italienne, la Sicile et la Libye, après que les forces de bombardement 

nécessaires auront été concentrées en Afrique du Nord, sous les ordres du 

général Bouscat ». 11 Quelques témoins, dont le commandant Stehlin, chef du groupe 

de chasse III/6, mettront en doute après la guerre une telle intention et accuseront le 

haut commandement aérien d’avoir menti aux pilotes et aux équipages afin d’éviter 

qu’ils ne gagnent Gibraltar ou Malte lors de la grande migration vers l’Afrique du 

Nord. Cet officier écrira : « Le général Vuillemin a-t-il réellement cru, en donnant 

l’ordre (…) que la France pourrait continuer à faire la guerre contre l’Italie, après 

avoir conclu un armistice avec l’Allemagne ? J’aurais dû comprendre que le général 

Bergeret avait signé, pour le commandant en chef et son major général, une mesure 

de précaution contre la tentation d’un atterrissage à Gibraltar. J’ai toujours amèrement 

regretté de m’être laissé tromper aussi grossièrement ». 12 Ce jugement a posteriori 

manque sans doute de mesure et le général Mendigal, un des collaborateurs les 

plus proches de Vuillemin, le rejettera totalement quand il apportera son témoignage, 

vers la fin de sa vie. 

S’il est un fait avéré, c’est qu’aucun accord n’a été conclu avec l’Allemagne lorsque 

le mouvement commence, le 18 juin. Deux jours plus tard, le colonel Heurtaux, 

un grand as de la guerre 1914-1918, successeur du général d’Harcourt à l’inspection 

de la chasse, dont l’honnêteté et le patriotisme ne peuvent être contestés, informe 

des pilotes réunis à Ussel que la lutte va continuer sur l’autre rive de la Méditerranée, 

au moins pour l’aviation. En vérité, c’est ce même jour, alors qu’il apprend la 

teneur des discussions préliminaires à l’armistice avec les Allemands, que l’opinion 

de Vuillemin évolue. Le commandant en chef fait alors savoir que, dans le cas où 

l’arrêt des combats inclurait l’Afrique du Nord, il faudrait respecter avec la plus 

grande rigueur les clauses imposées par l’ennemi. « La rupture, du fait de l’armée de 

l’Air, des clauses d’un armistice, précise-t-il, entraînerait inévitablement la reprise 

des hostilités, l’occupation totale du territoire français, la disparition de l’armature 

gouvernementale et, finalement, de la Nation française. Il est inutile d’insister sur les 

conséquences d’une telle hypothèse : elle équivaudrait en fait pour la France à un 

véritable esclavage ». 13 Une fois encore, au nom d’une logique de la sauvegarde et 

de la préservation de l’aviation française dont il s’est fait le défenseur zélé, Vuille- 

11 

Ordre particulier n° 55 du général commandant en chef les forces aériennes, 17 juin 1940, SHD/ 

DAA 1D2. 

12 

Stehlin, Paul, Témoignage pour l’histoire, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1964, p. 274. 

13 

Instruction personnelle et secrète pour le général pour le général commandant en cher les forces 

aériennes et les forces terrestres antiaériennes en Afrique du Nord, 20 juin 1940, SHD/DAA 1D2.


min agit dans le sens qui lui paraît le mieux convenir. Il dépêche le général Bouscat 

en Afrique du Nord avec la mission de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour 

empêcher des actes qui pourraient remettre en cause les engagements pris par les 

autorités françaises. Tâche difficile et ingrate au demeurant que celle qui consiste à 

convaincre les aviateurs repliés au Maroc, en Algérie et en Tunisie de ne pas commettre 

l’irréparable. Il faut faire « comprendre à chacun, avance cet officier de haut 

rang, la nécessité de respecter les clauses d’un armistice et la noblesse qu’il y a à 

faire face sans révolte au destin malheureux ». 14 Les bonnes paroles ne suffisant pas, 

des mesures de surveillance des avions et de mise sous clé des réserves de carburant 

et de munitions sont décidées et appliquées. 

Le 23 juin, instruit des dispositions définitives de l’armistice franco-allemand, 

Vuillemin ordonne aux zones d’opérations Centre et Alpes de suspendre le transfert 

des avions vers l’Afrique du Nord et de ne plus détruire le matériel, ni les munitions 

et les équipements abandonnés sur les aérodromes de métropole. Il demande aussi 

aux navigants de ne quitter sous aucun prétexte les bases sur lesquelles ils se trouvent 

en vue de rejoindre un territoire étranger, soucieux de ne pas s’exposer aux représailles 

prévues par la convention négociée à Rethondes. Le 24, tout de suite après 

la signature de l’armistice de Turin, l’idée d’une grande offensive aérienne contre 

l’Italie est remisée. A ce moment, 16 groupes de chasse, 22 groupes de bombardement 

et 10 groupes de reconnaissance sont en Afrique du Nord, capital en tout point 

important, et 12 de chasse, 10 de bombardement ainsi que 4 de reconnaissance sont 

restés en France. Toutes ces unités sont promises à la dissolution pure et simple et 

leurs avions destinés à être ferraillés sans autre forme de procès. 

La reprise en main de l’Armée de l’Air 

Le message adressé à ce moment par le chef de l’aviation à toute l’armée de 

l’Air a pour dessein de calmer les esprits, tout en laissant subsister quelque espoir : 

« Le commandant en chef n’ignore pas l’immensité du nouvel effort, du nouveau 

sacrifice qu’il demande. Mais il sait qu’il peut compter sur tous les chefs, tous les 

équipages, comme sur le personnel non navigant, pour que l’honneur de la France 

qu’ils ont si vaillamment défendue et sont prêts à défendre encore, ne soit pas terni 

par un manquement aux engagements qui pourraient être pris ». 15 Cette prise de 

position est quelque peu éloignée de celle que Pierre Cot décrira depuis son exil 

forcé aux Etats-Unis, vers la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale : « En juin 1940, 

le général Vuillemin combattit la proposition d’armistice, il voulait que la France 

continuât la lutte aux colonies. (…) Je ne me suis jamais posé la question de savoir 

quelles étaient ses opinions politiques. Mais j’imaginerais mal ce paysan du Centre, 

au sourire si fin, tombant dans les grossièretés du fascisme. Ayant le tempérament 

14 Ibidem. 

15 Ibidem.


d’un démocrate, il en avait sûrement l’âme. Son erreur principale avant la guerre 

et jusqu’à l’armistice, fut de laisser faire ceux qu’on avait placés sous ses ordres, 

notamment les généraux Tétu et Bergeret, véritables artisans de la défaite aérienne 

; ce fut ensuite de confondre le patriotisme avec la discipline en ne se révoltant pas 

contre le maréchal Pétain ; toute l’armée de l’Air l’aurait suivi s’il avait, dès le premier 

jour, imité de Gaulle. Mais par tout ce qu’il a fait depuis, le général Vuillemin 

a su réparer ses erreurs ». 16 Bouscat lui aussi y va de son discours lorsque, confronté 

aux premières désertions vers Gibraltar, il tance les aviateurs désormais oisifs sur les 

bases d’Afrique du Nord. L’officier général, lui aussi dans le doute, n’en hésite pas 

moins sur l’attitude à adopter : « En fin de compte, je pris la parole. Ma conviction 

ne dut pas paraître très ferme. Manifeste, par contre, fut ma gêne. Je restai dans des 

généralités et ne montrai pas une flamme que je n’avais pas ». 17 Parmi les pilotes et 

les équipages encore sous le coup des combats livrés depuis le 10 mai, le mécontentement, 

voire le désespoir sont en effet palpables. Le commandant Stehlin rapporte 

la colère qui s’empare de tous ses camarades aviateurs lorsque survient la nouvelle 

de l’arrêt des combats avec l’Italie et l’interdiction de prendre l’air qui s’applique 

aux avions déployés sur les terrains d’Afrique du Nord : « La tromperie a été en deux 

parties, d’abord pour nous amener en Afrique du Nord, puis nous réduire à l’immobilité, 

faute de carburant ». 18 

Une reprise en main est d’autant plus nécessaire aux yeux des chefs qui se sont 

ralliés à la cause de l’armistice et à l’obéissance au pouvoir en place – Pétain est 

alors le président du conseil en titre – que des résistances se dessinent au sein du haut 

commandement aérien. Vers la mi-juin, le général d’Astier de la Vigerie, avouant 

son désarroi mais aussi son désir de continuer la lutte dans l’empire colonial, est 

convaincu que tout est encore possible. A son sens, la plupart des navigants, convaincus 

que l’armée de l’Air n’a pas été vaincue, sont partisans d’une poursuite du combat. 

« L’on répugnait à imaginer qu’une troupe au moral élevé et disposant d’un 

matériel important fût soumise à la dure loi d’une défaite consommée par d’autres, 

explique-t-il. Elle devait échapper à la reddition en se réfugiant en Afrique du Nord, 

d’où elle serait en mesure, avec un ravitaillement minimum, de reprendre ensuite la 

lutte. Encore fallait-il être assuré de la résistance de ce territoire placé sous l’autorité 

du général Noguès et de l’appoint essentiel apporté par notre flotte ». 19 A l’instar de 

tous les aviateurs, l’ancien commandant de la zone d’opérations aériennes Nord se 

dit certain que si l’armée de Terre a bel et bien été battue, il n’en est rien de la Marine 

et de l’armée de l’Air qui sont désormais des atouts de première grandeur dans 

l’esprit de ceux qui s’opposent à la solution d’un armistice. Les forces importantes 

réunies en Afrique du Nord lui semblent à la fois prêtes et capables de se battre. 

16 

Cot, Pierre, Le procès de la République, New York, 1944, pp. 231-232. 

17 

Bouscat, René, De Gaulle-Giraud, dossier d’une mission, Paris, Flammarion, 1967, p. 7. 

18 

Stehlin, Paul, op. cit., pp. 277-278. 

19 

Astier de la Vigerie, François, général (d’), Le ciel n’était pas vide, Paris, 1952, p. 251.


Aussi s’empresse-t-il de prendre des contacts, d’abord auprès de l’amiral Darlan, qui 

lui assure que la flotte est prête à marcher, ensuite chez le général d’Harcourt, dont 

l’ascendant sur l’aviation de chasse est réel et profond, enfin Vuillemin qui ne le reçoit 

pas mais lui envoie Mendigal et Bergeret. Le premier lui semble résigné à l’idée 

d’arrêter la guerre, le second avance qu’il faudra apprendre à « ruser avec l’ennemi 

pour tirer le meilleur parti de la défaite ». 

Du côté des hommes politiques, le fatalisme domine, hormis chez Georges Mandel, 

un des adversaires déclarés de l’armistice, qui paraît intéressé par son projet. 

Mieux, l’ancien ministre lui demande de venir à Tours afin d’en discuter : « Le 13 

juin, M. Mandel me mande à Tours, où siège le gouvernement. Quand j’y arrive, le 

14, le gouvernement a repris la route vers le sud ; il.ne reste plus, dans cette ville déjà 

éprouvée par les bombardements, que les échos de conseils suprêmes tumultueux 

troublés par des présences indésirables. Enfin, le 15, je rejoins Mandel à Bordeaux. 

Dans son antichambre, je croise Jeanneney et Herriot très fermes dans leur opposition 

à la capitulation, Kérillis enflammé qui m’embrasse, plus loin, Jean Mistler que 

j’ai rencontré quelques jours auparavant, partisan déterminé de la lutte à outrance ; 

il me déclare aujourd’hui, avec autant de conviction, qu’il ne peut apprécier la situation 

militaire et s’en rapporte à l’avis du maréchal Pétain et du général Weygand. 

(…) Voilà Mandel dans son bureau. Il me questionne sur la situation actuelle de 

l’aviation et ses possibilités d’emploi en Afrique du Nord ; il me parle de la flotte sur 

laquelle il pense que l’on peut compter ; et puis son langage devient violent, il s’indigne 

des projets de capitulation ; il dénonce l’erreur commise en appelant Pétain et 

Weygand aux conseils du gouvernement; ses termes sont si crus qu’il est difficile de 

les écrire. Quand je lui donne mon opinion dont je peux croire qu’elle reflète encore 

celle de la grande majorité des aviateurs et le conjure de continuer la lutte en Afrique 

du Nord, son ton change et c’est avec une pointe de découragement qu’il ajoute : « Je 

ne peux rien tout seul; un Juif ne peut pas prendre en main, aujourd’hui, les affaires 

de la France. Quant à Reynaud, le fera-t-il ? Je n’en suis pas sûr ». 20 

Aussitôt, le général Vuillemin lui adresse des remontrances, craignant sans doute 

qu’une ligne de faille se produise au sein de l’armée de l’Air, avec toutes les conséquences 

tragiques qui pourraient en résulter. Les sanctions ne tardent pas à tomber 

puisque La Vigerie est relevé de son commandement par le général Pujo, ministre 

de l’Air du cabinet Pétain récemment constitué, et éloigné à la tête des forces aériennes 

au Maroc. « Mon incertitude ne devait pas être de longue durée ; convoqué 

au ministère, je m’y rendis le 20 juin. Le ministre Pujo me fait recevoir par le chef 

d’état-major général Picard que je connais de longue date. Celui-ci m’annonce ma 

nomination au commandement de la région aérienne du Maroc. Ma visite à Mandel 

a troublé certains membres du gouvernement et on m’éloigne; en termes amicaux 

mais formels. Picard me conseille de rejoindre mon poste le plus tôt possible et de 

me garder à carreau car il a été sérieusement question de m’arrêter. Si je peux garder 

20 Ibidem, p. 253.


un doute sur la portée de cet avertissement, il va être vite dissipé ! En quittant le 

bureau du chef d’état-major, je traverse la salle des pas perdus où sont réunis, par 

petits groupes, une centaine d’officiers ‘des arrières, administration centrale, services, 

organismes territoriaux ; tous, sur mon passage, se détournent avec affectation. 

C’est bien la disgrâce. (…) Aux yeux de ces aviateurs d’antichambre, je suis devenu 

l’aventurier ». 21 

En réalité, l’heure est partout à la résignation et à l’obéissance. La logique de 

la soumission aux instructions des autorités en place et de la survie l’a emporté sur 

toute velléité de continuer la lutte. Peut-on en l’occurrence parler de logique ? Ne 

vaut-il pas mieux évoquer le terme de devoir ? A ce propos, les cadres exhortent leurs 

hommes à ne pas écouter les bruits et les rumeurs qui circulent, à rester unis, à ne 

pas imiter les Tchèques et les Polonais qui embarquent à bord des bâtiments prêts à 

appareiller pour l’Angleterre depuis les ports de l’Atlantique ou de la Méditerranée. 

Le 25 juin, alors que l’armistice entre en vigueur, un aviateur note dans le journal de 

marche de son groupe de bombardement : « On doit rendre les avions indisponibles 

pour que personne ne puisse partir à Gibraltar et aller continuer à combattre les Allemands 

aux côtés de nos alliés. Beaucoup parlent de le faire, il faut attendre… » 22 Un 

autre rapporte : « Beaucoup se demandent où est leur devoir ; plusieurs envisagent 

de gagner et certains gagnent en fait, par la voie des airs, la zone britannique pour 

pourvoir continuer la lutte aux côtés de nos alliés ». 23 C’est ainsi que se dessinent 

les choix fondamentaux et les destinées si lourdes de conséquences qui attendront 

ceux qui choisiront un chemin ou l’autre. Le grand schisme de l’an 1940 est déjà en 

marche. 

21 Ibidem, p. 254. 

22 Historique de l’aviation de chasse pendant la campagne de 1940, s. d., SHD/DAA 3D497. 

23 Ibidem.

e i n e r po m m e r i n * 

Between “Douhetism” and “Close Air Support” 

The German Air War Doctrine in World War II 

I. 

Germania 

In 1921 the Italian Army General Giulio Douhet published the book “Il Dominio 

dell’ Aria”, presenting his thoughts regarding the role of air forces in the war of 

the future, which he described more precisely in a new edition in 1927. In the 

event of a war, he first envisioned focus attacks on the enemy’s military airfields to 

be carried out by air forces equipped with heavy, long-range bombers in order to 

keep enemy aircraft on the ground, thus preventing them from destroying friendly 

territory. Then, further bombing raids against all military and defense-related targets 

of the enemy should be continued until the enemy population’s will of resistance was 

broken. Douhet requested full independence for the newly established air forces, in 

practice their dominance among the Services. He accepted a reduction of the number 

of army and naval forces in favor of an expansion of the air forces for the plain reason 

that the occupation of enemy territory did not seem that important to him any 

longer. Furthermore, the provision of direct support to combat operations of the other 

Services would unnecessarily withdraw important forces from the air force. The 

term “Douhetism”, 1 which developed after his thoughts had been published, referred 

to the theoretical concept of an (air) warfare that was to achieve the enemy’s surrender 

not by eliminating the combat power of his forces, but by conducting bombing 

raids against industry and the civilian population. 

Although the idea of involving the population in war fighting might ex post be 

surprising, it was closely related with the Italian officer’s horizon of experience: In 

World War I, neither the major offensives of the army troops, nor the operations of 

the naval forces contributed to a quick decision of the war, and even turned out to be 

extremely costly in terms of human resources and materiel. Therefore, in the twenties 

and thirties of the 20 th century military strategists, like Douhet, tried to avoid 

long wars involving heavy losses. After 1918, it was generally assumed that the wars 

* 

Prof. (Emeritus) Dr. Reiner Pommerin joined the German Air Force in 1961 and holds the rank of 

Colonel (Res). He has taught at Cologne, Mayence, Erlangen, Jena, Dresden, Harvard, Oxford and 

Vanderbilt University. He is Chairman of the Advisory Board on Leadership Development and Civic 

Education of the German Federal Minister of Defense, member of the Board of the International 

Commission for Military History and Senator for Culture in the Senate of Culture of the State of 

Saxony, member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) at London. He is Coeditor 

of the Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift and author of numerous books and articles. 

1 

Cf. Karl Köhler, Douhet und Douhetismus, in: Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 14 (1964), pp. 

88-91.


of the future would be “total wars”, i.e. wars making use of all resources of a nation. 

It thus seemed only logical that not only the armed forces, but also the citizens of an 

enemy nation would be involved in the events of the war. 2 Hence also the destruction 

of the enemy’s economy and the shattering of his civilian morale became war aims. 

The use of the third dimension, the airspace, played a new and important role 

in the context of “total war”. Already in year of war 1917, the British government 

under Prime Minister David Lloyd George created the cabinet post of a Secretary 

of State for Air, which was first occupied by Harold Sidney Harmsworth. In March 

1918, Sir Henry Norman, a member of the Privy Council, pointed out to him in a 

memorandum “that the air is definitely the only area where it would be possible to 

conduct operations of considerably broader scale and in accordance with the new 

strategic principles”. 3 

In 1923, Douhet succeeded in convincing the Italian government under Benito 

Mussolini to set up the “Regia Aeronautica”, an independent air force, which did, 

however, not dominate over army and naval forces, as had originally been planned in 

his doctrine. In Great Britain, the foundation of an air force and the development of 

a strategic air war doctrine took place already prior to the end of World War I. This 

was caused by the attacks of German Zeppelins and so-called “Riesenbomber” (giant 

Bomber) aircraft on the city of London. This was the first time large, all-metal 

aircraft, that had been produced by Junkers and were referred to as “Möbelwagen” 

(furniture vans) in Germany, “the “Gotha G”, with a span length of 26 meters, and 

the “RVI aircraft” produced in the Zeppelin works at Staaken, with a span length of 

46 meters, came into operation. A total of 619 civilians lost their lives during these 

bombing raids, 1,650 were wounded and the material damage caused amounted to 3 

million pounds. 4 On the attackers side there were no losses caused by enemy action. 5 

With the experiences made during World War II and recent wars, the effects of 

those German bombs might be considered low. Nevertheless, they aroused great fear 

and alarm among the people of London to be subject to aerial bombing raids. This “air 

scare” – of all things the first German 1,000 kg bomb hit Chelsea Hospital – forced 

the British government to set up a commission headed by General Jan Christiaan 

2 

Cf. Bernd Jürgen Wendt, Der »totale Krieg« der Zukunft in den Planspielen der Reichswehr, in: 

Führungsdenken in europäischen und nordamerikanischen Streitkräften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. 

For Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Gerhard P. Groß (ed.) (Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte, 

Vol. 19). Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn 2001, p. 45-39. 

3 

Cited in Richard J. Overy, Luftmacht im Zweiten Weltkrieg: historische Themen und Theorien, in: 

Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ein internationaler Vergleich. For Militärgeschichtliches 

Forschungsamt, Horst Boog (ed.) (Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte, Vol. 12). Herford/Bonn 1993 p. 

24. 

4 

Cf. John Terraine, Theorie und Praxis des Luftkrieges: Die Royal Air Force, in: Boog, Luftkriegführung 

im Zweiten Weltkrieg (see Note 3), p. 537. 

5 

Cf. John H. Morrow, Die deutsche Flugzeugindustrie im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ein Vergleich, 

in: Boog, Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (see Note 3), p. 73.

e t w e e n “do u h e t I s m” A n d “cl o s e AIr su p p o rt”. th e ge r m A n AIr wA r do c t r I n e In wo r l d wA r II 91 

Smuts, which addressed general questions of air war. 6 The commission suggested 

that an independent British air force be set up, and, on 18 April 1918, the Royal Air 

Force was founded. However, it did not yet come into action during World War I. 7 

It’s future strategic orientation was already indicated in a memorandum issued by the 

Empire General Staff in January 1918. It contained the suggestion to systematically 

bomb important German cities until they were completely destroyed or at least until 

the morale among the workers living there was shattered. Such attacks would not 

only hamper industrial production on a permanent basis, but they would also sustainably 

undermine the public’s trust and confidence. 8 

The British were already mentally oriented towards this form of bomb war due 

to their traditional practice of establishing sea blockades, which had always been 

directed against the entire enemy nation and not exclusively against its armed forces. 9 

Furthermore, there was the however unfounded idea based on the famous remark of 

Sir William Douglas, the later Lord Weir, that racially different nations were more 

sensitive to bloodshed than the British and that their morale would thus break first. 10 

The person who defined the British air war doctrine was Marshal of the Air Force 

Lord Hugh Trenchard, the commander-in-chief of the new Service. 11 He firmly believed 

that air raids “owing to its crushing moral effect on a Nation, may impress the 

public opinion to a point of disarming the Government and thus becoming decisive”. 

12 Consequently, the Royal Air Force War Manual, the British regulation on air warfare 

enacted in 1928, contained the statement that a nation’s strength of will was the 

foundation for all its war efforts. After all, it was the will of the people that would 

empower the government to draw on the resources required for warfare. In line with 

Trenchard’s thoughts, the manual also stated that: „A Nation is defeated once the 

people or the government no longer have the will to pursue its war aims“. 13 

The German air war historian Horst Boog stated in this regard that these sentences 

– as weird as it may sound - actually illustrated the democratic approach of the 

6 

Cf. Raymond Fredette, The First Battle of Britain 1917-1918 and the Birth of the Royal Air Force. 

London 1966, p. 233. 

7 

Cf. Henry Albert Jones, The War in the Air. Oxford 1937, Vol. Appendices, Appendix II, p. 8-14. 

8 

Ibid., Appendix IV, p. 26. 

9 

Cf. Horst Boog, Der anglo-amerikanische strategische Luftkrieg über Europa und die deutsche 

Luftverteidigung, in: Horst Boog/Werner Rahn/Reinhard Stumpf/Bernd Wegener, Der Globale 

Krieg. Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941-1943. Militärgeschichtliches 

Forschungsamt (ed.) (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 6). Stuttgart 1990, 

p. 429. 

10 

Cf. Fredette, The First Battle of Britain (see Note 6), p. 225. 

11 

Cf. Phillip Meilinger, »Trenchard and >Morale Bombing


British air war doctrine, for, after all, the will of the people was given first priority 

in a democracy. 14 However, the widespread understanding, which was in line with 

the then applicable state of the art of aeronautical engineering, that modern, multiengine 

bombers could not be intercepted by the initially much slower single-engine 

fighter aircraft but by pure coincidence also played an important role. 15 This expectation 

culminated in the well-known sentence uttered by British Prime Minister Stanly 

Baldwin: „The bomber will always get through“. 16 

Trenchard’s air war doctrine, on the one hand, was designed to punish the people 

of an enemy nation by attacking their cities with bombers and, on the other hand, to 

bomb them to their senses so that they forced their political leaders to stop hostilities. 

The question as to whether this strategy would also work with non-democratic, 

totalitarian states remained unanswered. 

The air war strategy of the United States of America first took a completely different 

turn. 17 During World War I, their small army aviation branch did not enter 

the war in Europe until very late, supporting friendly ground forces during its few 

sorties. This might have contributed to the fact that, in the US Army, only General 

William Mitchell thought that the air war would play a decisive role in a future war. 

In his book published in 1925 he stated: “The influence of air power on the ability 

of one nation to impress its will on an other in an armed conflict will be decisive”. 18 

Mitchell therefore did not demand an augmentation of the fighter aviation branch, 

which would have been hard to justify due to the geostrategic position of the USA. 

Instead, he advocated a strategic bomb war on enemy territory. Like Douhet and 

Trenchard, Mitchell also assumed that the aerial destruction of vital centers in the 

enemy’s hinterland would break the enemy’s will of resistance faster than army operations 

on the ground would do. 

With his theses, the General set against him the rivaling Services of Army, Navy 

and Marine Corps in the USA, which were fighting hard for both their share in the 

national budget and their status. His strategic approach to an air war did not meet 

with great response in the USA since, at the same time, he also questioned their 

operational principles and efficiency. Rather, he had to stand trial for his theses in a 

military court and was forced to leave the US Army. Mitchell’s strategic ideas were 

not completely lost, but until long into World War II the American attitude towards 

air war was characterized by the view that aircraft only had to provide combat sup- 

14 

Cf. Boog, Der anglo-amerikanische strategische Luftkrieg (see Note 9), p. 433. 

15 

Cf. Irving B. Holley Jr., Die Entwicklung der Abwehrbewaffnung für die Bomber der US-Heeresstreitkräfte 

in den Jahren 1918 bis 1941. Eine Studie über Produktionserfolge trotz Mängeln in der 

Doktrin, in: Boog, Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (see Note 3), p. 166. 

16 

Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and the Two World Wars. London 1979, p. 59. 

17 

Cf. Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: the Evolution of British and American 

Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945. Princeton 2002. 

18 

William Mitchell, Winged Defense. The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power -Economic 

and Military. New York 1925, p. 214.


port to friendly ground and naval forces. This is the reason why the air force continued 

to be assigned to the US Army, and the US Air Force as an independent Service 

was not established until after the end of World War II, on 18 September 1947. 

In addition to the unwillingness of Army, Navy and Marine Corps to wage a strategic 

air war, there also was the moral abhorrence of major parts of the US population 

towards breaking the will of resistance of the enemy population by bombing them. 

Hence, it is true that the operational principles developed at the US Army Air Corps 

Tactical School since 1938 – a sort of official American air war doctrine – provided for 

the destruction of vital facilities of the adversary. Precision attacks – this meant bomb 

releases on specially selected and limited trade and industry targets – were to hit the 

adversary’s warfaring capabilities. Shattering the morale of the population by conducting 

bombing raids against the civilian population, however, was not envisaged. 

II. 

While the victorious powers of World War I had been thinking about the future 

role of the air force and the significance of the air war, already during the war or 

immediately after the end of the war, such thoughts necessarily had to be omitted in 

the German Reich for the time being. 19 Being bound by the clauses of the Treaty of 

Versailles, Germany was not allowed to establish a “Major General Staff”, set up and 

support air forces and associated facilities and installations. And the Reichswehr was 

restricted to the number of 100,000 soldiers. According to the concept of the German 

military leadership of the post-war period, the Reichswehr was a sort of cadre army 

designed to enable a fast augmentation and rearmament of the German armed forces 

upon discontinuation of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. 

The restrictions on no account prevented the German Reich from deliberately and, 

of course, secretly disregarding the clauses of the Treaty early on, although extent 

and efficiency of those measures remained relatively moderate. 20 Such illegal activities 

included the training of pilots within the scope of aerial sports or in the civil sector 

at Lufthansa, and the disguise of smaller flying units as “advertising squadrons” 

for advertising flights. Already since 1924 there had been a German flight center at 

Lipezk as part of the cooperation with Russia in the field of military policy. Here, 

military aircraft were tested and fighter pilots and observers were trained. 21 

As to the development of its own air war doctrine, the Reichswehr was first left 

19 

Cf. James S. Corum, »The Development of German Air Doctrine between the Wars«, in: War in 

History, 3 (1996), p. 85-101. 

20 

Cf. Wilhelm Deist, Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht, in: Wilhelm Deist/Manfred Messerschmidt/ 

Hans-Erich Volkmann/Wolfram Wette, Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik. 

Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.) (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 1) 

Stuttgart 1977, p. 402 and p. 473-496. 

21 

Cf. Wolfram Falck, Falkenjahre. Erinnerungen 1910-2003. Kurt Braatz (ed.). Moosburg 2003, p. 

27-41.


with nothing but the passive acknowledgement of foreign publications on the theory 

of air war. Lieutenant Colonel Hilmer Freiherr v. Bülow, the advisor for aviation 

matters at the “Truppenamt” (Troop Office), which actually assumed the tasks of 

the forbidden “Major General Staff” within the Army Command, was responsible 

for this task. Therefore it does not come as a surprise that Bülow’s “Richtlinien für 

die Führung des operativen Luftkriegs” (Guidelines on the conduct of operational 

air war), presented in 1926, did not include his own ideas, but only reflected already 

published thinking on this subject, like, for example, the ideas of Douhet or Mitchell. 

According to these guidelines, the new opportunities provided by “operational air 

war” made it possible to take “the war deep down inside the political, moral, economic 

and military sources of power” of an enemy state, whereby the German term 

“operativ” (operational) must not simply be equated with “strategisch” (strategic). 

Conducting air attacks on the enemy’s large cities, industrial centers, armaments 

industry and the food basis of the enemy, friendly air forces were supposed to try to 

destroy “the enemy’s morale and his will to continue the war“. 22 

Erhard Milch, the Lufthansa chief executive and later Field Marshal of the Air 

Force, remembered – ex post – that already in April 1932, on the occasion of a dinner 

hosted by the prominent National Socialist and well-known World War I fighter 

pilot, Hermann Göring, the leader of the NSDAP party, Adolf Hitler, had been talking 

about General Douhet’s ideas, “which attracted attention in specialist circles at 

that time”. Milch said that Hitler’s interest was focused on the bomb war as the best 

means to deter an adversary and that he maintained that Germany needed to have “a 

strong Wehrmacht, with Air Force and Army being equally important (a completely 

new idea at that time), if it wanted to free itself from the devastating shackles of the 

Treaty of Versailles”. 23 

On 28 April 1933 the National Socialist government under Reich Chancellor 

Adolf Hitler set up a Reich Aviation Ministry, appointing Hermann Göring the Reich 

Aviation Minister. Milch became the state secretary. For him, Dr. Robert Knauss, the 

Lufthansa company director, wrote a memorandum entitled “Die deutsche Luftflotte” 

(The German Air Fleet), which Milch approved and submitted to Göring. It contained 

an armaments conception for the German Air Force, but also reflected the 

author’s deliberations on the air war of the future. 24 According to Knauss, Germany 

would inevitably have to face a two-front war against Poland and France to regain 

its position as a great power in Europe. He therefore demanded a swift build-up of a 

22 Cited in Klaus A. Maier, Totaler Krieg und operativer Luftkrieg, in: Klaus A. Maier/Horst Rohde/ 

Bernd Stegemann/Hans Umbreit, Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent. 

Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.) (Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 2). 

Stuttgart 1979, p. 44. 

23 Cited in David Irving, Die Tragödie der Deutschen Luftwaffe. Aus den Akten und Erinnerungen von 

Feldmarschall Milch. Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Wien 1970, p. 54. 

24 Cf. Bernhard Heimann/Joachim Schunke, Eine geheime Denkschrift zur Luftkriegskonzeption, in 

Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte 3 (1964), p. 72-86.


strong air force as an independent Service. 

An air force equipped with approximately 390 long-range, four-engine bombers 

with a capacity of 2000 kg of explosive, incendiary and gas bombs – the latter had by 

the way already been demanded by Douhet – would reduce the enemy’s eagerness to 

attack since by means of such aircraft a war could immediately be conducted in his 

own center. Furthermore, the memorandum read: “Inflicting bomb terror on enemy 

capitals or industrial areas will result in moral collapse the faster the weaker the 

national attitude of the people and the more the metropolitan masses are oriented towards 

materialism and divided by social and political conflicts”. To gain Germany’s 

air superiority in Central Europe as fast as possible, Knauss recommended that the 

air force be augmented at the expense of naval armaments projects; after all, an air 

force equipped with 400 “large bomber aircraft” could be built with the means required 

for the construction of two armored cruisers. In addition to bomber aircraft, 

Knauss also demanded reconnaissance aircraft while fighter aircraft, in his opinion, 

had no operational functions; he assigned them only operations in support of army 

and naval forces. 

This was clear evidence of the influence of Douhet’s doctrine, but Reich Minister 

of War Werner v. Blomberg, in a directive dating 16 August 1933, pointed out that he 

by no means intended to set up a “strategic air force”. The aim rather was to set up an 

“operational air force” that in the event of a European multi-front war would have to 

assume operational functions as part of a comprehensive strategy, either acting on its 

own supported by patrol aircraft or interacting with army and naval forces. 25 Hence, 

the pendulum rather swung towards an air force designed to support the Army. 

On 26 February 1935, Hitler signed the decree on the foundation of the 

Reichsluftwaffe, putting it as the third branch of the Wehrmacht on an equal footing 

with Army and Navy and placing it under the command and control of Hermann 

Göring as commander-in-chief. 26 On 09 March 1935, Hitler had Göring proclaim 

officially that the German Reich was about to build up a German Air Force. In doing 

so, the Reich was to make its contribution to peacekeeping, acting within the scope 

of the Air Pact, which had been suggested by the Western powers. 27 A few days later, 

during a solemn ceremony; Hitler gave the first fighter wing of the new German Air 

Force the name of “Jagdgeschwader Richthofen”. 

Despite this clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Western powers had 

shown practically no reaction, thus encouraging Hitler to declare on 16 March 1935 

that he was no longer willing to submit to the arms limitations set out by the Treaty 

of Versailles. At the same time, he proclaimed the reintroduction of compulsory mili- 

25 Cf. Deist, Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht (see Note 17), p. 484. 

26 Cf. Rudolf Absolon, Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, Vol. 3, Boppard 1973, p. 177. 

27 Karl-Heinz Völker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933-1939. Aufbau, Führung und Rüstung der Luftwaffe 

und die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie (Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte. Militärgeschichtliches 

Forschungsamt (ed.), Vol. 8). Stuttgart 1967, p. 68ff.


tary service. The following protests expressed by France, Great Britain and Italy, 

which decided on a mild form of protest, must have confirmed Hitler’s assessment 

concerning the weakness of democracies. On 19 March 1935, the German Air Force 

showed in public for the first time: During a blackout and live air defense exercise, 

the “Jagdgeschwader Richthofen” appeared on the skies over Berlin. 

The fact that the German translation of Douhet’s book was published under the 

title of “Luftherrschaft” (air supremacy) in June 1935, i.e. only a few weeks after the 

German Air Force had been established, cannot be considered pure coincidence if one 

takes the efficient apparatus of Josef Goebbels, the Minister of Public Enlightenment 

and Propaganda into consideration. In the foreword to the book, Lieutenant Colonel 

Freiherr v. Bülow, who meanwhile had become the Director of the “Foreign Air 

Forces” division at the “Luftkommandoamt”, the later general staff of the German 

Air Force, emphasized that the establishment of the German Air Force was a welcome 

point of time to present Douhet’s thoughts to a broader public in Germany. 

Notwithstanding all of the comprehensible arguments regarding the decisive importance 

of Douhet’s doctrine, Bülow emphasized: „we are not committed to it“. 28 

With this, Bülow not only spoke in “pluralis maiestatis”, but he reflected the basic 

view held by the commanders of the new German Air Force. The speech held by the 

then chief of the Luftkommandoamt, Major General Walther Wever, on the occasion 

of the opening of the Air War Academy at Gatow on 1 November 1935, was proof of 

an air war concept differing from Knauss’ ideas. For Wever, operational cooperation 

between Air Force, Army and Navy in their fight against enemy armed forces had 

priority, even if he considered the bomber aircraft the decisive weapon of the air war 

and did not rule out its strategic use against enemy armaments industry. 29 

Here a special feature of the German Air Force command authorities must be 

pointed out. Comparisons with the organization of Anglo-American command authorities 

reveal that there was no policy planning staff. Whereas the Anglo-American 

supreme command authorities planned within an overall strategic setting, across 

continents and for lengthy wars of attrition, irrespective of day-to-day business, the 

continental power of the Reich, if only for lacking the appropriate resources, focused 

on winning a war as quickly as possible by conducting rapid army operations. 30 

As a result, the efficient support of such army operations automatically got into 

the center of air war considerations in the German Air Force. In a certain way, it 

became apparent that the entire higher officer corps of the German Air Force was 

composed of former army officers “who were of course first reluctant to use the wide 

range of operational possibilities of waging an independent air war and who, above 

28 Giulio Douhet, Luftherrschaft. Berlin 1935, p. 9. 

29 Maier, Totaler Krieg und operativer Luftkrieg (see Note 19), p. 44. 

30 Cf. Horst Boog, Anglo-amerikanisches Führungsdenken im strategischen Bombenkrieg von 1939 

bis 1945 in Abhängigkeit von wechselnden Kriegsbildern, in: Groß, Führungsdenken (see Note 2), 

p. 219.


all, had no experience in commanding large flying units. Here, organizational problems 

occurred, which could not be solved until the beginning of the war“. 31 The air 

war doctrines both in France 32 and in the Soviet Union 33 were, however, also characterized 

by similar considerations that were mainly directed towards supporting own 

and friendly army troops. 

In 1936, headquarters and agencies of the German Air Force received the result 

of their own considerations on a German air war doctrine in the form of German Air 

Force Regulation L.Dv. 16. It was entitled “Luftkriegführung“, 34 and was divided 

into the following seven sections: Air war, command and control, reconnaissance, 

operations, deployment, ground organization and replacement/supply. The latter two 

sections, however, remained void for the time being. They were to be filled later on, 

which was, however, never done due to the beginning of the war. Instead, in the year 

of war 1940, an unchanged version of German Air Force Regulation L.Dv. 16 was 

reprinted and published. 

First, the reader learned that the air warfare regulation addressed basic air war 

principles, which would be those acts of war “resulting from the independent appearance 

of the German Air Force as the third branch of the Wehrmacht”. It was, 

however, expressly mentioned that the regulation would only be a suggestion, since 

the principles established in the regulation required verification by the field units 

after advanced training and correction of technical deficiencies. It was also stated in 

the introduction that the German Air Force would be responsible for both offensive 

and defensive air war operations. After a listing of what belonged to the German Air 

Force in terms of organization and weapons, the following sentence was to be found: 

“The aviation forces will take the war to enemy territory right from the very start 

of war. Their attacks will target the roots of both the enemy’s combat power and its 

people’s will of resistance”. 

This was followed by a description of the tasks of the German Air Force in an 

air war. The most important task of the Wehrmacht in a war was to break the enemy’s 

will, the strongest expression of which were the armed forces of the enemy. 

Conducting the war in the air within the framework of the overall war, the German 

Air Force therefore had to serve the most noble war aim: To bring down the enemy 

forces. Fighting against the enemy air power, it would weaken the enemy forces 

and, at the same time, protect both its own armed forces and its own people in its 

31 

Deist, Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht (see Note 17), p. 480. 

32 

Cf. Thierry Vivier, Le Douhétisme français entre Tradition et Innovation, 1933-1939, in: Revue 

historique des Armées, 206 (1997), p. 89-99. 

33 

Cf. James Sterrett, Soviet Air Force Theory, 1918-1945. London 2007. 

34 

Luftwaffendienstvorschrift (L.DV. 16) “Luftkriegführung“ in der Version vom März 1940, in: Karl- 

Heinz Völker, Dokumente und Dokumentarfotos zur Geschichte der deutschen Luftwaffe. Aus den 

Geheimakten des Reichswehrministeriums 1919-1933 und des Reichsluftfahrtministeriums 1933- 

1939 (Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.) , Vol. 

9). Stuttgart 1968, p. 466-486.


Lebensraum. Engaging in the operations and combat actions on the ground and at 

sea, the German Air Force would provide direct support to Army and Navy. Engaging 

the sources of power of enemy forces and stopping the flow of enemy forces towards 

the front, the German Air Force would try to bring the enemy forces to a halt. The 

German Air Force would thus combat the enemy people and country at its most tender 

spots. Moreover, apologetically, so to speak, the regulation read: “These attacks 

might have accidental side effects which cannot be avoided”. (Today, to be more 

diplomatic, this is defined as “collateral damage”!). 

Already at the start of the war, German Air Force Regulation L.Dv. 16 provided 

for the offensive employment of the German Air Force against enemy air forces, if 

only to minimize the threat to ones own territory. A certain degree of uncertainty as 

to the efficiency of support to direct army and navy operations – referred to as “close 

air support” today - was reflected in the following sentences: “In close cooperation 

with the Army and the Navy, frequently the German Air Force, i.e. mainly its combat 

forces [this refers to bombers R.P.], will not find the targets, the engagement of 

which would fully utilize its offensive power and the destruction of which could 

entail efficient support for Army or Navy [...] Generally, air attacks on unimpaired 

or uncommitted ground forces that are employed at the front or in position do not 

promise any effects that are in keeping with the respective effort, but they will by no 

means be excluded in special cases”. 

It was considered more expedient to launch attacks on long-range targets “the 

destruction or elimination of which will have decisive influence on the operations or 

combat actions of Army or Navy […] massive attacks, mostly in low-altitude flights, 

against advancing reserves or moving forces in rear areas and retreating enemy forces, 

[can be R.P.] of decisive importance”. Following these explanatory notes concerning 

the situation we today refer to as interdiction, it was stated that a war could 

only be decided if all three branches of the Wehrmacht cooperated. With this, the authors 

of the memorandum, who originally came from the Army, wanted to counter an 

unnecessary build up of the Air Force in order to reduce the prejudices existing in the 

two other Wehrmacht branches against the new Service, the personnel and materiel 

establishment of which had, of course, been carried out at their expense. 

Furthermore, the regulation focused on the engagement of the enemy’s sources 

of power, i.e. all facilities serving the strengthening and augmentation of his fighting 

forces. This included attacks on enemy armaments production sites, food supplies, 

imports, electricity, gas and water supplies, railways and transport lines, military 

operations centers and the enemy’s seat of government, if this was the center of the 

enemy’s intellectual and moral resistance. 

A separate chapter of the regulation was dedicated to retaliation attacks. In its 

introduction, it read: “Attacks on cities for the purpose of terrorizing the population 

must on principle be declined. Nevertheless, if the enemy launches terrorist 

attacks on defenseless and unprotected open cities, retaliation attacks might be the 

only means to divert the enemy from this brutal type of air warfare. The decision as


to when the attack would go forward will be based on a preceding enemy terrorist 

attack. It must definitely be clear that the attack is launched for retaliatory reasons. 

Retaliation attacks require a detailed knowledge and an intuitive understanding of 

the way of thinking and moral condition of the enemy population. Choosing the 

wrong time and miscalculating the desired effect on the opponent might strengthen 

his will of resistance instead of shaking it. 35 

When looking at the air war doctrine of the German Air Force within the context 

of its planned and actually implemented armaments projects, it shows that center and 

pivotal point of the German air war doctrine was the support of the Army. 36 To conduct 

a strategic air war according to Douhet, Trenchard or Mitchell, the development 

of a strategic four-engine bomber capable of covering long distances would have 

been indispensable. Although Wever, in his function as the Chief of the Air Force 

General Staff, had tried to get this project under way before he died in a plane crash 

in June 1936, the project was cancelled even before the war. 

In a presentation on the subject of “Basic Principles for Operational Command 

and Control of the Air War”, delivered in October 1936, Major Paul Deichmann, 

Chief of the Command and Control Division at the Luftkommandoamt, supported 

attacks against the enemy’s sources of power on the one hand and the generic population’s 

“will of resistance” on the other in addition to support provided to Army and 

Navy operations. „The presentation illustrated, however, that in this field, too, the 

higher commanders held rather vague views and the systematic processing of related 

questions had just begun“. 37 

In 1936, Hitler promised General Franco to support airlift operations from 

Spanish-Morocco to the Spanish mainland. After 15,000 Moroccan soldiers and legionaries 

of the Spanish Foreign Legion and a considerable amount of material had 

been moved with “Junkers Ju 52” aircraft, Franco was able to employ them in the 

Spanish Civil War. Germany extended its support of Franco by dispatching a support 

unit by the name of “Legion Condor”, including various aircraft and pilots. The 

Spanish Civil War provided the German volunteers of the “Legion Condor”, who 

had temporarily been released from the Wehrmacht for this, with the opportunity 

to fly sorties under wartime conditions, thus being able to test the training status of 

pilots, newly developed types of aircraft and theoretical procedures in the field of 

air support. 38 Besides existing aircraft types, for example, the new Messerschmidt 

Me Bf 109 fighter aircraft, the fast two-engine Heinkel He 111 bombers and the 

Dornier Do 17 aircraft could be employed in Spain. Wolfram v. Richthofen, the 

35 

Ibid., p. 482. 

36 

Cf. James S. Corum, »The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941«, in: Journal of Strategic 

Studies 59 (1995), p. 68-90. 

37 

Deist, Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht (see Note 17), p. 494. 

38 

Cf. James S. Corum, »The Luftwaffe and the Coalition Air War in Spain, 1936-1939«, in: Journal 

for Strategic Studies, 18 (1995), p. 68-90.


commander of the “Legion Condor”, gained valuable information from this stay in 

Spain, which ended with the Legion’s participation in Franco’s victory parade in 

Barcelona on 21 February 1939. He could rely on this information later on during the 

attack against Poland and when cooperating with armored units in the breakthrough 

of the “Panzergruppe Kleist” to the Channel in spring 1940. 39 In their sorties over 

Spain, the fighter pilots Günther Lützow and Werner Mölders developed the loose 

two-aircraft formation, which is still applicable today. 40 

An attack that is still remembered today is the attack on the town of Guernica 

conducted by the “Legion Condor” and Italian combat aircraft pilots. In this attack, 

a bridge in the suburb of Renteria and supply routes that were important for Franco’s 

units were to be destroyed. In practice, however, the entire town was destroyed in 

the attack, with Guernica becoming a synonym for air terror attacks on the civilian 

population. 41 

“The German Air Force was a torso when it reported ready for war in late summer 

1939. Neither with regard to personnel, material, and training, nor with regard to air 

war theory, they were qualified to meet the requirements defined in the war plans 

of the political leaders [...] Many deficiencies and faults made by the German Air 

Force, most of their defeats and almost every failure experienced during World War 

II can be explained by the faults, inconsistencies and omissions that occurred during 

its establishment“. 42 

III. 

Even though the bombing of Guernica had shaken the international public, there 

was no internationally recognized contractual agreement restricting air warfare on 1 

September 1939 when Hitler attacked Poland, sparking off World War II. Therefore 

US President Theodor Roosevelt sent a note to the warring factions, calling upon 

them to declare in public that they would not expose the civilian population and 

unprotected cities to aerial bombing. Hitler answered: „For my part, I’ve publicly announced 

in my Reichstag speech today that the German Air Force has been ordered 

to confine its combat actions to military objects“. 43 The next day, France and Great 

39 

Cf. James S. Corum, Wolfram von Richthofen. Master of the German Air War. Lawrence, Kansas 

2008, p. 146-151. 

40 

Cf. Kurt Braatz, Gott oder ein Flugzeug. Leben und Sterben des Jagdfliegers Günther Lützow. 

Moosburg 2005, p. 158. 

41 

Cf. Klaus A. Maier, Guernica, 26.4.1937. Die deutsche Intervention in Spanien und der »Fall Guernica«. 

(Einzelschriften zur Militärischen Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Militärgeschichtliches 

Forschungsamt (ed.) , Vol. 17). Freiburg im Breisgau, 2nd Edition 1977, p. 55f. 

42 

Völker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe (see Note 24), p. 210f. 

43 

Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945. Serie D (1937-1945), Vol. VII: Die letzten 

Wochen vor Kriegsausbruch, 9. August bis 3. September 1939. Baden-Baden 1956, Dok. 531, p. 

423.


Britain also accepted the American recommendation, even though such a promise 

made by the British side seems weird in view of the Trenchard doctrine. 

Hitler’s reply was a lie since the first German act of war on 1 September was, 

by no means, the cannon fire launched from training ship “Schleswig-Holstein” on 

Gdansk’s Westerplatte at 04:47. Seven minutes earlier, at 04:40, the citizens of the 

small Polish town of Wielun had woken up startled by the sound of hurling sirens and 

explosions, engines humming above them and screaming to be heard. Dive-bombers 

of the German Air Force were bombing the town that had neither a military target 

nor industrial plants. Seventy percent of the small town was destroyed and 1,200 of 

its 16,000 inhabitants were killed. This aerial attack, killing children, adolescents, 

women and men in their sleep, served the purpose of testing new, stronger engines 

and bombs. Two days later, soldiers of the German Army came to record the effects 

of the attack, using measuring tape on the town’s building ruins. 44 

The next dive-bomber attacks on Warsaw supported the fact that the German 

side did not really wish to spare the Polish people the air war. Explaining the aerial 

attacks on the Polish capital on 10 September, the Air Force General Staff stated: 

“The attack should be viewed as retaliation for crimes committed against German 

soldiers. It is important to achieve extensive destruction in the densely populated 

parts of town during the first attack“. 45 Since admitting to having followed Douhet’s 

or Mitchell’s ideas was naturally not an option, the retaliation attack specified in 

German Air Force Regulation L.Dv. 16 was used as an explanation. Some days later, 

v. Richthofen, who had been seconded as an aviation commander for special duty to 

the 10th Army, requested sarcastically: „I urgently request that the last opportunity 

for a fire and terror attack be used as a large-scale test […] If aviation commander 

for special duty is tasked accordingly, all efforts will be made to completely wipe 

out Warsaw, the more so as there will only be a border customs office located there 

in the future“. 46 Though v. Richthofen was not given permission to launch such a terror 

attack, the Polish capital was not spared from almost complete destruction in the 

further course of the war. But with its area bombing of the town of Wielun right on 

the first day of World War II, the German Luftwaffe was the first air force of the warring 

factions to mount a Douhet-style terror attack, carrying out its first combat action. 

With this, the German Air Force actually started the bombing terror war, which 

returned to Germany – the party having caused it – only a few years after, sealing the 

fate of many German cities. 

Contrary to the doubts stated in Air Force Regulation L.Dv. 16, the war against 

Poland generally showed that, with German air superiority, the German Air Force 

44 Cf., Größte Härte…“ Verbrechen der Wehrmacht in Polen September/Oktober 1939. German Historical 

Institute Warsaw. Osnabrück 2005, p. 69-71. 

45 Cited in Olaf Groehler, Der strategische Luftkrieg und seine Auswirkungen auf die deutsche Zivilbevölkerung, 

in: Boog, Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (see Note 3), p. 332. 

46 Ibid., p. 334.


could be deployed efficiently in direct support of the fighting ground forces. Thus, 

the still fledging air force service gained increasing acceptance in the Army, dispelling 

concerns as had still been uttered by the Chief of the Army General Staff, 

General Ludwig Beck, following an indoor exercise in 1938: „Make sure that the Air 

Force will not be conducting an operational war somewhere in the enemy’s hinterland, 

with our infantry being stuck in a war of position“. 47 

Despite the news about the German bomb raids on Polish towns and cities, the 

British and the French air forces kept in the background, playing for time. The German 

air fleets in the West, on the other hand, were ordered to: „clearly leave responsibility 

for opening air warfare to England and France“, 48 even though commanders of the 

German Air Force advocated an attack on British industrial sites. Hitler, however, 

considered crossing Belgium and Netherlands territory, neutralization of the French 

Air Force and the destruction of the British-French Army as a precondition for later 

operations of the German Air Force against other targets. 

The first raids conducted by the Royal Air Force in September 1939 were directed 

at German maritime task forces in the German Bight. They resulted in heavy losses 

and the decision to wage future strategic bomb attacks mostly during the night. This, 

however, made “precision bombing” difficult, even though the marking tools for 

night target recognition were improving in the course of the war. The first German 

Air Force raid against England was directed against airfields of the Royal Air Force. 

The latter responded with an attack on the Hörnum Naval Air Force Base on the 

island of Sylt. Even though, for strategic considerations, the Royal Air Force would 

have preferred to attack the Ruhr area armaments center, the British war cabinet 

was opposed to this because of „the possibility that we would be accused of having 

started the undifferentiated bomb war, and fact that such an approach would probably 

result in German retaliatory strikes against England “. 49 

In the context of the campaign against France, Hitler forbade the German Air 

Force to bomb industrial sites and such targets that would pose a high degree of 

threat to the civilian population during the attack on Belgium, Luxembourg and the 

Netherlands. 50 On the one hand, this was to avoid English retaliatory strikes against 

Germany that would be justified by such attacks and, on the other hand, not to hamper 

the later use of industrial sites in these countries unnecessarily. Nevertheless, 

nearly 1,000 civilians were killed in an attack of the German Air Force on Rotterdam 

on 14 May 1940. 

47 Horst Boog, Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 1935-1945. Führungsprobleme-Spitzengliederung- 

Generalstabsausbildung (Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt 

(ed.) , Vol. 21). Stuttgart 1982, p. 174. 

48 Cited in Maier, Der operative Luftkrieg bis zur Luftschlacht um England (see Note 19), p. 331. 

49 Cited in Boog, Der anglo-amerikanische Luftkrieg (see Note 9), p. 453. 

50 Cf. Weisung Nr. 6 für die Kriegführung, in: Walter Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 

1939 -1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. Frankfurt am Main 1962, p. 33.


It was, however, not the attack on Rotterdam, but the military situation that had 

drastically deteriorated for England due to the German occupation of the opposite 

channel coasts, that triggered the war cabinet’s decision to start the bomb war, the 

concept of which had been set up long before. Quite in the spirit of the Trenchard 

doctrine, the Royal Air Force attacked the Ruhr area on 15 May 1940, thus beginning 

a strategic air war that was no longer directly associated with land or maritime operations. 

It was, however, not possible to much longer delay the fast collapse of France 

in which the German Air Force played an important role, acquiring air sovereignty 

and effectively supporting army operations. 

In his directive of 24 May 1940, Hitler fully authorized the German Air Force 

“to wage war against the English motherland“. 51 However, this could not be equated 

with the permission to wage an undifferentiated air war. Starting in August 1940, the 

attacks of the German Air Force within the scope of the planned German invasion 

were initially directed against military targets and the English armaments industry. 

On 24 August German aircraft seemingly accidentally dropped bombs on London, 

which led to a British retaliatory strike on Berlin. Hitler responded by releasing 

London as a target, with the priority targets at first continuing to be war-essential targets 

and not the population. Then, there were more bombing raids against a number 

of English towns and cities, which were referred to as retaliatory attacks. 

Bombing attacks, like for example the one on Coventry in November 1940, were 

aimed at eliminating industrial targets of military interest. However, due to British 

air defense and difficulties encountered with night target acquisition the result often 

was undifferentiated destruction in the target area. After the bombing of the historic 

town centers of Lübeck and Rostock by the Royal Air Force, the German Air Force, 

in 1942, turned to retaliatory attacks on historic British towns and cities and thus to 

undifferentiated air war. For the German towns and cities, the offensive character 

of Germany’s own air war doctrine became a serious disadvantage in view of the 

ever more destructive Anglo-American bombing attacks. In particular in the Eastern 

regions of Germany, little attention had been paid so far to air defense and air raid 

protection and now it was too late. 

With the attack on the Soviet Union, the German Air Force became a Service that 

mainly supported army operations. In this respect, it was fully in line with Adolf 

Hitler’s view who, as Lieutenant General Alfred Jodl noted in his diary, had declared 

already before the war, on 27 January 1938: „For Germany, the Army is of critical 

importance, with the other branches of the Wehrmacht playing a supplementary, 

helping role only“. 52 Getting weaker and weaker, the German Air Force was not able 

to fight a strategic air war in a theater of war as geographically large as the Soviet 

Union, with medium-range bomber aircraft that were scarcely suited for this purpose. 

51 Weisung Nr. 13, in: Ibid., p. 54. 

52 Cited in Boog, Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung (see Note 38), p. 130


IV. 

The German air war doctrine did not provide for a strategic air war and area 

bombing raids aimed at terrorizing the enemy population in accordance with the considerations 

of Douhet, Mitchell or Trenchard. This was in line with their omission 

to develop and produce heavy, four-engine, large-range bomber aircraft. German air 

warfare during World War II was, however, shifting between “Douhetism on the one 

hand and complete subordination to Army operations on the other“. 53 For in addition 

to direct army support operations, the German Air Force, contrary to its air war 

doctrine, was also waging a strategic air war with the attacks on the cities of Bath, 

York and Canterbury and later with the V1 and V2 leaflet bombs, thus conducting a 

dehumanizing war of terror in line with the conception of a “total war”. 

53 Michael Forget, Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Luftwaffe und Heer bei den französischen und deutschen 

Luftstreitkräften im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Boog, Luftkriegführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 

(see Note 3), p. 490.

Jo H n Pe at y * 

The Place of Douhet: A Reassessment 

Gran Bretagna 

In this piece I intend to reassess the relationship between Italian General Giulio 

Douhet and Britain’s Royal Air Force before World War II. 

Bernard Brodie, in his piece “The Heritage of Douhet”, declared that Douhet 

(author of “The Command of the Air”) “possessed the largest and most original mind 

that has thus far addressed itself to the theory of airpower”. Ironically, however, 

Douhet’s name is certainly more widely known, and his writings are certainly more 

often read, today than during his own lifetime. 

Our view of the extent and nature of Douhet’s influence on the thinking of airmen 

in the 20s and 30s has changed over the years. At one time, during and immediately 

after WWII, it was widely believed that Douhet’s influence on the air forces of the 

Great Powers had been pervasive and all-embracing. Hence, it was said, the faith in 

the bomber that was more or less common to all countries interested in the development 

of airpower in the inter-war years. Brodie strongly endorsed this view in his 

piece. 

Robin Higham later challenged this view, arguing that, on the contrary, Douhet 

was unknown and of no consequence. Higham’s seemingly definitive assessment has 

stifled serious debate on this question for decades. 

In this piece I intend to examine critically the prevailing orthodoxy as to the 

extent and nature of knowledge and influence of Douhet’s ideas in Britain before 

WWII, a view epitomised by Higham in an appendix entitled “The Place of Douhet” 

in his “The Military Intellectuals in Britain”. 

This piece is based upon research carried out some years ago at the Public Record 

Office, London and the Caproni Archives, Rome. At the latter I was privileged to be 

given access to the diaries of aircraft designer Gianni Caproni, Douhet’s supporter 

and advocate. Inevitably, given the nature of much of the evidence, this piece will 

raise rather more questions than it can provide answers for. My aim in writing it has 

been to provoke a debate, a debate in which this subject is seriously addressed, and 

which will hopefully lead to a thorough examination of all the surviving evidence, 

both official records and private papers, both in Britain and Italy. I am confident that 

* Dr John Peaty FRGS FRHistS is International Secretary of the British Commission for Military History. 

He sits on the Council of the Society for Army Historical Research and is a founder member 

of the RAF Historical Society. He holds a PhD in War Studies from King’s College London. He has 

lectured and written widely on military history including airpower.


the prevailing view will eventually be replaced by a more balanced and less dogmatic 

assessment of “The Place of Douhet”. 

In “The Place of Douhet”, Higham criticised Brodie and poured scorn on the idea 

that Douhet influenced British air strategy. He maintained that British air strategy was 

home-grown and dismissed the idea that the development of air theory was a homogeneous 

international development. Yet he was forced by the rejoinders of Brodie 

and Eugene Emme (“The Impact of Airpower”) to admit the close similarity between 

Douhetian and other theories of air warfare; and was consequently reduced to describing 

the simultaneous emergence of strategic airpower theories in the USA, Britain and 

Italy as an amazing coincidence - one analogous to the formulation of the theory of 

evolution by natural selection independently by Darwin and Wallace. I believe, and intend 

to show in this piece, that Higham’s thesis is inherently improbable: that considerable 

cross-fertilisation did in fact take place, and could hardly have been prevented. 

Higham emphasised the language barrier. He asserted that there was no promulgation 

of Douhet’s ideas in Britain before April 1936 - an article in “RAF Quarterly”. 

He overlooked or ignored an article in the same journal three years earlier. 

He discounted the testimony of Robert Saundby (“Prophet of Airpower”) and JM 

Spaight (“Air Power in the Next War”), and accepted, as do so many, John Slessor’s 

emphatic denial of any knowledge or influence of Douhet’s ideas in the RAF (“The 

Central Blue”). 

Higham’s view still holds sway and has yet to be challenged directly and in detail. 

Indeed, in a footnote in his “History of the Second World War”, Sir Basil Liddell 

Hart provided powerful support for the Higham view when he categorically denied 

that Douhet was known or influential in the RAF. 

In his “British Air Strategy between the Wars”, Malcolm Smith argued that 

Douhet’s ideas were known in Britain - but only to a few, only from the late 20s, only 

superficially and they had no influence. In his “Strategy without Slide-Rule”, Barry 

Powers dissented from the Higham view, citing the RAF’s great interest in the Italian 

air force in the 20s and the close friendship between the two air ministers, Hoare and 

Balbo. In his “Winged Warfare”, Michael Paris demonstrated that British aviation 

was interested in, and had contacts with, Italian aviation before WWI. 

Before examining in detail the question of Caproni’s relationship with British airmen 

during WWI, I think it is important to recall that airmen everywhere (not least 

in Britain) - and not only airmen - were greatly interested in, and impressed by, the 

strategic bombing campaign that the Italians mounted against Austria in the period 

1915-18 (and in which Caproni and his bombers played a very prominent part). 

The campaign’s enormous impact on the airmen of the time is now largely forgotten, 

for national pride and the Caporetto debacle later combined to dim memories 

and lead to a downplaying of Italian achievements, especially in Britain and the US. 

And, although Boone Atkinson (in “Airpower Historian”) has shown that the American 

concept of strategic bombardment - which originated in this period - was largely

tH e pl a C e o f do u H e t: a reassessment 107 

Italian (specifically Caproni) inspired, no historian has cared to examine the possibility 

that the British concept of strategic bombardment was - if not Italian inspired 

- than Italian influenced. Indeed, the scale of the Italian bombing campaign (which 

was very considerable, dwarfing the British and German campaigns) is almost totally 

unappreciated in Britain today - despite the fact that the Italian strategic bombing 

campaign was the first in history. 

At the end of July 1915, Douhet had proposed the creation of a force of 500 

Caproni bombers to mount a sustained strategic bombing campaign against Austrian 

communications, ports and industries. And, although Douhet’s proposal was officially 

turned down (despite Caproni’s enthusiastic support), within three weeks the 

Italians had embarked on just such a campaign - albeit in a limited fashion initially. 

The campaign reached its height in the late summer of 1917, with repeated and devastating 

attacks by large numbers of Capronis on the Adriatic port of Pola, HQ of the 

Austrian Navy. 

Italian aviation, and in particular the Italian strategic bombing campaign, were 

given extensive and admiring coverage in the US and British newspapers and aviation 

journals of the day - the bombing campaign right from its inception. During 

the war, all the major Italian achievements in the air were fully reported and widely 

discussed in Britain e.g. Laureati’s epic non-stop flight from Turin to London, the 

daring attack on Cattaro, D’Annunzio’s audacious daylight flight over Vienna and, 

of course, the massed raids on Pola. 

During the war, the Rome correspondents of the “Times” (William McClure), 

the “Daily Mail” (G. Ward Price) and the “Morning Post” (William Miller) all wrote 

many interesting and informative articles about Italian aviation, and especially its 

long-range bombing operations e.g. McClure’s article “Italian progress in the air” 

(Sept. 1917). McClure (who also had the distinction of being Chief Correspondent 

with the Italian armies during the war) was closely connected with Italian aviation 

circles, and had been ever since he had accompanied the Italian forces during the 

fighting in Libya. After he left the “Times” in 1920, McClure joined the British 

Embassy in Rome as Press Officer, and remained there until his death in 1939. Is it 

conceivable that McClure was not aware of Douhet’s writings? And if he was aware, 

is it likely that he would have kept such knowledge to himself? His fellow correspondent 

William Miller was a close friend and adviser of Hoare during the latter’s 

wartime service in Italy. 

It is now hard to appreciate that, during WWI, Italian aviation was widely regarded, 

in Britain and the US especially, as leading the world - principally because 

of its strategic bombing campaign. FW Lanchester (a leading and influential British 

airpower theorist), looking back on the Italian’s spectacular long-range bombing 

successes of summer 1917, wrote in the magazine “Flying”: “The Italian Air Service 

was very much to the front on the question of bombing, and had been advertised 

the world over by the exploits of the big Caproni machine. There were many who 

believed that the Italians were really ahead on the strength of this”.


General Ludovico has reminded us of some of the flattering things that British and 

US newspapers said about Italian aviation during the war. For instance, in 1917, the 

“Times” stated that the courage of her aviators, the perfection of her aerial instruments, 

the good disposition of her aviation organisation and the use which the command is 

able to make of it, have brought Italy to the first place among the nations powerful in 

the air, for she is the one that is able to gather the major fruits in this field. 

At the same time as highlighting the extensive and flattering coverage of Italian 

aviation in the British newspapers of the day, in his book Ludovico seems to hint that 

the spectacular Italian bombing raids of 1917 might possibly have had some influence 

on the Smuts report. Whatever one’s view of this, it is a fact that Smuts (along 

with a great many others in Britain) did admit to being very impressed by Italian 

aviation, that his report was written at the height of the Italian bombing campaign, 

and that the British press - and others - did use Italian achievements in the air to point 

up what they saw as British deficiencies in aerial organisation and strategy. 

Not surprisingly, Caproni, his aircraft and his ideas all featured prominently in 

the coverage that British newspapers and aviation journals gave to Italian aviation 

during WWI. An interview which Caproni gave to the “Petit Parisien” was reprinted 

in the “Times” in Oct. 1917, under the heading “Possibilities of the Air: Aeroplane 

raids as a decisive factor”. And another interview which Caproni gave to the “Auto” 

was reprinted in the “Globe” in Nov. 1917. Caproni (who was a fine linguist) was reported 

as saying: “Next spring we shall see a remarkable blossoming forth of Austro- 

German effort. The rear will suffer equally with the front. Paris, Lyon, Le Creusot, 

St. Etienne, St. Chamond, will be bombed with a frequency that we do not dream of 

now, and in the same way the Allies will carry death and desolation into the enemy’s 

country. But they ought not to lose a single minute.....It is aviation that will bring the 

war to an end. Victory will go to the belligerent who first perfects his aerial army. 

We must therefore speed up production. The enemy is on our heels and making tremendous 

efforts to gain mastery of the air, without which victory in modern warfare 

is nothing but a myth”. 

In light of the above, it is not surprising that during WWI the British aeronautical 

community was very much interested in the bombers being made by Caproni 

and used against Austria. And this interest produced many close contacts between 

Caproni and British airmen, as is amply shown by copious references in the Caproni 

diaries in Rome and in records held in Britain. I only intend to detail the most significant 

of these contacts. 

In December 1914, and on Caproni’s behalf, Arturo Mercanti (a respected aviation 

pioneer) approached the British embassy in Rome, offering Britain the right to 

manufacture Caproni bombers in exchange for raw materials. The military and naval 

attaches informed the War Office and Admiralty respectively and Mercanti was 

cordially invited to London. And in January 1915 Mercanti visited the War Office, 

although his visit was brief and without result.(By this time the French had already 

applied for a licence to manufacture Caproni bombers).


However, very favourable reports about the performance of the CA30 (including 

one by General Delme-Radcliffe, Head of the British Military Mission to Italy, who 

had been present at a demonstration), as well as of its “remarkable success”, led 

many in British aviation to become very interested. In August 1915 Flt. Lt. Valentine 

(based in Paris) hastily journeyed to Italy. He was accompanied by Capt. Maurice 

Baring (very shortly to become Trenchard’s trusted and indispensable ADC as well 

as his “mentor and guide” and lifelong confidante), who had previously served at the 

Rome Embassy and was a fine linguist, fluent in Italian. The two men were to see 

the Caproni machine, to find out if it could carry the Beardmore engine (the main 

weakness of the Italian aircraft industry for most of the war was its poor engines, 

and hence the comparative slowness of many of its products), and to judge whether 

it was advisable to order one for the RFC. They visited Malpensa, Gallerata, Turin, 

Milan and Rome. Their unscheduled visit was a surprise both to a somewhat peeved 

British embassy and to the Italian authorities. However, they were courteously treated 

by Caproni and all who they met, and, although they did not get to fly in a Caproni 

machine, they succeeded in ordering one. It would not, however, be ready for many 

months. In September 1915, after urgent arrangements had been made, Caproni’s 

brother/partner Federico and another representative, Bugni, visited London in order 

to confer with the War Office and Admiralty, and to expedite matters. And in 

December 1915 Baring and Capt. Cooper were ordered by Trenchard to go to Italy, 

to take possession of the Caproni machine (which was now believed to be ready), 

to flight test it, and to make arrangements for its being flown back (the preferred 

option) or else crated and transported back. The two men visited Turin, Gallerata, 

Milan and Malpensa, where they were taken up in a Caproni machine. However, 

the plane which had been ordered was not ready to fly. There were difficulties with 

the engines. Nor had the aircraft’s export been cleared with the relevant authorities. 

Baring and Cooper therefore had no option but to come away empty-handed. In the 

end, Valentine (now a Captain) went out to Italy and the plane was flown to France 

in stages until it crashed at Dijon. (It had been planned to fly the plane to England 

eventually). Not surprisingly, this put paid to British interest for some time. 

Interest revived in the spring of 1917, when Wing Commander John Babington 

(of the Admiralty Air Department) and O’Gorman (now Civil Engineer to the Director 

General of Military Aeronautics) visited Italy in order to fly and report upon 

the latest Caproni bomber. They were well received by, and had many discussions 

with, Caproni. However, they concluded that the Caproni machine was inferior to 

the Handley Page bomber, which had recently entered service. This was perhaps not 

unnatural, for Babington had been closely involved with the development and introduction 

into service of the Handley Page. It is ironic to recall that only a few months 

later, the US Bolling Mission, after its visit to Italy, reached the opposite conclusion; 

and that, moreover, by the end of 1917, a squadron of Capronis was in service with 

the Royal Naval Air Service. 

In the summer of 1918 (because of the need for bombers on the Western Front) it


was proposed to offer Italy (via the Supreme War Council at Versailles) a considerable 

quantity of raw materials for its aviation industry in return for supplying Britain 

with large numbers of Caproni bombers, amounting to half Italy’s output of the 

planes. In June 1918, Churchill (Minister of Munitions) asked Caproni for 50 of his 

planes. However, the war ended before anything came of these moves. 

What precisely did Caproni and his representatives say when they came into contact 

with British airmen? (Unfortunately but not surprisingly, no verbatim records 

of any of these discussions seem to have survived). If we assume that these discussions 

were like so many others, and that Caproni spoke much as he wrote, we can 

be pretty certain as to what was said. Conclusive evidence is provided by a contemporary 

report on Caproni’s ideas which I have discovered among the records of the 

old Air Historical Branch at the Public Record Office. This 700 word report, which 

was made at first-hand by the Belgian Military Attaché in Rome (and endorsed by 

the Belgian Minister of War), was with the Operations Branch of the British GHQ in 

France at the very beginning of 1916. The report, which is in French, is an admirably 

accurate and clear exposition of Caproni’s ideas, as compared with more famous 

expressions of those ideas; in this report there are unmistakable echoes of Douhet. 

It is very doubtful that any notice was taken of this particular report, either at 

the time or later. However, it is an important testament to Caproni’s standing, to his 

skill as a lobbyist, as well as to both the existence and closeness of the international 

aeronautical community. And it raises certain questions: Is it conceivable that this 

report was the only report on Caproni’s ideas ever to be seen by British eyes? What 

about his three famous and lengthy wartime memoranda - one for the Allied General 

Staff (1916; in English), one for the American Air Service (1917), and one for the 

French President (1918; in French). What about the book “Let us kill the war: let us 

aim at the heart of the enemy”, published (in English) in 1917? This book, which 

was quoted in the “Times” and which was widely disseminated amongst US airmen, 

was written by Caproni’s friend Nino Salvaneschi, although the ideas are clearly 

Caproni’s. And, above all, did no British Attaché, or visiting British airman, likewise 

meet Caproni, be impressed by the man and his ideas, and disseminate those ideas 

among colleagues and superiors? 

It is now largely forgotten that in the period 1917-18 a British Army Corps, as 

well as large RFC (in the north) and RNAS (in the south) contingents, served in 

Italy. This situation clearly provided a very great opportunity for the dissemination 

of the ideas of Douhet among many British airmen. The last commander of the RFC 

contingent was Phillip Joubert. Joubert was intimately associated with the RAF Staff 

College in the inter-war period, first as instructor (1922) and then as commandant 

(1930). Given the fact that, in 1918, Douhet was one of the heads of Italian Military 

Aviation, there must at least be the possibility that Joubert and members of his staff 

came into contact with Douhet. Undoubtedly, British and Italian airmen would have 

met regularly, both officially and unofficially; and it is entirely possible that members 

of the British air contingents became familiar with the ideas of Douhet at this


time - either at first hand, or through Italian airmen, or in written form. In any case, it 

would be strange indeed if British airmen serving in Italy were not greatly impressed 

by both the Italian’s strategic bombing campaign and by the enemy bombing of Italian 

cities: all the evidence does in fact show that, just like the US Bolling Mission, 

British airmen were greatly impressed by what they saw and heard in Italy. And 

what of Caproni? All the evidence, not least Caproni’s diaries, shows clearly that he 

had a very close relationship with the British air contingents in Italy; both of which 

participated in the Italian strategic bombing campaign. Moreover, a squadron of his 

giant CA42 triplanes was expressly built for, and operated by, the RNAS contingent. 

Caproni was later awarded the OBE by a grateful Britain in recognition of his many 

wartime services. In view of the above, I believe there is a need for a full examination 

of Joubert’s role at the Staff College in the 20s and 30s. There is clear evidence 

that records relating both to the RFC contingent in Italy and to Italian aviation during 

the war were supplied by the old AHB to the Staff College in the 20s, many at Joubert’s 

request. In 1927 the Staff College obtained an original copy of “The Command 

of the Air.” 

Joubert’s adjutant in Italy was William Wedgewood Benn (later Secretary of State 

for Air). Benn, who spoke Italian very well, devoted a large portion of his wartime 

memoirs “In the Side Shows” to his service in Italy. He writes, admiringly, of the 

Italian’s use of Caproni bombers against Austria. Referring to his strong belief in 

large, multi-engined aircraft of “untold possibilities”, he writes: “under the influence 

of Caproni in Italy, this partisanship became a definite part of my aerial faith”. Benn 

was a tireless and influential lobbyist in Parliament and in the press for the cause of 

independent airpower in the inter-war period. He was intimately associated with the 

Air Service Parliamentary Committee and was a fierce critic of the Navy’s attitude 

towards the RAF, championing Trenchard’s famous December 1919 air policy statement, 

and appearing before the Salisbury investigation into the RN/RAF controversy 

in July 1923. He revisited Italy in 1927, when he met leading Fascists. 

The first commander of the RNAS contingent was Murray Sueter. (Benn had 

also served with the RNAS contingent in Italy; the two men were friends). During 

his time in Italy, Sueter was much concerned with the development of the RNAS 

Caproni squadron. Like Benn, after the war Sueter was a tireless and influential lobbyist 

in Parliament (having been elected in 1922) and in the press for the cause of 

independent airpower, was likewise intimately connected with the Air Service Parliamentary 

Committee, and also appeared before the Salisbury investigation. When 

serving in Italy he would no doubt have been drawn to such like-minded men as 

Douhet and Caproni. 

The evidence presented above is crystal clear that Caproni’s many and varied 

contacts extended to British airmen. Was Benn the only British airman influenced by 

him? I think it is highly improbable. I believe it is highly probable that he had some 

influence on a number of British airmen - directly, and not just via the French and 

American airmen with whom he was closely associated. (Both France and the US


built large numbers of Caproni bombers under licence and used them extensively on 

the Western Front. The French were interested in Caproni’s designs right from the 

first days and obtained a licence when the CA30 was barely off the drawing board. 

In the winter of 1917-18, Caproni paid a long visit to Paris; and towards the end of 

the war, Caproni also made an extensive tour of the US. Additionally, in the period 

1917-18, large French and US air contingents were based in Italy). I am not necessarily 

suggesting that any influence that Caproni had on British airmen could be 

rightly compared to his profound influence on US airmen - which is not to say that 

any Caproni influence on British airmen can be disregarded. 

It is of course possible (though not I think probable) that Caproni did not refer to 

Douhet by name in his discussions with British airmen. In any case, they would have 

been aware of Douhet’s ideas, which is the important point. 

After Italy joined the Allied side in WWI, a British Military Mission was attached 

to the Italian Supreme Command (May 1915 to August 1919). The head of the Mission 

was Brig.-Gen. Sir Charles Delme-Radcliffe, who had been British Military 

Attaché in Rome before the war. Among the many reports he wrote during the war 

was one on Douhet’s court-martial. The British Embassy also reported on the courtmartial, 

a cause celebre of the day. 

The most important of the British airmen and soldiers who served in Italy during 

WWI was undoubtedly Hoare. Samuel Hoare (Secretary of State for Air 1922-4, 

1924-9 and 1940) headed the Special Intelligence Section of the British Military 

Mission from the early summer of 1917 to the beginning of 1919. 

Most of Hoare’s papers for the period 1917-19 were closed to public inspection 

for many years and I have not had an opportunity to study them. However, the 

biography of Hoare by JA Cross does provide a good deal of information about his 

wartime service in Italy. Suffice it to say that such evidence as he produces clearly 

shows that, during the years 1917-19, Hoare (in addition to his normal duties) learnt 

Italian and immersed himself in Italian society, with the dual aim of: 1. fostering 

those elements that backed the war; and 2. countering those elements that were neutralist/ 

pacifist/defeatist. To this end, Hoare cultivated those politicians, industrialists 

and journalists who supported the war and its active prosecution. For example, he 

became very friendly with Bissolati and he financed Mussolini. 

In light of his activities, I consider it very probable that Hoare came into contact 

with Caproni whilst in Italy - and quite possibly with Douhet himself. Final judgement 

will however have to await study of Hoare’s papers. 

Even if we suppose, despite the evidence presented above, that Hoare did not 

learn of Douhet and his ideas whilst serving in Italy, we can be all but certain that he 

did learn of Douhet and his ideas in the 20s. 

In his memoirs, Hoare testified to the great British interest in, and the especially 

close ties with, Italian aviation in the 20s. If the primary reason for the great interest 

was the growing might and reputation of the Italian air force, the closeness of the ties


was due in no small part to the personal relationship between Hoare and Balbo: the 

two men greatly liked and admired each other. 

For his part, Hoare (following his wartime service, a convinced Italophile) was 

concerned not only to maintain but also to expand the long-standing ties between 

British and Italian aviation. Hoare visited Italy several times during the mid 20s 

(meeting Mussolini in 1925, who thanked him for helping the nascent Fascist Party) 

and again, at Balbo’s invitation, in 1929. For his part, Balbo (an equally convinced 

Anglophile) led an Italian air delegation (which included General Guidoni, recently 

Air Attaché in London) on a tour of Britain in 1927. Warmly welcomed by Hoare 

and Trenchard, they were feted everywhere they went. They visited the Hendon air 

display, Cranwell, the Royal Aeronautical Society and the factories of leading aircraft 

manufacturers. Balbo returned to Britain in each of the three succeeding years; 

attending the Hendon air display in 1928 and the Schneider Trophy contest on the 

Solent in 1929, and visiting London in 1929. 

On his visits to Britain, did Balbo (or any of his companions) never once, either 

in public or in private, refer to or quote Douhet - Italy’s honoured son and foremost 

military theorist? In light of the great British interest in, and the very close ties 

with, Italian aviation in the 20s, I (like Powers) find it “impossible” to believe that 

Douhet’s ideas were not known in this country at that time. 

What does it matter if Hoare did know of/was influenced by Douhet? It matters a 

great deal. Hoare is a very important figure in the history of the RAF because, as his 

biographer amply demonstrates, in the difficult and crucial years of the 20s Hoare’s 

championship of the RAF was nothing less than decisive. Cross credits Hoare with 

three major achievements at the Air Ministry: successfully maintaining the independence 

and integrity of the RAF against fierce opposition; the considerable development 

of military and civil aviation; and the creation of a public opinion sympathetic 

to airpower. If, as has often been said, Trenchard was the Father of the RAF, then 

Hoare could fairly be termed its favourite uncle. 

I think it quite possible that Caproni had some influence on Trenchard’s thinking 

on airpower during WWI. It is now generally accepted that Trenchard was essentially 

an organiser; he was not in any real sense a theorist or polemicist. He had always 

to rely on others. Initially, Trenchard was strongly opposed to the idea of independent 

airpower and strategic bombing. His conversion only came about belatedly in the 

last months of the war, when he was put in command of the RAF’s new Independent 

Force and charged with the strategic bombing of Germany. Presumably, given that 

his past experience had only involved the tactical use of airpower, he would have 

been receptive to the advice and guidance of others, more experienced in the field of 

strategic bombing than himself. 

Given Baring’s intimate relationship with Trenchard, his two missions to Italy in 

connection with Caproni bombers, his fluency in Italian, and the world-wide standing 

of Italian aviation in general and Caproni in particular, it is almost inconceivable 

that Trenchard was not aware of Caproni’s ideas.


A long detailed and highly enthusiastic report on Italian aviation, and especially 

its strategic bombing campaign, written by Capt.-Commandant Lebon of the Technical 

Branch of the Belgian Air Service, was forwarded to Trenchard in October 1917. 

Lebon wrote admiringly and at length of “crushing” attacks on Austrian targets by 30 

and 40 Capronis at a time, enthused about the potential of the Caproni triplane, and 

concluded by saying that in the field of strategic bombing the Italians “are far ahead 

of all other nations”. 

Moreover, referring to the summer of 1918, Baring later recalled (significantly 

I think) that: “During this period we had a great deal to do with the American, the 

French and the Italian aviation. The Italians had a Squadron of Caproni machines 

quite close to us”. And finally, Caproni - accompanied by his friend Eugenio Chiesa, 

the Italian Commissioner for Aviation - actually visited Trenchard at his HQ in 

France in 1918. Could the influence of Caproni explain both Trenchard’s insistence 

on the need for the bombing of enemy airfields to achieve air superiority before a 

strategic bombing campaign could properly begin, and also Trenchard’s insistence 

that the morale of the enemy civil population should be the main target of a strategic 

bombing campaign? (Trenchard’s insistence on those points stayed with him, undiminished, 

throughout his life). 

Furthermore, given the testimony of Hoare, is it really likely that in the 20s 

Trenchard was totally unaware of Douhet’s ideas? As shown below, Trenchard was 

certainly aware of Douhet by 1928. Is it in fact credible that the very close similarity 

between the ideas of Trenchard and Douhet was (as Higham says) mere coincidence? 

I consider the evidence indisputable that, right from the earliest days, a close 

international aeronautical community existed; and that, even in the earliest days, its 

members had frequent opportunities to meet each other and to exchange information 

and ideas. At the outset it should be remembered that, ever since the mid-nineteenth 

century, each major nation had serving officers attached to its Embassies abroad - including, 

eventually, Air Attaches. And, at the risk of stating the obvious, the primary 

task of such officers was to familiarise themselves with the armed forces of the country 

in which they were serving, and to keep the authorities back in their own country 

informed of any developments. 

Following the Wright brother’s sensational tour of Europe in 1908-9, air displays, 

competitions and conferences became a regular part of the aviation scene. And by 

the 20s, such events had become institutionalised. Among the many air displays, 

the one held annually at Hendon was one of the most famous; and among the many 

competitions, one automatically thinks of the headline-making Schneider Trophy 

contests e.g. the one at Venice, hosted by Balbo and Andriani, in 1927. Of the many 

Aviation Congresses and Conferences, the ones held in Rome in October 1923 - presided 

over by our old friend Mercanti, then Italian Commissioner for Civil Aviation 

- and October 1927 were among the most notable. 

WWI was responsible for bringing French, Italian, British and US aviation closer


together. And, in many respects, the close relationship forged during the war continued 

into peacetime. A Supreme War Council, consisting of Permanent Military 

Representatives and a multi-national Secretariat, was established at Versailles in November 

1917. Various Inter-Allied Committees (including an Inter-Allied Aviation 

Committee) were set up. The establishment of the SWC brought together officers 

and officials from the four Allied nations and provided a forum for the inter-change 

of ideas and information, both official and unofficial. Incidentally, at the third session 

of the IAAC (July 1918), the Italian delegation under General Luigi Bongiovanni 

decisively forced the issue of the creation of an Inter-Allied Airforce to mount a 

co-ordinated strategic bombing campaign against Germany in 1919: which had first 

been proposed by the Americans - perhaps under Caproni’s influence - in March. 

Furthermore, during WWI there was a large traffic in aircraft and aviation supplies 

between the Allied nations, and this naturally led to the development of close 

contacts between Allied airmen and officials. In 1917 the Italians established an 

Aeronautical Commission in London. And in June 1918 the Ministry of Munitions 

opened an office in Rome. Also in 1918 an Inter-Allied Munitions Council came into 

being under the auspices of the SWC; Chiesa was one of the Italian delegates. In 

the late summer of 1918 a British Aeronautical Mission, led by Sir Arthur Duckham 

(Director-General of Aircraft Production), visited Italy. And, finally, one should not 

forget the frequent wartime and post-war Allied conferences - many held in Italy 

(e.g. Rome 1917, Rapallo 1917, Genoa 1922). 

In view of the above, I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that, particularly 

during the wartime and post-war years, a great many in Italian, French, British 

and US aviation either knew - or knew of - each other. And thus it scarcely seems 

credible to me that Douhet and his ideas would not be discussed by - still less be 

unknown to - many airmen outside Italy, especially in Britain, France and the US. 

The oft-claimed “language barrier” is a red herring - in fact, there was no real 

problem. Suppose we ignore for a moment the existence of translators and interpreters. 

During WWI many British and Italian airmen and soldiers acquired first-hand 

knowledge of each other’s language: some’s knowledge even pre-dated the war. 

Many of the Italians spoke English - most notably Caproni and Guidoni. Many of 

the British spoke Italian - most notably Hoare, Baring, Sykes and Benn. Very nearly 

all the major figures in British and Italian aviation spoke French - the “lingua franca” 

indeed. Finally, one should not forget that Caproni’s ideas were available in both 

French and English texts. 

It would indeed be incredible if, in the 20s, the British Air Attaches in Rome were 

less interested in, or less informed about, Italian aviation, than the British Military 

Attaches before WWI. (The Rome Embassy in the 20s, incidentally, had a reputation 

for being well informed). Air Attaches were appointed in Rome and London 

in May 1918. It is true that during the years 1921-24 there was no British Air Attaché 

in Rome. However, during this period, the British Military Attaché (Major- 

General John Duncan) also acted as Air Attaché and he kept the Air Ministry fully


informed of Italian developments in the aerial sphere, especially those consequent 

upon the March on Rome - including the creation of the “Regia Aeronautica” (Royal 

Air Force) in March 1923. Because of the pace and scope of Italian developments 

in the air, by the autumn of that year the British Embassy was urgently calling for 

the reappointment of an Air Attaché. And in 1924 Wing-Commander John Fletcher 

was sent out to Rome, where he remained until 1928. During his time in Rome 

Fletcher wrote many detailed, accurate and frankly alarming reports on the growth 

and overhaul of the Italian Airforce. Fletcher was a perceptive and shrewd observer, 

recognising both the great strides forward the Italian Airforce was making as well as 

its (less obvious) shortcomings. After his return to Britain, Fletcher lectured about 

the Italian Airforce. 

Given the British interest in Italian aviation in the 20s, would Douhet have really 

been unknown to the Air Ministry? For Douhet was a man who had been appointed 

to high office by Mussolini; a man who was proclaimed by Fascist propaganda to 

be one of the world’s greatest military theorists; and a man whose prolific and provocative 

writings were published with official or semi-official backing from 1921 

onwards. In particular, would his “The Command of the Air”, a book that was published 

by the Ministry of War and distributed to all army and naval officers (and 

which was later reissued by the Ministry of Culture), be likely to escape the notice 

of the British Embassy in Rome, and therefore not be transmitted to London? I consider 

it to be inherently improbable.(The US Military Attaché sent two copies of the 

book to Washington in March 1922). Nor can I believe that the two leading Italian 

aviation magazines “L’Ala d’Italia” and “Rivista Aeronautica”, both of which gave 

Douhet’s ideas extensive coverage, would have escaped the British Air Attaché’s 

attention. I cannot accept the implication of Higham and Liddell Hart that every British 

Air Attaché in Rome between the wars was incompetent and kept his superiors 

in ignorance of Douhet. 

The General Staff Monthly Intelligence Summaries testify to the great British interest 

in, and knowledge of, Italian aviation at this time. As of course do the Air Staff 

Air Intelligence Reports; report no. 13 (1926) being devoted entirely to Italian aviation. 

This report, which is extremely, long and detailed, shows a clear understanding 

of Italy’s Douhetian air strategy. To quote two passages from the report: “Italy firmly 

believes in the use of the “Armata Aerea” [the Independent Air Force, comprising 

the strategic bombers] for reducing the morale and “will to fight” of the enemy civil 

population”; “The first function of the Independent Air Force is to paralyse the enemy’s 

air force by direct air fighting and by attacking his ground organisations”. The 

report also highlights crowded northern Italy’s vulnerability to air attack and the 

greatly shaken civilian morale that resulted from such attacks in WWI - two of the 

key elements in Douhet’s thinking. The report is I believe strong, albeit circumstantial, 

evidence of a knowledge and understanding of Douhet’s ideas. 

In my judgement, it would seem that the RAF moved from a preoccupation with 

the French Airforce in the early 20s to a preoccupation with the Italian Airforce in


the mid/late 20s and early/mid 30s - a preoccupation which began with the restoration 

of amicable relations with France and with the rebirth of the Italian Airforce 

after the rise to power of Mussolini (and which ended with the coming of Hitler and 

the rebirth of the German Airforce). The fact that the Italian Airforce had become 

by the late 20s one of the largest, most modern, best equipped, and most powerful 

airforces in the world made such interest entirely natural. 

In his biography of Balbo, Claudio Segré rightly reminded us of the high regard 

in which Italian aviation was held throughout the world in the period from the mid 

20s to the mid 30s - due to the personal magnetism of the dashing Balbo; the audacity 

of his long-distance mass formation flights; the record-breaking successes 

of Italian pilots and aeroplanes (not least the Italian victories in the Schneider Trophy 

contests); and the great technical achievements of Italy’s aircraft designers and 

manufacturers - most notably Caproni heavy bombers, Savoia-Marchetti flying boats 

and Macchi racers.(At the time of his early death, Segre was working on a full-scale 

biography of Douhet, which we still lack. I had shared my preliminary findings with 

him and he was intending to follow up my research). 

One should also not forget the considerable contemporary interest in, and respect 

for, Fascism on the part of many soldiers and politicians outside Italy. 

It is perfectly fair to ask exactly why should the RAF be not only interested in 

but also influenced by Italian aviation in these years? And why Italian rather than 

French or US aviation? Hoare provides much of the answer - the “Regia Aeronautica” 

was throughout this period the only other independent airforce in the world, the 

only other airforce that was not just in both thought and practice an auxiliary of the 

army and navy; and Italy was one of the very few countries where really dramatic 

advances were being made in the field of aviation - technically, administratively and 

doctrinally. One should remember that serious debates about strategic airpower did 

not occur in France or in the US till the early 30s - and in both cases, Douhet’s ideas 

figured prominently. 

Besides the role of the British Air Attaches in Rome, there is of course to be considered 

the role of the Italian Air Attaches in London. There is no reason to believe 

that the latter would have been in any way shy about aeronautical developments in 

the “new” Italy, or about Douhet, Italy’s honoured son - on the contrary. Especially, 

as in 1926-7 the Italian Air Attaché in London was General Alessandro Guidoni. 

Guidoni, a world renowned aerial torpedo expert, spoke fluent English and had been 

friendly with British and US airmen ever since he had been the Italian technical 

delegate to the Inter-Allied Aviation Committee during the war. His advice had been 

sought by the US aviation mission under Crowell which visited Europe in 1919. He 

had been awarded the OBE by Britain for his war services, was greatly admired by 

Trenchard, and was elected an Hon. Fellow of the RAeS in 1927. A friend of both 

Caproni and Douhet, he had also befriended Mitchell and Charlton when he had 

served as Italian Air Attaché in Washington during the early 20s; he advised Mitchell 

on technical matters at the time of his famous bombing tests on warships.


Thanks to the work of Alfred Hurley, biographer of Billy Mitchell, we now know 

that when he was in Washington, Guidoni sent an Italian Aviation Journal’s summary 

of “The Command of the Air” to Air Service HQ and to “Aviation” magazine. The 

editor of the magazine discussed the piece with Mitchell, published an appreciation 

of “The Command of the Air” by Guidoni in his magazine (Nov. 1922), and planned 

to publish a translation of the entire book. In a letter to Douhet, Guidoni quoted the 

editor as saying that Mitchell was much impressed; the editor had also compared 

Douhet to Mahan. When he was in London, Guidoni certainly passed over Italian 

aviation publications to the Air Ministry. Did he, or any of his predecessors, supply 

information on Douhet to British Aviation journals like “Flight” or “The Aeroplane”, 

both of which gave extensive coverage to the aeronautical developments taking place 

in Italy from the mid 20s? Incidentally, it is possible that the British Air Attaché in 

Washington sent a copy of Guidoni’s article in “Aviation” magazine to London when 

it was published, for he was writing to his superiors shortly afterwards: “the Italian 

Air Attaché is granted access to many new developments especially within the US 

Army Air Service (a point of leakage now being delicately and cautiously tapped by 

your attaché)”. 

In his famous and controversial memorandum “The War Object of an Air Force” 

(May 1928), in which he first openly argued the case for an independent strategy in 

a future war, Trenchard referred to “foreign thinkers”. Two weeks later, MacNeece 

Foster, a prominent member of the Air Staff, was cheerfully reporting to Trenchard 

the “considerable effect” of his quoting “Italian sources” at a lecture which he gave 

at the Imperial Defence College. Later that same month, in a minute which he wrote 

attacking critics of Trenchard’s memorandum, Foster reiterated his firm belief that 

some “continental nations do regard the importance of the air as something quite 

unique”, and quoted as supporting evidence the utterances of Oronzo Andriani, a 

leading figure in Italian military aviation. Foster was quoting from a powerfully 

Douhetian speech on the subject of objectives in time of war that had been reported 

in Britain three years earlier; the speech had evidently made a lasting impression on 

at least one member of the Air Staff. It is extremely tempting to speculate that Foster 

had a hand in writing Trenchard’s memorandum and that he utilised Andriani’s 

speech in the writing. Foster was very knowledgeable about foreign aviation: he was 

the British air delegate to the League of Nations at Geneva. Foster gave lectures at 

the RUSI in Nov. 1925 and Dec. 1927. These lectures were Douhetian in everything 

but name; however, they received no criticism from within the RAF. Significantly, 

Foster was favourably quoted or referred to by several of the airpower propagandists, 

including PRC Groves and Spaight. In June 1928 the Air Staff campaign received 

extra ammunition in the form of a translation of a German article, in which leading 

airpower theorists - including Douhet - were enthusiastically quoted, and which was 

circulated to, among others, Spaight and Trenchard. To be sure, Douhet was not the 

only authority to be mobilised by the Air Staff at this time, but he does seem to have 

been one of the more prominently deployed.


It is a fact that there were a great many similarities in what the three great interwar 

proponents of air power - Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell - believed and advocated 

(there were also some differences of course). This was no doubt partly due to their 

ideas being the natural products of like stimuli. As Higham says, men subjected 

to similar influences sometimes arrive at similar conclusions, without necessarily 

being aware of each other’s ideas. But there was as well, undeniably, considerable 

cross-fertilisation, as Brodie says. For, it is clear that, from the earliest days, airmen 

constituted a close international community; the French, Italian, American and British 

members of which were brought even closer together by WWI. And even in the 

earliest days of aviation, there were opportunities for airmen from different countries 

to meet each other and to exchange information and ideas; as regards British, French, 

Italian and US aviation, such opportunities were naturally very much greater during 

the war. 

As Boone Atkinson has written, military men are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge 

debts - least of all to a country which had suffered the debacle of Caporetto. 

There was, it is clear, a conscious downplaying of Caproni’s influence on US airmen 

after the fact. No doubt national pride played a large part in this; as did professional 

pride (Caproni being a civilian). But, of course, unlike the Americans, the British had 

had considerable experience of strategic bombing during WWI - both as practitioners 

and as victims. As a consequence, the British were undoubtedly less receptive to 

outside influences than the Americans. Nevertheless, the evidence presented above 

strongly suggests, in my judgement, that British airmen were not only interested in 

and informed about, but also influenced by, Italian aviation and aviation developments 

in Italy - directly challenging the prevailing view. I do not of course seek 

to deny the deep native roots of British air power theory - HG Wells, Sykes, Lord 

Montagu, Lanchester, Sueter, Spaight “et al”. But I certainly do not think that it is 

unreasonable to argue that British airpower theory could have been a compound of 

indigenous factors and outside influences. 

I am not claiming that knowledge of (still less, interest in) the ideas of Douhet 

permeated all levels of the RAF: in all organisations there is a division between 

those who make and those who implement policy and their agendas can be very 

different. I do claim however that certain individuals, occupying positions of power 

or influence, were certainly aware of - and probably influenced by - Douhet. Knowledge 

and influence are of course different things. Knowledge, although an essential 

prerequisite for influence, does not automatically lead to influence. I readily admit 

that to date more hard evidence of knowledge has been accumulated than of influence. 

The evidence of influence is in truth largely circumstantial. However, I find the 

evidence of influence, albeit largely circumstantial, persuasive. It is hard to accept 

that the RAF’s awareness of Douhet’s ideas - as demonstrated in this piece - and the 

RAF’s passionate belief in strategic bombing between the wars were completely 

unconnected. 

Those who will no doubt retort (quite rightly) that over the years the RAF has in


some degree influenced many of the world’s airforces (including the Italian), thereby 

implicitly acknowledge the existence of an international aeronautical community - 

and consequently cannot logically deny the possibility that Italian ideas had some 

influence in Britain. Unless, that is, they are prepared to assert that influence can only 

ever flow in one direction. 

I am convinced that there is a need for a thorough and wide-ranging investigation 

of this neglected subject: certainly a more comprehensive and deeper investigation 

than I have been able to undertake. I will be content if this piece will have played 

some small part in stimulating just such an investigation. I realise that at this distance 

of time the likelihood of finding conclusive proof (of the “smoking gun” variety) of 

Douhet’s influence on British air policy must be considered remote. And I accept that 

it was in all probability largely home-grown (I am convinced that it was not entirely 

home-grown). But this is a very long way from saying that Douhet was unknown 

and of no consequence, as Higham and Liddell Hart assert - or little known and of 

no consequence, as Smith asserts. “Largely” allows for some exceptions and though 

the evidence I have unearthed is mostly circumstantial, I believe that a jury would 

convict. I consider the subject worthy of further research and so invite colleagues in 

both Britain and Italy to undertake it.

tr i a n ta f y L L i a ka i s a r o u-Pa n ta z o P o u L o u * 

Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) during 

World War II. Organization and Operations 

Warlike preparations 

Grecia 

On May 20, 1940, the Chief of Air Staff was asked to plan the air defence 

which consisted of three divisions: Active Air Defence, Passive Air Defence 

and Early Warning System. In order to ensure the air defence in the rear, the 

country was divided into large geographical zones which corresponded to Athens, 

Larissa, Thessaloniki, Kavala, Alexandroupolis and Ioannina. 

As far as the aerodromes were concerned until the outbreak of war, seven new 

aerodromes had been constructed (Sedes, Larissa, Dekelia, Phaliro, Eleusis, New 

Anchialos and Maleme, Crete) as well as 22 auxiliary airfields and 25 landing 

grounds 1 . 

According to the mobilization plan, the RHAF was organized into Army and 

Naval Air Commands 2 . 

The Army Air Command included the Bomber, Fighter and Army Co-operation 

Commands. 

The Bomber Command was formed on August 23, 1940, in Larissa and its aim 

was to bomb enemy supply lines, routes of advance or retreat and other strategic 

objectives. The Bomber Command had three squadrons at its disposal: 

No. 31 Bomber Squadron had eight serviceable Potez 633 B2 and was stationed at 

Niamata, Larissa. The Squadron’s flying personnel consisted of 23 officers and non 

commissioned officers (NCOs). 

No. 32 Bomber Squadron operated with 11 serviceable Bristol Blenheim Mk IV. 

It was based at Kazaklar airfield in Larissa. Its flying personnel consisted of 19 officers 

and 16 NCOs. 

No. 33 Bomber Squadron had 10 serviceable Fairey Battle B.1 and was stationed 

at New Anchialos, Volos. Twenty- five pilots and air gunners were assigned to this 

Squadron. 

* 

Member of the HCMH. 

1 

Hellenic Wings: An Illustrated History of the HAF and its precursors,1908-1944, Vol. I, published 

by the History Museum, HAF, Athens, December 1998, p. 82. 

2 

History of the Hellenic Air Force (1930- April 1941), Vol. III, published by the History Museum, 

HAF, Athens 1990, pp. 128-141.


Fi g u r e 1: The Polish-built P.Z.L. P.24 F/Gs were the main fighters during the 

Hellenic-Italian War (Archive of the History Museum, HAF). 

The Fighter Command was assigned to protect the vulnerable areas, to escort 

the sea convoys, to protect the Bomber Air Force allies, the multi-firing of the enemy 

phalanges and the interceptions of enemy aircraft. The Command included four 

squadrons: 

No. 21 Fighter Squadron was stationed at Vasiliki, near Trikala. The inventory of 

the Squadron consisted of 10 P.Z.L. P.24s while its flying personnel included 9 officers 

and 5 NCOs assisted by 150 persons with other specialties (Figure 1). 

No. 22 Fighter Squadron was stationed at the auxiliary airfield of Great Mikra 

near Thessaloniki. The Squadron employed nine P.Z.L.s and its flying personnel consisted 

of 6 officers and 6 NCOs while other specialties amounted to 100. 

No. 23 Fighter Squadron was based at Ambelon airfield, near Larissa. The 

Squadron employed 11 P.Z.L.s while 16 pilots and 26 engineers (officers and NCOs) 

together with 120 persons with other specialties were assigned to it. 

No. 24 Fighter Squadron was stationed at Eleusis Air Base. Its inventory consisted 

of 9 Bloch MB. 151s. Its flying personnel consisted of 10 officers and NCOs 

while persons with other specialties accounted to 180. 

The Army Co-operation Command was tasked to offer support to ground forces

o ya l He l l e n i C air fo r C e (rHaf) d u r i n g wo r l d wa r ii. or g a n i z at i o n a n d op e r at i o n s 123 

Fi g u r e 2: A formation of Henschel Hs 126A-1s (Archive of the History Museum, HAF). 

by carrying out reconnaissance missions and light bombing operations. Army Co-op 

had at its disposal four Squadrons and one Flight. 

No. 1 (Army Co-op) Squadron was a training squadron and did not participate 

as such in actual military operations. No. 2 (Army Co-op) Squadron was based near 

Kozani at the Petrana auxiliary airfield. It was equipped with 10 serviceable Bréguet 

Bré 19s. Flying personnel included 10 officers and 16 NCOs while persons with 

other specialties accounted to 160. 

No. 3 (Army Co-op) Squadron was divided into two flights based at Veroia and 

Lebet airfields respectively. Each flight was equipped with 8 serviceable Henschel 

Hs 126 A-1s. In December 1940 these two flights merged into one. The flying personnel 

included 23 officers and 7 NCOs supported by 220 persons with other specialties 

(Figure 2). 

No. 4 (Army Co-op) Squadron, was also divided in two flights, operated from 

the airfields of Gida and Kouklaina. The Squadron was equipped with 7 serviceable 

Potez Po 25s and one Avro 621 Tutor. Its strength included 12 pilots (10 officers and 

2 NCOs) assisted by 137 persons with other specialties. 

Independent Flight 2828 was based at the auxiliary airfield of Tanagra. The flight 

had 8 Bréguet Bré 19s at its disposal while flying personnel included 8 officers and 5


NCOs. Ground personnel consisted of 65 persons with other specialties. 

Naval Air Command was assigned with open sea patrols, anti–submarine patrols 

and mine searching missions. This Command on the eve of the war was consisted of 

the following three squadrons: 

No. 11 (Naval Co-op) Squadron was equipped with 9 Fairey III Fs and was based 

at Valtoudi, Magnesia. It possessed 8 pilots (officers and NCOs) while ground personnel 

consisted of 150-180 persons with other specialties. 

No. 12 (Naval Co-op) Squadron was operating from Suda Air Base in Crete as 

well as from Milos, Moudros and Mytilene. Its inventory consisted of 12 Dornier Do 

22Kg seaplanes. It included 15 pilots and 220 ground personnel (Figure 3). 

No. 13 (Naval Co-op) Squadron was stationed at Eleusis Air Base, having at its 

disposal 9 Avro 652A Anson Mk I. The flying personnel included 23 officers and 16 

NCOs supported by 200 persons with other specialties. 

The RHAF also used, for training purposes, 6 Hawker Horsley II bombers, 6 Avia 

B-534 (verze III) fighter /trainers, 2 Gloster Gladiator fighters, 20 Avro 621, 22 Avro 

626 Prefect and a number of Morane- Saulnier MS.230 trainers. The Breguet 19s 

and Potez Po 25s, were withdrawn from active service soon after the hostilities broke 

out while the Dornier Do 22Kg were sent to the State Aircraft Factory in order to be 

converted into front line combat aircraft. 

On the eve of the Hellenic-Italian War, the total potential of RHAF front-line aircraft 

was 78 aircraft (24 P.Z.L P.24s, 9Bloch MB.151s, 8 Potez 633 B2s, 11 Bristol 

Blenheim Mk IVs, 10 Fairey Battle B.1s and 16 Henschel Hs 126s). On the other 

hand, the Regia Aeronautica had 225 bombers, 179 fighters and 59 reconnaissance 

aircraft for this campaign, summing up in a total of 463. Furthermore, RHAF aircraft 

were by far less capable in comparison with those of the Regia Aeronautica as far as 

their overall specifications and performance were concerned 3 . 

Regarding the RHAF aerodromes, they had severe deficiencies in terms of antiaircraft 

protection, wireless communications and runway conditions. Most of these 

airfields were covered in clover and would become soggy and nonoperational in 

wet weather. The Regia Aeronautica on the other hand could use a large number of 

airfields all along the front. As a result, the Italian aircraft could penetrate deep into 

the Hellenic territory even under adverse weather conditions. The RHAF, in view 

of these deficiencies, had to rely to a very large degree on the abilities and courage 

of its pilots. However, The RHAF, as a small airforce with scanty supply of modern 

aircraft, entered the war with high morale. 

3 Hellenic Wings, Ibid, pp. 90-91.


Fi g u r e 3: Dornier Do 22 seaplane (Archive of the History Museum, HAF). 

Hellenic-Italian War 

The German policy, aiming at breaking up the borders all over Europe had an 

inevitable impact all across the Balkan peninsula. Hitler envisaged a rapid solution 

to the Balkan conundrum so as to have all his forces available for the “Barbarossa” 

operation against the Soviet Union. It seems that Hitler had entrusted the subjugation 

of Greece and Yugoslavia to Mussolini, so as to satisfy the Duce’s Mediterranean 

aspirations. 

It seems that the invasion and outright annexation of Albania in April 1939 was 

only a stepping-stone for invading Greece. The Italian provocation reached its peak 

when they torpedoed frigate ELLI on the 15 th of August 1940. The attack against 

Greece had become imminent. On October 25 th , 1940, Prime Minister I. Metaxas 

announced that according to available information, the Italian attack would unfold 

sometime during the next three days. It was indeed launched at early dawn on the 

28 th of October 1940. Early in the morning of October 28, 1940, Patras and Athens 

were bombed by Regia Aeronautica. 

The first engagement took place two days later over Korytsa between 3 Fiat GR. 

42 Falcos and 2 RHAF reconnaissance aircrafts. The latter managed to escape. The 

first loss of life occurred on October 30, 1940 when 5 Italian Fiat GR. 42 fighters 

were involved in a dogfight with two Henschel Hs 126s. The Italians managed to 

damage the engine of one Henschel which was forced to land. The observer, Pilot


Officer Evangelos Giannaris, was 

4 fatally injured and was the first officer 

of the Hellenic Armed Forces 

to be killed in action during the 

Hellenic – Italian War. In the course 

of the same incident the Italians 

shot down the second Hs 126 as 

well, causing the death of the crew 

(Figure 4). 

On November 1, 1940, the 

RHAF bomber squadrons undertook 

their first strike. Three Blenheims 

attacked Korytsa Air Base. One of 

the planes zoomed on the target and 

struck it causing the death of 40 

Italians and the injury of another 20. 

A few hours later two Italian fighters 

crashed on craters created by the 

bombing of the runway. 

Early morning on November 2, 

1940, one Bréguet Bré 19 of No. 

2 (Army Co-op) Squadron, undertook 

a reconnaissance mission over 

the Pindos Gorge. At 07:00 hrs the 

aeroplane approached what appeared to be a heavy concentration of military units 

along the Samarina – Distraton road. These turned out to be part of “Julia” Division 

which was moving towards Metsovon, infiltrating Hellenic defence lines through 

paths and ravines. The Kozani Command ordered the Cavalry Division to move rapidly 

from Thessaloniki and occupy the Metsovon Pass before the enemy could reach 

it. Overall, spotting the “Julia” Division was one of the most important events of the 

Hellenic – Italian War and played an important role in determining the outcome of 

the Italian invasion5 Fi g u r e 4: Pilot Officer Evangelos Giannaris 

(Archive of the History Museum, HAF). 

. 

In the early hours of the same day, another well- known episode of air fighting also 

occurred. 6 P.Z.L.s of No22 Fighter Squadron got involved with 15 Italian bombers 

and 7 fighters. Flying Officer Marinos Mitralexis, having exhausted his ammunition 

during a harsh pursuit of an Italian three – engined bomber, instead of returning 

to his base, pushed his throttle and “rammed” the rudder of the bomber with his 

4 Register of Officer and War Action Report of No3/2 Independent Flight during the period 28-10- 

1940 until 4-11-1940 and summary of No 3 (Army Co-op) Squadron, under Flight Lieutenant P. 

Mpakola, Athens, 24-7-1941, Archive of the History Museum, HAF. 

5 War report of No2 (Army Co-op) Squadron, under Flying Officer D. Karakitsou and D. Politi, Gaza, 

16-11-1942, Archive of the History Museum, HAF.


propeller, which was torn to pieces. 

As a result, the aeroplane dived into 

an uncontrollable spin and crashed. 

Four of the crew members baled out 

and landed safely on Macedonian 

soil, including the bomber’s pilot, 

Pilot Officer B. Pasgualotto. 

Mitralexi’s propeller had been 

twisted as a result of its impact with 

the bomber’s rudder, forcing him 

to land his P.Z.L. close to where 

the bomber had crashed. Having 

landed safely, Mitralexis jumped 

out of his cockpit with his revolver 

and arrested the crew of the Italian 

bomber, bringing them to the Army 

Headquarters of Thessaloniki. This 

incredible incident was confirmed by 

an interview given to the daily newspaper 

“Proia” by a crew- member 

of the Italian bomber, Pilot Officer 

Caribaldo Brussolo (Figure 5). 

Between November 3 and 13 

the Italian attack was halted and 

Fi g u r e 5: Flying Officer M. Mitralexis 

(Archive of the History Museum, HAF). 

the RHAF carried out many important missions, as interceptions of Italian aircraft 

with shooting down, striking operation against the Alpinisti and bombing of the port 

of Avlon and of the Korytsa airfield. A reconnaissance mission of No.21 Fighter 

Squadron on November 4, 1940 revealed that the Italians were retreating all along 

the front. The day after, the first Italian prisoners of war were sent to Athens. 

On November 14, 1940 the Hellenic Army launched a general counter – attack 

throughout the front which lasted until January 6, 1941. The RHAF focused its action 

on the central front, offering valuable air support to the advancing Hellenic 

Army units by destroying the enemy supply and retreating routes. 

The first day of the Hellenic Army counter-attack 2 Blenheims of No32 Bombing 

Squadron and 2 Faireys Battles of No33 attacked the southern Korytsa aerodrome 

destroying 10 aircraft and damaging others. During this attack one Blenheim was 

shot down by antiaircraft fire. Furthermore, during the bombing raid against northern 

Korytsa aerodrome one Italian Caproni CA 133 was destroyed on the ground. 

During the same day, 6 Faireys bombed the aerodrome of Argyrokastron destroying 

12 Italian aircraft on the ground. The Fighter Squadrons were also heavily involved 

in combat during the first day of the offensive. Forty- two sorties were recorded during 

which the Italians lost 3 Fiat CR.42s.


During the last two weeks of November, air warfare continued all along the front. 

On November 18, 5 P.Z.L.S of Nos 22 and 23 Fighter Squadrons were entangled in 

air combat. Sergeant G.Valkanas, its only pilot with no success to his credit so far, after 

having exhausted his ammunition during an attack against Italian fighters, threw 

his aircraft onto an Italian fighter. The crash was fatal for both, yet again indicative 

of the determination of RHAF pilots 6 . 

On November 18, 3 aircraft of No.32 Squadron took off heading towards 

Argyrokastron in a scheduled bombing mission. Due to heavy fog, one of the bombers 

abandoned the approach and headed towards the auxiliary Italian airfield at 

Premeti to release its bomb-load not being aware that the Italian Army had stored 

large quantities of ammunition at that particular airfield. For three days and nights, 

the airfield was set ablaze as a result of this unplanned bombing, destroying large 

ammunition depots and supplies 7 . 

On November 22, 15 bombers (Potez 633s, Bristol Blenheims and Fairey Battles) 

in co-operation with three reconnaissance Henschel Hs 126s undertook bombing of 

8km-long retreating enemy columns along the Korytsa - Maliki Lake - Pogradets 

route. The Hellenic aircraft attacked the Italian fighters which had scrambled to intercept 

them. As a result one Henschel was shot down. 

On December 2nd, the RHAF received from the British government 8 Gloster 

Gladiators of the Mk II version. According to an Army Air Command report to the 

Chief of Air Staff, these aeroplanes were regarded as “extensively used”. 

In early December, Argyrokastron and Premeti were occupied and the Italians 

were retreating towards Tepeleni. The RHAF continued the bombardment of retreating 

Italian units. The Italian Headquarters, in view of the unexpected successes of 

the Hellenic Army and the RHAF, decided to reinforce the Italian Air Command of 

Albania with transport aircraft as well as fighters and bombers. 

The RHAF, on the other hand, was faced with problems caused by weather conditions. 

Landing grounds had been rendered useless due to the rain, frost and snow 

which made aircraft vulnerable to air strikes. Wing Commander Emmanuel Kelaidis, 

Chief of the Fighter Command, ordered that all P.Z.L.s should be moved to Sedes airfield 

near Thessaloniki within four days. Despite short notice and within the deadline 

set, working 24 hours per day, the personnel of the airfield and the squadron managed 

to dismantle the P.Z.L.s, load them on lorries and drive them to Thessaloniki 8 . 

As the Hellenic Army advanced northwards into the Albanian territory the exist- 

6 Report on War Action of No23 Fighter Squadron during the Hellenic- Italian and Hellenic- German 

War 1940-1941, under the Group Captain Vet (ex Commander) G. Theodoropoulou, 3-11-1977, 

Archive of the History Museum, HAF. 

7 Report of Squadron Leader G. Sakki concerning the action of No32 Bomber Squadron during the 

Hellenic- Italian War 1940-1941, during which he served in the Squadron as a Reserve Warrant Officer 

Bomber - Gunner, Archive of the History Museum, HAF. 

8 E. Kelaidis, Air Force Memories, Athens 1972, p. 40.


ing airfields proved to be too far away from the theatre of operations. Moreover, adverse 

weather conditions had a negative effect on RHAF performance. The Hellenic- 

Albanian frontier is characterised by its odd climatic conditions. As a result, deep 

gorges and heavy fog cause strong wind currents and limited visibility, which altogether 

hinder air navigation. Strong rainfall covered existing roads, airfields and 

landing strips available for use by the RHAF. 

RHAF potential of front-line aircraft in January 1941 consisted of 28 fighters (7 

Gloster Gladiator Mk IIs, 2 Bloch MB. 151s and 19 P.Z.L. P. 24s) and 7 bombers (4 

Bristol Blenheim Mk IVs and 3 Fairey Battle B.1.s). The Army co-operation squadrons’ 

inventory included 4 Henschel Hs 126s and 10 Dornier Do 22s 9 . 

On January 9, Army Corps captured Kleisoura, while until the end of the month 

it was engaged in clearing up adjacent areas. The RHAF took, as far as possible, an 

active role in these operations, often hindered by adverse weather conditions. On 

January 25, as the weather had improved, 7 Gloster Gladiators and 3 P.Z.L.s intercepted 

8 Italian Fiat BR.20 M Cicogna bombers and shot down 3 of them, forcing 

the rest to flee. 

On February 9, 1941, the RHAF operated extensively over the front. Eight P.Z.L.s 

of Nos.22 and 23 Fighter Squadrons and 4 Gladiators of No.21 Squadron intercepted 

18 Italian SIAI S.M.79 bombers escorted by 12 Fiat G.50 and 12 Fiat CR. 42 fighters. 

Four enemy aircraft, and possibly 3 more, were shot down 10 . 

From the 13 th of February, II Army Corps launched an attack against Telepene. 

The RHAF was ordered to support this operation. A few days later, No.32 Squadron 

was reinforced by the arrival of another 6 Bristol Blenheim Mk IVs. These planes 

had no provision for emergency exit from their rear thus hindering the crew’s timely 

evacuation in case of emergency (Figure 6). 

On February 20 the Royal Hellenic Air Force resumed heavy action. Seven P.Z.L.s 

of No.22 Fighter Squadron in co-operation with 12 fighters from the other Fighter 

Squadrons were escorting heavy bombers over the front. Ten Romeo 37 and 15 Fiat 

G.50s Freccia fighters intercepted the formation and tried to isolate the P.Z.L.s of 

No.22 Squadron. Four Italian fighters were shot down, despite the fact that the Italian 

formation enjoyed an initial tactical advantage by flying at a higher altitude 11 . 

The most important event of March 1941 was the Italian spring attack, known as 

“Primavera”, which had been planned by Mussolini himself, after having visited the 

front. On early dawn of March 9 th , “Primavera” was initiated. Almost 200 aircraft (of 

which 70 were bombers) supported the Italian thrust. 

9 

Hellenic Wings, Ibid, p. 104. 

10 

No.21 Fighter Squadron, Operation Book from 28-10-1940 until 15-4-1941, Archive of the History 

Museum, HAF. 

11 

Report on military action of No.22 Fighter Squadron from 10/28/1940 until 27/04/1941, under the 

Wing Commander A. Antoniou (ex Commander), Athens 16-8-1946, Archive of the History Museum, 

HAF.


The RHAF suffered some losses in the air during the first day of the offensive (a 

Fairey Battle, a Bristol Brenheim and an Avro 626 and six of their crews). On March 

18 the Naval Air Command was informed about the presence of an Italian submarine 

outside Piraeus. No. 13 Squadron was assigned to destroy the submarine, and, judging 

from the large oil slick created after intense bombing, it was assumed that the 

U-boat had been successfully hit 12 . 

Hellenic-German War 

The German attack against Greece was imminent since the end of March. 

Therefore, the possibility of putting up effective defence was slim and German troops 

managed to penetrate deep into Macedonia on April 6 and 7. Many Hellenic Army 

forts fiercely resisted against overwhelming odds along the Eastern Macedonian 

frontier, until forced to surrender due to their isolation from the bulk of the Hellenic 

Army. Soon after, Wehrmacht captured Thessaloniki. 

The expected order for the redeployment of troops along the Olympus-Servia- 

Aliakmon line was issued only on April 12, when the situation on the front was 

irreversible. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Alexandros Korizis committed suicide on 

April 18 in view of the desperate situation along the front and the inability to find a 

satisfactory solution. 

Serious deficiencies of the RHAF, frequent mechanical failures of the strained 

aeroplanes, the worsening condition of airfields and landing grounds, together with 

the indisputable qualitative and quantitative superiority of the Luftwaffe turned the 

odds heavily against it. 

The Luftwaffe had at its disposal 1.030 aircraft for the invasion, 898 of which 

were fighters while the rest had different roles 13 . 

The RHAF during the three-week war against the Germans undertook 179 missions 

of all the types. On April 6 1941, P.Z.L. of No 22 Squadron and Block 151 of 

No 24 shot down 2 German aeroplanes, Dornier Do17 and Henschel Hs 126s. 

On April 15, RHAF fighter squadrons confronted a formation of Junkers Ju87s and 

Messerschmitt Bf 109s. During the incident, one P.Z.L. and one Gladiator were shot 

down but their crew remained safe. One more pilot was killed during the Luftwaffe’s 

raid at Trikala airfield having managed to hit two enemy bombers 14 . The same day a 

pilot of No.23 Squadron was killed after having shot down an Hs 126. 

The Bombers Command executed 18 missions totally. Finally, the Dornier Do 

22s of No. 12 (Naval Co-op) Squadron continued delivering sealed envelopes including 

important orders and carrying out search and rescue missions to the last 

12 

No13 (Naval Co-op) Squadron, Squadron Action in Greece, from 28/10/1940 to 23/04/1941, Archive 

of the History Museum, HAF. 

13 

Hellenic Wings, Ibid, p. 113. 

14 

C. Shores and B. Cull, Air war for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, 1940-41, London 1987, p. 223.


Fi g u r e 6: Bristol Blenheim MK IV aircraft (Archive of the History Museum, HAF). 

day of the invasion. Anti- aircraft artillery also contributed significantly by shooting 

down a considerable number of enemy aircraft. 

Due to the overwhelming might of the German military machine, a retreat was 

deemed necessary in order to reorganise the RHAF and carry out the war from Crete 

and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the situation became desperate when the Early 

Warning System, set up in Larissa according to British standards and advice, ceased 

to offer information on enemy sorties. As a result, Germans could easily catch RHAF, 

RAF and JURV 15 aeroplanes on the ground and destroy them. 

General Headquarters planning aimed at primarily ensuring the safe escape of 

personnel. The RHAF Flying Training Centre 16 was high up in the list of priorities 

and the Commanding Officer of the Centre was ordered to take every precaution 

during the transfer of cadets to Crete. To this end, the Royal Hellenic Navy commissioned 

the steamship “Alberta”, which, eventually sailed from Nafplion on early 

afternoon of April 20, 1941. 

15 Yugoslavian Air Force. 

16 The centre was established when the operation of the School of Aviation was suspended, now the Air 

Force Academy. Binding Law 2703/1940. Archive of the History Museum, HAF.


As far as the aircraft were concerned, the Fighter Command’s aeroplanes (11 

P.Z.L.s, 8 Gloster Gladiators and 2 Bloch MB.151s) were stationed at the auxiliary 

airfield of Amphiklia where the Germans managed to totally destroy them. A few 

planes managed to fly to Elefsis Air Base and Argos only to be destroyed there. 

The Bombing Squadrons were forced to move out to Elefsis from Tanagra, where 

they were destroyed by a raid of Messerschmitt BG 109s. The Army Co-operation 

Command at Agrinion airfield managed to save only 4 aircraft. No. 11 (Naval cooperation) 

Squadron on its way to Crete was forced to land at Monemvassia due to 

technical problems where it was destroyed by the Luftwaffe. No. 12 Squadron managed 

to send one of its Dornier Do 22s to Crete. Out of a total of 9 Avro Ansons of 

No. 13 Squadron, 5 managed to reach Crete. 

The Battle of Crete was the last act of the Hellenic-German War. Soon after the 

occupation of the island by the Germans, the Allied Forces undertook a titanic effort 

for the evacuation of Crete. Instructors and cadets of the Flying Training Centre 

managed to leave Crete and reach Egypt. 

A total of 10 RHAF aircraft eventually managed to arrive at Egypt. Five Avro 

Ansons of No. 13 (Naval co-op) Squadron, one Dornier Do 22 of No. 12 Squadron 

and 4 Avro 621 Tutors, with personnel of all ranks and specialties, formed the kernel 

of a reborn RHAF (Figure 7). 

Fi g u r e 7: The Avro Anson Mk I serial no.Π61 (N61) was among those which escaped 

to Crete and then to Egypt (Archive of the History Museum, HAF 30129).


The RHAF in the Middle East 

In order to organise the gradual arrival of the RHAF personnel in Egypt, a special 

Reception Depot was raised in Gaza. The RHAF delivered 2 Gloster Gauntlets and 

one Gloster Gladiator, which together with the Avro Tutor 621s offered the possibility 

to the inactive aircrews to engage in some flying training activity. 

The Air Ministry had been established in Cairo and Group Captain P. Vilos, DSO 

was assigned as a liaison officer of the RHAF with the RAF. The Hellenic community 

in Egypt and the Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria showed great interest. 

The first step for the reorganisation of the RHAF in the Middle East was the formation 

of the Higher Air Command (HAC), temporarily based in Cairo. The organizational 

structure of the RHAF in the Middle East included, under the Air Ministry, 

the General Directorate with three Directorates (personnel, logistics and Technical 

Services) and the Air Force Recruiting Office, while under the HAC the Staff and the 

Technical Directorate 17 . 

Given that independent training on the part of the RHAF was precluded due to lack 

of sufficient infrastructure, training had to be undertaken in the RAF Flying Training 

Schools in Africa. Staff Officers of the Air Ministry, under Wing Commander K. 

Platsis, DFC went to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia in order to investigate the 

possibility of RHAF personnel to be trained there. 

The training of the RHAF flying personnel in RHAF training section in Southern 

Rhodesia, was organised along the lines of the Royal Air Force and included the 

following stages: pre-preparatory, preparatory, initial, further and advanced training. 

Selected trainees (aged between 18 and 31) satisfied strict criteria so far as their overall 

performance and physical condition were concerned. Command of English was 

a prerequisite for admittance and hence language courses were intensively taught in 

parallel with training. RHAF qualified pilots, were also required to be retrained in 

the new types of RAF aircraft scheduled to be delivered to the Hellenic Squadrons 

(Figure 8). 

RHAF cadets in RHAF training section in South Africa followed identical training 

as their allied counterparts. They had to attain an advanced level teaching of the 

English language. Cadets were trained as air wireless operators/air gunners, ground 

wireless operators or observers. Apart from flying training, the Air Ministry arranged 

that ground personnel would also be trained at the RHAF Training Section in South 

Africa or at Aqir, at Aboukir and at Heliopolis. After graduating from the training 

centres, officers and NCOs were posted to Maintenance Units for specific training on 

the aircraft/equipment in Aboukir and in Tura 18 . 

17 

History of the Hellenic Air Force (1941-1944), Vol. IV, published by the Hellenic Air Force History 

Museum, 1998, pp. 131-134. 

18 

Ibid, pp. 146-164.


Fi g u r e 8: Pupil pilots and instructors flying in formation with North American T-6 Texan 

Harvards at the RHAF Training Section in Southern Rhodesia. De Havilland D.H.82A, 

Tiger Moths and Airspeed AS.10 Oxfords were also used as trainers at Service Flying 

Training Schools in South Rhodesia (Archive of the History Museum, HAF 40203). 

The first fully operational Squadron to enter service in the Middle East was 

No.13 Light Bombing Squadron. Later on, the Fighter Squadrons 335 and 336 were 

formed. 

No.13 Light Bombing Squadron operated under RAF No.201 Group and its primary 

task was to offer air cover to sea convoys and to carry out long range reconnaissance 

patrols, both during the day and the night. On July 14, 1941, the first 

anti-submarine mission was carried out from Dekheila Air Base with Avro Anson. 

In December 1941, the Squadron was equipped with 3 MK IV Bristol Blenheim at 

Mariyut airfield outside Alexandria. In January 1942, the Squadron was converted to 

the Bristol Blenheim Mk V. 

From May to October 1942, No. 201 Group entrusted the Squadron with anti- 

submarine and convoy patrol missions. On July 10 the Squadron was re-stationed at 

the airfield of Gaza in Palestine carrying out missions over the area between Haifa, 

Port Said and Beirut. Four days later, a flight of 6 Blenheims was ordered to move


Fi g u r e 9: A No.13 Light Bombing Squadron Martin A-30 Baltimore setting course at dawn 

(Archive of the History Museum, HAF 40093). 

to Saint Jean near Haifa. Its main task was to offer air-cover over an area extending 

from Cyprus and Beirut to Haifa and Tel Aviv occasionally reaching Alexandria, 

Mersa Matruh and even Tobruk in Libya. 

On October 14 and 24, during anti-submarine patrols, the Squadron was credited 

with shooting up two enemy U-boats on the surface. As a result of the intensive combined 

allied aerial action over the Eastern Mediterranean, the Sea became relatively 

safe for Allied convoys. Part of the credit undeniably belongs to No. 13 Hellenic 

Squadron, which was warmly congratulated by the allied commanders 19 . 

During the first months of 1943 the Squadron received new Blenheim known as 

“Bisley’’ at Landing Ground 07. The most important development during the last 

months of 1943 was the gradual replacement of the Bristol Blenheims by Martin 

A-30 Baltimores of the Mk III type, having enhanced capabilities such as increased 

range and heavier bomb load (Figure 9). Thus, the Squadron carried out offensive 

sweeps, photo-recce and bombing sorties over the Southern Aegean. Until December 

12, 1943, the Squadron had completed 1.302 missions, 740 of which were convoy 

19 Ibid, pp.189-190.


Fi g u r e 10: A formation of Hawker Hurricanes flying above a No.335’s base in the 

desert (Archive of the History Museum, HAF 40103). 

patrols, 494 anti-submarine sweeps, 50 offensive recces and 18 bombings. 

During the first three months of 1944, problems arising from political disputes 

within the RHAF forced the British to hasten the procedures for the Squadron’s restationing 

in Italy, which took place on April 29, 1944. 

No. 335 Hellenic Fighter Squadron was raised on October 7, as No.361 (Hellenic) 

Squadron and almost immediately renumbered to No. 335. Based at Aqir until 

December 1941, the Squadron was initially equipped with Hawker Hurricane Mk 

Is 20 (Figure 10). On January 26, 1942, the Squadron was ordered to move to Landing 

Ground 20, east of El Daba. By February 1942, the Squadron, being fully trained 

and ready for action, began operations flying convoy and standing patrols over the 

Western Desert. 

On July 26, 1942, the Squadron moved to the RAF Station at Idku under 252 

Wing, charged with the protection of Alexandria. As the situation along the front stabilised 

No.335 moved to Dekheila, east of Alexandria, where it temporarily stopped 

operations in order to be trained on the new Hurricanes Mk II bs. On October 2, the 

Squadron moved to LG85 from Amryia. Five days later, the first reconnaissance mission 

over El Alamein was flown 21 . Later, it was announced that the Squadron would 

20 J.D.R. Rawlings, Fighter of the RAF and their Aircraft, Mac Donald, London 1961. 

21 Operations Record Book, No 335 (Hellenic) Squadron, October 1942.


join No. 1 SAAF Wing covering 

the El Alamein front and escorting 

SAAF bombers. On October 23, it 

was re-stationed at LG37 just 75 

miles from the front, in order to participate 

in the Battle of El Alamein. 

At the second anniversary of 

the Italian attack against Greece 

was approaching (October 28 th ), 

Squadron Leader I. Kellas asked 

permission to “celebrate” the anniversary 

by carrying out a strafing 

operation against the Headquarters 

of the Italian XX Corps which was 

based behind the Axis lines. The attack 

was fierce. Twelve Hurricanes 

of No.335 (together with another 

dozen of No.274) caused significant 

damage to enemy lorries, tents 

and pillboxes 22 . 

In November, 9 pilots of No 335 

formed the basis of No.336 Hellenic 

Fighter Squadron. From February to 

January 1944 the Squadron was stabilised 

at Mersa Matruh in Egypt, 

carrying out shipping escort mis- 

Fi g u r e 11: Ground crew servicing the engine 

of a Supermarine Spitfire (Archive of the 

History Museum, HAF 40072). 

sions, anti-submarine patrols, offensive reconnaissance, interceptions and training 

sorties. 

On July 23, 1943, the two Hellenic Fighter Squadrons in co-operation with Nos 

74, 451, 127, 94, 213, 238 and 252 Allied Squadrons took part in operation “Thetis”, 

a massive ground-attack sweep on Crete 23 . On November 13, 1943, the mission 

was successfully repeated under the code- name “Operation Sociable” and again on 

November 15 and 17. 

In December 1943, its request of No.335 quest to be converted to the Spitfire Vb 

and Vc was finally met (Figure 11). In total, during 1943, the Squadron logged on 

more than 8.000 hours of combat and 3.400 hours of training. From March 1, 1944, 

the Squadron operated from the Bersis airfield in Tunisia. In September 15, No.335 

headed for its new base in Canne, Italy. 

22 st Protocol No. 2620/62015/5-1-1943/Air Ministry / Air-Force Staff / 1 Office / Report on the activity 

of 335 Hellenic Fighter Squadron, Cairo. 

23 

G. Ioannidis, Revenge raid in Greek heroic airmen (1940-1945).


No. 336 Hellenic Fighter Squadron started to operate at Almasa (LG 219) on 

February 25, 1943. Due to the intended expansion of the theatre of operations to 

include Southern Europe, the Allied Command decided to raise a second Hellenic 

Fighter Squadron 24 . Its personnel were mainly drawn from No.335 serving pilots. The 

Squadron was soon operational and the first sortie was realized on March 1, 1943. 

The Squadron was strengthened with the newly graduated Warrant Officers of the 

Air Force Academy, who immediately began training on the Hawker Hurricane Mk 

IIc, which was used by the Squadron. On April 3, the Squadron was placed under 

No.219 Group, RAF. Moving to Sidi Barrani, No. 336 began to fly convoy patrols 

along the coast from Alexandria (Figure 12). 

No. 336 was one of No.219 Group’s Squadrons, which took the offensive with a 

ground-attack sweep on Crete on July 23, 1943. The aim of the mission was to destroy 

vital enemy positions and installations on the island including coastal ones, in 

order to facilitate the Allied naval operations and their disembarkation all across the 

Aegean. The operation was considered to be of the highest risk due to the distance 

between Crete and Egypt and the heavy anti-aircraft protection of the island (almost 

a quarter of the participating aircraft were lost) 25 . 

No. 336 continued its assigned missions from African bases all through 1943 

mostly continuing to fly sweeps. To increase its strength 6 Spitfire Vcs were delivered 

to the Squadron on October 12, 1943. During the same month, No. 336 broke 

its monthly record of sorties reaching 545 in total. 

November included new attacks against enemy positions in Crete 26 . The Squadron 

moved from Sidi Barrani to El Adem on January 31 st . In March 1944, No.336 was restationed 

at Bu Amud. During this month the conversion from Hurricanes to Spitfires 

was completed. In April 1944, the Squadron was again ordered to move to Mersa 

Matruh. 

During summer it was announced that No. 336 would soon be ordered to move to 

European soil. On September 15, 1944, the Squadron moved to Canne, Italy. 

Operations in Italy and back home 

The RHAF, called from the Middle East in order to aid in the offensive in Italy, 

joined the action at pivotal point. By that time, due to the increased needs in the 

Western Front, the Allied Air Forces in Italy had been reduced by 70 per cent, thus, 

making the presence of the Hellenic Squadrons even more important. 

On May 19, 1944, the movement of No.13 Light Bombing Squadron to Italy 

was completed. Its new base was at Biferno, operating under No.3 Group, SAAF. 

24 Protocol No.3145/25-2-1943/ Air Ministry /Order on the composition of 336 Squadron, Cairo. 

25 History of the Hellenic Air Force (1941-1944), Vol. IV, Ibid, pp. 251-253. 

26 Ibid, pp. 257-258.


Fi g u r e 12: No.336 personnel posing in front of a Hurricane with their C.O., Flight 

Lieutenant S. Diamantopoulos, in the middle (Archive of the History Museum, HAF 40287). 

On May 24, No.13 began operations. Light bombing included bridges, railways and 

enemy strongpoints and installations at Pedaso, Civitanova, Fabriano, Fossombrone, 

Torre and Chiaravalle. From Biferno, the Squadron, having joined 254 RAF Wing, 

undertook light bombing operations in Yugoslavia and Albania, despite heavy antiaircraft 

fire over these countries 27 . In total, during its stay in Italy, the Squadron successfully 

bombed 6 railway bridges, 9 quays, 7 railway stations, 3 high-way bridges, 

4 ammunition depots, 3 factories, 8 military barracks, 7 oil/gas tanks, 5 military 

warehouses and 6 enemy columns. On November 4, 1944, the Squadron’s personnel 

left from Campomarino heading to Taranto to embark on ships for Piraeus. The 

airplanes would arrive later together with the fighters of No 335 and 336. 

On September 16, No.335 Hellenic Fighter Squadron was stationed at its new 

base at Nuova. The first operation took place on September 19 involving patrolling 

roads and transport routes around Split in Yugoslavia. On October 8 th the Squadron 

moved to Biferno. In the afternoon of the same day, the first RHAF officers returned 

home, landing at Araxos, which had been liberated a few days before. On October 

27 E. Kartalamakis, Flying in foreign skies, Athens 1993, pp. 539-540 and History of the Hellenic Air 

Force (1941-1944), Ibid, pp. 296-297.


Fi g u r e 13: From the parade of the Royal Hellenic Air Force Squadron 

(Archive of the History Museum, HAF 40080). 

19, 1944, orders came in for the Squadron’s movement to Greece 28 . Personnel departed 

for Piraeus on November 5 th . Aeroplanes arrived at Hassani Air Base 10 days 

later. From the 21 st to the 24 th of November the Squadron began patrolling over 

Crete, which was still under German occupation. 

On September 17, the No.336 Hellenic Fighter Squadron’s airplanes finally 

reached Biferno and the next day its allocated base in Nuova. No.336 operated over 

Yugoslavia having joined 281 Wing of the RAF Balkan Air Force. Action began immediately 

including armed recces and offensive patrols as well as escorts sorties to 

fighter-bomber Hurricanes. On October 8, a Squadron’s detachment of 3 aircraft was 

sent to home territory to fly offensive sweeps. On October 9, the detachment’s aircraft 

got involved in a reconnaissance mission over Cornish in co-operation with 2 

Spitfires of No.335. By November 14 th , all remaining aircraft of No.336 had reached 

Greece. 

The final chapter of the RHAF participation in the World War II took place on 

November 20, 1944, when o glorious parade took place in Athens in honour of all 

those who fought for Freedom 29 (Figure 13). 

28 

Operations Record Book, No 335 Hellenic Squadron, RHAF, October 1944, Archives of the History 

Museum, HAF. 

29 

Hellenic Wings, Ibid, p.154.


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

• Hellenic Air Force General Staff, Hellenic Air Support Command, History Museum, 

HAF, archive of periods 1930-1941 and 1941-1944. 

• Personnel Records. 

• Hellenic Wings: An Illustrated History of the HAF and its precursors,1908-1944, Vol. I, 

published by the History Museum, HAF, Athens, December 1998. 

• History of the Hellenic Air Force (1930-April 1941), Vol. III, in GK, published by the 

History Museum, HAF, Athens 1990. 

• E. Kelaidis, Air Force Memories, in GK, Athens 1972. 

• C. Shores and B. Cull, Air war for Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, 1940-41, London 

1987. 

• History of the Hellenic Air Force (1941-1944), Vol. IV, in GK, published by the 

Hellenic Air Force History Museum, 1998. 

• J.D.R. Rawlings, Fighter of the RAF and their Aircraft, Mac Donald, London 1961. 

• G. Ioannidis, Revenge raid in Greek heroic airmen (1940-1945), in GK. 

• E. Kartalamakis, The Air Force during 40s War, in GK, Athens 1990. 

• E. Kartalamakis, Flying in foreign skies, in GK, Athens 1993 and History of the 

Hellenic Air Force (1941-1944), Ibid. 

• GES/ DIS, Abridged History of Greek-Italian and Greek-German War 1940-1941, in 

GK, Athens 1985. 

• IPMS – Greece, Hellenic Aircrafts from 1912 until today, by G. Kandylakis, 

H. Korobilis, E. Daloumis and M. Tsonos, Athens 1992.

* 1 

Jo s e P H ab b o u d i 

The Military Doctrine of the Israeli Air Force 

Introduction 

The State of Israel was proclaimed 

on the 14 th of May 

1948 and was immediately attacked 

by seven Arab countries, whose 

armies invaded the country in an effort 

to nullify the November 29 th 1947 

United Nations resolution partitioning 

Palestine, a decision that all the Arab 

countries did not accept. Even prior to 

this, immediately after the United Nations 

vote in 1947, hostile incidents 

and violence on a warlike scale broke 

out between the local Arabs and the 

Jews, with the Arabs receiving heavy 

aid and support from the surrounding 

Arab countries, and following the 

Declaration of Independence on 14 

May 1948, these countries invaded 

and attacked Israel. 

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 

was set up in the course of this war, a 

mere two weeks following the State’s 

establishment, to defend its independence. 

The IDF initially consisted of 

the ground forces, navy and air forc- 

Israele 

Israel was attacked by five Arab countries 

one day after the Declaration of 

Independence, on May 15 th , 1948. 

es, - namely the IAF. The Israel Air Force (IAF) is made up of overseas volunteers 

(Mahal) who comprise 90% of the pilots and navigators, most with combat experience 

in World War II. They previously flew fighters, bombers and transport planes 

and are radio-operators. The veteran pilots had trained new Israeli pilots. The IAF 

ground forces comprise many Israelis, quickly trained in technical skills needed to 

support the aircraft. 

* The author served as the head of the Historian branch of the Israeli Air Force from 1967 to 1984.


The IAF’s Early Operations 

During its early days, the air force operated various types of light aircraft such 

as Pipers, R.W.D.s, and Taylorcrafts, among others, which were mainly either privately 

owned planes or borrowed from flying clubs. It was only in the second stage, 

a few weeks after the establishment of the State, that Messerschmitt fighters were 

purchased from Czechoslovakia, making it was possible to combat the modern aircraft 

of the Arab states which daily attacked the Jewish towns and settlements. Some 

months later, Spitfire fighters were also bought from Czechoslovakia. Egypt was 

awash with WW2 military surplus - Spitfire and Dakota aircrafts. 

The concept of attacking the enemy aircrafts on their own airfields was already 

formed during the War of Independence, but could not be acted upon due to the multiple 

tasks imposed on the small air force defending Israel’s skies. 

The War of Independence ended in January 1949, and during the months that 

followed, cease-fire agreements were signed firstly with Egypt and then with other 

Arab countries with the exception of Iraq, who refused to sign such an agreement 

with Israel. The Israeli government believed that the cease-fire agreements would 

eventually lead to peace agreements, whereas the Arab countries signed the agreements 

with a view to renewing the hostilities and ultimately bringing about the end 

of the State of Israel. 

After the War of Independence 

the concepts and 

perceptions of air power 

and its meaning began to 

be formed, with priority 

being given to defending 

the country’s skies. In the 

period after the war, Israel 

purchased WW2 piston-engine 

fighter planes and several 

years later, purchased 

its first jet aircraft, the Me- 

At the end of the war 

the IDF with the aid 

of the IAF liberated Eilat 

on the shores of the 

Red Sea - March 1949.

tH e mi l i ta ry do C t r i n e o f t H e is r a e l i air fo r C e 145 

teor, from Britain in 1953. Following that, additional, more advanced jet aircrafts 

were purchased from France including Ouragan (1955) and Mystere (1956), and 

Nord Atlas transport aircraft. Due to the shortage of aircraft, the air force operated 

both advanced jets and old piston engine aircraft. 

An aviation and technical school were opened. Candidates for pilot training 

courses were handpicked and accepted only after very rigorous selection. The course 

itself was of the highest standards, with no deviation from the standards set, and 

only those of impeccable qualities and abilities were accepted. The technical school 

trained technicians in accordance with the very high standards demanded by the air 

force. A school for adjutant officers was also opened thus paving the way for what 

has become an air force of top quality and professional standards, capable of advanced 

aerial manoeuvres. 

The State of Israel within the borders defined after the War of Independence was 

considered to be a very small country with a total area of 20,000 km 2 , surrounded 

by hostile countries from the north, south and east, and a sea-shore along its entire 

western side. Its center is only 15 km from its narrowest point in the east to the sea in 

the west. Due to its unsealed borders Israel suffered constantly from harassment and 

attacks by groups of infiltrators (called feidayiin) who crossed the border from the 

neighbouring countries, carried out attacks and crossed back into their own countries 

the same night, having received equipment and support from those states. 

Development of the Aerial Concept of the Israel Air Force 

At this point in time a concept was evolving vis à vis the operation of the air force 

and the missions it had to undertake. 

From the beginning, the air force was perceived as a force that fought in the air 

and from the air. It was clear that in any war, the air force must defend the State from 

an expected aerial attack by the enemy. In addition the air force was already seen 

as the central force in any foreseeable future war. Principles were developed upon 

which the air force based its strategy: 

a. Protecting Israel’s skies. A mission of top priority entailing the prevention of 

any possibility of an aerial attack on Israel; 

b. Air Superiority. Like every air force in the world, the idea of air supremacy had 

to be aimed at in any war plan. From this point of view the air supremacy idea 

included a very specific conception - attaining aerial supremacy in Israel’s skies 

over and in any area in which the army is operating. In order to attain the goal 

of air superiority a tactic was developed to attack the enemy air force as early as 

possible, preferably at the very start of the war, and to destroy it while still on the 

ground; 

c. Participation in ground combat. Support of ground forces by attacking enemy 

convoys, anti-aircraft and artillery positions, strongholds and other military tar-


gets. This operation also includes attacking tanks and armoured vehicles either 

on their way to the front or in retreat, with the aim of paralyzing the enemy in the 

battle zone; 

d. Strategic bombing. Attacking bridges, fuel dumps, ports, military installations, 

command posts etc., behind enemy lines and in enemy territory; 

e. Transport. Delivery of special forces behind enemy lines; 

f. Supply. Carrying essential supplies to ground forces – fuel, spare parts, ammunition, 

food etc; 

g. Photographic reconnaissance; 

h. Evacuation and transport of wounded to medical centers; 

i. Patrols in the battle area - for purposes of up to date intelligence and support of 

ground troops; 

j. Transporting war materials from abroad – essential in time of war. 

In accordance with these objectives, the air force developed its unique concept 

based on the versatility of the aircraft, adaptability 

of the air crew to carry out different types of missions, 

and development of the principle of “Central 

Command”. 

This concept became the underlying foundation 

of the air force’s policy and proved itself in 

all the wars and battles in which the IAF participated. 

At the end of the War of Independence the 

borders of Israel (inside the red line) measured 

20.000 km 2 . Israel was surrounded by hostile 

countries, with a narrow stretch of land measuring 

15 kms in the center.


The “Sinai Campaign” 1956 (called Mivza Kaddesh) 

After the War of Independence, Israel turned to absorbing thousands of new immigrants, 

especially those survivors of the Holocaust, and also Jews persecuted in 

Arab countries and in other places around the world. Within a couple of years, over 2 

million Jews arrived in Israel, increasing the population of the country by three times 

prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. 

The Arab countries, headed by Egypt, did not come to terms with the existence of 

the State and placed Israel under an embargo and attempted an attack on the State. 

They trained, supported, armed and dispatched terrorists that sowed destruction and 

death among the civilian population. At the same time they threatened to go to war 

again against Israel. In order to carry out their threat, they amassed vast amounts of 

weapons and trained their armies for the time when they could begin their attack. 

In 1955, Egypt signed an armament agreement to purchase Soviet arms from 

Czechoslovakia including tanks, artillery, ships and jet aircrafts, which were hoarded 

and concentrated in the Sinai desert on the border with Israel, and repeatedly declared 

its intention and threat to go to war with Israel. 

At that time, Nasser, the President of Egypt, nationalized the Suez Canal Company 

forcing Britain to relinquish control, without any compensation as Egypt begins 

to collect all toll fees. 

Israel was left with no choice but to fight against the Egyptian forces concentrated 

in Sinai. An agreement was signed between Israel, France and Great Britain – each 

one for its own reasons – to make a pre-emptive strike against Egypt in October 

1956 (called “Suez Campaign”). At that time, all IAF pilots were Israelis trained to 

operational proficiency. 

The IAF had detailed plans to destroy the Egyptian air force on the ground, however 

by agreement, the task was undertaken by the air forces of Britain and France. 

The IAF took part in the war before the Anglo-French attacks and fought against 

enemy aircrafts trying to attack Israeli ground forces in Sinai. The IAF was successful 

in all its missions that were decided on prior to the attack with regard to ground 

support and destroying enemy convoys in Sinai. During the war of the Sinai campaign 

Egypt lost 7 jet aircrafts, all in air-to-air fire (dog-fight) between them and the 

IAF. The IAF lost 15 aircrafts, all by anti-aircrafts fire. 

“The Six Day War” 1967 

At the end of the Sinai Campaign, Russia and the U.S.A. forced Israel to retreat 

from all the conquered territories without a peace treaty with Egypt. However, Egypt 

agreed to allow U.N. troops to be stationed in Sinai on the border between Israel and 

Egypt; to make Sinai a demilitarized area; and to open the international water way in 

the Red Sea to Israeli ships sailing to the port of Eilat in Southern Israel.


Israel continued to develop industry and agriculture while still absorbing immigration 

and settling the land, at the same time continuing to organize its armed forces 

and prepare them for the possibility of a further conflict, due to the continued threats 

of war from the Arab States, headed by Egypt, and the ongoing infiltration by terrorists 

across the border resulting in more death and destruction. 

One of the most important projects that Israel set itself was the development of 

the “National Water Carrier” to bring water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to the 

center and south thereby developing the country both agriculturally and industrially. 

Syria, near whose border Israel planned the building of the water carrier, started to 

sabotage the development work and to damage the heavy mechanical equipment. 

All the Arab countries supported Syria and threatened Israel with the backing of the 

USSR who armed and trained the armies of Egypt and Syria and supplied them with 

advanced modern weapons. 

There were multiple clashes between the IDF and the Syrian Army. In these 

clashes the Syrian air force suffered losses in dog-fights with the IAF. On 7th April 

1967 a large battle occurred between the Israeli air forces and the Syrian air forces 

not far from the Sea of Galilee, in which the Syrian had lost 6 aircrafts MiG21, without 

any damage to the IAF. 

After the last battle on April 1967, the authorities in Damascus announced that 

Israel was amassing its army on the Syrian border in order to attack and overthrow 

the ruling Ba’athist Party. Following these untruthful statements, Egypt mobilized 

its army, called up reserves and again concentrated forces on the Israeli Border in 

Sinai; at the same time closing the international water way to Eilat; and demanded 

that U.N. forces be withdrawn from Sinai on the Israeli border. 

This was a complete breach of all the agreements reached after the 1956 campaign. 

In addition, military agreements were signed between Egypt, Syria and Jordan 

who placed its army under Egyptian command. Later, Iraq joined this agreement. 

Egypt stationed commando units in Jordan in order to be able to attack Israel at the 

narrow point leading to the center of the Country. 

Israel tried to defuse the situation by repeatedly denying any hostile intent against 

Syria, and tried to enlist the aid of the international community. Despite these efforts, 

the wave of nationalism of the Arab crowds in Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Bagdad, 

etc., and its demands for war, influenced the Arab leaders, especially Nasser, President 

of Egypt and the leader of the Arabs States. Due to this situation it became obvious 

to the Israelis that war was inevitable. 

During this period the Arab countries purchased modern tanks, artillery and modern 

fighter aircrafts such as the MiG21, MiG19, MiG17 and Sukhoi7; and bomber 

planes such TU16 and IL28, trained in its use with the help of Russian experts. 

Israel also purchased high-quality equipment, mainly from France, which included 

tanks and aircrafts, and more planes of the types already in its possession, 

together with new ones such as the Super Mystere4B, Vautour bombers, and above 

all, the fighter aircraft Mirage3 (1963).


The IAF attacked Egyptian armoured and armed forces on their way who were 

escaping the air attacks in Sinai campaign in 1956.


In accordance with its concept, the IAF had previously prepared a very detailed 

strategy that in the event of war, the force would carry out the first missions in order 

to obtain air superiority over the combined air forces of all the Arab States. The code 

name for the operation was “Moked” (Focus) and set out in the minutest details the 

attacks on the enemy airfields in order to destroy most of the planes while still on 

the ground. 

With no other choice and with the risk that war could break out at any moment 

on the initiative of the Arab States, Israel carried out a pre-emptive strike on the 

morning of the 5 th June 1967. The IAF, catching the Egyptians by complete surprise, 

attacked 18 Egyptian airfields, destroying hundreds of aircrafts. Later during the day, 

a further 5 Syrian and 2 Jordanian airfields were hit as well as the advance airfield of 

the Iraqi air force. In these attacks most of the enemy’s aircraft were destroyed. 

Thus the IAF gained air superiority by destroying most of the enemy aircrafts, 

mostly MiG21s, MiG17s, Sukhoi7s, British Hunters in Jordan and Iraq. All the 30 

Topulev16 heavy-bombers in Egypt had been destroyed. This was achieved in the 

first three hours on the first day of the war. Now the IAF could turn it’s attention 

to supporting the ground forces by attacking enemy convoys, gun emplacements, 

command posts, bunkers and camps, and at the same time repulsed any enemy aircraft 

that might have survived the initial attack and tried to attack the Israel ground 

forces. The war ended in six days after the IDF had captured the whole of Sinai up 

to the Suez Canal, the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank of the Jordan 

River from Jordan. In the Six Day War, the IAF attacked 26 air-bases in the Arab 

countries. In these attacks more than 390 aircrafts were destroyed on the ground, and 

in air-to-air battles they lost 60 more aircrafts. The loss of the IAF was 46 aircrafts, 

mostly by anti-aircraft fire. 

Two MiG’s17 a/c destroyed by air attack in Kabrit, an Egyptian airfield, not far from the 

Suez Canal in the Six-Day War.


On the 19 th of June, the Israeli government unanimously voted to withdraw from 

Sinai and Golan in return for a peace treaty. In addition the government approved 

negotiating a satisfactory border with Jordan. The Egyptian leaders and other Arab 

States refused to come to terms with the military debacle and started to prepare 

themselves for a further round of fighting. When the leaders of Israel were asked 

what were they waiting for? Their reply was “We are waiting for a telephone call 

from the Arabs”. In place of the telephone call, the Arab States came up with the 

famous three “No’s” in the Khartoum Conference in November 1967: “No negotiations, 

No recognition and No peace” with Israel. 

The Six-Day War is exceptional in that the armed forces of a small country overwhelmed 

the armies of three states and captured territory three times that of the 

defending country in the short period of six days fighting. The IAF wiped out the air 

forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in three hours, a unique achievement in the annals 

of aerial warfare throughout the world. The concept of the IAF was proven to be correct, 

and air forces world-wide teach the strategy of the IAF in their military schools 

and colleges. 

“The War of Attrition” 1967-1970 

The War of Attrition is considered by the Israeli Military establishment and in the 

eyes of armies world-wide, as the “War of the Israeli Air Force”. The war began a 

few weeks after the end of the Six-Day War in 1967. The leaders of Egypt and other 

Arab States refused to come to terms with the military debacle and started to prepare 

themselves for a further round of fighting. 

Two IL’s14 a/c and a Mi8 helicopter destroyed by Israeli aircrafts in Bir Tmadeh airfield 

(note the shadow of the Vautour a/c on the background that attacked the airfield).


The USSR replaced all the military equipment lost by the Arabs in the Six-Day 

War with more up to date and better quality material – tanks, artillery, war ships, 

planes and most important of all an anti-aircraft missile system, that could close 

the skies against attacking aircraft. Russian advisors were sent to Egypt and Syria 

and trained the troops in the use of all the new weapons and both armies undertook 

intensive training in order to operate their new weapons. 

The Suez Canal was the dividing line between the Israeli and Egyptian forces. 

The Egyptians started to open artillery fire and employed commandos to cross the 

Canal, and to set up ambushes against the Israeli troops. On the eastern front, the 

Jordan River was the dividing line between Jordan and Israel, and from here Palestinian 

groups repeatedly crossed into Israel causing losses both in lives and property. 

In addition, there were many clashes on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. This 

situation lasted from the end of the Six-Day War in 1967 until half way through 1970 

causing heavy casualties in Israel, both military and civilian. 

Israel reacted to these attacks with the use of artillery and tanks, and also by operating 

deep inside enemy territory with the aid of elite commando forces flown in 

by helicopters, but refrained from involving the full force of the IAF in order not to 

cause any escalation in the conflict. 

During this period, the IAF purchased from the U.S.A. Skyhawk (1968) and Phantom 

(1969) aircrafts, as well as helicopters and high quality transport planes. New 

bases were built and new squadrons formed while and the aircrews and ground crews 

very quickly fully absorbed the new aircrafts into the day to day running of the air 

force. 

The situation on the borders continued to deteriorate until finally Israel was left 

with no choice other than to operate the air force in full strength. The Egyptians had 

concentrated some 1000 pieces of artillery, thousands of tanks and hundreds of thousands 

of troops on the Canal. The Israeli Army could not compete with this either in 

manpower nor equipment. The IAF made up for this inequality in numbers and was 

a suitable response to the firepower of the Egyptians against the Israeli Army. 

The first operations of the IAF on the Egyptian border were in 20th July 1969 

(“Boxer operation”) with heavy attacks on Egyptian artillery, camps and positions 

on the canal and above all the missile system that the Egyptians had positioned on 

the border. 

This war, which was called the “War of Attrition”, was a static war with both 

sides trying to inflict maximum loss and damage to the other side without the ability 

to capture territory. The IAF was termed in this war “The flying artillery of the IDF” 

as it took on the brunt of the war – without minimizing the many actions taken by the 

other forces such as the artillery, navy commandos and special forces behind enemy 

lines. The effect of these attacks by the IAF was decisive and proved the ineffectiveness 

of the Egyptian army. 

Even before the IAF was used along the canal, it instigated air battles with the


Egyptian air force. These dog-fights took place either in Egyptian air space south 

of the Canal in an area called as “Texas”, or north of the Canal over the sea and resulted 

in the shooting down of countless Egyptian aircraft. It was in response a sort 

of reprisal for the Egyptian firing on the Israeli forces on the bank of the canal, and 

also a way of gaining local air superiority over the battle area. These fights which 

lasted throughout the whole of the war proved the total superiority of the IAF, and 

the Egyptian air force was so heavily defeated that finally it gave up trying to combat 

the Israeli planes. The Egyptians lost about 100 planes in these battles, mostly due to 

dog-fights and others by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. 

The War of Attrition was waged on all fronts against countries bordering Israel 

– Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, although the vast majority of the operations were on 

the Egyptian front. The Syrian air force also suffered heavy losses from aerial battles 

and ground attacks from the air. 

Despite their heavy losses, the Egyptians continued their attacks along the Canal, 

while Israel wished to see an end to the fighting. This proved impossible and it was 

eventually decided to extend the field of battle and to commence air attacks into the 

heartland of Egypt. These attacks began in January 1970 (“Priha operation”) and 

lasted until April the same year, and resulting in the most severe damage to the Egyptians 

and perhaps most of all to their self-esteem as they were in a situation where 

their air space was open to the whims of the IAF with no means ways of defending 

themselves. 

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian leader, secretly approached the Soviet Union 

and asked for help in defending his country. The Russians agreed to this request and 

transferred to Egypt newer and better anti-aircraft missiles (SA2 and SA3), together 

with technicians and operators, and they also sent MiG21 interceptors together with 

crews of pilots, maintenance personnel and controllers. 

Thus slowly but surely, the Soviets became involved in the war. At the beginning 

they defended Cairo, Alexandria and the Aswan dam, but later started to get involved 

in the actual fighting. They started with the manning of anti-aircraft missile sites, and 

moved onto attempting to shoot down Israeli planes. In July-August 1970 Russianmanned 

missile sites succeeded in destroying five Israeli Phantoms, but they did not 

succeed in completely stopping the attacks across the Canal. In the final stages of 

the war they engaged Israeli planes over “Texas” and in the fighting, five Russianpiloted 

MiG21 aircrafts were shot down with their Russian Pilots. 

On the 7 th August 1970s a truce was declared between the sides on basis of a 

freeze of the situation as was on that morning. That same evening, the Egyptians 

breached the cease-fire and advanced their missile system right up to the front-line, 

thereby providing an additional threat of ground-to-air missiles to the IAF freedom 

of flight over the front line in the event of another outbreak of fighting had been 

jeopardized. 

From the IAF perspective the war ended in a stalemate. The IAF did not succeed


in destroying the new missile system on the Suez Canal, and the Egyptians had failed 

to prevent the flights of the IAF over the front line despite the losses incurred. 

During the war of attrition, Egypt lost 97 aircrafts and Syria 27, most of them 

by air-to-air fire (dog-fight) and some by anti-aircraft fire. The IAF lost 18 fighter 

aircrafts. 

Egypt agrees to a US brokered 90-day cease-fire on 7 August. Egypt used the 

truce to move missiles towards the Suez Canal. President Nasser intends renewing 

the War of Attrition after cessation of the truce. In this static war, Egypt with a large 

population, fully supported by the Soviets was able to replace its fallen soldiers and 

equipment. President Nasser of Egypt died before the end of the 90-day cease-fire. 

Vice-president, Anwar Saadat was named president of Egypt. 

“The Yom Kippur War” 1973 

After the cease-fire of 1970, the Arab states, lead by Egypt, continued their threats 

against Israel. However, the Egyptian border remained quiet and this was reflected 

along the other borders in the north and the east. In the next three years Syria and 

Egypt continued extensive arms purchases, especially anti-aircraft missile systems, 

including mobile ones (SA6) and their fighting units were trained by Russian troops 

and technicians. 

The IAF also received new aircrafts and prepared for the next round of fighting. 

The most important mission facing it was of course to find a way of destroying the 

missile systems in order to gain aerial superiority. Extremely detailed tactical plans 

were prepared including series of attacks timed to the second. These plans were 

based on the assumption that in any future war, the air force would have enough time 

at the outset of hostilities to attack the missile sites, and only after their destruction 

would it turn its power to other missions such as ground support and attacking other 

targets to support the ground forces. 

On 2pm the 6th October 1973, Egypt and Syria opened a massive offensive both 

from the air and on the ground against Israeli forces along the Suez Canal in the 

south and in the Golan Heights on the north of Israel. 

This was on the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement, which 

is a day of fasting and prayer, and hence the name of the war (“Yom Kippur War”). 

There was not sufficient time to reinforce the relatively few troops stationed on the 

borders before the sudden attack, and these troops were unable to stop the massive 

attacks thrown against them. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal with two armies, 

one in the north and one in the south of the canal, setting up bridgeheads on the east 

bank, while the Syrians advanced all along the Golan Heights and threatened to 

reach the Sea of Galilee. 

Due to this situation, the IAF was forced to support the ground troops by attacking 

the enemy forces, without having first taken out the missile batteries which gave 

the enemy an umbrella. As a result, the IAF lost many aircrafts in the first phase of


the war. However, in the first three days of the war, despite more losses, the IAF 

succeeded in aiding the ground forces preventing further advances of the enemy, especially 

on the Golan Heights, until the reserve forces could be called up and arrive 

at the front lines. 

With the arrived of the reserves, the ground forces went on the offensive with 

massive air support. In the next four days, from the 9 th to the 12 th October, the Syrians 

were pushed back not only to the original borders before the war, but the IDF 

advanced to within 35 kms of Damascus. 

On the Egyptian front, the enemy had managed to establish a bridgehead to a 

depth of 8-10 kms from the Canal. The fighting was mostly static at this stage, but 

on the 12 th October, the Egyptians tried to advance with tanks and infantry on a large 

scale. Once again the IAF together with the armour units played a major part in repulsing 

this attack, forcing the Egyptians back to their original positions. 

The change came on the 16 th October, when the IDF succeeded in forcing a crossing 

of the Suez Canal between the two Egyptian armies and set up a bridgehead 

which was quickly expanded both to the north and the south. By the 22 nd October, the 

Egyptian Third Army in the south was completely cut off from any support or supplies 

and its situation became critical. A cease-fire was agreed on both fronts shortly 

afterwards (on 24th October). 

In this war, the IAF was forced to wage war differently to what had been planned, 

and to fight in areas protected by ground to air missiles. Despite losses, the IAF was 

able to intercept enemy aircraft trying to attack ground troops, to engage them in the 

air and to destroy in all more than 350 Egyptian and Syrian aircrafts in air-to-air battles. 

50 more aircrafts were hit by anti-aircraft fire, and about 30 were destroyed in 

their own air-bases. At the last phase of the war the IAF attacked the Egyptian missiles 

and destroyed some 40 sites and 10 more were destroyed by the ground forces. 

By the end of the war the skies over Egypt were once again open to the IAF with no 

missile protection. 10 Airfields in Egypt and 8 in Syria were also attacked, forcing 

the air forces of the enemy to waste its attacking potential through having to be in 

the air to protect its own bases. In Syria, targets attacked included bases, command 

posts, fuel dumps, ports and other vital strategic targets in the country. 

The IAF also participated in the transport of supplies and materials to the front 

line forces, and the evacuation of hundreds of injured to medical centers in the center 

of the country. 

In the Yom Kippur War the IAF lost 102 aircrafts, fifty per cent of which were hit 

by ground-to-air missiles and 40 more by anti-air fire. 

The war ended with cease-fire agreements at a stage where Israeli forces were 

within artillery range of the Syrian capital Damascus, and within 100 km from the 

Egyptian capital Cairo, with an Egyptian army of 35,000 men surrounded with no 

water, and with no possibility of fresh supplies.


Peace with Egypt and Jordan 

Within the framework of the agreement reached with the intervention of the US, 

the IDF withdrew from the west bank of the Suez Canal to new positions in Sinai, 

with UN forces forming a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces on the 

ground. In the next couple of years the Egyptians, especially their president Anwar 

Saadat, finally realized that they could not regain the territory that had been lost 

in the Six Day War by force, and instead turned to a peaceful solution. After wide 

spread diplomatic activity, the Egyptian President came to Israel in November 1977 

and addressed the Israeli Parliament (The Knesset). The peace treaty between Israel 

and Egypt was signed in 1979 and in accordance with its terms, Israel withdrew from 

all of Sinai, the water way from the Red Sea to Eilat was opened, Sinai was demilitarized, 

and ambassadors were exchanged between the two countries. 

Following this, a peace treaty was signed with Jordan in 1994, and Israel started to 

enjoy peace and co-operation along its two longest borders with Egypt and Jordan. 

The latest fighter aircrafts 1973-1982 

During this period the IAF received the very latest fighter aircrafts that were produced 

in the United States – the F15’s and the F16’s, and also the newest helicopters 

both for attack and ground support purposes and for transport. 

Over the years, the IAF carried out many missions far from its borders which are 

still classified. However, two missions of this nature that have become known world 

wide are an indication of the IAF’s abilities and performance levels. 

Bombing and destruction 

of one of the Egyptian 

bridges in the north of 

the Suez Canal (note 

the Egyptian armoured 

vehicle enroute to the 

bridge).


a. Rescue of the hostages from Uganda (“Yonathan Operation”) 

In the end of June 1976, an Air France plane departed from Israel on his way 

to France. The airplane landed in Athens, and after his departure from there it was 

hijacked by Arab and German terrorists, and flown with all its passengers on board 

to Entebbe airport in Uganda, where they were held hostage. The Jewish passengers 

were separated from the non-Jewish ones, who were soon released. The hijackers 

demanded the release of dozens of terrorists and murderers held in Israeli jails, or 

if their demands were not met, they would kill the hostages. Thus both humiliating 

Israel and forcing it to bow to the terrorist’s demands. 

The Israeli government was faced with a terrible dilemma, either to give in to 

the terrorists’ demands, with its resulting humiliation, or military intervention. The 

air force came up with a plan to fly Israeli Special Forces to Entebbe and to rescue 

the hostages. The plan was accepted and the detailed planning and training of the 

troops was completed in only four days. The IAF flew the forces between the 3td 

and 4th July thousands of kilometers away to Entebbe, where it gained control of the 

airport, freed the hostages, killed the terrorists and any Ugandan troops that had been 

involved in trying to stop the operation. The soldiers, airmen and hostages returned 

back to Israel with a tumultuous welcome that echoed around the world. One brilliant 

Israeli officer named Yonathan was killed in this operation. The IDF hence the 

name of this operation –”Yonathan”. 

b. Destruction of the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor (“Opera Operation”) 

Another operation carried out far from the borders of Israel which achieved world 

Bombing of the 

Nassarieh airfield in 

Syria, Yom Kippur 

War.


Aerial attack of strategic target of oil terminal deep in Syria-Yom Kippur War. 

Egyptian MiG21 burning in 

air combat in the Yom 

Kippur War.


MiG21 downed in air 

to air battle (note the 

brake-chute opens 

after being hit). 

wide renown, occurred in June 1981. Iraq had built a nuclear reactor near Baghdad 

with the aim of manufacturing atomic weapons and threatening to use them against 

Israel. The reactor was built with the aid of France, and by the beginning of 1981 

they had reached the stage of near completion and the ability to manufacture atomic 

weapons. Israeli authorities were extremely worried at the possibility of an enemy 

nation like Iraq having the ability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. The 

IDF started to look for ways to combat the Iraqi threat and the IAF prepared a plan to 

destroy the reactor by air, started training and reached the stage of operational capability. 

When the green light was given by 

the government, eight F16 aircrafts accompanied 

by 6 F15 aircrafts attacked 

the reactor with special armament and 

destroyed it. This was an operation of 

outstanding quality carried into effect 

by IAF personnel in an operation carried 

out far from the borders of Israel. 

Many air forces throughout the world, 

including the United States air force 

(USAF), congratulated the IAF on its 

exceptional achievement. 

The first Israeli bridge over the Suez 

Canal in the Yom Kippur War 

(that operation changed the face of 

the war).


The Arab refugees and their influence on events 

Attacking anti-aircraft 

missile batteries in 

Egypt. During the last 

phase of the war, all 

the missile anti-aircraft 

on the west bank of 

the Canal had been 

eliminated, both by air 

force and ground 

attacks. 

During the War of Independence in 1948 thousands of Arabs fled their villages 

in areas where there was fighting, hoping to return when the Israelis were defeated. 

When this proved not to be the case, those Arabs became refugees, and instead of 

being absorbed in the countries they fled to (as were a similar number of Jewish refugees 

from the Arab countries), they were installed in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, 

in Jordan, both on the West Bank and in Jordan proper, and in Syria and Lebanon, to 

be used as pawns in the power struggle between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 

Both on their own initiative, and also with active backing from the Arab countries 

they started to cross the border and to attack Israeli villages, transports, and carrying 

out ambushes, causing extensive damage and much loss of life. Israel retaliated 

with raids on the refugee camps which gradually increased in size and culminated 

with the 1956 Sinai Campaign, which included the seizure of the Gaza Strip. When 

the Gaza Strip was returned under Egyptian control, the attacks resumed, but on a 

smaller scale. In 1963 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed to 

co-ordinate attacks. 

After the Six-Day War, with Gaza and Sinai in Israeli hands, and Israeli forces on 

the Golan Heights, the only area from which the PLO could operate from was Jordan, 

and this border became the focal point with the terrorists crossing the Jordan River, 

going through the desert to reach Jerusalem and the coastal plain. From 1967 until 

1970 the Jordan border became a battle ground with the Israeli army fighting not only 

the terrorists but also the Jordanian army which assisted them. The Jordanian side of 

the river became a desert as the inhabitants of the villages along it fled the fighting.


The PLO grew in power until it started to threaten the very existence of the 

Hashemite Kingdom and its King, Hussein. In 1970, the Jordanian monarch ordered 

his army to disarm the PLO, and when the PLO refused, the army drove the armed 

Palestinians from the refugee camps and they fled to Lebanon. 

Lebanon, which forms the northern border with Israel, is a small Arab country 

with a mixed population of Shiite and Sunni Moslems, and various Christian sects, 

mainly Maronite, and Druze. The relationship between the populations was very 

fragile and there were often disputes and clashes between them. The refugee camps 

from 1948 were in the south of the country and now the new refugees from Jordan 

joined them. Up to this time, the northern border had been the quietist of all the borders, 

with only very rare incidents, even during the Six-Day War, but with the arrival 

of the new active PLO members from Jordan with their leader Yasser Arafat, the 

Lebanese border was transformed to and became the new hotbed of terrorist activity 

with the Israeli settlements that were right on the border becoming easy targets. 

The authorities in Lebanon were not strong enough to stop the activities of the 

PLO, which had soon formed a “state within a state” in South Lebanon and threatened 

to change the entire social regime of the Country. The constant fighting and the 

attacks by the IAF on the refugee camps resulted in mass flights by the other inhabitants 

of the area and completely undermined the balance of power. The resulting internal 

conflict between the Moslem and Christian populations amounted to Civil War 

from 1976, and the Christian community requested the aid of the Syrian Government 

to help repel the new threat from the Moslem sects and the South. For the Syrians, 

who have always considered Lebanon to be part of a Greater Syria (“Grande Syrie”), 

this became an ideal opportunity for its army to enter Lebanon as” invited guests”. 

The Lebanese wars of 1982 and 2006 

This new situation, with a modern army concentrated to the north of the country 

was a danger to Israel. The IAF continued its flights over Lebanon and when the Syrian 

air force attempted to engage the IAF planes, the resulting air battles saw large 

numbers of Syrian planes destroyed until eventually they stopped flying over Lebanon. 

The skies over Lebanon remained clear for the IAF to fly for a couple of years 

until the Syrians stationed a large ground-to-air missile system in the Beka’a Valley 

in East Lebanon. thus endangering air superiority for the IAF. Israel did not accept 

the new situation and threatened to hit the missile sites if they were not removed. 

a. The first Lebanon War 1982 (“Mivza Sheleg”) 

At the same time, terrorists crossing from Lebanon into Israel carried out numerous 

attacks resulting in death and damage. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in order 

to knock out the terrorist’s bases. At first Israel refrained from engaging the Syrian 

army in an effort to prevent escalation, but when the Syrians started to activate their


army against the Israeli ground forces, the road to all out conflict was short. 

The IAF attacked and destroyed the missile system in the Beka’a Valley in a 

fast concentrated operation. The Syrian air force intervened in order to defend its 

ground forces, and in three days of air-to-air battles, the Syrians lost approximately 

90 aircrafts, with no losses to the IAF. 9 more Syrian aircrafts were shot-down by 

anti-aircraft units, one of them was MiG25. 

The war ended with a total defeat of the Syrian army and the PLO while the IDF 

controlled half of the country including the capital Beirut. Throughout the war, the 

fighting was limited to Lebanon alone, while the Golan Heights, which formed a 

direct border between Israel and Syria, remained totally silent. 

b. “The Second Lebanon War” (2006) 

The result of the First Lebanon War (1982) was the removal of the PLO with 

there leader Yasser Arafat from Lebanon, leading to the rise of a new terror force – 

The destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor that had been hit by the IAF in 1981.


Hezbollah. This time made up of Lebanese Shiite Moslems supported by Syria and 

Iran who supplied the organization with modern ground-to-ground missiles, Katyusha 

rockets and other armaments. Once again, Israel found itself fighting a terrorist 

organization on its northern border. Despite these attacks, Israel refrained from 

another all out campaign, limiting itself to counter attacks mainly through use of the 

air force. 

This situation lasted for many years with the Hezbollah growing stronger and 

being supplied with both medium and long-range missiles by Iran and Syria, and 

the Lebanese authorities being helpless against it. In the year of 2006, in an attack 

on an Israeli patrol on the border, the Hezbollah killed 8 soldiers and kidnapped two 

others. This time Israel decided to react with force against the terrorists. The IAF 

opened a massive attack on the long range missiles that were in the center and north 

of Lebanon and destroyed them in the first wave. The terrorists retaliated with a massive 

barrage of missiles on the north of Israel causing extensive damage and loss of 

life. Dozens of houses and factories were damaged and the population was forced to 

remain in shelters. The IAF attacked the Hezbollah and Shiite Center in Beirut with 

full force and totally destroyed it. 

The war ended with the intervention of the UN. An agreement was reached in 

which the Hezbollah would no longer have bases on the Israeli border with a UN 

force being stationed in south Lebanon to ensure its implementation. Up to this day 

(2010), the northern border has remained quiet. 

The Gaza War 2008 “Oferet Yetsuka Operation” (Cast Lead) 

The south of the country was also not quiet considering that the terror organizations 

were active in the overcrowded refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. After Israel 

unilaterally withdrew from the Strip in August 2005, the extremist group Hamas 

gained control and vowed to continue the fight against Israel. When Israel built fences 

that prevented infiltration from the Strip, the Hamas group started to fire home made 

rockets against the civilian Israeli population of the towns and settlements around 

the Strip. This situation lasted for eight years, in which time thousands of rockets 

and mortars were fired from the strip, and although the loss of life and damage to 

property was not very serious, it resulted in trauma to all the civilian population in 

the south area of the country. The political decision not to attack the Gaza Strip was 

seen by Hamas as a sign of weakness and fear on the part of Israel. 

The mortar and missile fire from the Strip, escalated in the absence of any reaction 

from Israel, until eventually, there was no choice other than to put a stop to it 

once and for all. At the end of December 2008 the IDF was activated against Hamas, 

the Israeli Army and the IAF attacked and destroyed numerous Hamas targets, and 

the result was that from that time on the border with Gaza is relatively quiet (2010).


The Israeli “Hetz” 

anti-missile defense system. 

Protecting Israel’s Skies Using Ballistic Missiles - 

High Quality Weapons in the IDF 

The reader of this article can understand that the threats against Israel by its enemies 

are very strong and real, and some of these enemies continue to stress their 

desire to destroy the State of Israel. They prepare their armies and arm them with 

the most modern weapons with the aim of attacking and destroying the Jewish State. 

They do not hide their intentions and continue to develop nuclear or biological weapons 

of mass destruction. 

Syria secretly built a plan to produce nuclear weapons on the border near Turkey, 

which was destroyed by an air strike. The world assumes that the strike was by the 

IAF. Iran, in defiance of all international demands, continues to develop nuclear 

weapons and makes no secret of its intentions to use them against Israel. 

During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, both Egypt and Syria fired land-to-land missiles 

against Israel - Frog missiles from Syria and Scud missiles from Egypt. Israel 

had to confront these newly acquired weapons that have entered the war theater. The 

situation deteriorated during Operation “Desert Storm” - the first Gulf War in 1991 

when Iraq fired about 40 Iraqi developed “Hussein” Scud missiles into Israel. These


missiles caused both human and property damage in Israel, and in addition Israel 

feared they could carry chemical or nuclear war-heads. The United States transferred 

ground-to-air “Patriot” missiles to protect Israel from the Iraqi Scuds, but they were 

unable hit the incomming missiles which caused damage. 

The situation in northern Israel declined even before the Second Lebanon War 

in 1996 when Hezzbollah acquired thousands of short and medium range rockets. A 

similar situation occured before “Operartion Cast Lead” in 2009 when Hamas fired 

thousands of rockets into civilian settlements in southern Israel, causing human and 

property damage, disrupting the population’s daily lives during an eight year period. 

In the past new years, Israel has a new threat since the regime in Iran has developed 

nuclear capability and their leaders have threatened to destroy Israel. 

A few years before the first Gulf War, Israel began, together with the USA, to 

develop anti-ballistic missiles to strike incomming missiles before they enter Israeli 

air-space. 

Apart from the strength of the air force, Israel has developed with great success, 

anti-missile systems - the “Hetz” (Arrow) to shoot down long-range missiles. It is 

the only country in the world with a defense system of this type. 

Israel has, together with the USA, successfully developed an advanced missile 

system to strike incomming ballistic missiles in project “Kipat Barzel” (Iron Dome) 

to protect against rockets. Israel continue working with the United States to develop 

additional weapons of different types for its defense against both-short and longrange 

missiles. In the second half of 2009, there was a joint Israeli-American multisystem 

defense exercise which proved the abilities of the IAF and the quality of the 

defense system of the United States to defend against a missile attack. 

The Israeli government has decided, from the military aspect, that the Israel Air 

Force will operate missile systems neccessary to protect the country against incomming 

missiles and aircraft. The Israel Air Force has high quality new aircraft, the 

most advanced in the world, equiped with powerful strategic weapon systems against 

incomming missiles. Most of the new equipment and weapons referred above are operated 

by the IAF. 

Most of the weapons used in Israel are developed by the Israeli Aircraft industry 

(IAI), Israeli Military Industry (IMI) and by “Rafael” Advanced Defense System, 

including civilian industries. All these industries of high-tech advanced defense systems 

for land, sea, air and space applications. 

Rescue of downed pilots 

There is a specially trained unit for the rescue of downed pilots, which also operates 

to rescue civilians from remote places where swift and easy access is not possible. 

Many injured people have had their lives saved by the IAF.


The Development of the UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

During the Yom Kippur War, Syrian missile batteries in Lebanon caused heavy 

damages to Israeli fighter jets. As a result, Israel developed the first modern UAV - 

unmanned aerial vehicle. The images provided by these UAV helped Israel to completely 

neutralize and destroy the Syrian Air defenses at the beginning of the 1982 

Lebanon war resulting in no damage to the IAF. The IAF used again most of the 

UAV systems in the second Lebanon war (2006) and in the Gaza war (2008). 

The UAV developed specially for surveillance purposes with the ability to carry 

weapons. Israel is a leader in this field and has succeeded in building short term aircraft 

and also long term UAV capable of staying airborne for 24 hours or more. 

The Strategic Arm of the State of Israel 

The Israeli air force is seen by the leaders of Israel as the strategic defense arm of 

the State. A large part of the defense budget is invested in the IAF, which enabled it 

to purchase and operate the most advanced aircrafts in the world. In it serve air crews 

and ground crews trained to the highest possible degree. 

Over the years the IAF has participated in numerous operations (many of them 

are still secret), which represent a colossal contribution to the security of Israel. 

Many of the operations are taught in military academies world-wide and the IAF is 

highly rated among the most advanced air forces in the world. 

The Israel air force is in a constant state of readiness 24 hours a day to defend the 

skies and the space of the country and its population, being able to act at very short 

notice to any mission that may be demanded of it. 

UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – 

RQ-2 developed in the Israeli Aircraft 

Industry.

daV i d iV r y * 

The Air Arm during the Lebanon War 1982 

Background 

Israele 

As a preface to direct reference to the use of air power in 1982, one should understand 

several transformations that the Israel Air Force experienced in the field 

of air warfare, organization and weapons, in order to better analyze the war and its 

results. The destruction of air forces on the ground within a few hours during the 

Six Day War (1967), and the air combat achievements, were both an unprecedented 

achievement, which also has mixed results because it led to great expectations from 

the Israel Air Force. 

On the other hand, the defeated air forces learned many lessons and implemented 

them, so it was impossible to repeat the results. Shielded shelters were built for 

aircraft that exceeded their number, additional runways were built and many emergency 

runways were prepared. All this was part of passive defense. 

The anti-a/c defense got a huge leverage, guns but mainly missile. The surfaceto-air 

missile (SAM) was a leap forward when the Soviet doctrine of operating a 

strenuous independent arm, the divisions of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 batteries were the 

massive foundation of the doctrine, and thousands of SA-7 missiles were available 

in almost any unit or military facility. 

During the War of Attrition (1968-1970), this concept was leveraged and the Israel 

Air Force found itself in August 1970 with a cease fire treaty, when the Egyptian 

army had advanced its surface-to-air missiles right up to the canal, contrary to the 

agreement, but Israel had to restrain itself because it did not have a decisive answer 

to surface-to-air missiles. As part of the means that the IAF had, it developed attack 

methods and war doctrine, including the use of air power in the presence of surfaceto-air 

missiles. EW methods were also acquired from the U.S., means that were 

developed during the Vietnam War. 

We arrived at the Yom Kippur War in 1973, after improving the attack tactics and 

EW capability; however, we did not succeed in pushing forward the development of 

weapons to destroy surface-to-air missiles, thus losing the air freedom of action we 

were used to, and which the IDF ground forces were used to. 

In the operation plans prior to the Yom Kippur War, the IAF demanded 48 hours 

to launch air power against surface-to-air missiles sites and air bases, thus assuring 

air superiority to continue fighting. The IDF staff level was sympathetic to this; 

however reality in the 1973 war did not enable such luxury. The IAF was required 

* M.Gen., former Chief of the IDF Air Force.


to take part in containing the ground invasions from day one, so the operation plans 

did not come to a test. 

Despite the fact that the achievements at the end of the war were impressive, the 

IAF felt bad. This feeling was expressed by former IAF Commander Ezer Weizmann, 

later minister of defense and President of Israel: “The missile bent the wing of the 

fighter plane”. 

This resulted in a certain grinding in the strong status of the IAF, which had an 

impact on the distribution of budget and preference in allocation of manpower; i.e., 

the ground forces were considerably favored. 

In October 1977, I took the position of IAF Commander and replaced M/G Benny 

Peled – a charismatic commander who began a revolution, in the organizational 

structure and a more technological approach to answer operational problems. 

In November 1977, President Sadat arrived in Israel for a visit to Jerusalem, the 

beginning of a process of strategic importance that led to the signing of a peace treaty 

and retreat from Sinai in March 1979. 

Nevertheless, war against hostile activity continued in the north. In March 1978 

we find ourselves in the midst of the Litani operation, a military operation that tried 

to push back terrorist presence from the border deep into Lebanon, following the 

killing of civilians by terrorists who penetrated from Lebanon. 

After the Litani operation in March 1977, UNIFIL entered south Lebanon, but 

they did not prevent the terrorists from moving south and harassing the northern settlements. 

So we had to operate almost daily from the air against terrorist targets in 

south Lebanon. At the beginning interception aircraft were sent from Syria (MiG 21 

and MiG 23) in order to disturb our air activity; however, after a few encounters – 

many of them planned by us – they suffered accumulating losses in air combat, and 

usually remain to patrol in Syria without penetrating Lebanon. One could say that 

towards the Lebanon War of 1982 we achieved full freedom of air power in Lebanon, 

which was very significant to the IAF pilots’ esteem and air control. 

The Syrians, who understood that they are not a match to the IAF in air combat, 

transferred three SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 surface to air missile divisions to the Lebanon 

Beka’a for protection against the IAF. This narrowed somewhat the air freedom of 

power on the Lebanese eastern side, thus reaching 1982. 

Attack on the surface-to-air missiles in the Beka’a in june 1982 

On Wednesday, 9 June 1982, at 14:00, the attack on the surface-to-air missiles 

during the Lebanon war began. This chapter deals with one of the greatest successes 

in air warfare, in which the dense surface-to-air missile defense was destructed – 

SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 missiles that were deployed in the Lebanon Beka’a valley and 

along Lebanon’s eastern border. 

The surface-to-air missile defense was a Soviet war doctrine, with a seperate

th e AIr Ar m d u r I n g t h e le b A n o n wA r 1982 169 

command and a lot of investment. In many times, this caused many doubts as to the 

effectiveness of offensive air power against such defense, when the results of the 

Vietnam war and Yom Kippur war left a bad taste with the air power. 

Preparation for the operation itself and the possibility of confronting once again 

the surface-to-air missile defense was the role of many people, mostly air force, but 

also many of the R&D and defense industries. 

For 9 years since the end of the Yom Kippur war, the IAF was busy developing an 

anti surface-to-air missile system. The lessons of the Yom Kippur war, as written in 

a document dated 30 January 1974, summarizes briefly the lessons and briefings of 

the war in all IAF units. The document had been approved by IAF Commander MG 

Benjamin Peled, includes in chapter 4 – weapon systems – the main requirements 

and efforts to implement an answer to the surface-to-air missile threat. It mentioned 

“surface-to-air missile operation system”, with an emphasis on “system” rather than 

a specific weapon. The Yom Kippur war lessons showed that one should refer to 

the operation of air power in modern war through the operation of combat systems 

that include all the elements of intelligence, command and control, communication, 

training and weapon systems. In other words, accurate, sophisticated, modern weapons, 

with new technology is not sufficient, if you cannot get the control and backing 

of other systems working in harmony towards success. 

The IAF, with the assistance of defense industries, succeeded in making progress 

along the 9 years, and built many elements that gave it the opportunity to design 

various attack systems against surface-to-air missiles. A combination of elements 

created a combat system suitable for different arenas and different conditions. The 

surface-to-air missile arena in Lebanon was, therefore, one variant but the Lebanon 

option was the focus in training and simulations, including real models without releasing 

ammunition in the Lebanon scenario itself. 

In IDF status assessments that took place prior to June 1982 and dealt with various 

operative planning that included penetrating Lebanon in order to banish the terrorists 

from southern Lebanon, there was always the dilemma of surface-to-air missile. 

Since these were part of the Syrian military forces, it meant entering a confrontation 

with the Syrians, not only the terrorists. This is why alternatives and timing were 

explored in combat that requires the attack on surface-to-air missiles On the other 

hand, as long as Syrian surface-to-air missiles operate, the limitations of operating 

the Israel Air Force were being examined. 

The fundamental question was, of course, whether an attack on the surface-to-air 

missiles in the Beka’a would deteriorate to a major war with Syria. Since the political 

direction was usually to avoid war with Syria, especially during the Lebanon war, 

the question was laid at full force on the desk of the defense establishment each day 

since the war started. 

During the first days of the Lebanon war, my instructions were to avoid any air 

penetration into Syria, and even stop pursuing Syrian jets if it risked crossing the


border into Syria. Since I was in the command and control position most of the time, 

this was implemented indirectly by me and the policy was screened to all levels, 

even when I was absent. It seems that Syria understood this message very well, and 

there were very few attempts on their side to intercept our aircraft. It seems they used 

to take minimum risks and action at times it was less potential for encounters. Even 

the surface-to-air missiles did not create high risks to our aircrafts. 

On Monday, 7 June, there were first frictions between Syrian ground forces and 

our ground forces in the east front. The Northern Command demanded an attack on 

the surface-to-air missiles on Tuesday. This was discussed at a meeting at Northern 

Command, with the participation of the Minister of Defense Sharon, Chief of Staff 

Eitan, and me. Northern Command claimed that it could reach the Beirut-Damascus 

road by Tuesday, thus accomplishing the goals. The attack on the surface-to-air missiles 

was therefore postponed without taking the chance of deteriorating the war. 

My recommendation was also to postpone the attack for an additional 24 hours 

because we learned about upcoming changes in the Syrian air defense set up, and I 

wanted to be sure about the set up in order to avoid surprises while the attack was 

being launched, and to get a better understanding of the Syrian policy – where were 

they planning the center of gravity of their defense. Chief of Staff Eitan supported 

my recommendation and the minister approved it. On the other hand, I instructed 

head of operations, Col. Sela, to allocate and arm fighter planes for Tuesday in case 

the situation deteriorated and we could be forced to attack the surface-to-air missiles 

even on Tuesday. We set aside almost 100 high performance aircrafts (mostly F-4s) 

to be prepared for this potential situation. 

During the night, the SA-6 division was transferred from the Golan Heights to 

the Lebanon area in order to thicken the surface-to-air missile set up, increasing their 

number to over 19 batteries. I was very happy we decided to postpone the attack to 

Wednesday. This let us understand that the Syrians were planning to restrict themselves 

to the Lebanon area, or else they would not have weakened their defense in 

the Golan, thus creating a better penetration option towards Damascus. 

On Tuesday, the friction on the ground increased between the Syrian forces and 

the eastern command under M/G Yanush Ben Gal. Each side blamed the other for 

the friction. However, when both forces face each other under a lot of tension, with 

mutual suspicion. Even a simple test of guns could cause an eruption. It is therefore 

difficult to determine who initiated the friction that intensified on Tuesday. 

During the night meeting on Tuesday, it seemed that the ground goals were not 

achieved, so there was a consensus around recommending to the government to attack 

the surface-to-air missiles, after assuming that deteriorating to an overall war 

with Syria was of minor chances due to the transferring the SA-6 division from the 

Golan to Lebanon. 

Since the possibility of war with Syria was still an option as an output of attacking 

the surface-to-air missiles operated by Syrian soldiers, it was the right decision


to bring it before the government for approval. It was agreed that the minister would 

present it to the government on Wednesday morning, while assessing that an approval 

will be obtained by 10:00, and an attack could be planned for 12:00. 

Chief of Staff Eitan decided to stay at the northern command for the night, and 

drive to Tel Aviv the following morning to join us at the IAF command post, from 

where we planned to conduct the fighting, and complete the preparations and briefings 

towards the attack. 

Minister Sharon wanted someone who is familiar with the plans to attend the government 

meeting with him, in order to answer any professional questions that may 

rise. It was decided that B/G Amos Amir, who left his position as head of air division, 

was now free of any role, would join the minister as an expert. 

The government meeting on Wednesday was lengthy. We kept in contact with 

Amos Amir and understood that a decision would not be made till 10:00, so I instructed 

the IAF to postpone the time starting the attack to 14:00 in order to operate 

without pressure. The government indeed gave its decision after 11:00, meaning that 

we had more than 2 hours for all the required actions. 

After receiving the approval, there was a sense of alert and tension in the command 

post. The command echelon felt as if it were just before a matriculation exam. 

The material was learned and exercised for years, but the test page is yet to be revealed. 

There was concern about unexpected questions. 

Personally, I began a series of phone calls with wing and base commanders, and 

C2I units, in order to make sure that everyone was aware of the approval and get 

feedback on their preparedness. I sensed that the IAF was alert and ready. This reminded 

me of the time before take off during “Moked” operation in the Six Day 

War. The crews know their goals, the “band’ knows how to play in synchronism after 

many drills. The instruments are tuned and waiting for the conductor to give the note. 

In this case, it was the hands of many clocks showing 14:00. The clocks were reset 

at all levels of control, command, and operation. 

The command cell, where we were prepared to control the special operation 

against the missile defense, was located in the new IAF command post, one floor 

under the main command center where I sat. All command cells face the control desk 

that gives a current air status picture. The desk and mission boards on top of it give 

one common language for all command cells. 

The command cell for the attack on the surface-to-air missiles exercised many 

times in simulation with and without airborne power. We had a skilled team headed 

by Sela and Itzik Ben Israel, whom I knew and could count on them while I, myself, 

had to focus on the interception of Syrian fighter planes that could be launched to 

protect to SAM batteries, but also threaten our forces. This is where things can take 

an unexpected turn and require an immediate response. Experience in command is 

very significant here. In fact, I had to prevent Syrian air force from interfering with 

the attack on the surface-to-air missiles, so that the attack will take place without


external interference and be conducted like in peace time drill. 

The surface-to-air missiles attack cell was not aware of the air combat and confrontations 

that took place at the same time, during which 26 Syrian jets were downed 

in 40 minutes after being sent to disrupt our attack. 

Upon opening our attack on the surface-to-air missiles at 14:00, all airborne 

Syrian planes were diverted east and sent for immediate landing. In fact, within 5 

minutes there was not a single Syrian aircraft in the air. The Syrian goal was obvious. 

Allow the surface-to-air missiles to fire freely and shoot down any aircraft in the air 

without having to identify it first. Until then, the Syrians used to patrol with several 

aircraft along the Syrian-Lebanese border on the Syrian side. 

It was clear that the Syrians expected impressive achievements from its surfaceto-air 

missiles, in light of their success during the Yom Kippur war. 

However, within 20 minutes of the attack, the Syrian command suffered a great 

disappointment. The surface-to-air missiles were desperate for air protection in order 

to defend itself from the effective IAF attacks. Syrian aircraft were sent blindly on a 

repeating trail, 3-5 minutes between a formation in an attempt to harass and threaten 

our attacking aircraft and disrupt the attack. 

The Syrian command center was under a lot of stress. My senses told me that the 

operation of the Syrian fighters was under panic, which made it a lot easier for me 

to control the battle. The fact that they flew the same route enabled us to ambush 

them in the most convenient places. We disrupted their control and communication 

systems with EW, which increased their panic. The Syrian command sent the aircraft 

into the Beka’a at relatively low altitude in order to search for our attacking aircraft. 

Since they could not receive guidance at such low altitude by Syrian radar, and the 

radars in Lebanon were destroyed earlier, the “interceptors” became targets to our 

aircraft that had guidance and were equipped with efficient radars. 

In this case I had to restrain our controller’s enthusiasm to conduct the interception 

without identification, which could have endangered our own planes. With the 

help of the controllers, I selected the our patrols with the best chances and sent them 

for the encounter, while others had to await their turn. On the other hand, in order to 

stop our aircraft from chasing Syrian aircraft into Syria, I instructed them to cease 

contact, so that the encounters were relatively brief, and our pilots’ agility was being 

tested. Our pilots felt confident with the orders from the command center and total 

trust in the command instructions, while entering combat like hunters more than having 

to prove their capabilities. As things evolved, we could act with more discretion 

and with fewer mistakes, so we ended with a score of 26:0. In 40 minutes we downed 

26 Syrian aircraft without losing one single aircraft of our own. 

I dragged some of the fights into an encounter above our ground forces, leading 

to the capture of 9 Syrian air crew men. The idea was to get qualitative captives in 

order to assure a quick swap of prisoners at the end of the fighting in case we lost 

any of our crew men.


As already mentioned, in parallel to air combat the attack continued on the surface-to-air 

missiles with very good results. I could follow this by reading the Syrian 

side and from intelligence reports. I was also briefed by the command cell. Along 

this time, Chief of Staff Eitan sat as a scout in the command cell next to me. I glanced 

at him from time to time and saw how much he was impressed and, happy to hear the 

reports about Syrian aircraft being downed. He was full of admiration. 

Aviem Sela came up to our floor and whispered to me that 13 batteries were totally 

destroyed, each received a double verification, and the remaining 6 are paralyzed 

with one verification of destruction each. According to intelligence, there is no life in 

the formation, meaning there is no electromagnetic radiation of radar, so the surfaceto-air 

missiles were in fact destroyed. We still have armed aircraft patrolling ready to 

attack because we wanted to verify “the mother of destruction”. The understanding 

between me and Sela developed amazingly in the last year, so even before he spoke 

I understood that he thought there was no point to continue and endanger more airplanes. 

I immediately instructed to stop the attack and divert all aircraft to assist our 

land forces in Lebanon’s other fronts. Till this day, Sela reminds me that I instructed 

to stop the attack without consulting with the Chief of Staff, but I sensed that we are 

close to a dangerous situation that could lead to a mistake and risk shooting down our 

own aircraft. On the other hand, we destroyed the surface-to-air missiles and downed 

26 aircraft without losing a single aircraft, so it would be better to end the attack at 

this point, a fast and right decision without any time to consult because each second 

could be critical for one of the airplanes. 

The decision involved the fact that some of the airplanes in the waiting circle 

did not have targets, and they were forced to dump their loads into the sea in order 

to avoid landing fully loaded. They were very frustrated to have missed out on the 

celebration of surrounding and destroying the surface-to-air missiles. During the first 

evening, I could still hear criticizing remarks about stopping the attack, a decision 

that was later understood and received full backing from all levels of command and 

operation. 

The attack on the surface-to-air missiles was planned with high factors in order 

to assure destruction. Each battery required two verifications for destruction in order 

to prevent a situation in which smoke or different angles could mislead us, finding 

ourselves with a partly destroyed formation. 

In all fields of activity, in EW, we doubled the power and number of jammings. 

The amount of chaff dispersed was double than required by operations research. This 

helped us create a friendly environment for our aircraft, and almost total blindness 

to the Syrian air defense. We wanted to pass this test after the trauma of Yom Kippur 

with the highest score. 

We deliberately published the success of the Hawk Eye E2C aircraft as a cover 

story for other air activity we performed. The publication was absorbed and some 

countries considered it to be the main reason for the success of the operation in


Lebanon. The truth is that this aircraft that was designed to operate above the sea, 

suffered many difficulties in land operation, we later made every effort to sell it. At 

the end, we received many compliments. We invited former IAF commanders to a 

briefing that same evening. One just criticizing remark was made, one that I contemplated 

a lot before the Lebanon 1982 war – the exposure of weapon systems we used 

could have led the other side to prepare counter measures towards the possibility of 

a real war. Exposure of our capabilities during a limited operation in Lebanon could 

expose us to many difficulties during a future real war. Criticism is of course legitimate 

and we did our best to conceal our means and capabilities. 

We could not, of course, conceal our capability to destroy the surface-to-air missiles 

because this was the result of the successful attack. In a historical perspective, 

the achievement was very significant to Israel’s element of deterrence. Since the 

1982 war and up to 2010, Israel was not required to fight a real major war, some of 

this can be attributed to the deterrence achieved and which leads to the conflict on 

exposure being justified. If one decides to attack surface-to-air missiles, one must do 

it with the best of means and capabilities in order to achieve the best possible result, 

and obtain maximum deterrence. There is no doubt that such conflict will arise in 

the future due to the asymmetric type of war. It seems that this lesson is true in most 

cases. 

Short story to be added: In June 1992, when I was director general of the MoD, 

visiting Czechoslovakia right after the Glasnost, on a formal visit and during a side 

meeting, the deputy Chief of Staff of the host country at the time, former commander 

of the anti-a/c forces, told me with enthusiasm that he was in Moscow in 1982 at the 

National Security College, and our achievement in destroying the surface-to-air missiles 

caused a shock to the Soviet defense establishment. In his opinion, it was one 

of the reasons that led to Glasnost. I cannot assess the contribution of our success to 

the development of Glasnost, but it was clear that from the military aspect, the Soviet 

expectations were different. They built very high self confidence with their anti a/c 

defense following the Vietnam war, the war of Attrition and the Yom Kippur war, 

and this caused a revolutionary change in their approach.

* 1 

od e d er e z 

The IAF and the UAV Era 

Israele 

Oded, In your flying days-In how much time did you collect 300 flying 

hours?” this was the question, and my answer: “Well Son, In my time, 

“Say, 

in flying fighters you made a lot of sorties but very short ones, and 300 

hours would have taken about a year and a half (18 months)”. “Really?” responds the 

young man “I did it in 3 weeks!” 

That was a real conversation between me, a retired air force veteran and my 

grandson, who is an active deputy squadron commander who operates UAV’s from 

the same IAF base that I commanded a generation ago. 

And this exchange of words symbolizes one of the greatest and most significant 

breakthroughs in the history of the Israeli Air Force: The application and deployment 

of the Unmanned Aircraft. 

The following brief history of UAV’s is quoted from the Internet site http://www. 

ufl.edu/uav/uav 

The concept of unmanned aerial vehicles was first used in the American Civil 

War, when the North and the South tried to launch balloons with explosive devices 

that would fall into the other side’s ammunition depot and explode. Since we talk 

about a period in which manned flying machines were not in existence – this historical 

fact does not serve the issue – but it became one, when in WW2, the Japanese 

tried to launch balloons with incendiary and other explosives with the idea that high 

altitude winds would carry them to the US, where the dropping bombs would cause, 

at least, panic. Apparently, both these ideas were not effective. The US did use a prototype 

UAV called Operation Aphrodite in WW2. It was an attempt to use manned 

vehicles in an unmanned mode. However, at that time the US did not have the technology 

to launch or control the aircraft. 

Today’s UAV’s owe much to the design of the cruise missiles that were used in 

WW2 by the US and British forces. At the close of WW2, Chance Vought Aircraft, 

a company with no missile experience, was contracted to develop new machines. 

What won them the contract was that the proposed test missile would have a landing 

gear, which would help save cost! 

This was the beginning of the UAV. 

In the 1960s, the US started to develop “drones”: unmanned vehicles built for 

spying and reconnaissance. This was after the losses of U-2s over Russia and Cuba. 

The first such drone was the “Firebee”: a jet propelled aircraft’ made by Ryan 

* Brig. Gen. (ret), former Chief of IAF Intelligence.


Aeronautical Company. They were heavily used over Communist China and major 

flaws, technical and operating, were discovered and corrected. 

The Vietnam War was the first time that UAVs, the drones in particular, were used 

extensively in reconnaissance and combat roles. At first they were used for “simple” 

day recee missions, and later they were equipped with night recee equipment, communication 

and electronic intelligence. 

Over the last few years, it has been Israel that was responsible for much of the development 

that has happened in the UAV sector. The Hunter and the Pioneer, which 

are used extensively by the US military and other western forces, are direct derivatives 

of Israeli systems. 

When and why did the IAF start its UAV operation? 

Right after the “6 days War” (June 1967), Israel was engaged in what is known as 

“the War of Attrition” (that ended on Aug. 7 th 1970). At the first stages this war was 

around the Suez Canal and land affected mainly IDFs ground forces. In a later phase 

(mid 1969) the IAF became the main operator in the battle zone, and at that phase we 

encountered the ground to air Russian AAA and SAM systems that were deployed by 

the Egyptians and the Syrians. 

The IAF has suffered a few aircraft (A4s, F4s, transport) losses as well as some 

crews, and was looking for means that would allow continuing operational activity 

in the very hostile environment. As usual, various techniques and tactics were developed; 

among them was the study of the Unmanned Aircraf, mainly for the reconnaissance 

missions which were quite intensive. 

Being a former reconnaissance expert, with a lot of operational experience in the 

1960s’ and flying actively F-4s in air/air and air/ground missions, I was no stranger 

to the operational atmosphere and needs, and with my engineering degree and experience 

in Weapon systems development, I was given the task of the IAF Program 

Manager for the study, implication and deployment of the UAV. 

This took place in December 1970; I was a Lt. Col and had to report to Gen. 

Benny Peled who became the IAF CIC in mid 1973. 

What we had in mind was to define and find a platform that could answer the 

operational need of delivering (or bringing) vertical photo images, covering enough 

range to answer the large areas to be monitored, being able to do various profiles: 

low-low, high-low-high, etc. and the raison d’etre: a platform that does not leave 

p.o.ws and widows behind, even in case of mission failure. We didn’t know very 

much about what’s going on in this area and learning that most of the European activity 

in this field is in the Aerial Targets we focused our search in the US. 

Since time was very crucial, we decided that we won’t commence a development 

program but would rather adopt an existing platform and perform the minimum engineering 

changes to fit it to our operational requirements. 

As published in the Wikipedia a great advance was achieved in drone technology 

and operational practice during the Vietnam War. A series of fast track adaptations 

of an existing target drone resulted in a system whose effectiveness was beyond

tH e iaf a n d t H e uav er a 177 

expectations, even with guidance technology which was extremely crude by modern 

standards. Our search lead us to Teledyne-Ryan Aeronautical in San Diego, Ca and 

a contract for 25 “birds” was signed to be delivered in a few months. The platform 

was based on the Teledyne SC/SD versions with some modifications: airframe, and 

operating that we needed as a response to our operational requirements. The “bird” 

was designated 124I and in Hebrew: MABAT, which has two meanings: it’s the 

initials of A Plane without A Pilot and the word A Look or Observation. The major 

significant changes involved with our program were the ground launch assisted by a 

RATO booster and a Mid-Air Recovery System (MARS) by Helicopter. 

The first phase of the project that started in early 1971 by sending a small team of 

technicians, software experts and a couple of pilots – none with any experience with 

Unmanned vehicles to the company’s facility in San Diego – to learn and qualify in 

the system without flying it. The contract dictated that there won’t be any real flights 

in the US and that all 5 acceptance and test flights will be performed in Israel and 

will begin in late Aug.1971 so that the system’s development phase (engineering), 

organizational preparations in picking the people to be the technical and operational 

nucleus, training them overseas, preparations in Israel of the infrastructure to absorb 

the system and performing the acceptance flights: all was planned to be done in 

about 10 months. 

With our very little knowledge of unmanned flying systems we were quite worried 

of having to operate them from our AF Base in the center of the country and at 

the center of the populated area and having a very dense aerial traffic military and 

civil, so the first decision was to carry the operation, on a temporary basis to a very 

remote place: one of the forward airbases that we used in the Sinai Desert. 

Due to hard work and super enthusiastic attitude from both our Israeli group and 

the Teledyne Ryan people, across all levels, we met the target date! 

I have to make clear that we could advance in our program and solve whatever 

problems because we were considered as a project that does not interfere with the 

Air Force daily operations, and being self contained and not having anybody in the 

HQ who knew better than us, we did not even demand HQ colonels attention. On 

the other hand, we couldn’t do so well with the moral support and backing of Gen. 

Benny Peled who was a real partisan of the concept. 

All 5 test-acceptance flights, in which we examined different profiles, were successful 

and gave us the confidence in our ability to plan and control the missions, to 

maintain the equipment and, in fact, to feel assured enough in order to convince our 

commanders that the concept of UAV as part of our Air Force is viable. 

As for the organizational structure we suggested that the operating unit will be just 

like a “flying” squadron, and that we’ll have experienced ground crews with electronics 

background, and ground material-ammunition background for the launcher. 

The optical equipment will be looked after at the base level, and as aircrew we decided 

to use experienced aircrews. Either active or grounded for medical reasons. 

This decision was very important – the alternative suggested by the HQ was to find 

some of the model aircraft fans and recruit them. I insisted that as long as we fly real


plane we cannot develop the idea that it can be treated as a toy. And since we argued 

on a very small number and with my consent to use grounded pilots, it worked. 

I mention this because a few years later, when we developed the Mini RPVs-we 

did use model aircraft fans in some piloting tasks. 

Proving the capability and showing confidence are not enough, because we could 

easily stay stuck and forgotten in the remote base in the Sinai unless we convince 

the command that we should get the orders for operational missions. The fact that at 

that time (Oct. 1971). 

I became a branch-commander in the Operations Division, helped the unit because 

I was able to convince my colleagues that they (the UAV Sqd.) should get a 

fair share in the reconnaissance missions. 

In 1972, a small number of Northrop MQM-74 (Chucker) were bought and absorbed 

as a flight (sector) in the Sqd.. These were target drones and were meant to 

be used as decoys. 

The “Yom Kippur” war (Oct.1973) put the first UAV Sqd. into full operational 

service. But at the end of this 3 weeks war most of the platforms were lost, performing 

a number of successful reconnaissance missions (see SA-2 photo) and a great 

number of “suicide missions” as decoys for the SAMs. 

Right after the war, the Sqd. Experts have developed with the approval of the AF 

technical Div. a substitute for the Reconnaissance need by transforming the MQM- 

74 Target Drone to a recee platform. Installing in it a MiniPan camera, the “birds” 

were ground launched, flew by a program and had quite a nice record in bringing 

back the photos although their technical reliability wasn’t very high, and that’s an 

understatement. 

I came back to the Base this time as the base commander and demanded that the 

AF will conduct an inquiry in every single case of loss, exactly as if it was a manned 

air craft – the results were very effective: first we’ve learned, after talking to USN 

operators in Point Mogu (Ca.) that our rate of success is similar to theirs, and that we 

don’t have a operating default. The involvement of the HQ technical Div made them 

look at and treat the system as part of the active arsenal, which was a very important 

step towards the future. On the operational hand, we‘ve learned that most of the 

flights were a success, we didn’t lose birds because of AAA or SAMs, being small, 

fast and flying low made the penetration easier and hardly noticed, not like the larger 

124I. This too was a lesson that had great implications on our future developments. 

Another lesson and a very convincing one was learned: the main achievement of 

the introductory first years of operation was that even if a mission fails, you don’t 

lose your crews and don’t have widows and families to take care of, which is why 

we decided, back in 1970, to start the program. 

A new contract for additional 124Is and Firebees was signed and at that time some 

of our people, of the Sqd.. And base level, officers and a few enlisted men, came out 

with some ideas and got permission to work, at the industry (IAI and Tadiran) on 

developing the idea of a much smaller RPV with real time intelligence capabilities.

tH e iaf a n d t H e uav er a 179 

The outcome was the Mini RPV, or MAZLAT in Hebrew. The industry was quite enthusiastic, 

understanding that the markets will be ready and willing for the renewed 

concept based on the operational experience and feedback of the IAF. 

In fact, one of great advantages in weapon systems development, in Israel, is the 

fact that the country is small, a lot of people are not total strangers to each other, 

many of the people who work in the industry are doing their military reserve duty 

operating or maintaining systems that were developed in their own or a next door 

office. This means that “the circles are very tight” and modifications, improvements 

and testing of good ideas do not suffer from a long lead time and beaurocracy. 

So, from the mid 1970s onward, a lot of thought and work was put in developing 

techniques and capabilities that will suit new operational requirements which, after 

the experience gathered and the operational lessons learnt aimed toward more sophisticated 

missions. Not just carrying a payload but being able to perform a variety 

of missions in a multi-role profile, of one or some birds participating in a mission. 

When I was nominated the Chief of Air Force Intelligence (mid 1977) I managed, 

as the customer of what the Rpvs were supposed to bring, to encourage their 

participation in operations and to ensure the presence of more than just one squadron 

in the Air Force. This was the time in which I heard some of my fellow generals, 

questioning the budgets, manpower and priorities that the RPV systems were allocated 

– but it was not a real opposition – the operational results were very convincing, 

and the existing manned platforms had a lot of work to do, so in fact there was 

a well organized participation in missions that eased the competition, and beside all 

that the Manned A/C were used in a different type missions than the UAVs, so that 

each system could excel in its preferred area of operation. 

An operating system, even an unmanned one, depends on the people as much as 

on the equipment. We started with very few people as mentioned above and have 

gone through a self designed on the job training in the preparations, flight planning, 

before flight checks, the supporting logistics and the in flight monitoring of the platform 

and the payload. As the missions came in and the unit became and was treated 

as an Air Force Squadron we had to go up a few classes from the “experimental” 

phase. 

A major effort was done in the build-up and training of the men power. The on 

the job training made a big step in being transformed to an organized “school” for 

flying teams (operators) and ground crews, and the human resources management 

went well into the Air force Main Stream and was, no more, an unforeseen “burden” 

that had to be solved in an unordinary manner, which is normally the case with the 

operation of special projects and “unique” systems. 

The work of the squadron and base became much easier after the Air Force High 

Command was convinced that there is a high dividend in the operation of the UAVs, 

as part of the Air Force and under the command and control of the Air Force, and 

that the “environmental” risks and skepticism about the “Robots that will storm the 

populated skies…” is very very low!


Penetration into the Air Force became smoother’ due to the fact that some of the 

officers’ who had great belief in the systems and the concept were advanced to positions 

in which their influence on Air Force Decisions and Planning was stronger. 

A brief “History” of the RPVs /UAVs in service with the IAF is taken from the 

Wikipedia: 

UAVs are being operated in the IAF since 1971 performing various tasks. A lot 

of publicity was made during the “Al Akza intiphade” due to their high involvement 

in intelligence collection, and target location. In past years the IAF used US made 

target drones and Reconnaissance platforms but in later years the IAF’s UAVs are 

Israeli made by Israeli Defense Industries. 

Now days the UAVs in service with the IAF are The Heron 1 and Hermes 450 for 

observation, intelligence collection, and target designation. 

The Harpy is a “suicide” platform in Air defense Suppression, and as published in 

Aviation Week some Hermes 450 were equipped with missile-launchers. 

In October 2007, the IAF made a presentation of the Heron TP which is about to 

enter service and a tactical Mini RPV “Skylite B” which is in use for imaging intelligence 

collection. 

The IAF has gone a long way in the deployment of UAVs since the first steps 

back in 1970 – and in parallel and very dependent on the operational and experimental 

successes of the first systems, The Israeli Defense Industries became international 

leaders in developing and introducing new and updated UAV systems. 

UAVs today have a very large spectrum of flight capabilities: altitude, velocity, 

endurance. High Survivability due to building materials, flight profiles, low noise 

and multi-role function due to the many various payloads. 

The IAF has accepted and absorbed the concept and the systems and it now considered 

an important supporting pole in its overall structure. 

The UAVs in the IAF have significance as proven Power Multiplier and as such 

have won their place in the Air Force future plans. And as I look back along the track 

we, the beginners walked, I can only thank the wisdom and far sight of my collegues, 

in the unit and the HQ for directing us to push the concept with a constant measure 

of the proportions. We pushed after we’ve shown results and we never threatened to 

replace somebody “by a robot”. We didn’t promise a big cut in manpower when we 

are fully operational because we knew we’ll need more or less the same figures as 

in a manned squadron, but even in severe mission failures, we never left a pilot or a 

widow behind.

asiLio di Ma rt i n o * 

Una storia incompiuta. 

Potere aereo e dottrina d’impiego in Italia 

dal 1923 ad oggi 

Italia 

La nomina di Italo Balbo a Sottosegretario di Stato per l’Aeronautica nel novembre 

del 1926 può essere considerata un momento cruciale nella storia della 

giovane Forza Armata. Il suo predecessore, il generale dell’esercito Alberto 

Bonzani, aveva dato alla Regia Aeronautica una solida struttura di base, definendo 

nel novembre 1924 i criteri per il reclutamento e l’avanzamento di un corpo ufficiali, 

per forza di cose quanto mai eterogeneo, e dettando nel 1925 un ordinamento che, 

nello stabilire la composizione e i compiti della cosiddetta armata aerea e delle aviazioni 

dell’esercito e della marina, cercava di fare chiarezza in una situazione ancora 

confusa e terreno di scontro tra visioni contrapposte. Balbo andò infatti ben oltre 

nel tentativo di dare all’aeronautica non solo un’anima, sforzandosi di alimentarne e 

cementarne lo spirito di corpo, ma anche una convinta ragion d’essere, attraverso lo 

strumento propagandistico delle crociere collettive e l’affermazione di una dottrina 

d’impiego del potere aereo di cui queste imprese venivano a essere una prima manifestazione. 

L’esaltazione degli aspetti tecnici e organizzativi schiudeva una dimensione 

che travalicava quella dell’eroismo solitario par dare concretezza al concetto 

di massa e alla capacità di proiettarla a grande distanza. La visione imperante era 

quella che, nel proporre una decisa rottura con gli schemi tradizionali nel segno della 

modernità e dell’innovazione, si rifaceva al pensiero del generale Giulio Douhet, 

visione che proprio in quegli anni giungeva alla piena maturità con la strutturazione 

sistematica delle idee dell’ufficiale casertano. 

Il primo tentativo di verificare sul campo la praticabilità di queste teorie, al di là 

delle dichiarazioni ufficiali che ne ribadivano la centralità per la Regia Aeronautica, 

fu fatto con le grandi manovre dell’estate del 1927. Queste si svolsero in Veneto tra il 

16 e il 20 settembre sotto la direzione del capo di stato maggiore, generale Armando 

Armani, con l’impiego delle unità da caccia, da ricognizione e da bombardamento 

inquadrate nella I e nella II Zona Aerea Territoriale con un totale di 207 velivoli, 114 

“azzurri” e 93 “rossi”. Tema dell’esercitazione era un conflitto tra Italia e Jugoslavia 

con i due partiti che si fronteggiavano lungo una linea che dal Passo di Resia, sul 

confine italo-austriaco, andava alle foci del Po attraversando il Passo della Mendola, 

* Brigadier Generale A.M. - Storico aeronautico.


Cima d’Asta, l’Altopiano di Asiago, i Monti Berici, i Colli Euganei e la città di 

Rovigo. Per la prima volta l’arma aerea avrebbe operato in modo prettamente autonomo 

rispetto alle forze di superficie, una circostanza che Armani non mancò di sottolineare 

nella conferenza iniziale, tenuta a Padova il 15 settembre 1927, precisando 

però che il concetto di autonomia andava sempre e comunque interpretato in termini 

di concorso, sia pure indiretto, allo sforzo comune: 

… non si vuole intendere, come talvolta è accaduto in passato ed ancora oggi accade, che 

le operazioni dell’Armata Aerea abbiano luogo all’infuori del quadro generale, complessivo 

degli altri episodi della guerra terrestre e navale, ma soltanto che, giustamente inquadrate 

in tale complessa trama, possono svolgersi con razionale, ampia libertà d’azione, 

per concorrere, con la loro nuova e potente espressione, il più delle volte indirettamente, 

all’esito felice delle altre operazioni sulla terra e sul mare … . 1 

Inoltre, dal momento che, soprattutto per la caccia e il bombardamento le direttive 

di impiego erano ancora in via di definizione, le manovre furono concepite come 

un momento di sperimentazione sul campo delle soluzioni allo studio. Come tali 

avrebbero quindi avuto un’impostazione diversa da quella tradizionale, proponendo 

non un confronto continuato nel tempo, con la proclamazione finale del partito 

vincitore, ma la successione di singoli momenti di guerra aerea, a sé stanti, dai quali 

ricavare gli insegnamenti del caso. 

Le unità aeree del partito “azzurro”, affidato al generale di brigata aerea Francesco 

Vece mentre il partito “rosso” era guidato dal parigrado Vincenzo Lombard, aprirono 

le ostilità con un attacco notturno alla base aerea di Aviano portato da 10 Ca.73 del 7° 

Stormo, prendendo l’avversario di sorpresa nonostante vi fosse il presupposto di una 

situazione internazionale già ai limiti della rottura, e ottenendo il risultato di rendere 

il campo inservibile per almeno ventiquattro ore, sia pure al prezzo di perdite non indifferenti. 

Verificata così l’importanza di una decisa azione di controaviazione al fine 

di assicurarsi un significativo vantaggio iniziale, e ribadita di contro la necessità di 

adottare tutti quei provvedimenti necessari a contenere l’effetto di una tale mossa, non 

escluso l’abbandono delle basi aeree del tempo di pace, lo scenario disegnato a tavolino 

prevedeva l’impiego di reparti da caccia per mantenere la superiorità aerea lungo 

il fronte, tema che non poté essere sviluppato nella maniera voluta per il peggiorare 

delle condizioni atmosferiche. Si ebbe però la conferma che alle crociere di sbarramento 

era preferibile un impiego concentrato nel tempo e nello spazio, alla ricerca di 

una superiorità aerea temporanea e localizzata nel settore di maggiore interesse ai fini 

dell’andamento generale delle operazioni, evitando una inutile dispersione di forze. 

In proposito fu verificata l’opportunità di un impiego a massa e da posizione centrale 

dei reparti da caccia, arrivando alla conclusione, dettata anche dall’indisponibilità 

1 Ministero dell’Aeronautica, Ufficio di Stato Maggiore, 1° Reparto Operazioni, Relazione sulle esercitazioni 

aeree, Provveditorato Generale dello Stato, Roma, settembre 1927, Archivio Ufficio Storico 

Stato Maggiore Esercito (AUSSME), Rep. G-28, Fasc. 73, Campi e manovre.

un a s t o r i a i n C o m p i u ta. po t e r e a e r e o e d o t t r i n a d’impiego in ita l i a d a l 1923 a d o g g i 183 

di mezzi adeguati per le comunicazioni terra-bordo-terra, che era più conveniente 

ripartirli in due nuclei distinti, da impiegare l’uno a copertura dell’obiettivo dei bombardieri 

avversari, l’altro per intercettarli sulla via del ritorno. Fu anche condotto con 

successo un esperimento di ricongiungimento in volo tra reparti da bombardamento 

e i reparti da caccia incaricati di scortarli, un problema al quale si era cercato di dare 

soluzione già nel corso della Grande Guerra con risultati spesso insoddisfacenti, e 

venne verificata la fattibilità di missioni di ricognizione in profondità senza scorta, 

ivi incluso l’impiego di ricognitori per segnalare via radio la partenza e la rotta di 

formazioni di bombardieri, anche in questo caso recuperando una modalità operativa 

già in uso nel 1918. All’ostacolo proposto dalle condizioni atmosferiche avverse si 

aggiunsero le difficoltà causate dall’imperfetto funzionamento degli apparati radio, 

ma nel complesso la direzione delle manovre ritenne che l’esperimento fosse riuscito, 

traendone l’indicazione che per l’esplorazione lontana erano fondamentali la velocità 

e la capacità di far quota dei velivoli, insieme alla disponibilità di apparecchiature a 

onde corte affidabili, con una portata di un migliaio di chilometri. 

Armani volle anche mettere alla prova la mobilità dell’organizzazione di supporto, 

con il trasferimento senza preavviso dell’82ª Squadriglia Caccia, su C.R.1, 

da Ghedi a Padova, e il montaggio su questo campo di nove hangar già dislocati a 

Gardolo e Bolzano. I risultati furono soddisfacenti: le due autocolonne arrivarono 

a destinazione rispettivamente in 13 e in 17 ore, e il montaggio degli hangar venne 

completato in meno di 5. L’efficacia di uno dei più importanti “servizi di campagna”, 

e cioè quello delle auto-sezioni hangar, poteva quindi dirsi accertata e così pure 

Velivolo Ca.73.


quindi la capacità di variare all’occorrenza in tempi molto rapidi lo schieramento dei 

reparti, se necessario trasferendoli su campi non completamente attrezzati. 

Le grandi manovre si chiusero il 20 settembre con un esercitazione di tiro di 

caduta sul poligono del Vivaro, presso Aviano, in cui da quote comprese tra i 1.000 

e i 2.000 metri bombardieri bimotori Ca.73 e monomotori B.R.1 sganciarono in 

tutto 367 bombe di peso variabile dai 15 agli 800 kg su simulacri di bersagli che 

rappresentavano impianti ferroviari, un campo di aviazione, un ponte, un deposito e 

postazioni d’artiglieria. In tutto questo non c’era molto di innovativo e, se si esclude 

il colpo di apertura con il bombardamento simulato di Aviano, che sottolineava la 

validità di un attacco preventivo alle fonti del potere aereo avversario per acquisire 

una superiorità che i caccia avrebbero poi potuto mantenere senza sforzo, vi si ritrovano 

temi già sviluppati nell’ultima fase della Grande Guerra. Lo stesso può dirsi 

della dimostrazione di bombardamento a volo rasente effettuata il 19 settembre da 

32 B.R.1 del 13° Stormo, sempre sull’aeroporto di Aviano, durante la quale emersero 

difficoltà di fondo legate al profilo di volo piuttosto convenzionale seguito dagli 

attaccanti. Il problema non sfuggì alla direzione delle manovre che ne trasse spunto 

per sottolineare come il volo rasente richiedesse specifiche direttive di impiego ed 

anche, se non soprattutto, soluzioni appropriate per i dispositivi di puntamento e lo 

stesso armamento di caduta: 

Questa nuova forma d’impiego trova la sua ragione di essere, e basa il suo successo, sulla 

sorpresa e conseguentemente sulla difficoltà, da parte della difesa antiaerea, di segnalare 

e colpire gli apparecchi. Un velivolo, sia pure di grosse dimensioni, che voli rasente agli 

Caccia Fiat C.R.20.


ostacoli, sorvolerà così inaspettatamente e velocemente tutti gli appostamenti difensivi, 

da rendere molto difficoltosa l’esecuzione del tiro da parte delle mitragliatrici e specialmente 

dei cannoni antiaerei. Gli apparecchi del 13° stormo mantennero, invece, una quota 

assai pericolosa, agli effetti dell’avvistamento e del tiro avversario, allontanandosi così 

dai criteri, che sembrano i più sani, per l’impiego dell’aviazione a volo rasente. 

Si era avuta insomma un’azione di bombardamento a bassa quota, con tutte le 

conseguenze del caso dal momento che i velivoli erano rimasti esposti al fuoco delle 

mitragliatrici della difesa. Di qui i dubbi sull’opportunità di questa forma di impiego, 

con la conclusione di ricorrevi per il momento solo in situazioni eccezionali e senza 

alcuna sistematicità, continuando però a studiare il problema. 

Le grandi manovre del 1927 valsero soprattutto a verificare il livello di preparazione 

dei reparti e l’idoneità del materiale di volo a pochi anni dalla costituzione della 

Regia Aeronautica, prendendo a riferimento l’esperienza fondante della Grande 

Guerra. Possono quindi essere viste come il tentativo di determinare la situazione 

iniziale a partire dalla quale elaborare una dottrina di impiego, intendendo con questo 

il complesso di procedure e tattiche con cui tradurre in atto una teoria della guerra 

aerea che, almeno formalmente, era e rimaneva di stampo “dohuettiano”. Un ulteriore 

passo in avanti avrebbe dovuto essere fatto nel 1928, approfondendo l’analisi 

delle soluzioni sperimentate l’anno precedente, ma le condizioni di efficienza dei 

reparti, condizionate dal cattivo stato del materiale di volo, portarono prima a limitare 

la portata delle manovre, cancellando la fase a partiti contrapposti e lasciando la 

sola fase di mobilitazione e radunata, e poi ad annullarle del tutto sostituendole con 

una esercitazione dei quadri. 2 

Il tema da sviluppare, lo stesso previsto per le esercitazioni reali poi annullate, 

prevedeva che i due partiti si fronteggiassero lungo una linea che attraversava 

l’Italia seguendo l’Appennino Tosco-Emiliano. Il partito rosso, che rappresentava 

lo “stato del sud” ed era guidato dal generale di brigata aerea Francesco De Pinedo, 

per compensare la forte inferiorità numerica avrebbe attaccato i campi d’aviazione 

della pianura emiliana e lombarda nella prima notte di guerra, allo scopo di impedire 

le operazioni di radunata, e a questa azione di controaviazione preventiva avrebbe 

affiancato un’operazione di interdizione non convenzionale, infiltrando con idrovolanti 

dei nuclei di sabotatori con il compito di far saltare i ponti sul Po. Nei giorni 

successivi De Pinedo, data la manifesta superiorità della caccia avversaria, prevedeva 

di impiegare le sue forze da bombardamento notturno contro obiettivi selezionati, 

innanzitutto i terminali ferroviari ma anche i principali centri industriali, e di utilizzare 

i suoi reparti da caccia solo per contrastare i bombardieri diurni dell’avversario. 

Il partito azzurro invece, secondo l’impostazione che alla sua azione avrebbe voluto 

dare il generale di brigata aerea Pietro Oppizzi, puntò a sfruttare la sua superiorità 

2 Gianluca Gangi, Alla ricerca di una dottrina. Le manovre della Regia Aeronautica dal 1927 al 1933, 

Società Italiana di Storia Militare, Quaderno 1998.


di mezzi per attaccare con continuità e in massa, di giorno e di notte, i centri demografici 

e militari, nel secondo caso con specifico riferimento ai punti nodali della 

rete stradale e ferroviaria della Toscana, mentre alla caccia era affidato il compito di 

ricercare e distruggere le forze aeree avversarie. 

L’analisi di queste intenzioni evidenzia da un lato l’importanza ancora una volta 

attribuita a un’offensiva di controaviazione preventiva, dall’altro la fiducia nelle 

possibilità di un impiego “contro valore” dei bombardieri, partendo dall’assunto di 

un dominio dell’aria già acquisito e da mantenere con l’impiego della caccia. Tanto 

l’una quanto l’altra impostazione erano dettate dalle caratteristiche dello strumento 

a disposizione, in termini sia quantitativi sia qualitativi, il che è una ulteriore dimostrazione 

del legame esistente, sempre e ovunque, tra tecnologia e dottrina. 

Lo stato di approntamento dei reparti di volo della Regia Aeronautica e le condizioni 

dei materiali in dotazione condizionarono anche lo sviluppo delle attività addestrative 

programmate per il 1929, che proposero comunque degli scenari diversi da 

quelli fino ad allora considerati. L’esercitazione con i quadri organizzata tra marzo e 

aprile ipotizzava una guerra con la Francia, con l’apertura delle ostilità preceduta da 

un breve periodo di crescente tensione. In un tale quadro erano previste massicce e 

ripetute incursioni diurne e notturne sulle basi dell’aviazione avversaria e a seguire 

il bombardamento dei nodi stradali e ferroviari della regione compresa tra Lione, la 

valle del Rodano e la frontiera, secondo la linea di tendenza che si era manifestata 

l’anno precedente, mentre rimaneva esclusa qualunque forma di collaborazione con 

le forze di superficie, portando agli estremi limiti il concetto di autonomia dell’azione 

dell’aeronautica e dandogli la connotazione di un dogma indiscusso e indiscutibile. 

Nella realtà i vertici della forza armata erano consapevoli che i reparti da bombardamento, 

malamente equipaggiati e sotto organico, avrebbero trovato serie difficoltà a 

colpire obiettivi quali Lione, Tolone e Marsiglia, dando a questa azione la necessaria 

continuità, mentre l’area di Parigi, di vitale importanza in termini non solo politici 

ma anche industriali, rimaneva comunque al di fuori della loro portata. 

In antitesi con uno dei presupposti di queste esercitazioni con i quadri, le manovre 

che si svolsero sulla costa toscana tra il 29 agosto e il 2 settembre del 1929 

ebbero come tema la cooperazione con le altre forze armate, quasi a simboleggiare il 

contrasto tra due visioni opposte e la difficoltà a realizzarne una sintesi appropriata. 

L’ipotesi da sviluppare era il contrasto a un’operazione di sbarco che una forza navale 

preventivamente concentrata a Portoferraio, nell’isola d’Elba, avrebbe effettuato 

sulla costa toscana, nella zona di Massoncello. La Regia Aeronautica era chiamata 

a intervenire schierando tra La Spezia e Orbetello una brigata aerea di formazione, 

composta da reparti da caccia, da bombardamento notturno e da bombardamento 

marittimo. 3 Nonostante i limiti inerenti alla struttura di questa grande unità, che non 

aveva reparti da bombardamento diurno equipaggiati con macchine più agili e più 

veloci degli idrovolanti del bombardamento marittimo, e una certa schematizzazione 

3 Gianluca Gangi, op. cit.


degli eventi, che incise sulla possibilità di sfruttare al meglio la flessibilità dello strumento 

aereo comprimendo la libertà d’azione, l’esercitazione dimostrò quanto un 

intervento a massa e di sorpresa dell’arma aerea potesse essere determinante ai fini 

del successo della difesa, e di converso evidenziò come nessun tentativo di sbarco 

potesse riuscire senza un adeguato appoggio aereo. 

I principi della massa e della sorpresa, e in parte anche quello della continuità 

dell’azione, per ciò che potevano consentire i mezzi disponibili, trovarono applicazione 

in tre momenti successivi: nell’attacco alla base di Portoferraio, mirato a 

disorganizzare il convoglio prima che uscisse in mare e avente quindi per obiettivo 

principale le navi, nel bombardamento notturno del convoglio stesso una volta in 

navigazione, e infine nell’intervento concentrato in poco più di sette minuti di oltre 

un centinaio tra bombardieri e caccia che si susseguirono sulla testa di ponte alternando 

secondo una sequenza prestabilita il bombardamento allo spezzonamento, e 

questi al mitragliamento e al rilascio di gas tossici. Se in merito all’efficacia degli 

attacchi portati alle unità in navigazione vi furono non poche perplessità, in parte 

mitigate dal fatto di aver accertato che anche di notte una formazione navale non era 

comunque immune all’offesa dall’alto, senz’altro positivo fu il giudizio sugli altri 

due momenti dell’esercitazione. Nel bombardamento delle navi in porto si ritenne 

infatti che, facendo convergere sull’obiettivo le squadriglie da direzioni diverse per 

disperdere la reazione contraerea, si fosse ottenuta una notevole concentrazione di 

capacità d’offesa nel tempo e nello spazio, a tutto vantaggio dell’efficacia dell’attacco, 

e ugualmente efficace fu valutato l’intervento sulle truppe ammassate e allo scoperto 

sulla spiaggia, con un’annotazione particolare per l’impiego degli aggressivi 

Ansaldo AC.3.


Bombardieri SM.79. 

chimici, da solo sufficiente ad arginare la penetrazione all’interno. Nella circostanza, 

anche se agli equipaggi fu ordinato di portarsi all’attacco alla minima quota possibile 

e sfruttando la copertura del terreno per massimizzare il fattore sorpresa, venne però 

persa l’occasione per sperimentare sul campo la tecnica dell’attacco a volo rasente, 

chiamando a prendere parte alle manovre il VII Gruppo Autonomo da Caccia del 

maggiore Amedeo Mecozzi che di questa modalità d’azione era l’indiscusso alfiere. 

Di contro l’utilizzo di nuovi modelli di macchine, come il caccia Fiat C.R.20 

e il bombardiere Caproni Ca.74, per quanto ancora bisognose di messa a punto, 

significava che qualcosa cominciava a muoversi anche per il materiale di volo, pur 

restando la situazione tutt’altro che ottimale. Erano infatti ancora in linea velivoli 

concepiti dieci anni prima, come il B.R.2 e il B.R.3 da bombardamento diurno, mentre 

il bombardiere notturno Ca.74, come del resto il precedente Ca.73, lasciava molto 

a desiderare in termini di prestazioni e qualità di volo. 

Nel 1930 non vi fu spazio per grandi manovre aeree ma la Regia Aeronautica 

ebbe comunque il suo momento con la prima Giornata dell’Ala, celebrata l’8 giugno 

sull’aeroporto romano del Littorio, oggi dell’Urbe. Questa manifestazione, voluta da 

Balbo come affermazione del ruolo e delle capacità della Forza Armata, fu concepita 

non come una successione di momenti di acrobazia, sul modello degli eventi similari 

organizzati dalla RAF, ma come una dimostrazione di capacità operativa, alternando 

l’esibizione acrobatica, interpretata soprattutto in forma collettiva, con momenti di 

spettacolare realismo, dalla finta caccia, all’attacco al suolo, al lancio di paracadutisti. 

Tutto questo era anche strumentale alla battaglia che lo stesso Balbo stava 

conducendo per superare l’ordinamento Bonzani e ridimensionare ruolo e consisten-


za delle aviazioni ausiliarie, a disposizione dell’esercito e della marina, portandole 

nel contempo sotto il controllo dell’aeronautica in aderenza alla visione dell’ultimo 

Douhet. Il nuovo ordinamento venne infine approvato il 6 gennaio 1931, ma la giustificata 

ricerca di una piena parità con le altre forze armate ebbe l’effetto deteriore 

di suggerire un atteggiamento di diffidenza nei confronti di qualsiasi ipotesi di collaborazione 

interforze, a detrimento di una visione unitaria dello strumento militare 

nazionale e in ultima analisi in contrasto con le idee dello stesso Douhet. 

Le tesi “douhettiane”, che rimanevano alla base dell’idea dell’unità organica delle 

forze aeree, furono oggetto delle grandi manovre del 1931, le prime e anche le 

sole nelle quali si cercò di dimostrarne la validità attraverso l’impiego a massa dei 

mezzi disponibili in uno scenario che dava concretezza alla minaccia aerochimica. 

Tra il 26 agosto e il 3 settembre vi furono impiegate 69 squadriglie inquadrate in due 

divisioni aeree per un totale di 894 velivoli, 4 intensificando nei mesi di preparazione 

le attività di costruzione e riparazione per completare in tempo utile le dotazioni dei 

reparti. Il quadro di riferimento vedeva l’Italia, già in guerra da pochi giorni con la 

Jugoslavia, attaccata a occidente dalla Francia. 5 Di qui il compito per l’armata aerea 

di proteggere i centri industriali e demografici dall’aviazione avversaria, allo scopo 

di dare tempo alle forze di superficie di riorganizzarsi in funzione della nuova situazione, 

e di conseguenza la suddivisione dei reparti impegnati nelle esercitazioni in 

due partiti, l’uno proiettato alla conquista del dominio dell’aria e al suo sfruttamento 

in una prospettiva contro valore più che contro forze, l’altro impegnato a contenere 

e neutralizzare una tale offensiva. 6 

Il confine ideale era costituito dall’Appennino Tosco-Emiliano, tra il Passo della 

Cisa e le fonti del Metauro, a sud del quale si estendeva il territorio dell’ipotetico aggressore, 

identificato con il partito B, con capitale Roma, mentre il territorio nazionale 

da proteggere, affidato al partito A, era rappresentato dalla pianura padana con 

capitale Milano. L’importanza delle manovre era sottolineata dal fatto che lo stesso 

4 Nel dettaglio si trattava di 288 velivoli da caccia terrestre (C.R.A., C.R.20, C.R.20 bis), 48 idrovolanti 

da caccia marittima (C.R.20I e M41 bis), 48 velivoli da assalto (AC.3), 120 velivoli da 

bombardamento notturno (Ca.73, Ca.74, Ca.74G), 120 velivoli da bombardamento diurno (B.R.2 e 

B.R.3), 76 idrovolanti da bombardamento marittimo (S.55), 13 velivoli da bombardamento di tipo 

sperimentale (Ca.102), 20 velivoli da ricognizione strategica (A.120), 153 velivoli da collegamento 

di vario modello. Per l’occasione furono inoltre costituiti 5 comandi di brigata e 7 comandi di stormo 

dando vita a un ordinamento che vedeva in tutto 2 comandi di divisione, 5 comandi di brigata, 12 comandi 

di stormo, 28 comandi di gruppo, 69 squadriglie (27 da caccia terrestre, 4 da caccia marittima, 

12 da bombardamento diurno, 10 da bombardamento notturno, 12 da bombardamento marittimo, 2 

da ricognizione strategica, 2 sperimentali). 

5 Il conflitto con Francia e Jugoslavia alleate era stato individuato nel 1925 dal generale di corpo 

d’armata Pietro Badoglio, appena nominato capo di stato maggiore generale, come il caso peggiore 

che l’Italia avrebbe potuto trovarsi a fronteggiare. Questa ipotesi operativa sarebbe rimasta di piena 

attualità almeno fino alla metà degli anni Trenta. 

6 Grandi Manovre 1931. Relazione conclusiva, documento dattiloscritto senza protocollo e senza data, 

Archivio Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Aeronautica (AUSSMA), Grandi manovre del 1931.


Balbo aveva voluto tenerne l’alta direzione, affidando la direzione delle operazioni al 

generale di divisione aerea Giuseppe Valle, con il generale di divisione aerea Oppizzi 

e il generale di brigata aerea Lombard a capo rispettivamente del partito A e del partito 

B. Altrettanto significativa era la mancanza di qualsiasi coinvolgimento delle 

altre due Forze Armate, a rimarcare la caratterizzazione puramente aeronautica delle 

grandi manovre, finalizzate a verificare la capacità dell’arma aerea di decidere l’esito 

del conflitto con una energica e decisa azione sviluppata nella prima settimana di 

operazioni. In questa prospettiva il partito A, posto dal tema stesso dell’esercitazione 

in una condizione di oggettiva inferiorità, dovendo rovesciare il fronte e rischierare 

le sue forze, impiegò i reparti da caccia in compiti di difesa aerea e i bombardieri in 

azioni di controaviazione, lasciando spazio soltanto al bombardamento di Firenze 

eseguito nella notte sul 28 agosto e il giorno successivo anche con l’impiego di gas. 

Il partito B attaccò invece con decisione i gangli vitali dell’avversario e in particolare 

la sua capitale, cercando per questa via una rapida soluzione del conflitto in assoluta 

coerenza con le teorie di Douhet. Milano fu quindi bombardata a più riprese, 

nella notte sul 30 agosto e poi ancora l’indomani con la luce del giorno, nel quadro 

di un’operazione articolata in più fasi che avrebbe costretto alla resa la Nazione A 

nell’impossibilità di completare la mobilitazione, a causa della disorganizzazione 

dei servizi, e con la popolazione della capitale demoralizzata e terrorizzata. 

Nell’esaltare la potenza distruttiva degli attacchi contro-città, portati a quote relativamente 

basse e affiancando all’uso di ordigni esplosivi e incendiari l’erogazione 

di aggressivi chimici, l’atto conclusivo delle grandi manovre del 1931 aveva un chiaro 

fine propagandistico che non deve però far dimenticare lo scopo ultimo di stabilire 

la reale efficacia di un’azione mirata a distruggere la volontà di combattere dell’avversario. 

L’azione contro-città avrebbe dovuto essere preceduta da una campagna 

di controaviazione, coerentemente con l’affermazione secondo cui «la guerra aerea 

consiste e si esaurisce nella conquista del dominio dell’aria», 7 ma nell’impostazione 

dell’esercitazione questa premessa venne data per scontata, assumendo che le forze 

attaccanti già avessero la libertà d’azione necessaria. Ci si concentrò quindi sulla 

seconda fase della campagna, quella dell’attacco ai centri demografici e industriali, 

certo di maggiore impatto sull’opinione pubblica, tratteggiandone una possibile successione 

per fasi che, nel riprendere quel calcolo degli effetti così tipico di Douhet, 

era anche un tentativo di tradurre la teoria in dottrina di impiego: 

1) – Azione notturna di logoramento mediante il metodico succedersi di squadriglie da 

bombardamento intervallate di 5 o 10 minuti contro i punti più vitali del bersaglio. […] 

Tale azione preliminare, da condursi con equipaggi ben addestrati, rendendo le varie 

7 Giulio Douhet, Il Dominio dell’Aria, Libro Secondo, edizione 1932 riproposta dall’Ufficio Storico 

Stato Maggiore Aeronautica in Il Dominio dell’Aria e altri scritti, a cura di Luciano Bozzo, Roma, 

2002, p. 150: «La guerra aerea consiste e si esaurisce nella conquista del dominio dell’aria; conquistato 

il dominio dell’aria, le forze aeree devono prefiggersi l’esecuzione di offese contro la superficie 

intese a spezzare la resistenza morale e materiale dell’avversario».


squadriglie indipendenti, lascia ai Comandanti l’iniziativa dell’attacco e completa libertà 

di manovra, e permete di colpire l’obiettivo con una densità di fuoco di 100 tonnellate 

per ora. In tal modo si da una prima scossa all’intelaiatura difensiva del nemico e, con 

martellamento sistematico e inesorabile, si deprime la popolazione, si interrompe il funzionamento 

delle comunicazioni, si esaurisce la difesa contraerea che al mattino ha gli 

uomini stanchi e le disponibilità di munizioni fortemente intaccate. 

2) – Azione di assalto a volo rasente compiuta alle prime luci dell’alba su apparecchi blindati 

e veloci, muniti di mitragliatrici, bombe da 1 kg esplosive e incendiarie, e gas tossici. 

Tale azione troverà le popolazioni in fuga verso la campagna, i comandi disorganizzati, 

le artiglierie contraeree inefficaci per la bassa quota. […] la perdita di apparecchi sarebbe 

ben compensata dalla precisione del tiro, e dall’effetto morale e materiale raggiungibile. 

Circa le ostruzioni aeree, le esperienze della passata guerra ne hanno dimostrato la scarsissima 

efficacia e personalmente sono assai scettico al riguardo, malgrado che presso 

altri stati occupino un posto d’onore. 

3) – Appena cessato l’attacco al suolo deve scatenarsi l’offensiva a massa con il massimo 

numero di apparecchi disponibile, iniziando l’assalto con una prima ondata di centinaia 

di apparecchi veloci da bombardamento diurno carichi alternativamente di bombe e 

gas tossici che avvelenano e mascherano la seconda ondata composta di apparecchi da 

bombardamento notturno, più lenti ma più potenti, resi meno vulnerabili dall’esaurimento 

dell’artiglieria contraerea. Ad ogni ondata corrisponde un lancio di almeno 200 tonnellate 

di materiale offensivo. 

4) – Le azioni diurne sono protette da stormi da caccia divisi in squadriglie che agiscono 

compatte contro qualsiasi attaccante aereo, di qualsiasi entità esso sia composto. Ciò 

a prescindere dal fatto che gli apparecchi da bombardamento moderni, specie se agenti in 

formazioni compatte sono già in grado di difendersi da sé. 8 

Le grandi manovre del 1931 furono interpretate come la conferma delle teorie di 

Douhet e del ruolo potenzialmente decisivo della Regia Aeronautica in un contesto 

di assoluta autonomia delle operazioni aeree rispetto alle azioni dell’esercito e della 

marina ma sorprendentemente il tema dell’azione contro-città non venne più riproposto. 

Pesò forse la consapevolezza dell’eccezionalità dello scenario che era stato 

disegnato, dando per scontato il dominio dell’aria, e probabilmente incise anche una 

realistica valutazione dei mezzi a disposizione. Fatto sta che nel 1932 si ebbe solo 

la partecipazione di una aliquota delle forze aeree alle manovre navali di settembre, 

e anche le esercitazioni con i quadri condotte nella primavera del 1933 in relazione 

a un’ipotesi di conflitto che vedeva Italia e Germania schierate contro Francia 

e Jugoslavia ebbero un’impostazione più convenzionale, pur sempre nel rispetto 

dell’autonomia dell’aeronautica. 

Al di là delle considerazioni che il gioco delle alleanze può suggerire sull’evoluzione 

della situazione europea, con la Germania per la prima volta in veste di 

alleato, sia pure con capacità ancora limitate, e un atteggiamento quanto meno be- 

8 Grandi manovre 1931. Relazione conclusiva, AUSSMA, Esercitazioni, Fasc. 5.


Bombardieri Cant. Z.1007. 

nevolo dell’Ungheria, lo scenario proposto dalla direzione delle manovre, assunta 

dallo stesso capo di stato maggiore, generale di squadra aerea Giuseppe Valle, nel 

fotografare la situazione degli strumenti aerei degli ipotetici belligeranti consegnava 

la superiorità numerica, in particolare per quanto riguardava la componente da bombardamento 

diurno, alla Francia e alla Jugoslavia, con l’aviazione di quest’ultima 

già pienamente efficiente e pronta all’azione avendo mobilitato per prima. In questo 

contesto le forze aeree italiane, mentre dovevano proteggere il territorio nazionale 

dalle offese che potevano provenire da molteplici direttrici, non erano in condizioni 

di passare a loro volta all’offensiva se non contro uno soltanto dei due avversari, e 

comunque nei limiti del raggio d’azione dei reparti da bombardamento, in ogni caso 

insufficiente per colpirne i gangli vitali. 

Il generale di brigata aerea Aurelio Liotta, con una decisione non certo in linea 

con il pensiero di Valle, che avrebbe voluto una conferma dell’approccio “douhettiano” 

e dell’impatto decisivo dei colpi sferrati al morale dell’avversario, scelse di 

attaccare innanzitutto le più importanti infrastrutture aeronautiche, e a seguire i centri 

nodali delle comunicazioni stradali e ferroviarie e i centri logistici, ivi inclusi gli 

stabilimenti dell’industria bellica, per impedire l’alimentazione dell’esercito jugoslavo 

e frenarne la progressione. Data così la priorità alla controaviazione e all’interdizione 

strategica, non veniva tuttavia esclusa la possibilità di colpire anche i centri 

demografici e la stessa capitale dell’avversario, qualora per questa via fosse stato 

davvero possibile avere effetti risolutivi. Il moltiplicarsi delle possibilità d’azione 

si tradusse peraltro in una parcellizzazione delle forze disponibili, disperse tra più


Caccia Fiat C.R.42. 

obiettivi senza alcuna relazione tra gli effetti desiderati e il carico bellico dei velivoli 

impiegati, in aperta violazione del principio della massa e con una incertezza di 

fondo sulla portata che queste operazioni avrebbero dovuto avere. Considerazioni 

analoghe possono farsi sul ruolo dell’aviazione d’assalto, vista da un lato come lo 

strumento ideale per colpire obiettivi puntiformi, quali ponti e centrali elettriche, 

dall’altro come una soluzione da utilizzare soltanto in casi particolari per i rischi associati 

all’attacco a volo rasente e le caratteristiche delle macchine, frutto di un compromesso 

tra le prestazioni richieste a un caccia e quelle proprie di un bombardiere. 

Il suo impiego non rappresentava quindi una reale alternativa al bombardamento, 

anche questo peraltro utilizzato in modo poco razionale per la tendenza a colpire 

simultaneamente più obiettivi invece di martellarne uno solo fino a neutralizzarlo 

completamente. L’intervento sul campo di battaglia, in appoggio alle forze terrestri, 

era infine limitato a specifiche situazioni, per concorrere allo sfruttamento del 

successo o, in caso contrario, per contenere la progressione delle forze avversarie, 

senza tuttavia disporre di un “sistema” di mezzi e procedure idoneo ad assicurare una 

effettiva integrazione aria-suolo. 

La visione “douhettiana”, ad onta delle dichiarazioni ufficiali e delle affermazioni 

finalizzate a ribadire l’autonomia e l’indipendenza della Regia Aeronautica, 

rimase sullo sfondo anche durante le grandi manovre del 1934, le più importanti del 

dopoguerra in quanto organizzate per dare una dimostrazione del grado di efficienza 

raggiunto dell’esercito dell’Italia fascista in poco più di un decennio. Concepite in 

una dimensione aeroterrestre, si svolsero nella seconda metà di agosto al confine tra


Toscana ed Emilia all’interno di un quadrilatero i cui vertici erano Bologna, Forlì, 

Serravalle, presso Pistoia, e il Monte Scalari, nell’alta valle dell’Arno. Il tema proposto 

era il conflitto tra due stati divisi dal crinale appenninico che avevano già una 

parte delle loro forze a contatto lungo la frontiera. Nella prima delle due fasi previste 

si sarebbero sviluppate le operazioni di radunata, con gli elementi avanzati dei due 

schieramenti impegnati a migliorare le loro posizioni per favorire l’intervento delle 

forze retrostanti, successivamente la parte che sarebbe stata in condizioni di prendere 

l’iniziativa avrebbe cercato di sfondare le linee dell’avversario e dilagare nelle sue 

retrovie. Nel frattempo, con l’obiettivo di mettere alla prova anche l’organizzazione 

della difesa civile, da ambo le parti le popolazioni sarebbero state esposte alle offese 

dal cielo e costrette quindi ad assoggettarsi alle misure precauzionali del caso. 

L’alta direzione delle manovre fu affidata al generale designato d’armata 

Francesco Saverio Grazioli, il comando delle forze del partito azzurro, schierate 

a sud dell’Appennino e costituite da tre corpi d’armata e dalla Divisione Celere 

“Emanuele Filiberto Testa di Ferro”, 9 al generale di corpo d’armata Ottavio Zoppi, 

quello delle forze del partito rosso, operanti dal versante nord e comprendenti due 

corpi d’armata, al generale designato d’armata Pietro Ago. 10 Le operazioni iniziarono 

all’alba del 19 agosto, con le opposte aviazioni impegnate a ostacolare la radunata 

dei due eserciti mentre il partito rosso assaliva i passi del Giogo e della Futa e le posizioni 

degli azzurri fra Senio e Santerno, venendo qui contrattaccato con successo. 

Per fronteggiare la minaccia che si delineava alla Futa il partito azzurro decise di far 

entrare in azione la divisione celere. La grande unità, dopo aver urtato le avanguardie 

avversarie ricacciandole verso nord, vide però il suo slancio controffensivo frenato 

dall’intervento dell’aviazione d’assalto, lanciata in massa e di sorpresa ad attaccare 

a volo rasente le strade che salivano serpeggiando dalla conca del Mugello. Chiusa 

così la prima giornata delle manovre, l’indomani il partito rosso, sostenuto sempre 

dall’aviazione d’assalto, tentò di consolidare i successi iniziali e di attestarsi in po- 

9 Nel 1930, nel tentativo di disporre di grandi unità manovriere e potenti al tempo stesso, erano state 

create due divisioni celeri, con due reggimenti di cavalleria, ciascuno su due gruppi squadroni a 

cavallo e uno squadrone mitraglieri, un reggimento bersaglieri su tre battaglioni, una compagnia 

motociclisti, una compagnia cannoni da 47/32, un gruppo carri L, un reggimento d’artiglieria su tre 

gruppi da 75/27, due motorizzati ed uno a cavallo, due batterie contraerei da 20 mm. Nell’organico 

della Divisione Celere «Emanuele Filiberto Testa di Ferro» figuravano i reggimenti “Lancieri di Firenze” 

e “Lancieri Vittorio Emanuele II”, il 6° Reggimento Bersaglieri, il LVII Battaglione “Camicie 

Nere”, un gruppo carri veloci, uno di artiglieria a cavallo, uno di artiglieria da campagna e uno di 

artiglieria pesante campale. Nella realtà le divisioni celeri si dimostrarono una soluzione poco efficace, 

dal momento che, a fronte di una buona mobilità tattica, erano molto vulnerabili e avevano una 

insufficiente potenza d’urto. Per dare concretezza al concetto di guerra di movimento, sostenuto dal 

generale di corpo d’armata Federico Baistrocchi, sottosegretario alla Guerra dal luglio 1933 e capo 

di stato maggiore dell’esercito nel 1934, e tra gli altri dallo stesso Grazioli, sarebbe stato necessario 

affrontare con ben altre risorse il processo di motorizzazione e meccanizzazione delle grandi unità. 

10 Francesco Saverio Grazioli, Le grandi manovre dell’esercito nell’Anno XII, Unione Nazionale Ufficiali 

in Congedo d’Italia, Roma, 1934, AUSSME, Rep. L-13, Fondo Grazioli.


sizione dominante sulla displuviale. Nel contempo il partito azzurro si rafforzava a 

sua volta su tutta la fronte, non solo in corrispondenza della Futa ma anche sul Giogo 

e nella valle del Santerno, lanciando poi di nuovo all’attacco la divisione celere che 

questa volta riuscì a far arretrare l’avversario e a superare il crinale tra il Setta e il 

Santerno, creando le premesse per il terzo atto delle manovre. Nella giornata del 22 

agosto la pressione degli azzurri venne contenuta da una difesa manovrata, intesa a 

logorare l’attaccante mentre si avvicinava alle posizioni sulle quali il difensore intendeva 

resistere a oltranza, ma il giorno dopo il partito rosso fu costretto a ripiegare 

dalla pressione dell’avversario, e questo nonostante la sua aviazione attaccasse gli 

impianti ferroviari di Firenze nel tentativo di ostacolare i rifornimenti alle truppe al 

fronte. L’episodio conclusivo si svolse nella mattinata del 24 agosto, quando il partito 

azzurro, impegnando una massa di manovra di sette battaglioni, riuscì ad avvolgere 

la destra dello schieramento rosso minacciando la strada della Futa. Altrettanto 

rapida e improvvisa fu però la reazione dei rossi, che con l’impiego tempestivo delle 

riserve riuscirono ad arginare lo sfondamento e a ripristinare una situazione di equilibrio 

prima che la direzione decidesse di porre fine alle operazioni. 

Lo scopo di collaudare la nuova dottrina tattica ispirata al movimento e alla manovra 

poteva dirsi raggiunto, dal momento che entrambe le parti avevano basato la 

loro azione su questi principi, mirando a riprendere l’iniziativa non appena possibile 

e conducendo nel frattempo una difesa non passiva e inerte ma dinamica e manovrata. 

In una battaglia combattuta a colpi di divisione, mentre le divisioni ordinarie 

erano le pedine destinate soprattutto all’attacco di forza, le divisioni celeri erano 

«strumento essenzialmente di rapido movimento e di speditiva manovra», nato dalla 

consapevolezza dell’importanza del fattore tempo nella guerra moderna in cui l’avversario 

non deve avere il tempo e il modo di rafforzarsi sul terreno, come ebbe a 

dire Grazioli durante il gran rapporto finale. 11 Se in questa prospettiva la motorizzazione 

e la meccanizzazione delle grandi unità erano fondamentali, lo stesso poteva 

però dirsi dell’aviazione, intervenuta nella lotta totalizzando circa 2.000 ore di volo 

e sviluppando un’intensa attività di ricognizione, bombardamento e attacco al suolo, 

nel segno di una concomitanza degli sforzi con le truppe dei due partiti. È comunque 

interessante notare come, nell’analisi dell’andamento delle operazioni proposto dal 

generale di divisione aerea Francesco Pricolo, a cui era stata affidata la direzione 

della componente aeronautica, risalti lo sforzo di ribadire la priorità dell’impiego indipendente 

delle forze aeree contro obiettivi in profondità, determinanti ai fini della 

tenuta materiale e morale dell’avversario, mentre l’intervento nell’area della battaglia 

rimaneva una eventualità destinata a concretizzarsi solo in circostanze particolari. 

Pricolo si preoccupò infatti di sottolineare come la vera essenza dell’arma aerea, 

e la sua stessa ragion d’essere, fossero state messe in luce dalle grandi manovre 

dell’estate del 1931: 

11 Commento alle grandi manovre pronunziato da S.E. il Generale Grazioli al gran rapporto finale, 

Estate 1934, Appennino Tosco-Emiliano, AUSSME, Rep. L-13, Fondo Grazioli.


F-84G e F-104G. 

Si dimostrarono allora, con l’impiego di tutta la massa dei velivoli da bombardamento 

e da caccia, divisa in due opposti partiti, le reali possibilità dell’aviazione indipendente, 

possibilità che erano ancora da molti non previste o credute. Con la lampante evidenza 

dei fatti venne affermato e confermato il concreto valore della nuova, ardita, italianissima 

dottrina d’impiego delle forze aeree, che possono e debbono essere adoperate, nel quadro 

generale della guerra, in poderose azioni contro gli importanti obiettivi che fino a ieri si 

ritenevano immuni da ogni offesa, e che, pur tuttavia, per il loro valore logistico, strategico, 

demografico, per la loro capacità produttiva, per la loro sensibilità nervosa, per così 

dire, potrebbero provocare effetti determinati di disgregazione materiale, e soprattutto 

morale, nella intera compagine nazionale, quando venissero colpiti con la fulminea violenza 

dei moderni e agguerriti reparti bombardieri. […] si è venuto così a costituire un 

saldo organismo bellico che sarebbe erroneo e pericoloso impiegare in azioni di modesto 

raggio o contro obiettivi sulla fronte mentre bersagli di ben più grande importanza e vulnerabilità 

possono essere colpiti a centinaia di chilometri nell’interno della nazione nemica, 

con vantaggi immediati, enormemente più grandi ai fini della soluzione del conflitto. 

L’addestramento dei nostri reparti dell’Armata aerea è stato quindi indirizzato verso il 

raggiungimento di questi scopi, evitandone l’impiego in azioni frammentarie e molteplici, 

che tornano a tutto detrimento della capacità offensiva della massa. 12 

12 Francesco Pricolo, L’Armata Aerea e le grandi manovre, in “Le vie dell’aria”, n. 34-35 del 2 settem- 

bre 1934.


Satellite SICRAL 

Fatta questa premessa, e a ribadire come nulla fosse cambiato rispetto a tali affermazioni 

di principio sul ruolo delle forze aeree, ruolo che peraltro presupponeva 

una disponibilità di mezzi inesistente sia dal punto di vista qualitativo sia dal punto 

di vista quantitativo, la partecipazione della Regia Aeronautica alle grandi manovre 

dell’esercito veniva ad essere un esperimento da cui trarre motivi di riflessione per il 

futuro. In questo scenario, mentre le azioni a grande raggio erano state limitate a un 

contesto di controaviazione e di interdizione, si era avuto l’impiego di una aliquota 

consistente delle forze aeree a diretto vantaggio dello sviluppo delle operazioni terrestri, 

per stroncare l’ultima resistenza dell’avversario o per contenere la portata di 

un insuccesso, avendone la conferma della flessibilità propria dello strumento aereo 

e della sua adattabilità alle più diverse circostanze: 

Con tale decisione, nulla vien tolto quindi, alle prerogative della Armata Aerea; e questo 

impiego eccezionale di una aliquota delle sue forze è logicamente prevedibile, in simili 

particolari circostanze. Si può dire anzi di più: che cioè all’occorrenza, al momento di 

conseguire il successo definitivo o di salvare una situazione disperata, troveremmo logico 

che anche tutta l’Armata Aerea fosse scagliata sulla fronte e sulle immediate retrovie, 

così come potrebbe essere lanciata contro una base navale o contro la flotta avversaria. È 

questa anzi una delle caratteristiche più singolari e più importanti dell’Armata Aerea che, 

libera da ogni vincolo di spazio, può a volta a volta portare la sua potenza offensiva sul 

bersaglio giudicato più redditizio ai fini generali del conseguimento del successo.


L’analisi del contributo delle diverse specialità sottolineava l’apporto della ricognizione 

che, grazie a una efficiente rete di comunicazioni radio aveva permesso ai 

comandi di seguire con continuità l’andamento delle operazioni, costringendo nel 

contempo l’esercito avversario a effettuare nottetempo i movimenti più importanti, 

evidenziava il ruolo della caccia nel garantire alle altre specialità la necessaria libertà 

d’azione, mantenendo localmente un adeguato livello di superiorità aerea, anche se i 

collegamenti tra le diverse formazioni avevano lasciato a desiderare, e si soffermava 

sugli interventi dello stormo d’assalto in termini che, pur esaltando l’abilità dei piloti 

e l’efficacia delle loro azioni, lasciano intendere il persistere di non poche perplessità 

in merito a questa tipologia di impiego del mezzo aereo nell’area della battaglia: 

Le azioni fulminee di mitragliamento ed ipritamento contro le truppe e i carriaggi, specialmente 

se ammassati o incolonnati nelle immediate retrovie si sono dimostrati efficaci. 

È necessario, però, realizzare al massimo grado la sorpresa, ciò che è apparso assai difficile 

sul terreno montano, ove gli apparecchi, benché condotti a volo rasente, possono essere 

avvistati a distanza, a causa dei naturali dislivelli esistenti e della impossibilità di seguire 

completamente col volo l’andamento del terreno. […] In sostanza, questa particolare forma 

di impiego merita di essere seriamente studiata e sperimentata, con la mente scevra da 

qualsiasi preconcetto, al fine di stabilire se e fino a qual punto possa essere utile, tenuto 

conto delle prevedibili perdite in relazione alla importanza dei risultati conseguibili. 

Il giudizio rimaneva dunque sospeso e il tema dell’aviazione d’assalto restava 

incompiuto, ad onta delle espressioni entusiastiche usate nello stesso periodico per 

descriverne l’azione: 

Ma il più realistico e, insieme, il più terrificante quadro di ciò che sarebbe l’aviazione 

in caso di guerra e dei catastrofici effetti che potrebbero derivarne ad un esercito in movimento, 

ce lo ha offerto lo stormo d’assalto. […] La Divisione celere procedeva bene 

intervallata, mandando innanzi le sue motomitragliatrici e i suoi carri veloci, e poi i bersaglieri 

ciclisti, la cavalleria e i suoi pezzi motorizzati, tutto insomma il suo magnifico e 

modernissimo complesso. Contro queste colonne si è letteralmente scatenato lo Stormo 

d’assalto, talvolta a non più di dieci metri d’altezza, innaffiando di piombo le truppe in 

movimento, seminando la via di spezzoni esplosivi. […] Ma lo sforzo massimo, il capolavoro 

offensivo degli “arditi dell’aria”, si è avuto tra il ponte di Ghieieto e San Piero a 

Sieve, ove le colonne dello Stormo d’assalto hanno trovato cavalleria, artiglieria motorizzata 

e carriaggi. Si sono visti i sessanta apparecchi piombare sulla preda, come rapaci. In 

pochi istanti, chilometri e chilometri di strada sono stati coperti da una nebbia biancastra, 

il veleno della guerra, e attraverso quella cortina, una sarabanda demoniaca di macchine 

che scagliavano bombe e scaricavano nastri di mitraglia, instancabili, fulminee, apocalittiche. 

[…] successivamente si è appreso che almeno un terzo delle unità colpite doveva 

essere considerato fuori combattimento. 13 

Al di là dell’evidente contrasto con la posizione di Pricolo, improntata a una ben 

13 Constatazioni, insegnamenti e conferme, in “Le vie dell’aria”, n. 34-35 del 2 settembre 1934.


maggiore cautela, contrasto che riflette la diffidenza della Forza Armata verso soluzioni 

non in linea con il pensiero di Douhet, colpisce in questo resoconto la naturalezza 

con cui si fa riferimento all’impiego di aggressivi chimici. Anche Pricolo del 

resto non aveva avuto remore nel ricordare l’azione di “ipritamento” condotta dallo 

stormo d’assalto sul cammino della divisione celere, a riprova del fatto che questo 

tipo di soluzione figurava ancora a pieno titolo nella dottrina di impiego delle forze 

aeree e non si vedeva alcuna ragione per nasconderlo, parlandone anzi apertamente 

sulle pagine di un periodico in libera vendita. Con queste premesse l’impiego di aggressivi 

chimici nella campagna d’Etiopia non costituisce una sorpresa e, pur rimanendo 

ingiustificato dal punto di vista umanitario, e anche dell’opportunità politica, 

sembra inserirsi in un quadro di riferimento dottrinale compiutamente definito. 

Le operazioni in Africa Orientale durante la cosiddetta “guerra dei sette mesi”, tra 

l’ottobre del 1935 e il maggio del 1936, e nel corso dei cicli operativi di polizia coloniale 

degli anni seguenti, videro la Regia Aeronautica operare a supporto delle forze 

di superficie con missioni di ricognizione, bombardamento, trasporto e collegamento 

in un contesto in cui mancavano del resto quegli obiettivi che avrebbero potuto 

giustificare soluzioni maggiormente in linea con le teorie sull’impiego indipendente 

e “contro valore” del potere aereo. Scartata l’idea di bombardare Addis Abeba, per 

ragioni di opportunità politica, nonché per i forti dubbi sull’efficacia di una tale iniziativa, 

si ebbe l’attivazione di un dispositivo aeroterrestre caratterizzato da una forte 

integrazione delle catene di comando, con le forze aeree agli ordini del comandante 

di scacchiere, che alla prova dei fatti si rivelò oltremodo valido. 

In Etiopia, è stato osservato, la cooperazione fu perfetta perché il comando era 

unificato e si appoggiava a un efficiente sistema di comunicazioni, permettendo di 

sfruttare la superiorità assicurata dall’uso incontrastato del potere aereo in una guerra 

di movimento. 14 Questo schema, che riproponeva in un contesto molto diverso 

dal punto di vista dell’ambiente e dell’entità dei mezzi soluzioni già attuate in Libia 

nell’ultima fase della riconquista, tra il 1927 e il 1931, non venne però ulteriormente 

sviluppato e rimase relegato all’ambito coloniale, proprio perché in contrasto con 

il dogma assoluto dell’autonomia e dell’indipendenza dell’aeronautica. Le conseguenze 

si sarebbero viste durante l’ormai imminente conflitto mondiale, in cui il 

problema dell’aerocooperazione non ebbe mai una risposta efficace, lasciando nel 

vago il problema del controllo tattico dei reparti aerei chiamati ad agire a supporto 

dell’esercito. 

L’intervento in Spagna non avrebbe modificato questo stato di cose. L’appoggio 

aereo ravvicinato vi fu praticato largamente e con efficacia, impiegandovi velivoli 

robusti e maneggevoli come i C.R.32, e sperimentando velivoli specificamente concepiti 

per l’assalto, come il Ba.65, ma senza troppo entusiasmo e soprattutto senza 

sfruttare l’occasione per mettere a punto tecniche e procedure tali da realizzare un 

dispositivo aeroterrestre davvero integrato. Oltre alla preoccupazione per le perdite 

14 Roberto Gentilli, L’aeronautica in Libia e in Etiopia, in L’aeronautica italiana. Una storia del Novecento 

(a cura di Paolo Ferrari), Franco Angeli Storia, Milano, 2004, pp. 318-320.


che l’attacco al suolo comportava, dominava infatti il timore di trasformare l’aeronautica 

in un’appendice dell’esercito: 

[…] in Abissinia come in Spagna, l’Aeronautica, pur conservando una parvenza di autonomia, 

è sempre stata messa alle dirette e complete dipendenze dei Comandi dell’Esercito, 

i quali, per abito mentale o anche per contingenze superiori forse alla loro stessa 

volontà, hanno sistematicamente impiegato l’Aviazione soltanto o principalmente nelle 

numerosissime attività rivolte a immediato e diretto vantaggio delle truppe terrestri. 15 

A differenza dell’Etiopia, il bombardamento di obiettivi al di fuori del campo 

di battaglia ebbe largo spazio, venendo indirizzato contro impianti ferroviari, nodi 

stradali, complessi industriali e aree portuali. Protagonisti di queste azioni, che per 

la loro valenza si proiettavano al di fuori dell’ambito tattico e certo più dell’assalto 

riflettevano la visione della Regia Aeronautica, furono soprattutto i “Falchi delle 

Baleari”, che da Maiorca, allineando mai più di una trentina di velivoli, attaccarono 

ripetutamente le installazioni portuali di Barcellona e le navi alla fonda. Le 16 

incursioni registrate tra il 10 gennaio e il 15 marzo 1938 causarono danni e vittime 

anche alla città, un risultato inevitabile tenuto conto della quota di sgancio, di solito 

prossima ai 6.000 metri, e della scarsa precisione dei dispositivi di puntamento, ma 

Barcellona era anche un importante centro demografico e con tutta probabilità le 

bombe cadute sui quartieri cittadini non erano considerate dei colpi a vuoto, potendo 

comunque incidere sul morale della popolazione. Questo scopo dichiarato ebbero le 

incursioni dei giorni 16, 17 e 18 marzo, nelle quali 44 tonnellate di bombe causarono 

550 morti e 989 feriti, nell’evidente tentativo di dare concretezza alle teorie sul bombardamento 

strategico e sull’uso risolutivo dell’arma del terrore. 16 Come nel caso 

dell’aviazione d’assalto gli sviluppi successivi non avrebbero portato a definire una 

reale dottrina d’impiego e neppure a costruire uno strumento aereo adeguato a darle 

concretezza. Il logoramento subito dalla Regia Aeronautica, insieme all’eccessiva 

fiducia riposta in soluzioni in parte scelte e in parte imposte dalla situazione dell’industria 

nazionale, segnò anzi l’inizio di un declino che si sarebbe fatto sempre più 

rapido con il passare del tempo, mentre si accentuava il ritardo tecnologico rispetto 

alle aeronautiche alle quali il riarmo degli anni Trenta aveva dato nuovo slancio e 

permesso un salto generazionale nel campo dei materiali di volo. 

In un clima caratterizzato dalla mancanza di un’autentica visione interforze, in 

cui ogni Forza Armata riteneva non solo di dover far da sé ma anche di dover salvaguardare 

il suo spazio di manovra, le teorie di Mecozzi e l’idea stessa dell’aviazione 

d’assalto potevano essere considerate pericolose. Vi si poteva infatti vedere la riproposizione 

del concetto di aviazione ausiliaria, con una interpretazione restrittiva 

incentrata soltanto sulla cooperazione con le forze di superficie. Mancò quindi la 

15 

Francesco Pricolo, La Regia Aeronautica nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale 1939-1941, Longanesi, 

Milano, 1971, pp. 29-30. 

16 

Lucio Ceva, L’aeronautica nella guerra civile spagnola, in L’aeronautica italiana. Una storia del 

Novecento (a cura di Paolo Ferrari), Franco Angeli Storia, Milano, 2004, pp. 357-364.


spinta a elaborare un quadro di riferimento che permettesse all’aeronautica di sviluppare 

secondo precise direttrici la preparazione di uomini e mezzi. Anche la teoria 

del bombardamento contro-città non venne però approfondita, lasciando così irrisolta 

la questione dottrinale, tanto più che il pensiero di Douhet sembrò venir messo 

da parte, al di là delle dichiarazioni di facciata, in ragione sia della configurazione 

stessa dello strumento, privo di bombardieri pesanti, sia del delinearsi di una situazione 

strategica mediterranea in cui il bombardamento si caratterizzava sempre più 

come controforze. Non senza motivo si può anzi stabilire un qualche collegamento 

con l’evoluzione del quadro normativo, che a sua volta sembrava mettere al bando 

l’arma del terrore e quindi il mezzo principale per colpire il morale dell’avversario. 

La legge di guerra e neutralità, emanata con il R.D. n.1415 del 1938, all’articolo 42 

vietava infatti il bombardamento «che abbia il solo scopo di colpire la popolazione 

civile o di distruggere o danneggiare i beni non aventi interesse militare», e al successivo 

articolo 51 proibiva «l’impiego di mezzi batteriologici, di gas asfissianti, 

tossici o simili, come pure di liquidi, materie o procedimenti analoghi». 

L’insieme di questi fattori, pur in assenza di una formalizzazione in chiave dottrinale, 

contribuiva a disegnare un quadro di riferimento che aveva ben poco in comune 

con lo scenario delle grandi manovre del 1931, senza peraltro favorire la nascita di 

un approccio interforze. Un riflesso di questa situazione, a tutti gli effetti dominata 

da un’incertezza di fondo, si può cogliere anche negli studi sviluppati nel corso delle 

attività di formazione superiore destinate agli ufficiali della Regia Aeronautica, in 

particolare presso la Scuola di Guerra Aerea da poco istituita. Uno dei temi proposti 

durante la sessione del 1939 ipotizzava lo scoppio di un conflitto tra Italia e 

Germania da una parte e Francia a Gran Bretagna dall’altra, e nello svilupparlo uno 

dei frequentatori, verosimilmente in coerenza con l’impostazione generale del corso, 

individuò una serie di compiti che interessavano innanzitutto le categorie della controaviazione 

e dell’interdizione, lasciando in secondo piano non solo la cooperazione 

con l’esercito, ma anche il bombardamento dei centri industriali più vicini al confine, 

e quindi compresi nella zona di Lione, i soli del resto entro il raggio d’azione dei 

plurimotori della Regia Aeronautica. 17 

17 Scuola di Guerra Aerea, X Corso Alti Studi, Ipotesi di guerra Italia - Germania contro Francia - Inghilterra. 

Studio dello schieramento delle G.U.A. italiane e ripartizione dei compiti tra le stesse, t.col. Umberto 

Chiesa, 21 giugno 1939, Archivio 3° Reparto Manutenzione Velivoli (Treviso). Questo l’enunciato 

dei compiti individuati per l’aeronautica: 

«a) agire all’apertura delle ostilità con immediate ed intense azioni di bombardamento sugli obiettivi 

aeronautici avversari situati nel proprio settore, dando precedenza in ordine d’importanza alle basi, depositi 

carburanti e munizioni, magazzini, 

b) azioni offensive sui principali nodi ferroviari e stradali che dalla valle del Rodano attestano alla nostra 

frontiera, 

c) azioni offensive su obiettivi interessanti la produzione bellica con particolare riguardo ai centri industriali 

di Lione, St. Etienne, 

d) eventuale cooperazione con le forze dell’Esercito agenti offensivamente o a sostegno di queste nel 

caso che l’avversario abbia il sopravvento in qualche punto del settore, 

e) ricerca del dominio aereo nel cielo del proprio settore, 

f) difesa del proprio schieramento e del territorio nazionale fino alla linea Rapallo-Piacenza-Bergamo».


UAV Predator 

L’aerocooperazione continuava a essere definita una possibilità eventuale, e soltanto 

a conflitto inoltrato fu fatto il tentativo di codificarne in una circolare criteri 

e procedure in risposta alle sempre più pressanti esigenze che venivano dal fronte, 

riproponendo lezioni già apprese e poi accantonate: 

La guerra odierna pone in primo piano la cooperazione tra le forze terrestri ed aeree, 

attraverso la quale: 

- si realizza nella battaglia un massimo di capacità offensiva e difensiva, 

- si assicura alla manovra la continuità e l’estensione necessarie per ottenere risultati 

decisivi. 18 

L’aeronautica era chiamata a colpire gli elementi della forza nemica in atto, in 

potenza o in formazione entro i limiti individuati dalla distanza di sicurezza dalle 

truppe amiche e dal raggio d’azione dei velivoli, con la precisazione che la priorità 

doveva essere data a quegli obiettivi che potevano avere effetti immediati o quasi 

sull’efficienza delle grandi unità avversarie impegnate in combattimento o in riserva. 

I criteri generali di impiego erano individuati nella tempestività dell’intervento, nella 

sua sincronizzazione con l’azione delle forze di terra e nella sua aderenza, intesa 

non solo come capacità di agire a distanza di sicurezza ma anche come prontezza ad 

adeguarsi ai mutevoli sviluppi delle operazioni in atto. Non meno importante era la 

18 Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito, Ufficio addestramento, Stato Maggiore Regia Aeronautica, IV Reparto, 

Circolare n. 1000/A, L’aviazione nella battaglia terrestre, maggio 1943.


continuità dell’azione su obiettivi che potevano essere concentramenti di truppe e di 

automezzi, colonne motomeccanizzate, postazioni d’artiglieria, centri di resistenza 

di particolare importanza, depositi e centri di rifornimento, posti di comando, punti 

nodali delle comunicazioni e punti di passaggio obbligato, un elenco nel quale figuravano 

anche le basi aeree. Queste, rientrando nella categoria della controaviazione, 

esulavano di solito dall’ambito di competenza del comandante delle grandi unità 

terrestri ma nella fase iniziale della battaglia poteva essere opportuno accantonare 

qualunque altro obiettivo per cercare di neutralizzare le forze aeree avversarie o 

almeno la loro componente più avanzata. L’intervento nella battaglia terrestre non 

modificava le dipendenze derivanti dall’autonomia organica dell’arma aerea, ma 

il comandante responsabile della condotta della campagna doveva sapere di poter 

contare sempre e comunque sul concorso dell’aeronautica, nei confronti della quale 

le sue richieste, pur vagliate dal punto di vista tecnico dal comandante delle forze 

aeree, avevano il valore di un ordine. Solo in scacchieri strategicamente autonomi o 

geograficamente isolati le unità dell’aeronautica erano però alle dirette dipendenze 

del comandante dell’esercito avente la responsabilità operativa dello scacchiere. 

In generale le richieste di intervento non previste da un ordine di operazione dovevano 

essere rivolte dai comandi di grande unità del Regio Esercito, di norma tramite 

l’ufficiale di collegamento della Regia Aeronautica, al comando dei reparti di volo 

già designati ad assicurare il concorso aereo alla grande unità richiedente e in ogni 

altro caso indirizzate al comando della grande unità aerea competente. La richiesta 

doveva specificare la natura e la posizione dell’obiettivo, gli elementi che potevano 

facilitarne l’identificazione, il tipo di effetto atteso, la situazione delle forze amiche, le 

condizioni atmosferiche in zona, lasciando al comandante delle forze aeree il compito 

di individuare i reparti da impiegare e di definire le modalità dell’azione. Tra la richiesta 

e l’intervento non dovevano passare più di due ore per le specialità della caccia e 

dell’assalto e di tre per il bombardamento. Era prevista la costituzione di organi di collegamento, 

a livello di ufficiale superiore, dell’aeronautica nel primo caso, dell’esercito 

nell’altro, presso i comandi di gruppo di armate o di armata e presso i comandi di 

grande unità della Regia Aeronautica. Ufficiali dell’aeronautica erano poi distaccati 

presso i comandi delle grandi unità dell’esercito a favore delle quali era previsto il 

concorso aereo, mentre ufficiali osservatori dell’esercito erano inviati presso i reparti 

di volo designati ad assicurarlo. Gli ufficiali di collegamento dell’aeronautica, oltre 

ad avere la funzione di consulenti tecnici dei comandanti di grande unità, dovevano 

mantenere aggiornato il quadro di situazione e assistere i velivoli durante la rotta di 

avvicinamento e di allontanamento, se possibile tenendosi in contatto radio. 

L’attenzione per le procedure dell’aerocooperazione arrivava troppo tardi, e 

comunque continuava a riflettere una ossessiva preoccupazione per l’indipendenza 

dell’aeronautica, al punto che, come contropartita all’eventualità di porre delle 

unità aeree a disposizione di comandi dell’esercito, veniva ricordata la possibilità 

di avere, in situazioni particolari, ad esempio in regioni desertiche, reparti dell’esercito 

sotto il comando di ufficiali dell’aeronautica, e questo quando le condizioni che


avevano portato all’esperimento del Battaglione Sahariano erano ormai un ricordo 

del passato. 19 Questa circolare anticipava però in qualche modo la situazione che si 

sarebbe creata nel dopoguerra. Svanite le ipotesi di impiego strategico, incompatibili 

sia con la configurazione dello strumento sia con il nuovo scenario internazionale 

e con la collocazione che vi aveva l’Italia, la dottrina d’impiego delle forze aeree 

si identificava con la dottrina aerotattica sviluppata in ambito NATO. In un contesto 

in cui ogni sforzo era indirizzato a padroneggiare tattiche e procedure dettate 

dalle regolamentazioni codificate in seno all’Alleanza Atlantica non c’era spazio 

per elaborazioni autonome e ogni altra ipotesi risultava velleitaria e improponibile. 

Così accadde ad esempio con la direttiva proposta nel 1967 da Amedeo Mecozzi, 

in cui al rifiuto dell’azione “contro valore”, si affiancava l’esclusione dell’opzione 

nucleare, un’eventualità che era invece parte integrante della dottrina dell’Alleanza 

Atlantica. 20 Gli eventi epocali che segnarono il passaggio dagli anni ’80 agli anni 

’90 hanno però alterato profondamente questo quadro, e nel demolire le rassicuranti 

certezze hanno rilanciato la rielaborazione dottrinale, ferme restando le caratteristiche 

universalmente riconosciute del potere aereo. Il processo è ancora in corso e, pur 

avendo un sicuro punto di riferimento nelle organizzazioni internazionali, e in primo 

luogo nella NATO, propone soluzioni ben diverse da quelle che per decenni sono 

state codificate dalle procedure dell’alleanza. 

19 Il Battaglione Sahariano, creato nel 1936 su iniziativa di Balbo, all’epoca governatore della Libia, 

si configurava come un complesso interforze concepito e organizzato per operare nelle distese desertiche 

integrando una componente terrestre motorizzata e una componente aerea. Dato il ruolo 

fondamentale di questa, il comando del reparto era affidato a un ufficiale superiore dell’aeronautica, 

e capitani dell’aeronautica erano anche al comando delle sue quattro compagnie, ciascuna delle 

quali, nella configurazione finale, affiancava una sezione di tre velivoli da ricognizione a due plotoni 

motorizzati e un plotone mitraglieri. Allo scoppio della guerra la componente autoportata fu separata 

dalla componente aerea e, inquadrata nel Raggruppamento Maletti, sarebbe stata distrutta a Sidi el 

Barrani, tra l’8 e il 10 dicembre 1940. L’esperimento non venne riproposto e le nuove compagnie 

sahariane furono semplici unità motorizzate. 

20 Amedeo Mecozzi, Direttiva per l’aviazione militare, “I Quaderni della Rivista Aeronautica”, 1/2006, 

pp. 20-94. Il contenuto della direttiva veniva così riassunto dallo stesso Mecozzi in una sorta di sommario: 

«L’Aviazione Italiana, anche in base alla propria posizione nell’alleanza intende svolgere le proprie 

azioni belliche: 

1 - Senza impiegare armamento atomico. 

2 - Senza effettuare distruzioni nelle attività civili del nemico. 

3 - Agendo in concomitanza delle operazioni dell’Esercito e della Marina 

4 - Dando la preferenza agli obiettivi costituiti dalle forze armate nemiche che si trovino al di là dei 

campi di battaglia terrestri e degli spazi dove si svolgano combattimenti navali. 

5 - Salvo intervenire nella suddetta battaglia e nel suddetto combattimento quando la necessità lo 

imponesse. 

6 - Adoperando in prevalenza per le proprie operazioni la specialità denominata cacciabombardieri 

(o d’assalto). 

7 - Conservando la propria unità integrale, la propria autonomia organica e il proprio ordinamento a 

massa».


La situazione attuale vede un ricorso sempre più diffuso alle manifestazioni più 

soft del potere aereo, strettamente collegate a quella lotta per il dominio del terreno 

dell’informazione che è indispensabile presupposto di qualunque operazione. Il potere 

aereo, attraverso la sua capacità di proiettarsi anche oltre i limiti dell’atmosfera, 

riconfigurandosi come potere aerospaziale, o meglio aereo-spaziale, può risultare 

decisivo nell’accelerare la chiusura del ciclo di Boyd, o ciclo OODA, dal nome delle 

sue quattro fasi, Orient, Observe, Decide, Act, incidendo oggi sulla fase Observe più 

ancora che sulla fase Act. Un capitolo a parte è quello della capacità expeditionary, 

oggetto di crescente attenzione, che sfrutta le caratteristiche proprie del potere aereo 

per proiettarne le capacità oltre i limiti del territorio nazionale e dell’area di tradizionale 

interesse dell’Alleanza Atlantica. 

Gli elementi caratterizzanti questo quadro, ben più variegato dell’antico contrasto 

tra i sostenitori dell’impiego strategico dell’arma aerea e quelli dell’aerocooperazione, 

sono la prevalenza del soft kill rispetto all’hard kill, che rimane comunque un’opzione 

perseguibile attraverso un impiego selettivo e mirato della potenza di fuoco, 

la ricerca di soluzioni “net-centriche”, la proiettabilità del dispositivo. Il tutto in una 

prospettiva di continuo e costante sviluppo che, come è stato recentemente ribadito 

dal suo massimo vertice, deve essere finalizzato ad avere una 

Forza Armata agile, organica e ben integrata con le altre, equilibrata nelle sue componenti, 

di eccellente qualità e in grado di mettere in campo, attraverso l’impiego del proprio personale, 

tutte le Capacità Operative Fondamentali che una Forza Armata efficace ed efficiente 

deve assicurare, ovviamente proporzionate alle risorse disponibili. 21 

Indicazioni che a ben vedere avrebbero potuto essere valide in ogni momento 

della storia dell’Aeronautica Militare, in quanto il mutare dei tempi non ne altera il 

fine ultimo, quello di essere uno strumento efficace della politica nazionale. 

21 La rilevanza del Potere Aereo-Spaziale per la sicurezza nazionale, Intervento introduttivo del Capo 

di Stato Maggiore dell’Aeronautica, generale di squadra aerea Giuseppe Bernardis, all’Air Power 

Congress (Firenze, 11-12 maggio 2010), Rivista Aeronautica 3/2010, pp. 12-19.

o L f d e Wi n t e r * 

Paesi Bassi 

A Century of Military Aviation in the Netherlands, 

1911-2011 

Man’s age-old desire to be able to fly and to master the airspace was finally 

fulfilled at the beginning of the twentieth century. In December 1903, two 

American bicycle repairers, Orville and Wilbur Wright, succeeded, for the 

first time, in carrying out a controlled and uninterrupted flight in a motorised aircraft 

that was “heavier than air”. The flight with the Flyer I, which lasted twelve seconds 

and took off from the windy Kill Devil Hills on North Carolina’s eastern seaboard, 

heralded the beginning of motorised aviation. After a modest start, aviation soon 

picked up speed and branched off into various directions. The aircraft’s potential for 

playing a role in warfare was soon recognised in military circles. When World War 

I broke out, ten years after the memorable flight by the Wright brothers, virtually all 

belligerents had a (provisional) military air force. By the end of the war, the air arm 

had undergone a tempestuous development and claimed its position as an inalienable 

part of the armed forces. Since then, the battle for air supremacy has formed an 

unmistakeable factor in deciding armed conflicts. 

The burgeoning aviation sector also made itself felt in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 

In the small monarchy, at that time still the motherland of a vast and impressive 

colonial empire in Southeast Asia, developments in the field of “aeronautics” 

were followed with intense interest by, among others the military. This article focuses 

on a century of military aviation in the Netherlands, whereby the history of the 

Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) and its immediate predecessors serves as a 

guideline. The history of the RNLAF can be roughly divided into three periods: 

• the period from 1911 to 1939, in which the modest Dutch air arm gained a permanent 

foothold in the armed forces of a (colonial) power which pursued a policy of 

armed neutrality; 

• the period from 1940 to 1989, in which the Dutch air arm underwent its baptism 

of fire in World War II and, following the war, was integrated into the allied defence 

effort of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); 

• the period from 1990 to 2011, in which the Royal Netherlands Air Force – as 

part of the Dutch armed forces which was being restructured into an expeditionary 

force – participated in a wide spectrum of humanitarian missions and crisisresponse 

operations. 

* Senior researcher for the Netherlands Institute of Military History.


Besides the RNLAF and its immediate predecessors, the Netherlands, for a long 

time, also had two other military air services: the Military Aviation Branch of the 

Royal Netherlands Indies Army (abbreviated to ML-KNIL in Dutch) and the Naval 

Air Arm (MLD) of the Royal Netherlands Navy. In view of the necessary limits to 

the size of this article and the complexity of the subject material, the history of the 

Dutch colonial air force and the naval air arm will not be examined in any detail. 

Even though it would not be until July 1913 that the Netherlands founded its first 

military air service, a number of officers had for some considerable time already 

been exploring the military possibilities of utilising airspace. These officers played 

an important role in the Nederlandse Vereeniging voor Luchtvaart (NVvL, the Dutch 

Association for Aviation) that had been set up in The Hague in October 1907. Two of 

them, C.J. Snijders and H. Walaardt Sacré, left their mark on the pioneering phase of 

military aviation in the Netherlands. 

From the very beginning, Major General Snijders, who was rising through the 

ranks rapidly, proved to be an unfaltering champion of aviation. In the summer of 

1909, Snijders asked his fellow engineer officer Walaardt Sacré to look into the possibilities 

for using aerial vehicles for military purposes. Captain Walaardt Sacré, who 

was to later earn certificates for flying balloons and airships, made various trips 

abroad for the purpose of study and reported on them in great detail. In the interim, 

Snijders tried to convince the Minster of War to establish an aviation organisation in 

the Dutch armed forces. The minister then tasked a special committee with assessing 

the benefits and necessity of such an organisation. In this Militaire Luchtvaart 

Commissie (Military Aviation Committee), which Snijders was to chair for some 

time, Walaardt Sacré fulfilled a key role as secretary. Even before the committee had 

completed its final report, the Dutch army would have its first practical experience 

with the military deployment of aircraft. 

In the large-scale army-manoeuvre exercise held in September 1911 – a first in 

the Netherlands, involving 20,000 military personnel – room had been made for an 

“aviation service”. As the Dutch armed forces did not have the required materiel, 

the civilian sector was called upon to provide the necessary equipment. In addition 

to two balloons from the NVvL and three cars, the exercise involved six privatelyowned 

aircraft. At that time, the Dutch army did not have fully-licensed military 

pilots. Even though a number of regular officers had meanwhile been sent abroad to 

be trained as pilots, they had not yet completed their training. Still, they participated 

in the exercise as observers in two-seater aircraft. The aircraft were flown by civilian 

aviators and a number of qualified personnel on extended leave who were called up 

for a limited duration. The debut of the Dutch aircraft in a military role went down 

in history as “a happy and successful improvisation”. Notwithstanding the lack of 

training and experience on the part of the observers, the reconnaissance flights had 

provided a wealth of military information. 

The experiences gained with the “flying-machines” strengthened the conviction 

of the members of the Militaire Luchtvaart Commissie that the armed forces

a Ce n t u ry o f mi l i ta ry av i at i o n in t H e ne t H e r l a n d s, 1911-2011 209 

should have its own 

military air service. In 

its final report of April 

1912, the committee 

recommended the purchase 

of aircraft, kite 

balloons, observation 

balloons and (provisions 

for) a motorised 

airship. The Minister 

of War adopted the recommendations 

in their 

entirety and requested 

that the required financial 

resources be 

allocated in the 1913 

Defence budget. Parliament, 

however, insisted 

on earmarking the 

funds exclusively for 

aircraft, and a decision 

was made accordingly. 

The Luchtvaartafdeeling 

(LVA or Army 

Air Arm) was established 

on 1 July 1913 

and headquartered at 

Soesterberg Air Base. 

Walaardt Sacré was 

appointed commander 

September 1911, the military debut of the aircraft in the 

Netherlands. Six (civilian) aviators flew in the first largescale 

army-manoeuvre exercise. 

and reported directly to the Chief of the General Staff, General Snijders, who would 

prove an important pillar in promoting the development of the air arm, which was 

still in its infancy. The LVA was to be equipped with a modest number of training and 

reconnaissance aircraft, mainly Farman biplanes purchased in France. 

The start of the First World War in August 1914 thwarted the development of the 

LVA. Although the Netherlands was not involved in the fighting, it had to show its 

readiness and resolve to defend its neutrality, by force if necessary. Surrounded by 

countries at war, it was very difficult for the Dutch to purchase new aircraft abroad. 

Moreover, at the time, the Netherlands did not have its own, fully-fledged aircraft industry. 

Despite a number of positive factors, Soesterberg Air Base was growing into 

a well-equipped airfield, military auxiliary airfields in other places in the Netherlands 

were given limited infrastructure, and the LVA was also making good headway 

in terms of personnel strength (the complement had grown from over 30 men in 1913


to almost 650 in 1918) - the materiel situation remained pressing. 

The situation was alleviated to some extent by the “windfall” of over a hundred 

aircraft of the various countries who were involved in the war being grounded on 

Dutch territory due to emergency landings as a result of engine failure, battle damage, 

fuel shortage or navigational errors. The Dutch military authorities promptly 

interned the foreign pilots and confiscated their planes. The LVA transported the 

aircraft on special trailers to Soesterberg Air Base, where they were checked by technical 

personnel and, if possible, repaired. The almost seventy serviceable confiscated 

aircraft formed a welcome addition to the Dutch air fleet. The LVA benefitted greatly 

by these “uninvited guests”. Dutch technical personnel were thus able to acquaint 

themselves with the most advanced equipment, including the latest developments in 

the fields of radiotelegraphy and armament. They grew into all-round experts with 

a wide knowledge of materiel. While it was true that the LVA pilots lacked combat 

experience, they were nonetheless able to familiarise themselves with practically all 

types of military aircraft available at the time. At the end of World War I, the pilots 

maintained their flying skills in a motley collection of aircraft. 

The post-war years brought international détente. The Covenant of the League 

of Nations, concluded in 1920, contained provisions that virtually excluded another 

war. Many national governments estimated that the chances of preserving peace 

were high and therefore felt that drastic cuts in defence expenditure were justified. 

The Dutch armed forces were set strict financial limits during the interwar period. 

The same was true of the LVA, which had to make do with a decreasing budget in 

the 1920s. The limited financial resources had a highly debilitating effect on the 

development of the young air service, all the more so given the fact that technological 

innovations in the air industry were the order of the day. The LVA was unable to 

maintain a sizeable air fleet, for the simple reason that there was no money for large 

procurement projects. 

Dutch air defence was expected to be able to repel the first air attack by an aggressor 

and that was as far as the military ambition went. To be able to continue fighting 

the Dutch armed forces would need the support of allies. At the time, three main 

tasks were identified for the air arm: to carry out reconnaissance flights, to eliminate 

enemy aircraft and to carry out bombardments. The Dutch army leadership assigned 

top priority to the reconnaissance task of the LVA, followed by the elimination of 

enemy aircraft. The carrying out of bombardments, which was considered an offensive 

task and therefore less suitable for the more defensively-oriented Dutch armed 

forces, was given the lowest priority. 

The LVA tried to maintain its striking power at an acceptable level by procuring 

small series of modern aircraft on a regular basis. It placed its orders preferably 

with Dutch aircraft manufacturers such as Anthony Fokker and, some time after 

that, Frits Koolhoven. These manufacturers produced aircraft for both the civilian 

and the military market. The LVA, in the period from 1920 to 1935 always ordered 

with Fokker. This decision was partly motivated by employment considerations, but


also by the fear on the part of the Dutch government that, given a new war, it could 

once again be confronted with supply problems. After all, in the First World War, the 

Dutch had had frustrating experiences with foreign producers who, wholly or partly 

failed to honour their obligations because of the priority given to their own armed 

forces. Up till 1940, Fokker supplied the LVA with various series of training aircraft, 

reconnaissance/light bomber aircraft and fighter aircraft. Barring the odd exception, 

the volume of the aircraft orders generally did not exceed several dozens. From 1935 

onwards, the LVA also placed a number of orders with Koolhoven. 

Against a backdrop of growing international tension in the second half of the 

1930s, the Dutch government decided to increase the defence budget and to order 

new fighters and bombers. The government now decided to place orders with foreign 

aircraft producers besides the customary national producers. The new equipment 

began coming in in the years 1938 and 1939. A number of important steps were 

also taken in the organisational domain. In the 1920s, due to the dearth of financial 

resources, the then commander of the LVA characterised his organisation as being 

made up of “nothing more than a hard core of personnel with technical expertise and 

operational readiness, a training institute”. In the 1930s, the LVA underwent a series 

of far-reaching reorganisations which were often accompanied by bitter disagreement 

between the authorities concerned. 

Military aviation circles were lobbying with increasing fervour for a more independent 

position of the air arm. Judging by the developments in the surrounding 

countries, the proponents of a more independent air force concluded that other countries 

set great store by the air arm. The air forces in Great Britain, France, Germany 

and Italy had gained independent status on a par with the other Services, coming 

under a single command. Pleas to the military establishment for a similar approach 

in the Netherlands fell on deaf ears, however. It was only in 1937 that the first steps 

were taken towards a centrally-led air arm which was to form part of an integrated 

air defence command. Besides the air forces, this integrated command would also 

include the other air defence assets such as air defence artillery, search lights and the 

aircraft warning service (for detecting and reporting enemy aircraft). This integrated 

organisation, the Commando Luchtverdediging (Air Defence Command), was set up 

on 1 November 1938. 

Following a far-reaching internal reorganisation, the military air arm as a whole 

came under this command. On 1 July 1939, the LVA, following a transition phase, 

was promoted to Wapen der Militaire Luchtvaart (Military Aviation Arm) and was 

the last of the arms to obtain independent status within the Royal Netherlands Army 

in addition to the infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers. The new arm comprised 

a Luchtvaartbrigade (Aviation Brigade), which was composed of three Luchtvaartregimenten 

(Aviation Regiments) which accommodated all flying units, emergency 

services, depots and training institutes. Insiders considered these reorganisations and 

structural changes as an important foundation for the establishment of a modern, 

effectively-led Dutch air arm. At the same time, they also concluded that the ultimate


goal had by no means been reached yet. At the beginning of 1940, there was still no 

mature and well-oiled organisation in place. In addition to a number of organisational 

flaws, there were personnel problems, including a shortage of pilot instructors, 

observers and pilots, while the lack of modern aircraft equipment caused an endless 

list of problems. 

On 10 May 1940, the German invasion of the Netherlands brought an abrupt end 

to the policy of neutrality and non-involvement which the Kingdom of the Netherlands 

had consistently pursued since its inception in 1815. After a period of more 

The cradle of Dutch military aviation, Soesterberg Air Base during the interwar period.


than a century in which the Netherlands had been spared direct involvement in a 

war, it was now forced to tolerate a German occupation force on its soil for a period 

of five years. In the early days of May 1940, the Netherlands endeavoured to defend 

its neutrality through the use of armed force and immediately sought association 

with the allied forces that had taken up the hatchet against the Axis powers from 

September 1939. Following the Second World War, the Netherlands unequivocally 

decided to join the NATO treaty organisation. Its armed forces have made a concrete 

contribution to the Allied defence since then.


The Military Aviation Arm was only able to deploy some 125 operational aircraft 

to oppose the almost 1,000 German aircraft the Luftwaffe was able to deploy over the 

Netherlands in 1940. In addition to the staggering numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe, 

there was also a vast difference in quality. Most German aircraft were superior 

to the Dutch aircraft in terms of speed and armament. Moreover, the German pilot 

corps had gained a good deal of combat experience in operations over Spain, Poland 

and Scandinavia from 1936 onwards. In the five-day battle which was unleashed on 

10 May, the Luftwaffe almost completely wiped out the Dutch air fleet. A number of 

Dutch fighter aircraft were destroyed on the ground during German surprise attacks, 

while the Dutch aircraft also had to concede defeat in air engagements. Despite the 

vast German air superiority, the personnel of the Military Aviation Arm put up a 

heroic struggle. Together with the other elements of the Air Defence Command, the 

Dutch air arm succeeded in eliminating an estimated 350 German aircraft, some 220 

of which were Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft that had been deployed in airborne 

operations in the west of the Netherlands. This remarkable success did not go unnoticed; 

within a few days of the capitulation, the Commander-in-Chief of Land 

and Sea Forces, General H.G. Winkelman, awarded the Military William’s Order, 

the highest military honour for bravery in the Netherlands, to the Military Aviation 

Arm. 

Just as the Royal Family, the Council of Ministers and a large part of the flight 

personnel of the Naval Air Arm, some 250 military personnel of the Military Aviation 

Arm flying schools succeeded in making their way to England in May 1940. 

Over time, this group of personnel, which mainly consisted of instructors, trainee 

pilots and technical personnel would largely be absorbed into the Royal Air Force 

(RAF). Later on in the war, they were joined by Dutchmen who had managed to 

escape from occupied territory to England in order to make a contribution to the 

liberation of the Netherlands from there. In addition to these so-called “Engelandvaarders”, 

there were also Dutch nationals from neutral or unoccupied countries who 

offered their services. In all, the RAF was to admit around 700 Dutch personnel to its 

ranks, who then were assigned to various operational units in the roles of pilot, crew 

member or ground personnel. 

Some RAF units were even predominantly Dutch. These squadrons came under 

British operational command. Dutch Naval Air Arm personnel formed the nucleus 

of 320 (Dutch) Squadron, which had been set up in June 1940 and which initially 

conducted convoy protection flights, later followed by high-risk bombardments of 

German ships. In 1943, 320 Squadron – now equipped with Mitchell bombers and 

augmented by personnel from the Military Aviation Arm – was to focus mainly 

on attacking targets on the European continent. 322 (Dutch) Squadron, which had 

been set up in June 1943, was equipped with Spitfires and would number more and 

more Dutch pilots. This squadron distinguished itself by carrying out escort flights, 

convoy patrols and so-called anti-Diver operations against V-1s after they had been 

launched. The pilots from 322 Squadron succeeded in eliminating over one hundred


A Republic F-84F Thunderstreak of 315 Squadron, The MDAP supplied the 

RNLAF with 180 Thunderstreaks. 

of these “flying bombs”. The squadron then specialised in defensive patrols, fighter 

sweeps, armed reconnaissance and low-altitude attack missions on ground targets. 

The Dutch pilots completed many thousands of combat missions in which they suffered 

heavy losses. They also gained a wealth of experience that was to stand them 

in good stead during the reconstruction of the air force in the post-war years. 

From 1943 onwards, the Dutch government in exile in London considered the 

organisation and (more independent) positioning of the air arm, both during and after 

the war. In July 1944, the various Dutch air arms were amalgamated temporarily in 

the Directoraat der Nederlandse Luchtstrijdkrachten (DNLSK, Directorate of Dutch 

Air Forces), which focused primarily on registration, maintenance and organisation 

of training. The DNLSK negotiated with the British Air Ministry about post-war assistance 

in the reconstruction of the Dutch air force and managed to clinch a number 

of comprehensive agreements on this subject. In March 1946, the DNLSK moved 

from London to The Hague; it was to be abolished in July 1948. The Second World 

War acted as a catalyst in the development of the Dutch air arm into an autonomous 

organisation. The war experiences, the increased strategic and tactical importance 

of the air forces and close Allied cooperation contributed to the air arm’s gradual 

development into an independent Service from 1945. 

In the Cold War period from 1948 to 1989, the Netherlands did not revert to its 

policy of non-involvement from before 1940. In the first post-war years, the Netherlands 

waged a decolonisation war in the Dutch East Indies, which took up a great


deal of energy and resources, both in the political and in the military domain. Even 

before the ink had dried on the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia 

in December 1949, the communist expansion in Eastern Europe led to the conclusion 

that the Netherlands, in close cooperation with its Western allies, would have to concentrate 

on rebuilding its defence. The Korean War (1950-1953) was another pointer 

in the same direction, and confirmed the desirability and urgency of a military effort. 

After the Netherlands had once again reached calmer waters in 1950, following 

the turbulent times of the decolonisation, it was possible to focus on rebuilding the 

national armed forces. It was crystal clear from the start that that would only be possible 

in an allied context and with substantial support from the principal international 

partners. The Netherlands was one of the first nations to seek an alliance with likeminded 

Western democracies, signing the Brussels Pact in 1948. This pact, aimed at 

European military cooperation, was the precursor of the Western European Union. 

The Dutch accession to NATO in April 1949 was the logical next step. The Netherlands 

has always shown itself a loyal and reliable ally. 

In addition to the political willingness to earmark a considerable part of public 

expenditure for defence (from 12.6% in 1946 to 23% in 1952), a number of profitable 

bilateral agreements ensured that the Dutch armed forces could be rebuilt at a 

brisk and steady pace. In the case of building up the air force, it was particularly the 

support of the United Kingdom and the United States of America that was of eminent 

importance. In the first post-war years, the RAF played an important role in training 

Dutch air force personnel. In the materiel domain – the Netherlands had virtually no 

equipment whatsoever – the Target One plan formed a good solution. The Netherlands 

was able to procure almost 400 aircraft from RAF surplus supplies. In addition 

to Spitfires and transport aircraft, these were mainly training aircraft intended for 

setting up flying schools in the Netherlands. 

British influence on the Dutch air force in the 1940s and 1950s was considerable. 

The new Dutch air force uniform, for instance, including the rank insignia, was 

clearly inspired by the RAF uniform. The organisational model of Dutch air defence, 

made up of air bases with interception fighters, radar stations and an airspace monitoring 

service, also followed the British example. This was clear from the organisational 

design, whereby, on the instigation of the British, the Belgian and Dutch 

air defence elements were organised in a single Air Defence Group, No 69 Group. 

Also, in the materiel domain, it was British-made aircraft that formed the backbone 

of Dutch air defence right up to the 1960s. From 1948, the outdated Spitfire was 

replaced by the Gloster Meteor fighter jet (266 aircraft), which, in turn was replaced 

by the Hawker Hunter (209 aircraft) from 1956. 

The Dutch accession to NATO heralded a close military cooperation with the 

United States, which was formalised in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program 

(MDAP). Through this bilateral military aid programme, which covered the period 

from 1950 to 1961, the United States made materiel available on a large scale. The 

lion’s share was received as “grand aid”, which meant that they were in-kind sup-


plies from US surplus supplies or from the production line. For the Dutch air force 

the MDAP would make itself felt primarily in the supply of tactical fighter bombers 

(187 Republic F-84E/G Thunderjets and 180 Republic F-84F Thunderstreaks), 

photo reconnaissance aircraft (24 Republic RF-84F Thunderflashes), night fighters 

(63 North American F-86K Sabres), training aircraft (28 Beechcraft T-7s and 41 

Lockheed T-33As), light aircraft (155 Piper Super Cubs) and helicopters (36 Hiller 

OH-23 Ravens). In addition, the MDAP was also responsible for the supply of vehicles, 

ground equipment, ammunition and radar and communications systems. This 

was followed up at a later stage by the American supply of guided-weapon systems 

to the Netherlands. 

Ultimately, the influence of the superpower America on the Dutch air force proved 

to be both more profound and more stable than the British influence. From the end 

of the 1950s, the Netherlands, as a general rule, would buy its new main weapon 

systems for the air force in the United States. In addition to new-generation fighter 

aircraft, such as the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, the Northrop NF-5 and the General 

Dynamics F-16, this also involved the purchase of American guided-weapon systems, 

transport aircraft and helicopters. The choice for these weapon systems also 

meant that the Dutch air force, for decades, worked closely with the Americans in the 

fields of (pilot) training, procedures and logistics. 

The promotion of the Dutch air arm to an autonomous Service in the Netherlands 

came at a relatively later time than was the case in the countries around the 

Netherlands. As mentioned before, the path to autonomy was a gradual one. From 

April 1947, the build-up of the air force was undertaken under the direction of the 

Chief of the Air Staff (CLS) and the Commando Legerluchtmacht Nederland (CLN), 

which formally still came under the army. The establishment of the post of CLS was 

the starting signal for the formation of an air force staff within the Ministry of War 

(renamed Ministry of Defence in 1959). Specific air force affairs were increasingly 

extricated from the grasp of the army and assigned to the budding air force organisation. 

In September 1950, the CLN was abolished in a reorganisation and a number of 

executive commands were set up in an intermediary role between the air force leadership 

and the various units. With the exception of a number of name changes and 

amalgamations, this command structure remained in-tact until the end of 1991. Over 

the years, the air force became increasingly autonomous, with a command structure 

matching that of the navy and the army. The development culminated in March 1953 

when the air force – except for the elements that came under the navy – was granted 

the title “Royal”. Almost forty years after its inception, the Dutch air arm – on a par 

with the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) and the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) 

– would go on as the third independent Service, the Royal Netherlands Air Force 

(RNLAF). 

From the 1960s, the striking power of the RNLAF comprised four clusters or 

pillars, which operated more or less independently from each other, each making 

its own contribution to the NATO defence effort in Western Europe. The develop-


ment processes of these four air force pillars – combat aircraft, guided weapons, 

transport aircraft and helicopters – followed their own patterns. Even though the air 

force leadership recognised and acknowledged the individual importance and raison 

d’être of these four pillars, for a long time, they were not considered as equally important. 

During the Cold War, the RNLAF accorded priority to the combat aircraft 

and, to a lesser extent, to the guided weapons. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 

emphasis shifted more and more to air transport and helicopter operations. 

Until the 1970s, the RNLAF’s combat aircraft were divided over two separate 

commands: one of which focused on air defence, and the other on the conduct of 

tactical tasks, the principal ones being attacking ground targets, providing support 

to ground troops and conducting (photo) reconnaissance. Specific types of fighter 

aircraft were selected for the various tasks. The British-made air defence fighters 

were assigned to the Commando Luchtverdediging, (CLV, Air Defence Command), 

which had several squadrons operating from the air bases of Leeuwarden, Twenthe, 

Soesterberg and Ypenburg. The US-made tactical fighter bombers came under the 

Commando Tactische Luchtstrijdkrachten (CTL, Tactical Air Command); the squadrons 

were stationed at the air bases of Eindhoven and Volkel. The fighter aircraft of 

the two commands were gradually integrated into the NATO alliance. The integration 

of the tactical squadrons in particular proceeded smoothly; they rapidly came 

under Allied command and were integrated in 1952 into the multinational Second 

Allied Tactical Air Force, headquartered in Rheindahlen, Germany. The advent of 

the F-104G Starfighter in 1962 was an important step towards the standardisation 

of the air fleet. The F-104 fulfilled both air defence and tactical roles. Partly as a 

result of that, 1973 saw the amalgamation of the Air Defence Command and the 

Tactical Air Command into a single command for all operational combat units under 

the name of Commando Tactische Luchtstrijdkrachten (Tactical Air Command). The 

F-16, from the 1980s onwards, proved a worthy successor to the Starfighter, also 

owing to the fact that it had excellent multi-role capabilities, much more so than its 

predecessor. Seeing that the F-16 was also to take over the tasks of the NF-5 fighter 

bomber, which had been phased out at the beginning of the 1990s, the standardisation 

process by transfer of tasks to one fighter aircraft had been effected at the end 

of the Cold War period. 

At the beginning of the 1960s, the Dutch armed forces were assigned six (tactical) 

nuclear tasks on top of its conventional tasks, as part of the NATO strategy. 

Two of these nuclear tasks were to be carried out by the RNLAF. 311 Squadron 

and 312 Squadron, which were both stationed at Volkel Air Base, were assigned a 

fighter bomber strike task, and so made a contribution to NATO’s offensive nuclear 

air forces. The pilots of the two squadrons were subjected to an intensive retraining 

programme in order to master the techniques of launching tactical nuclear weapons. 

The aircraft – initially the Thunderstreak, followed by the Starfighter and finally the 

F-16 – were modified to be able to carry out the strike task using atom bombs. 

The second nuclear air force task was of a defensive nature and was assigned to


During the Cold War the RNLAF deployed two Guided Missile Groups with Nike missiles in 

West Germany. These SAMs could be armed with both conventional and nuclear warheads.


the guided weapons against airborne targets (surface-to-air missiles), a new element 

in the RNLAF organisation that reached maturity in the 1960s. Since the RNLAF was 

already tasked with air defence and was better suited than the army, both from a personnel 

and materiel perspective, to maintain the guided weapons, which had important 

similarities with aircraft, the guided weapons were incorporated into the RNLAF 

arsenal. In addition to training capacity, the United States, through the MDAP, also 

provided launch installations and Nike missiles to set up and equip an air defence 

belt, situated in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) at about 150 kilometres 

from the Iron Curtain. Between 1961 and 1963, the RNLAF established two Guided 

Missile Groups (GGWs) in various locations in West Germany, manned by a total 

of eight squadrons and equipped with nine Nike launch installations each. The Nike 

missiles could be armed with both conventional and nuclear warheads and be deployed 

against high-altitude bomber formations. The nuclear warheads could also be 

used against ground targets to reinforce the army corps’ nuclear artillery capacity. 

To supplement the Nike belt, for countering high-altitude targets, between 1963 

and 1966, NATO realised a second integrated air defence belt to counter low-altitude 

flying targets. This guided-weapons belt was equipped with conventional Hawk missiles. 

The RNLAF set up a further three Guided Missile Groups for this Hawk belt, 

manned with four squadrons each and stationed in the north-east of Germany. The 

Hawk, in contrast to the Nike system, was a fully mobile weapon system. The Guided 

Missile Groups had a high level of readiness and could be deployed within a short 

response time and under almost any weather conditions. The expansion of the guided-weapons 

belts enabled the number of flying air defence squadrons to be reduced. 

At its zenith, during the 1960s, almost 25 per cent of the RNLAF personnel complement 

was assigned to the Guided Missile Groups. At the end of the Cold War, the 

Nike system was phased out, which meant that the Guided Missile Groups lost their 

nuclear task. Meanwhile, the number of guided missile units had been significantly 

reduced. With the introduction of the Patriot system in 1986, the RNLAF acquired 

a new generation of guided weapons. In the early 1990s, the remaining guided missile 

units were withdrawn from Germany and subsequently integrated into a single 

Guided Missile Group stationed at De Peel Air Base in the Netherlands. 

In the post-war years, the air transport task had been mainly assigned to 334 

Squadron, which was carrying out a wide range of tasks, initially with a motley 

collection of single and twin-engine propeller aircraft. In addition to cargo and passenger 

transport, the squadron also carried out paratroop drops, medical evacuations, 

crew training, and provided assistance to crippled aircraft. In the event of natural 

disasters, 334 Squadron would also be deployed to fly in (medical) aid supplies and 

aid workers. Despite the squadron’s respectable track record, its scope of action was 

limited by the low load capacity and the limited range of the available transport 

aircraft. The transition to an air transport fleet with a global range and capable of 

carrying large payloads would only be effected in the 1990s. 

Around 1960, the outdated Douglas C-47 Dakota transport aircraft were replaced


by twelve Fokker F-27 Friendships, with a maximum range of 2,500 kilometres and 

a maximum payload of approximately 3,000 kilograms. In addition to these transport 

aircraft, Fokker also provided various series of training aircraft and built, under 

licence, a considerable number of fighter aircraft for the RNLAF during the Cold 

War period. Fokker’s batch production and assembly building of, among others, the 

Gloster Meteor, Hawker Hunter, F-104 Starfighter and the F-16 gave an enormous 

boost to the post-war recovery of the domestic aircraft industry sector in the Netherlands. 

With the introduction of the Hiller H-23B Raven in 1955, the helicopter made its 

debut in the ranks of the RNLAF. The rotary-wing aircraft were assigned to Light 

Aircraft Group (LAG) squadrons, an element that, until the 1970s, was also responsible 

for various types of fixed-wing light aircraft. Of all air force units, the LAG 

was the element that worked together most closely with the army. If, in peace time, 

the RNLAF had the operational command over the Light Aircraft Group, in wartime 

and during exercises, operational command switched to the commander of 1 

Army Corps. The range of tasks of the LAG was gradually extended during the Cold 

War. Starting in the 1950s with transport and communications flights, the LAG was 

later tasked with carrying out reconnaissance flights and supporting army exercises. 

With the replacement of the Hiller in the 1960s by the Sud Aviation Alouette II and 

Alouette III helicopters and the advent of the MBB Bölkow Bo-105C helicopter 

from 1975, the deployment scope was expanded even further. From the 1970s, area 

surveillance, liaison missions, artillery fire control, medical evacuations and forward 

air control (FAC) were added to the LAG’s tasks. 

The end of the Cold War necessitated a fundamental “rethink” of the role of the 

armed forces. For the RNLAF, the new focus of the Dutch defence policy manifested 

itself mainly in the purchase of a new air transport fleet and the introduction of more 

effective helicopter weapon systems. The latter led to the procurement of light and 

medium-heavy transport helicopters, later followed by the influx of attack helicopters. 

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact ushered in a 

period of drastic downsizing and restructuring of the Dutch armed forces. The “cashing 

in on the peace dividend”, which was to be incorporated in the defence policy of 

consecutive governments of various political persuasions, also had a strong impact 

on the RNLAF. This coincided with a period in which the Netherlands was pursuing 

an active foreign policy, as a result of which the armed forces not only carried 

out a large number of humanitarian missions, but also made a sizeable contribution 

to crisis response operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Thus, the 

armed forces were confronted with the apparent paradox of having to vastly improve 

its performance while being given substantially fewer resources to do so. 

The reorganisations and the spending cuts, in combination with the numerous international 

missions in which the Netherlands participated, required the transformation 

of the air force into an organisation that was tailored to the new circumstances.


“Lean and mean” became the new creed and motto. In November 1991, the commands, 

which had performed an intermediary function at the executive level between 

the air force staff and the units, were disbanded, which resulted in a more horizontal 

organisational structure of the RNLAF. In terms of its personnel complement, the 

RNLAF was at its zenith in 1967, with almost 28,000 personnel (regular, reserve, 

conscript and civilian personnel). Around 1990, the complement had been reduced to 

approximately 20,000 personnel. In the mid-1990s, the government decided to suspend 

conscription and the last air force conscript personnel left the Service in 1996. 

From that time onwards, the ranks of the armed forces were to be filled exclusively 

by volunteer personnel. Personnel reductions were to be a recurrent phenomenon in 

the following years. In 2010, the total air force personnel complement numbered just 

under 9,000 positions. 

After 1990, the number of air force elements was to be reduced strongly. This did not 

stop at the complete withdrawal of the Guided Missile Groups from Germany that was 

mentioned earlier in this article. The RNLAF also concentrated and merged virtually 

all its depots, workshops, (pilot) training and logistic support elements at Woensdrecht 

Air Base. Moreover, four air bases, Ypenburg, Deelen, Twenthe and Soesterberg had to 

close, in that order. By 2011, the striking power of the RNLAF has been concentrated 

at no more than five locations, namely: the fighter aircraft at Leeuwarden and Volkel 

Air Bases, the air transport fleet at Eindhoven Air Base, the helicopter fleet at Gilze- 

Rijen Air Base and the Guided Missile Group at De Peel Air Base. 

In addition to the Guided Missile Groups, it was the fighter aircraft in particular 

that were faced with substantial reductions. The initial air fleet of 213 F-16s was 

gradually reduced by more than half, which meant the disbandment of various fighter 

aircraft squadrons. Between 1992 and 2003, however, the F-16 fleet underwent a 

comprehensive mid-life update (MLU) programme, which resulted in an extension 

of the aircraft’s operational life. This international programme included an avionics 

upgrade, which significantly expanded the deployment possibilities of the F-16, 

especially at night and in poor weather conditions. Under the MLU programme, 139 

F-16s were fitted with new central on-board computers, better radars, an Advanced 

Identification Friend or Foe system, improved assets in the field of electronic warfare 

and improved armament. In 2011 the goverment decided to a further reduction of the 

F-16 fleet to a total number of 68 aircrafts. In the guided missile pillar, following in 

the tracks of the Nike, the Hawk was gradually taken out of the arsenal from 2005. 

The mobile Patriot system underwent a number of upgrades which made it better 

suited to engage ballistic missiles. 

As mentioned before, after the Cold War, greater emphasis was placed on air 

transport and the helicopter fleet. From 1994, the fixed-wing air transport fleet was 

transformed completely. While the twelve Fokker F-27s were being phased out, the 

RNLAF was taking into service a mixture of light and (medium-) heavy transport 

aircraft. In the second half of the 1990s, the air transport fleet consisted of two KDC- 

10s, two C-130s, four Fokker 60s, two Fokker 50s and one Gulfstream IV business 

jet. In the years to follow, even greater emphasis was placed on the heavier aircraft:


Two F-16s land at Leeuwarden Air Base. The fighter Squadrons 322 and 323 have 

been stationed at Leeuwarden for several decades. 

the Fokker 60s and 50s were replaced by two additional C-130s and one DC-10. 

Thanks to this transformation, the scope and range of action of the air transport fleet 

was substantially increased. The KDC-10, a strategic air transport aircraft, is not 

only capable of transporting a maximum payload of 65,000 kg over transatlantic distances, 

it also has air-to-air refuelling (AAR) capabilities. Owing to the KDC-10, the 

range of action of the Dutch F-16s increased considerably, both in (longer) training 

flights and in operational flights at larger distances from the Netherlands. 

The helicopter fleet underwent a similar metamorphosis in the 1990s. The Alouettes 

and Bölkows were replaced by three Augusta Bell AB 412SPs (for the Search 

and Rescue task), 13 Boeing CH-47 Chinooks, 17 Eurocopter AS 532-U2 Cougars 

and 30 Boeing AH-64D Apaches. The new composition and the increased possibilities 

for deployment of the helicopter fleet necessitated a far-reaching restructuring 

of the organisation, which, in July 2008, would result in the establishment of the 

Defence Helicopter Command (DHC), an all-Services command in which all helicopters 

were integrated, including those of the Royal Netherlands Navy. With the 

arrival of the DHC, where the higher-echelon maintenance was concentrated, the 

armed forces had at its disposal a single central point of contact for helicopters; this 

was to ensure a faster and more effective deployment. 

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the four main weapon systems used by the 

RNLAF were all to be deployed in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.


In addition, the transport aircraft and transport helicopters were to be used frequently 

in humanitarian missions. The scope of this article does not allow for a full description 

of the international missions in which the RNLAF participated. The most prominent 

operations in which the RNLAF took part are therefore outlined below. 

The Guided Missile Groups were to be deployed in crisis response operations 

even before they were withdrawn from West Germany. During the Gulf War (1990 

– 1991), Turkey asked the Dutch government to provide an air defence unit to guard 

against possible Iraqi Scud-missile attacks. From January to March 1991, two Patriot 

squadrons were stationed near Diyarbakir Air Base in Southeast Turkey during 

operation Wild Turkey. The Patriot units were later to be reinforced by two Hawk 

squadrons. In addition, in February and March 1991, the RNLAF deployed another 

eight Patriot launcher stations to Israel in the context of operation Diamond Patriot, 

again to guard against the danger of Iraqi Scud attacks. The deployment to Turkey 

was to be repeated twelve years later in operation Display Deterrence. During the 

Second Gulf War, the Turkish government again asked the Netherlands to provide 

Patriot units to protect Turkey against potential Iraqi missile attacks. From February 

to April 2003, two Patriot batteries took up positions at Diyarbakir Air Base, while 

another battery took up position near the Turkish town of Batman. The units were 

not required to take action. 

Dutch F-16 fighter aircraft did not play a role in either of the two Gulf Wars. They 

were, however, to make their mark over the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and 

afterwards over Afghanistan and Libya. From April 1993, Dutch F-16s participated 

in operation Deny Flight, which was aimed at enforcing a no-fly zone over Bosnia. 

Operating from the Italian air bases of Villafranca and later Amendola, between 

1993 and 2001, the F-16s carried out a highly varied range of tasks. In addition to air 

defence (Combat Air Patrol – CAP) and reconnaissance (recce) missions, they also 

flew ground-support missions (Close Air Support – CAS). The Dutch fighter aircraft 

operated on the basis of the so-called swing-role principle, whereby they were able 

to carry out both offensive and defensive tasks during the same mission, depending 

on the specific operational requirements of that moment. The deployment over the 

former Yugoslavia was the first time the air force had used weapons since the decolonisation 

war in Indonesia. On 21 November 1994, Dutch F-16s participated in 

the air strike against Udbina airfield in Croatia, a precision bombardment aimed at 

destroying the take-off and landing strips. In September 1995, in operation Deliberate 

Force, which was aimed at forcing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, the 

F-16s fulfilled a wide variety of tasks. Thus, they carried out over ten per cent of the 

bombardments, among other things. The systematic suppression of the ethnic Albanian 

majority in Kosovo led to the NATO decision in March 1999 to start a phased 

air campaign, operation Allied Force, which was to last 78 days in total. The Dutch 

F-16s were prominently represented in this operation; as early as the first night of 

the campaign, a Dutch F-16 shot down a Yugoslav MiG-29 Fulcrum, followed by a 

large number of bombing attacks on various Serb targets later in the operation. The 

accelerated delivery of LANTIRN targeting pods enabled the Dutch F-16s to carry


Two Dutch AH-64D "Apaches" at Kabul International Airport. Between 2001 and 

2010 the RNLAF deployed a detachment of combat helicopters to Afghanistan. 

out laser-guided precision bombardments independently. 

After years of operational activity over the Balkans, the F-16s departed for Afghanistan 

in September 2002 to take part in operation Enduring Freedom, operating 

from Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. The F-16s were tasked with providing Close 

Air Support over Afghanistan. Dutch F-16s carried out bombardments and used their 

mounted guns to relieve ground troops who were under fire. As part of the International 

Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), from 2004 onwards, the F-16s operated 

in an international context, initially from Kabul International Airport and later from 

Kandahar Airfield in the south of Afghanistan. In addition to providing air support 

– often against mobile tactical targets – and convoy escorts, the F-16s also carried 

out recce missions. They were scheduled to stay in Afghanistan until the end of 2010 

in order to provide convoy protection to the redeploying Dutch military personnel 

after the completion of their mission in Uruzgan. Later it was decided that the F-16s 

will take part in (the protection of) a new police training mission in the northern 

Afghan province of Kunduz. From March 2011 Dutch F-16's, operating from the 

Decimomannu Air Base on Sardinia, also help to enforce the no-fly zone over revolting 

Libya. 

Since the Cold War, the transport aircraft of the RNLAF have carried out numerous 

humanitarian missions and have taken part in various peace operations. The 

F-27s of 334 Squadron still proved very useful in the first period after the fall of the 

Berlin Wall. At the end of 1989, they flew food parcels and medicines to Romania


where the Ceausescu regime had been brought down. In 1992, an F-27 detachment 

spent almost six months in Southeast Asia to carry out transport flights from Thailand 

for the UN mission in Cambodia. The F-27s were also deployed to support the 

F-16 detachment in Villafranca, Italy, and they carried out human relief flights and 

(medical) evacuations in the Balkans. From 1994, the air transport task for humanitarian 

missions was carried out by the C-130s, including Rwanda in 1994, Angola 

in 1995, the Caribbean in 1995 and 1998, and by the KDC-10s, including Iran in 

1997, Afghanistan in 1998 and Central America in 2001. These new transport aircraft 

greatly improved the RNLAF’s capabilities for providing strategic air transport 

and support to Dutch military missions at large distances from the Netherlands. The 

air-to-air refuelling capability of the two KDC-10s was another big step forward. 

The multifunctional tanker aircraft proved their value in the Kosovo crisis in 1999 

and later during operation Enduring Freedom and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. 

As mentioned before in this article, helicopter operations became increasingly 

important to the RNLAF’s international operations. In the years after 1989, this task 

was carried out initially by the Alouette III and the Bölkow, for instance in Iraq, 

Cambodia and in the Balkans. The new transport and combat helicopters took over 

this task at a later stage. A Chinook detachment provided humanitarian aid to the 

Kosovar refugees in Macedonia and Albania in 1999, and a detachment consisting 

of four CH-47s was deployed to the Horn of Africa from 2000 to 2001 in the context 

of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Between 2001 and 

2004, Cougar and Chinook detachments rotated within the framework of the Implementation 

Force (IFOR) and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina. 

This was to be repeated between 2003 and 2005 in the context of the Stabilisation 

Force Iraq (SFIR), from Tallil Air Base in southern Iraq. This rotating system of 

Cougars and Chinooks was to be applied again in Afghanistan, at Kandahar Airfield 

between 2006 and 2010. The transport helicopters were assigned the whole of South 

Afghanistan as their area of operations. As had been the case with the deployment of 

transport helicopters, the deployment of Dutch combat helicopters was highly valued 

by both the Dutch ground forces and by the international coalition partners. Apache 

helicopters were deployed to Bosnia (1998-1999), Djibouti (2001), Iraq (2004-2005) 

and Afghanistan (2004-2005, 2006-2010) respectively. 1 June 2006 witnessed the 

first deployment in combat action of a Dutch AH-64D in Uruzgan. Since that time, 

the Dutch Apaches frequently used their weapon systems to support Dutch troops on 

the ground in combat. They demonstrated their effectiveness in providing Close Air 

Support. The Apaches, on various occasions, succeeded in relieving ground troops 

who were under fire. 

In 2011, the Netherlands will boast a century of experience with the military deployment 

of the aircraft. Until 1940, the development of the Dutch national air arm 

took place, both literally and figuratively, within its own “narrow” borders. The politics 

of non-involvement, the generally limited (financial) resources and the views of 

the military establishment led to a modest position of the air arm in the Netherlands,


it was considered as an auxiliary arm on the fringes of the army. This was to change 

after the Second World War: from 1940 the new norm was set by more intensive 

international cooperation with the allies. The operational theatre of the air force was 

no longer restricted to Dutch territory. During the Second World War, the Dutch 

were active on various faraway battlefields, and following the war, the air force was 

integrated into the NATO defence structure. In 1953, following many foreign air 

forces, the Dutch air force was accorded the status of independent Service, on a par 

with the army and the navy. From that time onwards, the NATO treaty area was to be 

the theatre of operations for the Royal Netherlands Air Force. Training and exercises 

mainly took place outside the Netherlands and the deployment of combat aircraft 

was directed and coordinated from international headquarters. The guided missile 

units of the RNLAF were not stationed in the Netherlands, but formed an integral 

part of the guided missile belt in Germany along the Iron Curtain. After the Cold 

War, the RNLAF was streamlined into a smaller, flexible and expeditionary air force, 

and, with its combat aircraft, guided missiles, transport aircraft and helicopters, the 

RNLAF provides a contribution to humanitarian operations and peace operations 

across the entire spectrum of force, on the global stage and always in an international 

framework. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

• A.P. de Jong (ed.), Vlucht door de tijd. 75 jaar Nederlandse luchtmacht (Houten 1988) 

• P.E. van Loo, Crossing the Border. De Koninklijke Luchtmacht na de val van de Berlijnse 

Muur (The Hague 2003) 

• W.H. Lutgert and R. de Winter, Check the Horizon. De Koninklijke Luchtmacht en het 

conflict in voormalig Joegoslavië 1991-1995 (The Hague 2001) 

• R. Nederlof, Blazing Skies. De Groepen Geleide Wapens van de Koninklijke Luchtmacht 

in Duitsland, 1960-1995 (The Hague 2002) 

• D. Starink, De luchtmacht opgebouwd. De totstandkoming en de realisatie van het Luchtmachtopbouwplan-1951 

(The Hague 2001) 

• D. Starink, “De nuclearisering van de krijgsmacht” in: B. Schoenmaker and J.A.M.M. 

Janssen (ed.), In de schaduw van de Muur. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht rond 1960 (The 

Hague 1997), 82-99 

• D. Starink, Gevechtsvliegtuigen voor de KLu. De geschiedenis van de keuzebepaling en 

de aanschaf (The Hague 1991) 

• R. de Winter, Hendrik Walaardt Sacré (1873-1949) Leven voor de Luchtvaart (The Hague 

1992) 

• R. de Winter and E.H.J.C.M. Doreleijers, Luchtmachtstructuren in beweging. 80 jaar 

luchtmachtorganisatie (The Hague 1994) 

• R. de Winter and P.E. van Loo, Luchtmachtbevelhebbers geportretteerd 1954-2005 (The 

Hague 2006)

an t o n i o d e Je s u s bi s P o * 

Portogallo 

Doctrine, Capacities, Technology and operational 

Environment on the Employment of the Air Power; 

the Case of Guerrilla Warfare 

The Portuguese experience on the effective employment of airpower in actual 

operations, during the past century, can be resumed to the war against guerrilla 

in which the country has been involved in Africa for thirteen years, 1961- 

1974. In the two wars that ripped the world in the twentieth century, the Portu guese 

Air Power had no noteworthy intervention. 

In fact, participation of Portuguese aviators in the First Great War took place 

with them being integrated into allied formations, due to material difficulties in acquiring 

airplanes that could make up a single national air force unit. In the Second 

World War Portugal maintain a neutral position and remained out of the centre of 

the conflict, and because of this the Portuguese action was merely limited to ensure 

readiness of the scarce air resources that were available then, assigning a squadron 

to the Azores archipelago. 

Our purpose, when describing that counter guerrilla war period, in their most 

relevant aspects, is to match this description with the principles of air doctrine in 

construction in Europe and America since the twenties. 

The first steps of the Portuguese Air Force 

Before we get into this description, we need to devote some lines on the route of 

the Portuguese Air Force soon after its constitution as a Branch of the Armed Forces 

in 1952. 

The first effort after this legal constitution resided, essentially, in the areas of 

organization and doctrine, development and implementation of training standards, 

according to the model adopted by most of the Western Air Forces. 

In fact, the Portuguese Air Force lived one of its golden ages in the fifties of last 

century, in terms of the technological upgrading, the volume of the means that were 

allocated to it and for its high level of operational readiness. It flew about 55,000 

flight hours per year, one quarter of this effort being the responsibility of the two 

squadrons of F-84G combat aircraft. 

* Lieutenant General (Retired) Portuguese Air Force.


In the middle of the decade there were plans for a restructuring of the system of 

air forces which included six Fighter Squadrons, two Squadrons of Maritime Patrol 

and Antisubmarine Warfare, a Transport and Search and Rescue Squadron, among 

other means, within the framework of Euro Atlantic defence and strategic air space 

of national interest, all of these Squadrons based in national airfields in the Portuguese 

mainland and insular territory. 

It was an ambitious plan which had the approval of the Minister of National 

Defence. But as early as 1957 the concerns about the security in the Portuguese 

overseas territories began, which led to abandon this plan, or to redirect some of its 

aspects to another configuration. 

In 1952 the Air Force had a strength of about 2,000 people and eleven squadrons 

organized into groups, with the following main types of airpla nes, among other less 

significant: Hurricane, F-47 Thunderbolt, Spitfire, Junkers JU-52, Lysander, B-17, 

C-54, Curtiss Helldiver, T-6, Grumman, in a total of 375 aircraft, including in this 

inventory the resources that had come from the previous Military Aeronautical Service 

and Naval Aviation belonging to the Portuguese Army and Portuguese Navy, 

respectively. 

In the meantime Portuguese Air Force received two Squadrons of F-84G aircrafts 

under the “Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement “ established with the United 

States of America following the end of World War II, and this reception was a very 

important technological and operational milestone. 

In 1959 the effective staff reaches the number of about 7,500 people, after the introduction 

of the fleet of F-86F integrated in two Squadrons, in 1958, under the same 

agreement, which gives an idea of the expansion that mean while took place. 

Preparing for war 

Given the international environment in general and to the Bandung Conference 

of 1955 in particular, a sense of fear of some instability in the overseas Portuguese 

territories began to grow. 

Portugal, who had fought some forty years before with the sacrifice of many 

lives, to maintain sovereignty over those territories, enforcing its historical rights, 

facing up to the other European powers, did not feel threatened, in principle, by 

these tendencies. In the face of attacks that were directed to it at international assemblies, 

Portugal responded with the arguments of the specific political organization 

of those territories, which according to the Portuguese Constitution were considered 

as Portuguese provinces, and of the existence of a multi-continental and multi-racial 

Portuguese community. “The winds of history” were however merciless in the denial 

of these arguments and led the country to a relative political isolation. 

However, given the international environment of those times in which the constitution 

and support of independence movements was fomented, and on the other 

hand the official Portuguese position, the conflict became inevitable and a break in

do C t r i n e, Ca pa C i t i e s, te C H n o l o g y a n d o p e r at i o n a l en v i r o n m e n t o n t H e em p l o y m e n t o f t H e air po w e r ; t H e Ca s e o f guerrilla wa r fa r e 231 

the safety of those territories was expected to occur. 

Aware of this hypothetical situation, the Undersecretary of State for Aeronautical 

Affairs published a Directive in 1957 for the launching of the necessary facilities 

to support air operations in Portugal’s overseas territories, in anticipation of local 

operation and of air deployment to the three operational theatres. 

In 1958 an inspection visit to assess the situation is made by a team headed by the 

Air Force Chief of Staff, and in the following year the Himba operational Exercise 

took place. 

The Himba exercise consisted of a military air transport operation to check routes 

and infrastructure, potential stopovers for transit and operation, and a demonstration 

of sovereignty, of the presence of a military force in Portu guese Africa; 14 planes 

were involved, namely 6 Skymaster, 2 C-47 Dakota, and 6 PV-2 Harpoon that flew 

to Angola from the Continental ba ses, using Portuguese scale airfields, along the 

oceanic route. In Angola, they flew over Carmona, Santo Antonio do Zaire, Cabinda, 

Malange, Henrique de Carvalho and Lobito; a big air show was held in Luanda with 

aircrafts and ground troops parading, the launching of paratroopers and real air fire 

display, before an enthusiastic crowd, proud of its Air Force. Other parades were 

held in Sá da Bandeira and Nova Lisboa. This action was of fundamental importance 

from the psychological standpoint with the population, in addition to the operational 

test that it consisted of. 

The Air Force built fifteen major runways in Angola, nine in Mozambique, five 

in Guinea, plus major extensions and improvements to the existing ones in that date 

which were too few. 

Towards the end of 1956 a decree had been published that created the Portuguese 

Air Regions, one covering the mainland, the Azores, Madeira, Cape Verde 

and Guinea, another that included Angola and S. Tome and Principe and the other 

based in Mozambique, which included, apart from this territory, the Portuguese territories 

in India, Macau and Timor. In each of these regions Air Bases would be 

formed and other classes of aerodromes to ensure full coverage of the Portuguese 

Overseas Territory in terms of airspace jurisdiction. It took relatively some time for 

the organization of these new commands and to deploy the necessary means to these 

remote regions. However, the legal and physical conditions were created for a quick 

implementation in face of developments in the political internati onal and local environments, 

when more appropriated. 

The onset of war in Angola 

In January of 1961 a popular movement of resistance and challenge against the 

legitimate authority begins in Angola, in much localized areas in the North. First, in a 

small village named Mailundo, then in other towns or vil lages, whose people worked 

almost exclusively in the cultivation of cotton, at the service of a large company. 

Those people refused to work and to obey the orders of administrative authorities.


This strange situation became very tense at the site, with rumours about the creation 

of groups of local agitators, and the confrontation with the authorities by large 

masses. The positions adopted by these populations resulted from two influences, 

that joined forces in the end: political propaganda fostered by movements based 

in Congo, with a contagious effect that caused, and religious fanatics of a sect also 

spread in several areas in Africa; the basic ideas of these two sources merged to produce 

a sentiment of revolt that would lead to acts of complete paroxysm. 

The ground forces available, which were scarce, immediately rushed in an attempt 

to impose order. The outbreaks of disorder spread in the same moulds, to other 

populations in an area that is designated by “Baixa do Cassange”. The military reaction 

that followed the revolt calmed down the spirits; the agitators, of strange ethnic 

origins, disappeared, and the region became peaceful after about two weeks. 

Until this situation was reached, the ground forces felt strongly threatened, using 

force and producing casualties. Not only the military forces, but certain segments of 

the population and police forces, felt in situations of large peril. As a result of the 

inevitable confrontations military forces suffered relatively small casualties, and the 

civilian casualties were about two hundred. 

The aircraft in this scenario acted primarily through actions of reconnaissance, 

transportation of supplies and ammunition, as well as attack in dramatic situations, 

when the human masses in a trance seemed to surround civilians and military ground 

units. All this emergency action takes place without communications between aircraft 

and land forces and without patterned proceedings of air to ground cooperation 

and airspace management. 

By the time of the events in Baixa do Cassange, the only military airfield in Angola 

was in Luanda. The aircraft parked there were 11 PV2, maritime patrol aircraft 

adapted to operations in air land environments, 7 NORDATLAS transport planes, 

4 light aircraft DO-27 and 4 BROUSSARD and some T-6G (to be deployed to the 

NEGAGE airfield, as we will see later). In that month of January 1961, the PV2 

aircraft were engaged in 38 mis sions and in an identical number in February, broken 

down by independent strike actions, attacks in close support of ground forces and 

populations, air recon missions and medical evacuation. The NORDATLAS conducted 

19 missions in January in and 34 missions in February transporting personnel 

and cargo. 

At the end of 1960, 4 Auster light aircraft used in visual reconnaissance actions, 

airborne command post, cargo transportation, medical evacuation, had been deployed 

to Carmona, near the future airfield of Negage landing on makeshift runways. 

During the events at the Baixa do Cassange these four aircraft accomplished around 

200 flying hours, searching for and detecting rebel movements, guiding the ground 

forces in an extremely primary way, given the lack of air/ground communication, 

providing food, ammunition and mail to the besieged forces. On the 6th February 

two of these aircraft are deployed to Malange for the same type of air activity.


Since mid-1960 that the Negage airfield was being built, located about 135 nautical 

miles east-northeast of Luanda. On 7th February 1961 the first landing of an 

Auster and a NORD takes place here, although the airfield facilities were concluded 

only in September that year. This military airfield, already legally constituted, was 

named as AB3 (aerodrome base number 3). 

On March 15, 1961 a brutal offensive is started by human waves armed with 

machetes and “canhangulos” (artisanal rifle) against towns and farms in the districts 

of Zaire, Uige and Cuanza Norte, particularly Quibaxe, Vista Alegre, Aldeia Viçosa, 

Quitexe, Quicabo, New Caipemba, Nambuangongo, Zala, Quibala, Bessa Monteiro, 

Madimba, Canda, M, bridge, Buela, and others. The rebels killed thousands of 

people, all civilians, including more than a thousand whites. Many of these places 

were occupied by the attackers, while the resident population escaped. Elsewhere the 

population was able to resist and stay, providing authentic strongholds which were 

permanently threatened with no possibility of escape and trying to survive. This action 

spread panic across the region, which led to an almost total exodus of resident 

population, even those who had not been threatened yet. 

Light aircraft, civil and military, proceeded to the transport of fleeing terrified 

people, concentrating at the aerodrome of Negage, where an airlift to Luanda was 

organized for around 3,500 people, essentially with NORD ATLAS planes. 

On March 16, the first paratroopers company arrives in Luanda by airplane and 

is immediately deployed to the area of operations. The paratroopers had been constituted 

in 1956 under the Air Force, initially at battalion level (over the following 

years, the organization expanded to form a regiment in the mainland, battalions in 

three theatres of war and finally as Corps, alrea dy after the war in Africa, integrated 

into the structure of the Portuguese Air Force; they are currently integrated into the 

Army). 

The military response to the chaotic situation caused by the offensive of March 

15 is made with the few forces available in which the aircraft means played a relevant 

role in support of civilian populations and land forces, and in reconnaissance 

and strike flights against the rebel forces. 

On April 21 the first contingent of ground forces goes to Angola which will enhance 

the existing units. Three days before more paratroopers had depar ted from 

Portugal to Angola by airway, and on May 8, No. 21 Paratrooper Battalion, based in 

Luanda, is formed. 

Prior to March 15 ground forces in Angola were just two regiments, one based in 

Luanda, one in New Lisbon, another group of Cavalry based in Silva Porto – considering 

the dimensions of the territory, and in particular the area affected by actions 

of extreme violence, these forces were too short and were relatively displaced out of 

the area of operations. 

The guerrilla attacks continued but not as intensely as in mid-March, now more 

selecti ve or specific, such as the attack on Úcua with the massacre of 13 white, or


Quitexe on April 10, or Lucunga with massacre of civilians, among many others. 

The military start with the rescue operations to recover the occupied or devastated 

villages, suffering a few attacks such as the ambush of a column in Cólua, on April 

2, where Portuguese forces suffered nine deaths, among them two officers. On April 

29 a column of para troopers drives a large group of rebels out of Mucaba in a siege 

on a stronghold of residents, after a fire action carried out by PV2 aircraft. 

These major operations launched by ground forces, through siege and recovery 

of positions, as was the case with Operation Green Stone, the assault operation of 

Nambuangongo, and operations in the hills of Canda and Sacandica were supported 

by air units of the Air Base No. 9 and the AB3 in Negage. The PV2 91 st Squadron 

conducted 56 missions in March and 88 in April, the NORD 92 nd Squadron 92 missions 

in March and 103 missions in April. The PV2 pilots made an average of 60 

flight hours per month and the NORD pilots about 45. This flight effort would grow 

in a crescendo until November 1961 – in this year the PV2 flew about 3,000 flight 

hours, and the monthly number of missions increased to approximately a hundred 

(in July); the NORD reached 2600 hours (until the end of the year transported about 

29,000 passengers and about three thousand five hundred tons of cargo). 

In late March 4 T-6G airplanes flying from Luanda, reached the airfield of Negage. 

They were basic flight training aircrafts, adapted to ground attack with 7.62 m/m 

machine-guns, installed in outer nests, combs of 37 m/m rockets, 15 and 50 Kilos 

bombs, in different configurations. The armament in the external stations affected 

significantly the aerodynamics performance of the plane, although in parameters 

which were acceptable for the execu tion of the mission. These aircraft had radio 

equipment for contact with the ground forces, in FM. 

On April 30 there were 4 T-6, 4 Auster and 4 DO-27 (light aircraft used for liaison 

and reconnaissance, capable for transport of 5 equipped military, or 440 kilos of 

load, and also used as close air support with nests of two 37 m/m rockets installed on 

the lower surface of the wings), operating in Negage by 14 pilots already in placed 

there. 

These numbers increased gradually and at the end of the year there were 15 T-6G 

and 9 DO-27 in this Airfield. In the month of March the T-6 performed 22 operational 

missions, 72 in April and 103 in May (highest average of the year) being the majority 

armed recon operations. There were 11 close air support operations in April and 25 in 

May. The DO-27 aircraft, which in April and May were only four, performed 96 air 

actions in April and 161 in May, averaging about 50 hours/pilot assigned per month; 

and in April the DO- 27 pilots there were 13, in July 18 and in November 22. The 

fleet of T-6G, performed 1867 hours of flight until the end of 1961, and the fleet of 

DO-27, a total of 3254 hours of flight in the same year. All the pilots placed on this 

Airfield were qualified in more than one aircraft, to support this effort of flight that 

the Unit was requested to make in emergency situations. These figures give a rough 

idea about the quick reaction to the situation, by the building up of the air power in 

the region. The same had occurred with other units.


The major ground operations that started in April took place at the Nor thern Intervention 

Zone (ZIN), which was established then, and included the districts of 

Cabinda, Zaire, Uige, Luanda, Kwanza Norte and Malange, being supported by 

air forces in operations of fire support, recon, logistical support including medical 

evacuation. In addition to these typical actions, the aircraft proceeded to interdiction 

operations, or independent aerial attacks, and also in air transport actions in support 

of the affected civilian po pulation. All logistical support actions covered the entire 

territory, although the priority effort was focused on that ZIN. 

Since the beginning of the deployment of the forces to Angola, an organi zation 

for joint operations was thought of. A Joint Operations Centre (CCO) was immediately 

proposed to be built in Luanda, at General Staff level, according to the doctrine 

prevailing then in NATO, manned with adequate staff personnel and equipped with 

communications which would allow the planning and management of joint operations. 

After many discussions among the General Staff and of the branches of the 

armed forces they reached the conclusion that this superstructure would be incompatible 

in face of the reality of resources available. The solution adopted was a more 

flexible one to establish coordination at various levels, from the Land Command and 

Command of the Air Region, to the air detachments placed in support of ground units 

- these detachments, of variable structure according to the operational situation, gave 

a satisfactory response to the requests of the corresponding land commands, according 

to the tactical, technical and logistical instructions of the Air Region Command; 

each detachment could not exceed the effort of flight authorized by the Air Region, 

which managed, obviously, the full flight hours potential. 

Another initial concern was the organization of the Intelligence services, which 

came to be fixed by law (Law Decree of the Government of the Re public) in June 

1961. The Commission for Provincial Information, the Cen tralization and Coordination 

of Information Services of Angola (SCCIA) and District Committees were 

created. The Provincial Committee was chaired by the Governor and included the 

Military Commands, the Director of SCCIA, and the Director of the Investigation 

Police for the Defence of the State (PIDE) in Angola. The SCCIA were the executive 

organization which included the research centre, the military cabinet, the political 

cabinet, and the civilian cabinet, the cabinet of special activities, administrative 

and communication services. At district level there were district sections with an 

equivalent composition (military, administrative, police) that were connected with 

the central offices above. It is important to make reference to these services, in that 

it reflected a global character for all the operations of war, involving not only military 

but also civilians - this feature was very strong in Angola at the beginning of 

the operations, manifested, for example, with the provision of local volunteers in 

defensive actions with proper armament. Initially, volunteer air forces consisting of 

private aircraft piloted by civilian pilots were created spontaneously and were subsequently 

monitored by the Regional Air Command; the civilian pilots were subject 

to certain military rules in nature, especially in terms of security. They constituted an


air militia and performed transport actions, recon and medi cal evacuation, especially 

of civilians. 

In August two other types of aircraft come into play: the F-84G integrated in 

Squadron 93 and the helicopter AL II in the Transport and Reconnais sance Squadron, 

becoming later Squadron 94 , both from Air Base No 9. 

The F-84 aircraft, acquired under the “Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement”, 

had been put out of active service of the Portuguese Air For ce in the mainland in 

1961. After its phase-out it was transferred to Angola and it would be used for reconnaissance 

missions in the northern border and in interception missions of eventual 

supply convoys of the rebel forces, and detection of corridors of infiltration, interdiction 

missions or independent attack, or close air support to the ground forces. 

Apart from the internal .50 machine-guns, it displaced external stations where several 

types of air armament could be suspended such as 2.75 and 5 inch rocket, 50 

and 200 kilos and 250, 500 and 750 pounds bombs. In August there were five planes 

ready for operations (transported by sea from Lisbon, but assembled in Luanda), 

with seven pilots assigned who flew a total of 44 missions in that month; in the following 

month they flew 139 missions, 66 of close air support, 14 of reconnaissance, 

eight border patrols in the Northern frontier, 29 of independent attack and 22 of other 

nature, such as demonstration flights, training or flyovers. Since October, 11 aircraft 

were ready. It must be highlighted the fact that the rate of readiness of the fleet was 

80% in August, 77% in September, 66% in October, 82% in November and 90% in 

December 1961, numbers that are impressive for a fleet previously “extinct” because 

was reaching the end of their normal life. 

Fundamentally, Squadron 93 constituted itself as an important deterrent element, 

both internally and internationally, apart from its relevant direct action, given its firepower. 

When war started in Angola news came about that foreign aviators would be 

available to offer their services to the guerrillas, with small aircraft that could launch 

attacks on major targets, escaping unscathed to sanctuaries nearby in neighbouring 

countries - with no air defence system to stop them, including radar coverage and interceptors, 

and as such aircraft would not need major infrastructures to operate, they 

might become powerful weapons, in particular against Air Power. This news was not 

confirmed in Angola, but the F84 would have been the most appropriate means to 

oppose, in some measure, to this menace. 

The AL II was acquired by the Portuguese Air Force in 1958; on August 18, 1961 

the assembly of the first two helicopters of this type was completed in Luanda, and 

a year later 4 more were assembled, amounting to a fleet of six aircraft until their 

replacement for the ALL III in July 1963. The primary mission of ALL II was medical 

evacuation, featuring two stretchers on the outside of the cabin - it had not a very 

intensive use, as compared with AL III. 

One of the first concerns of the Air Force was to establish a system of communications. 

A fixed service in SSB was established which linked the Regional Air


Command with Negage, Maquela, Cabinda and Toto, as well as an Aeronautical HF 

mobile service linking the stations above with some aircraft that had this type of receivers. 

Air control towers operating in the VHF band were built in the airfields. All 

airplanes, with the exception of the F84, the NORD and C54, were equipped with 

VHF/FM for contact with the ground forces. The only radio aids to navigation were 

radio beacons installed at the main bases. A relatively obsolete radar was installed 

in Negage. 

The operations for the recovery of the strongholds occupied by rebel forces were 

given as concluded by late September 1961, when the situation was considered stable 

with no outbreaks of lawless violence uncovered. This meant that the war would 

go on to have another feature, more in accor dance with the classic guerrilla war 

paradigm. 

With the completion of major operations, started in April 1961, the military had 

been gradually gaining control of the situation: the villages and farms were being 

occupied by military force, and security was being established. It was a very difficult 

situation, in particular because of the nature of anarchic violence. With more security, 

the populations were returning progressively to their homes, economic activity 

was returning to normal, the roads which had been cut with “abatizes” (huge tree 

trunks) and mines were being cleaned and brid ges that had been destroyed were being 

rebuilt, the first being the so-called coffee road in the hills of Canda, in July. A 

ground forces grid was being set up, with a lot of small units in all relevant posi tions. 

Between February and late June 1961 the ground forces casualties amounted to 50 

killed and over a hundred serious injuries. 

Air activity continued in this period at that pace, not only in participation in these 

operations but also in actions of presence and logistical support to military personnel 

and civilians in other areas of Angola. Outside the areas where there was still no 

presence of Portuguese troops, the Air Force acted independently, with no need in 

coordinating its actions within the strategy defined by the high ranks, either through 

reconnaissance and patrol or by offensive actions when the objectives were considered 

important. 

The declaration of stability towards the end of September 1961 did not obviously 

mean the end of military operations. The political system called the operations from 

that moment on, as police operations, for reasons of international political strategy, 

but in reality they were war operations in the form of guerrilla warfare. As noted, 

only the Northern Province was hit by this wave of violence that was directed from 

the Congo. 

The fundamental difference in the military situation was in the form of action of 

the rebel forces: the first phase, between March and September, was characterized 

by massacres of civilians, with knives, machetes and “canhangulos” and the rebel 

forces moved in open terrain against the populations and military forces, in large 

fanaticized masses. It was relatively easy to detect the movements of these hordes


by aerial reconnaissance, or to detect suspicious signs of imminent attack, as it was 

possible to stop its advance with intimidating aerial fire. In the following stage the 

enemy hides in the forest and ambushes the military columns, by flogging actions 

against the barracks, being much more difficult to detect them; the enemy forces in 

presence have now a military character, with political and technical preparation, and 

begin using more sophisticated armament - instead of machetes and canhangulos, 

they start having automatic weapons, mines and shells, decreasing the attacks on the 

population and attacking our forces, according to the technique of hit and run, filtering 

through the jungle, a difficult place to penetrate by conventional military forces. 

However, they have other type of difficulties: the adherence of the population, estranged 

from ideological or political motivation, which in its majority wants peace 

above all, and the need of getting supplies across the border by creating corridors of 

infiltration with a minimum of fixed points or routes considered indispensable but 

detectable by air. 

As mentioned, the air operations were very much oriented for visual reconnaissance, 

for armed reconnaissance, to attack small and very well located guerrilla targets, 

for close air support to ground forces, in addition to logistical support actions 

for the benefit of the military forces. The missions of assault with helicopters and 

special forces, with fire support given by the T - 6, the PV2, the F - 84, and the helicopter 

gunship (side fire power with 20 m/m cannon shot) were very relevant in the 

context of operational situation. Also the air action of tracking enemy trails, executed 

with helicopters and paratroopers, which consisted of discovering and tracking 

the infiltrators from the North, concluded by detection, arrest or attack on guerrilla 

groups in supplying operations was a very significant example of use of air power. 

In Angola there was only one main operating air base, BA No 9, throughout all 

the period of war until 1975 (in Portuguese classification military airfields could be 

main operating airbase – BA, aerodrome bases – AB, tactical airfields – AM, and 

alternate or temporary airfields – AR, depending on the infrastructure, the volume of 

resources and the organiza tion). There were two aerodrome bases, one in Negage, 

AB 3, built in 1961 as we have already seen and the other in Henri que de Carvalho, 

AB 4, implemented afterwards. It was yet legally established a third one aerodrome 

base, the AB10 in Serpa Pinto, but was never activated. In addition to these major 

infrastructures there were still tactical airfields (AM) and alternate airfields. Dependent 

on BA 9 there was the AM95 in Cabinda; AM 31 in Maquela do Zombo, AM 

32 in Toto, AM 33 in Malange depended on the AB 3; dependent on AB 4 were AM 

41 in Portugalia, AM 42 in Camaxilo, AM 43 in Cazombo and AM 44 in Luso. The 

alternate airfields were the N’Riquinha, Cuito Canavale and Gago Coutinho. From 

the tumultuous times of the year 1961, military operations in Angola entered a phase 

of routine in the Northern Intervention Zone, in that it was characterized by typical 

guerrilla warfare, with control of territory by the Portuguese forces. 

However other movements appeared, the MPLA and UNITA, and the ini tial 

movement of UPA developed into FNLA. For political reasons, these forces moved


eastward, nearly five years after the initial operations in the North, forcing the creation 

by the Portuguese authorities of the Eastern Intervention Zone (ZIL) covering 

the districts of Lunda and Moxico. After 1966 the Portuguese forces began to confront 

the three movements in this ZIL, which required a redirection of effort. AB 4 

was reinforced with six PV2, two of which were deployed permanently in Luso, and 

in 1968 it already had a Beechcraft 45 plane, 11 T-6G and 11 DO27 flying about 300 

hours per month in total. The total air resources in Angola were roughly maintained, 

being some of them redirected to the East. 

The fleet of helicopters Allouette III, which arrived in 1963, reached in 1972 its 

maximum number of 29 units which conducted about 4,500 flight hours per year, 

always attributed to BA 9 organically, but with detachments on several bases in the 

theatre of operations in transport actions of assault, fire support and medical evacuation. 

In 1970, 5 SA-330 helicopters, PUMA, came to the theatre of operations, integrated 

in Squadron 94 but operating in the East; the year after the fleet is enhanced 

with another helicopter of this type. Until the end of 1973 they conducted on average 

about 1,200 flight hours per year. These helicopters were deployed in Mozambique, 

at AB 7, in a total of three in 1973 and five in 1974. This means a transfer of war 

effort along the time. 

Between 1963 and 1966 a P2V5 airplane was deployed to BA 9 for air patrol, 

and carried out 1064 flight hours in 508 missions in the first year, 1083 flight hours 

in 162 missions the following year, and 200 flight hours and 39 missions in the last 

year of deployment (1966). 

A major effort on the East front, with aircrafts diverting from other units, the 

introduction of the fleet of B26, in numbers of four aircraft in October 1972 and the 

inactivation of the F-84 the following November were the biggest differences from 

the start up of the theatre of operations. 

The tactical airfield of Luso becomes the centre of air operations with PV2, T-6, 

DO27 and ALL III, stationed there or based on AB 4. The operations assumed a 

character of routine and the Portuguese armed forces tried to disconnect the enemy 

organization, which suffered many difficulties of various kinds on the ground - the 

first of which was the lack of unity among the three movements. The battle for development 

continued throughout the province, now that the necessary security measures 

were reached. 

The war in Guinea 

The war in Guinea had very different characteristics from the war in Angola, 

namely in the way it was initiated, in the organization of the guerrilla and in the 

geographical characteristics of the territory. The evidence of the existence of a rebel 

movement was also given by a relatively spectacular fact that was the vandalizing of 

the touristic infrastructure on the beach of Ponta Varela, up North, which led to the


abandonment of this enterprise. Still in 1961 an attack on S. Domingos took place 

which resulted in four injuries and another attack was held in Tite, opposite Bissau 

with a military casualty. The effort of the rebel movement was initially directed 

towards its internal organization, staff training of political and military leaders, for 

the recruitment of combatants, for its deployment on the ground, for ideologi cal 

indoctrination, for military training, for the isolation of some areas cutting its access 

routes, with mines and abatis; in the early years of its existence, the expression of 

the rebel force was not very visible from the outside. The violent actions were too 

few. On the contrary of what happened in Angola, there was only one movement; 

immediately after the initial phase of rebellion, the African Party for the Independence 

of Guinea and Cape Verde, which initially had another name, set aside other 

movements with the less international support, which had meanwhile appeared, and 

from now on had hegemonic position. 

The Portuguese air power in the province was less than rudimentary, in 1961; it 

consisted of a small number of T-6G and of Auster planes. In the face of potential instability, 

the Air Force sent to Bissau 8 F-86F aircraft and its weaponry. The “ferry” 

of these aircrafts, which consisted of an im portant operation with some risk attached 

to it, began on 15th August 1961, using the Spanish base of Gando, in the Canary 

Islands, and the airfield of Sal in Cape Verde, and was supported by P2V5, C-54 and 

DC-6 airplanes and by Navy vessels, in support of navigation, search and rescue 

and trans port of support equipment. In the planning of this mission three hypotheses 

were considered for intermediate support points: Porto Santo – Canary Islands - Sal; 

Canary Islands - Sal; and in a direct flight from Montijo in mainland to Sal. For all 

the plans it was considered the use of four external fuel tanks, a configuration that 

had never been experienced earlier; the last possibility (direct flight to Sal) considered 

the compulsory ejection of the four external tanks during flight, after the fuel 

was used up, with the ulti mate part of the route to be flown at 42,000 feet. At the end 

of the study, the latter solution was chosen, with transit through the Canaries, which 

was the safest solution. 

These aircraft began immediately to implement actions of sovereignty with flights 

over the entire territory, patrol of river and land communication routes, demonstration 

of presence in the air, constituting themselves as a deterrent force of great importance. 

In the meantime the ground forces organization was expanding, with installation 

of ground units, made with great caution, but with no serious difficulties during 

the deployment operations, besides the problems with obstacles, minefields and 

traps placed in their respective accesses. In a relatively small area of about 32,000 

square kilometres, flat, covered with forest for the most part, cut by numerous rivers, 

sea inlets and channels, over eighty bases of ground forces were constituted, which 

number continued to increase, and over seventy air strips for the operation of light 

aircraft were prepared. On the contrary, the F-86F operated during its stay until mid- 

October 1964 (withdrawn from the theatre of war by American imposition) from


Bissau, without the existence of an alternate or emergency airfield. The Fiat G91 

plane which replaced the F-86, but only in 1967, occa sionally used the runway of 

Gabu, in the East, to extend its range of action in operations in the East and Southeast 

and the medium transport aircraft used regularly the air strips of Farim, Bafata and 

Gabu. 

The first real action of air attack occurred on April 4, 1963, as an action of demonstration 

and intimidation, consisted in an air attack against a strip of land near a 

village which the enemy had isolated. The enemy hostile act that caused such action 

was the sail of the PAIGC flag and the shooting at an Auster airplane with light armament 

when overfly the tabanka (indigenous settlement) of Dar es Salaam. Immediately 

after this event a series of bombardments took place against targets that were 

very precise geographical locations where there we re indications of enemy presence, 

selected by the General Province Go vernment itself. 

At the beginning of military operations, there was the Aerodrome Base 2 in direct 

dependency of Cape Verde and Guinea Air Zone (ZACVG) with headquarters 

at Bissau. With development of military operations, and in creased air assets, this 

airfield gained the status of main operating air base, with the designation of BA No. 

12, becoming the only base unit of the territory throughout the period of the war. 

Farim, Bafata, Gabu, Aldeia Formosa and Cufar were air strips with a length of approximately 

700 meters. The small aviation fields had a minimum length of about 

400 meters. 

Given the size of the territory, the conduction of air operations was fully centralized, 

and only in very specific and few circumstances, temporary advanced commands 

as well as detachments of aircraft means were formed. 

Initially, existing fleets were of T-6G and Auster, this being replaced by the DO- 

27 during 1964. The evolution of the fleet was in order to stabilize (1970) in the following 

types and quantity: 21 helicopters AL III, 24 DO-27, 3 C-47, 12 Fiat G-91, 18 

T-6G, 3 NORDATLAS. The average number of pilots was around 35, each qualified 

in more than one type of aircraft. With this volume of means the BA 12 carried out 

about 30 sorties per day, with peak values higher under conditions of high frequency 

of military operations. For example it is noted that in 1969 BA 12 flew 17,751 hours 

of flight time on the performance of 5812 air actions, being about 36% air transport, 

28% medical evacuation, 13% of airborne command post, 11% of pre-planned independent 

attack, 6% of visual reconnaissance, 3% attack in close support and 3% of 

surface forces covering and protection (land columns or river convoys). The plane 

that flew more was the DO 27 soon followed by AL III and T6; the Fiat G91 flew over 

1200 flight hours per year ( more than 2000 sorties), with an average flight profile 

of around 35 minutes. For certain periods, depending on the operational situation, a 

P2V5 that was in Sal in permanent deployment was sent to Bissau for bombardment 

activities, particularly night bombing. 

The Base developed a remarkable capacity in terms of photographic recon mis-


sions, using the C-47, DO-27, and Fiat G91 equipped differently, which allowed 

various updated mosaics of the area of operations, according to operational needs 

and at a very short notice. The exploitation of information reports from Commander 

in Chief Headquarters upon this mosaic facilitated identification of suspect places 

then confirmed by visual reconnaissance. This process allowed the elaboration of a 

credible set of target folders and an up to date order of battle. The visual reconnaissance 

was, whenever possible, done systematically, following a plan, without direct 

association to the launching of specific operations, or it was executed in accordance 

with operational specific demands to confirm intelligence notices. 

Beyond the reconnaissance and independent attack, the air means were used in 

direct support to ground forces, and in support for populations by means of transport 

and medical evacuation. For example the concentration of pilgrims to Mecca was 

made in BA12, every year, for transport from the various places of the province by 

military aircraft, from which they left on commercial flights. 

The guerrillas, who were well armed and disciplined, and had a high operational 

capacity for their mission, often acted in a much concealed way through ambushes, 

attacks on barracks, usually at a distance with artillery, and attacks against military 

forces nearby and against populations that did not follow them. The most important 

of the guerrilla bases were located outside, near the border, constituting themselves 

as sanctuaries. On rare occasions the enemy acted almost in conventional form; in 

these circumstances they were very exposed to the air action, particularly in areas 

with lower forest cover. 

In every theatre of operations air dominance was absolute, in the way that the 

guerrillas did not have air assets. However, since the beginning the guerrillas sought 

to counter the aerial action through anti-aircraft artillery. 

In Guinea, there were several stages in the mode of anti-aircraft action. At first it 

was done by shooting indiscriminately against all the military airplanes (there was 

one case or another against civil aircraft), with individual weapons. Next came the 

7.62 m/m weapons placed on a tripod. After came the guns with 12.7 m/m. The first 

were only effective in short distances, when the aircraft was spotted and flew at low 

altitude. The latter produced greater effects but were easily visible from the air, as 

it usually was located in clearings and firing was visible from the air with relative 

ease. Following this initial period when it seemed that all weapons were still pointed 

at aircraft, an absence of any anti-aircraft activity was noted in the whole theatre 

which could have been a result of general directives to avoid the detection of presence 

of the guerrillas on the ground. After that, the guerrillas adopted more powerful 

weapons, the ZPU-4 Soviet 14.5 m/m, placed in appropriate gun emplacements in 

areas where they intended to demonstrate its impregnability – including air space 

impregnability – it is unlikely that such demonstration would have produced the 

desired results in spite of enemy propaganda saying the opposite, since such deployment 

remained vulnerable, because it was easily spotted and could be subject to air 

attack. Along this period various aircraft were hit, including its crews but none a fatal


case. For example, in 1965 8 DO, 6 T6, 1 AL III, 2 G91 and a C47 were hit; in 1966 

2 DO, 9 T6, in the 2 nd semester; in 1967 5 DO, 5 T6, 3 AL III, and 2 G91; in all these 

cases the aircrafts were repaired at the Base. The most serious case occurred in 1968 

when a G91 was gunned down and the pilot ejected successfully, leaving unharmed. 

The anti-aircraft guns returned again to silence at a given period, at the end of which 

a new offensive took place, which was followed by a new stop – from the guerrilla 

point of view it mattered to embarrass air activity, since it was the element of imbalance 

in the development of the war, but it is assumed that the use of anti-aircraft guns 

brought too many risks. And it is at the end of these cycles of activation / deactivation 

that the missile surface - air Strella arises in 1973, with very significant results 

within a very short time: a G91 and its pilot killed with explosion on the air, 2 G91 

put down, in which pilots were ejected and were recovered, 1 DO 27 shot down with 

two pilots, one T6 shot down with a pilot. This version of the missile had vulnerability 

though: it had technical limitations in its launching, which conditioned its 

efficiency (at a very low altitude and distance was not very effective, and its range 

was around 10,000 feet), and produced a lot of smoke which allowed detection of the 

launching site and subsequent attack. Despite this, its introduction in the theatre of 

operations changed substantially the way of operating air assets and created a strong 

sense of insecurity. 

A brief overview of the war in Mozambique 

The war in Mozambique had also different characteristics from those of Angola 

and Guinea. 

On August 24, 1964 a missionary in the Maconde plateau is murdered, stabbed 

to death. This action was attributed to ideological motivation and its authorship to 

rebellious elements of the UNA (National African Union). A month later an attack to 

an administrative post and to a headquarters of Mueda takes place, this time led by 

FRELIMO. These facts created insecurity in the Northern Province, especially in the 

district of Cabo Delgado, which required a specific military organization to counter 

this threat. 

The air bases established from that time, which was progressively garnis hed with 

air assets was as follows: 

- The BA No. 10 in Beira; 

- The AB5 in Nacala; 

- The AB6 in Nova Freixo; 

- The AB7 in Tete; 

- The AB8 in Lourenço Marques; 

- The AM 51 in Mueda; 

- The AM 52 in Nampula;


- The AM 61 in Vila Cabral; 

- The AM 62 in Marrupa; 

- The AM 71in Furancungo; 

- The AM 73 in Mutarara. 

In 1963 there were 6 C47, 4 Nord and 4 PV2 in BA10; 9 T6, 8 DO-27 and 2 

Auster in AB5. 

In 1965 there were 4 Nord, 5 PV2, 2 DO-27 and 4 Auster in BA10; 5 C47, 2 DO- 

27 and 2 Auster in AB 8; and 21 T6, 14 DO-27 and 15 Auster in AB 5. 

In the following years the AB6 was equipped with 9 DO-27, 4 Auster, 8 Fiat G91 

and 8 T6; the AB 7 with 7 DO-27, 4 Auster, 8 Fiat G91 and 8 T6. 

In 1967, 9 Nord, 6 C-47, 6 PV2, 24 DO-27, 16 Auster, 45 T - 6G, and 6 AL III 

were assigned to the 3 rd Air Region, having been performed in the following year 

16,368 flight hours and about 8,000 missions. 

In 1970 the fleet was as follows: 35 DO, 36 T6, 25 AL III, 16 G91, 5-C 47, 8 

Nord, 13 Auster, 4 Cherokee and 6 Cessna, with 102 pilots assigned. That same year 

15,736 hours of flight in compliance of 10, 969 air missions were made. In 1972, 

29,944 hours of flight and in 1973, 37,324 flight hours were carried out. 

In 1974 there were around the theatre 5 SA-330, 27 DO, 26 T6, 31 ALL III, 16 

Fiat G-91, 9 Nord, 8 C47, 10 Auster, 4 Cherokee and 6 Cessna. The total number of 

pilots was 122, who flew a total of 25,090 hours. 

These figures clearly show the trend in the allocation of resources and the progressive 

increment of flight effort, i.e., the intensification of the war. The allocation 

of aircrafts in the different bases gives also an idea about the focus of activity in all 

the theatre of operations. 

After the start of the Cahora Bassa dam, the guerrilla crossed the Zambezi River, 

and established in the area of Tete, performing a series of actions which were intended 

to show presence, attack ground units and stops the development of the dam 

construction. The order of battle was thus changed and the war spread to the Western 

Province. 

Fiat airplanes began operations in late 1968 in AB 5; a second squadron was constituted 

in 1970 in AB 7; detachments were deployed in AM 52, Port Amelia and AM 

51on a regular basis and they also operated in AB 6, AM 61 and BA 10. 

The AL III came to achieve the total quantity of 31, which operated from AM 

52, AM 51, AM 61 and BA 10, and it was the fleet that flew more in mission types 

identical to those of other theatres. 

The Regional Air Command was based in Lourenço Marques, and subsequently 

the Advanced Command of Nampula was formed. There were in Mozambique 10 

major civil and military airport infrastructures, (Beira-3 runways, 2400 m; Marrupa 

1560 m; Mueda two runways, 2350 m; Nacala 2500 m; Nampula 2000 m; Nova


Freixo 2500 m; Porto Amelia 1800 m; Quelimane 1800 m; Tete 2500 m; Vila Cabral 

2000 m), and more than 200 runways longer than 700 meters distributed throughout 

the territory. 

The enemy had anti-aircraft artillery calibre 12.7 m/m, more concentrated in the 

Maconde plateau. In 1965 they hit 5 DO, 8 T6 and 1 Auster; in 1966 7 DO, 8 T6, 1 

Auster, 1 Nord and 1 PV2; in 1967 they hit 14 T6, including one shot with the pilot 

and in 1972 5 DO-27, 11 T6 including 2 shot down, 11 AL III which resulted in the 

death of a pilot and a mechanic and four pilots wounded, 2 G91and 3 Nord; in 1973 

7 G-91, 3 C47 which resulted in the death of a radioman, 5 Nord, 11 DO-27, 3 T6, 10 

AL III which resulted in the death of one pilot and two gunners, two pilots injured, 

and a C47. In the first half of 1974 they hit 11 DO-27, 3 T6, 10 AL III with death of 

a pilot and two gunners and two pilots injured. The acquisition of missile Strella did 

not produce the results obtained in Guinea, fundamentally because it was no surprise 

and the appropriate countermeasures had already been introduced. The worst case 

was that of the C-47 hit that managed to land on an emergency airfield. The aircraft 

was carrying foreign military attachés visiting the theatre of operations. 

Air operations took place along the lines of the other theatres. The great distances 

between the Operational Command, the base units and areas of operations naturally 

hampered the coordination of air activity and cooperation with ground forces, consuming 

lots of flight hours in transit. 

Some principles concerning the use of airpower 

in counter guerrilla 

The preceding description aimed to support some conclusions about the use of 

airpower in war against guerrillas from a concrete experience. 

The idea of a system, with the aircraft and the air mission in its centre, should 

be present in any form of employment of airpower, including counter guerrilla war. 

Given the continued dependency of the aircraft in infrastructures in the theatre, the 

first concern of those responsible for planning should be the creation of the conditions 

that would allow air operation in satisfactory safety conditions. The efficiency 

of the air power will be much dependent on the points of support in ground that will 

to be granted in the air operations. 

The counter guerrilla war is a war of lassitude that takes so much time; it can not 

be solved in short term and will consume a lot of resources. As this type of war take 

place in remote sites, generally, the principle of sustainability should be present in a 

realistic view, which means availability of the necessary resources in time, readiness 

of operational assets, proper qualification of personnel being ready to work in the 

real environment, updated doctrine. In the Portuguese case a very flexible organization 

was put in place oriented to the concrete aspects of the mission, and some 

operational centres were build in the rearguard to prepare the pilots, the technicians,


the logisticians and the administrative with the necessary skills to face the situation 

in the overseas. 

The operation and maintenance of aircraft required trained personnel to achieve 

the objectives imposed by the war in acceptable levels of flight safety, and not being 

very easy this was achieved in a satisfactory way, particularly in those units where it 

was possible to maintain a good framing of its staff. The roughness of the operation 

and maintenance required special care to avoid growing risk situations. As important 

as the material conditions were the psychological conditions, the psychological 

preparation of the combatants and the support of the Nation – the war had these two 

fronts, equally important. 

The guerrillas cannot dispose of air power, for reasons inherent in the nature of 

war and because they are conspicuous, and this is one of the characteristics, among 

many others, that distinguishes this type of war from the conventional war. Air power, 

when used correctly, in this operational context, is a factor of imbalance because 

it explores the third dimension in an engaging form, in terms of visibility, penalty 

or flagellation, creating uncertainty and insecurity, and also in terms of support of 

populations. Competition for security of the people was one of the objectives of both 

parties in conflict. 

The counter-guerrilla war cannot require highly sophisticated means, but most 

important is to maintain presence, and create insecurity to the guerrillas and populations 

supporting them, and at same time conquering populations through cooperative 

actions allowing an improvement of living conditions – in this context, air assets 

play an important role. It is normally said that the main objective of the guerrilla is to 

wear out conventional forces which is true, but the fact remains that the guerrilla also 

wears out if continued pressure on their forces is exerted and psychological action 

influences the populations cutting off support to the guerrilla, if they have an alternate 

way. It is also possible to degrade the will to fight on the guerrilla side, although 

we have to recognize that this involves remarkable costs. 

The counter guerrilla demands, in a strong way, the exploitation of the characteristic 

of flexibility and versatility of the aerial means. For instance, in the Portuguese 

case, aircraft designed for maritime patrol were used as a means of ground attack, 

close support or medical evacuation and even transportation. Aircrafts for general 

transportation was leveraged for attack and recognition. Airplanes of instruction 

were adapted as ground attack aircraft – the T-6 was the close support airplane to the 

ground forces most used in all theatres, with very positive results. The tactical mobility 

of forces, which was achieved through helicopters, was crucial to the success of 

many operations; the coordination of this manoeuvre with fire support provided by 

conventional aircraft and jet fighters, reached levels of remarkable precision. 

As demonstrated by the facts, Air Power is a factor of imbalance in guerrilla warfare, 

by having access to all parts of the theatre, making the creation of sanctuaries, 

which were indispensable to the guerrillas, very difficult, for the ability to observe,


forcing enemy to the camouflage that was never fully effective, for the inherent 

offensive capacity, and for the possibility of supporting populations in various domains. 

In the war against guerrillas there is room for difference between joint operation 

and support operation, in that in the first one setting goals and conception of the 

manoeuvre are established by the participant forces exploring synergies resulting 

from the capabilities of each type of force. The support operation responds to precise 

requests issued by the supported units, but for this type of operation it becomes 

mandatory to establish performance standards that allow a better understanding of 

the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the air means, which results in the maximized 

exploration of the capabilities of the force to be in support. This difference was very 

important in certain conditions, despite the difficulty to be managed seamlessly. 

The execution of air operations in counter guerrilla warfare placed some specific 

problems that can be easily overcome in our days, but there were real problems in 

the past. For instance, in addition to its own problems of navigation, it could be as 

difficult to detect enemy targets as well as the friendly forces that could be very close 

– with the technology available at the time this was a very difficult problem to solve, 

although this difficulty did not conduct to situations of fratricide fire. There were no 

available guided weapons, but its inexistence did not substantially affect the results 

of operations, given the nature of the targets, the level of training of most of the crew 

with very good CEP (Circular Error Probable), and the air supremacy that allowed 

some stability in the execution of the attack. 

In counter-guerrilla warfare there is no need for very sophisticated means of combat 

but it is decisive to know how to exploit the potential of such resources in face 

of the needs of the mission. 

In the Portuguese case, in the fight between the aircraft and the anti-aircraft 

weapons, the aircraft survived by adopting the appropriate tactics and reacting hard 

against the ground attackers when detected. It is said, frequently, that it was the appearance 

of the Strella missile that made the war end sooner. In our point of view, 

this analysis lacks fundaments although it is true that the shooting of several aircraft 

in a very short period of time produced a very negative psychological effect, by 

surprise, but this did not prevent the reaction to occur which lowered drastically the 

initial results. 

In every theatre the Air Force, in addition to participating in joint and support 

operations, acted independently in planning and implementation of many actions, 

such as was the case with systematic aerial reconnaissance in exploration of the intelligence 

reports, or the selective attack on the enemy positions which constituted 

as targets of opportunity, or in areas where it was not easy to access by land. In all 

theatres areas of free intervention of the Air Force were marked, where it was not 

required prior coordination to perform operations in accordance with high rank directives 

of war strategy.


The possibility of helicopter transportation of fresh troops to the scene of action, 

whatever was the degree of accessibility to land in that place did change the shape 

of warfare and was a factor in the imbalance against the guerrillas. The planning of 

this action required special care to achieve some surprise, and being also necessary 

the correspondent fire support to minimize the vulnerabilities, particularly in the moment 

of departure. 

In the guerrilla war it is much more difficult to obtain accurate information about 

military targets, because the guerrilla warrior lives mixed with the population. However, 

this position of principle often does not correspond with reality, because as the 

guerrilla upgrade it creates a closer configuration to the conventional forces. And as 

conventional forces they become more vulnerable to the air attacks. 

The war ended with the end of the political regime in Portugal, where it resulted 

in the formal independence of these territories, followed by a civil war for more 

than about twenty years in some countries. The area of cooperation that began to be 

developed sooner between Portugal and the new countries was precisely the military 

area, which seems to be relevant in a way that this had resulted from the mutual respect 

and recognition of the role and ethos of the warriors on both sides.

Ja i M e d e Mo n t o t o y d e si M ó n * 

La Doctrina Aérea del Ejército del Aire hasta 

su integración en la OTAN 

Spagna 

Desde antes de la creación de la Aviación Militar hasta la entrada de España 

en la OTAN, la Doctrina Aérea española evolucionó apareciendo ideas en 

diversos sentidos, según los pioneros de la Aviación consideraban que sería 

mejor para obtener el mayor fruto de su empleo. 

La Aviación Militar nació en España por iniciativa del Cuerpo de Ingenieros. En 

1.909 el Coronel de Ingenieros D. Pedro Vives Vich, acompañado por el Capitán D. 

Alfredo Kindelán Duany, realizó un viaje para estudiar el desarrollo de la aviación 

en distintas naciones europeas. De ahí surgió la creación del Servicio de Aviación 

el 2 de Abril de 1.910, que se integró con el de Aerostación en el Servicio de Aeronáutica 

Militar. Mientras tanto se habían publicado en España algunos libros sobre 

el particular, como “Los aeroplanos desde el punto de vista militar”, del Capitán de 

Infantería D. Celestino Bayo Lucía, en 1.910, y “El aeroplano militar”, del ingeniero 

D. Gaspar Brunet y Viadera, en 1.911. El libro del Capitán Bayo ya esbozaba sus 

ideas sobre la utilización de aeroplanos en la guerra. 

Una Real Orden de Octubre de 1.911 permitió el reclutamiento de aviadores entre 

todas las Armas y Cuerpos del Ejército y la Marina. Posteriormente, el Real Decreto 

de 28 de Febrero de 1.913 por el que se creó el Servicio de Aeronáutica Militar ya 

hablaba del “Dominio del Aire” como concepto clave que justificaba la existencia de 

un nuevo Servicio cada vez más independiente. La adecuada reglamentación permitió 

que la Aviación Militar española se expandiera y desde Octubre de 1.913 pudiera 

enviar a las operaciones de pacificación de Marruecos una Escuadrilla operativa y 

luego hasta cinco unidades diferentes, desplegadas en aeródromos separados por 

cientos de Km. de territorio hostil. 

Durante la Primera Guerra Mundial, los dos Oficiales que hasta ese momento 

habían encabezado las dos ramas del Servicio, el Coronel D. Pedro Vives y el Capitán 

D. Alfredo Kindelán, fueron sustituidos por el también Coronel de Ingenieros 

D. Julio Rodríguez Mourelo y el recién ascendido Comandante de Estado Mayor D. 

Alfonso Bayo Lucía. 

Entretanto, en Italia el Maggiore Giulio Douhet se adelantó a su tiempo, cuando 

en 1.910 puso los cimientos de un pensamiento aéreo aún vigente, treinta años antes 

de que se hicieran realidad. Sus teorías básicas eran las siguientes: “Dominar el 

* Coronel Ejército del Aire (ret).


aire significa encontrarse en condiciones de impedir volar al enemigo, conservando 

para sí mismo dicha facultad. Aquel que posea el dominio del aire y disponga de 

una fuerza ofensiva adecuada, protegerá por un lado el territorio y el mar propios de 

las ofensivas aéreas enemigas y negará al adversario la posibilidad de llevar a cabo 

cualquier tipo de acción aérea auxiliar en las operaciones de tierra y mar”. 

En 1.916 el Capitán Kindelán escribió una serie de artículos en el periódico “El 

Heraldo de Madrid”, que luego fueron recopilados en un folleto titulado La flota aérea 

española: bases para su organización. En este mismo año se publicó “El aeroplano 

en la guerra”, del Comandante Alfonso Bayo, que abogaba por una Aviación 

Naval dependiente del Ministerio de Marina. 

En 1.918, el Ministerio de Marina publicó Ideas para la organización del Servicio 

de Aviación Naval en España, del Comandante de Infantería de Marina D. Manuel 

O’Felan y Correoso. O´Felan defendía que “el servicio naval aéreo” debía ser 

un servicio auxiliar que dependiera exclusivamente de la Marina en todas sus partes. 

El 18 de Septiembre de 1.917 se creó la Aviación Naval, que a partir de Septiembre 

de 1.920 se llamó Aeronáutica Naval. 

El 18 de Julio de 1.918 se creó la Sección y Dirección de Aeronáutica en el Ministerio 

de la Guerra, con lo que el Servicio ganó en autonomía y competencias. El 

mando del Servicio recayó en el ya General Rodríguez Mourelo. En Julio de 1.919 

el General de Ingenieros D. Francisco Echagüe Santoro, relevó a Rodríguez Mourelo 

y se procedió a la reorganización del 17 de marzo de 1.920. Posteriormente, el Real 

Decreto de Marzo de 1.922 supuso un notable avance, al equiparar a la Aviación a 

una 5ª Arma, como defendía el Capitán D. César Gómez Lucía en su libro Aviación 

del mismo año. 

El recrudecimiento de la guerra de Marruecos obligó a crear los primeros Grupos 

y Escuadras de Aviación. También se creó por primera vez la Escala del Aire en la 

cual aparecieron los distintos empleos aeronáuticos: oficial aviador, capitán de escuadrilla, 

comandante de grupo y jefe de escuadra, sustituyendo a las graduaciones 

militares que desaparecieron dentro del Servicio de Aviación. 

En 1.922 un grupo de aviadores entusiastas, encabezados por el General Echagüe, 

el Coronel D. Jorge Soriano Escudero y el ya Teniente Coronel Kindelán, crearon la 

revista mensual “Aérea”, para empezar a presentar en públicos sus ideas y reflexiones 

sobre el mejor empleo posible de la Aeronáutica Militar. En los primeros números 

de “Aérea” empezaron a aparecer artículos cortos en los que los aviadores españoles 

pretendían extraer consecuencias doctrinales de la contienda que ellos vivían 

día a día en Marruecos y de las informaciones obtenidas del extranjero, empleando 

los términos “fuerza aérea” y “aviación independiente” y defendiendo habitualmente 

su empleo autónomo. 

En Octubre de 1.923 se publicaron en “Aérea” dos artículos con pretensiones 

doctrinales. En el artículo La Aeronáutica y el porvenir de España, se determinaba 

“la cantidad y composición de las fuerzas de mar, tierra y aire” que España debía

la do C t r i n a aé r e a d e l ej é r C i to d e l ai r e H a s ta su i n t e g r a C i ó n e n l a OTAN 251 

sostener, dentro de un presupuesto compatible con 

nuestros medios económicos. Esta fuerza de defensa 

aérea era de 800 bombarderos, de los que 

500 estarían con bases en la Península, 200 en 

Canarias y 100 en Baleares, lo que costaría 

menos de 100 millones de pesetas. Por esta 

cantidad “España, sin gran sacrificio económico 

y sólo por el desarrollo de su aeronáutica”, 

podía “convertirse en una potencia 

defensiva de primer orden que sea considerada 

con respeto por todas las naciones”. 

El segundo artículo, La Aeronáutica Italiana, 

estudiaba con detalle el Decreto del 

22 de Junio de 1.923 que significó la creación 

en Italia del Comisariato de la Aeronáutica, 

que constituía un verdadero Ministerio 

del Aire en todo menos en el nombre. El autor, 

Federico Abeilhé y Rodríguez-Fito, Comandante 

de Intendencia del Servicio de Aviación, proponía 

considerar la organización italiana como un mo- Capitán Kindelán 1.913 

delo a seguir en el futuro, aunque comprendía que 

los medios españoles eran “relativamente escasos 

en cuanto a los Servicios de guerra y casi nulos en lo civil”. En Abril de 1.924, 

Abeilhé publicó otro artículo, titulado La Aviación, problema nacional, en el que 

explicaba sus ideas para el desarrollo de la aviación civil española y el fomento de la 

industria aeronáutica nacional y ponía como ejemplo las iniciativas italianas. 

Douhet había escrito los primeros textos sobre el Dominio del Aire y los medios 

auxiliares en 1.910. En 1.921 añadía: “Hoy, después de la Gran Guerra, no tengo 

que modificar ninguna palabra de las que escribí hace once años: el tiempo ha confirmado 

mis deducciones, a pesar de que el concepto del Dominio del Aire no se 

haya afianzado con claridad”. En 1.923 publicó La Defensa Nacional, libro en el que 

insistía en la necesidad de crear un Ministerio de Defensa Nacional en el que la Aviación 

jugara el papel preponderante que le correspondía. Sus ideas fueron realizadas 

pocos años después, pero durante estos años, la Regia Aeronautica italiana había 

estado evolucionando y desarrollándose siguiendo las ideas de Giulio Douhet, ascendido 

a General, pero apartado finalmente del mando. Luego, en 1.928 se publicó 

la nueva edición de El Dominio del Aire, en la cual Douhet explicaba sin cortapisas 

sus ideas, después de que la historia y la evolución de la técnica hubieran empezado 

a darle la razón. 

El 19 de Enero de 1.924 se nombró Jefe de la Aeronáutica Militar española al 

General D. Jorge Soriano que, como Teniente Coronel, había sido Jefe de las Fuerzas 

Aéreas en Marruecos.


El 9 de Agosto de 1.924 se convocó un curso de instrucción para formar Oficiales 

pilotos del Servicio de Aviación para el mando de Grupos y Escuadrillas. Como 

director del Curso se nombró al Teniente Coronel Kindelán, que tenía la categoría 

aeronáutica de Jefe de Base, máximo grado existente en la Aviación Militar española. 

Kindelán, fue el autor de las 24 conferencias sobre Doctrina de la Guerra Aérea, 

Táctica Aérea y Organización Aérea, que recogió en un libro que se editó en 1.925 y 

constituye el primer tratado de Doctrina y Arte Militar Aéreo redactado en España. 

En él proponía un plan quinquenal que elevara sustancialmente los efectivos del 

número de escuadrillas, desarrollara la industria nacional y produjera 250 aviones 

anualmente. Luego destacaba las características esenciales de la Aviación: la universalidad 

en el espacio y en el tiempo, y la rapidez. De ellas deducía las características 

de la aviación militar: generalidad de empleo, movilidad, gran rendimiento ofensivo 

en relación al coste, utilización parcial en paz, acción política, y rapidez en la movilización. 

Además Kindelán destacaba una característica especial: “la Aviación está 

hecha para la defensiva estratégica”, aunque no consideraba a la Aviación como un 

arma defensiva, ya que “su característica táctica es la ofensiva”. También recordaba 

que la Aviación era muy adecuada para la defensa del territorio nacional español, 

porque proporciona una economía general de fuerzas notable. Sostenía que la Aviación 

está hecha por naturaleza para la defensa estratégica de países como España o 

Italia, con largas fronteras marítimas, puesto que era idónea para el ataque por líneas 

exteriores y la defensa por líneas interiores. Había que crear una Aviación Independiente 

con misiones estratégicas propias. De aquí pasaba a defender la importancia 

del dominio del aire, aunque recordaba que el dominio del aire tiene limitaciones de 

espacio y tiempo. 

Kindelán decía: “hoy nuestra potencialidad económica nos permite crear una 

fuerza aérea respetable y una fuerza marítima de defensa de costas suficiente para 

bastar a nuestra defensa. Y entonces el problema de nuestra protección de las fronteras 

terrestres se reduce a términos que caen dentro de nuestras posibilidades económicas”. 

Por otra parte, la Aviación es el arma política por excelencia, al ser la 

única que puede atacar en cualquier momento el corazón del territorio enemigo. 

Pero tampoco perdía la cabeza y recordaba que: “no se debe creer que la Aviación 

es dócil instrumento para la fantasía de aquéllos que, por ignorancia o exceso de 

imaginación, pretenden emplear esta Arma en misiones que no la corresponden o en 

utopías de difícil realización”. 

Kindelán diferenciaba entre el Servicio de Aviación y el Arma Aérea: “El Servicio 

actúa siempre en colaboración con el resto del ejército. El Arma no; en el Arma, la 

aviación unas veces colabora…; otras tiene misiones autónomas, misiones que no 

dependen más que de la suprema dirección de la guerra, del Alto Mando en su escalón 

jerárquico superior, o elevándonos más todavía, del Gobierno de la Nación”. Al Arma 

Aérea le correspondían todas las misiones de carácter independiente, en las que “la 

aviación obra por su efecto destructor sobre el adversario.” Estas misiones se subdividían 

en “combate aéreo”, “combate aéreo terrestre” y “combate aéreo naval”.


Más adelante recordaba que el objetivo de la lucha es “la supremacía en el aire 

con las señaladas limitaciones de tiempo y lugar; el medio único de conseguirla: emplear 

sin desmayo una política ofensiva inexorable y continua contra la flota aérea 

enemiga, en el aire como en tierra, de noche como de día”. Kindelán insistía en la 

importancia de un buen mantenimiento y una buena logística para dar continuidad a 

la acción aérea, ya que pueden acabar prematuramente con una campaña aérea antes 

de la derrota del enemigo. También recordaba que “en el aire como en el mar y la 

tierra, en tiempos de Aníbal como en la pasada campaña europea, la estrategia tiende 

a alcanzar una serie de éxitos tácticos que impongan al enemigo nuestra propia 

voluntad”. 

Finalmente Kindelán estudiaba la organización de la Aeronáutica militar en diversas 

naciones (principalmente Francia, EE.UU., Rumania, Italia y Gran Bretaña) 

y finalizaba proponiendo la creación de un Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, que 

unificara los de Guerra, Marina y algunos otros servicios. 

En la revista “Aérea” continuaron apareciendo colaboraciones de todo tipo sobre 

Arte Militar Aéreo, Doctrina Aérea y posibles organizaciones de la Aeronáutica 

Militar, a fin de obtener la mejor defensa nacional de España. Entre otros hay que 

mencionar a Vicente Balbás, Felipe Acedo, “Orellitra”, César Gómez Lucía y, muy 

especialmente, a Luis Manzaneque. 

En Marzo de 1.926 el Capitán D. César Gómez Lucía escribió su artículo ¿Aún la 

Quinta Arma?, que era un alegato en contra de la consideración de la Aviación sólo 

como 5ª Arma, ya que su desarrollo había sobrepasado todas las previsiones. Decía: 

“el aire lo envuelve todo, no puede nadie eludirle y al surgir la Aviación hay que 

cambiar las técnicas y decir que el dueño del aire vencerá en mar y tierra..... Ha habido 

pero no habrá Quinta Arma; la Aviación que antes auxilió a Infantería y Artillería 

ahora se les escapa. En lo sucesivo todas las Armas servirán para consolidar lo que la 

Aviación haya decidido...Hablar de Quinta Arma resulta un poco desfasado”. 

Dos meses más tarde en “Aérea” se publicaba el juicio y condena de Mitchell 

en Estados Unidos y un reportaje sobre las “Maniobras de Aviación en Inglaterra” 

firmado por Gómez Lucía. El resultado de las maniobras demostró a los militares 

británicos que el primer día de guerra podía ser decisivo, y que la futura guerra se 

jugaría con Aviación, Supremacía Aérea y con un Ejército y una Marina expectantes, 

que consolidarían lo ya decidido. 

En 1.926 se realizaron los tres espléndidos raids de la Aviación Militar española: 

el vuelo del “Plus Ultra”, con Ramón Franco y Julio Ruiz de Alda desde Palos 

(España) a Buenos Aires (Argentina); el vuelo Madrid-Manila emprendido por González 

Gallarza, Loriga y M. Esteve; y el de la “Patrulla Atlántida”, encabezada por 

Rafael Llorente, desde Melilla (Marruecos) a la Guinea Ecuatorial. Estos tres vuelos 

demostraban la capacidad que ya habían alcanzado los aviadores españoles. 

Este mismo año, el Real Decreto Ley del 23 de Marzo de 1.926 producía grandes 

novedades en la Aviación Militar española. Se creó la Jefatura Superior Aeronáutica


dentro del Ministerio del Ejército, se establecieron las Ramas del Aire y de Tierra en 

el Servicio de Aviación y se creó la Escala del Servicio para los Oficiales y la Tropa; 

además se creó el uniforme verde oscuro de Aviación, distinto del caqui del Ejército, 

que llevaba en las hombreras las barras y ángulos de los distintivos de categoría aeronáutica, 

con las estrellas de empleos del Ejército en las bocamangas. 

La nueva edición de El Dominio del Aire publicada en 1.928, causó verdadero 

impacto en las ideas y opiniones de los aviadores españoles. Esta edición fue seguida 

de la aparición del libro Nociones de arte militar aéreo, esencialmente basadas 

en informaciones sobre Aeronáutica Militar italiana, escrito por el Comandante de 

Artillería D. Carlos Martínez de Campos y Serrano, Conde de Llovera, y el Capitán 

de Corbeta D. Mateo Mille y García de los Reyes, agregados militar y naval respectivamente 

a la Embajada de España en Roma. El prólogo era del General Soriano que 

decía “ el dominio del aire… es factor esencial para el logro de la victoria”. 

En las Nociones se estudiaba la organización de una Aviación Militar tomando 

como base el modelo italiano, se analizaban tipos y características de los aviones 

de caza, bombardeo y reconocimiento, se trataban la doctrina y la táctica aérea, y 

se estudiaba la importancia de la Aeronáutica independiente que, según Douhet, ya 

no debía actuar como un Arma más, sino como un Ejército por separado, como el 

de Tierra y la Marina, concepto que los autores no aceptaban. También estudiaban 

detenidamente el papel de la defensa aérea y la cooperación del Ejército del Aire con 

el de Tierra y la Marina. 

En Enero de 1.930 el Comandante de Artillería y jefe de escuadra aérea Luis 

Manzaneque Feltrer, publicó en la revista “Aérea” un artículo titulado La defensa 

nacional. La nueva doctrina de guerra, que tuvo gran éxito. Luego, en 1.931, Manzaneque 

publicó su gran libro El Dominio del Aire y la Defensa nacional, y después 

publicó numerosos artículos en la “Revista de Aeronáutica” de 1.932 a 1.946. En 

toda su obra están presentes las constantes de su pensamiento como estratega aéreo: 

la aparición del Arma Aérea había revolucionado la guerra, las naciones que se negaran 

a aceptar esta realidad lo pagarían muy caro, no era necesario efectuar grandes 

reducciones en el Ejército y en la Marina, pero sí era necesario crear una fuerte 

“Armada Aérea” como arma defensiva capaz de disuadir a los posibles enemigos 

de invadir España por tierra o por mar. En 1.930 llegaba a la conclusión de que se 

necesitaría una flota de 700 aviones: 200 “aparatos de batalla” (bombarderos estratégicos 

bien armados y con gran capacidad de carga y radio de acción), 300 triplazas 

de combate y ataque y 200 monoplazas de caza. 

Todo esto debía ser posible sin desequilibrar el presupuesto nacional, “pues no 

hay que olvidar que la economía ha de ser el cimiento sobre el que se asiente la 

potencia militar de un país”. El reparto del presupuesto para la defensa “no puede 

ser igual para todos los países, porque la geografía, como siempre, mandará en la 

guerra”. 

Luis Manzaneque fue un “douhetista” convencido pero no extremista, que tuvo


gran éxito en la difusión de sus ideas porque sólo quería conseguir la mejor defensa 

nacional dentro de las posibilidades económicas de España. 

Con motivo de las sublevaciones de Jaca y Cuatro Vientos contra la monarquía, 

el gobierno del General Berenguer deshizo la organización de la Aviación Militar. 

Un decreto de 8 de Enero de 1.931 suprimió la Jefatura Superior de Aviación, el 

uniforme verde específico de Aviación, la Escala del Servicio y sus categorías aeronáuticas, 

y restauró la anticuada organización de Sección y Dirección Aeronáuticas, 

se disolvieron las Escuadras Aéreas y se estableció como unidad orgánica superior 

el Batallón Aéreo. 

El gobierno del Almirante Aznar mantuvo estos cambios, pero este gobierno cayó 

el 14 de Abril de 1.931 con la proclamación de la República, y en Julio de 1.931 

se creó el Cuerpo General de Aviación, con un uniforme propio (parecido al de la 

Marina pero con las estrellas del Ejército), aunque no se llegó ni a la Escala única 

ni siquiera a la creación de la 5ª Arma, pese a las promesas del nuevo gobierno. Las 

dificultades del escalafonamiento fueron insuperables. 

En 1.931 dejó de publicarse la revista “Aérea”, pero en 1.932 apareció la “Revista 

de Aeronáutica”, editada por la Jefatura de Aviación del Ministerio de la Guerra; su 

primer director fue el Comandante de Aviación D. Francisco Fernández y González 

Longoria. Éste y otros discípulos de Kindelán siguieron defendiendo sus ideas 

básicas: la necesidad de crear una Aviación independiente y que englobase los dos 

Servicios (el Militar y el Naval) que coexistían por separado, la necesidad de crear 

una “Armada Aérea” acorde con las ideas de Douhet – pese a que el estado de la 

técnica aún no había permitido la creación del bombardero estratégico tipo “Fortaleza 

volante”-, y la integración de la caza, la “antiaeronáutica” (artillería antiaérea, 

barreras de globos, etc.,…) y la defensa civil en un Sistema de Defensa Aérea. Ya en 

el nº 3 de la “Revista de Aeronáutica” (Junio de 1.932), un editorial titulado “La reforma 

de nuestra Aviación Militar”, pedía al gobierno que llevara a cabo la necesaria 

reorganización de la Aviación Militar, que incluyera “el concepto de lo que nuestra 

Aviación ha de ser en el conjunto de los medios defensivos de España” y que fijara 

“su doctrina de empleo” para, así, “decidir los efectivos y composición de nuestra 

arma aérea y su distribución más conveniente en el territorio nacional”. 

En Septiembre de 1.931 el Capitán de Navío D. Pedro María Cardona y Prieto, 

ex-Director de Aeronáutica Naval, escribió en la “Revista General de Marina” su 

artículo Con miras a la orgánica aeronáutica nacional. El tercer frente, en el que 

atacaba a la Aviación independiente y defendía una Aviación Naval dependiente del 

Ministerio de Marina. 

En la “Revista de Aeronáutica” de Octubre y Noviembre de 1.932 le respondió 

el Comandante Fernández G. Longoria desmontando todos sus argumentos en los 

artículos Contestando a un ataque. Los eternos aerófobos y La acción aérea independiente. 

Demostraba que la Aviación podía atacar “la comunicaciones marítimas 

con una intensidad igual o superior” que la Marina y que “la acción aérea indepen-


diente es igual o más decisiva que la naval en el aspecto de privar a una nación de 

elementos indispensables”. Recordaba que “la Aviación, para la misma importancia 

relativa, es más barata que el Ejército y mucho más barata que la Marina”. Admitía 

que “la Aviación en sus ataques sufrirá pérdidas; pero el efecto que sufrirá a pesar 

de ellas, las compensará sobradamente”. Por eso Longoria preconizaba que España 

pudiera disponer de una Armada Aérea eficaz como instrumento para disuadir a sus 

vecinos de intentar involucrarla en cualquier conflicto. 

Coincidiendo con esta polémica, se publicaron los dos artículos del Capitán de 

Aviación D. Manuel Martínez Merino La hidroaviación en España (Septiembre de 

1.932) y Más sobre hidroaviones (Febrero de 1.933), en los que recordaba que España 

tiene más de 3.000 Km. de costa, que “si alguna vez necesitamos el Arma Aérea, 

más probablemente será para combatir sobre mar que sobre tierra” y que “el Arma 

Aérea no debe tener sus límites en la orilla del mar”, por lo que pedía aumentar el 

número de hidroaviones de la Aviación Militar y señalaba que la “Armata Aérea” de 

la Regia Aeronautica italiana contaba con un 45% de hidroaviones. 

Por otra parte, el Jefe del Servicio de Aviación, Comandante D. Ángel Pastor 

Velasco, pronunció el 12 de Noviembre de 1.932, en presencia del Presidente del 

Gobierno y Ministro de la Guerra, una conferencia en la Escuela Superior de Guerra 

sobre El factor aéreo en la guerra futura; Pastor defendió las ideas de Douhet, afirmando 

que “la Aviación podía llevar a cabo operaciones, con independencia absoluta, 

en el momento oportuno”. Luego, en Marzo de 1.933 Pastor publicó en la “Revista 

de Aeronáutica” su artículo La Aviación Militar, en el que remachaba “La Aviación 

es más que un Arma. … viene a constituir una tercera fuerza armada de características 

tan diferenciales como las del Ejército y la Marina. … principalmente por su 

capacidad para hacer la guerra aérea con independencia absoluta del resto de los 

elementos armados de la Nación, operaciones que pueden conducir a la terminación 

de la guerra, si se cuenta con fuerzas suficientes y se emplean acertadamente”. 

A primeros de 1.933 entró en la polémica el Teniente de Navío D. Antonio Álvarez-Ossorio 

y de Carranza, gran piloto naval, con diversos artículos en la “Revista 

General de Marina” y en la “Revista de Aeronáutica”. Empezó en Enero de 1.933 

con su artículo Armada Aérea y Aviaciones Auxiliares. Parecía que reconocía la necesidad 

de crear una Armada Aérea y una Aviación independiente, pero pedía una 

Aviación Naval, al estilo de EE.UU. y Japón. En Abril publicó su artículo Puntualizando, 

oponiéndose a lo defendido por Martínez Merino en Septiembre de 1.932 y 

Febrero de 1.933. Retorcía los argumentos de éste y pontificaba: “Que la Aviación 

naval opere en la mar o la del Ejército en la tierra es incuestionable”. Luego decía 

que hacía falta “el aviador marino”. 

En el mismo número de la Revista le respondía Longoria en su artículo Precisando 

algunos conceptos. En él demostraba que era necesario que “el militar del 

aire” no fuera “el militar aviador ni el marino aviador”, sino “el aviador puro”, “que 

por su educación y conocimientos, por su espíritu aéreo y por su adecuada preparación 

estará plenamente capacitado para realizar las misiones guerreras de la Aviación


con todas las garantías de acierto”. 

Longoria defendía la creación de 

una Aviación independiente y de 

una Academia del Aire. Decía que 

“el Teniente de Navío Álvarez-Ossorio, 

cuya competencia, entusiasmo 

y cariño por la Aviación están 

muy por encima de lo corriente”, 

había llegado a conclusiones equivocadas. 

En Mayo de 1.933 también 

Martínez Merino respondió a Álvarez-Ossorio 

en su artículo Hidroaviación 

no es Aviación Naval, en el 

que abogaba por una “Aviación de 

Guerra” que englobase la Armada 

Aérea, la Aviación para la Defensa 

Aérea y las Aviaciones de cooperación 

con el Ejército y la Marina. 

También recordaba que la Aviación 

Coronel D. Manuel Martínez Merino 

del Ejército había empleado sus hidroaviones 

pilotados por Oficiales 

del Ejército desde la base de El Atalayón para apoyar al Ejército de Tierra en Marruecos 

y que “la destrucción de una escuadra en la mar es un objetivo esencialmente 

aéreo”. Finalmente preconizaba “el cadete aviador” “formado en una Academia o 

Escuela de Aviación”. 

Álvarez-Ossorio respondía en una Carta abierta agradeciendo “los inmerecidos 

elogios de Longoria”, pero diciendo que lo expuesto por Longoria no le parecía ni 

atendible ni contundente, aunque terminaba “prefiero rendirle un tributo de admiración 

por su competencia, entusiasmo y sinceridad de sus convicciones”, ya que 

ambos se esforzaban “por crear un organismo útil a la defensa nacional”. 

El Comandante de Aviación D. Alejandro Gómez Spencer, en sus artículos Comentarios 

de Marzo y Noviembre de 1.933 recordaba que “el dominio del aire se 

logra con la batalla aérea”, lo cual hacía necesario el combate en el aire y la creación 

de cazas de escolta de gran autonomía con depósitos adicionales lanzables. Comparando 

a España con Inglaterra, demostraba que necesitábamos una Fuerza Aérea 

mayor. También defendía la denominación “Ejército del Aire” en lugar de “Armada 

Aérea”, mala traducción del italiano. 

En Marzo de 1.935 renació la polémica cuando el Capitán de Fragata Mateo Mille 

publicó en el diario “El Debate” un artículo contra la Fuerza Aérea única y Luis 

de Castro defendía la ineficacia del bombardeo aéreo. En Mayo Longoria publicó 

en la “Revista Aeronáutica” su artículo La acción sobre el mar; Álvarez-Ossorio


respondió en Julio con Sobre la acción en el mar y en el mismo número Longoria 

respondió con “Contestación obligada”, que establecía la universalidad de empleo 

de la Aviación en la guerra, ya que podía atacar los objetivos que le señalase el Mando 

Supremo, fuese en la mar o en tierra, con completa independencia de la Marina 

o del Ejército. Como Longoria decía, la experiencia demostraba que los aeroplanos 

podían hundir cualquier buque, luego “no hay objetivos invulnerables a los ataques 

aéreos” y “la aviación puede aplicarse en el mar a destruir los medios de tráfico – ya 

sean flotantes o situados en tierra – y atacar a las fuerzas navales organizadas y sus 

bases de apoyo”. 

Finalmente, el Comandante Fernández Longoria escribió otros tres artículos bajo 

el título Preparación de la guerra aérea, que se publicaron en la “Revista de Aeronáutica” 

de Octubre a Diciembre de 1.935. En ellos detallaba ampliamente sus ideas 

sobre la guerra aérea, tratando de presentar una Doctrina de Empleo muy completa, 

en la línea de Douhet. 

Durante la Guerra Civil de 1.936 a 1.939, el bando nacional escogió al General 

Kindelán para mandar su Aviación Militar y éste unió las Aviaciones Militar y Naval, 

para aprovechar dos características de la Aviación: su universalidad de empleo y su 

movilidad estratégica; su buen juicio y firme dirección fueron un factor decisivo en 

la guerra en el aire, que tuvo un influjo crucial en las operaciones de superficie. El 

bando gubernamental también se decidió por la unificación de los Servicios de Aviación 

en Julio de 1.936. Ambos bandos aplicaron la idea de una única Fuerza Aérea, 

que se podía dedicar a obtener el dominio del aire en una zona de operaciones, a 

operaciones estratégicas y al apoyo táctico a las fuerzas de superficie. 

Al acabar la guerra se creó el Arma de Aviación con Escala única y, enseguida, un 

Ministerio y un Ejército del Aire independiente, con su propio uniforme y Academias 

y Escuelas propias; pero se marginó al General Kindelán, pese a que había creado el 

Arma Aérea unificada y la había llevado a la victoria, y se nombró, uno tras otro, a 

dos Ministros del Aire que no eran aviadores. Pero la doctrina era muy clara: había 

que constituir una Armada Aérea con capacidad para bombardear decisivamente la 

retaguardia enemiga, como arma disuasoria para defender la neutralidad española. 

Por motivos políticos Kindelán y el Infante D. Alfonso se fueron rápidamente 

excluídos de la nueva cúpula aeronáutica, pero pudieron defender y difundir sus 

ideas. 

La primera obra de Kindelán de esta época, Mis cuadernos de Guerra, era un 

relato de ésta y sus prolegómenos, pero contenía algunos detalles de doctrina, como 

cuando decía que la obtención del dominio aéreo pasaba por tres fases: “la etapa previa 

de supremacía o preponderancia, que no era aún el dominio, la de adquisición 

de éste y la de ejercicio y conservación del mismo”. Igualmente está clara la idea del 

mando único de la gran masa de Aviación. La polivalencia y la rapidez de reacción 

del Arma Aérea también quedan patentes en este libro. 

Desde Diciembre de 1.940 hasta Marzo de 1.942, el Infante D. Alfonso escribió


en la “Revista de Aeronáutica” una 

serie de artículos titulada Aeronáutica 

Militar. Política Aérea. Doctrina 

de empleo, en el que presentaba 

sus ideas sobre el particular en 19 

axiomas básicos. No se trata sólo 

de Doctrina Aérea, sino de normas 

de empleo del Arma Aérea, detalles 

de organización del Estado y 

del Ejército del Aire y política de 

personal. Los axiomas más destacables 

eran los siguientes: 

- El Arma Aérea abre el camino 

a las fuerzas de superficie y las 

protege en marcha y en reposo. 

- El territorio nacional es un vasto 

recinto aéreo defendido por 

el Ejército y la Marina que cooperan 

con el Arma Aérea. 

- El Arma Aérea defiende el territorio 

nacional, ataca al enemigo 

en sus puntos vitales y, con la 

cooperación de la Marina y del Ejército, procura adquirir aeródromos mejor situados, 

ocupando territorios enemigos. 

- Las fuerzas de superficie no pueden atacar sin supremacía aérea en la zona de 

operaciones. 

- Todas las vías de comunicaciones son muy vulnerables por aire. 

- Es más fácil bombardear un objetivo que impedir este bombardeo. 

- Dentro del Arma Aérea la rama ofensiva la constituyen el bombardero y el caza 

de largo alcance. 

- La defensa debe componerse de cuatro elementos (caza, artillería antiaérea, reflectores 

y red de alerta y control) bajo un solo mando. 

- Las transmisiones son de vital importancia para el Arma Aérea. 

Kindelán también escribió algunos artículos en la “Revista de Aeronáutica” y 

varios libros. En Marzo de 1.941 publicó un artículo titulado Aeronáutica militar. 

Política aérea de guerra. Luego, en Noviembre de 1.941, publicó otro artículo titulado 

Aeronáutica Militar. El concepto de dominio en la guerra. Al estudiar el Arma 

Aérea de otras naciones durante la guerra, decía que se habían olvidado “sus más 

fundamentales principios”, sobre todo el “principio de concentración”. 

Para Kindelán la R.A.F. debía tener un solo objetivo primordial: la Luftwaffe. En


cuanto a la Luftwaffe, decía que “no hay aviación bastante fuerte si se dispersa su 

esfuerzo. Su actuación en Polonia y Noruega fue magnífica”, pero en la Batalla de 

Inglaterra su esfuerzo se dispersó y Kindelán preguntaba: “¿por qué no se estableció 

una prelación de objetivos?”; la Luftwaffe tenía que obtener: dominio del mar desde 

el aire, dominio de tierra desde el aire y dominio total del aire. 

Luego Kindelán recordaba la importancia del dominio del aire y que ni el Ejército 

de Tierra ni la Marina prescindirán jamás voluntariamente del auxilio aéreo y afirmaba 

que “el dominio del mar puede ser ejercido desde el aire”. 

Recordaba que “la Aviación tiene tres misiones de dominio: dominar el aire, dominar 

el mar y dominar la tierra, aunque “el dominio aéreo no es casi nunca absoluto 

en tiempo y espacio”. La conclusión ante la invasión de Creta era clara: antes “el 

intento de desembarco en una isla o archipiélago presumía el dominio del mar circundante”, 

pero “hoy el dominio del mar se conquista desde el aire”. 

Luego, en el otoño de 1.944, Kindelán escribió su libro La Próxima Guerra, en 

el que, apoyando las ideas de Mackinder, decía: “Parece iniciarse en nuestros días 

la decadencia del Mar respecto a la Tierra, debido a la aparición de un nuevo instrumento 

bélico de incontrastable poder: el Arma Aérea”. “Con el Arma Aérea, la 

reacción continental ha pasado de 40 Km. de alcance a más de un millar de millas”. 

Luego Kindelán insistía: “La Aviación es algo tan profundamente revolucionario 

que permite substituir veinte combates periféricos por una sola batalla contra el 

corazón del país enemigo”. “Desde que la Aviación existe no es preciso destruir el 

frente para vencer”. 

Aceptaba los principios militares clásicos, pero advertía “Para el Ejército y la 

Marina de nada les sirve haberse preocupado de cuidar su “libertad de acción”; sin 

el Aire, la “iniciativa en superficie” no existe, la “superioridad de elementos” de 

nada sirve. Y afirmaba: “En contraposición a la dispersión en el concepto de “Espacio”, 

el desarrollo del Arma Aérea impone la concentración en el concepto de “tiempo”, 

lo cual afecta también a la “persistencia en la acción”. Luego presentaba su 

tesis básica: las guerras se ganan por una acción coordinada y armónica de Aviación, 

Marina y Ejército (que le parecía la tesis más razonable.) 

Para Kindelán, las principales misiones del Arma Aérea eran: a) destruir la potencia 

aérea enemiga hasta alcanzar el pleno dominio del aire, o a lo menos marcada 

supremacía (la más fundamental y prioritaria). b) después proteger las industrias de 

guerra, los hogares y las comunicaciones contra los ataques aéreos del enemigo; cooperar 

con la Flota en la defensa de las rutas marítimas; cooperar con las dos Armas 

de Superficie en operaciones ofensivas; y atacar las industrias de guerra, transportes 

y bases navales y aéreas del enemigo. Kindelán añadía que, en el mar, en muchas 

ocasiones sólo actuaba la aviación embarcada, que obtenía victorias tácticas (con 

consecuencias estratégicas). 

Kindelán recordaba: 1) El dominio del aire sólo puede lograrlo el Aire y es premisa 

indispensable de las operaciones terrestres o navales, como decía el Mariscal


Montgomery. 2) El dominio de los mares pequeños se obtiene por acción aérea. El 

de los océanos por acción combinada aeronaval. 3) El dominio del terreno se obtiene 

por la acción aeroterrestre coordinada. 4) Debido al progreso de la técnica, aumentarán 

la eficacia y poder decisivo del dominio aéreo. 

Sobre el General Douhet, Kindelán decía “De todos los grandes doctrinarios de la 

postguerra, sólo él ha formulado un sistema sólidamente establecido en el conjunto y 

en los detalles. Su estudio es un manantial inagotable de reflexión, y su doctrina puede 

influir de modo decisivo sobre los acontecimientos de mañana. Profundamente 

clásica en sus puntos de partida y en sus métodos, llega a conclusiones revolucionarias”. 

Desde luego, las primeras conclusiones de Kindelán son claras y en la línea de 

Douhet: “a) Sobre tierra, la defensiva es aptitud fácil y económica; la ofensiva difícil 

y cara. b) Sobre mar sucede cosa análoga, salvo operaciones ofensivas parciales, a 

las que la mar se presta. c) En el aire la aptitud defensiva es imposible; la ofensiva es 

fácil y rinde mucho. Parece lógico adaptar las Armas (los tres Ejércitos) a las aptitudes 

de mayor rendimiento para cada una: la defensiva, para las Armas de superficie; 

la ofensiva, para la Aviación”. 

Luego Kindelán precisaba otros Principios derivados: 

a) No existe más dominio indispensable que el del Aire; este dominio raramente 

llega a ser absoluto. 

b) La ofensiva estratégica es misión específica del Arma Aérea. 

c) El dominio del mar lo conquista y lo mantiene la Aviación. 

d) Sólo puede contrarrestarse un poder aéreo con otro aéreo. 

e) Las operaciones de bloqueo y desembarco sólo debe intentarlas quien disponga 

del dominio del aire. 

f) En el aire la calidad vence a la cantidad, y la precisión de efectos constituye el 

principal factor de eficacia. 

g) La potencia ofensiva de una Aviación varía en razón inversa a la distancia al 

objetivo. 

Volviendo a la Batalla de Inglaterra, Kindelán decía que se desistió de cruzar el 

Canal de la Mancha porque se consideró que la empresa era muy arriesgada mientras 

no se derrotara a la R.A.F.. Además los alemanes emprendieron la batalla con 

un concepto erróneo y medios inadecuados, ya que consideraron que se trataba de 

combates accesorios para preparar la acción principal, reservada al Ejército de Tierra. 

Pero se trataba de la acción principal, de la “batalla decisiva”; ganada la batalla 

aérea, la invasión era una empresa fácil, de éxito seguro; perdida, de nada serviría la 

formidable máquina de guerra alemana. Le faltó a la Luftwaffe una doctrina lógica 

y la fe para seguirla hasta el fin. No se emplearon los aviones adecuados, ni donde 

era debido, ni como era debido, ni cuando era debido. Kindelán también estudiaba 

el desembarco en Normandía y citaba las palabras del mariscal Montgomery: “Si se 

logra coordinar las Fuerzas de Tierra y de Aire, nada puede resistirlas y no se puede 

jamás perder una batalla”.


En 1.945 se publicó un nuevo libro de Doctrina Aérea, titulado El Arma Aérea. 

Empleo Táctico El libro estaba escrito a principios de 1.944 por el ya Coronel Mata 

Manzanedo, que en Marzo de 1.942 había escrito en la “Revista de Aeronáutica” un 

artículo titulado ¡¡Sorpresa…!! Aviación, en el que hablaba de cómo las cualidades 

de la Aviación permitían la sorpresa en sus tres variantes, estratégica, táctica y técnica. 

En su libro Mata presentaba entre otras conclusiones: 1º El Arma Aérea, imprime 

a toda batalla de importancia un carácter tridimensional. 2º La Fuerza Aérea puede 

alcanzar a toda la fuerza terrestre o naval, a menos que esté protegida por su propia 

Fuerza Aérea. 

Las acciones aéreas por él enumeradas tienen por objeto conquistar y conservar 

el dominio del cielo”. Para Mata, las características del avión le otorgan la universalidad 

de empleo y “su acción por excelencia es la ofensiva: a) En el espacio: porque 

todos los objetivos enemigos comprendidos en su radio de acción militar resultan 

vulnerables a sus ataques. b) En el tiempo: porque su acción permite al enemigo sin 

saber qué punto será objeto del ataque. c) En potencia: porque la dispersión de las 

bases no es obstáculo para que “formen masa” en el aire. 

Para Mata, al aparecer el explosivo nuclear, con un solo avión atacante que pase 

es suficiente para producir efectos demoledores, de consecuencias estratégicas. Por 

eso “el Arma Aérea ha de emplearse en masa, empeñándose ofensivamente, desencadenando 

una acción potente, para producir grandes efectos en el menor plazo y, 

en todo caso, anticipándose a las actividades similares del enemigo”. Hay un orden 

de urgencia en la ejecución de las misiones del Arma: 1º Destrucción de la potencia 

aérea del enemigo. 2º Cooperación con las fuerzas navales para la protección de las 

rutas marítimas cuando el abastecimiento del país se realice fundamentalmente por 

estas vías. 3º Cooperación con las fuerzas terrestres y navales en sus operaciones 

ofensivas. 4º Ataque a los recursos de todo orden del país enemigo. 

Mata consideraba que el Arma Aérea debía estar dividida en tres componentes: 

Armada Aérea o Aviación de empleo estratégico, Aviación de cooperación con el 

Ejército de Tierra y Aviación de cooperación con la Marina. 

Al igual que el Coronel Mata, muchos discípulos y seguidores de Kindelán presentaron 

sus ideas en la “Revista de Aeronáutica”. Durante 1.942 y 1.943 el ya Teniente 

Coronel Manuel Martínez Merino expuso sus ideas sobre Doctrina y Arte 

Militar Aéreos. En Mayo de 1.942 publicó un artículo titulado Estudios sobre un 

cadáver, que era un análisis sobre la derrota de Francia en 1.940: después de que la 

Luftwaffe había sabido conquistar el Dominio del Aire sobre Francia, la Wehrmacht 

no había tenido problemas en derrotar al ejército francés y ocupar la Francia continental. 

El tiempo había dado la razón a los “douhetistas”. 

En Octubre de 1.942 Martínez Merino publicó su artículo Aeronáutica Militar.- 

Cooperación con el Ejército de Tierra, en el que exponía sus ideas contra las tesis 

de los “ultra-douhetistas”, que consideraban que esta aviación debía suprimirse por


completo en beneficio de la Armada Aérea. Eso sí, cada Aviación de Cooperación 

tenía que estar bajo el mando de un General del Aire, que debía estar en los Cuarteles 

Generales del Ejército de Tierra y de la Marina respectivamente. 

En Mayo de 1.943, el ya Coronel Martínez Merino publicó otro artículo titulado 

Las Grandes Unidades Aéreas, en el que fijaba las misiones de los Cuerpos de Ejército 

del Aire. 

Poco después, en Octubre de 1.943, Martínez Merino publicó otro artículo, titulado 

Aviación sobre el mar y Aviación de cooperación con la Marina, en el que daba 

por sentado “la necesidad que tiene la Marina de la cooperación aérea”, y añadía: “ni 

aun en el supuesto de una Marina con Aviación propia, puede desentenderse el resto 

de la Aviación del cometido de apoyarla”, “cuanto menor sea una Marina, más necesitará 

el apoyo del Aire” y “para disponer del dominio del aire, necesario a la Marina 

como al Ejército de Tierra, será necesario acudir al Ejército del Aire”. 

Finalmente, en Junio de 1.944, Martínez Merino publicó su artículo Necesario repaso 

a Douhet en el que decía: “Tan fuera de la realidad nos parecen los que esperan 

que las doctrinas de Douhet llegue a aplicarse al pie de la letra, como los detractores 

furibundos que en su fobia quieren negar a la Aviación capacidad para destruir ciudades, 

hundir barcos o abatir la moral de la retaguardia”. Pasaba revista a la situación 

de la guerra en Octubre de 1.943 diciendo que todo iba según las previsiones generales 

de Douhet y además recordaba que Douhet había escrito para Italia, que era un 

país con condicionantes específicos y que había dicho: “Si yo estuviera pensando en 

un conflicto entre EE.UU. y Japón, no llegaría a estas mismas conclusiones”. 

Puntualizaba que Douhet había dicho: “No debemos preguntarle a Napoleón qué 

hizo, sino qué hubiese hecho si se encontrase en nuestros tiempos y en nuestras 

circunstancias”. También había escrito: “Se dice a menudo que el mejor medio de 

defenderse es atacar. En el dominio aéreo esto es cierto de una manera más absoluta. 

En él el único medio de defenderse es atacar”. Douhet también decía: “Conquistado 

el dominio del aire, la Armada Aérea victoriosa podrá proporcionar amplios medios 

auxiliares a su propio Ejército y a su propia Marina”. 

En el Pacífico ya no se libraban batallas navales, sino “batallas aéreas” o aeronavales. 

Pocos días después de publicarse su artículo en la revista, el éxito de la 

invasión de Europa y el desembarco en Normandía bajo el “paraguas aéreo” aliado 

demostraron que Douhet y Martínez Merino estaban en lo cierto. 

Después de la victoria aliada, la doctrina española se mantuvo con los mismos 

principios básicos, pero con los matices de la USAF y la R.A.F. Durante 1.946 el 

Coronel Martínez Merino escribió en la “Revista de Aeronáutica” varios artículos 

sobre cooperación bajo el epígrafe Arma Aérea. El primero fue El Ejército del Aire 

en las batallas de superficie, en el que enumeraba las misiones del Ejército del Aire: 

a) Destrucción del poder aéreo enemigo, atacándole en sus bases, en el aire o en sus 

fábricas, consiguiendo así el dominio del aire. b) Protección del territorio nacional 

contra los ataques aéreos. c) Atacar el interior del territorio enemigo. d) Cooperar


con el Ejército de Tierra en todas sus operaciones. e) Cooperar con la Marina en las 

operaciones navales. Todo muy douhetiano. 

Hacía un estudio histórico sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial en el que recordaba 

cómo “la curva de los éxitos y de los fracasos” coincidía exactamente en los dos 

bandos con la del dominio aéreo. Recordaba que Churchill, después del fracaso de 

la campaña en Noruega, reconoció que su inferioridad frente al poder aéreo enemigo 

había sido suficiente para justificar la retirada de la Escuadra inglesa, y que Gran 

Bretaña se había dedicado a desarrollar su fuerza aérea de un modo frenético, dado 

su retardo inicial frente a Alemania. 

Por su parte los Estados Unidos habían adoptado el lema “La victoria se conseguirá 

en el aire”, y la Aviación Militar estadounidense, creció enormemente y desarrolló 

una Aviación Estratégica que realizó sus misiones sobre Europa con arreglo 

a las doctrinas de Douhet y de Severski, hasta conseguir aplastar a la Luftwaffe en 

colaboración con la R.A.F.; por otra parte creó sus Fuerzas Aéreas Tácticas para 

apoyar a las fuerzas de tierra. 

Martínez Merino resumía la campaña del Pacífico diciendo que había sido la 

lucha por la ocupación de una serie de bases aéreas necesarias para llegar a poder 

atacar el territorio metropolitano del Japón. Se habían realizado numerosos desembarcos 

navales y aéreos, cuyo éxito estuvo asegurado siempre que se contó con la 

supremacía aérea. 

En el siguiente artículo titulado La Aviación y la guerra en el mar, repasaba todas 

las acciones navales de alguna importancia. Señalaba que los ingleses habían estado 

a punto de perder la Batalla del Atlántico y que sólo la ganaron gracias a la mejora 

de la capacidad y del radio de acción de los aviones del Mando Costero de la R.A.F.. 

Recordaba que en el Mediterráneo no había habido grandes enfrentamientos directos 

entre las Flotas de batalla italiana y británica, sino golpes de la Aviación embarcada 

británica en Tarento y de los hombres-rana italianos en Alejandría, para reducir estas 

Flotas; la verdadera lucha había sido por los convoyes de abastecimiento. 

Sobre la guerra en el Pacífico recordaba que no había habido grandes batallas 

navales, sino aeronavales. Después las fuerzas de superficie desembarcaban en una 

isla para adelantar el despliegue aéreo y siempre la conquistaban si contaban con la 

supremacía aérea. Los desembarcos en el Mediterráneo y en el Pacífico habían proporcionado 

una experiencia valiosísima a los aliados, que así pudieron desembarcar 

con éxito en Normandía y en Provenza, bajo la protección de la Fuerzas Aéreas aliadas. 

La experiencia de estas enormes operaciones con fuerzas de Tierra, Mar y Aire 

bajo un mando único, habían llevado a los Estados Unidos a crear la Junta de Jefes 

de Estado Mayor en Washington. 

En el siguiente artículo, titulado Intervención del Poder Aéreo en la guerra en el 

mar, Martínez Merino recordaba que la aparición del Arma Aérea había producido 

diversas batallas aeronavales, llamadas “batallas aéreas” por los japoneses, en las 

que la mayoría de las flotas de combate no habían llegado al contacto balístico ni, 

habitualmente, al contacto visual.


Martínez Merino sacaba una conclusión clara: “la participación de la Aviación 

en todos los cometidos de acción sobre el mar, se ha manifestado también como 

resolutiva” y que en el mar, como en tierra, “ninguna acción será ya posible sin la 

intervención aérea y sin el dominio del aire”. 

Finalmente, en Diciembre de 1.946, Martínez Merino publicaba su artículo Análisis 

de algunas doctrinas de guerra aérea, publicado primero en la revista “Ejército” 

y reproducido en parte en el número de Junio de 1.946 de la “Military Review” 

estadounidense. Empezaba por definir el objeto de las doctrinas de guerra aérea, 

luego pasaba revista a las doctrinas aéreas que consideraba más revolucionarias y 

discutidas, luego veía sus aplicaciones o sus repercusiones en la última guerra y, 

finalmente trataba de deducir las directrices generales de las futuras doctrinas de 

guerra aérea. 

Recalcaba que Douhet no había formulado su doctrina con carácter general, sino 

específicamente para Italia; detallaba las “características probables de las guerras 

futuras” que Douhet había predicho y los principios de doctrina que había deducido 

de sus observaciones. Terminaba diciendo que la historia le había dado a Douhet la 

razón en la mayor parte de sus puntos. 

A continuación pasaba revista a las ideas del General William Mitchell. Detallaba 

las ideas directrices de su doctrina, y finalizaba con algunas frases muy significativas 

como: “La potencia aérea es el factor decisivo en nuestra defensa en el Pacífico. Sin 

ella, tanto cualquier intento de apoderarse de nuestras posiciones como el de proteger 

nuestra propia nación contra un enemigo, serán infructuosos”. 

Posteriormente pasaba revista a las ideas de Alexander de Severski. Entre las frases 

de Severski, Martínez Merino destacaba: “si nuestra estrategia en el Pacífico se 

hubiese fundado en un predominio del poder aéreo, hubiéramos podido responder a 

la agresión del Japón lanzando inmediatamente sobre sus islas toda nuestra potencia 

aérea de bombarderos”. “Indudablemente nuestro dominio en el Pacífico debe estar 

basado en una estrategia aérea”. 

Después Martínez Merino demostraba la conveniencia, desde el punto de vista 

económico, operativo y doctrinal, de tener toda la aviación reunida en un Ejército del 

Aire, aunque luego éste pudiera dedicarse al apoyo y cooperación con las fuerzas de 

superficie. También reiteraba la conveniencia de un mando supremo interejércitos en 

cada batalla o en cada teatro de operaciones, que podía ser un alto jefe del Ejército, 

de la Marina o del Aire, en cada caso. Douhet pedía un “Ministerio Único de las 

Fuerzas Armadas” y Martínez Merino citaba al Mariscal Montgomery, que decía “La 

victoria aérea es la clave de la victoria terrestre”. 

Después Martínez Merino presentaba las organizaciones de las Fuerzas Aéreas de 

varios países (Alemania, Inglaterra, Estados Unidos, Rusia, Francia, Italia y Japón). 

Para finalizar se atrevía a establecer un nuevo concepto general: “Cada día más, el 

cielo será quien dé o quite la victoria”. 

Finalmente, Martínez Merino publicó en 1.948 su libro Arte Militar Aéreo, en el


que recopilaba y desarrollaba las conferencias que había impartido en los cursos para 

generales en la Escuela Superior del Ejército. 

En la introducción, Martínez Merino dice que “la guerra moderna ha de considerarse 

en su aspecto integral” y que “es indispensable la unidad de mando”. La guerra 

será total, ya que hasta la retaguardia será un frente de combate. Como consecuencia, 

“en el Arte Militar, todo ello no será sino la coronación de un cambio profundo que 

se venía incubando desde la aparición del aeroplano”. La guerra tridimensional crea 

“ese nuevo Arte Militar”, que abarca la guerra total, los tres Ejércitos integrados en 

una sola Fuerza, y una estrategia única. 

En el capítulo Doctrinas de Guerra Aérea, Martínez Merino recuerda los principios 

fundamentales: voluntad de vencer, acción de conjunto, libertad de acción y 

economía de fuerzas, que considera “eternos” y “universales” y también menciona 

otros, menos fundamentales o derivados de los anteriores. 

A continuación estudia las doctrinas de guerra aérea de Douhet, Mitchell y Severski. 

De Douhet, puntualiza que éste buscaba soluciones para Italia “y en el marco 

de los recursos y necesidades de Italia”, por lo que no se debe “tratar de aplicar 

íntegramente o trasplantar sus ideas a todos los países del mundo”. Luego presenta 

la evolución de sus escritos. Para él, Douhet había acertado plenamente en sus ideas 

sobre: guerra total, triunfo por el dominio del aire, posibilidad de adquirir este dominio, 

grandes ofensivas aéreas, destrucción total de ciudades, necesidad de crear el 

Ejército del Aire, unidad de acción de los tres Ejércitos, defensa aérea por el ataque 

aéreo y no limitación del empleo de los aviones por convenios internacionales. 

Al estudiar los escritos de Mitchell, recordaba su experiencia como aviador y su 

demostración de que las bombas de aviación adecuadas podían hundir a un acorazado. 

Resumía su doctrina en: la Aviación se debía separar del Ejército y de la Marina; 

había que crear un verdadero poder aéreo en EE.UU. y preparar grandes Unidades 

de Aviación de bombardeo estratégico de gran radio de acción; y había que basar la 

estrategia americana, especialmente en el Pacífico, en una poderosa Aviación. 

A continuación estudiaba la doctrina de Alexander de Severski, que resumía en: 

el Arma Aérea ha modificado profundamente los principios tácticos y estratégicos; 

sólo una potencia aérea puede llevar a cabo una guerra ofensiva y ganar así la guerra; 

la Aviación es la única de las tres Fuerzas que puede operar independientemente y 

además puede apoyar a las otras dos; no es posible ninguna operación importante de 

superficie sin apoyo aéreo; el poder aéreo debe tener la primacía en la nueva estrategia; 

sólo un poder aéreo puede vencer a otro poder aéreo. Además, Severski decía: 

“para una victoria definitiva sobre el Japón, necesitamos imponerle un bloqueo de 

tres dimensiones, valiéndonos del poder aéreo”. 

Finalmente Martínez Merino analizaba en conjunto los puntos fuertes y los errores 

de las tres doctrinas. Consideraba que había, sobre todo, cinco puntos comunes 

a todas ellas: a) La guerra será total; b) Es posible obtener el dominio del aire; c)El 

dominio del aire garantizaba el triunfo y la victoria era imposible sin el dominio; d)


Era posible llevar a cabo grandes ofensivas aéreas y lograr la destrucción total de 

ciudades, centros y moral enemiga y la Aviación podía conseguir la decisión por sus 

medios; e) La Aviación debía formar un Ejército independiente de Tierra y Marina: el 

Ejército del Aire. Las aviaciones auxiliares, Naval y de Ejército, deben desaparecer. 

Cuando estudiaba las diferentes organizaciones aéreas, Martínez Merino puntualizaba 

que, la Luftwaffe era una Aviación independiente, con su propio Ministerio 

del Aire, pero estaba consagrada al apoyo al Ejército de Tierra y carecía de mentalidad, 

doctrina y material para ser una aviación estratégica, como se había puesto 

de manifiesto en la Batalla de Inglaterra. En cambio la R.A.F. había aprendido a lo 

largo de la guerra y modificó su orgánica y su material según vió que era necesario 

hacerlo. En Estados Unidos la evolución había sido mayor y se había creado no sólo 

una Fuerza Aérea independiente, sino también un Presidente de la Junta de Jefes de 

Estado Mayor y un Ministerio de Defensa. Después hacía algunas predicciones sobre 

el futuro, bastante acertadas y prudentes. 

Como vemos, la doctrina del Ejército del Aire en esta época era básicamente 

douhetiana, aunque se careciera de medios para ponerla en práctica. El material del 

Ejército del Aire estaba constituído por una especie de “museo volante” de principios 

del II Guerra Mundial, con aviones cada vez más anticuados y que casi no 

podían volar por falta de repuestos y gasolina. Básicamente contaba con el Me-109 

como avión de caza y el He-111 como bombardero, y ambos remotorizados con 

motores británicos. 

Tras los acuerdos con EE.UU. en 1.953, la Doctrina Aérea del Ejército del Aire 

español estuvo claramente influída por la correspondiente doctrina de la USAF, lo 

cual constituye un contraste con la política general de defensa del Gobierno español 

y con la capacidad del Ejército del Aire, que sólo podía colaborar en la defensa aérea 

de la OTAN en Europa, y poseía una mínima capacidad de apoyo táctico, pero seguía 

considerando que lo esencial de la doctrina aérea era la capacidad de destrucción del 

poder y el potencial aéreo enemigos. 

En la Enciclopedia de Aviación y Astronáutica, editada en 1.972, el entonces Comandante 

de Aviación D. Rafael González-Granda Aguadé, decía que la base de la 

doctrina aérea estaba constituída por los siguientes postulados: 

1. Las características más acusadas de las fuerzas aéreas son: gran radio de acción, 

velocidad, movilidad, flexibilidad y capacidad de penetración. Otros de sus contemporáneos 

destacaban la rapidez de reacción, la flexibilidad de empleo, la capacidad 

de penetración y la potencia. 

2. Las fuerzas aéreas ejercen una influencia decisiva en todos los aspectos de las 

relaciones internacionales. 

3. Las fuerzas aéreas son indivisibles; es decir, para que sus características se exploten 

al máximo, deben ser empleadas en todos los escalones como un instrumento 

indivisible.


4. Las fuerzas aéreas se deben emplear primordialmente para conseguir y explotar 

el dominio del aire. 

5. En caso de guerra, la neutralización de la capacidad destructora de las fuerzas 

aéreas enemigas es de vital interés. 

6. La existencia de fuerzas aéreas de defensa, organizadas en tiempo de paz, es indispensable 

para la seguridad nacional. 

7. En la guerra, el dominio del aire eleva el concepto de seguridad de todas las fuerzas 

militares en acción. 

8. Las fuerzas aéreas poseen capacidad para conducir operaciones militares contra 

todos los componentes del potencial enemigo. 

9. El esfuerzo aéreo debe repartirse cuidadosamente entre los diversos tipos de operaciones. 

10. Las fuerzas aéreas deben emplearse continuamente en la obtención de información. 

11. El término poder aéreo comprende la total capacidad aérea de una nación y su 

potencial aéreo puede cambiar radicalmente la marcha de una guerra. 

Por otra parte, la doctrina española de esta década, aplicable a los tres Ejércitos 

y a las acciones conjuntas, comprendía seis principios. Tres de ellos se consideraban 

fundamentales: Voluntad de vencer, Acción de conjunto y Sorpresa; los otros tres 

eran derivados de aquéllos: Libertad de acción, Aprovechamiento del éxito y Economía 

de fuerzas. 

En los años 80 y posteriores, tras la entrada de España en la OTAN, la Doctrina 

Aérea del Ejército del Aire estaba constituída básicamente por la IG-00-1 sobre 

Doctrina Aeroespacial, que es un fiel reflejo de las siguientes publicaciones OTAN: 

ATP-27B (Operaciones Ofensivas de Apoyo Aéreo), ATP-33 (Doctrina Aérea Táctica), 

ATP-34 (Apoyo Aéreo Táctico de Operaciones Marítimas), ATP-40 (Doctrina y 

Procedimientos para el Control del Espacio Aéreo en la Zona de Combate) y ATP-42 

(Operaciones de Superioridad Aérea), que también se desarrollan en las Normas para 

el Apoyo Aéreo a las Fuerzas Terrestres (NAAFT) y las Normas y Procedimientos 

para las Operaciones Armada-Aire (NPOAA). 

Después de la integración de las Fuerzas Armadas españolas en la estructura de 

la OTAN, España ha cesado de tener una Doctrina Aérea propia para adoptar la de 

la OTAN. 

En Marzo de 1.999 el Capitán de Aviación Manuel de la Chica Camúñez y el 

Teniente de Aviación Bayardo Abós Álvarez-Buiza formaban parte de un grupo de 

ataque de la OTAN, formado por más de 50 aviones aliados, dentro de la operación 

ALLIED FORCE sobre Kosovo. La formación aliada atacó objetivos con bombas 

láser de precisión, protegió con contramedidas a los caza-bombarderos, mandó cazas 

a hacer CAP sobre puntos de escape y coordinó reabastecimientos en vuelo. Después 

de varios ataques similares el gobierno serbio no dudó en modificar su actitud y


aceptar las condiciones de paz de la coalición internacional. Finalmente el Ejército 

del Aire español habia realizado bombardeos estratégicos, akcanzando los objetivos 

que tradicionalmente se asignarian a una Armada Aérea: obligar a un gobierno a 

capitular y aceptar un cambio radical en su politica. Estos ataques obtuvieron una 

victoria estratégica porque se disponía del personal (pilotos, mecánicos, armeros, 

controladores, etc.,…) perfectamente adiestrado, de un material adecuado como el 

F-18 (capaz de actuar como avión de ataque), y a que se hizo buen uso de las enseñanzas 

de los pensadores que durante más de 75 años habían defendido la correcta 

doctrina aérea para el Ejército del Aire.

tH e a n Po t G i e t e r * - de r M o t Mo o r e ** 

Sudafrica 

The South African Air Force: 

Historical Notes and Involvement in the Korean War 

The South African Air Force (SAAF) has celebrated its 90 th birthday in 2010, 

making it one of the oldest independent air forces in the world. The SAAF 

has a long and celebrated history, while South African pilots have build up 

a reputation as of the finest in the world. When the Union Defence Force (of South 

Africa) was created in 1912 provision was made for a flying core, called the South 

African Aviation Corps or Zuid-Afrikaanse Vliegenierskorps. 1 In 1913 the first ten 

South Africans underwent pilot training in Kimberley. Just before the outbreak of the 

First World War, in 1914, five of them then went on to complete pilot training at the 

Flying School of the Royal Flying Corps in Uphaven, Britain. During the First War 

South African pilots performed exemplary service in the Royal Flying Corps and in 

the Royal Naval Air Service. They participating in most phases of the war and served 

in such diverse theatres as the Western Front, Southwest and East Africa, Russia, 

the Western Dessert, Gallipoli and Palestine. In the process they achieved much 

distinction – for example Captain A.W.B. Proctor is credited with 41 kills, while C. 

(“Boetie”) Venter with 22 kills. 2 

Even before an own air force for South Africa was created, South African pilots 

have therefore made their mark. In the decades to follow the SAAF build up a good 

record during various wars and conflicts, and when South Africa experienced a process 

of political and military transition in the 1990s, the Air Force became a force the 

new nation can be proud about. The purpose of this article is to briefly narrate the 

history of the SAAF and to illustrate its commitment and operation proficiency with 

reference to a brief period during its involvement in the Korean War. 

Creation and founding years 

The history of the South African Air Force (SAAF) dates back to 1920. Its origin 

is probably in a meeting between General J.C. (Jan) Smuts (SA Prime Minister 

and member of the Imperial War Cabinet) and Lieutenant Colonel H.P. (Pierre) van 

Ryneveld in London in 1919, where they discussed the need for an air force. 3 The 

* Prof Thean Potgieter, Director Centre for Military Studies, Stellenbosch University 

** Military historian, University of Fort Hare 

1 K.A. Maxwell and J.M. Smith, SA Air Force Golden Jubilee Book, SAAF, 1970, p. 14. 

2 

Ibid., pp. 18-19. 

3 Ibid., p. 20.


new entity was created as the Air Services of the Union of South Africa Defence 

Force on 1 February 1920 after Britain donated about 100 First World War vintage 

aircraft (including 48 DH9s, 30 Avro 504s and 22 SE5s) with workshop machinery 

and spare parts, to South Africa. Consequently Pierre van Ryneveld (later General 

Sir Pierre Van Ryneveld) was appointed at its head as Director Air Services and the 

service was listed as a Permanent Force unit on 1 February 1923. 4 Van Reyneveld 

had an outstanding career in the Royal Flying Corps during the First World War, was 

well respected as a leader and, amongst others, saw deployment in Egypt, Palestine 

and Salonika before commanding 78 Squadron (Home Defence) in Britain, one of 

the first night-fighter units, as well as the 11 th Army Wing. 

Sadly, the new air force’s first operational experience was internally as it was used 

against striking gold miners on the Witwatersrand in 1922. When the strikes turned 

violent, General Jan Smuts (South African Prime Minister) declared martial law and 

used the air force to bomb the miners’ positions. Two aircraft were shot down (killing 

two crew members and injuring two others). Shortly afterwards (in 1922, 1925 and 

1932) it also played an important part in suppressing ethnic rebellions in the former 

German Southwest Africa (currently Namibia). Amongst these clashes was the infamous 

crushing of the Bondelswarts revolt in southern Namibia, which led to internal 

and international criticism for the Smuts government. 

In the next challenge the SAAF had to face it came of second best. In line with 

the global depression of the time its budget was severely slashed in the early 1930s, 

which resulted in a substantial scaling down. However, as the maintenance of an 

air force was still regarded as important to South Africa, some progress still took 

place. Pilots were kept active (by even doing crop spraying) and a Central Flying 

School was established at Zwartkop in 1932 which was the beginning of long professional 

tradition. 5 After the economic recovery in 1936 government approved the 

creation of a reserve of 1000 pilots and 1700 mechanics to be trained over the next 

six years, while new bases were created in Bloemspruit, Durban, Waterkloof and 

Cape Town. 6 

The Second World War and its aftermath 

The Second World War caught the SAAF by surprise. At its outbreak it had a 

mere 1500 men. Though it had 104 aircraft, only eight of these (six Hurricanes, one 

Fairy Battle bomber and one Blenheim bomber) were up to date. 7 These shortcomings 

were quickly addressed and top priority was given to training and equipment. 

At the war’s height in 1944 SAAF was at a peak with 45 000 members (including 

4 

L. Steyn, A short history of the South African Air Force, 1920-2010, Unpublished brief history, 

SAAF Museum, Pretoria, 2010, p. 1. 

5 

H. Heitman, Die Suid-Afrikaanse Krygsmag, CNA, Johannesburg, 2001, p. 53. 

6 

Ibid. 

7 

P. Moorcraft, Africa’s Super Power, Sygma/Collins, Johannesburg, 1981, p. 134.

tH e so u t H af r i C a n air fo r C e: Hi s t o r i C a l notes a n d in v o lv e m e n t in t H e ko r e a n wa r 273 

6500 Women’s Auxiliaries), had 35 operational squadrons and operated 33 different 

aircraft types. As part of the Allied Joint Air Training Scheme, more than 33 347 pilots 

were trained at the 38 air schools set up around Southern Africa. Of these 12 221 

flew for the SAAF while many South Africans also served in the British Royal Air 

Force. 8 Operationally a high priority was awarded to control over the vital sea route 

around the Cape. The SAAF provided valuable assistance to naval units in keeping 

the strategic shipping lanes clear of Axis warships and submarines and flew more 

than 15 000 coastal patrol missions during the war. The SAAF first went into action 

against the Italians in the Horn of Africa (Abyssinia), moving from there to the 

Western Desert theatre in North Africa. In Abyssinia SAAF set about neutralising 

the Italian air force in the area (Italy was then part of the Axis Forces) flying 5000 

sorties, destroying 71 enemy aircraft in combat and at least 70 in attacks on airfields, 

while their losses were 79 pilots and aircrew dead and 5 missing in action. 9 South 

African pilots established a reputation for valour and determination and their valuable 

contribution to the Desert Air Force (North Africa) in 1942 can be judged from 

the fact that on D+1 of the El Alamein attack, No 3 Wing of the SAAF flew 133 of 

the 174 bomber sorties, while the four fighter squadrons flew 1 377 sorties (106 a 

day) between 19 and 31 October. 10 In addition the SAAF also made vital contributions 

to the campaigns in the Mediterranean, the Balkans, Italy and flew very demanding 

missions, parachuting supplies to the Polish Home Army in Warsaw during 

August and September 1944. 

As a result of the altered strategic situation after the end of the war, the Russians 

closed all access to West Berlin in June 1948 and the vast amounts of provisions 

the city required had to be provided by air. From October 1948 onwards 20 SAAF 

aircrews joined other air forces in the “Berlin Air Bridge” (which lasted into 1949) 

flying thousands of tons of food and coal into Berlin. 11 

The Korean War 

After open conflict broke out in Korea in 1950 the South African government 

availed 2 Squadron of the SAAF (with 49 officers and 157 airmen) to serve with 

the United Nations forces in Korea. The “Flying Cheetahs” as they were called, left 

South Africa on 27 September for the Johnson Air Force Base in Tokyo, where they 

converted to F-51D Mustangs before travelling on to Korea. In 1953 they traded 

their surviving Mustangs for the F86F Sabre. 12 During the Korean conflict the Flying 

Cheetahs carried out 12 405 operational flights with Mustang and Sabre aircraft 

while aircraft losses amounted to 79. In total 826 South Africans served in Korea, of 

8 H. Heitman, Suid-Afrikaanse Krygsmag, p. 57. 

9 K.A. Maxwell and J.M. Smith, SA Air Force Golden Jubilee Book, p. 42. 

10 H. Heitman, South African Armed Forces, Buffalo Publications, Cape Town, 1990, p. 55. 

11 P. Moorcraft, Africa’s Super Power, p. 138. 

12 H. Heitman, South African Armed Forces, p. 57.


whom 34 pilots and two ground personnel were killed and eight became prisoners of 

war. 13 The South Africans could claim to the destruction of, among other things, 18 

tanks, 160 artillery pieces, 120 anti-aircraft guns, 615 vehicles, 4 locomotives and 

200 railway trucks. After the end of the war 2 Squadron received a United States 

Presidential Unit Citation, because it had displayed “… such gallantry, determination 

and esprit de corps in accomplishing its missions under extremely difficult and 

hazardous conditions as to set it apart and above other units participating in the same 

campaign”. 14 

The apartheid years 

The apartheid-era was a difficult period for the SAAF. Not only did it progressively 

suffer under various armaments boycotts due to the pariah status of South 

Africa, but it also had to maintain its combat readiness as South Africa was involved 

in a conflict in Southwest Africa (Namibia)/Angola border region. 

After successfully operating Sabres in Korea, the SAAF ordered 34 of the latest 

version, the Sabre Mk 6. These were delivered after 1956 and SAAF 1 and 2 

Squadrons now flew 16 Sabres and 12 de Havilland Vampires each. For maritime 

patrols the SAAF acquired the Avro Shackleton Mk3. From 1957 onwards a countrywide 

national air defence radar network was developed and a school for airspace, air 

traffic and fighter controllers established. This infrastructure is still in service, however, 

it has been modernised and operates fixed as well as mobile installations. 15 

During the 1960s and 1970s South Africa was increasingly isolated as a result of 

its apartheid policies. As African countries received independence from their former 

colonial masters, the South African state felt increasingly threatened by its Warsaw 

bloc-backed neighbours. This resulted in the acquisition of new fighters, bombers, 

transport aircraft and helicopters, as well as the development of locally manufactured 

air-launched ordnance. The expansion and modernisation process included the 

following: Sixteen Aermacchi MB326 aircraft were acquired from Italy in 1966, 

where after it was locally produced under licence as the Impala by Atlas Aircraft 

Corporation. Also in the 1960s followed the acquisition of a fleet of Mirage III and 

Mirage F1 fighters, Canberra and Buccaneer bombers, C130B Hercules and C160Z 

Transall transporters, Piaggio P166 Albatross coastal patrol aircraft, as well as additional 

DC-4 Skymasters and DC-3 Dakotas. In addition SAAF acquired Alouette 

II and III, Puma, Super Frelon and Westland Wasp helicopters. 16 

Due to the international condemnation of apartheid, South Africa suffered from 

growing economic sanctions and a variety of armaments boycotts which culminated 

13 L. Steyn, South African Air Force, pp. 1-2. 

14 H. Heitman, South African Armed Forces, p. 58. 

15 L. Steyn, South African Air Force, p. 2. 

16 P. Moorcraft, Africa’s Super Power, pp. 138-153.


in a compulsory UN Security Council arms embargo in November 1977. 17 South 

Africa, now embroiled in the conflict in northern Southwest Africa and southern 

Angolan was forced to become more self-sufficient and adept high technology to 

local operational requirements. The local defence industry blossomed as they had 

to keep the defence force operational and vast amounts of public money were injected 

into it. Weapons, ammunition, logistics and military equipment production 

increased. The first prototype of a locally manufactured attack helicopter, the Alpha 

XH1, flew in February 1986, with the XPT-1 Experimental Test Platform being unveiled 

in April 1987. 18 This led to the development of the Rooivalk attack helicopter. 

From April 1987 onwards SAAF also took delivery of its new fighter aircraft, the 

Cheetah (an improved and rebuilt Mirage III). 

During the 1970s and 1980s the SAAF played an important role in the drawn 

out low-intensity conflict on the border of the then Southwest Africa (Namibia) and 

Angola. South African pilots displayed their characteristic “can do” mentality and 

were at times heavily engaged in supporting South African ground operations into 

Angola. After a lengthy process of negotiations and an UN-mediated settlement, 

South Africa and Cuba withdrew militarily from Namibia and Angola in 1989, bringing 

about the independence of Namibia and vast political changes for South Africa. 

The changing regional and domestic environment meant that the SAAF went through 

a process of rationalisation and scaling down after 1990. Various aircraft types were 

withdrawn from service and several squadrons were disbanded. 

SAAF: National Air Force Of A New Democratic South Africa 

The 1990s spelled change not only for South Africa, but also globally. The Cold 

War was no more and the domestic situation in South Africa also changed as the 

country’s political leaders embarked on a negotiation process that would lead to the 

creation of the “new” democratic South Africa in 1994. The SAAF rendered crucial 

support to the Independent Electoral Committee (IEC) in 1994 and in Operation 

Jambu (its biggest peacetime operation ever) it flew 820 hours in support of the 

electoral process. During the inauguration of President Nelson Mandela, 74 aircraft 

participated in the flypast. 

The creation of the “rainbow nation” meant that a new South African National 

Defence Force (SANDF) had to be created and the SAAF had to reflect South African 

society. The air wings of the former tribal homelands (so-called TBVC states) as 

well as the non-statutory forces (MK and Apla the armed wings of the ANC and the 

PAC respectively) as well as the aircraft and helicopters of the TBVC states were 

integrated into the new SAAF. As part of the integration process pilots from the 

17 T.D. Potgieter, The Secret South African Project Team: Building Strike Craft in Israel, 1975-1977, 

in Scientia Militaria, Vol. 32, Nr. 2, 2004, p. 133. 

18 H. Heitman, South African Arms and Armour, Struik, Cape Town, 1988, pp. 156-158.


former Bophuthatswana Air Wing and the non-statutory forces received their wings 

and completed training and advanced SAAF training. Women also benefited in the 

new dispensation and have qualified to perform most tasks within the SAAF on an 

equal footing with their male counterparts. 

Since 1994 the SAAF have participated in numerous search and rescue and humanitarian 

support missions in South Africa and in the region. SAAF helicopters 

and aircraft have rescued people from burning buildings, searched for and rescued 

lost mountaineers, mariners and have provided disaster relief in the region. Regional 

missions included a rescue and supply mission to Rwanda in July 1994; SAAF assistance 

to Mozambique during the elections in October 1994; disaster assistance to 

Tanzania in February 1998; and assistance to Mozambique after the massive floods 

in February and March 2000. During this mission more than 14 000 people were 

rescued and 2 647 tonnes of supplies and medical aid was flown into the worst affected 

areas. 19 

In 1998 forces from South Africa and Botswana entered Lesotho in an effort to 

restore order to the mountain kingdom after the Lesotho government approached the 

SADC for assistance. The SAAF participated in the operation (Operation Boleas) 

and a SAAF contingent was based in Maseru for its duration. During the first decade 

of the twenty-first century South Africa forces participated in various UN peace support 

operations in Africa. The SAAF played an important role during these operations 

as it supported SANDF units deployed in Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic 

Republic of Congo with helicopter crews, by flying supply missions and by participating 

in support of Joint Operations. 

By the end of the twentieth century the SAAF aircraft and equipment was old and 

outdated, mainly as a result of the arms embargo in the 1970s and 1980s. As South 

Africa was now a respected member of the international community, the SAAF embarked 

on a re-equipment programme in 1998/1999. 16 Squadron was reactivated 

and became the home squadron for the locally produced Denel Rooivalk Attack 

helicopter (at the Bloemspruit base) in October 1998. As part of the acquisitions 

programme the SAAF is set to receive SAAB Gripen fighters, BAE Systems Hawk 

Mk120 trainers, Agusta A109 helicopters and Agusta/Westland Lynx helicopters between 

2005 and 2012. 20 

Case study: SAAF in action in Korea, 22 april to 24 june 1951 21 

For more than three years the Korean War was fought on the Korean peninsula with 

the belligerents first being engaged in a war of rapid movement across the peninsula. 

19 

L. Steyn, South African Air Force, pp. 3-4. 

20 

Ibid., pp. 3-5. 

21 

The section on the SAAF in Korea between April and June 1951 is based on an article by D.M. 

(Dermot) Moore, SAAF in Korea, published in Militaria, Vol 10, Nr 4, 1980, pp. 24-34.


After North Korean invasion of South Korea, the South Korean and UN forces were 

pushed down to the southern extremity of the peninsula. A brilliant UN offensive and 

the amphibious landings at Inchon, push the North Korean forces the Chinese border 

in the north which resulted in a Chinese intervention. UN forces were again forced 

into a haphazard retreat south. By the end of June 1951, however, it seemed that the 

Communist forces were ready to negotiate and that the UN objectives might be in 

sight. 22 What is however of interest is the preceding two months, the role of air power 

and the air offensive, together with the place of the SAAF’s 2 Squadron (2 Sqn) in 

these events. 2 Sqn was heavily engaged in the intense air war during this critical 

phase of the war, and South African pilots gained a formidable reputation for getting 

the job done, as one US officer stated: “We always gave them the dirty or tricky jobs 

that no one else wanted because we knew that they would handle them”. 23 

The Ground Situation 

The ground situation in the sixty-four days before 24 June 1951 can be divided 

into two periods: from 22 April to 19 May the UN forces successfully resisted the 

“Fifth Phase Offensive” by combined Chinese and North Korean Forces; while from 

20 May to 24 June the UN forces launched an offensive that achieved the stabilization 

of a Main Line of Resistance (MLR) - for the most part just north of the 38th parallel. 

This MLR was to remain virtually static until the end of the war (see Map 1). 

By 21 April 1951 the UN forces had established themselves along the Utah and 

Kansas Phase lines after a successful offensive. 24 On 22 April 1951 the Communist 

Forces attacked the US I and IX Corps positions in strength in an attempt to recapture 

Seoul. 25 Although they did not achieve the objective, General Van Fleet, who 

took over from General Ridgway on 11 April (who succeeded General MacArthur), 

was forced to withdraw to the No-name line by 30 April. 26 The Communist offensive 

halted and Van Fleet immediately replied with an offensive aimed at denying 

the enemy the opportunity to build-up for a new offensive, threatening their supply 

routes in the Hwachon area and the so-called ”Iron Triangle”. A policy of hot 

pursuit was proclaimed over the 38th parallel. 27 The UN advance achieved some 

success although it was slowed by rain on 27-28 May. The retreating enemy ground 

forces, compelled to move during the day, was exposed to air attacks and by the end 

of May the UN forces had re-established themselves along the Kansas line. They 

22 

J.W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, second edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood 

Cliffs, 1965, p. 490. 

23 

H. Heitman, South African Armed Forces, p. 58. 

24 

J. Miller, O.J. Carroll & M.E. Tackley, Korea, 1951-1953, Office of the Chief of Military History, 

Washington (S.A.), pp. 20-27. 

25 Ibid., p. 103. 

26 Ibid., pp. 102-107. 

27 Ibid., p. 109.


consolidated this position with barbed wire, cleared fields of fire, created minefields, 

constructed shelters and concentrated artillery. General Ridgway, UN Commanderin-Chief 

(UNCINC), authorized local advances to gain more favourable ground for 

defence and Van Fleet launched Operation Piledriver on 1 June 1951, which was 

to bring the US I and IX Corps to the Wyoming line by 15 June 1951. During this 

advance they encountered heavy enemy resistance organised in depth, as they approached 

the base of the ”Iron Triangle”. 28 

The Air Situation 

The air war during this period was characterized by two features: an intensified 

interdiction by the Far East Air Force (FEAF) into which SAAF, ROKAF and 

RAAF elements were incorporated, and the implementation of a revised air war plan 

by the Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) in mid-June. The FEAF interdiction 

campaign was named Operation Strangle and its objective was to isolate the MLR 

from its sources of supply in North Korea and Manchuria. A strip of territory stretching 

east-west across Korea, between 38° 15’N and 39° 15’N, was divided into three 

interdiction zones, a zone being allocated each to the 5th Air Force, the Navy and the 

1st Marine Air Wing. The enemy road and rail systems were placed under 24-hour 

attack (see Map 1). 29 

The revised air war plan of the CCAF was probably resulted from a conference 

between CCAF officers and their Soviet advisers held in Mukden in May 1951. The 

failure of the ground offensive was attributed to the CCAF’s failure to gain air superiority 

over Korea and in an attempt to rectify the situation it was decided that new 

‘International Communist Volunteer Air Force’ personnel would assist the CCAF; 

efforts to repair the North Korean airfields would be redoubled with the aid of cover 

provided by MIG-15’s; nuisance raids would be conducted against the South as soon 

as the North Korean airfields could take light aircraft; while Ilyushin ground attack 

aircraft (with crews trained by Russian advisers) would support the CCAF ground 

forces in a new offensive. 30 

The Combat Role of 2 Squadron 

In common with other fighter-bomber squadrons of the 5 th Air Force, 2 Sqn SAAF 

was very involved in these events and both air and ground crews had to work very 

hard to maintain operations. Most of the FEAF fighter-bomber effort centred on 

interdiction missions, while the fighter-bombers were also utilised for close support, 

rescue and escort missions, or were diverted while en route to interdiction targets. 

28 Ibid., pp. 110-111. 

29 D. Rees, Korea: The Limited War, MacMillan, London, 1964, p. 376. 

30 R.F. Futrell, L.S. Mosley & A.F. Simpson, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, Duell, 

Sloan and Pierce, New York, 1961, pp. 278-279.


Map 1: 2 Squadron in Korea, 22 April – 24 June 1951 

– Airfields used by 2 Squadron 

– Airfields attacked by 2 Squadron 

– Town 

– Rendezvous (RV) and orbit points, Sinuiju raid


Between 22 April and 24 June 1951 2 Sqn flew 1130 combat sorties, which could 

be divided into the following missions: interdiction (84,4%); close support (8,4%); 

rescue (3,6%); and counter-air, essentially aimed at airfields (3,6%). 31 

The squadron’s interdiction effort concentrated on the Main Supply Route (MSR) 

with the targets being the road and the railway line between Pyongyang, Sariwon, 

Kaesong and the MLR. Target selection sought the destruction of the communication 

routes at points difficult to repair or by-pass (such as bridges, railway tunnels, 

cuttings, marshalling yards and routes built up through damp ground or rice paddies). 

Supply dumps and troops concentrations en route to the front was also selected 

as targets. Close support strikes were mainly in support of the US I Corps in the 

Western Sector. From the middle of June onwards, 2 Sqn F-51 Mustangs were also 

called upon to attack North Korean airfields in what essentially was a counter-air 

campaign. 

Aircraft Armament 

The standard armament per aircraft against road and railway targets was two 

500lb (227,3kg) G.P. bombs, six 5 inch (127mm) high velocity aircraft rockets 

(HVAR) and a maximum load of .50 ammunition. For attacks on supply areas and 

for close support missions the G.P. bombs were usually replaced with two 110 gallon 

(416,35 litre) drop tanks filled with napalm and fused with modified white phosphorous 

grenades. Four aircraft missions sometimes consisted of two aircraft armed with 

napalm and two armed with G.P. bombs. After the primary target was bombed with 

either G.P. or napalm bombs, the secondary ordnance was available for targets of 

opportunity. This secondary ordnance sometimes proved useful when an interdiction 

mission was diverted by the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) to render close support 

to the ground forces. 

Aircraft attacking airfields used the 500lb bombs to pothole the runways, and 

V.T. fused bombs and rockets for flak suppression. The use of proximity fuses was 

made possible by the development of an L-bracket which prevented the ordnance 

being carried on the external wing racks of the fighter-bombers from arming prematurely. 

32 The bombs could now be dropped safely from high above the bursting flak, 

to explode at an altitude where they caused optimum damage. Bombs with six hour 

delayed fuses were also placed on the airfield runways during the last raid of the day 

against the North Korean airfields in order to harass the repair crews operating under 

cover of darkness. 

31 South African Military Archive Depot (SAMAD), War Dairies and Missions SAAF (Korea), Box 

14, Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 22 Apr 1951-30 Apr 1951; Box 15, Debriefing Forms, SAAF220, 

1 May 1951-31 May 1951; Box 16, Debriefing Forms, SAAF220: 1 June 1951-24 June 1951. 

32 Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, p. 331; Republic of Korea, The History of the United 

Nations Forces in the Korean War, Vol.1, Seoul, 1972, p. 422.


Airfields used by 2 Squadron 

On 23 April 1951, 2 Sqn missions took-off from K-9 airfield and landed at K-10 

on their return. The Squadron had been operating from K-9 since 25 March under 

the operational control of 35 Fighter-Interceptor Wing, while their normal base at 

K-10 was being rebuilt. At K-10 they functioned under the operational control of 

18 Fighter-Bomber Wing. 33 On their return to K-10 the Squadron found all facilities 

greatly improved and “...equivalent to any permanent air station in the Union.” 34 The 

great disadvantage of K-10 was its distance from the frontline, and as a result the 

aircraft of 18 Fighter-Bomber Wing were instructed from 2 May onwards to re-arm 

and re-fuel at the forward airfield K-13 (280km north of K-10). The three squadrons 

of the wing, 67 and 12 Squadrons (USAF) and 2 Sqn (SAAF) were each instructed to 

rotate their flights through K-13 in the following way: A flight of four aircraft had to 

be dispatched from K-10 on an operational mission landing at K-13 on a daily basis; 

they had to rearm and refuel at K-13 and fly two more missions from K-13 on the 

same day, staying at overnight K-13; and fly one more mission from K-13 the next 

day before returning to K-10. Twenty ground crewmembers formed the “rest and 

recuperation (R and R) detachment for the squadron at K-13. On 7 May this detachment 

was moved to K-16 where the same rotation procedure as for K-13 was applied 

to the aircrews (see Map 1). 35 

In practice the rotation procedure through the forward airfields became far more 

demanding than the instructions contained in the original Frag Order indicated. 

A typical example is that of a flight consisting of Captain (Capt) G. Kotze, and 

Lieutenants A.B. de Wet, I. Gow, M. Frost and F.M. Bekker. Three of these pilots 

flew 10 successive missions over a period of five days before returning to K-10. The 

standard of the ground crews’ work can be assessed by the fact that the same four 

aircraft, Nos. 334, 303, 329 and 306 were used on all these missions. In order to 

illustrate the rotation process, the operations for the five days (flown by the above 

pilots) are tabulated in Table 1 (next page). 

33 SAMAD, War Diaries (Korea), Box 3 and 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 25 March and 23 April 1951. 

34 SAMAD, War Diaries (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 24 April 1951. 

35 SAMAD, War Diaries (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, Appendix “I”, Frag Order, 5-2 for 2 

May 1951; and 2 Squadron War Diaries, 7 May 1951.


Table 1: SAAF rotation through the forward airfield K·16: an example 36 

Date 

(Duration) 

13 May 

(1:40) 

13 May 

(0:55) 

14 May 

(0:50) 

14 May 

(0:55) 

15 May 

(1:20) 

15 May 

(1:20) 

16 May 

(1:20) 

16 May 

(1:35) 

16 May 

(1:30) 

17 May 

(2:00) 

Airfield Pilots 

K-10 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-16 

K-10 

Capt G.Kotze 

Lt I. Gow 

Lt A.B. de Wet 

Lt M. Frost 

Capt G.Kotze 

Lt I. Gow 


Lt M. Frost 

Capt G.Kotze 

Lt I. Gow 


Lt M. Frost 

Capt G.Kotze 

Lt I. Gow 


Lt M. Frost 

Capt G. Kotze 

Lt F. Bekker 


Lt M. Frost 

Capt G. Kotze 

Lt F. Bekker 


Lt M. Frost 

Capt G. Kotze 

Lt F. Bekker 


Lt M. Frost 

Capt G. Kotze 

Lt F. Bekker 


Lt M. Frost 

Capt G. Kotze 

Lt F. Bekker 


Lt M. Frost 

Capt G. Kotze 

Lt F. Bekker 


Lt M. Frost 

Targets 

(Mission) 

Supply dumps 

Ops Hotpants 

(1863) 

Camouflaged 

supply 

dumps, Ops 

Hotpants 

(1823) 

Buildings 

and supply 

stacks Ops 

Windburn 

(1802) 

Camouflaged 

supply 

dumps, Ops 

Windburn 

(1809) 

Village 

Caves 

Vehicles 

(1807) 

Village 

Vehicles 

(1823) 

Caves 

Vehicles 

(1807) 

Supply dumps 

in wood 

(1802) 

Supplies 

in dug-out 

highway 

bridge 

(1815) 

Village 

(1802) 

36 SAMAD, SAAF220, Debriefing Forms, 13-17 May 1951. 

Claims Remarks 

Nil 

Bombs 

jettisoned 

Inchon Bay 

Destroyed: 

1X supply 

dump 

Damaged: 

2X buildings 

1X large POL 

dump 

Poor visibility 

prevented 

assessment 

Destroyed: 

2X vehicles 

Damaged: 

1X villiage 

1X POL 

dump 

Destroyed: 

2X vehicles 

Damaged: 

1X vehicle 

1X village 

Damaged: 

1X vehicle 

Fires started - 

Destroyed: 

1X supply 

dump 

Damaged: 

1X highway 

bridge 

Poor visibility 

prevented 

assessment 

Target area 

covered by 

bad weather, 

crossed 

bombline 

Second 

mission on 13 

May 

Second 

mission on 14 

May 

Bekker 

replaces Gow 

Second 

mission on 15 

May 

- 

Third mission 

on 16 May 

Last mission 

of rotation 

through K-16 

– return to 

K-10


The Sinuiju Raid 

The routine of the interdiction missions was broken on 9 May, when 312 aircraft 

of the 5 th Air Force and the 1 st Marine Air Wing participated in Operation Buster, 

a massive raid on the 26 square km Sinuiju airfield area, which was a major North 

Korean airbase just south of the Yalu River. This and other airfields in North Korea 

had reached a stage of repair where they could be used by CCAF in an attempt to 

gain air superiority over North Korea (which would be important for a future ground 

offensive by North Korea and her allies). The neutralization of these airfields was 

thus vital and the subsequent air raid had four distinct tasks: First, top cover had to 

be provided to protect the attacking fighter-bombers from MIG-15 interference as 

Sinuiju was very close to the MIG bases in Manchuria. The second task was flak 

suppression, the third the actual bombing of the airstrip, surrounding revetments 

and supply dumps, and finally the rescue efforts (by SA-16 and SA17 flying boats) 

escorted by tactical aircraft (see Table 2 for the task allotments). 37 

Table 2: Task Allotment, Sinuiju Raid 1 

Top cover 4 Wing F-86 Sabres 

27 Wing F-84 Thunderjets 

1st Marine Air Wing Pantherjets 

Flak suppression 8 Wing F-80 Shooting Stars 

49 Wing F-80 Shooting Stars 

51 Wing F-80 Shooting Stars 

Airfield attack 1st Marine Air Wing Corsairs 

18 Wing F-51 Mustangs 

Rescue escort 18 Wing F-51 Mustangs (16 aircraft from 2 Sqn, eight aircraft from 18 

Fighter-Bomber Group) 

The co-ordination of the successive waves of aircraft on their various interrelated 

tasks required precise direction and timing. For example: the 18 Fighter-Bomber 

Wing Frag Order for 9 May 1951 tasked 2 Sqn to “Dispatch 1, 24 ship fit (including 

8 from 18th) to perform escort and rescue cap for SA-16s and SA-17s as indicated 

below”. 38 The rendezvous time was 12h45 and the rendezvous point as XC5005. 

The orbit time was from 13h00 to 16h00 and the orbit point XC3062 (see Map 1). 

The attack itself started at 14h00. 39 Any of the attacking pilots who got into trouble, 

had to head for the orbit area where they could ditch and be picked up by the flying 

boats. The task of 2 Sqn was to fly combat air patrol (CAP) over the downed pilots 

and the rescue aircraft. 

37 

Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, p.277; Republic of Korea, The History of the United 

Nations Forces in the Korean War, Vol. 1, p. 418. 

38 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, Appendix “I”, Frag Order 5-9 for 9 

May 1951. 

39 

Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, p. 277.


As part of this mission, sixteen 2 Sqn aircraft in four flights of four aircraft each 

took off, starting at 11h10 with Major (Maj) J.P.D. Blaauw as leader. They completed 

their mission without incident 40 and the raid itself was a great success. The UN forces 

inflicted heavy casualties, while they destroyed a number of aircraft on the ground, 

106 buildings, one large aviation fuel dump and 26 ammunition and supply dumps. 

Only one Thunderjet was damaged. 41 

Reduced Sortie Rate 

From 22 May onwards, 2 Sqn sorties were limited to 16 per day. The proximity 

of K-16 to the MLR allowed for sorties of a much shorter duration with a resultant 

increased sortie rate. The danger was therefore that too many experienced pilots 

might complete their operational tour of 75 sorties before the end of the month, leaving 

no one to train and lead the new batch of replacement pilots. 42 This policy and the 

adverse weather kept the daily sortie rate below sixteen (with only a few exceptions) 

to 8 June when seventeen replacement pilots became available for operational duties. 

The seventeen new pilots arrived in two batches: the first 11 pilots under Capt H.J. 

Snyman on 29 May, while six pilots under Capt R.H. Rogers on 1 June. Capt L.P.T. 

Eager and four additional pilots arrived on 2 June. 43 

Despite the initial reduction in the sortie, the hard work for both pilots and ground 

crew continued. After 8 June the sortie rate rose to approximately 24 sorties per 

day. The men who had prepared the new batch of pilots for combat now gradually 

completed their tours. On 21 June Capt J.A. Joubert led four aircraft from K-16 on a 

road interdiction mission to complete his 100th effective combat sortie in Korea. This 

mission caused two complete road cuts in the Chinnampo area (with 500lb bombs), 

and they then proceeded to rocket and strafe buildings which had been indicated as 

secondary targets in the same area. Capt G.G. Willers and Lt P.J. Strydom also completed 

their tours with 75 sorties each on the same mission. 44 

Marshall’s DFC 

One of the most effective missions of the period was one led by Lt G. H. Marshall 

on 24 June 1951. Together with Capt L.P.T. Eager, Second Lieutenants (2Lts) J.F.G. 

Howe and J.P. Verster, he was briefed to carry out an interdiction mission north- 

40 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 9 May 1951; Box 15, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 9 May 1951. 

41 

Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, p. 277. 

42 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 22 May 1951. 

43 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 29 May 1951, 1-2 June 1951 and 8 

June 1951. 

44 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 21 June 1951; Box 16, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 21 June 1951.


east of Kaesong. They carried napalm, rockets and .50 ammunition and took-off 

at 19h45. While en route to their target they heard an airborne controller call for 

support from any flight that could hear him. Marshall diverted his flight to answer 

to the call and the controller indicated the target. It was a troop concentration by 

the enemy about 30km south-west of Chorwon (see Map 1). The troops opened fire 

with automatic weapons and 20mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns, but the four 2 Sqn 

Mustangs attacked through an intense and accurate barrage of enemy fire. Howe and 

Verster later expressed surprise at having survived the attack while the enemy fire 

was so intense that the controller instructed a USAF flight to stand-by to CAP any of 

the South Africans who might be hit. Yet, the attack was successful and the opposite 

side sustained the following losses: unknown number of troop casualties, one 40mm 

gun position and two automatic weapons positions were destroyed and one 40mm 

gun position damaged. 45 

The courage of these pilots was recognised and on 2 July the Squadron was informed 

that Marshall would receive the American Distinguished Flying Cross immediately, 

while the other three pilots received the Air Medal. Tragically Verster 

was never to hear of his award as he was killed the previous day ferrying a Mustang 

from K-10 to K-16. 46 The citation which accompanied Marshall’s award described 

the incident thus: 

Despite poor visibility and in the face of withering enemy ground fire, Lieutenant Marshall, 

without hesitation and with complete disregard for personal safety made successive hazardous 

attacks with relentless accuracy on the enemy positions. In an exceptional display 

of aggressiveness and aeronautical skill he engineered the attacks of his flight with such 

outstanding airmanship that the optimum damage was inflicted against the enemy without 

the loss of one of his aircraft. 47 

Airfield Neutralisation 

Aerial photographs taken on 6 June showed all the North Korean airfields to be 

unserviceable, but a few days of bad weather gave them time to catch up with the 

damage caused by the FEAF raids. At least one airfield, Sariwon, became operational 

for light aircraft and on 14 June CCAF started with the type of harassment successfully 

used by the Russians against the Germans in the Second World War. PO-2 

Polikarpov biplanes (canvas covered open cockpit trainers) were sent late at night or 

early in the morning to catch 5 th Air Force aircraft being prepared by ground crews. 

The damage that could be inflicted by these small lone-flying aircraft was relatively 

slight, but their nuisance value was considerable. They were nicknamed ‘Bed Check 

45 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 24 June 1951; Box 16, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 24 June 1951. 

46 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 5, 2 Squadron War Diary, 1-2 July 1951. 

47 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 5, 2 Squadron War Diary, July 1951 Appendix “A”: Citation for 

the immediate award of the Distinguished Flying Cross to Lt G.H. Marshall.


Charlies’ by 5th Air Force personnel. In the early hours of 14 June two PO-2’s headed 

southwards, one bombed a runway repair crew at Suwon Airbase (K-13) while the 

other an Eighth Army vehicle park near Inchon. 48 This was hardly effective close air 

support, but it was a beginning. 

K-16 airfield, situated on an island in the Han River south of Seoul, was vulnerable 

to attack and during the night of 15-16 June K-16 was bombed and strafed, but 

o damage or casualties was reported. 49 During the next few days CCAF increased its 

air activity as it attempted to implement the revised air war plan of 10 May 1951. On 

17 June, Sabres from 4 Wing encountered 25 MIG-15’s, whose pilots were more aggressive 

than before and large numbers of MIG-15’s again challenged the Sabres on 

18 and 19 June. On 20 June a flight of Mustangs from 18 Fighter Bomber Wing were 

sweeping a road south of Sinuiju when they encountered eight IL-10’s (Ilyushin 

ground attack aircraft) en route to render close support to the CCF ground forces on 

the island of Sinmi-do. Both sides called for reinforcements and a dogfight ensued 

involving in addition to the original Mustangs and IL-10’s, Yak-9’s, MIG-15’s and 

Sabres. The 5th Air Force lost one Mustang in exchange for one Yak-9 and two IL- 

10’s destroyed as well as damage to three IL-10’s and four MIG-15’s. 50 

The FEAF commanders decided to meet the mounting air threat with an intensive 

airfield neutralization programme. From 17 June onwards B-26’s attacked the North 

Korean airfields at night, while B-29’s and the fighter-bombers attacked during the 

day. 51 A decisive stage of the war was reached, both on the ground and in the air. 2 

Sqn also became involved in the airfield raids. On 18 and 19 June SAAF aircraft 

bombed airstrips at Ongjin and Haeju with 500lb bombs and counted nine direct hits 

afterwards. 52 On 23 June Capt J. Swanepoel led Lts D. Green, S. de la Harpe and 

T. Sivertsen on an attack against the revetments at Sariwon airfield, which was protected 

by 37 automatic weapons and numerous 20mm and 40mm anti-aircraft guns. 

Swanepoel led his flight in at 6-15 metres above the ground and succeeded in covering 

the target with napalm. Due to the intense and accurate incoming fire they did 

not wait around to survey the damage. The same day separate flights of four aircraft 

each from 2 Sqn attacked the airfields at Anak, Sinmak and Ongjin and on 24 June 

flights of four aircraft from 2 Sqn attacked the airfields at Sariwon, Anak, Sinmak 

and Haeju using V.T. fused rockets for flak suppression and 500lb bombs to pothole 

the runways. 53 As the ground offensive came to an end, the air offensive moved into 

48 


49 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 22 May 1951 and 16 June 1951. 

50 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 20 June 1951; and Futrell, et al., 

United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 280-281. 

51 

Futrell, et al., United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 281-282. 

52 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 18 June 1951; and Box 16, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 18 and 19 June 1951. 

53 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 23 and 24 June 1951; and Box 16, 

Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 23 and 24 June 1951.


top gear and with the commencement of the FEAF airfield neutralization programme 

North Korea and her allies began to make peace overtures (see Map 1). 

Cost in Men and Material 

The UN pilots face quite a challenge as their opponents were determined to protect 

supply routes, supply dumps and airfields from air attack. Besides excellent 

camouflage techniques, they also employed a heavy anti-aircraft screen and in May 

1951 FEAF intelligence officers plotted the positions of 252 anti-aircraft guns and 

673 automatic weapons. The anti-aircraft gun positions were fixed, but a major danger 

along the main supply routes was posed by truck-towed 37mm Soviet M-1939 

automatic weapons (effective against targets up to 1 400m). 54 Test flights that UN 

forces did against own forces anti-aircraft batteries revealed the extreme vulnerability 

of the wingman in the two aircraft low-level reconnaissance while searching for 

targets. After these tests 18 Fighter-Bomber Wing (including 2 Sqn) changed their 

armed reconnaissance tactics in an effort to avoid further losses. Now, only the flight 

leader flew at 100m looking for targets of opportunity, while the remaining three 

aircraft covered him against flak from 1200m. 55 

Between 22 April and 24 June 1951, 2 Sqn lost five aircraft as a direct result 

of enemy ground fire and three to accidents, while eight were damaged in action. 

Pilot casualties amounted to three killed (two in accidents) and four wounded. One 

pilot listed as missing in action (MIA) was later found to be a prisoner of war. The 

Mustang’s liquid cooled engine also made it particularly vulnerable to ground fire. 

This factor combined with the fact that Chinese regiments had an air defence company 

armed with Soviet 12,7mm machine guns (very effective against low-flying 

aircraft) increased the operational hazard. On 29 April Capt Kotze’s aircraft was hit 

in the engine by automatic fire while attacking enemy troops dug in along a ridge 

north of Seoul. His leader, Lt I. Gow, strafed and silenced the gun position, receiving 

a bullet through the wing in the process. 56 On 30 April Lt P. Celliers led four aircraft 

on a bombing mission against a railway tunnel on the line between Sinmak and 

Kumchon. Taking off from K-10 at 08h40 they bombed the tunnel with 500lb G.P. 

bombs and then split up into two elements to search for secondary targets. At 10h15 

Celliers’ aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire about 20km to the east of the original 

target. He baled out of the burning aircraft almost immediately. His wingman, Lt 

G.G. Paterson, alerted rescue and also re-assembled the original flight, leading it and 

another 2 Sqn flight to Celliers until he was rescued by helicopter. Celliers finally 

54 


55 

Ibid., p. 306; and Republic of Korea, History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, Vol. 

1, p. 421. 

56 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 14, Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 29 April 1951.


arrived back at K-10 at 21h00 with his right leg wounded by a 20mm shell. 57 

On 1 May, the aircraft of Lts D.W. McKellar and G.H. Marshall were hit by automatic 

weapon fire in the wing tanks while on an interdiction mission. 58 The next 

day Capt J.M. Sweeney had a disconcerting experience. While attacking vehicles 

5km south-east of Songsanni, he came under intense and accurate automatic ground 

fire. His aircraft was hit in the port aileron trimming and the starboard side of the 

cockpit and he was wounded in his right buttock. Shepherded by Maj J.P.D. Blaauw 

and weak from loss of blood, he managed to bring his aircraft back to K-16, where 

he passed out on landing. 59 On 6 May, the day before he completed his tour of duty 

with 75 sorties, Lt J.H. Kruger’s aircraft was hit in the tail plane, 60 while on 11 May 

his namesake, Lt V.R. Kruger, was involved in an incident on his 74th combat sortie. 

At 15h30 Maj Blaauw and Lts P. Clulow, M. Mentz and V.R. Kruger took-off from 

K-16 on their third mission for the day. At 16h40, 12km west of Singye Kruger’s 

aircraft was hit in the main plane by ground fire. The wing collapsed and the aircraft 

caught fire, forcing him to bale out. Blaauw and Mentz flew a CAP over the downed 

pilot while Clulow made a vain attempt to alert rescue. When his fuel began to run 

low, Blaauw sent Clulow and Mentz back to K-16 while he continued the CAP until 

his fuel ran out (at 18h45) and he was forced to belly land next to Kruger. By now 

another 2 Sqn flight was diverted from an interdiction mission and arrived on the 

scene. At the same time Mentz took off on his fourth sortie of the day, this time to 

lead a flight of three USAF Mustangs to rescue Kruger. The two pilots on the ground 

were successfully lifted by helicopter at 19h45. Kruger was injured (dislocated right 

shoulder, cracked right scapula, second degree burns on his hands and face), while 

Blaauw was only lightly injured with abrasions and bruises to the nose and eyes. 61 

On 15 May at 18h55, Lt M.H. Rorke fatally crashed on take-off. It was his third 

mission for the day as he conducted interdiction missions at 14h50 and 16h30. This 

mission was also an interdiction mission and his F-51 `was loaded with napalm, 

rockets and .50 ammunition. The aircraft swung round 180°, collided with a crashed 

B-29 bomber at the end of the runway and immediately burst into flames. 62 On 24 

May Lt A. Gotze’s aircraft was hit in the scoop while he was searching for a downed 

57 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 30 April 1951; and Box 14, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 30 April 1951. 

58 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 15, Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 1 May 1951. 

59 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 2 May 1951; and Box 15, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 2 May 1951. 

60 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 6-7 May 1951. 

61 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 11 May 1951 ; Box 15, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 11 May 1951; and Republic of Korea, History of the United Nations Forces in the 

Korean War, Vol. 1, p. 420. 

62 

SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 15 May 1951; and Box 15, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 15 May 1951.


pilot, but he landed safely after being escorted to K-18. 63 On 1 June Gotze was leading 

a flight of four aircraft on a low-level reconnaissance (about 15m) when his No 

2, Lt H. MacDonald reported that his aircraft was burning and he had to bale out. A 

30 minute search revealed the wreckage of an aircraft spread over about an area of 

roughly 180m and across a railway line, 12km south of Pyongyang and the pilot was 

listed as M.I.A. 64 MacDonald was not heard of again until a Voice of India broadcast 

later reported his arrival in a P.O.W. camp. 65 

On 2 June two aircraft were damaged when two pilots in training, 2Lts T. 

Liebenberg and R.V. Sherwood suffered mishaps on landing at K-10. 66 These incidents 

were attributed to the poor visibility at K-10 for the transitional training of 

relatively inexperienced pilots. After this, authority was sought and received from 

the Officer Commanding 18 Fighter-Bomber Wing for transitional training to take 

place at the nearby K-1 airfield, which was considered to be far more suitable. 67 On 

9 June Liebenberg, in No 4 position on a flight led by Lt F.M. Bekker and carrying a 

load of 500lb bombs, rockets and .50 ammunition, crashed on take-off. The aircraft 

exploded and the pilot was killed. 68 While on an early morning interdiction mission 

on 13 June, Bekker’s aircraft was hit in the starboard main plane wing root by an 

explosive bullet. He had to land at K-16 without brakes as the bullet damaged his 

hydraulics. 69 

The final casualty of the period occurred on 22 June. Lt A.G. Frisby led a flight 

consisting of Commandant R.F. Armstrong, Lts D. Marchand, and C. de Jongh from 

K-16 to interdict supplies north-west of Namchonjam. To the west of Sibyonni (at 

600m) the leader was hit by ground fire and had to bale out. At roughly 250m a 

brown object was seen to leave the aircraft, which then crashed into the side of a 

river bed and broke up. No parachute was seen and there was no sign of the pilot. 

Armstrong led four aircraft to search the scene, but they found no sign of the pilot. 

They concluded that he baled out at 250m and that his parachute failed to open. 70 

63 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 15, Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 24 May 1951. 

64 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 1 June 1951; Box 16, Debriefing 


65 H. Parker, Out of the Sky into the Bag, Outspan, Vol 51, No 1352, p. 24. 

66 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 2 June 1951. 

67 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 8 and 18 June 1951. 

68 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 9 June 1951; and Box 16, Debriefing 


69 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 16, Debriefing Forms SAAF220, 13 June 1951. 

70 SAMAD, War Dairies (Korea), Box 4, 2 Squadron War Diary, 22 June 1951; and Box 16, Debriefing 

Forms SAAF220, 22 June 1951.


Concluding remarks 

The main objective of 2 Sqn in Korea was interdiction – to isolate the battlefield 

from the sources of supply, while their main threat came from enemy ground fire. In 

general South African pilots displayed a professional approach, a high level of mutual 

loyalty, a willingness to assist comrades and team spirit, as the various examples 

illustrated. The Squadron certainly showed much tenacity, persistence and courage 

in performing their operational duties with pilots frequently flying three or even 

more missions in one day. 

The SAAF has a long and proud history, a history that showed commitment and 

service, despite ever changing times. The example of Korea showed the SAAF as a 

highly innovative and adoptable force with a good operational track record. With the 

renewal of equipment, serious efforts to maintain the professional approach of the 

service and live up to standards, it is truly entering a new era and will continue to 

serve the country as called upon.

La r s er i c s o n Wo L k e * 

Svezia 

Douhet or not Douhet. 

Swedish Air Power Doctrine in the 1930´s and 1940´s 

In 1911, the year of the first Italian use of Air strikes in Libya, the Swedish army got 

it´s first planes and a year later the army followed. 1 However, it was not until 1926, 

that a unified Swedish Air Force was created by the army and navy air branches. 

The new arm, although weak in number, in the following years around 1930 developed 

an operational doctrine that could be described as douhetism 2 , although Douhet 

himself wasn´t translated to Swedish. However, when the German Luftherrschaft arrived 

in 1935 3 , his thoughts were opened also for Swedish readers. Most Swedish officers, 

as well as civilians, knew German as their first foreign language. 

The decade between 1934 and 1945 was probably one of the most important 

decades in the history of the Swedish Air Force. Now it developed it´s doctrine 4 , it 

operational and tactical skills as well as went through an unprecedented enlargement. 

In 1934 the Air Force got a new Commander-in-Chief, Torsten Friis, who 

already during World War One had studiedthe Air units used by the Austro-Hungarian 

Army at the Russian and Serbian fronts. 5 The new Commander-in-Chief 

already from his first year in officer was keen on a close co-operation between the 

* Professor in military history at the National Defence College, Stockholm and member of the Board 

of the Commission Internationale d´Histoire Militaire. 

1 For the Swedish reaction upon the Italian use of Air planes in 1911 see Lars Ericson Wolke, “Bomba 

och bränn dom.” Taktik och terror under 100 år av flygkrig (In Swedish: ”Bomb and Burn them.” 

Tactic and Terror during 100 years of Air Warfare) , Lund 2009 pp. 20-24. 

2 For the early development of Air Doctrines for the Army and Navy see Klaus-Richard Böhme, 

Svensk luftförsvarsdoktrin 1919 till 1938 (In Swedish: Swedish Air defence doctrine 1919 to 1938), 

in Aktuellt och Historiskt. Meddelanden från Militärhistoriska avdelningen vid Kungl Militärhögskolan 

1973, Stockholm 1973 pp. 129-172. The first Air doctrines are seen in a broader Swedish 

and international perspective in Lars Ericson Wolke, Krigets idéer. Svenska tankar om krigföring 

1320-1920 (In Swedish: The Ideas of War. Swedish thought about Warfare, 1320-1920), Stockholm 

2007 pp. 310-316. 

3 Giulio Douhet, Luftherrschaft, Berlin 1935. 

4 Another study of the development of Swedish Air doctrine during the 1930´s and 1940´s is, with 

extensive archival references, published in English in Lars Ericson (Wolke), The Swedish Air 

Force and the Question of Doctrine, 1934-1945, in Klaus-R Böhme/Carl Linton, eds., Air Power. 

Doctrine and Technology. Linköping 14-16 August 1996. Proceedings, Stockholm/Linköping 1996 

pp. 35-47. 

5 Torsten Friis and the Air Force is studied in Lars Ericson (Wolke), Torsten Friis, in Gunnar Artéus, 

ed., Svenska officersprofiler under 1900-talet (In Swedish: Swedish Officer profiles during the 20 th 

Century) , Stockholm 1996 pp. 154-176.


Air Force and the young but growing Swedish Air Industry. The Air force played 

an important role when the SAAB Company was created in 1937. 6 

The result of this close work between the political sphere, the Air Force and the 

industry can be shown with some figures: Between 1933 and May 1939 Sweden 

imported 45 planes and from August 1940 to April 1943 another 118 were bought, 

it total 163. The vas majority of these were bought from Italy, especially Capronibombers. 

Some planes were also bougth from Germany and the USA. In Sweden, 

during the period from October 1937 to September 1943 not less than 414 planes 

were manufactured, that is three times the amount that Sweden was able to buy from 

other countries. This build-up resulted in a transformation from a very weak Air 

Force at the time of the outbreak of the war in 1939 to a strong and efficient Air Force 

in 1944-45. This was fundamental for the continued development of Sweden´s Air 

Force in the 1950´s and 1960´s. 7 

The first doctrinal feud in the med 1930´s took place between the new Air Force 

and the leading admirals of the navy. Torsten Friis accepted to be CIC of the Air 

Force on May 4, 1934 and only a little more than a week later the minister of defence 

wrote to him about some questions raised by the CIC of the Navy admiral Fabian 

Tamm. Among these questions were the dispute wether the defence budget should 

prioritate a bomber Air Force or heavy artilleriships. The minister, Ivar Vennerström, 

didn´t make an open choice of his own in this feud between the Air Force and the 

Navy, but at least he showed some sympathy for the naval point of view. Vennerström 

told Friis that his opinion was that the roots of this dispute were to be found in 

“some kind of romantic bomberviews that has tended to spread to much.” 

These words by the minister could be regarded as a criticism against the tendency 

towards a bomber doctrine in the Air Force, but it is more likely to have been ment 

to be an attempt to ease down the antagonism within the Armed Forces. Torsten Friis 

also tried, from his very first day in office, to ease the tensions and create a good 

relationship towards the Navy. That work seems to have been rather successful. As 

one important step he saw to that the most pro-bomber officers in his own force 

expressed themselves with a little smaller letters. However, and this is important, 

this was only a matter of official tactics, not at any point a concession towards the 

standpoint of the admirals. 8 

6 For the development of the Air industry see Klaus-Richard Böhme, Svenska vingar växer. Flygvapnet 

och flygindustrin 1918-1945 (In Swedish: Swedish Wings growing. The Air Forces and the Air 

industry 1918-1945), Stockholm 1982. 

7 See Böhme 1982 and Erik Norberg, Flyg i beredskap. Det svenska flygvapnet i omvandling och 

uppbyggnad 1936-1942 (In Swedish: Air Forces in preparedness. The Swedish Air Force under 

reconstruction and built-up 1936-1942), Stockholm 1971. 

8 For the rivalry between the Air Force and the Navy see Anders Berge, Sakkunskap och politisk rationalitet. 

Den svenska flottan och pansarfartygsfrågan 1918-1939 (In Swedish: Expert knowledge 

and political rationality. The Swedish Navy and the question of armoured ships 1918-1939), Stockholm 

1987.

do u H e t o r n o t do u H e t. sw e d i sH air po w e r do C t r i n e in t H e 1930´s a n d 1940´s 293 

When Torsten Friis became CIC in 1934 a Parliamentary Defence Commission 

that had started it´s work in 1930 almost had reached it´s conclusions. The result was 

published in 1935 and was to a large extent used in the 1936 Defence Resolution of 

the parliament. Several influencial defence politicians were strongly in favour of an 

Air Force with a strong emphasis on it´s bomber capacity. This was reflected in the 

Parliamentary decision. 

The essence in the Air Doctrine as reflected in the Defence Resolution 1936 was a 

strong bomber force. It´s main purpose was to stop an enemy Air Force by attacking 

it´s bases. The Air Force also argued strongly for the use of bomber planes against 

enemy naval units, as an important part of the invasion defence. In August and September 

1934 the Air Force for the first time trained divebombing against ships, as an 

obvious attempt to show the diversified usefulness of bombers. 

The fundamental problem for all those involved in thinking about Air doctrines in 

the mid 1930´s was: how to prevent a stronger enemy from bombing and destroying 

Sweden´s cities and industries. In this Sweden din´t differ from any other European 

dountry at the time, and most influencial officers and politicians were of the same 

opinion as the British prime minister Stanley Baldwin put in in 1932: “The bomber 

will always get through.” Secondarily came the question wether Sweden´s Air Force 

could be of any use against an invasion fleet across the Baltic Sea. Both these problem 

led to a doctrine which without any doubts can be described as douhetism. 

Both Giulio Douhet and the Englishman Percy Groves were read and discussed 

in Sweden in the mid 1930´s. But their thoughts were not uncritically adopted. This 

is reflected in the words used by captain Gustaf Adolf Westring, the Swedish officer 

that had the best knowledge about Douhet and his thought, when he in August 1935 

commented the Italian writer: “This is just plain theory and have because of that 

maybe not so much importance, but it can always be of some little use.” But in realy, 

the influence of Douhet or at least thoughts very similar to those of Douhet were 

very influencial in Sweden during the 1930´s and were of criúcial importance in the 

development of both doctrine and the creation of a bomber fleet for the Swedish Air 

Force. 

In the tradition of Giulio Douhet also Percy Groves argued for the use of bombers, 

not against the enemy bases but against the home land and the war enemy. This 

was an operational doctrine for a large power, not for a small power like Sweden, 

whom likely would be inferior in number in a future war, presumable against Germany 

or Soviet-Russia. 

As a consequence of that the Swedish Air Force made specific “bombing files” for 

potential targets in the east. The military planners in Sweden regarded it as certain 

that the Soviet Union before launching an attack against Sweden, had to pass through 

the until the summer 1940 formally still independent Baltic countries (however they 

had been forced to allow Soviet military bases from the autumn 1939). This men that 

the Swedish Air Force planned for strikes against the harbours in Tallinn, Paldiski,


Pärnu, Riga, Liepaja and others, as well as against air fields used by the Russians. 

Important bridges, like the one in Kaunas, Lithuania over the river Njemen and railroad 

junctions as Tapa in northern Estonia were also regarded as important targets 

for the Swedish bombers. The main aim was to prevent the invasion, or at least stop 

the second echelon of the invading force before it left the eastern coast of the Baltic 

Sea. In case of war with Germany the main potential targets were the northern 

harbour at Rostock, Sassnitz, Swinemünde and, maybe, also the large naval base at 

Kiel. However, Kiel was so heavily defended that even in theory an attack against 

that naval base must be regarded as extremely risky and very likely to fail. 

An obvious risk in case of war was also that the enemy could answer on Swedish 

attacks against his bases with attacks on the bases of the Swedish bombers. To prevent 

that the doctrine in use in Sweden in the mid 1930´s argued for several different 

bases to be prepared. This doctrine was teached at the War College by the Air Force 

officer Axel Ljungdahl and presented in a paper by Björn Bjuggren. The tactics used 

was to spread out the planes on bases far from the coastline or land borders, and to 

assemble them in an advanced base just before the beginning of an operation. After 

an attack on enemy bases of ships, the planes would return to the more remote and 

better protected bases. 

Much of the Swedish debate concerned the limited capabilities of the fighter force 

as well as the anti aircraft-artillery. The Swedish fighters of the time could only operate 

over a smallarea and for a very limited period of time. This ment that the planes 

had to be based very close to the target that they were supposed to protect, and also 

relieved after a short while of time in the air. But the most important problem was 

the need for warnings to the fighterbases in god time before the enemy bomber arrived 

to the target. The warningsystems at the time didn´t fulfil that need. In the case 

of the capitol, Stockholm, there was a strong doubt of wether any warning would 

arrive in time, so that the fighters could start and create their formations in the sky. 

And even if son, how to direct the fighters against the bomber? There were no such 

systems in operation. The only hope was the visual observations by the fighter pilots 

themselves. This is why the discussion about to defend Sweden´s cities tended 

to corcle about how to attack the enemy bases themselves. This was regarded the 

only efficient way to defence the mother country, regardless of the geographical and 

tactical problems with such a doctrine. The weak capabilities of the fighters against 

enemy bombers were stressed in a large manoeuvre in Skåne in southern Sweden in 

1935. The same was the situation of the antiaircraft artillery. All this were regarded 

as supporting those who argued for a large bomber fleet, as an indirect defence for 

our cities and industries. The question then was how large the proportion of bombers 

there should be among the aircraft. 

The defence resolution of 1936 decided there should be four bomber wings, one 

fighter wing and two reconnaissance wings, in total seven wings ore three more than 

at the creation of a unified Air Force in 1926. The fighter wing, F 8, was deployed 

close to Stockholm.


It´s interesting that the douhetism was more widespread among the politicians 

in the parliament than among the Air Force officers themselves. The Air Force had 

argued for another fighter wing and one reconnaissance wing. But these demands 

were rejected by the politicians for financial reasons. What we can call the “bomber 

lobby” was strong eithin the parliament. If the demands of the Air Forces had been 

followed, the proportions between bombers and fighters would have been 2:1, i.e. 

exactly the same proportions as in the British RAF, the foreign force that had given 

the largest impulses to Sweden. 9 

This resulted in a bomber force proportionally – but of course not in quantity 

– larger than in most European countries, but this is not the same as to say that the 

Swedish Air Force rejected the use of fighters, quite the opposite. The leading men in 

the Force were of course very much aaware of the fact that the proportions between 

bombers and fighters were – as I all fields of military activities – depending upon the 

race between offensive and defensive weapons. One can also note that the CIC in 

person, from his very first year in office showed a large interest in both Swedish and 

foreign fighterplane constructions. 

In the spring of 1939, with only some moths left to the outbreak of the war, the 

Swedish Air Force counted two bomber wings (F1 and F 4), two reconnaissance 

wings (F 2 and F 3) and one fighter wing (F 8 close to Stockholm). The two other 

bomber wings decided by the Parliament in 1936 were established on July 1, 1939 (F 

6) and in 1940 (F 7). In total the Air Force could muster some 195 planes in September 

1939, but for different reasons (especially lack of spare parts and modern propellers) 

only 134 of these were operational. Therefore Torsten Friis when the war broke 

out could only send 47 bombers and 33 fighters in the air. However these figures are 

disputed among scholars, and they should be regarded as minimum figures. 

The first year of the war underlined the importance of having a strong Air Force 

to protect the mobilization as well as cities, industries and communications. During 

the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union, Sweden in January 1940 sent 

a wing (F 19) with four bombers and twelve fighters to support Finland. The creation 

of this volunteer unit ment that one third of Torsten Friis operational fighters were 

sent to Finland. This was the only time, together with the UN-operations in Congo 

1960-64, that the Swedish Air Force had been taken part in war operations. 10 

The experiences from the winter war were important, but they also showed how 

vulnerable the relatively small Swedish Air Force was. The parliament in 1940 decided 

to create two more fighter wings and one reconnaissance wings. The first, 

9 For the debate about how to count these proportions see Norberg 1971 pp. 225 note 30 and Klaus- 

Richard Böhme, “Review of Norberg” 1971, in “Historisk Tidskrift” (Historical Review) 1972:2 p. 

302. 

10 For F 19 see Göran Andolf, Svenska frivilligkåren (In English: The Swedish Volunteer Corps), in 

Svenska frivilliga i Finland 1939-1944 (In English: Swedish Volunteers in Finland, 1939-1944), 

Stockholm 1989 pp. 39-190, especially pp. 176-187.


fighter wing, F 9, was established in July 1940 in Gothenburg. The German occupation 

of Norway in April 1940 had made the defence on Sweden´s second largest city 

and the western border extremely important. From October 1940 and on another 

fighter wing, F 10, also was established at Bulltofta close to Malmö, Sweden´s third 

largest city, and the Germanockupied Denmark. 11 

This was an important shift in the Air doctrine, and it occurred without any explicit 

discussion. The military events around Sweden´s borders had made the decision 

for more fighters necessary. No bombers, how useful they might be for other 

tasks, could ever defend Sweden against German attacks from a large number of 

bases not only in Germany but also in Denmark and Norway. There was not even a 

theoretical possibility to prevent such attacks by bombing the German air bases. 

Another important factor was the technical development that during the 1930´s 

had been in favour of the bomber planes. Now in 1940 the technology had shifted 

and made fighters with a speed up to some 600 km/hour superior in speed to bombers 

with a speed between 400 and 500 km/hour. Machinegun-armed fighter planes could 

now with some hope of success attack bombers in aerial combat plane versus plane. 

But to this also came a third important impuls to shift Sweden´s Air doctrine in 

1940: the outcome of the Battle of Britain. The British results against the Luftwaffe 

were impressing, and underlined also for the Swedish Air Force the importance of 

the use of fighters for the defence against attacking bomber fleets. But in Sweden, as 

in many other countries, one wasn´t totally aware of how the British victory had been 

accomplished: the still hidden secret about the radar. 

The impulses from the Battle of Britain could clearly be seen in the following 

years. Already in 1940 manoeuvres with the Air Squadron, the elite striking force 

of the Air Force, showed the superiority of the fighters in the air battle. In 1941 new 

directives for the Air Force was written in the warplanning for Case I and Case II 

– i.e. war against Germany and Soviet Unions respectively – including for the first 

time the task of defending populated cities. When a German invasion of Sweden was 

much feared in February and March 1942 the fighter units were concentrated close 

to the three largest cities Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. The defence against 

an invasion fleet and enemy land forces on the ground were left to the bomber units, 

who thereby kept one of their two main tasks from the 1930´s. 

In November 1941 two Swedish Air Force officers – colonel Axel Ljungdahl 

(from 1954 CIC of the Air Force) and colonel-lieutenant Lars Hägglöf – visited 

Great Britain. Their hosts showed the many thing, although they didn´t disclosed 

all secrets. The British experiences from the Battle of Britain were reported back to 

Stockholm: “Attacks against Air bases isn´t enough of You want to win superiority in 

the air. Through such attacks You can destroy some air crafts, a task difficult enough 

against well prepared air bases. The combat in the air is a more efficient way, since 

11 Gösta Norrbohm/Bertil Skogsberg, Att flyga är att leva. Flygvapnet 1926-1976 (In English: To fly is 

to live. The Air Force 1926-1976), Höganäs 1975 pp. 76-77 and 138-141.


You then shoot down the crews. After severe losses also the remaining crews begin 

to loose their morale.” 

The big secret behind the British victory, the radar, was not totally detected by the 

Swedes, however they in their reports spoke about what they called “the radiolocation”, 

akind of echosystem in the air. Or as Axel Ljungdahl put it: “This was the first 

time the we ever heard the word ‘radar’, and we were highly astonished when we on 

the large operational map (in a combat leading centre) could se how German planes 

moved in France.” 12 

The impressions from the Battle of Britain were important for the development 

of anew Swedish Air Doctrine, but they shouldn´t be overestimated. The experiences 

from the first two years of the war, especially the Finnish Winter War and the German 

occupation of Denmark and Norway were as important. The shift in the Swedish 

Air Doctrine had already began before the Battle of Britain took place, but the 

speed and direction in that shift was increased after the British victory. 

Not all impulses came from Britain. Other important news about the development 

of Air technology, operational art and tactics also came from Moscow and to a larger 

extent from Berlin. Important visits by Swedish officers took place at the Luftwaffe 

both before and after the outbreak of the war. 13 

Among the most important news were the German way of co-operation between 

Air units and Army forces in Close-Air-Support operations, as well as the system for 

supplying the Air units, the Fliegerhorst-organisation. The later was introduced in 

Sweden in 1942 in form of the so called “Air bases-areas”, a system that was strongly 

supported by the new (from 1942) CIC of the Air Force, Bengt Nordenskiöld. 14 

The report written by Ljungdahl and Hägglöf from their visit in Britain in November 

1941 gave a good push to the work on a Swedish radar construction, a work 

that had been going on since 1939. The work included several high-tech industries 

like Bofors, SAAB and L M Ericsson and during 1944 radar was introduced both 

in the anti-aircraft artillery and the Air Force. In 1944 Britain also revealed some 

important radar secrets to Sweden, as a gratitude since Sweden to the British had 

handed over some German V 2-bombs that had landed by mistake in Sweden. During 

the large manoeuvre with the fighter Squadron in September 1944 radar was used 

for the first time inn Sweden to support operational control of the fighters from the 

operational control room on the ground. 

12 

Axel Ljungdahl, En flygofficers minnen (In Swedish: The memories of an Air Force officer), Stockholm 

1972 pp. 147-148. 

13 

Klaus-Richard Böhme, Kontakter med en tänkbar angripare. Flygvapnet och Luftwaffe 1935-1939 

(In English: Contacts with a potential aggressor. The Air Force and the Luftwaffe 1935-1939), in 

Militärhistorisk Tidskrift 1989 (Military History Review 1989) pp. 223-249 and Gunnar Richardson, 

Beundran och fruktan. Sverige inför Tyskland 1940-1942 (In English: Admiration and fear. Sweden 

in front of Germany 1940-1942), Stockholm 1996 pp. 35-38. 

14 

Norberg 1971 pp. 204-205.


During these years of shift of Air doctrine the Swedish Air Force also steadily 

grew in number. In 1945 the Air Force consisted of 17 wings, seven bombers, seven 

fighters and three reconnaissance, and every unit had more, and also more modern, 

planes than in 1939. The CIC Bengt Nordenskiöld could muster a little more than 

1 000 planes when the war ended in Europe in May 1945. 

The changes in the Swedish Air Force doctrine in the years after 1936 was partly 

due to technical changes, partly to experiences of the war since 1939. In the first 

years of the 1940´s there wasn´t, of course, any realistic possibilities for the Swedish 

bomber wings to attack the Soviet or German air bases, not to speak about attacking 

Soviet or German cities in order to prevent attacks against similar targets in Sweden. 

The thought of using bombers to prevent bombing of Swedish cities and industries 

was already history. 

Instead the bomber wing should be used the enemy invasionfleet or army units 

crossing the Swedish border. However, in the dramatic morning of June 22, 1941, 

when Nazi-Germany launched it´s massive invasion of Soviet Russia, bombers of 

the 1st bomber wing at Västerås air base were put on alert. In case of a Soviet attack 

their task would have been to try to attack invasions ships and, if possible, harbours 

in the Sovietockupied Estonia. 15 

A defence commission suggested in 1941 the establishment of as many fighter 

wings as bomber wings (six of each), and it argued for a closer cooperation between 

the Air Force, the Army and the Navy: “The fighter units shall have enough capacity 

to make an efficient protection for the own air forces in the air and on the ground, 

the army forces and their communications, the naval forces in harbour and close to 

the coasts and, finally, to the populated areas. These units are, together with mobile 

troops, the most important weapon against an enemy invasion.” 

This was postulated in January 1942 and marks the end of the bomber epoch 

in Swedish Air Force doctrine. The attempts by the Air Force to create a kind of 

strategic bomber force came to an end, and instead the Force began to develop tactical 

bombers (for CAS-missions), fighters and the new attack planes, light and fast 

planes aimed for attacking the invasion fleet. This shift in the doctrine also ment that 

the Air Force came to work more close to the other two branches of the armed forces. 

A strong strategic bomber force could operate more independent than the tactical 

and attack forces that now began to dominate the agenda. The most clear expression 

for this shift in doctrine was the creation of the “Attack squadron”, the main mobile 

striking tool to be used by the CIC of the armed forces in case on an enemy invasion 

throughout the cold war. 

15 Lars Ericson (Wolke), Buffert eller hot? De baltiska staterna i svensk militär planering år 1941 (In 

English: Buffert or threat? The Baltic states in Swedish military planning in 1941), in Bo Hugemark, 

ed., I orkanens öga. 1941 – osäker neutralitet (In English: In the eye of the hurricane. 1941 – uncertain 

neutrality), Stockholm 1992 pp. 127-154, especially pp. 138-141.


The history of the Swedish Air Force between the years 1934 and 1945 shows how 

fast a military doctrine, in this case an Air doctrine, can change, due to technological 

and practical development as well as other factors, national and international. 

The fast shift in Sweden´s Air doctrine especially the years 1940-42 resulted in 

effects for several decades to come, first regarding the concentration of bombers as 

a tool against the invasion fleet and not the enemy bases on land, later in the same 

basic tasks for the new attack planes of the Air Force. The stability in this shift is 

underlined if we study the debate during the 1950´s whether Sweden´s armed forces 

should get nuclear capability. In 1954 the CIC of the armed forces, Nils Swedlund, 

argued that Sweden should have nuclear arms for tactical use, either against an invading 

fleet approaching across the Baltic Sea, or against large troop concentration 

that already had landed on the beaches. It´s not explicitly clear whether the armed 

forces were prepared to launch nuclear attacks on Sweden´s own territory, or against 

important enemy harbour and railroad junctions. But what is clear is that the Swedish 

armed forces totally rejected any proposal for Swedish nuclear arms to be used 

for strategical purposes. However a few voices in the debate argued for a strategical 

devise, the so called “Leningrad-bomb”, in order to deter the Soviet Union to use 

nuclear arms against Swedish cities. But these voices had no anchorage within the 

armed forces. 16 

However, if the shift in Sweden´s Air doctrine had not been taken place in 1940- 

42, the debate in the 1950´s could have been a more explicit one about a Douhetinfluenced 

doctrine in combination with nuclear arms. That would have been a totally 

different history. 

16 Jan Thörnqvist, Den öppna och den slutna militära debatten om taktisk och operativ anpassning av 

försvaret mot kärnvapen, 1954 till 1965 (In English: The open and secret military debate about the 

operational adjustment of the armed forces towards nuclear arms, 1954 to 1965), i Kent Zetterberg, 

ed., Svenska kärnvapen? En antologi uppsatser kring frågan om svenska taktiska kärnvapen under 

kalla kriget (In English: Swedish nuclear arms? An anthology of papers concerning the question 

about Swedish tactical nuclear arms during the cold war), Stockholm 2010 pp. 51-83.

Ju L i e n Gr a n d * 

La doctrine d’emploi des troupes 

d’aviation suisses durant le XXème siècle 

Svizzera 

1. Introduction 

A 

l’heure actuelle, l’Armée suisse se compose essentiellement de deux entités 

distinctes : les Forces terrestres et les Forces aériennes. Il n’en fut pas toujours 

ainsi. L’arme aérienne est créée durant la Première Guerre mondiale 

et ne devient autonome et organisée qu’en 1936, avec la mise sur pied de l’Office 

fédéral de l’aviation militaire et de la défense contre avions. Il se développe durant 

la Seconde Guerre mondiale et le début de la Guerre froide pour devenir, en 1968, 

un corps d’armée à part entière et atteint son paroxysme dans les années 1980 avec 

l’acquisition de l’appareil F-5 Tiger. Mais la fin de la Guerre froide remet en question 

les missions générales de l’Armée suisse, ce qui contraint également les Forces 

aériennes à une réduction, tant au niveau des effectifs que du matériel. 

Le présent article tente de passer en revue, pour le XXème siècle, la doctrine 

d’engagement des troupes d’aviation helvétiques. Il nous appartient donc de définir, 

avant toute chose, le concept de doctrine. Pour ce faire, le présent nous donne une 

clé de lecture. Citons les Forces aériennes du XXIème siècle : « La doctrine est la 

mise au point et la description des principes fondamentaux régissant l’engagement 

des forces armées. [ ] », puis, plus loin : « Elle [la doctrine] fixe les principes de 

base des mécanismes de fonctionnement des Forces aériennes tels que structuration, 

organisation, équipement, instruction, entraînement et communication externe. » 1 En 

conséquence, nous analyserons en premier lieu les missions confiées à nos aviateurs, 

dans le cadre de la défense générale du pays afin d’établir les continuités ou les césures 

qui ont marquées l’évolution des Forces aériennes. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons 

les indicateurs relatifs au matériel, à la structure ou à l’organisation, disponibles dans 

les sources et qui sont de qualité et de quantité différentes suivant chaque période. 

Nous avons également été contraint d’effectuer des choix : l’une des particularités 

helvètes est d’avoir confié la responsabilité de la défense contre avions aux troupes 

d’aviation, là où d’autres pays l’ont laissée à l’arme de l’artillerie. Aussi, même si 

des troupes DCA étaient incorporées au sein des formations des Forces terrestres, le 

* Secrétaire général ASHSM 

1 Site internet des Forces aériennes : http://www.lw.admin.ch/internet/luftwaffe/fr/home/die_luftwaffe/ 

organisation/luftwaffenstab/doctrine/definition.html, version 29.09.2010 ; voir également Schweizer 

Luftwaffe, Luftwaffe Basisdoktrin – Fassung Weiss, du 20 décembre 2001, 154 p. disponible sous : 

http://www.lw.admin.ch/internet/luftwaffe/de/home/die_luftwaffe/organisation/luftwaffenstab/ 

doctrine/downloads.html.


chef d’arme de la DCA était subordonné au commandant des troupes d’aviation. Il 

va sans dire que les missions confiées à nos aviateurs dépendent de celles confiées 

à la défense contre avion basée au sol, néanmoins la place manque ici pour analyser 

toutes les deux. Nous nous concentrerons donc, dans cette contribution, à analyser la 

doctrine relative à la composante volante. De même, nous nous sommes concentré 

sur les engagements de guerre de notre aviation, laissant de côté la problématique de 

la neutralité et de sa protection qu’il serait néanmoins très intéressant d’ausculter notamment 

sous l’angle de la création et de l’évolution de l’escadre de surveillance. 

Pour cette analyse, nous nous sommes essentiellement basé sur les règlements 

en vigueur dans l’Armée suisse. Ceux-ci varient d’une époque à l’autre mais nous y 

retrouvons une certaine structure et continuité. Le fil rouge en matière de règlements 

est représenté par la Conduite tactique également appelée, par le passé, Conduite des 

troupes ou Service en campagne. Le règlement de Conduite opérative nous donne 

également, pour certaines périodes, des renseignements importants sur l’engagement 

de notre arme aérienne. Ensuite, nous avons eu recours aux règlements internes des 

troupes d’aviation relatifs à son engagement. Il est à déplorer que nous n’ayons pas 

réussi à retrouver tous les règlements qui, du fait de leur classification ou de leur âge, 

ne sont pas disponibles dans certains fonds. Organisée de manière fédérale et selon le 

principe de démocratie directe, la Suisse recèle certains particularismes dans le domaine 

de la défense. Le Parlement et le Conseil Fédéral portent une part importante 

dans les choix relatifs à l’organisation de notre Armée, notamment dans le domaine 

du matériel et de la structure de nos troupes. Les documents établis à ce niveau sont 

vitaux pour notre étude, aussi avons-nous étudié les messages du Conseil Fédéral 

relatifs à l’organisation des troupes ou à l’achat de matériel. Pour finir, nous avons 

complété notre analyse par la lecture d’études consacrées à la problématique de 

l’aviation en particulier ou de la défense en général. Particulièrement recommandée, 

la série d’études de la collection L’Etat-major général suisse ou encore les ouvrages 

publiés par l’Association Suisse d’Histoire et de Sciences Militaires. 

Notre contribution sera organisée de manière chronologique. La Première Guerre 

mondiale forme la première tentative de formation d’une troupe d’aviation digne de 

ce nom. Puis, la seconde période commence avec les années 1920, marquées d’un 

pacifisme optimiste et le délaissement du domaine de la défense. 2 La création de 

l’Office fédéral de l’aviation militaire, en 1936, marque le début d’une troisième 

période avec la montée en puissance de l’arme aérienne durant la Seconde Guerre 

mondiale. La quatrième période va de la fin du second conflit mondial à 1966, date 

de la mise en place de la défense combinée. Cette mise en place, qui occupe la fin 

des années 1960 et le début des année 1970 marque notre cinquième période. Enfin, 

la sixième et dernière période voit les Forces aériennes atteindre leur paroxysme 

dans les années 1980, avant que la chute du mur de Berlin ne les contraignent à des 

réductions dues au passage à la défense dynamique. 

2 Ernst Wetter: L’aviation militaire suisse in “Revue militaire suisse”, n°10, 1974, p. 450.

la d o C t r i n e d’emploi d e s t r o u p e s d’av i at i o n suisses d u r a n t le xxè m e sièCle 303 

2. Des débuts timides 

L’histoire de l’arme aérienne en Suisse débute comme dans toutes les autres armées, 

par une curiosité timide de la part des états-majors. Des essais sont entrepris 

en 1911, avec l’engagement d’un appareil lors des manœuvres de septembre du 1 er 

corps d’armée. Les résultats sont très mitigés, forgeant ainsi les arguments des adversaires 

de l’arme aérienne. 3 Un deuxième essai, en 1913, se termine même par 

un accident. 4 Le Conseil Fédéral préfère ainsi attendre avant de prendre une décision. 

Cette attitude attentiste pousse alors la Société suisse des officiers à lancer une 

collecte nationale pour la création d’une aviation. Des officiers de haut rang sont 

sceptiques, comme le commandant de corps Sprecher von Bernegg. D’autres y sont 

carrément opposés, notamment le commandant de corps Wille, futur général durant 

la Première guerre mondiale. 5 Qu’à cela ne tienne, la collecte aboutit et l’on se dirige 

vers la création d’une troupe d’aviation alors que le premier conflit mondial éclate. 

Lors de la mobilisation générale de 1914, l’embryon de troupe d’aviation est 

donc représenté par dix pilotes mobilisés avec leur propre appareil. Parmi les huit 

appareils, nous retrouvons deux biplans LVG et Aviatik, un Blériot, un monoplan 

Grandjean, un Farman, un Morane-Salunier, un Sommer ainsi qu’un hydravion. 6 

Difficile de trouver dans ces conditions une doctrine d’engagement alors même que 

la troupe n’existe pas officiellement ! Ce n’est que le 13 août 1915 que le Conseil 

Fédéral officialise la troupe en publiant une Organisation provisoire de l’aviation 

militaire. 7 Cette organisation demeurera en vigueur d’ailleurs jusqu’en 1936 ! Elle 

sera révisée en 1920, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1928, 1929, 1931, 1932 et 1936. 8 Nous nous 

trouvons donc face à du provisoire qui dure ! La mise en place du corps des aviateurs 

durant la guerre relève du chaos. Sa subordination reste provisoire et personne ne 

semble se préoccuper de l’utilisation de cette arme nouvelle. De 1914 à 1916, l’arme 

aérienne dépend directement des services de l’Etat-major général. Puis, à l’automne 

1916 et jusqu’en 1917, elle est subordonnée à l’office du Génie. Son commandant 

délègue alors ses compétences au Chef de la télégraphie de l’armée ! En mars 1917, 

enfin, une double-subordination est mise en place : pour l’engagement, l’arme aérienne 

dépend de l’Etat-major général mais demeure subordonnée au Génie en ce 

qui concerne le matériel et l’instruction. 9 A la fin de la première Guerre mondiale, 

il n’existe toujours aucune doctrine d’engagement relative à l’emploi de notre arme 

3 

Christophe Siméon: L’envol manqué de l’aviation militaire suisse à la fin de la Belle époque (1910- 

1914). Neuchâtel, Alphil, 2008, pp. 73-75. 

4 

Ibid., pp. 132-133. 

5 

Ibid., pp. 88-89 et 110. 

6 

Ibid., pp. 156-157. 

7 

Ibid., p. 157. 

8 

Office fédéral de l’aviation militaire et de la défense contre avions: 50 ans: Office fédéral de 

l’aviation militaire et de la défense contre avions. Berne, Office fédéral de l’aviation et de la défense 

contre avions, 1986, p. 23. 

9 

Ibid.


aérienne. 10 Au sein de l’Etat-major général, l’aviation ne représentait pas une priorité 

mais l’on peut tout de même se représenter comment l’engagement des troupes 

d’aviation en cas de conflit y était envisagé. Lors des entretiens avec l’état-major 

français pour une éventuelle collaboration, on parle de cantonner les avions helvétiques 

dans les rôles d’exploration et de direction des feux d’artillerie. 11 La chasse 

n’est donc pas d’actualité, comme l’atteste également les achats d’appareils durant le 

conflit : 12 DH-1/2, 43 Wild, 109 DH-3, tous des appareils à engager pour des tâches 

d’exploration. L’acquisition de ces modèles met au jour des tensions entre le Service 

technique militaire et les troupes d’aviation quant aux procédures et responsabilités 

pour l’achat du matériel volant. Ce problème sera d’ailleurs récurrent jusqu’à nos 

jours. Au sortir de la guerre, le bilan est donc plutôt mitigé et l’aviation suisse est 

évaluée par un attaché de défense américain comme « practically helpless ». 12 Le 

général Wille demande, dans son rapport sur le service actif, alors même qu’il était 

sceptique avant la guerre, le renforcement de l’aviation militaire suisse. 13 

3. L’aviation suisse dans l’Entre-deux-guerres 

L’Entre-deux-guerres en Suisse est marqué par un certain pacifisme ambiant, loin 

du renforcement demandé par le général. L’idéologie du « plus jamais ça » règne 

pour une majorité de la population, même si elle n’a pas connu la guerre. L’armée ne 

reçoit pas les crédits nécessaires pour sa modernisation et sa préparation s’en ressent. 

Il n’en va pas autrement en ce qui concerne les troupes d’aviation qui, comme nous 

l’avons vu plus haut, demeurent organisées sur une base provisoire. Depuis 1921, 

l’aviation, subordonnée à l’Etat-major général, disposait d’un chef en la personne du 

colonel Immenhauser. Celui-ci jouait le rôle d’un chef d’arme. Une doctrine d’emploi 

devrait donc se dessiner, même si l’on ne connaît pas encore de directives fixes 

quant à l’aviation. 14 

En 1924, le Conseil Fédéral présente au Parlement un message relatif à la nouvelle 

organisation des troupes. Celui-ci nous permet de nous représenter l’engagement 

des troupes aériennes. Il n’en demeure pas moins que, si le message présente 

la menace aérienne comme l’une des plus dangereuses, « ce problème reste encore 

à résoudre ». 15 Nous nous trouvons donc toujours dans le flou le plus complet. Les 

missions que l’on désire confier à l’aviation sont de nature défensive. On envisage 

10 Ibid., p. 19. 

11 Hans Rapold: Zeit der Bewährung ? Die Epoche um den ersten Weltkrieg 1907 - 1924. Bâle, coll. 

L›Etat-major général suisse, Vol. V, Helbling & Lichtenhahn, 1988, pp. 203 et 305. 

12 Ibid., p. 425. 

13 Ibid., p. 333. 

14 Hans Senn: Erhaltung und Verstärkung der Verteidigungsbereitschaft zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen. 

Bâle, coll. L’Etat-major général suisse, vol VI, Helbling & Lichtenhahn, 1991, pp. 109-111. 

15 « Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale relatif à une nouvelle organisation des troupes. 

(Du 6 mai 1924.) » in Feuille fédérale, 1924, Vol. 2, n° 21, pp. 61-63.


ainsi pour celle-ci un rôle d’exploration, de renseignement et de liaison. Elle doit 

également être en mesure de pouvoir empêcher les escadrilles ennemies d’évoluer 

au-dessus de notre territoire. 16 L’organisation des troupes prévoit la création de 5 

groupes d’aviation, chacun destiné à une mission particulière. Le premier, composé 

de 6 compagnies d’avions légers 17 sert à l’exploration rapprochée et l’observation 

pour l’artillerie. Cela représente une compagnie par division. Le second groupe se 

compose également de 6 compagnies, destinées aussi aux divisions. La mission demeure 

la même mais les appareils doivent être plus puissants afin d’évoluer en montagne. 

Les troisième et quatrième groupe sont tous deux composés de 6 compagnies 

d’avion d’observation lourds. Le troisième groupe est également destiné aux divisions 

pour les missions « difficiles » tandis que le quatrième est destiné au commandement 

de l’armée pour l’exploration lointaine. Le cinquième groupe est également 

à disposition du haut commandement et se compose de 6 compagnies d’aviation de 

chasse, « chargés de protéger, contre les attaques des escadrilles de bombardement, 

le terrain situé en arrière du front de l’armée. » On renonce, en revanche, à acquérir 

des avions de bombardement ainsi que des avions blindés armés de mitrailleuses. 18 

Un état-major des troupes d’aviation est également mis sur pied avec, non pas la 

mission de commander les troupes, mais de s’occuper des questions intéressant les 

troupes d’aviation au sein de l’Etat-major général. 

Cette première ébauche nous permet de faire quelques constatations intéressantes 

: les deux missions confiées à notre aviation sont la chasse et l’exploration. La 

seconde tâche obtient la priorité. Ensuite, il est prévu de subordonner, en cas de 

service actif, trois groupes aériens aux trois corps d’armée, respectivement aux divisions, 

alors que deux groupes restent à disposition du commandement de l’armée. 19 

On ne choisit donc pas la concentration des forces mais on préfère mettre les moyens 

directement à disposition des Grandes unités, même si en temps de paix, les unités ne 

sont pas endivisionnées. 20 Ces tâches sont entérinées par le règlement du Service en 

campagne de 1927, quoique dans une priorité différente que celle donnée dans le document 

Organisation des troupes : on y définit en effet la chasse comme la mission 

principale de l’aviation. 21 Néanmoins, cette organisation reste un vœu pieu, car le 

16 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 

17 On ne parle alors pas d’escadrille au sens moderne, puisque le document Organisation des troupes 

se réfère à des escadrilles composées de 30 à 60 avions ! Le document fait alors allusion à des 

compagnies d’aviation qui comprennent alors autant le personnel volant que les rampants. Cette 

particularité est par ailleurs relevée par les aviateurs eux-mêmes : Etienne Primault: Les possibilités 

de l’aviation militaire suisse in “Revue militaire suisse”, n°4, 1927, p. 155. 

18 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale relatif à une nouvelle organisation des troupes. 

(Du 6 mai 1924.), op. cit., pp. 76-77. Pour l’emploi tactique de ces types de formations voir : Maj 

EMG Ackermann: Emploi de l’aviation en temps de guerre in “Revue militaire suisse”, n°7, 1932, 

pp. 327-341. 

19 Ibid., p. 146. 

20 Ibid., p. 244. 

21 Règlement Felddienst, 1927, Berne, DMF, pp. 35-39.


matériel ne permet pas d’accomplir les missions retenues. A la fin des années 1920, 

les appareils que possède la troupe d’aviation ne permettent en effet que de mener 

des missions d’exploration. 22 Le capitaine Primault, futur commandant des troupes 

d’aviation dans les années 1950 écrit alors : « Elle [l’aviation] est tout au plus un 

service ou, si vous préférez, un moyen de renseignements. » 23 Ce changement de 

vision, imprimé dans le règlement de 1927 est confirmé par le message du Conseil 

Fédéral relatif à l’acquisition d’avions de 1929, qui place l’avion de chasse comme 

le plus à même de répondre à nos besoins. 24 Cherchant à poursuivre la mise en place 

de l’organisation des troupes de 1924, le Conseil Fédéral propose alors l’acquisition 

de 60 appareils de chasse et 45 d’observation. 25 On remarque donc que, si cet achat 

ne permet pas de combler le manque de matériel pour réaliser les plans de 1924 26 , 

les autorités commencent à se préoccuper de l’engagement de l’arme aérienne à la 

fin des années 1920. Un service autonome relatif à l’aviation militaire est donc enfin 

créé en 1936. 

4. La création d’un office fédéral de l’aviation militaire 

et la Seconde Guerre mondiale 

Cette mise en place d’un office consacre définitivement la création des troupes 

d’aviation qui deviennent ainsi autonomes, avec leur propre commandant qui, par 

la même occasion, fait office de chef d’arme. Un état-major lui est adjoint en 1937 

et l’office reçoit la compétence, en 1938, d’établir les règlements d’engagement de 

l’arme. 27 En corollaire, une nouvelle Organisation des troupes est donnée. Celle-ci 

introduit le régiment d’aviation, qui a pour but de coordonner l’action combinée de 

plusieurs groupes d’aviation. On compte ainsi 3 régiments qui regroupent les 21 

escadrilles des 7 Groupes. 28 

Néanmoins, les travaux sur la doctrine d’engagement ainsi que la planification 

de l’engagement des troupes d’aviation n’avancent que très peu. La montée des 

périls en Europe aboutit à un renforcement d’urgence de l’Armée suisse, mais la 

Commission de défense nationale, « général » en temps de paix, ne consacre que pas 

22 Hans Senn: op. cit., p. 115. 

23 Etienne Primault: op. cit., p. 153. 

24 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale concernant l’acquisition d’avions, moteurs 

d’avions et autre matériel de corps pour la troupe d’aviation. (Du 13 décembre 1929.) in Feuille 

fédérale, 1929, Vol. 3, n° 51, pp. 613-614. 

25 Ibid. 

26 Senn Hans: op. cit., p. 115. 

27 Werner Rutschmann: Die Schweizer Flieger- und Fliegerabwehr - Aufträge und Einsatztruppen 

1939-1945. Thoune, Ott Verlag, 1989, p. 27. 

28 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale relatif à une nouvelle organisation des troupes. 

(Du 19 juin 1936.) in Feuille fédérale, 1936, Vol. 2, n° 26, p. 36 et Werner Rutschmann: op. 

cit., p. 30.


ou peu de séance à l’aviation. 29 Une étude de 1935 sur la question de la protection 

aérienne, rédigée par le colonel EMG Bandi, futur commandant des troupes d’aviation, 

est donnée par le chef de l’EMG, le commandant de corps Roost. Celle-ci pose 

comme base la défense aérienne passive élargie par des éléments de défense active. 

L’influence de Douhet est palpable dans cette étude qui veut donner des capacités offensives 

aux forces aériennes. Un autre élément indiquant une modification réalisée 

après la guerre apparaît : la concentration des forces est évoquée et non la dispersion 

telle qu’exprimée dans l’Organisation des troupes de 1924. 30 

Ainsi, lorsque la guerre éclate, l’état de préparation est déplorable ; certaines 

escadrilles ne disposent même pas d’avions ! Le Général ne trouve, dans les documents 

de l’EMG, rien de relatif à l’engagement des forces aériennes. 31 Le Général 

Guisan apprécie la situation comme un « véritable état de crise » : « La doctrine de 

l’emploi de l’arme manquait : le principal règlement tactique n’était pas élaboré. 

Les sens et la volonté de collaboration avec les forces terrestres faisaient défaut. » 32 

Durant la guerre, ce ne sera donc pas la mission qui détermine les moyens mais les 

moyens à disposition qui donnent les missions! 33 Avant la prise du Réduit national, 

l’aviation reçoit la mission primaire de couvrir la marche des unités contre les attaques 

aériennes. 34 Cet engagement est réglé dans les différents ordres d’opération 

révisés périodiquement durant la guerre. La prise du dispositif du Réduit modifie 

quelque peu ces missions. D’une arme de sacrifice, l’aviation reçoit la mission de 

couvrir la mobilisation, combattre les troupes aéroportées et de participer au combat 

retardateur avec les brigades légères. 35 A ce titre, l’organisation est modifiée par la 

création d’un quatrième régiment d’aviation. De la sorte, chaque corps d’armée dispose 

de son régiment. La décentralisation des moyens est donc maintenue. 36 

La Seconde Guerre mondiale voit la naissance du premier règlement d’engagement 

des troupes d’aviation, bien que provisoire. Ce document est plutôt concis 

puisqu’il ne contient que dix-huit pages et est l’œuvre du commandant des troupes 

d’aviation, le colonel-divisionnaire Bandi en 1943. Les tâches dévolues à l’aviation 

sont l’exploration et le combat. Seule la première est prévue au niveau opératif, la 

seconde se déroulant uniquement au niveau tactique. Tous ces engagements sont 

alors menés au profit des troupes terrestres, même la « chasse libre ». La conduite 

du combat demeure néanmoins très aléatoire puisque le règlement prévoit même la 

29 Werner Rutschmann : op. cit., p. 29. 

30 Ibid., pp. 23-28. 

31 Rapport du Général Guisan a l’Assemblée fédérale sur le service actif 1939-1945, Lausanne, Imprimeries 

Réunies SA, 1945, p. 99. 

32 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 

33 Ibid., pp. 109-110. 

34 Hans Senn: Anfänge einer Dissuasionsstrategie während des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Bâle, coll. L›Etatmajor 

général suisse, vol VII, Helbling & Lichtenhahn, 1995, p. 96. 

35 Hans Senn: Anfänge einer Dissuasionsstrategie während des Zweiten Weltkrieges, op. cit., p. 324. 

36 Werner Rutschmann: op. cit., pp. 317-318.


communication entre troupes au sol et aviation par le bais de draps disposés au sol ! 37 

A la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la troupe d’aviation est autonome mais encore 

engagée uniquement au profit des Forces terrestres, avec un matériel vieux et 

mal adapté à la conduite de la guerre moderne. 

5. Le début de la guerre froide - une Konzeptionsstreit 

Au sortir de la guerre, ce sont encore les documents d’avant-guerre qui prévalent. 

Il faut alors les remettre au goût du jour. L’Organisation des troupes de 1946 entérine 

ainsi les changements apportés durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Elle consacre 

notamment la création de la division aérienne et introduit enfin le concept d’escadrille. 

On passe alors à 27 escadrilles d’aviation et escadrilles de nuit, réparties entre 

4 régiments d’aviation et 1 escadre de nuit. L’organisation au sol est, elle également, 

modifiée pour aller dans le sens du principe de la base aérienne. 38 Le début de la 

guerre froide provoque un choc au sein de l’élite de notre pays qui ne veut en aucun 

cas revivre la situation de dépendance imposée durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 

L’aviation est donc rapidement renforcée au niveau matériel, notamment par l’acquisition 

de P-51, de DH-100 Vampire et DH-110 Venom qui permettent un saut qualitatif. 

L’organisation de l’Armée est elle aussi rapidement modifiée par l’Organisation 

des troupes 1950, qui n’amène cependant rien de nouveau pour les troupes d’aviation. 

39 Le principal règlement de conduite connait lui également une remise au goût 

du jour, avec la publication de la Conduite des troupes 1951 (CT 51) qui remplace 

le règlement de Service en campagne de 1927. La CT 51 suit une structure similaire 

au règlement d’avant-guerre et souffre encore d’une vision limitée sur les capacités 

de l’aviation, puisque celle-ci arrive en onzième position dans les moyens de combat 

cités par la CT 51, après même le renforcement du terrain ! De même, sa contribution 

au combat est relativisée dans son chapitre introductif. 40 Notre aviation doit alors se 

borner à la collaboration tactique avec les forces terrestres et n’engager le combat 

aérien que si la mission l’exige. (chi. 148). 41 La seule exception est représentée par 

l’exploration lointaine, tâche stratégique au profit de l’armée. 42 Son engagement doit 

être réservé aux phases décisives de la bataille. Il sera analogue à celui de l’artillerie 

37 Provisorische Ausbildungsvorschrift der Fliegertruppe 1943, Die Kampfführung der Fliegertruppe, 

1943, PC du général en chef de l'Armée, p. 18. 

38 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale concernant la modification de l’arrêté de 

l’Assemblée fédérale du 7 octobre 1936 sur l’organisation de l’armée (organisation des troupes). 

(Du 30 septembre 1946.) in Feuille fédérale, 1946, Vol. 3, n° 21, pp. 308 et 323. 

39 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale concernant l’organisation de l’armée 

(organisation des troupes) (Du 10 octobre 1950) in Feuille fédérale, 1950, Vol. 3, n° 41, pp. 118 - 

162. 

40 Règlement 51.20 f Conduite des troupes 1951, 1953, Berne, DMF, p. 32. 

41 Ibid. 

42 Ibid., p. 89.


et peut être considéré comme du Close Air Support. 43 L’aviation est directement subordonnée 

au commandant en chef de l’Armée qui l’engage ou en subordonne des 

parties à une unité d’armée pour une action bien précise. L’officier d’engagement 

d’aviation de l’unité d’armée en question conduit alors les moyens mis à disposition. 

44 Il s’agit alors ici d’une modification puisque l’on renonce à l’éparpillement 

des moyens qui prévalaient encore avant la Seconde guerre mondiale. Cette fois-ci 

les moyens sont concentrés dans les mains du commandant en chef. 

Dans les années 1950, les troupes d’aviation ne représentent donc pas une composante 

essentielle dans la conduite du combat de l’Armée suisse. Son développement 

va également se trouver ralenti par la Konzeptionsstreit. Il s’agit d’une lutte 

livrée entre les partisans de plusieurs doctrines de combat. Dans les grandes lignes, 

les partisans de la mobile defence affrontent ceux de l’area defence 45 : dans le premier 

cas, une armée mobile est envisagée pouvant mener un combat mécanisé et 

protégé par une aviation de chasse forte, capable d’atteindre la supériorité aérienne, 

alors que le second courant demande une armée statique, combattant depuis des positions 

fixes et préparées de longue date. Dans ce cas-là, une aviation d’appui suffit 

largement. 46 Cette querelle va produire une indécision quant à l’emploi de l’aviation 

et empêcher sa modernisation durant la décennie. D’autres problèmes entravent ce 

développement, comme la lutte menée avec les officiers de la DCA, qui prônent le 

cantonnement des aviateurs aux missions de CAS afin d’assurer eux-mêmes la défense 

de l’espace aérien, ou encore les intérêts relatifs au développement d’avions 

helvétiques pour équiper nos troupes d’aviation. 47 

De plus, le colonel-divisionnaire Primault, commandant des troupes d’aviation 

durant les années 1950, n’a pas de vision clairement établie sur l’emploi opératif 

de l’aviation et change souvent son avis quant à l’emploi de l’arme aérienne. Le 

commandant de corps Walter Dürig, commandant des troupes d’aviation de 1987 à 

1989, évalue les capacités opératives des troupes d’aviation pour les années 1950 et 

1960 comme étant « catastrophiquement mauvaises », puisqu’aucun exercice opératif 

n’eut lieu avant 1972. 48 Seul un changement à la tête de l’armée, en 1958, avec 

43 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 

44 Ibid., p. 37. 

45 Ces termes sont intervenus bien plus tard, il n’existait pas sous cette forme à l’époque. Nous les 

utilisons pour des vertus de démonstration. 

46 Cette description demeure très schématique et succincte. Les différents courants en opposition se 

distinguent encore par d’autres caractéristiques, notamment en ce qui concerne les attentes adressées 

aux troupes d’aviation. Pour le lecteur intéressé, nous recommandons vivement la lecteur de Braun 

Peter: Von der Reduitstrategie zur Abwehr. Die militärische Landesverteidigung der Schweiz im 

Kalten Krieg 1945 - 1966. Baden, coll. L’Etat-major général suisse, Vol. X, 2 tomes, hier+jetzt, 

2006, p. 1055. 

47 Voir Julien grand: N-20 et P-16, les raisons de l’échec d’une industrie aéronautique suisse autonome 

1945-1966. Fribourg, travail de licence - manuscrit, 2006, p. 155. 

48 Walter Dürig : Die Schweizerische Luftverteidigung in der Mitte des geteilten Europas in De Weck 

Hervé [Eds] : La Suisse et la guerre froide 1950-1990. Berne, ASHSM, 2003, pp. 149-182.


l’arrivée de nouveaux membres au sein de la Commission de défense nationale va 

permettre de débloquer la situation et sortir de cette crise de conception. La fin de 

la période voit néanmoins la parution du premier règlement non-provisoire relatif à 

l’engagement des troupes d’aviation. 49 Celui-ci ne change rien au constat que notre 

force aérienne est à engager de manière tactique. L’analyse est toutefois quelque peu 

affinée puisque l’on parle de deux phases de guerre : 1° la protection de la neutralité ; 

2° les engagements de guerre. Les missions ne varient guère, le transport aérien s’y 

est ajouté. 50 L’engagement est néanmoins envisagé de manière centralisée afin de 

pouvoir fixer un effort principal. 51 On désire atteindre ainsi une supériorité aérienne 

locale et limitée dans le temps 52 , signe qu’un chasseur devra alors faire son apparition 

dans les rangs des troupes d’aviation. Le soutien des troupes au sol, tant direct qu’indirect 

demeure néanmoins le point central ; celui-ci doit être conduit et coordonné 

au niveau des corps d’armée, qui disposent chacun d’une centrale d’engagement air, 

alors que les divisions et brigades ne disposent que d’un poste de direction air. 53 Ce 

règlement ne révolutionne pas l’engagement mais rend perceptibles des évolutions 

à venir : la chasse comme partie intégrante de l’engagement des troupes d’aviation 

ou encore la centralisation de son engagement en une seule et unique centrale d’engagement. 

Pour l’instant néanmoins, la situation ne diffère guère de celle rencontrée 

durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. 

6. La mise en place de la défense combinée 

En 1958, les changements au sein de la Commission de défense nationale font 

pencher la balance de la Konzeptionsstreit dans le sens de la mobile defence. Cela 

signe en partie l’arrêt de mort de la production indigène d’avions, en l’occurrence 

l’abandon du P-16. 54 Cette doctrine se voit concrétisée dans l’Organisation des 

troupes de 1960. L’aviation de chasse y apparait très clairement puisque l’aviation 

doit être en mesure de pouvoir repousser des raids aériens importants, dans une 

phase de protection de la neutralité. 55 Ensuite, l’Armée doit pouvoir mener un combat 

mobile sur le plateau, le tout couvert par l’aviation. Celle-ci appuie toujours les 

troupes terrestres mais, soit par la lutte contre les bases de feu et les installations 

adverses ou par la couverture aérienne. 56 Pour les troupes d’aviation, ce change- 

49 Règlement 56.3 Einsatz und Kampfführung der Flugwaffe, 1959, Berne, DMF, p. 111. 

50 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 

51 Ibid., p. 12. 

52 Ibid., p. 31. 

53 Ibid., pp. 69-76. 

54 gr a n d Julien: op. cit. 

55 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale concernant l’organisation de l’armée 

(Organisation des troupes) (Du 30 juin 1960) in Feuille fédérale, 1960, Vol. 2, n° 29, p. 327. 

56 Ibid., pp. 334 – 336.


ment trouve sa concrétisation dans la commande de 100 chasseurs Mirage III. 57 Une 

mauvaise gestion du projet aboutit à un dépassement de crédits de plusieurs centaines 

de millions, que le parlement refuse d’accorder. Cela aboutit à une énorme 

crise politique et à la première commission d’enquête parlementaire de l’histoire 

suisse. 58 Le nombre de Mirage commandés passe donc à 57, dont uniquement 36 

en version chasseur. La copie livrée dans l’Organisation des troupes 1960 est donc 

à revoir La conception 66, connue sous le terme d’Armée 61, voit le jour et représente 

une spécificité helvétique. Le terme de défense combinée apparaît : des éléments 

d’infanterie classiques combattent depuis des positions préparées avec pour 

but de canaliser les forces adverses et créer les conditions favorables à la riposte des 

éléments mécanisés du secteur. 59 La mission des troupes d’aviation demeure l’appui 

des troupes au sol, mais les objectifs envisagés sont hors d’atteinte des autres 

armes. 60 Le spectre des missions d’Offensive Counter Air et d’Air Interdiction remplace 

alors celui de Close Air Support. 61 Chose nouvelle également, une centrale 

d’engagement nationale est évoquée, qui sera mise en place avec l’acquisition du 

radar de surveillance FLORIDA. 

A ce moment-là, les troupes d’aviation comptent trois régiments d’aviation : le 

premier à 6 escadrilles (2 sur Hunter, 4 sur Venom) basé en Valais ; le second à 8 

escadrilles (2 sur Hunter, 2 sur Venom et 4 sur Vampire) basé dans l’Oberland bernois 

et le troisième à 7 escadrilles (1 sur Hunter et 6 sur Venom) basé dans la région 

du Gothard. Ces escadrilles sont concentrées sur 11 bases aériennes qui se trouvent 

toutes dans la zone de responsabilité du Corps d’armée de montagne 3. La centralisation 

des moyens, tant géographiques que dans la conduite, est donc atteinte à ce 

moment-là. 62 La centrale d’engagement des Forces aériennes viendra chapeauter le 

tout. Les missions citées plus haut sont ancrées dans la Conduite des troupes 69 : 

l’aviation est un instrument d’exploration opérative ainsi qu’une réserve des commandants 

supérieurs ; sa mission première consiste en l’appui indirect des troupes 

au sol et est engagée en outre pour la couverture aérienne et, exceptionnellement, 

pour l’appui direct au sol. 63 

57 Arrêté Fédéral concernant l’acquisition d’avions de combat (Mirage III S), ainsi que de matériels 

pour les troupes d’aviation (Du 21 juin 1961) in Feuille fédérale, 1961, Vol. 1, n° 26, pp. 1634- 

1635. 

58 Voir Paolo Urio : L’affaire des Mirages : décision administrative et contrôle parlementaire. Genève, 

Ed. Médecine et hygiène, 1972, p. 311. 

59 Rapport du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale concernant la conception de la défense nationale 

militaire (Du 6 juin 1966) in Feuille fédérale, 1966, Vol. 1, n° 24, pp. 873-897. 

60 Ibid., p. 884. 

61 Peter Braun : Der Operationsbefehl « ALPHA » von 1962 in Braun Peter et De Weck Hervé [Eds] : 

La planification de de la défense combinée dans l’Armée 61. Berne, ASHSM, 2009, pp. 255-276. 

62 Adrien Tschumy : Planification au corps d’armée de montagne 3 et Peter Braun : Der Operationsbefehl 

( ) in Peter Braun et De Weck Hervé [Eds] : op. cit., pp. 209, 222 et 252. 

63 Règlement 51.20 f Conduite des troupes 1969, 1969, Berne, DMF, p. 9.


7. Les adaptations de la défense combinée 

et le passage à la défense dynamique 

La doctrine d’emploi des troupes d’aviation ne connaitra alors que peu de changement 

jusqu’à la chute du Mur de Berlin. Les préparatifs au niveau opératif s’améliorent 

néanmoins notablement, avec le premier exercice opératif en 1972 ou encore 

la rédaction d’un ordre d’opération fixant les premiers engagements pour chaque 

escadrille en cas de conflit, à une distance allant jusqu’à 95 kilomètres au-delà de la 

frontière. 64 Au niveau matériel, et malgré l’arrivée des Mirage, la flotte est vieillissante 

pour les années 1970. Le Département militaire fédéral demande l’acquisition 

d’un avion d’attaque au sol, censé être le Corsair américain. En 1972, le Conseil 

fédéral renonce à cette acquisition, ce qui pose le problème du renforcement de notre 

aviation. 65 En 1973, une solution transitoire est trouvée dans l’acquisition de 30 

Hunter supplémentaires, qui assurent alors à la fois des missions de couverture aérienne 

et d’attaque au sol. 66 En 1975, une centaine d’avions de combat F-5 Tiger 

sont achetés, avec pour but premier d’assurer la couverture de zone, complétée en 

1980 par une deuxième série de 38 appareils. 67 Les Forces aériennes sont donc ainsi 

en mesure de remplir les 4 missions opératives qui leur sont confiées et atteignent, 

à ce moment-là, leur paroxysme. La police et la défense aérienne sont confiées aux 

Mirage ; la couverture de zone, soit l’atteinte d’une supériorité aérienne limitée dans 

le temps et l’espace est remise aux Tiger alors que la mission d’appui au sol est 

assurée par les Hunter ; l’exploration est affaire des Mirage de reconnaissance, le 

tout enfin complété par la mission de transport aérien confiée aux avions légers et 

hélicoptères. 68 L’importance alors accrue de l’aviation et ses tâches sont entérinées 

par la Conduite des Troupes 1982. La collaboration avec les troupes terrestres y est 

plus clairement définie par le biais de lignes de commandement clairement hiérarchisées. 

69 Des crédits de vols sont attribués aux corps d’armée qui les distribuent à 

leurs Grandes Unités et peuvent être utilisés pour les 4 missions opératives confiées 

aux troupes d’aviation. 70 

64 Peter Braun : Der Operationsbefehl « ALPHA » von 1962, op. cit., pp. 262-269. 

65 Hans Senn : Entstehung, Redaktion und Umsetzung der Konzeption der militärischen Landesverteidigung 

vom 6.6.66 in Planungstab der Armee [Eds]: La conception du 6.6.66 - 40 après. Berne, 

ZEM, Dok 92.001 df, 2007, p. 45. 

66 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale sur l’acquisition d’avions Hunter (Du 31 janvier 

1973) in Feuille fédérale, 1973, Vol. 1, n° 8, pp. 345-349. 

67 Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale sur l’acquisition d’avions de combat (Du 27 

août 1975) in Feuille fédérale, 1975, Vol. 2, n° 34, pp. 889-903 et Message concernant l’acquisition 

d’avions de combat et d’avions-école du 12 novembre 1980 in Feuille fédérale, 1980, Vol. 1, n° 3, 

pp. 222-254. 

68 Walter Dürig : op. cit., p. 166. 

69 Règlement 51.20 f Conduite des troupes 1982, 1983, Berne, DMF, 121 p., voir également l’illustration 

1. 

70 Règlement 51.15 f La conduite de l’armée et des Grandes Unités (CAG 83), 1983, Berne, DMF, pp. 

26-30.


Cette organisation va demeurer jusqu’à la fin de la Guerre froide. En 1989, la 

chute du Mur de Berlin remet en cause le modèle de la défense combinée. En 1995, 

est mise en place la nouvelle armée sous le titre Armée 95. De défense combinée, on 

passe alors à la défense dynamique. La Conduite tactique 95 ne parle plus de missions 

d’attaque au sol, seules demeurent la couverture de zone, la reconnaissance et 

le transport. La mise hors service des Hunter a, de facto, supprimé les missions qui 

formaient alors le cœur de compétence des troupes d’aviation au début de la Guerre 

froide et jusque dans les années 1960. Le FA-18, entré en service afin de remplacer 

le Mirage, ne dispose en effet d’aucune capacité d’attaque au sol vu que la munition 

requise pour ce type d’engagement n’a pas été achetée. 71 La notion de combat dans 

le seuil infra-guerrier est nouvellement évoquée, ce qui augmente l’importance de la 

protection et de la sauvegarde de la neutralité pour les Forces aériennes. 72 La conduite 

de l’engagement est encore plus centralisée puisque les corps d’armée ne disposent 

plus de crédits définis mais doivent adresser leurs demandes au commandement de 

l’Armée, qui fixe les priorités en accord avec le commandement des troupes d’aviation 

et de défense contre avions dans l’ordre d’opération de l’Armée. 73 

8. Conclusion 

Il est possible de tirer plusieurs conclusions de ce tour d’horizon de l’emploi de 

nos troupes d’aviation durant le XXème siècle. Tout d’abord au niveau des missions 

qui leur sont confiées. Une lente mais certaine évolution est notable. Premièrement 

engagées pour des tâches d’exploration, la mission principale est rapidement devenue 

l’appui des troupes au sol dès les années 1930 et ce jusque dans les années 1970. 

On peut alors y distinguer deux phases. La première couvre la Seconde Guerre mondiale 

et les années 1950 qui cantonnent l’aviation dans un rôle de Close Air Support. 

Les fonds ne doivent pas être gaspillés et la priorité demeure les troupes combattant 

au sol. Il faut donc se limiter au strict nécessaire. La césure intervenue en 1958 au 

sein de la Commission de défense nationale met quelque peu au rencart le CAS, pour 

fixer la priorité sur l’Air Interdiction et l’Offensive Counter Air. L’aviation devient 

alors l’artillerie qui permet de frapper au-delà du champ de bataille. De cette période-là, 

date également l’entrée de l’aviation de chasse dans le concept d’engagement 

des troupes d’aviation qui reçoivent alors la mission de couvrir les éléments les plus 

modernes des corps d’armées, à savoir les divisions mécanisées. Cette mission prend 

petit à petit le dessus dans les années 1970 - 1980 avec l’acquisition des Tiger. La 

mise en place d’Armée 95 couronne définitivement la couverture de zone comme 

mission principale puisque les Forces aériennes perdent à ce moment-là la capacité 

71 Règlement 51.20 f Conduite tactique 1995, 1995, DMD, règlement donné en 15 parties de taille 

variable. 

72 Règlement 51.15 f Conduite opérative (Cop 95), 1994, Berne, DMF, édition provisoire, p. 40. 

73 Règlement 56.90 d Führung und Einsatz der FF Trp 95, 1995, Berne, DMF, pp. 23 et 29.


de mener des frappes au sol. La reconnaissance opérative survivra encore jusqu’à 

l’Armée XXI, mais cette capacité sera alors également mise au placard avec le retrait 

des Mirage de reconnaissance. 

La conduite des troupes d’aviation livre également son lot de constatations intéressantes. 

Les moyens envisagés dans les années 1920 sont totalement décentralisés 

et confiés aux divisions. Une concentration des rares moyens alors à disposition est 

alors totalement impossible. Seul le renforcement administratif du corps d’aviation, 

dès 1936, va permettre d’inverser la tendance. L’introduction du régiment d’aviation 

permet alors, au moins, de coordonner les engagements au sein d’un même corps 

d’armée. Ce système est définitivement mis en place dans les années 1950 avec la 

Regl 51.20 1982 p. 46 - Lignes de commandement pour l’engagement des troupes 

d’aviation.


centrale d’engagement air au niveau des corps d’armée. Les travaux préparatifs des 

années 1960 et les avancées technologiques qui permettent la mise en place d’une 

centrale d’engagement au niveau national, avec le système FLORIDA, vont définitivement 

mettre les troupes d’aviation sur la voie de la centralisation des moyens. La 

Conduite des troupes 1982 définit alors clairement les lignes de commandement et 

les attributions, notamment par le biais de crédits de vols. Le passage à l’Armée 95 

termine cette évolution avec une aviation alors totalement autonome, où les Grandes 

Unités ne disposent même plus de crédits pré-définis. Les demandes d’appui des 

Grandes Unités doivent d’abord transiter par l’Etat-major de conduite de l’Armée 

avant d’être transmises au commandement des troupes d’aviation, qui décident quels 

moyens sont engagés. 

Le dernier point touche l’organisation matérielle. Trop souvent, l’équipement des 

troupes d’aviation ne permet pas de remplir les missions envisagées par les autorités 

politiques ou militaires du pays. Cela est particulièrement criant dans l’organisation 

des troupes de 1924. La mission de chasse alors envisagée ne pourra jamais être 

remplie car l’aviation ne dispose alors que d’avions capables de mener des missions 

d’exploration. Les Messerschmitt acquis avant et durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale 

permettront quelque peu de corriger le tir. Se présente également le cas de figure 

où du matériel est acquis ou développé alors même que la doctrine n’est pas clairement 

définie. C’est le cas notamment du P-16. La commission d’acquisition d’avion, 

active dans les années 1940 et 1950, ne se pose alors pas la question de savoir pour 

quelle(s) type(s) de mission l’appareil est développé et demeure concentrée sur des 

points très techniques, comme par exemple de savoir ce qui est le plus avantageux 

pour nos troupes d’aviation : un monoplace ou un biplace ! 

Nous devons également faire la constatation que les préparatifs menés pour l’engagement 

des troupes d’aviation jusque dans les années 1960 ne sont pas optimaux. 

Cela explique en partie les errements au niveau de l’acquisition de matériel, bien que 

les rivalités entre les différents services (aviation, état-major général, service technique 

militaire, ) y soient également pour beaucoup. La mise en place de la défense 

combinée permet enfin d’aligner les missions confiées aux troupes d’aviation avec 

le matériel en dotation dans les escadrilles. Il s’agit alors du point culminant pour 

nos troupes d’aviation. La fin de la Guerre froide et la chute des crédits alloués à la 

défense auront pour conséquence de mettre les Forces aériennes devant le choix cornélien 

de renoncer à certaines tâches, comme les capacités d’attaque au sol. A l’aube 

du XXI ème siècle, le défi est maintenant de façonner le nouveau profil de prestations 

de notre aviation, avec pour toile de fond, le remplacement des Tiger et les réductions 

budgétaires.


Bibliographie 

1. Sources 

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que de matériels pour les troupes d’aviation (Du 21 juin 1961) in Feuille fédérale, 

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Aktivdienst 1939-1945, Berne, Buchdruckerei Rösch, Vogt & Co, 1946, p. 213. 

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des troupes. (Du 6 mai 1924.) in Feuille fédérale, 1924, Vol. 2, n° 21, pp. 

41-224. 

• Message du Conseil fédéral à l’Assemblée fédérale relatif à une nouvelle organisation 

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17-171. 

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d’avions, moteurs d’avions et autre matériel de corps pour la troupe d’aviation. 

(Du 13 décembre 1929.) in Feuille fédérale, 1929, Vol. 3, n° 51, pp. 603-626. 

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de l’arrêté de l’Assemblée fédérale du 7 octobre 1936 sur l’organisation de l’armée 

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1946, Vol. 3, n° 21, pp. 305-582. 

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de l’armée (organisation des troupes). (Du 10 octobre 1950) in Feuille fédérale, 

1950, Vol. 3, n° 41, pp. 118-162. 

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349. 

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combat. (Du 27 août 1975) in Feuille fédérale, 1975, Vol. 2, n° 34, pp. 889-903. 

• Message concernant l’acquisition d’avions de combat et d’avions-école du 12 

novembre 1980 in Feuille fédérale, 1980, Vol. 1, n° 3, pp. 222-254. 

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der Fliegertruppe, 1943, PC du général en chef de l'Armée, p. 18. 

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1945, Lausanne, Imprimeries Réunies SA, 1945, p. 262. 

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la défense nationale militaire. (Du 6 juin 1966) in Feuille fédérale, 1966, Vol. 1, 

n° 24, pp. 873-897. 

• Règlement Felddienst, 1927, Berne, DMF, p. 210. 

• Règlement 51.15 f La conduite de l’armée et des Grandes Unités (CAG 83), 

1983, Berne, DMF, p. 37. 

• Règlement 51.15 f Conduite opérative (Cop 95), 1994, Berne, DMF, édition provisoire, 

p. 40. 

• Règlement 51.20 f Conduite des troupes 1951, 1953, Berne, DMF, p. 161. 



• Règlement 51.20 f Conduite tactique 1995, 1995, DMD, règlement donné en 15 

parties de taille variable. 

• Règlement 56.3 Einsatz und Kampfführung der Flugwaffe, 1959, Berne, DMF, p. 

111. 

• Règlement 56.90 d Führung und Einsatz der FF Trp 95, 1995, Berne, DMF, p. 

69. 

2. Etudes 

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Landesverteidigung der Schweiz im Kalten Krieg 1945-1966. Baden, coll. L’Etatmajor 

général suisse, vol X, 2 tomes, hier+jetzt, 2006, p. 1055. 

• Braun Peter et De Weck Hervé [Eds] : La planification de de la défense combinée 

dans l’Armée 61. Berne, ASHSM, 2009, p. 318. 

• De Weck Hervé [Eds] : La Suisse et la guerre froide 1950-1990. Berne, ASHSM, 

2003, p. 231. 

• De Weck Hervé [Eds] : La Suisse / Die Schweiz 1945-1990. Berne, ASHSM, 

2005, p. 292. 

• Grand Julien : N-20 et P-16 , les raisons de l’échec d’une industrie aéronautique 

suisse autonome 1945-1966. Fribourg, travail de licence - manuscrit, 2006, p. 

155. 

• Office fédéral de l’aviation militaire et de la défense contre avions: 50 ans : Office 

fédéral de l’aviation militaire et de la défense contre avions. Berne, Office fédéral 

de l’aviation et de la défense contre avions, 1986, p. 130. 

• Planungstab der Armee [Eds]: La conception du 6.6.66 - 40 après. Berne, ZEM, 

Dok 92.001 df, 2007, p. 147. 

• Rapold Hans : Zeit der Bewährung ? Die Epoche um den ersten Weltkrieg 1907 

- 1924. Bâle, coll. L›Etat-major général suisse, vol V, Helbling & Lichtenhahn, 

1988, p. 496.


• Rutschmann, Werner : Die Schweizer Flieger - und Fliegerabwehr - Aufträge und 

Einsatztruppen 1939-1945. Thoune, Ott Verlag, 1989, p. 396. 

• Senn Hans : Erhaltung und Verstärkung der Verteidigungsbereitschaft zwischen 

den beiden Weltkriegen. Bâle, coll. L›Etat-major général suisse, Vol. VI, Helbling 

& Lichtenhahn, 1991, p. 513. 

• Senn Hans : Anfänge einer Dissuasionsstrategie während des Zweiten Weltkrieges. 

Bâle, coll. L’Etat-major général suisse, Vol. VII, Helbling & Lichtenhahn, 1995, 

p. 534. 

• Siméon Christophe : L’envol manqué de l’aviation militaire suisse à la fin de la 

Belle époque (1910-1914). Neuchâtel, Alphil, 2008, p. 256. 

• Urio Paolo : L’affaire des Mirages : décision administrative et contrôle parlementaire. 

Genève, Ed. Médecine et hygiène, 1972, p. 311. 

3. Articles 

• Ackermann, Maj EMG : Emploi de l’aviation en temps de guerre in “Revue militaire 

suisse”, n°7, 1932, pp. 327-341. 

• d’Everstag R.-W. : La réforme de l’aviation militaire in “Revue militaire suisse”, 

1918, pp. 403-413. 

• Primault Etienne : Les possibilités de l’aviation militaire suisse in “Revue militaire 

suisse”, n°4, 1927, pp. 145-156. 

• Primault Etienne : La question de notre aviation in “Revue militaire suisse”, n°3, 

1951, pp. 105-115. 

• Rédaction RMS : Dossier 60 ans de l’aviation in “Revue militaire suisse”, n° 10, 

1974, pp. 435-487. 

4. Divers 

• Site internet des Forces aériennes: http://www.lw.admin.ch/internet/luftwaffe/fr/ 

home/die_luftwaffe/organisation/luftwaffenstab/doctrine/definition.html, version 

29.09.2010. 

• Doctrine de base des Forces aériennes : Schweizer Luftwaffe, Luftwaffe 

Basisdoktrin – Fassung Weiss, du 20 décembre 2001, p. 154. disponible sous: 

http://www.lw.admin.ch/internet/luftwaffe/de/home/die_luftwaffe/organisation/ 

luftwaffenstab/doctrine/downloads.html 

• Bolliger Kurt : La conduite de la guerre aérienne dans les années 1980, exposé 

du commandant des troupes d’aviation et de défense contre avions, le commandant 

de corps Kurt Bolliger, à la conférence de presse du 11.6.1974, à l’occasion 

de la cérémonie pour le 60 e anniversaire des troupes d’aviation, au Musée suisse 

des transports à Lucerne. Berne, 1974, polycopié, p. 11.

f. Rezzan Ünalp * 

Turkish Air Campaigns during the 

Battles of çanakkale March 1915 - January 1916 

Turchia 

Introduction 

Those, who wrote the history of the air power just before the World War I, have 

attached little importance to the aerial aspects of the Ottoman-Italian war and 

Balkan Wars. In fact, the basic principles governing the employment of the 

aircraft in the theater for attack purposes have been introduced during these battles. 

The Ottoman army having learnt lessons from experience during the Balkan Wars 

has recognized the need for a separate corps of observation which would assume the 

duty of observation in an aircraft in support of the pilot, and to that end issued an 

order in May 1913 in order to train staff officers as air observers and establish an 

independent corps of air observers. On the other hand, the British had just seen the 

necessity of an independent observation in July 1914. At the beginning of the campaign 

in the Çanakkale front the British did not 

have even one trained observer. 

First Lieutenant Fazıl 

At a time when First Lord of the Admiralty 

Churchill did not say anything about 

the employment of the aircraft in the Strait of 

Çanakkale, the Ottoman army posted aircraft 

to Çanakkale patrol the Strait long before the 

bomb attacks. Although there was no aircraft 

capable to perform military tasks in the Yeşilköy 

(Ayastefanos) Flight School, a one-man Nieuport 

seaplane was deployed to Çanakkale on 

August 18, 1914 under First Lieutenant Fazıl’s 

command. Since it was expected in Çanakkale 

that the army posted an aircraft not a seaplane, 

no works were carried out for a seaplane base. 

While a seaplane base was being under construct 

near the Cape Nara in the Anatolian section of 

* 

Col. PhD Secretary General Turkish Commission of 

Military History.


Çanakkale, First Lieutenant 

Fazıl conducted 

reconnaissance flights 

around the Islands of 

Gökçeada (Imbros), 

Tenedos and Lemnos. 

Though the Ottoman 

army already began to 

use aircraft in Çanakkale 

in August 1914, 

it took six months that 

the first British aircraft 

arrived the area. 

Another two-man 

Yeşilköy Flight School. 

seaplane titled “Mahmut 

Şevket Pasha from 

the Yeşilköy Flight 

School was also assigned to Çanakkale. It could not, however, serve for a long time, 

since it overturned on October 26, 1914. Its pilot, First Lieutenant Savmi (Uçan) and 

air observer survived. Bleriot aircraft named “Ertuğrul” was posted to Çanakkale in 

January 1915. This aircraft was the first army aircraft assigned to the area and generally 

flown by First Lieutenant Mehmet Cemal (Durusoy). Ertuğrul had already con-

tu r k I s h AIr cA m pA I g n s d u r I n g t h e bAttles o f ÇA n A k k A l e mA r c h 1915 - JA n u A ry 1916 321 

ducted many reconnaissance 

flights over the 

enemy area long before 

the British aircraft carrier 

Ark Royal came to 

the area. When the British 

War Council ordered 

the navy to conduct an 

operation against the 

Strait of Çanakkale, the 

Ark Royal was hastily 

deployed to the area. 

The Ottoman army, Blériot (Ertuğrul). 

found itself unprepared 

in the battle, requested 

Germany to provide support to its combat force. Pilot First Lieutenant Erich Serno, 

who has been serving in German air units since 1991, was assigned to the German 

military mission in İstanbul and charged with the task of restructuring the Yeşilköy 

Flight School. First Lieutenant Serno was promoted to the rank of captain, as applied 

to all German officers serving within the Ottoman army at that time. He became 

officially commander of the Flight School, but he was given the responsibility of 

restructuring the whole aviation organization of the Ottoman Army at the same time.


First Lieutenant Savmi Uçan. First Lieutenant Mehmet Cemal 

(Durusoy). 

Cavalry First Lieutenant Şakir Fevzi (General Fevzioğlu) who received pilot training 

in Germany supported also First Lieutenant Serno. 1 

The Strait of Çanakkale Fortress Command was being reinforced by German naval 

artillery since September 1914. The Fortress Command was responsible for defense 

lines at both sides of the Strait and under the command of Colonel Cevat Bey. 

All Turkish and German aircraft in the area were assigned to the command of the 

First Flight Company, which had been subordinate to Çanakkale until July 1915 and 

subsequently assigned to the command of the 5th Army. The 5th Army, established 

on March 25, 1915, was under the command of General Otto Liman von Sanders 

having been chief of German military mission in Turkey who became Commander 

of the 1st Army later. 2 

The allies had a 40-aircraft combined air force for the air support, whereas the 

Turks relied solely on Bleriot (Ertuğrul), Rumpler B. I. and three Albatros B. I. Aircraft. 

3 

1 The Air War, The Dardanelles Air Battles, Bülent Yilmazer, Mönch Press, Ankara, 2005, p. 53. 

2 Richard T. Whistler, Over the Wine-Dark Sea, Aeral Aspects of the Dardanelles, Gallipoli Campaign, 

Part III, Turco-German Aviation, Over the Front, 1994, USA, Vol. 9(3), pp. 231-233. 

3 Karl Stirling Schneide, Aviation in the Dardanelles Campaign, March 1915-January 1916, International 

Symposium on The Dardanelles Battles, Reasons and Results, TTK Press, Ankara, 1993, p. 

94.


Phases of the 

campaign 

The main task of 

Turkish-German aviation 

services was to 

conduct reconnaissance, 

but both sides 

performed bombardment 

missions at the 

beginning of the landing. 

However, a few 

missions were successfully 

completed due to 

the limited bombing 

capacity and unsophisticated 

fire directing 

methods. Air combat rarely occurred between the aircraft of both sides towards the 

end of the landing and many of the damages suffered by the aircraft resulted either 

from mechanical failures or pilot’s error. 4 

Albatros B.I Aircraft. 

First Phase: Attack by Allies on the Strait of Çanakkale 

Of the four aircraft (3 Albatros B. I and 1 Rumpler B.I type aircraft), three were 

assigned to Çanakkale front and the other was deployed the Fortress Command since 

there was a special requirement for air reconnaissance reports. This Rumpler B.I 

type aircraft arrived at the airport in the night of March 17, which was built three kilometers 

from the Strait of Çanakkale. Commander of the Fortress sent this aircraft 

to the Allied Naval Force 

in Tenedos in the morning 

of March 18. 

The reconnaissance 

flight conducted by Captain 

Serno in the morning 

of March 18 played a decisive 

role in the naval campaign. 

The vessels group 

observed by Schneider was 

the joint British-French armada. 

Aircraft, returning 

4 Whıstler, p. 230.


to Çanakkale under 

anti-aircraft 

fire, gave report 

to Admiral 

von Usedom and 

thus, ensured 

that the Fortress 

Command made 

itself ready for 

the campaign. 5 

Meanwhile, 

Second Lieutenant 

Pilot Cemal 

saw the approaching 

fleet by Bleriot 

(Ertuğrul) and 

confirmed the assault. 

Before the 

attacks started, the hostile naval-reconnaissance aircraft that had been unable to see 

the mines had issued the certificate of clear ground. It used to be believed that the 

mines cast in 8 m in depth could be seen from 1000 m high above. However, the 

aircraft could only detect the ones that were very near to the sea level. The chopping 

sea also prevented the mines to be detected. 6 

Çanakkale under bombs. 

Having beaten the outer 

bastions of the Çanakkale 

since February 1915, the 

great armada, of British 

and French vessels started 

its main attack on March 

18, 1915. The mines laid 

by Nusrat mine vessel 

and could not be detected 

by minesweepers played 

a major role at this wellknown 

phase of the Battles 

of Çanakkale. Of the allied 

armada, Bouvet, Irresistible 

and Ocean had sunk 

Dropping of the airplanes onto sea by hoist. 

5 Karl Stirling Schneide, Ibid., p. 94. 

6 Yavuz Kansi, Ibid, p. 196.


and Gaulois, Suffren and Inflexible had gotten severe damage. 7 

First Lieutenant Cemal and Observer Ensign Osman Tayyar had patrolled around 

strait by Ertuğrul (Bleriot) at 04.00 pm. Captain Seidler and Lieutenant Hüseyin Sedat 

conducted an aerial reconnaissance for the second time. They discovered Lemnos 

80 km far in the west. During the aerial reconnaissance the enemies had been seen to 

have withdrawn. 

The heavy rain 

and storm prevented 

further 

reconnaissance 

in the following 

days. One 

of our artilleryman 

brought a 

British aircraft 

down in the Saronic 

Gulf. 

Due to insufficient 

aerial 

support a cap- 

Balloon Ship Hector. 

7 Atlas, Issue No:77, Istanbul, August, 1999, p. 22. 

Balloon Vessel Manica.


tive balloon 

vessel named 

Manica leaving 

Britain arrived 

the Strait of 

Çanakkale on 

22 March. On 

March 26, Captain 

Serno and 

Captain Schneider 

conducted 

a new aerial 

reconnaissance, 

which was repeated 

by Captain 

Schneider 

and Lieutenant Hüseyin Sedat by the late afternoon. The report given by them revealed 

that they would not be a new armada attack. Meanwhile, two Albatros B.I 

aircrafts arrived Çanakkale. 8 

The British air troop in Gallipoli was the third fleet of the Royal Naval-Air Service 

(RNAS) under the command of Fleet Commander Charles Samson arriving 

Bozcaada. The carrier Ark Royal, the aircraft and flight personnel tried to do their 

best while serving around Çanakkale. They conducted aerial reconnaissance around 

Edremit, İzmir and Enez Gulf. They arranged the vessel artillery fires during bombardment 

in Saronic Gulf. 9 

The Airborne Crew Following Reconnaissance. 

2. Second Phase: Aerial Activities During Gallipolis Landing 

On April 25, 1915, French and British forces landed on Gallipolis Peninsula, 

which rendered the nature of the combat from naval campaign to land campaign. 

Escadrille M.F 98T, a supplementary squadron arrived Bozcaada so as to accompany 

the French troops. The squadron consisted of 8 aviation aircraft and 6 Maurice Farman 

aircraft. The French, though, failed in the air campaign at Çanakkale front, they 

kept off in order to spread propaganda. 

Depending on the weather conditions the airplanes in Tenedos (Bozcaada) generally 

took flight two or three times a day. It was including a dangerous flight of more 

than 17.5 miles at open sea. Their task was to identify the Turkish positions, improve 

the coordination of the maps and take photographs. 

8 Yavuz Kansu, pp. 196-198. 

9 Nigel Steel, Peter Hart, Gallipoli, Legend of a Defeat, Sabah Press, Translated by Mehmet Harman- 

ci, İstanbul, 1977, p. 249.


While the land airplanes were continuing 

to conduct operations in Tenedos (Bozcaada) 

HMS Ark Royal was utilizing its seaplanes in 

the vicinity of İzmir and Enez for the mission 

of long-range reconnaissance. 10 

By the arrival of the German submarines 

the HMS Ark Royal, which was slow in motion 

and vulnerable was first sent to the Mudros 

Port and then to Salonika to serve as aircraft 

carrier. It was replaced by HMSBen-my-Chree 

equipped with five seaplanes. 

Çanakkale Front was not only witness to 

the use of land and seaplanes but also to another 

“first”. It caused the fact that the balloon 

activities increased in the Royal Navy and that 

Major General Birdwood asked for free or tied 

balloons to help identify the distribution of the 

Ottoman artillery companies and arrange the 

fires accordingly. The advantages of the tied 

balloons are that they could stay in the air for a long time and that the reconnaissance 

reports could directly conveyed via telephone lines and that mechanical problems 

were quite rare in the balloons when compared to the English aircraft. 

A trade ship called Manica discharging the cargo of fertilizer at Manchester port 

was made ready for the balloon operation and arrived at Mudros Port on 9 April 

1915. Air reconnaissance activities contributed significantly to the operations of the 

English army during the Battles of Çanakkale operation and caused casualties in 

the Ottoman forces, therefore the only successful air reconnaissance activity were 

considered those executed by the balloons. In the mean time the balloon ship Hector 

which was formed modifying a trade ship would come to the area on 9 June 1915 

and support Manica. 

On the Turkish side, 1st Flight Company in Galata in the vicinity of Gallipoli, 

strengthened with a few aircraft together with the Turkish and German observers 

continued to execute reconnaissance and bombing tasks against the English and 

French forces on the islands. The bombs used to be sent by hand. The aircraft had 

little ammunition. The first aircraft the rear cockpit of which was equipped with 

weapons arrived in August 1915. This unit based in Çanakkale had approximately 4 

aircraft. 11 

Lieutenant (Navy) Hüseyin Sedat. 

In order for the Allied powers to land in Cape İlyas and Anafartalar Bay at the 

10 Schneide, p. 95. 

11 Whistler, p. 234.


edge of Gallipoli peninsula 

on 25 April 1915 necessitated 

new air reconnaissance. 

In the morning of 

25 April as predicted by 

Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa 

Kemal the English 

powers started a landing 

operation from Sedd-el 

Bahr with the Australians 

and from the north 

of Kaba Tepe with the 

New Zealanders. At the 

same time they executed 

two delaying manoeuvres. While the French were launching a surprise attack on 

Anatolian side the Royal Navy Division were performing a demonstration attack in 

Bolayır. 

Von Sanders was mistaken by this demonstration attack and thought that the Entente 

Powers wanted to cut off the peninsula on its narrowest part to stop his army. 

So he sent one of the divisions to the north and by doing this he removed his forces 

from the real combat area. Although he sent Esat Pasha, Army Corps Commander to 

resist the possible attack from the south, they were left without reinforcement. 12 

While General von Sanders was determining the defence of Çanakkale in accordance 

with his own ideas the Flight Company in this area was under the command 

of the Fortress Area Command subordinate to the General Command of the Straits. 

When the landing operation started in the morning of April 25 with an intense sea 

bombardment second lieutenant (pilot) Garber and Lieutenant (Navy) Hüseyin Sedat13 

Naval Airplanes Gotha. 

started a reconnaissance flight. In a reconnaissance flight of 3 hours starting 

from Saroz Bay to the Anatolian coast 45 transports were identified. It was identified 

that the warships were leaving and that they were having a landing rehearsal. This 

very important reconnaissance report couldn’t be conveyed to the 5th Army on time 

and no other flights could be achieved, as the aircraft were broken. The reconnaissance 

achieved on 27, 28, 29 April showed that the real forces of the enemy were in 

Sedd-el-Bahr and Arıburnu and that the other operations in Beşike Port, Kumkale 

and Bolayır were demonstration landings. 

12 

Lord Kinross; Rebirth of a nation with Atatürk, Translated by Necdet Sander, İstanbul, December 

1994, p 100. 

13 

Lieutenant Hüseyin Sedat served many flights in Çanakkale. He was an experienced Ottoman officer 

in observing at offshore. He served as chief engineer (Charkchibashi) in ʻRefahʼ ship that was sank 

after being torpedoed by a submarine on 22 January 1941. Among the crew of Refah, who lost their 

lives. there were aviation personnel, who were selected for an education in England, as well.


Turkish Soldiers. 

The bombs thrown from the aircraft by hand at the firing line were not very effective 

and the limited number of aircraft and ammunition did not sufficiently damage 

the enemy. For instance, an observer in Euryalus, the English armoured ship performing 

the task of fire support and reconnaissance off shore Cape İlyas stated that 

an aircraft had flown over the battleship on 30 April and that it had thrown bombs 

dropping into the sea and exploding there. No alliance ships were damaged by air 

bombardment. However, the information given by the aircraft about the location, 

power, movement, weapons position and depot locations were more helpful for the 

Turks than the bombardment results. 14 

When lieutenant colonel Mustafa Kemal woke up with the noise of the naval 

gunfire in the morning of April 25 he found himself in the centre of the war. He sent 

a cavalry troop for reconnaissance towards Kocaçimen Tepe and understood that 

they encountered a big enemy attack towards Chunuk Bair and that the Sari Bair 

ridges and particularly the hills of Chunuk Bair consisted the key points of the whole 

Turkish defence. Having the idea that only one battalion would not be adequate for 

defence and that a division would be necessary he took over the responsibility. He 

gave an order, which was beyond the Division Command and sent the 57th Regiment 

to Kocaçimen Tepe with a mountain battery. Mustafa Kemal understood that they 

encountered the real attack and directed most of the reserves of Sanders to war and 

he was right with his decision. 

Watching the operation from Queen Elizabeth ship, the English Commander-inchief 

Sir Ian Hamilton would write these words in his memoirs: 

“Under so many savage blows, the labouring mountains brought forth Turks. Here 

and there advancing lines; dots moving over green patches; dots following one another 

across a broad red scar on the flank of Sari Bair; others following- and yet othersand 

others- and others, closing in, disappearing, reappearing in close waves converging 

on the central and highest part of our position. The tic tac of the machine guns and the 

roar of the big guns as hail, pouring down on a greenhouse… The fire slackened. The 

attack had ebbed away; our fellows were holding their ground. A few, very few, little 

14 Kansu, p. 198.


dots had run back 

over that green 

patch- the others 

had passed away 

into the world of 

darkness” 15 . 

After heavy 

conflicts the 

Turkish Army 

stopped the Allied 

Power’s 

advance on the 

peninsula in June 

1915. Under the 

command of the 

Fortress Area 

command the 1st 

Aircraft Company 

was transferred to the 5th Army at the end of June. Such an organisational 

amendment was not enough to efficiently utilize the air power performing in a small 

area nearby Çanakkale town on the Anatolian side. At the end of July 1915 the airport 

was moved to a new place nearby Galata on the European side so as to ensure 

that the reconnaissance reports were quickly conveyed to the headquarters. From the 

new airport in Galata the Company continued to carry out reconnaissance missions 

on the off-shore islands which were seized by the enemy. 

At this stage after the enemy powers achieved to hold their ground and advanced 

in Sedd-el Bahr, the English 3rd Fleet formed a small airport there to overcome the 

problem of range. As this area, which was within the range of the Turkish artillery 

were exposed to heavy gunfire as soon as an aircraft landed, it was not used after 

June 1915 except for the emergencies. 16 

In July-August 1915 German Naval Flight Company subordinate to the General 

Command of the Straits was formed in Cape Nara on the Anatolian side of the Strait 

of Çanakkale with the naval airplanes Gotha WD1 and Gotha WD2 coming from 

Germany; the English reinforcement was achieved towards the end of August 1915 

by the arrival of R.N.A.S 2nd Fleet at the area. 17 

Anafartalar Group Commander Colonel Mustafa Kemal. 

15 Kinross; pp. 100-104. 

16 Whistler, p. 234. 

17 The Air War, Air Battles in the Battles of Çanakkale, p. 87.


3. Third Phase: Occupation of Anafarta Bay; Anafarta Battles 

After the Allies attacked Chunuk Bair - Kocaçimen line and seized these areas 

they advanced across Kabatepe-Maydos line and wanted to cut off Turkish Army’s 

ties with İstanbul and land the other forces on Anafartalar to make this area movement 

base. At the night of 6-7 August the landing operation started in the north of 

Arıburnu and Anafartalar. 18 

In order to accompany the allied power’s occupation another aircraft power joined 

the second R.N.A.S Fleet. The Fleet were consisting of 4 magnificent Bristol reconnaissance 

airplanes, 6 Caudrons, 6 BE 2C in addition to 6 Morane Parasols. With 

these inventory the Allies managed to have an air force consisting of 48 airplanes. 

On the other hand the 1st Turkish Flight Company had only 8 airplanes and they had 

very poor safety due to the conditions of the region. 

The basic problems which Turkish aviation units faced with were the distribution 

and delivery of the airplanes. They solved the problems of making bomb and 

providing hand tools by establishing a warehouse in Bakırköy and using craftsmen 

in İstanbul. 

Some of these craftsmen were designated for making propeller and jig that were 

essential. First Flight Company, backed The Fifth Army up beyond the manpower 

struggle in İstanbul Battles. 19 

Mustafa Kemal20 who was promoted to colonel rank on June 1, 1915 was appointed 

to Anafartalar Group Command on 8 / 9 August 1915. 

By means of an order coming from Army Headquarters on 8 / 9 August, Colonel 

Mustafa Kemal was appointed to Anafartalar Frontal Group Command. In the next 

morning at sunrise, the attack would be conducted immediately. On 10 August, Mustafa 

Kemal would conduct the most enormous and bloodiest attack of the Battles of 

Çanakkale. During the command of Mustafa Kemal in Anafartalar Group 

Command, first lieutenant Mehmet Zeki Doğan ( Zeki Doğan was the first commander 

of Air Forces which was turned out to Force Command in 1944.) was aidedecamp 

of Mustafa Kemal. 

In his book called “Gallipoli” published in 1956, Alan Moorehead, an Australian, 

wrote, “ The presence of that young and genius Turkish Chief ( M. Kemal ) at that 

time is one of the most tragic stroke of fortune for the Allied” for Anafartalar Battles. 

21 

18 

Schneide, p. 97. 

19 

Schneide, p. 97. 

20 

Mustafa Kemal who was promoted to colonel rank on June 1, 1915 was appointed to Anafartalar 

Group Command on 8 / 9 August 1915. 

21 

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam, Mustafa Kemal, İstanbul, 1979, p. 249.


Pilot First Lieutenant 

Ali Rıza. 

4. The Forth Stage: Departure of The 

Allies / The Turkish Victory in Battles of 

Çanakkale 

On 10 August Chunuk Bair (Conkbayırı) Battle revealed 

that in Gallipoli Peninsula landing forces had no 

chance in land battles. The battle of Çanakkale was stuck 

to trenches. Although Mustafa Kemal offered to pulverize 

the adversary with an attack since he was sure about 

the withdrawal of the adversary, he was replied, “we 

don’t have any force to sacrifice, even a soldier.” Upon 

realizing that a great opportunity was about to be missed, 

Colonel Mustafa Kemal resigned his post on December 

10, 1915. Liman von Sanders respecting to Colonel Mus- 

tafa Kemal converted the resignation into sick leave. After arriving at İstanbul, Mustafa 

Kemal learned that the adversary vacated Çanakkale harmlessly (19 December 

1915). 22 

In September 1915 the joining of Bulgaria to war near the Central Powers facilitated 

the transfer of the military equipments. Airplanes could easily pass through 

Bulgaria without any risk of confiscation. While the essential military equipments, 

especially airplane spare parts were being transferred via recently opened supply 

roads, on November 30, 1915, Albatros CI Airplane under the control of Pilot First 

Lieutenant Ali Rıza together with Observer Lieutenant İbrahim Orhan confronted 

with a French airplane at the moment of reconnaissance flight over Kaba Tepe. In the 

air warfare Lieutenant Orhan23 , observer of the airplane, succeeded in hitting the fuel 

tank of the enemy airplane with a machine gun and then the enemy airplane went 

down in flames between İntepe and Sedd-el-Bahr (Seddülbahir). 24 

The reconnaissance flights, air photos and reports at the end of the Battles of 

Çanakkale showed that the enemy was preparing to evacuation. This recognition was 

achieved on the reports given after reconnaissance flight by German Aviation Units 

Inspector Major Siegert. However, General von Sander’s opinion that the enemy 

wouldn’t relinquish control of the Strait of Çanakkale and his determined manner 

gave an opportunity to the Allies to leave from the island suffering fewer losses. 

Before evacuation a great number of fires disclosing that occupying forces were 

22 Falih Rıfkı Atay, p. 94. 

23 In 1916 Lieutenant Orhan was sent to Germany to take pilot training. After getting pilot brevet he 

carried successful missions in Palestine and Medina. In 1918 he was one of the İzmir The Fifth Airplane 

Company airmen. During Worl War I, on June 13, 1918, in the course of reconnaissance flight 

over Chios with his observer Lieutenant Hüseyin Hüsnü, his airplane which was hit by anti-aircraft 

fire went down near the island. İbrahim Orhan died and Hüseyin Hüsnü became a prisoner of war. 

Lieutenant İbrahim Orhan was buried in Chios. 

24 Kansu, p. 205.


damaging all supplies and equipments were observed. 

Meanwhile, Turkish aviation units launched 32 bombs 

and hit 17 targets in Sedd-el-Bahr (Seddülbahir) camp. 

Moreover two equipment hangars in Mudros (Mondros) 

Bay and an airplane hangar in Tenedos (Bozcaada) were 

demolished and four shots fell down at close range of 

enemy ships. In 1916, upon coming to Çanakkale in the 

first week of December Fokker Fighter Company (6th 

Fighter Company) took part in the operation. On January 

4, 1916 Pilot First Lieutenant Schubert, from German 

Maritime Airplane Company, hit one of the airplanes of 

French Maurice Farman and made it shoot down. 25 

Although they participated Battles of Çanakkale Frontal 

for a short time, Fokker Staffel airplanes played great 

parts in the subsequent battles. In Gallipoli Frontal, Fokkers successfully managed 

the missions of fighter interception. On the last days of battles merely six enemy 

airplanes were shot down whereas we only had one. 26 

Throughout the year, 1916, no personnel in air force at Ottoman army were killed 

in Çanakkale. A Fokker airplane belonging to the 6th Flight Company (6th Fighter 

Company made up of Fokker airplanes were deployed in Galata since January in 

1916 and joined with 1st Company for a while) suffered damage. There wasn’t any 

damage or loss at the airplanes belonging to 1st Flight Company. Four of maritime 

aircrafts suffered damages owing to mechanical problems and emergency landing. 

Compared to existing airplanes, guns and the number of personnel, the air force of 

enemy outnumbered that of us. However, Turks had full sovereignty over Çanakkale 

skies. While the remaining Allies units were leaving secretly at night in 10 January 

1916, this was the picture of aviation in the peninsula including Çanakkale. 

Conclusion 

Although it is in limited numbers, aviation has played an important part in the 

Battle’s of Çanakkale. The airplanes participating the operation each day were never 

under sixty on Allies’ part whereas in Ottoman this number could scarcely be twenty. 

Some of the airplanes were in maintenance, thus the number of airplanes used in 

operations decreased. The operations were conducted under harsh circumstances due 

to the heavy weather conditions for airplanes with small engines, lack of spare parts 

and especially the existence of long supply roads for Germans and Turks. Moreover, 

qualified personnel were needed much. 

25 Schneide, pp. 99-100. 

26 Whistler, The Defense of The Bosphorus and The Fokker Staffel, Over The Front, Vol. (3), USA, 

1999, p. 259. 

Observer Lieutenant 

Orhan.


During the Battles of Çanakkale, the assignments given regardless of ranks in 

Ottoman Aviation units led to how to be effective in using very few airplanes against 

allied forces. Captain Serno definitely persuaded Turkish and German senior military 

personnel that far more airplanes was needed to defend Gallipoli peninsula. In 

the Battles of Çanakkale although General Hamilton, commander of Allied Powers, 

considered that reconnaissance was worthless and deceptive, Ottoman General Staff 

wished that the army had to be equipped with airplanes at once and skilled personnel 

supposed to use those airplanes were to be trained. This paved the way for successes 

caused by airplanes. 

As the war entered its final phase, air force reversed towards the enemy. During 

the war, the effectiveness of the Allies’ joint air force and the number of airplanes 

decreased. On the contrary, Turkish Air force gained strength and contributed to the 

unique Turkish Victory in Çanakkale. 

View from Cape Nara.

Ja M e s s. co r u M * 

U.S. Air Force Doctrine: 

The Search for Decisive Effect 

U.S.A. 

From the very beginning of American military aviation, the central idea behind 

American airpower doctrine and theory has been to employ airpower with 

decisive, war-winning effect. For almost a century, the U.S. Air Force has 

maintained its strategic focus and has built a force with a strong common belief that 

decisive victory in war could be achieved by airpower, with a minimal contribution 

by other forces. While the technologies and tactics have changed, the core doctrinal 

principles have remained constant. 

The Birth of the American Airpower Doctrine 

Although the airplane was invented in America, the U.S. military at first lagged 

behind the major European powers in developing an air doctrine. Prior to America’s 

entry into World War I on the side of the Entente in April 1917, there was basically 

no American airpower to speak of. The U.S. Army could provide only one squadron 

of obsolete airplanes to support the U.S. Army’s intervention into Northern Mexico 

in late 1916. By April 1917 only a handful of American officers had been trained as 

pilots. In stark contrast, America’s British, French, and Italian allies, as well as the 

enemy Germans, all fielded large and modern air forces by 1917. 

By 1917 tactical aviation in the form of reconnaissance, fighter planes and 

close air support attack had become an integral part of all major ground operations. 

Specialized fighter forces had been created by all major air forces to establish 

conditions of air superiority over the battlefield-conditions that would allow one’s 

own airpower to be employed with maximum effect. Long range bombers, carrying 

bombs of over 500 KG, had already made cities in England, France, and Germany 

targets for strategic air attacks. Airpower, with its ability to strike quickly and deeply 

into the enemy homeland, had brought the civilian population and economy under 

threat as never before. Airpower had truly made war total. 

The American political and military leaders understood that a revolution had 

occurred in warfare with the invention of the airplane. They were aware of the 

increasingly important role that airpower played in every aspect of the war. In the 

spring of 1917 the French government requested large scale assistance to build 

up their front aviation force. The French asked the Americans to provide 4,500 

* Dean, Baltic Defence College


airplanes, 5,000 aircraft engines and 50,000 aircraft mechanics to arrive on the 

Western Front by the Spring of 1918. It was a goal totally beyond the very limited 

capability of American industry. But, as unrealistic as it was, the French request had 

the positive effect of providing an immediate impetus to create a large American 

aircraft industry. 1 

In May 1917 the U.S. Congress voted an appropriation of $640,000,000 to enable 

the U.S. Army to quickly build an air arm equal to that of the other major powers. 

It was an enormous sum and, up to that time, the largest single appropriation ever 

made by the U.S. Congress. 2 The massive influx of funds made it possible for the 

Americans to quickly build up the infrastructure of aviation—engine companies, 

aircraft manufacturers, airfields, and schools to train the mechanics and pilots. 

America’s allies contributed by providing training, aircraft and equipment. Most 

of the American air units that made it into combat before the end of the war were 

equipped with excellent British and French planes, and most of the American pilots 

had been trained under French supervision. In addition to the material support to 

create an air force, the British, French, and Italian allies also shared their ideas of 

airpower—ideas that the Americans would modify in their own way to develop a 

distinctly American doctrine of aerial war. 

Among the handful of American airmen in 1917 was Major William (“Billy”) 

Mitchell, who was in Europe as an observer of Allied airpower. Mitchell laid the 

groundwork to establish an American aviation structure in France to help support 

the American forces that would soon arrive. As a first step, Mitchell met with the 

commander of Britain’s Royal Flying Corps in France, General Hugh Trenchard, to 

discuss the development of an American air force. Trenchard, soon to become the first 

chief of staff of the Royal Air Force, was creating a strategic bomber force that was 

intended to strike vital operational targets behind the front lines, and would also strike 

vital war industries deep within Germany. Mitchell was impressed by Trenchard and 

his views and proposed to the American Expeditionary Force Commander, General 

Pershing, that the Americans copy the British concept of an independent strategic 

bomber force. 3 

As Mitchell worked to prepare the way for American air power in Europe, other 

key officers of the American Air Service in a mission headed by Major Bolling 

visited Allied air forces to determine what types of aircraft America should build 

and how American aviation might be organized for the war. The Bolling Mission 

provided realistic guidance to the American army staff and recommended certain 

types of aircraft for the fledgling Air Service. 4 The American mission met with the 

1 

Stephen Budiansky, Air Power (New York: Viking Press, 2003) p. 112. 

2 

Ibid. 

3 

On Mitchell, his career and wartime service see James Cooke, Billy Mitchell (Boulder, Lynne Riener, 

2002) On the genesis of his wartime airpower ideas see pp. 51-55. 

4 

Cooke, pp. 56-57.

u.s. air fo r C e do C t r i n e:. tH e se a r C H f o r deCisive effeCt 337 

Italian airmen and chose the Italian Caproni heavy bomber to equip the American 

Expeditionary force. 

In November 1917 Major Edgar Gorrell, tasked to study organization and 

equipment for the American Air Service, enthusiastically passed on ideas from 

British and Italian allies on the use of heavy bombers in the strategic role to attack 

enemy industries and vital targets far behind the front lines. An outline plan for 

strategic bombing was presented to General Foulois of the AEF Air Service who 

endorsed the plan and forwarded it Pershing. 5 

As the American presence in Europe grew through 1917 and an aviation 

headquarters set up, Pershing appointed Colonel William Kenly as the chief of 

the American air service in France. Mitchell, promoted to colonel, was seen as an 

energetic and capable officer, but was also seen as too young and too undisciplined 

to be an effective manager. Kenly, followed later by another non-airman General 

Mason Patrick, had the managerial and leadership skills to develop the force and to 

use the young enthusiasts like Mitchell and Gorrell to the best advantage. 6 

The American Expeditionary Force air plan of 1918 conformed largely to General 

Pershing’s view that the main purpose of airpower was close support of the armies 

in the field. The plan was to build 202 American squadrons of which 101 would be 

observation squadrons (also capable as light bombers), and 60 fighter squadrons. 

But the bombing mission had not been ignored and a force of 41 bomber squadrons 

was proposed. The bomber force proposal was the result of a June 1918 study on the 

possibilities of strategic bombardment by the Director of Military Aeronautics. 7 

By the fall of 1918 American airpower performed creditably in supporting the 

US Armies in the St. Mihiel and Meuse Argonne offensives. In September 1918 the 

Americans launched their first large scale ground offensive to drive the Germans from 

the St. Mihiel salient. Mitchell, now promoted to brigadier general, was given commend 

of 1,418 airplanes (one half of them French) to support the offensive. Mitchell and the 

American air units performed very creditably providing support to the ground troops 

and demonstrated that American airpower had matured as a capable combat force. 8 

American bombers also flew a few long range strike missions into Germany, but the 

war ended before this aspect of American airpower could be explored. 

By the end of World War I the Americans were in possession of one of the World’s 

major air forces and had created a modern airframe and aircraft engine industry. The 

next question was how the force would develop. 9 

5 

Conrad Crane, Bombs, Cities and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence: 

University Press of Kansas, 1993) p. 12. 

6 

An excellent biography of General Patrick is Robert White, Mason Patrick and the Fight for Air 

Service Independence (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). 

7 

Ibid. p. 12. 

8 

Budiansky, p. 114. 

9 

On lessons learned by American airmen in World War I see I.B. Holley, Ideas and Weapons (New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 1953) reprint (Washington GPO, 1983).


Developing Key Airpower Concepts: 1920-1921 

General Mason Patrick ensured that the bomber idea would not be ignored when 

he assigned Colonel Edgar Gorrell the duty of writing the final report on the aviation 

activities of the Americans in Europe in World War I. Gorrell’s four volumes provide 

a rich history of the American wartime effort and a thorough study on the techniques 

and experience of strategic bombing was included in the report. 10 Gorrell’s report went 

into the library of the Air Corps Tactical School where it was used by a generation of 

American officers in developing doctrine. 11 

After World War I the U.S. military was largely demobilized. But aviation had 

shown its worth and a new organization, the Air Service, was created by the U.S. 

Army. After a rough beginning, in 1921 General Patrick was called back to serve 

as the Air Service commander. An exceptionally talented leader, Patrick worked to 

create an effective leadership cadre for the service. A major training center for Air 

Service officers was established at Langley Field in Virginia and this school soon 

became the center of thinking and development for the Army Air Service. 

In the meantime, Brigadier General Mitchell was given the leeway to carry out 

experiments with new bomber aircraft. Convinced of the future role that bombers 

could play in war, he set out to convince the U.S. Congress and military leaders of 

the decisive role that airpower could play in future warfare. Mitchell made headlines 

by leading a bomber force that sank the modern German battleship Ostfriesland 

in Chesapeake Bay in a series of tests in 1921. Although the tests were conducted 

in highly unrealistic conditions, the fact that airplane bombs could sink one of the 

world’s most modern battleships, a ship that had withstood numerous heavy gun hits 

at the Battle of Jutland, forced naval officers and army generals to reconsider the 

potential of the airplane. 12 

However, Mitchell pushed too far and too fast. His books and articles advocating 

“air mindedness’ and his bombing experiments won headlines, but his open attacks on 

the Navy and Army leadership did a lot more harm than good for American aviation. 13 

Mitchell was court- martialed and suspended from the army in 1926 for his behavior. 

Yet, while Mitchell was won headlines, the real work developing the aviation forces 

was carried out by General Patrick, who led the process of transforming the Air 

Service into the Air Corps in 1926 and created a sound infrastructure for American 

military airpower to develop further. 

10 

For full text of the report see Mauer Mauer ed., The U.S. Air Service in World War I, 4 vols. (Washington: 

GPO, 1978-1979). 

11 

Crane, pp. 14-15. 

12 

Cooke, pp. 116-137. 

13 

For a critical assessment of General Mitchell and his thinking see Mark Clodfelter, “Molding Airpower 

Convictions: Development and William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought,” in Paths of Heaven: 

The Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. Phillip Meilinger (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1997) 

pp. 79-114.


In the 1920s in the Air Corps Tactical School, first located in Virginia and then 

moved to Maxwell Field in Alabama in 1931, U.S. Army aviators began to develop a 

uniquely American view of air warfare. One of the most notable of the early airpower 

theorists was Major William Sherman of the Air Corps. His 1926 book, Air Warfare, 

provided a comprehensive view of aviation, its roles and its likely development. 14 

The use of airpower in ground forces support and in strategic bombing missions, 

as well as the future importance of air transport, were all discussed in his book. 

Sherman provided a far more coherent and balanced view of airpower than Mitchell, 

and his extensive discussion of strategic bombing, which he saw as the main role of 

the air arm, discussed the moral as well as tactical issues involved in bombing enemy 

cities and industries. Sherman’s thinking was as sophisticated as anything written in 

Europe at the time, and showed how much American airpower thinking had matured 

since 1918. Tragically, Sherman, one of America’s most capable airpower thinkers, 

died of an infection in 1927. 

Yet others carried on the intellectual work at the Air Corps Tactical School. While 

the official army doctrine still saw the chief Air Corps role as that of a support arm 

for ground units, the Air Corps began to develop its own doctrine of air power, a 

largely unofficial doctrine that was very different from that of the mainstream army. 

In 1926 a new manual for the Air corps emphasized the employment of combined 

air forces against the enemy. In the 1926 doctrine the enemy population and the vital 

points of the enemy homeland were listed as primary targets for air operations. 15 

In the late 1920s and early 1930s a small cadre of Air Corps instructors at the Air 

Corps Tactical School (ACTS) began an intense study of the economics of warfare. 

An understanding of how economies and production affected warfare had first been 

pioneered in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington and this also 

became part of Air Corps’ approach to studying airpower and war. For example, 

instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) noted how the destruction of a 

few specific bridges could disrupt a national transportation network for weeks. The 

loss of one factory making a single essential engine part could stop production of a 

major aircraft plant. The loss of a few electric generating stations could shut down 

the electric net for an entire region. 16 

The conclusion was drawn that for airpower to decisively affect an enemy’s 

ability to wage war, one did not need to carry out mass bombardment attacks against 

an entire industry, or devastate an entire region. The desired effects -- the shutdown 

of production or transportation-- could be accomplished by attacking only a few 

14 William Sherman, Air Warfare (New York: Ronald Press, 1926) reprint, (Maxwell Air Force Base: 

Air University Press, 2002). For Sherman’s discussion of strategic bombing see pp. 190-208. 

15 Crane, p. 21. 

16 Peter Faber, “Interwar U.S. Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American 

Airpower,” in Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. Phillip Meilinger (Maxwell 

AFB: Air University Press, 1997) pp. 183-238.


carefully selected targets. It was an attractive doctrine that avoided the slaughter of 

enemy civilians and soldiers. If one deprived the enemy of his material to wage a 

war— then the enemy would be forced to sue for peace. 

By the early 1930s such concepts were developed into a specific doctrine. At 

the Air Corps Tactical School in 1933 the faculty and students began research on 

identifying railroad chokepoints; vital railyards, and bridges whose loss would 

impose a massive dislocation of the national transportation net. 17 A generation of 

airmen was trained at the Air Corps Tactical School in the elements of airpower 

thinking that would dominate the U.S. Air Corps and, later, the Air Force. The ACTS 

doctrine of strategic bombardment known as the “industrial web theory” of airpower 

concentrated on identifying key nodes of economic activity whose loss would cripple 

whole sectors of the economy. 18 

The strategic bombing doctrine ensured decisive effect with an economy of 

effort—but for such a doctrine to work America had to have an air weapon that had 

the range, speed, and accuracy to penetrate deep into enemy territory, avoid enemy 

air defenses, carry a heavy bomb load, and strike a pinpoint target. The rapidly 

developing American aviation technology turned the concept of strategic bombing 

from a fantasy into a real possibility in a few years. The mid-1920s to the mid-1930s 

saw an enormous advance in aircraft technology. In the 1930s aircraft engines went 

from 500 horsepower to 1,200 horsepower. NACA cowlings cut drag and increased 

speed. High octane fuel made engines more efficient while increasing range. The 

all metal and multi-engine transport planes built for the rapidly growing American 

airlines pioneered advanced production technologies and made the dramatic new 

engine and airframe designs the norm throughout the industry. 

In 1931 the Air Corps fielded its first all metal monoplane bomber. The two engine 

B-9 bomber had a retractable landing gear, a speed of 186 mph, carried 2260 pounds 

of bombs and was the most advanced bomber of its day. 19 The B-9 was followed in 

1932 by the B-10; another twin engine monoplane bomber equipped with machine 

gun turrets for defense and flew at 207 mph. 20 Even as the B-10 was being introduced 

into the Air Corps units, the Air Corps and Army leadership proposed an exponential 

leap in bomber technology. In 1934 the Air Corps negotiated with American’s 

aviation industry to develop a four-engine bomber that could carry 5,000 pounds 

of bombs for 1,300 miles, or 2,500 pounds of bombs for 2,300 miles. The next year 

the prototype of the B-17 first flew and on a test flight achieved an average speed of 

232 mph while flying a distance of 2,100 miles. 21 This exceeded all expectations and 

17 

A discussion of the role of Acts in development of American bombing concepts is found in Stephen 

McFarland, America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing 1910-1945 (Washington: Smithsonian, 1995). 

18 

Ibid. pp. 176-177. 

19 

Budiansky, p. 181. 

20 

Ibid. 

21 

Ibid. pp. 181-183.


was far ahead of anything flying in Europe. In fact, the B-17 could cruise at a speed 

faster than the best fighter planes of the day. Equipped with the precise gyroscopic 

Norden bombsight and modern navigation aids, the Air Corps now had the airplane 

with which it could realistically expect to carry out its theory of precision strategic 

bombardment. 

Through the 1930s and 1940s a key figure in this process of doctrine development 

was General Henry ‘Hap” Arnold, one of the first American officers who had learned 

to fly. Arnold had held a key position on the Air Service staff in Washington in World 

War I and, although he did not win combat experience, his work with industrial 

mobilization of resources for American aviation gave him a superb understanding of 

aviation technology and its potential—an understanding that served him very well in 

his career. He served with General Mitchell in the post World War I period as one of 

Mitchell’s key assistants. After Mitchell’s resignation Arnold learned to temper his 

outspoken advocacy for airpower and worked within the army staff system to further 

the goal of an independent air force equal to the army and navy. 

Partly under Arnold’s influence, American military aviation moved from being a 

an Air Service, a specialist branch of the army with a status like infantry or cavalry, 

to being the Air Corps, an organization with its own assistant secretary of the army, 

a special headquarters, and considerable training infrastructure of its own. In 1934- 

1935 the Air Corps was granted permission to set up a General Headquarters to serve 

as a command headquarters of the Air Corps deployed in case of war. While much of 

the air force would operate in direct support of army units, in wartime much of the 

American aviation force would be concentrated under the command of an airman and 

employed in mass as a decisive weapon. From 1918 to 1941, step by step, the Army 

aviation force moved towards full independence as a separate service. This was the 

goal of Arnold and a cadre of senior American airmen that included General Carl 

Spaatz, who commanded the American strategic bomber forces in Europe in World 

War II and later become the first chief of staff of an independent U.S. Air Force. 22 

World War II and American Air Doctrine 

In 1939 Arnold became chief of the Army Air Corps and prepared plans for 

aviation expansion in case the Americans were drawn into the World War that had 

begun in Europe. Arnold, and many of his colleagues such as Spaatz, believed that 

airpower, if employed correctly and as a strategic weapon, could win the war on its 

own. The goal was to avoid the kind of long and bloody ground campaign that had 

resulted in years of stalemate and the loss of millions of men in World War I. 

With the beginning of limited American rearmament in 1939, American airmen 

began planning in earnest to create the type of air force they believed America would 

22 On the key personalities who led the early U.S. Army Air Corps see John L. Frisbee, Makers of the 

United States Air Force (Washington DC: Office of air Force History, 1987).


need to defeat Nazi Germany. In this period before America’s entry into World War II, 

the precision strategic bombing concept became established as the official doctrine, 

not only of the Air Corps but of the U.S. Army as a whole. It had been Arnold’s 

program of steady progress and advocacy of the bombing theories and the Air Corps’ 

careful investment of limited aviation funds into a heavy bomber—the B-17— that 

could truly fulfill the promise, that helped convince the U.S. Army leadership to 

accept precision bombing doctrine as a key factor in planning for the war budget 

and national industrial mobilization. 23 In 1940 Air Corps planners started thinking in 

terms of an American production capability of 50,000 aircraft per year—something 

in the realm of fantasy only two years before. In fact, the seemingly fantastic figure 

of 50,000 aircraft produced in one year was reached in 1942. 

The Air Corps was renamed and reorganized as the Army Air Forces (AAF) 

in 1941. While still part of the army, it had status closely approaching service 

independence. Arnold say the oncoming war as an opportunity to prove the theory 

that airpower could provide the decisive win. The practical expression of the theory 

was Arnold’s creation of a special strategic planning group on the Army Air Forces 

Staff, the Air War Planning Division (AWPD). In the summer and fall of 1941 a 

key group of officers, most of whom had taught at the faculty of the ACTS and who 

would go on to serve as senior officers in World War II, developed a plan for creating 

and deploying a vast American air force that would employ strategic bombing as its 

main method of defeating Germany if war came. 24 The Air Corp’s strategic war plans 

also included fighter forces for air defense, and light bombers for tactical support of 

the army—but the main resources were to go into the strategic heavy bomber force. 

The AWPD -1 Plan, the Army Air Forces component of the Army’s strategic war 

plan, was approved in late 1941 by General George Marshall, the U.S. Army chief 

of staff. That such as concept was readily approved shows not only Marshall’s broad 

vision, but also how American airpower concepts that had once been derided by the 

Army leadership were now broadly accepted by the American military and civilian 

leadership. 

The expanded AAF would be organized around units equipped with large numbers 

of heavy bombers, the existing B-17s and B-24s, which would be supplemented by 

the very heavy bomber in development since 1939. The very heavy bomber would 

have an intercontinental range, fly very high and fast, and carry a large bombload. 

This bomber, being developed as the B-29, would become the characteristic symbol 

of American airpower theory and doctrine by 1945. 

World War II served as a laboratory for the American airpower concepts 

developed since the First World War. In Europe, at least, the idea that Germany 

could be defeated through airpower alone proved fallacious. The American bombing 

23 Crane, 22-27. 

24 Lawrence Kuter, Harold George, Haywood Hansell and others who developed the AWPD-1 Plan 

had been instructors at the ACTS in the 1930s. See Budiansky, pp. 177-180.


offensive against German industries and strategic targets that began in 1943 ran into 

far more problems than anticipated. Under combat conditions, bombing accuracy 

was much worse than expected. The heavy bombers, although heavily armed and 

designed to defend themselves, proved much more vulnerable to German fighters 

than prewar theorists had expected and suffered unacceptably high losses. 25 German 

industry proved far more resilient and capable of absorbing heavy punishment than 

prewar airpower theorists had suspected. 

On the other hand, American strategic airpower, while not the war winning weapon 

Arnold and Spaatz hoped it would be, was still very successful and played a key role 

in the Allied victory. In 1944 and 1945, supported by long range escort fighters and 

equipped with better technological aids, the heavy bomber force began inflicting 

decisive damage on key German industries. Bombing Germany’s oil refineries 

trigged a fuel shortage that limited German operations on every front in 1944 and 

1945. The heavy bombing campaign against the German and French transportation 

nets crippled the German reinforcement and resupply of forces fighting the Allied 

landing in Normandy and made the Allied victory on that front certain. 26 

In the Pacific the reality of war operations again proved that many of the prewar 

concepts were flawed. Building and deploying and using the B-29 bomber in combat 

against Japan proved to be a much more difficult proposition than anyone had 

imagined. Precision bombing operations failed in Japan due to unforeseen problems 

with the plane, the weather, and the lack of decisive industrial targets. By the time the 

American bombers began their major offensive against Japan in early 1945 Japanese 

industry was already largely shut down due to the highly effective naval blockade 

by American submarines that had stopped Japan’s import of raw materials. Eager to 

employ airpower in a decisive fashion, General Curtis LeMay, the commander of 

the B-29 forces in the Pacific, turned to bombing Japan’s cities with incendiaries in 

massive attacks. 27 

American airpower had come full circle. The first B-29 raids on Japan had all 

aimed for precision targets, aircraft and armaments factories, and other military 

targets. When precision bombing had little effect on degrading the Japanese war 

capability the Army Air Forces turned to a straightforward Douhetian doctrine of 

targeting the civilian population in order to demoralize Japan’s national will to fight. 

Starting with a massive incendiary raid against Tokyo in March 1945, which burned 

over sixteen square miles of the city and killed an estimated 100,000-plus people, city 

after city was smashed by the American B-29s in incendiary attacks. The Japanese 

25 On US bomber losses over Germany see Crane, p. 50. 

26 On the development of U.S. Army Air Forces thinking during World War II see Robert F. Futrell, 

Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 2 Vols. (Maxwell AFB: 

Air University Press, 1989) Vol. 1. pp. 127-180. 

27 On the B-29 operations see Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. bombers Over Japan during 

World War II (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996).


air defenses were so weak that the Americans could even give the Japanese public 

a list of cities to be bombed without fear that the warnings would lead to bomber 

losses. Indeed, the American 20 th Air Force lost far more B-29 bombers to the rigors 

of long distance flying than to enemy action. 

The American city busting campaign culminated in the dropping of two atomic 

bombs on Japan in August 1945. The use of the atomic bomb immediately ended the 

war, but also symbolized the end of one era of airpower and the start of another. For 

the next twenty years the United States airpower thinking centered on how the United 

States might employ these devastating weapons in strategic and tactical attacks to 

paralyze and annihilate any major attack by the Soviet Union or its satellites. 

The World War had seen American airpower develop from a small air force to an 

enormous force organized into a large bomber force, tactical air forces, air defense 

forces and air transport forces. Airpower was American’s trump card. At sea, the 

aircraft carrier replaced the battleship as capitol ship of the navy. The World War 

proved that no navy could survive if its opponents controlled the air and the U.S. 

Navy developed its own large and capable air arm capable of controlling the sea, 

defeating enemy navies and attacking land targets. Like the Air Corps, the U.S. Navy 

developed its own concepts of airpower employment that proved largely successful 

in World War II. 28 Armies might still function in conditions of aerial inferiority, but 

a decisive advantage in airpower such as the Americans and British possessed in the 

skies over France in 1944 meant that an enemy such as the Germans were severely 

limited in their logistics, movement and operational flexibility. Essentially, no ground 

force could prevail against enemy air superiority. 

Postwar American Airpower and the Atomic Age 

While the newly independent U.S. Air Force retained cadre forces for all the major 

roles of airpower --ground attack, air defense, air transport and strategic bombing— 

it was strategic bombing that received the funding priority and attention of the 

leadership in the post World War II era of drawdown and demobilization. Armed with 

the atom bomb, the new Strategic Air Command (SAC), headed by General Curtis 

LeMay, became the primary American military force. 29 As the strategic bomber force 

grew into a true intercontinental bomber force and was equipped with fast jets in the 

early 1950s, a school of new theories of atomic warfare arose. From the late 1940s 

into the early 1960s strategic thinkers such as Bernard Brodie and Hermann Kahn 

28 On U.S. Navy airpower concepts see David Mets, “The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of 

American Naval Thought,” in Paths of Heaven, pp. 115-149. 

29 A good overview of this period is found in Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force (Washington 

DC: Air Force History and Museum Program, 1996).


developed theories of deterrence based on nuclear weapons. 30 

Faced with the need to deter a Soviet enemy that could threaten America’s 

European allies with overwhelming ground forces, the Americans found it cheaper 

and simpler to deter the Soviets by a superior airpower force that could guarantee 

massive nuclear destruction in the USSR in case of overt aggression. The nuclear 

deterrence theories assumed that the Soviets were highly rational actors who would 

carefully weigh the risk of openly attacking America or American allies and would 

back away from overt confrontation. It was a theory and doctrine, if cruel and 

ruthless in its implications, also worked to maintain peace and stability in Europe 

for decades. 

On the other hand, in the immediate postwar world the Americans paid little heed 

to how airpower might respond to a war carried out by a proxy power for limited 

aims in an area on the margin of American interests. Would America use nuclear 

weapons if core interests and values were not at stake? Would the emphasis on the 

strategic bomber force and lack of resources for its tactical air forces prove to be a 

strategic mistake? 

The Korean War initiated by the invasion of communist North Korea against a 

Western-aligned South Korea in June 1950 provoked American and international 

intervention to defend the South Koreans. American airpower based in Japan and 

Pacific bases was the first American response to the North Korean attack. Although 

the Americans and their allies had air superiority at the start of the war, the 

overwhelming airpower advantage failed to stop the relentless North Korean advance 

that carried the invader up to a small perimeter around Pusan. Finally, American and 

UN reinforcements, backed up by a massive application of available airpower, finally 

enabled the UN forces to hold the line. Aerial interdiction carried out in a manner no 

different from World War II helped cripple North Korean logistics and demoralize 

the communist ground forces, but airpower alone could not be decisive in this type 

of war. It was only the American amphibious landing at Inchon that turned the tide 

in Korea in 1950. 31 

30 Brodie and Kahn were prolific and influential; authors. The key works on nuclear war theory by 

Bernard Brodie are: Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New 

York: Harcourt, 1946); Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); 

From Cross-Bow to H-Bomb (New York: Dell, 1962); Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 1966). Herman Kahn wrote several important books on nuclear 

war theory to include: Thinking about the unthinkable (New York, Horizon Press, 1962); On thermonuclear 

War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). Kahn worked closely with the military 

developing special studies as a member of the Rand corporation. Some of Kahn’s Rand studies 

include Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense, 1958; and The Nature and Feasibility of War 

and Deterrence, 1960. 

31 An overview of the air war in Korea is found in Alan Stephens, “The Air War in Korea, 1950-1953” 

in A History of Air Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2010) pp. 

85-106.


Later that year, American airpower again played a key role in slowing the 

onslaught of the Chinese forces that had intervened in the war. However, although 

airpower could severely hurt the enemy, it could not prevent the Chinese forces from 

holding a defensive line across the peninsula and stalemating the conflict from 1951 

until an armistice was negotiated in 1953. The American military found the Korean 

War to be an exceptionally frustrating experience. Although the Communist nations 

had been foiled in their attempt to overrun South Korea, the readiness of Communist 

China and North Korea to lose vast numbers of soldiers, and the relative lack of 

strategic nodes and targets in North Korea, meant that American airpower could not 

have the kinds of effects it had demonstrated in world War II. 32 

While Korea was a new type of limited war that was played out on the margins 

of the American national interest, the extensive use of airpower in that conflict 

resulted in few new doctrines for American airpower. The indecisive nature of the 

war convinced American airmen to avoid limited wars if at all possible. So during 

the 1950s and early 1960s American airpower thought concentrated on the issue 

of nuclear warfare. The initial delivery method of nuclear weapons was the heavy 

bomber. With the invention of the hydrogen bomb in the early 1950s a single bomber 

could carry more firepower than was deployed by all the armed forces of World 

War II. It was not just an issue of destruction and heavy casualties— such firepower 

threatened the very existence of civilization. By 1954 the situation became more 

interesting when America fielded its first tactical nuclear weapons. These bombs, 

ranging in effect from a few kilotons to 100 kilotons, weighed less than one ton and 

could easily be carried by a jet fighter bomber. Such small weapons meant that naval 

aircraft could also be nuclear capable. The army developed artillery pieces that fired 

small nuclear rounds. Soon the army, Navy and Air Force all began development 

of a host of missile systems ranging from small tactical cruise missiles to huge 

intercontinental missiles that could be based in America and send huge warheads 

onto targets deep in the Soviet Union within an hour of launch. The sheer variety of 

nuclear weapons made available in the 1950s changed military thinking to accept the 

idea that a nation might fight a largely conventional war with small nuclear weapons 

in support, or employ small nuclear weapons as a signal to an aggressor nation as a 

means of stopping an invasion before total nuclear war was initiated. 33 

Vietnam and the Era of Limited War 

By the late 1950s American strategic and military thinkers realized that an approach 

to war that emphasized the nuclear holocaust option did not answer the likely threat 

of small, limited wars initiated outside of Europe by allied or client states of the 

32 

On the U.S. Air Force response to the Korean War and the issue of limited war see Futrell, Vol. 1. 

pp. 273-352. 

33 

For a discussion of U.S. Air Force thinking in this era and the debate about flexible response see 

Futrell, Volume 2, pp. 39-64.


communist powers. An Air Force study headed by Bernard Brodie concluded that the 

traditional strategy of striking at the enemy’s “sources of national power” might not 

be applicable in a limited conflict. US Air Force General Weyland, head of the Air 

Force’s Tactical Air Command, remarked that “we must have adequate tactical air 

forces in being that are capable of serving as a deterrent to the brush-fire kind of war, 

just as SAC (Strategic Air Command) is the main deterrent to global war.” 34 

By the early 1960s the doctrine of “flexible response” became the American war 

doctrine and strategy. The United States was to have a variety of options to deal with 

threats from total nuclear war to the limited “Korea-type” wars. General Maxwell 

Taylor, special military advisor to President Kennedy and later chairmen of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff noted in 1962. .. “Mindful of the awful dangers of atomic warfare, 

we require a military policy which takes it primary purpose the deterrence of that 

disaster. At the same time, … it must giver due recognition to the need to cope with 

many situations short of general war—particularly para-war.” 35 

Beginning in the Kennedy presidency, American conventional military forces 

were again built up as the confrontations between the Western and communist nations 

began to heat up—especially in Southeast Asia. The doctrine of flexible response 

would soon be tested in the conflict in Vietnam. 

When the question of how America ought to respond to North Vietnam’s support 

of the insurgent movement in South Vietnam arose the Kennedy and Johnson 

administrations looked to air power as a means of decisively defeating the North 

Vietnamese. Curtis LeMay, the famous bomber commander of World War II, was 

chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force in the early 1960s and directed his staff to develop 

an airpower solution to stopping the North Vietnamese. The Air Force developed a 

list of 94 strategic targets whose destruction would cripple North Vietnam’s armed 

forces and military capability. The 94 targets included transportation, industry, 

command centers, and fuel storage. LeMay and the Air Force believed that the 

destruction of all these targets in a quick, sharp campaign would quickly force North 

Vietnam to sue for peace. 36 

Academic theorists working for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 

notably Walt Rostow and Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, favored the 

use of airpower against North Vietnam and the bombing of the 94 targets advocated 

by the Air Force. But Rostow and Bundy also advocated a strategy of using bombing 

as a means of sending signals to the North Vietnamese. The destruction of the target 

list would be gradual and would escalate in violence until the North Vietnamese gave 

in to a negotiated settlement. 37 

34 Cited in Budiansky, pp. 374-375. 

35 Cited in Futrell, Vol. 2, p. 40. 

36 Budiansky, pp. 378-379. 

37 Donald Milne, Our Equivalent of Guerrilla Warfare: Walt Rostow and the Bombing of North Vietnam, 

1961-1968, “Journal of Military History” Vol. 71/1. January 2007, pp. 169-203. See 183.


In 1965 and 1966 the Americans embarked on a major bombing campaign of 

North Vietnam that generally followed the Rostow/Bundy strategy. At the same time, 

large American ground combat forces were sent to South Vietnam. The air campaign 

against North Vietnam that was expected to have quick and decisive effects failed 

to cripple the North Vietnamese military capabilities. 38 However, North Vietnamese 

forces fighting in a low-level war in the south required relatively little in the way 

of logistics. Even a massive interdiction campaign by the U.S. could not stop the 

flow of supplies from North Vietnam to the south. By 1966 the “Rolling Thunder” 

bombing campaign had knocked out 60% of North Vietnam’s oil storage facilities. 

Yet the North Vietnamese quickly adapted their logistics system and dispersed fuel 

throughout the country in 55 gallon drums. Attacks that would have crippled a highly 

industrialized economy or mechanized armed forces had little effect against a low 

tech country and military. 39 

The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy carried on an intermittent strategic bombing 

campaign against North Vietnam and an interdiction campaign against the supply 

routes along the Ho Chi Minh trail from 1965 until 1973 when the U.S. forces left South 

Vietnam. In many respects, the Vietnam war was an important learning experience 

for the American airpower. The US military employed many new technologies in 

the Vietnam War. Remote electronic sensors were deployed to collect targeting data 

along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Many new aircraft were tested in combat. Laser-guided 

precision bombs saw their debut in bombing North Vietnam. The US Air Force also 

had to contend with highly sophisticated and extensive air defense systems in the 

skies over North Vietnam—and the aircraft losses throughout the whole of the war 

were heavy. Even though American airpower could claim significant tactical victories 

and accomplishments, as in Korea, the war for the Americans ended in a negotiated 

truce and not in anything resembling victory. This allowed for American withdrawal 

and final North Vietnamese victory over South Vietnam two years later. 40 

From the Cold War to Desert Storm 

After the very disappointing experience of Vietnam the U.S. military turned its 

attention to the more serious and immediate question of how to face the vast Soviet 

and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in case of an open confrontation between East 

and West on a European battlefield. In the case of the Cold War turning hot, the United 

States could not count on numerical superiority, or even fighting with air superiority. 

38 A good overview of the U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam is found in Mark Clodfelter, 

The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 

1989). 

39 Budiansky, pp. 382-383. 

40 See Kenneth Werrell, Chasing the Silver Bullet: U.S. Air Force Weapons Development from Vietnam 

to Desert Storm (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2003) On US aircraft in Vietnam see pp. 9-35; on 

USAF munitions and sensors in Vietnam see pp. 36-54.


In such a conflict, the U.S. Air Force would likely have to carry out its missions in 

the face of highly sophisticated enemy air and fighter defenses. Despite the massive 

size of the Soviet forces, the Americans still maintained a strong technological lead. 

From the middle of the 1970s until the end of the Cold War the American concept of 

future air war centered on the idea of leveraging better technology to defeat a strong 

enemy air defense, strike deep behind enemy lines, and use the precision capabilities 

steadily developed since World War II to create maximum effects with an economy 

of force. 

In taking this approach the Americans developed and fielded a superb array 

of modern aircraft and weapons. In order to penetrate enemy air defenses stealth 

technology was perfected in the F-117 attack aircraft which could not only penetrate 

a modern air defense system, but could put several tons of bombs on the target with 

exceptional accuracy. Laser range finders that enabled bombs to be guided by the pilot 

in flight meant that modern aircraft could easily deliver heavy bombs to within feet 

of the target point. Space satellites gave the American airmen exceptionally precise 

information on enemy defenses and targets, while modern digital communications 

enabled intelligence to be transmitted almost instantaneously to the pilot in the 

cockpit. Put together, all of these developments in information, munitions, and 

aircraft capability amounted to a new doctrine of employing airpower. Because the 

costs of the new technologies were so high, and the ability to integrate all these new 

technologies into effective systems so difficult, it was a uniquely American approach 

to aerial warfare. Only the United States could afford to field such systems and to 

train people to use them in concert. 41 

The most significant US airpower thinker of the 1980s and 1990s was an Air 

Force Colonel and Vietnam veteran John Warden. Warden believed that air power 

was the decisive element in modern war and argued that the Air Force should think in 

terms of an independent air campaign. Viewing a likely enemy as a system, Warden 

argued that one should think of the enemy in terms of rings—with the priority of 

targeting to the “inner” and more important rings of leadership and key infrastructure 

with fielded forces being on the outer and lower priority rings. Warden argued that 

by hitting key targets one could paralyze the enemy system and make it incapable of 

effective battle without a long campaign of attrition against the fielded forces. 42 

The United States never fought its Cold War enemies, but the technology, skills 

and doctrines for war developed for Cold War enemies proved to be an excellent 

preparation to fight the conventional conflicts of the 1990s. In the Gulf War of 1991 

41 On the development of the USAF technology after the Vietnam War see Werrell, pp. 55-220. See 

also Benjamin Lambeth, The Transformation of American Airpower (Ithaca: Cornell University 

Press, 2000). 

42 Warden’s key concepts are expressed in: John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat 

(Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988); “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower 

Journal 9, Spring 1995, pp. 40-55.


American and Coalition airpower, which was overwhelmingly American airpower 

when counting sorties and bombs dropped, demonstrated what modern air forces 

armed with stealth, precision, and superior C2 could do against even a well-equipped 

enemy. In a six week air campaign that preceded the Coalition ground assault, the 

Iraqi air defense were first taken down, then key leadership and command and control 

targets were destroyed. Finally, the elite units of the Iraqi army were systematically 

targeted and heavily attritted. By the end of the air campaign, the Iraqi forces were 

demoralized they had lost much of the fighting power. When finally unleashed, the 

ground forces needed only four days to overwhelm the huge Iraqi army. 43 

Warden’s ideas and the group of airpower planners he led in the Pentagon had 

great influence over the air war plan in 1991. Many can rightly argue that the key 

concepts expressed by Warden are very close to the traditions of the Air Corps Tactical 

School. 44 The question was whether the airpower success in Iraq in 1991 signified 

a true revolution in military affairs in which airpower now plays the key role in applying 

military force, or the product of a set of unusually favorable circumstances. 

The NATO air campaign against Kosovo in the 1999 was an instance of defeating 

a nation using air power alone. But the victory came only after a frustrating 78day 

campaign and the goals of the campaign were very limited, Serbian withdrawal 

from the Province of Kosovo. In fact, the 1999 campaign demonstrated many flaws 

in the NATO and American application of airpower. As a coalition operation there 

were serious difficulties in developing a united strategy. Partner air forces found it 

difficult to operate alongside the Americans because other NATO nations had not 

invested in precision munitions or modern C2 systems. In the biggest air campaign 

since the Gulf War, it was still not clear that a true revolution had occurred. 45 Still, 

the most impressive feature of the campaign was the American capability to strike 

targets precisely. 

In 2001 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy proved 

exceptionally capable in fighting against conventional enemies with little or no airpower. 

With huge technological advantages American airpower managed to cripple 

and destroy whole Iraqi divisions before they even reached the front. 46 Moreover, 

they did so with such precise effects that civilian casualties and damage to the civilian 

infrastructure was minimal. 

At the dawn of the 21st Century the U.S. Air Force and Navy have such a techno- 

43 

The best critical history of the Air War of 1991 is Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen, Revolution in 

Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993). 

44 

See David Mets, The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists (Maxwell 

AFB: Air University Press, 1999). 

45 

An excellent critical analysis of this campaign is Tony Mason, Operation Allied Force, 1999 in A 

History of Air Warfare, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2010) pp. 225- 

252. 

46 

See Williamson Murray, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 in A History of Air Warfare, pp. 279-296.


logical superiority and well-trained force, that the dream of winning a conventional 

state on state war with airpower in the lead role has become a reality. It is a doctrine 

for war that requires such complex and expensive technology that only the United 

States can realistically apply this doctrine. Yet, in the ongoing counterinsurgency 

campaigns in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq since 2003, the technological advantage 

does not play the same central role as it might in conventional war. Current 

conflicts against non state forces offer no strategic target set or industrial nodes 

whose destruction will cripple the enemy forces. If unconventional wars are the norm 

for the coming decades, American airmen will have a frustrating future.

National Experiences - British Commission for Military History

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